UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


SCHOOL  OF  LAW 
LIBRARY 


LIBRARY  OF 

W.  A.  ALDERSON 
LOS  ANGELES 


CODE    EEMEDIES 


CODE   REMEDIES: 

REMEDIES  AND  REMEDIAL  RIGHTS 

BY  THE  CIVIL  ACTION 


ACCORDING    TO 


THE  REFORMED   AMERICAN  PROCEDURE 


A  TREATISE  ADAPTED  TO  USE  IN  ALL  THE   STATES   AND   TERRITORIES 
WHERE  THAT  SYSTEM  PREVAILS 


BY 

JOHN   NORTON   POMEROY,  LL.D. 

AUTHOR    OF    "  A    TREATISE    ON    EQUITY    JURISPRUDENCE,"    ETC. 

JTourtf)  lEtiition 

EEVISED     AND     ENLARGED 


THOMAS   A.   BOGLE 

PROFESSOR    OF    LAW   IN    THE  UNIVERSITY    OF    MICHIGAN 


BOSTON 

LITTLE,  BROWN,  AND   COMPANY 

1904 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  years  1876.  1883, 

By  John  Xohton  Pomeroy, 

Id  the  Office  ol  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Paltered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  j'ear  1893, 

By  Annie  R.  Pomeroy, 

Id  ihe  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


Copyright,  1904, 
Bt  Little,  Brown,  and  Company. 


y)rintriB 

.*<.  J.   rAKBIHLL  A   Co..   noSTON.  V.    S. 


TO 

AARON   J.   VANDERPOEL,   Esq., 

OF   THE    NEW   YORK    BAR, 

THIS   BOOK   IS  INSCRIBED  ALIKE  AS   A   TRIBUTE   TO   HIS   HIGH   PROFESSIONAIi 

CHARACTER,    AND   AS   AN    EXPRESSION    OF   THE   AUTHOR'S 

PERSONAL    REGARD. 


PREFACE  TO  THE  FOURTH  EDITION. 


The  last  edition  of  this  work  was  published  in  1894.  Since 
that  time  so  many  decisions  upon  important  questions  of  Code 
Pleading  have  been  reported  that  another  edition  has  become 
necessary.  To  collect,  cite,  and  classify  these  decisions  with 
reference  to  the  topics  discussed  in  the  text,  and  thus  place  them 
at  the  convenient  disposal  of  members  of  the  legal  profession, 
as  well  as  students  of  the  law,  has  been  the  main  purpose  of  the 
present  editor.  This  required  a  large  amount  of  space,  but  as 
the  original  text  included  considerable  matter  that  was  theoreti- 
cal rather  than  of  present  practical  value,  as  well  as  extended 
quotations  that  properly  belonged  in  the  notes,  it  has  been  possi- 
ble to  do  much  in  the  way  of  omission  and  condensation.  At 
the  same  time  everything  essential  to  the  subject  has  been  in- 
cluded, and  it  is  believed  that  the  text  as  so  amended  presents  a 
more  concise  and  systematic  view  than  in  its  original  form. 

In  some  cases  the  text  has  been  re-written,  such  altered  por- 
tions being  indicated  by  brackets,  and  in  a  few  instances  verbal 
changes  have  been  made  without  being  indicated.  The  para- 
graphs of  the  text  have  been  supplied  with  appropriate  black- 
letter  headings.  Many  of  the  notes  of  the  author  and  of  the 
previous  editor  have  been  condensed,  but  the  cases  have  all  been 
retained.  Nearly  three  hundred  pages  of  new  matter  have  been 
added,  while  the  new  cases  cited  number  over  four  thousand, 
with  dates  and  references  to  both  the  official  Reports  and  the 


X  PREFACE    TO    THE    FOURTH    EDITION. 

National  Reporter  system.  New  topics  have  been  treated  in  the 
notes,  with  suitable  italic  or  black-letter  headings,  and  in  all  cases 
the  new  notes,  as  well  lus  the  new  portions  of  the  text,  have  been 
distinguished  by  brackets. 

The  statutory  references  and  citations  have  been  fully  revised, 
the  references  now  being  made  to  the  latest  revisions  of  the 
statutes.  These  notes  on  the  statutory  provisions  are  believed 
to  present  the  most  complete  view  of  the  details  of  the  various 
Code^  now  conveniently  available  to  the  profession  in  a  work  of 
tliis  kind,  and  it  is  hoped  they  will  prove  useful  in  determining 
the  vidue  of  cases  decided  in  the  different  States,  The  Table  of 
Contents  has  been  wholly  re-written,  and  made  more  complete, 
while  the  Index  and  the  Table  of  Cases  have  also  been  recon- 
structed. The  paragraphs  of  the  text  as  they  now  stand  have 
been  numbered  consecutively,  but  the  original  numbers  have 
been  retained,  and  distinguished  by  stars. 

(iranted  that  Professor  Pomeroy's  criticisms  of  Common  Law 
Pleading  were  not  always  just,  his  eulogies  of  the  "  Reformed 
System ''  not  always  deserved,  and  that  he  was  too  much  given 
to  tlieoretical  discussion  of  practical  subjects,  still  it  may  justly 
be  said  that  as  a  writer  upon  the  Code  he  stands  without  a  rival. 

Tiie  facts  make  it  my  duty  to  acknowledge  here  my  deep 
obligation  to  Kdson  R.  Sunderland,  assistant  professor  of  law  in 
the  University  of  Michigan,  for  most  valuable  assistance  rendered 
me  throughout  the  preparation  of  this  edition. 

THOMAS   A.    BOGLE. 


Ukivkksity  ok  Michigan, 

Ann   AitiK.K,  .Fulv  *J7.  1004. 


PREFACE    TO    THE    SECOND   EDITION. 


A  SECOND  EDITION  of  this  work  has  for  some  time  been 
needed,  and  the  delay  in  preparing  it  must  be  attributed  to  an 
overwhelming  pressure  of  other  engagements.  In  now  present- 
ing it  to  the  profession,  I  desire  to  express  my  sincere  thanks  for 
the  favor  with  which  the  book  has  been  received  by  the  Bar  and 
the  Bench.  The  work,  when  originally  published,  was  to  some 
extent  an  experiment.  It  was,  I  believe,  the  first  attempt  pro- 
fessedly to  treat  of  those  features  which  are  common  to  all  the  codes 
of  procedure,  and  which  constitute  the  essential  elements  of  the 
new  system.  In  it  I  ventured  to  call  that  system  the  "Reformed 
American  Sj^stem  of  Procedure,"  and  was  gratified  to  know  that 
the  name  was  accepted  by  one  of  its  principal  authors  as  distinc- 
tive and  appropriate.  The  abbreviated  title  by  which  my  book 
is  commonly  known,  —  "  Remedies,"  —  and  which  it  is  now  too 
late  to  change,  is  in  some  respects  misleading ;  for  it  fails  to  in- 
dicate the  real  subject-matter  and  purpose  of  the  work.  In  the 
full  title  given  to  it,  the  words  "  by  the  civil  action  "  were  meant 
to  be  the  most  emphatic  and  important.  The  work  is  intended 
to  be  both  a  scientific  and  a  practical  treatise  of  the  fundamental 
principles  and  essential  elements  of  the  "  Civil  Action,"  as  the 
instrument  for  administering  justice  established  by  the  Reformed 
Procedure  in  all  the  Code  States  of  our  own  country,  and  in  Eng- 
land, and  in  many  of  the  British  colonies.     Whatever  varieties  of 


Xn  rREFACE   TO   THE   SECOND    EDITION. 

detail  in  matters  of  mere  practice  may  be  found  in  the  different 
State  codes,  these  principles  and  elements  are  fundamental  and 
essential,  and  are  inherent  in  the  Reformed  Procedure  wherever 
it  prevails,  whether  in  the  United  States  or  in  Great  Britain. 
They  are  the  union  of  legal  and  equitable  rights  of  action  and 
remedies  in  the  same  civil  action,  resulting  from  the  abolition  of 
the  distinction  between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  and 
of  the  forms  of  legal  actions ;  the  equitable  instead  of  the  legal 
theory  of  parties  ;  the  general  principles  of  pleading,  including 
the  union  of  causes  of  action  in  the  same  complaint  or  petition ; 
the  mode  of  stating  causes  of  action;  the  answer  of  "denial," 
and  what  defences  may  be  proved  under  it;  the  answer  of  "  new 
matter,"'  and  what  defences  it  embraces,  and  equitable  defences ; 
the  counter-claim,  including  all  affirmative  relief,  legal  or  equita- 
ble, to  the  defendant :  the  final  reliefs,  or  judgments.  In  adjudi- 
cating upon  these  most  important  matters,  the  courts  of  the  vari- 
ous Code  States  have,  with  a  remarkable  unanimity,  substantially 
reached  the  same  conclusions.  At  the  inauguration  of  the  new 
system,  it  is  not  surprising  that  there  should  have  been  some 
discrepancy  of  judicial  opinion  ;  but  every  year  has  shown  a 
stronger  tendency  towards  a  complete  agreement,  so  that  the 
unity  of  the  system  throughout  the  Code  States  is  now  virtually 
established.  It  would  be  a  source  of  the  highest  gratification  if 
I  might  believe  that  my  own  book  had  contributed  anything  to 
the  attainment  of  this  result.  These  are  the  subjects  with  which 
it  deals ;  and  by  citing  and  comparing  the  corresponding  sections 
of  the  codes,  as  well  as  the  decisions  interpreting  them,  in  differ- 
er»t  Stetes,  it  endeavors  to  present  all  that  is  essential  to  the 
reformed  procedure,  as  one  complete  whole,  and  as  both  scien- 
tifically and  practically  superior  to  the  common-law  methods 
which  it  has  displaced. 

In  preparing  tliis  edition,  I  have  not  thought  it  expedient  to 
alter  in  any  substiintial  manner  the  original  text ;  a  few  mistakes 
and  omibsions  have  been  corrected,  but  the  text  stands  virtually 


PREFACE   TO   THE   SECOND   EDITION.  xiii 

unchanged.  I  have  seen  no  sufficient  reason  to  modify  any  of 
its  theoretical  conclusions,  and  several  of  its  practical  conclusions 
have  been  sustained  by  the  courts ;  none,  so  far  as  I  am  aware, 
have  been  distinctly  condemned.  The  new  matter  is,  therefore, 
chiefly  confined  to  the  notes  ;  and  it  brings  the  discussions  of  the 
text,  as  illustrated  by  judicial  opinion,  down  to  the  present  day. 
The  important  decisions  in  each  of  the  Code  States  and  Territo- 
ries, made  since  the  publication  of  the  first  edition,  have  been 
collected  and  arranged  in  the  notes  in  connection  with  the  doc- 
trines and  rules  to  which  they  relate.  Some  cases  may  have 
been  overlooked,  but  I  believe  the  additions  will  enable  the 
reader  to  discover  the  present  condition  of  the  law  and  of  judi- 
cial authority  upon  all  the  important  topics  discussed  in  the  text. 
A  new  and  much  fuller  Index  has  also  been  added.  I  had  re- 
ceived complaints  from  several  sources  that  the  Index  of  the  first 
edition  was  too  meagre  for  the  wants  of  the  practising  lawyer ; 
I  trust  it  will  be  found  that  this  defect  has  been  cured.  All 
other  substantial  additions,  and  new  materials  or  modes  of  treat- 
ment, are  reserved  for  the  supplemental  work  on  the  Civil  Action, 
by  which  I  still  hope  to  complete  my  original  design. 

The  Reformed  Procedure  is  no  longer  an  experiment.  It  is 
certain  to  become  universal  wherever  the  common  law  and  equity 
jurisprudence  is  found.  The  fact  that  it  was  accepted,  in  all  of 
its  essentials,  by  the  ablest  judges,  lawyers,  and  statesmen  of 
England,  shows  that  it  rests  upon  a  scientific  as  well  as  practical 
basis.  It  has  been  adopted,  since  the  publication  of  this  work, 
by  two  additional  American  States,  Colorado  and  Connecticut; 
its  adoption  in  substance  by  all  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  mere  ques- 
tion of  time.  There  is,  however,  one  grave  defect  in  the  legis- 
lation of  all  our  American  commonwealths,  —  with  the  single 
exception  of  Connecticut,  —  to  which  I  would  earnestly  call  the 
attention  of  all  judges  and  lawyers  who  are  interested  in  the  im- 
provement of  the  law :  a  defect  which  is  the  immediate  cause  of 
nearly  all  the  uncertainties,  discrepancies,  and  conflicts  of  judicial 


II V  PREFACE   TO   THE   SECOND    EDITION. 

opinion   that   have  arisen   under  the  system.      By  the  union  of 
legal  and  equitable  rights  and  remedies  in  the  single  civil  action, 
courtii  were    necessarily  confronted  with   the  direct  opposition 
between  many  doctrines  and  rules  of  the  common  law  and  of 
equity,  applicable  to  exactly  the  same  condition  of  facts ;  and 
the  question  at  once  arose,  How  is  this  opposition  to  be  dealt 
with  in  the  practical  administration  of  justice  ?     Every  lawyer 
who  has  carefully  considered  this  matter,  and  especially  every 
lawyer  who  has  examined  the  course  of  judicial  decision  through 
all  the  Code  States,  will  agree  with  me  that  this  conflict  between 
equitable  and  legal  rules  concerning  the  same  state  of  facts  has 
been  the  source  of  all  the  real  difficulty  in  interpreting  and  set- 
tling the  Reformed  Procedure.     Some  courts  have  evaded  the 
difficulty  by  retaining  the  distinctions  between  legal  and  equita- 
ble actions,  and  legal  and  equitable  remedies,  practically  as  broad 
and  well  defined  as  under  the  former  system  ;  but  this  method 
jtlainly  violates  both  the  spirit  and  the  letter  of  the  codes.     The 
whole  difficulty  and  its  cause  might  be  removed  by  a  brief  addi- 
tion to  the  codes,  which  would  cany  out  to  its  final  results  the 
clear  intent  of  the  reform.     The  same  difficulty  presented  itself 
to  the  advocates  of  the  new  procedure  in  England  while  the 
measure  was  pending  in  Parliament ;  it  was  obviated  by  insert-* 
ing  in  the  "  Supreme   Court  of  Judicature  Act "  the  following 
clause :  "  Generally  in  all  matters  in  which  there  is  any  conflict 
or  variance  between  the  rules  of  eciuity  and  the  rules  of  the  com- 
mon law,  witjj  reference  to  the  same  matter,  the  rules  of  equity 
shall  pnvaiiy     The  State  of  Connecticut  has  incorporated  the 
clause  into  it,s  recent  reformatory  legislation.     If  the  provision, 
or  one  substantially  the  same,  were  added  to  all  the  codes,  the 
union  of  legal  and  equitable  remedies  would   be  made  perfect, 
and  the   Keformed    Procedure   would    l)e    freed    from  the    only 
practical    difficulty    which    it    has   encountered ;    until   such  an 
amendment  is  cfTected,  it  must    remain   somewhat  crippled   in 
iU  oi^erations,  and  imperfect  in  its  results. 


PREFACE   TO    THE    SECOND   EDITION.  XV 

In  conclusion,  I  desire  to  acknowledge  the  aid  which  I  have 
received,  in  preparing  this  edition,  from  my  former  students, 
Mr.  Charles  W.  Slack  and  Mr.  Marcellus  A.  Dorn,  members  of 
the  San  Francisco   Bar. 

JOHN   NORTON   POME  ROY. 

San  Francisco,  Feb.  17,  1S83. 
Hastings  College  of  the  Law:   University  of  California. 


PREFACE    TO   THE    FIRST   EDITION. 


The  new  procedure  which  was  devised  by  the  codifiers  and 
inaugurated  by  the  Legislature  of  New  York,  in  the  year  1848, 
now  prevails  in  more  than  twenty  other  States  and  Territories  of 
this  country,  and  may,  therefore,  be  properly  termed  "  The  Re- 
formed American  System  of  Procedure."  After  a  most  careful 
consideration,  and  the  most  cautious  and  deliberate  examination 
by  a  commission  composed  of  the  ablest  judges  and  barristers,  it 
has  finally  been  accepted  in  its  essential  features  and  elements  by 
the  British  Parliament,  and  has  recently  displaced  the  time-hon- 
ored methods  of  the  common-law. and  the  equity  courts  in  Eng- 
land. This  fact  alone  may  be  regarded  as  decisive  of  its  intrinsic 
excellence,  as  conclusively  demonstrating  that  it  is  founded  upon 
natural  and  true  principles  ;  that  it  embodies  rational  notions  in 
respect  to  the  manner  of  conducting  judicial  controversies  be- 
tween private  litigants  ;  and  that,  in  its  conception  and  design, 
it  is  far  superior  to  the  artificial,  technical,  and  arbitrary  modes 
which  had  so  long  been  looked  upon  as  perfect  by  generations 
of  English  and  American  lawyers.  It  is  shown  in  the  Intro- 
ductory Chapter  of  the  present  work  that  this  whole  course  of 
reform  is  but  a  repetition,  not  simply  in  a  general  outline,  but 
even  in  the  minute  details,  of  what  took  place  in  the  jurispru- 
dence of  Rome ;  so  that  the  modern  legislation  has,  in  this  re- 
spect, merely   followed   an   inevitable   law   of  progress,   which 


xviii  PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST  EDITION. 

always  works  out  the  same  results  under  the  same  social  con- 
ditions and  circumstances. 

Althousrh  the  codes  which  have  been  enacted  in  the  various 
States  and  Territories  sometimes  differ  slightly  from  each  other 
in  respect  to  the  minor  measures  and  steps  of  practice,  and  al- 
though some  of  them,  in  reference  to  certain  special  matters,  have 
more  freely  carried  out  the  original  and  underlying  theory  to  its 
logical  results,  and  have  by  distinct  provisions  expressly  abro- 
gated particular  dogmas  of  the  old  law,  which  in  other  States 
are  only  included  in  the  general  language  of  the  statute,  and  are 
thus  left  within  the  domain  of  judicial  construction,  yet  in  all  its 
essential  notions  and  fundamental  doctrines  the  reformed  pro- 
cedure is  one  and  the  same  wherever  it  prevails,  either  in  the 
United  States  or  in  England.  The  "  Civil  Action  "  which  it  has 
created  and  introduced  as  the  single  and  sufficient  instrument 
for  the  trial  of  all  judicial  controversies  between  private  suitors 
and  for  the  pursuit  of  all  judicial  remedies  is  the  same  in  concep- 
tion, in  form,  and  in  substance,  possessing  the  same  characteristic 
features,  governed  by  the  same  elementary  rules,  and  embodying 
the  same  organic  principles.  How  completely  the  reformed  sys- 
tem is  severed  from  the  ancient  common-law  modes,  how  entirely 
it  abandons  all  the  arbitrary,  formal,  and  technical  notions  which 
were  their  very  essence  and  life,  and  how  firmly  it  rests  upon 
natural  and  necessary  facts  as  its  foundations,  is  shown  in  the 
Introductory  Chapter  and  in  other  portions  of  this  work.  It  is 
imjtossible,  therefore,  that  its  full  benefits  can  be  attained,  and 
that  full  scope  can  be  given  to  its  original  purpose,  until  the 
courts  and  the  profession  shall  accept  it  in  its  simplicity,  and 
shall  cease  to  obstruct  its  efficient  operation  and  to  interrupt  its 
free  movements  by  antiquated  dogmas  and  rejected  doctrines 
drawn  from  the  system  which  it  has  thoroughly  overthrown  and 
bupplanled. 

The  design  of  the  author  is  to  present  the  entire  remedial 
defiartment  <jf  the   law  —  the   remedies  and   remedial   rights  — 


PREFACE   TO   THE   FIRST   EDITION.  Xi  . 

according  to  the  reformed  procedure.  The  volume  now  sub- 
mitted to  the  profession,  although  in  itself  a  complete  and  inde- 
pendent work,  accomplishes' a  part  of  this  full  purpose.  It  treats 
of  the  "  Civil  Action,"  which  is  the  central  fact  of  the  new  pro- 
cedure, and  which,  as  has  been  said,  is  everywhere  the  same  in 
all  its  distinctive  features  and  elements.  It  is  not  a  treatise  upon 
"  Practice  ; "  but  it  discusses  in  a  thoroughly  practical  manner 
those  features  and  elements  which  constitute  the  Civil  Action, 
and  which  differentiate  that  judicial  proceeding  from  the  action 
at  law  and  the  suit  in  equity.  The  discussions  and  conclusions 
which  it  contains  are  not  theoretical ;  they  are  everywhere  and 
always  based  upon  an  exhaustive  examination,  analysis,  and  com- 
parison of  the  decided  cases :  and  the  author  has  freely  drawn 
upon  the  judicial  decisions  of  the  States,  and  by  this  means 
presents  to  the  reader  a  body  of  authority  which  fully  indicates 
the  action  of  the  courts  and  their  theories  and  modes  of  interpre- 
tation throughout  the  commonwealths  in  which  the  system  pre- 
vails. Although  it  cannot  be  pretended  that  every  case  referring 
to  the  Civil  Action  has  been  cited,  —  in  fact,  many  of  them  are 
unworthy  of  citation,  since  they  are  the  reflections  of  crude  and 
incorrect  opinions  long  since  rejected,  while  others  are  the  mere 
repetitions  of  points  already  well  settled,  —  yet  it  is  believed 
that  none  are  omitted  which  contain  the  statement  of  a  new  and 
correct  principle.  The  author  has  endeavored  to  collect  all  the 
leading  cases  in  every  State,  —  all  those  which  have  been  finally 
accepted  as  authoritative,  and  which  represent  the  mature 
thought  and  convictions  of  the  judiciary ;  and  in  no  other  work 
can  be  found  such  a  mass  of  judicial  opinion  gathered  from 
courts  of  the  various  States,  giving  a  construction  to  the  statu- 
tory provisions  which  describe  the  Civil  Action,  and  building 
up  an  harmonious  and  consistent  system  of  procedure  upon  the 
reform  legislation.  While  the  author  has  everywhere  endeav- 
ored to  reach  the  true  principles  of  interpretation,  and  to  extract 
from  the  cases  a  statement  of  universal  doctrines  which  shall 


XX  PKEFACL    TO    THE    FlliST    EDITION. 

aid  in  the  solution  of  all  future  questions,  and  has  not  scrupled 
to  express  his  own  views  and  opinions,  such  speculations  and 
arguments  are  always  plainly  indicated  and  represented  in  their 
real  character,  so  that  the  reader  need  never  confound  them  with 
the  results  of  actual  judicial  decision,  and  be  thus  led  to  accept 
as  settled  law  what  is  only  a  personal  conviction  or  suggestion  of 
the  author. 

While  the  work  is  thus  intended  to  be  a  practical  handbook 
for  the  lawyer,  as  an  aid  in  the  every-day  duties  of  his  profession, 
it  is  hoped  that  its  use  may  tend  to  bring  the  procedures  of  the 
different  States  into  closer  relations,  and  may  finally  produce 
the  perfect  identity  of  method  and  form  which  is  possible  from 
the  legislation  itself,  and  which  was,  beyond  doubt,  the  design 
of  the  several  legislatures  in  adopting  the  reform.  Such  an  iden- 
tity is  entirely  practicable,  and  the  full  beneficial  results  of  the 
change  will  not  be  attained  until  it  is  reached.  In  every  State 
there  has  accumulated  a  growing  amount  of  judicial  interpreta- 
tion which  would  be  of  the  greatest  assistance  to  the  Bench  and 
Bar  of  all  the  other  States ;  and  in  several  of  them  certain  spe- 
cial rules  and  methods  have  been  wrought  out  and  finally  estab- 
lished, which  need  only  to  be  known  in  order  to  be  universally 
followed.  Such  a  reform,  founded  on  the  nature  of  things,  and 
not  upon  artificial  and  arbitrary  assumptions,  never  goes  back- 
ward :  and  the  time  will  surely  come  when  the  system  that 
has  already  spread  so  widely  will  be  introduced  into  every  com- 
monwealth, and  when  the  distinction  between  legal  and  equita- 
ble modes  of  pursuing  remedies  will  disappear,  and  finally  be 
forgotten. 

The  central  conception  of  the  reformed  procedure,  and  the  one 
from  which  all  the  elements  of  the  Civil  Action  are  developed,  is 
the  abolition  of  the  distinction  between  legal  and  equitable  suits, 
and  the  substitution  of  one  judicial  instrument,  by  which  both 
legal  and  equitable  remedies  may  be  obtained,  either  singly  or  in 
combination.     The  full  scope  and  effect  of  this  grand  principle 


PREFACE   TO   THE    FIRST    EDITION.  XXI 

are  exhaustively  discussed  in  the  opening  chapter,  while  the 
necessary  limitations  upon  its  operation  which  inhere  in  our  judi- 
cial institutions  are  also  carefully  pointed  out.  Having  thus  laid 
the  foundation  upon  which  the  whole  superstructure  rests,  the 
remaining  parts  of  the  Civil  Action  are  examined  in  turn,  and 
the  practical  rules  which  control  their  use  are  minutely  explained 
in  the  light  of  judicial  authority.  These  general  features  are  the 
parties  to  the  Civil  Action,  plaintiff  and  defendant,  the  presenta- 
tion of  the  cause  of  action  by  the  plaintiff,  and  of  the  defence  or 
claim  of  affirmative  relief  by  the  defendant.  The  two  latter 
divisions  include,  among  other  important  particulars,  the  princi- 
ples of  the  reformed  pleading ;  the  scope  and  effect  of  the  gen- 
eral denial,  with  the  defences  which  may  be  proved  under  it;  the 
nature  and  object  of  specific  denials  ;  the  answer  of  new  matter, 
and  the  defences  which  must  be  specially  pleaded ;  and  the  coun- 
ter-claim. The  discussion  of  these  special  topics,  being  of  the 
greatest  practical  importance,  has  been  purposely  made  very  full 
and  minute.  An  attempt  has  also  been  made  to  obtain,  in  a 
general  and  complete  form,  the  true  meaning  of  certain  phrases 
found  in  all  the  codes,  upon  which  the  interpretation  of  most 
important  provisions,  and  the  practical  rules  resulting  therefrom, 
so  closely  depend.  Among  the  statutory  phrases  are  "  the  cause 
of  action,"  "  the  subject  of  action,"  "  transaction,"  "  causes  of 
action  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,"  and  the  like.  If  the 
author  has  succeeded  in  ascertaining  the  true  meaning  of  these 
and  similar  expressions,  and  the  legislative  intent  in  their  use, 
he  is  confident  that  he  will  have  rendered  a  substantial  aid  to  the 
profession,  and  even  to  the  courts,  in  the  difficult  work  of  statu- 
tory interpretation.  The  treatise,  as  a  whole,  if  its  purpose  has 
been  properly  carried  out,  will  be  a  practical  handbook,  adapted 
to  the  use  of  the  profession  in  every  State  and  Territory  where 
the  reformed  procedure  prevails.  It  is  also  designed  as  a  text- 
book for  students,  whether  in  offices  or  in  law  schools ;  and  to 
that  end  frequent  reference  has  been  made  to  the  common-law  and 


xxil  TKEFACK   TO   THE   FIIIST    EDITION. 

equity  systems  of  i:)rocedure,  in  explanation  of  their  more  general 
doctrines  and  principles,  and  in  comparing  them  with  those  which 
have  been  substituted  in  theii-  place. 

JOHN   NORTON   POMEROY. 
Rochester.  X.  Y.,  December,  1875. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTION 
Section  Page 

1.  Necessity  of  remedial  law 1 

2.  Remedies    and    remedial    rights     and     duties.      Definitions    and 

illustrations 2 

3.  Distinction  between  public  and  private  remedies 3 

CHAPTER   FIRST. 

Abolition  of  the  Distinctions  between  Actions  at  Law  and  Suits 
IN  Equity,  and  of  all  the  Common  Law  Forms  of  Action. 

4.  Statutory  provision 5 

SECTION   FIRST. 

The  General   Principles   as  to  a  Union  of   Legal  and  Equitable 
Methods  which  have  been  adopted  by  the  Courts. 

5.  Purpose   of   Section   One,   Chapter  One.      General    principles    of 

construction 7 

6.  Narrow  interpretation  by  some  judges.    This  interpretation  overruled        7 

7.  How  interpreted  in  most  of  the  States.     Criticism  of   interpreta- 

tion in  these  States 10 

8.  No  change  in  rights,  duties,  or  liabilities 11 

9.  No  change  in  remedies  or  remedial  rights 13 

10.  The  differences  that  have  been  abolished.    What  is  established  ?     .  14 

11.  Rule  settled  herein.     Familiar  rule  in  old  system 16 

12.  Struggle  in  establishing  rule.     Missouri  doctrine 19 

lo.  Summary  of  foregoing  discussion.     Fundamental  principle  stated     .  21 

14.  Pleading  at  common  law  and  in  equity 22 

15  Two  schools  of  interpretation  respecting  modes  of  pleading  under 

the  code 23 

SECTION    SECOND. 

The  Combination  by  the  Plaintiff  of  Legal  and  Equitable  Primary 
Rights  and  of  Legal  and  Equitable  Remedies  in  one  Action. 

16.  Principles  of  unity  applied  to  particular  cases 27 

17.  Both  equitable  and  legal  relief  awarded.     Illustrations 28 


xxiv  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

SecUon  Page 

IS.    Docirine  in  Missouri  and  Wisconsia 30 

lit.    Legal  relief  only  actually  awarded.     Illustrations 33 

2u.    Legal  relief  awarded,  but  equitable  relief  denied.     Illustrations  .     .  34 
•2\.    Where  equitable  remedy  only  is  demanded,  and  legal  remedy  only 

is  granted.     Doctrine  in  Missouri  and  Wisconsin 36 

22.  Where  allegations  and  proof   entitle  to  equitable  relief  only,  but  . 

only  legal  relief  is  prayed  for,  equitable  relief  will  be  awarded. 
Rule  in  Missouri 37 

23.  Where    allegations   entitle    to   equitable    relief,   and   not   to    legal 

relief,  and  equitable  relief  alone  is  asked,  and  proof  fails  to 
establish  case  alleged,  but  does  establish  legal  cause  of  action, 
suit  must  be  dismissed     Converse  of  this  rule.    Principle  herein  .       38 

24.  May  invoke  equitable  right  in  aid  of  legal  action 39 

25.  Mode  of  trial  when  both  legal  and  equitable  causes  of  action  are 

alleged.     How  waive  right  to  jury  trial 40 

SECTIOX   THIRD. 
Equitable  Defences  to  Actions  HRoronT  to  enforce  Leg.\l  Rights 

AND    TO    obtain    LeGAL    REMEDIES. 

26.  Former    system.       Illustration.      Criticism.      Subject    matter    of 

Section  Third 42 

27.  Meaning  of  the  terms    "equitable"  and  "defence."      Restriction 

imposed  by  some  courts  herein 44 

28.  Meaning  of  equitable  defence.     Definition  by  New  York  Court  of 

Appeals 45 

29.  Ca5es  holding  that  facts  entitling  to  equitable  relief  against  legal 

cause  of  action  can  be  interposed  only  upon  the  condition  that 
affirmative  relief  is  demanded.     Criticism 46 

30.  Correct  construction.     Limitation  upon  the  interposition   of   equi- 

table defences  to  legal  causes  of  action 47 

3L    Illustrations  and  examples 48 

32.  In  actions  to  recover  land.    Three  classes  of  cases.    Illustrations       .  49 

33.  In  actions   by    vendors   against  vendees   to  recover  possession    of 

lands.     Illu.strations 51 

34.  Other  actions  to  which  such  defences  are  applicable 52 

35.  Affirmative  relief  upon  facts  alleged  in  answer.     Cross-complaints. 

Different  positions  contrasted 53 

SECTION   FOURTH. 

A    Lf.gai.    Remedy    Ohtained    upon    an    Equitable    Ownership    or 
Equitable  Primary  Right. 

■\(t.    Statement  of  question  discussed  herein.      Ejectment   at  common 

law 55 

37.    Arbitraryand  technical  character  of  old  rule.    Distinction  abolished 

by  code.     View  still  entertained  by  some  courts.     Criticism  37 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 

Section  Page 

38.  Question  stated  in  Paragraph  Thirty-six  answered  upon  principle. 

Argument 57 

39.  Conclusion 58 

40.  Result  of   discussion  upon   principle   compared   ^\•ith    doctrine   of 

decisions.  Concession  by  Author.  Rule  in  Missouri,  Wisconsin, 
Indiana,  California,  and  Iowa 61 

41.  Conflict  in  New  York.     Phillips  v.  Gorham.     Rule  in  Kansas     .     .       63 

42.  Another    class    of    actions    herein.       Partner    against    copartner. 

Familiar  rule  herein.  Holding  in  Indiana.  In  Missouri.  Inmost 
of  the  States.  Case  herein  referred  to  contrasted  with  one  pre- 
viously discussed.     Argument.     Conclusion  reached 64 

43.  Additional  instances 68 

44.  Importance  of  subject-matter  dwelt  upon  in  Section  Fifth.     Final 

object  of  reformed  system.     Author's  prediction 69 

SECTION   FIFTH. 

The    Nature     of    Civil    Actions   and   the    Essential    Differences 

between  them. 

45.  Features  of  civil  actions  that  are  really  different  and  which  the 

new  system  does  not  change 70 

46.  Actions  still  differ  in  substance.     Statement  of  this  doctrine  by  the 

courts 70 

47.  Illustrative  examples  of  doctrine  reached.     Difference  in  form  of 

discussion  under  the  old  system  and  the  new.     Danger  herein  .     .       73 

48.  Distinction  between  actions  ex  contractu  and  those  ex  delicto  pre- 

served.    Election.     This  distinction  relates  to  cause  of  action       .       74 

49.  Conclusion.      Criticism   of   the   author.      Difference     in  the    two 

systems  of  procedure 75 


CHAPTER   SECOND. 
The  Parties  to  the  Civil  Action. 

SECTION   FIRST. 
The  Statutory  Provisions  and  their  General  Principles. 

50.  Introductory.      Fundamental   difference  between   legal    and   equi- 

table actions  in  respect  to  parties.     Intention  shown  in  the  codes 

to  adopt  equitable  theory 77 

51.  General  code  provisions 78 

52.  Same  subject 79 

53.  Same  subject 80 

54.  Same  subject 80 

55.  Same  subject 81 

56.  Same  subject 81 


XXVi  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Section                                                                                           ^  Page 

57.  Same  subject 83 

58.  Special  code  provLsious 83 

59.  Same  subject 84 

60.  Statutory  provi.sions.     Interpretation.     Two  views 85 

61.  More  radical  statutes  in  a  few  States.     Outline  of  treatment  of  parties  86 

SECTION   SECOND. 
The  Rfai.  Party  in  Intkkkst  to  bk  madk  Plaintiff. 

62.  Statutory  provision  as  to  real  party  in  interest 87 

63.  Principal  effect  of  statutory  provision 88 

64.  Legal  assignment.     Action  in  name  of  assignee.     Illustrations    .     .  88 

65.  Equitable  assignment.     Same  rule.     Illustrations 89 

66.  Effect  of  statute  in  case  of  negotiable  instruments.      Conflict   in 

opinion 91 

67.  New  York  decisions 93 

68.  The  rule  in  New  York 93 

69.  Rule  in  other  States 94 

70-    Absolute  assignment  made  conditional  or  partial  by  contemporane- 
ous and  collateral  agreement 96 

71.  Instances  of  action  by  assignee  as  real  party  in  interest    ....  99 

72.  Same  subject 100 

73.  Joinder  of  assignor  in  some  States 101 

74.  Assignment  pendente  lite.     Substitution  of  assignee 102 

7.J.    Assignment  of  part  of  demand.     Action  by  grantee  on  covenants  .  103 

76.  Suing  "  to  the  use  of  "  another.     Beneficiaries  under  express  trusts  104 

77.  Actions  by  third  persons  for  whose   benefit  contracts  have   been 

made 105 

78.  Commercial  paper.     Action  by  legal  promisee 112 

79.  Instances  of  real  party  in  interest.     Actions  on  bonds,  actions  by 

principals  and  agents,  etc 114 

iiO.    Particular  injury  to  plaintiff  essential  in  certain  cases.     People 

cannot  maintain  action  to  redress  private  wrong 117 

81.    Special  provision  in  New  York  respecting  action  by  grantee  of  land 

held  by  disseisor  at  time  of  conveyance.     Partnerships  ....  119 

SECTION    THIRD. 

Thk  Ekkkct  of  an  Assignment  ok  a  Thing  in  Action  upon  the 
Defences  thkukto. 

1-'.    ."^i.'nutory    provisions    respecting    the   effect   of   assignment   upon 

defences 120 

83.  Defetif-es  and  counter-claims  distinguished 121 

84.  Interpretation  of  the  statute 121 

85.  The  rule,  as  existing  prior  to  the  codes,  stated.     Assignee  takes 

subject  to  equities  and  legal  defences 122 

86.  Doctrine  ajtplies  also  to  second  and  subsequent  assignees  ....  123 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XXVil 

Section  Page 

87.  Illustrations 123 

88.  Doctrine  of  estoppel  applied  against  tiie  assignor  in  case  of  quasi- 

negotiable  demands 125 

89.  Extension  of  doctrine  of  estoppel  to  all  things  in  action,  making 

them  all  practically  negotiable 127 

90.  Recapitulation  of  rules  established  independently  of  the  codes    .     .     129 

91.  Effect  of  code  provision  upon  defence  of  set-off.     No  substantial 

change 129 

92.  Illustrations 132 

93.  Right    of    set-off    may    be    available   although   once  suspended. 

Illustration 1.35 

94.  California  rule.     Set-off  of  demand  accruing  after  assignment  but 

before  notice 136 

95.  Nature  of  notice  necessary  to  protect  assignee.     Defendant's  rights 

as  against  assignee  purely  defensive 137 

96.  Actions   to   wind  up  insolvent  corporations.     Doctrine   of  set-off 

complicated  by  other  considerations 138 

97.  Right  of  set-off  in  actions  by  personal  representatives.     Rule  in 

New  York 139 

98.  Rules  as  to  set-off  apply  to  other  defences,  except  that  it  is  notice, 

not  assignment,  which  cuts  off  availability 140 

SECTION  FOURTH. 
When  a  Person  other  than  the  Real  Party  in  Interest  may  sue. 

99.  Statutory  provisions 141 

100.  Meaning  of  term,  "  trustee  of  an  express  trust."    Theoretical  view     142 

101.  Judicial  view      .     .         145 

102.  Same  subject.     New  York  cases        147 

103.  Statute    includes   an   agent   with   whom  an     express   contract   is 

made.     Illustrations        148 

104.  Actions  on  bonds  given  to  protect  other  persons.     Obligee  may  sue     151 

105.  Actions  on  contracts  made  for  undisclosed  principals.     Agent  may 

sue 152 

106.  Other  classes  of  trustees 153 

107.  Actions  brought  by  public  officers 154 

108.  jNleaning  of  phrase  "  persons  expressly  authorized  by  statute  "  to 

sue.     Classes  of  persons  included 156 

109.  Actions  by  executors  and  administrators         158 

110.  Actions  by  general  guardians        159 

SECTION    FIFTH. 
Who  may  be  joined  as  Plaintiffs. 

111.  Statutory  provisions 161 

112.  Scope  of  statutory  provisions.      The  provisions  respecting  plaintiffs 

compared  with  those  respecting  defendants.     Apply  to  legal  as 
well  as  equitable  actions .     .     .     .     , 162 


XXViii  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Section  Tage 

llo.    The     statute     in   effect   an    enactment  of   the   equity   doctrine. 

Practical  question  herein 163 

114.  Statutory     provisions    confirm   common-law    rules   to   a   certain 

extent 164 

115.  Code   allows   a  freer   union   of  parties  plaintiff    than  under   the 

common  law 165 

116.  Joinder  of  holders  of  interests  which  are  several        166 

117.  Recapitulation  of  foregoing  theoretical  analysis        167 

l\t>.    General  theory  of  judicial  interpretation.     Introductory  ....  108 
11'.*.    Interpretation    given    by    the   courts   of    New    York   and     Ohio. 

Liberal  construction 169 

120.    Same  liberal  \ievf  adopted  in  Indiana 171 

IJI.    In    Missouri    and   California.        Statute   held    to    apply    only  to 

equitable  actions 173 

122.    Recapitulation  of  judicial   views.       Cases   in    which  there  is   an 

election 175 

1J3.    Manner  of  raising  question  as  to  proper  parties  plaintiff.       Defect 

of  parties  means  too  few 176 

1J4.    Question    of   defect  of   parties   must  be   raised  by  demurrer   or 

answer 178 

125.    Meaning  of  want  of  legal  capacity  to  sue 180 

120.    Kffect   of    misjoinder    of    parties    plaintiff.      Common    law   and 

equity  rules 181 

127.  Same  subject  under  the  codes.     Preliminary  analysis 182 

128.  Misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  no  defence  in  an  equitable  action       .     .     .     184 

129.  Doctrine  that  demurrer  will  lie  or  dismissal  as  to  party  improperly 

joined 180 

130.  Misjoinder  fatal  as  to  all  the  plaintiffs  in  a  legal  action.       View  of 

some  courts 186 

131.  New  York  ca.ses.     Criticism 189 

132.  True  interpretation  of  the  codes  as  to  consequences  of  misjoinder  190 

133.  Whf'n   objection    may  be   made   by  demurrer   or  answer  against 

party  improperly  joined 192 

Rules  a.<  to  Plaintiffs  in  Particular  Classes  of  Cases. 

134.  Order  of  proi)0.sed  tieatment 193 

First :    Legal  Actions. 

135.  Lei,'al   actions   by  joint  owners  and  owners   in  common  of  land. 

Modern  statutes.     Common-law  rules 194 

130.    Decisions  under  the  codes 195 

137.  Same  subject 196 

138.  Legal  actions  by  joint  owners  of  chattels.     At  common  law.  Under 

the  codes 199 

139.  Code  decisions.     Part-owners  of  ships 201 

140.  Joint  owners  of  chattels 201 

141.  Surviving  partners 203 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  XXIX 

Section  rage 

142.  Extreme  limits  to  wliich  some  courts  have  carried  doctrine  as  to 

joint  rights 203 

143.  Legal   actions  by  persons  having  joint  rights   arising  from    con- 

tract      204 

144.  Same  subject.     Illustrations 207 

145.  Criticism  of  cases  holding  that  a  joint  promisee  cannot  be  made 

a  defendant = 209 

146.  Legal  actions  by  persons  having  several  rights  arising  from  con- 

tract   210 

147.  Legal  actions  by  persons  having  joint  rights  arising  from  personal 

torts .0 214 

148.  Legal  actions  by  persons  having  several  rights  arising  from  per- 

sonal torts 215 

149.  Actions  in  special  cases 216 

150.  Actions  by  parents  or  guardians  for  the  seduction  of,  or  injury  to, 

their  children  or  wards •     219 

Second  :    Actions  by  and  between  Husband  and  Wife. 

151.  Common  law  and  equity  rules 221 

152.  Statutory  provisions 221 

153.  Wife  must  sue  alone  in  some  States 224 

154.  Result  of  New  York  statutes 225 

155.  Actions  for  personal  torts  and  for  fraud  and  deceit 226 

156.  Actions  for  personal  torts  to  wife 228 

157.  Actions  for  torts  to  wife's  person  in  New  York  and  States  having 

similar  statutes 230 

158.  Actions  for  torts  to  wife's  property 231 

159.  Tort  actions  between  husband  and  wife 232 

160.  Desertion  by  husband  as  affecting  wife's  capacity  to  sue  ....  233 

Third:  Equitable  Actions. 

161. 'Grand  principle  underlying  equity  doctrine.     Scope  of  inquiry  .     .    234 

162.  Equity  rules  more  explicit  respecting  defendants  than  plaintiffs. 

Two  classes  of  co-plaintiffs  in  equity 235 

163.  Statement  of  fundamental  principle  and  what  it  assumes.    Special 

subject  of  inquiry  stated 237 

164.  Subordinate  general  principles  herein.    Where  actual  plaintiff  holds 

only  equitable  right  or  title,  holder  of  legal  right  or  title  should 

be  made  co-plaintiff 238 

]*i5.    Case  of  suits  by  assignees.     Change  effected  by  codes  .     •     .     .     .     239 
160.    Case  of  suits  for  administration  of  decedents'  estates 240 

167.  Rule  applicable  to  persons  having  legal  demands  arising  out   of 

same  subject-matter 241 

168.  All  holders  of  concurrent  equitable  rights  against  the  defendant 

should  be  made  co-plaintiffs 241 

169.  Doctrine  extends  to  actions  relating  to  personal  property.    Illustra- 

tions      244 


XXX  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Section  Pago 

170.  Suits  to  redeem 246 

171.  ■  Suits  for  accouutiug.    All  persons  interested  in  having  an  account 

taken,  or  in  its  result,  should  be  made  co-plaintiffs 247 

172.  Residuary  legatees,  distributees,  and  next  of  kin.     Statement  of 

general  rule  herein 249 

173.  Same  subject.     Exceptions.     Statement  of  distinction  herein  re- 

ferred to 250 

174.  Special  applications  of  general  principles  above  stated.     General 

rule.     Important  exceptions 251 

175.  Case  of  suits  by  executors  and  administrators,  and  suits    by   as- 

signees in  insolvency.     Important  exceptions  continued     .     .     .     253 

176.  General  principle  applicable  to  those  having  future  and  expectant 

interests.     Equity  doctrine.     Illustrations 254 

177.  General  rule  in  suits  for  specific  performance.     Illustrations      .     .  255 

178.  Co-plaintiffs  in  suits  to  enforce  the  trusts  of  a  will  .  .     .  256 

179.  Principle   underlying  special  rules.       Connecting   link.     General 

principle 257 

180.  Distinct  claims  not  necessarily  inconsistent.     Conflicting  decisions  258 

181.  Case  of  creditors'  suits 259 

182.  All  beneficiaries  under  a  trust  should  join  in  a  suit  to  enforce  it. 

Different  rule  in  suits  to  overthrow  a  trust 260 

183.  Joinder  of  persons  owning  distinct  parcels  of  land 262 

184.  Miscellaneous  cases.   Joinder  of  holders  of  separate  liens.    Creditors 

of  corporations 265 

SECTION  SIXTH. 
Who  may  be  joined  as  Defendants. 

185.  Statutory  provisions 266 

186.  Subject-matter  and  plan  of  treatment  herein 267 

187.  Intent  and  object  of  legislation.     Principle  of  construction.     Con- 

clusions reached  in  preceding  section  adopted  and  repeated  here. 
Changes  made  should  apply  to  all  actions.     Position  of  courts    .     268 

Particular  Rules  and  Doctrines. 

188.  How  take  advantage  of  nonjoinder  of  defendants.   Waiver.    Power 

of  court  herein 270 

180.    Consequences  of  nonjoinder  of  defendants 273 

19<i.    Misjoinder  of  defemlants.      Two  cases  herein.      Two  aspects  of 

true  case  of  technical  misjoinder .'71 

191.    Situation  of  defendants  properly  sued.     Change   in   common-law 

rule  liorein      Doctrine  t-stablished  l)y  the  cases 275 

19'-'.    How  question    of   misjoinder   may   be    raised  by  defendants   ini- 
projHirly  juined.       DtMnuner    interposed    l)y    whom.      Waiver 

herein 277 

193.    Ki'capitulation  of  code  reforms  respecting  misjoinder  of  defend- 
ants.    Critici.sm 270 


TABLE   OF    CONTEXTS.  XXXI 

Section  Page 

194.  Same   respecting   nonjoinder.      Less    liberal   interpretation   here. 

Case  of  nonjoinder  and  misjoinder  compared.      Criticism  and 
recommendation 280 

First:  Legal  Actions. 

195.  Actions  against  owners  or  occupants  of  land.     Limitation  herein. 

Distinguished  from  common-law  action  of  ejectment     ....  281 

196.  Who  should  be  joined.     Illustrations 282 

197.  Who  should  not  be  joined.     Illustrations 285 

198.  Actions    against    owners    or  possessors   of    chattels.       In    actions 

to  recover  possession  of  chattels.    Common-law  rule  not  changed     286 

199.  Ship-owners 287 

200.  Actions  upon   contract;    joint  liability.      Common-law   rules  un- 

changed in  legal  actions.     Exceptions 288 

201.  One   of   two   or    more  joint  contractors   incapacitated.      Retired 

partners 290 

202.  Case  of  implied  contracts.     Illustrations 291 

203.  Survivorship.       In   States  containing  no  special  statutory  provi- 

sions  respecting  joint   liability,  common   law  rule  unchanged. 
Practical  result  herein 292 

204.  States    whose     codes   contain   provisions    changing    common-law 

rule.     Result 294 

205.  Criticism  of  general  rule 296 

206.  Actions  upon   contract;    joint   and  several  liability.      No  change 

by  general  language  in  most  codes.     Illustrations 297 

207.  Actions  upon  contract;  several  liability.     No  change  in  common- 

law  doctrines  —  except 299 

208.  Liability  in  actions  for  tort.     Common-law  doctrines  unchanged. 

General  rule  as  to  parties  defendant  herein.     Illustrations     .     .  300 

209.  Joint  liability  must  rest  upon  community  in  wrong-doing      .     .     .  303 

210.  Case  of  joint  conversion  of  chattels 304 

211.  Case  of  replevin  and  detinue 304 

212.  Common  carriers 305 

213.  Lessor  and  lessee.     Principal  and  agent 305 

214.  Cases  where  joint  liability  is  impossible 306 

215.  Joint  tort  may  give  rise  to  many  actions,  but  only  one  satisfac- 

tion        306 

216.  Statutory  actions  in  the  settlement  of  decedents' estates    ....  308 

217.  Some  special  actions 310 

218.  Joinder  in  case  of  substituted  debtor 311 

Second:  Actions  against  Husband  and  Wife  or  either  of  them:  Parties  Defendant 
as  Affected  hy  the  Marriage  Relation. 

219.  General    extent   of   statutory  modification  of   common-law  rules. 

No   change   in   suits    against    wife  for  her  torts,   frauds,   and 
other  wrongful  acts 311 


Xxxii  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

Section  ''•''g« 

J2ll.    Result ^12 

'221.    The  settled  rule.     Tort  committed  in  presence  or  by  conipulsioa 

of  husband 313 

•_'22.    Where  tort  is  committed  by  wife  in  the  use  or  by  means  of  her 

sopanite  property 314 

22'i.    Under  New  York  statutes 315 

224.  Wife  as  party  in  actions  concerning  the  homestead 316 

225.  Defence  by  wife  when  both  are  sued  together 316 

Third :  Equitable  Actions. 

226.  General  principles.      Distinction  between    necessary   and  proper 

parties 317 

227.  Distinction    between    necessary   and    proper    parties    illustrated. 

Practical  test 318 

228.  Equity  doctrine  herein.     Statutory  provision 319 

229.  Persons  consequentially  interested 321 

230.  Actions  to  foreclose  mortgages.      Introductory.     Statutory  distri- 

bution of  parties 321 

231.  Object  of   the  judgment  in   foreclosure.      Necessary  and  proper 

parties  herein 323 

232.  Variations  in  practical  rules  due  to  differences   in  local   law   as 

to  nature  of  interests  in  land 324 

233.  Mortgagor  and  his  grantee  as  parties 325 

234.  Successive  grantees  of  mortgaged  premises  as  parties.     Adminis- 

trator and  heirs  of  mortgagor .     328 

235.  Personal    representative  of  owner  of   mortgaged   premises  neces- 

sary party  in  California.      Judgment   creditors   of   mortgagor. 
Assignor  of  secured  debt 330 

236.  Special  statutes  making  assignor  of  a  thing  in  action  a  necessary 

party 331 

237.  ^\'he^e  holder  of  less  than  all  of  a  series  of  notes  secured  by  same 

mortgage  brings  foreclosure  suit 331 

238.  Occupant  of  premises  as  party.     Averments  of  petition  as  to  each 

ptMson  nia<le  defendant 332 

239.  Subsequent   and   prior   incumbrancers   as   parties.      Husband   in 

ca-st;  of  mortgage  on  wife's  land 333 

240.  Joinder  of  wife  of  mortgagor 335 

241.  Joinder  of  wifi-  of   murtgaj:or   in   foreclosure  of  purchase-money 

m<irti;a;ie ;?36 

212.    Parti<'.s   in    foreclosure   of   mortgage   uiion    homestead.      Adverse 

claimant  as  party-     Otiier  ca.ses 337 

243.  Partien    in   creditors'   actions;    and   actions  by   or   on    behalf   of 

creditors   to  set   aside    fraudulent   transfers   by   their   debtors. 
General  remarks 338 

244.  Parties  <i<'f<Midant  in  action   by  judgment  creditor  to  n-ach  equi- 

table assets;  and  to  reach  property  fraudulently  transferred  .     .     33!) 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  Xxxiii 

Section  Page 

245.  Assignee  of  judgment  debtor   a  necessary  party.      Where  legal 

title  is  in  third  person  and  equitable  ownership  in  debtor       .     .  341 

246.  Assignees  of  separate  parcels  of  property  should  be  joined.     Reason 

herein 342 

247.  Other  cases.     Trustees  of  an  express  trust.     Innocent  third  parties  342 

248.  Actions  relating  to  the  estates  of  deceased  persons 343 

249.  Illustrations 344 

250.  When  administrator  is  not  a  necessary  party.     Illustration  .     .     .  345 

251.  When  legatees  and  next  of  kin  are  neither  necessary  nor  proper 

parties 346 

252.  When  a  different  rule  applies 347 

253.  Trusts.    Actions  to  enforce  performance  of  express  trusts.     Trus- 

tees and  survivors  necessary  parties 348 

254.  Joining  beneficiaries.     Distinction  between  actions  in  opposition 

to,  and  in  furtherance  of,  the  trust 349 

255.  Same  subject 351 

256.  Implied  trustee  necessary  party  in  actions  to  reach  property  im- 
pressed with  implied  trustor  to  enforce  a  lien  thereon.     Examples  .  352 

257.  Actions  against  corporations  and  stockholders  and  between  part- 

ners.    Introductory " 354 

258.  Receivers.     Creditors.     Directors 354 

259.  Judgment  creditors.     Stockholders 355 

260.  Corporation,  officers,  and  assignee 356 

261.  Assignor  of  stock.     Rule  in  Indiana.     In  New  York 356 

262.  Accounting  by   one   partner   against   another   and   by   surviving 

partner 357 

263.  Actions  for  specific  performance.     Conflict  of  opinion  herein     .     .  358 

264.  Holder   of  adverse  claim.      Personal  representative  of   deceased 

vendor.     Heirs.     New  York  and  Iowa  cases 359 

265.  Prior  mortgagee.     Agent  of  vendor.     Person  making  redemption  .  361 

266.  Actions  to  quiet  title.     Scope  of  statute  herein  in  Western  States. 

Multiform  use  of 361 

267.  Illustrations  of  action  and  its  form 363 

268.  Same  subject 363 

269.  Case  in  New  York 304 

270.  Actions  for  partition.     Their  general  purpose.     General  creditors. 

Holders  of  liens  on  entire  tract 365 

271.  Holders  of  liens  on  undivided  shares 366 

272.  Different   rule   where   object   of  suit  is    to   sell  land  and  divide 

proceeds 368 

273.  Joinder  of  wife  of  tenant  in  common.     Administrator  of  deceased 

tenant  in  common.     In  New  York 370 

274.  In  Indiana  and  California 371 

275.  Actions  for  various  miscellaneous  objects.     Partnership   matters 

and  accounting 372 

276.  Rescission  and  cancellation 373 

277.  Same  subject 373 


XXxiv  TABLE    OF   CONTKNTS. 

Section  Page^ 

'Jib.    Same  subject 374 

279.  Enfurceiiieut  of  liens 375 

280.  Same  subject 376 

281.  Same  subject 376 

282.  Ck)ntribution 377 

283.  Actions  by  taxpayers 377 

284.  Actions  to  redeem 378 

SECTION  SEVENTH. 

When   One   Person   may   sue    or   be     sued   on   Behalf   of   all  the 
Persons   interested. 

285.  Statutory  provision •    ,     .     .  379 

280.    Author's   analysis   of  language   of   statute.     Two  distinct   cases. 

Essential  elements  of  each  case 380 

287.  Necessary  allegations  herein 382 

288.  Judicial  interpretation  of  statute.     Order  pursued  in  examination 

of  decided  cases 383 

289.  Statute  re-enacts  equity  rule.     Must  be  some  connection  between 

parties  represented  in  both  cases.     Test 384 

290.  Aj«i>licable  both  to  legal  and  equitable  actions.    Number  of  parties 

in  second  case 385 

291.  Particular  instances 386 

292.  Same  subject 387 

293.  Nature  of  such  action.    What  essential  on  part  of  those  not  named 

in  order  to  become  parties 388 

294.  Equity  rule.     Rule  in  Kentucky 389 

29."j.    Question  whether  one  has  made  himself  a  party  may  present  itself 

in  two  aspects 389 

29G.    Same  subject 391 

297.  Conclusion  of  author  from  discussion 391 

298.  Necessary  averments  of  complaint  or  petition 392 

SECTION  EIGHTH. 
Persons   severally  Liable   upon   the   same  Instrument. 

299.  Reasons   for   separate  treatment.     Two  classes  of   statutory  pro- 
visions       393 

800.    Quotation  of  statutory  provisions 393 

301.  Two  classes  of  st;itutory  jirovisions  compared  and  distinguished     .  396 

302.  Turning-point  of  decisions  herein.     Illustrations 397 

303.  Forms  of  contract  inchided  in    statute.     Illustrations.     Form    of 

judgment 398 

301.    Form  of  judgment  continued.     Jiiscussion  by  Wisconsin  Supreme 

Court 399 

305.    Joint  and  several  liability  may  be  treated  by  promisee  or  obligee 

as  several  under  statute  herein 401 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS  XXXV 

Section  Page 

306.  Case  of  guarantor  and  principal   debtor.     Weight   of   authority. 

Rule  in  Iowa 402 

307.  When  liability  arises  from  same  instrument 403 

SECTION   NINTH. 
Bringing  in  New  Parties  :  Intervening. 

308.  Two  types  of  code  provisions  herein 404 

309.  Statutory  provisions  of  first  form 405 

310.  Statutory  provision  of  second  form 406 

311.  Three  transactions  herein.     First  of  said   transactions.     Moving 

party 407 

312.  Second  of  said  transactions.     Scope  of  statutory  provision  herein. 

Moving  party 408 

313.  Intervention  in  Iowa  and  California.     Origin  of 408 

314.  Third   of  said   transactions.      Interpleader.      How   distinguished 

from  other  of  said  transactions 409 

315.  Bringing  in  additional  parties.     When  the  court  must  act    .     .     .  410 

316.  Same  subject     .     ". 412 

317.  Same  subject      Limitations  herein 413 

318.  Examples  and  illustrations.     Pleadings.    Rule  in  Indiana  in  refer- 

ence to  assignors 414 

319.  Author's  suggestions  herein 415 

320.  Intervention.     Need  not  be  necessary  pai'ty.     Discretion  of  court. 

Time  of  application       417 

321.  Statutory  provision  limited.     Illustrations 417 

322.  Additional  illustrations 419 

323.  The   Iowa  and   California  system   of   intervening.      Illustrative 

examples 420 

324.  Author's  statement  of  the  doctrine 427 

325.  Concluding  remarks ^     .  428 


CHAPTER   THIRD. 

The  Affirmative  Subject-Matter  of  the  Action:  The  Formal  Statement  of  the  Cause 
of  Action  by  the  Plaintiff. 

SECTION   FIRST. 
The  Statutory  Provisions. 

326.  Introduction 430 

327.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  complaint 430 

328.  Statutory  provisions  applicable  to  all  pleadings 436 

329.  Statutory  provisions  respecting  amendment 439 

330.  Order  of  proposed  treatment 442 


XXX vi  TABLE    OF   CuNTENTS. 


SECTION   SECOND. 

Joinder  ok  Causes  of  Action. 
Section  Page 

331.  Subdivisions  for  discussion  herein o     .     .     .     .     443 

I.    The   Statutory    Provisions. 

332.  Language  of  the  codes  herein 443 

333.  Features  common  to  many  codes.     States  in  which  these  features 

are  wanting 446 

334.  Departures  from  original  type 449 

335.  Scope  and  meaning  of  statutory  provisions.      Difficulties  of  inter- 

pretation   449 

II.  The  Forms  and  Modes  m  which  a  Misjoinder  may  occur,  and  the  Manner  in 

which  it  7nust  be  objected  to  and  corrected. 

336.  Separate  statement  of  different  causes  of  action 450 

337.  How  question  of  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action  is  raised.    Effect  of 

sustaining  demurrer  upon  this  ground 451 

338.  Effect  of  misjoinder  in  some  States 452 

339.  Motion  by  adverse  party  requiring  correction  of  pleading      .     .     .  454 

340.  Possible  forms  of  misjoinder 4.54 

341.  First  form  of  misjoinder  not  ground  of  demurrer.     Remedy  is  by 

motion 454 

342.  Remedy  when  second  form  of  misjoinder  occurs 456 

343.  Rule  in  few  States 4-57 

344.  Remedy  when  third  case  of  misjoinder  occurs 458 

345.  Author's  criticism  and  suggestion  herein 458 

III.  Meaning  of  the   Term  '■'■Cause  of  Action;''''  where  one    Cause  of  Action 
only  is  stated,  although  several  Different  Kinds  of  Relief  are  demanded. 

346.  Confounding  "  cause  of  action  "  with  "  remedy."    Decisions  herein. 

Definition  obtained  by  analy.si.s 4.59 

317.  Remedy.    Elements  of  every  judicial  action.     Elements  constitut- 

ing cause  of  action 460 

318.  Cause  of  action  and  remedial  right  differentiated.     Examples  .     .     462 

349.  Test  in  determining  whether  different  causes  of  action  have  been 

stated.     Caution  in  ajiplying  test 465 

350.  Two  or  more  <li.stinct  rii^^hl.s  each  invaded  by  distinct  wrongs,  and 

two  rights  invadtd  by  one  and  the  same  wrong,  or  one  right 
broken  by  two  separate  wrongs 467 

351.  General  principle  drawn  from  analysis  of  essential  elements  of  a 

judicial  action 467 

352.  Cause  of  action  not   to  be  confounded  with  relief.      Illustrative 

cases 471 

3.53.    Saiue  subject 472 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  XXX VI l 

Section  Page 

354.  Same  subject 475 

355.  Cases  in  Missouri 470 

356.  Summary 477 

IV.  The  Joinder  of  Causes  of  Action  arising  out  of  the  same  Transaction  or 
Transactions  Connected  with  the  same  Subject  of  Action  ;  Legal  Meaning  of 
the  Terms  "  Transaction  "  and  "  Subject  of  Action.' ' 

357.  Most   frequent   applications    of    this    class.      Includes  legal  con- 

troversies         477 

358.  Controlling  words  herein.     Neces.sity  of  judicial  definition  of    .     .  478 

359.  Language  of  Comstock,  J.,  and  author's  criticism 479 

360.  Observations  made  by  courts  respecting  meaning  of  these  terms     .  481 

361.  Author's  criticism 482 

362.  Same  subject 484 

363.  Same  subject 485 

364.  Same  subject 486 

365.  Jones  r.  Steamship  Cortes 487 

366.  Observations  of  the  author.     Two  alternatives 488 

367.  Meaning  of  "  transaction  " 488 

368.  Same  subject 489 

369.  Meaning  of  "  subject  of  action  " 492 

370.  Exajiiples  of  causes  of  action  held  to  have  arisen  out  of  the  same 

transaction 494 

371.  Examples  of  causes  of  action  held  not  to  have  arisen  out  of  the 

same  transaction 497 

372.  "What  facts  must  be  averred  herein 497 

V.  Instances  in  tohich  the  Proper  Joinder  of  Causes  of  Action  is  connected  loith 
the  Proper  Joinder  of  Defendants ;  Discussion  of  the  Provision  that  all  the 
Causes  of  Action  must  affect  all  of  the  Parties. 

373.  Statement  of  question  examined  in  this  subdivision 498 

374.  Effect  of  code  provision  requiring  that  causes  of  action  joined  in 

one  complaint  must  affect  all  the  parties 499 

375.  Illustration 500 

376.  lUusti-ations 501 

377.  Causes  of  action  so  joined  must  also  affect  all  the  plaintiffs.     Illus- 

trations       502 

378.  The  doctrine,  as  stated  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  re- 

specting a  cause  of  action  against  an  executor,  administrator,  or 

trustee  united  with  one  against  him  in  his  individual  capacity    .  504 

379.  Illustrations 505 

380.  Discussion  of  questions  under  consideration  in  Wilson  v.  Castro    .  505 

381.  Calvert's  observations  upon  the  distinction  between  "  subject  "  and 

"  object  "  of  the  action 509 

382.  Same  subject 512 


XXXviii  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

Section  Page 

383.  Author's  criticism  of  Calvert's  theory 513 

384.  Application  of  Calvert's  analysis  to  the  language  of  the  codes    .     .  514 

^'I.    Instances  in  which  all  the  Causes  of  Action  are  against  a  Single  Defendant, 
or  against  all  the  Defendants  alike. 

385.  Questions  discussed  in  this  subdivision  pertain  wholly  to  joinder 

of  causes  and  not  to  parties 514 

380.    Joinder  of  causes  arising  out  of  contract.     Illustrations    ....  515 

387.  When  tort  is  waived  and  suit  is  brought  upon  implied  promise. 

Illustrations 515 

388.  Additional  illustrations 516 

389.  Causes  for  injuries  to  property.     Illustrations 517 

390.  Malicious  prosecution  and  slander  or  libel 518 

391.  Special  cases 519 

392.  Rule  in  Iowa 519 

393.  Illustrations  from  Indiana  and  California 520 

394.  Cause  of  action  upon  contract  cannot  be  joined  with  one  to  re- 

cover damages  for  a  tort.     Illustrations.     Author's  criticism  .     .  .521 

395.  Illustrations 522 

396.  Cause  of  action  against  one  in  personal  character  cannot  be  united 

with   one  against    him    in    representative   character.      Reason. 

Author's  criticism.     Illustrations 523 

397.  Some  unclassified  cases.     Author's  criticism 525 

398.  Grouping  of   actions  for   injuries  to  the  person   in  some    States. 

Illustrations 526 

399.  Holding  of  Wisconsin  court  in  action  to  quiet  title 527 

SECTION   THIRD. 
The  General  Principles  of  Pleading. 

400.  The  three  types  of  pleading  prior  to  the  reformed  system.     Plead- 

ing by  allegation 527 

401.  The  equity  .'system  of  pleading 528 

402.  The  common-law  system  of  pleading.     Introductory 531 

403.  Technicality  of  the  system 532 

404.  Essential  principles  and  elements  of  common-law  pleading    .     .     .  533 

405.  Same  subject 534 

406.  History  of  the  action  of  assumpsit 536 

407.  Outline  of  jiropo-sed  discussion  of  reformed  procedure 539 

408.  Two  theories  as  t(j  the  relation  between  the  new  and  old  systems    .  539 

409.  The  theory  generally  adopted 541 

410.  K.s8ential  principles  of  reformed  system  of  pleading.     Introductory  541 

411.  Manner  of  averring  material  facts 542 

412.  The  term  "  cause  of  action  " 547 

413.  True  signification  of  the  term 548 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  XXxix 

Section  Page 

414.  Complete  statement  of  entire  cause  of  action  would  include  legal 

rules  and  rights  and  duties 549 

415.  Term  as  applied  to  legal  actions 550 

416.  Term  as  applied  to  equitable  actions 551 

417.  Nature  of  the  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action  when  term  is 

applied  to  both  legal  and  equitable  suits 552 

418.  Elements  omitted  and  retained  when  cause  of  action  is  set  forth 

in  the  complaint 553 

419.  Cases  where   facts  showing  primary  right  are   omitted   because 

presumed 554 

420.  Only  ultimate  facts  are  to  be  alleged 555 

421.  The  doctrine  as  applied  to  equitable  suits 557 

422.  This   distinction  between  material   facts   in   legal   and  equitable 

actions  sustained  by  the  courts 559 

423.  Facts  should  be  alleged  as  they  actually  existed  or  occurred,  not 

their  legal  effect 560 

424.  Cases  supporting  doctrine  that  facts,  not  legal  conclusions,  are  to 

be  stated 561 

425.  Same  subject 563 

426.  Cases  supporting  doctrine  that  material,  not  probative,  facts  are 

to  be  stated 565 

427.  Instances  of  allegations  approved  or  condemned  by  the  courts  .     .  570 

428.  Same  subject .572 

429.  Same  subject 573 

430.  Attitude  of  courts  in  instances  cited  largely  due  to  liberal  rule  of 

construction 576 

431.  Doctrine  that  facts  pleaded  should   be   stated   as   they  occurred 

or  existed.     Two  questions  presented 577 

432.  Necessity   or   propriety  of   alleging   a  promise   in   actions   upon 

implied  promises 577 

433.  Case  of  Booth  v.  Farmers'  and  Mechanics'  Bank  (N.  Y.)       .     .     .  580 

434.  Conclusions 581 

435.  Criticism  of  Booth  v.  Farmers'  and  Mechanics'  Bank 582 

436.  Common  counts  under  the  codes 584 

437.  Use  sanctioned  also  where  obligation  is  express 586 

438.  Criticism  of  doctrine 588 

439.  Further    rules    of    pleading   to    be   considered.     Outline   of    dis- 

cussion           ...  590 

440.  Strict  construction  of  pleadings  superseded  by  liberal  construction  590 

441.  Judicial  approval  of  liberal  construction 591 

442.  Insufficient,   imperfect,    incomplete,  or  informal  allegations,    and 

the  mode  of  objecting   to   and   correcting   them.     Distinction 

between  imperfect  and  wholly  deficient  allegations        ....  595 

443.  Motion   the  proper   method   of    attacking   pleadings     which    are 

merely  imperfect 596 

444.  Demurrer,    or   dismissal   of  petition    at   the    trial,    proper   when 

allegations  are  wholly  deficient 6O0 


xl  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Section  Page 

■145.    Retlundaiit,    immaterial,  and  irrelevant  allegations,  and  the  mode 

of  objecting  to  and  correcting  them.     Distinctions 009 

446.  Motion,  not  demurrer,  proper  method  of   objecting  to  superfluous 

allegations - 6J.1 

447.  The  doctrine  that  the    cause   of  action  proved  must   correspond 

with  the  one  alleged.       Degrees  of  variance  between  allegations 

and  proof 61o 

448.  Consequences  of  different  degrees  of  variance 614 

440.    In.'^tances  where  variance  has  been  held  immaterial 616 

450.  Instances  of  complete  failure  of  proof 620 

451.  Examples  of  fatal  disagreement  between  cause  of  action  pleaded 

and  proved 621 

452.  Variance  fatal  where  cause  of  action  in  tort  alleged  and  one  in 

contract  proved 623 

453.  How  nature  of  cause  of  action   is   determined.     Illustrations  of 

causes  ex  contractu 627 

4.'>4.   Illustrations  of  causes  ex  delicto 629 

455.  Further  examples  of  variance  where  tort  is  alleged  and  contract 

proved 630 

456.  Amendments  allowed  by  the  code 632 

457.  Conflict  of  authority  on  right  to  amend  by  substituting  different 

cau.><e  of  action 634 

458.  Election  between  actions  ex  delicto  and  actions  ex  contractu    .     .     .  638 

459.  New  procedure  makes  no  change  in  doctrine  of  election        .     .     .  646 

460.  Chi.'jses   of  cases  where  election  is  allowed.     Conversion.     Conflict 

of  authority        648 

461.  Actions   against   common   carriers   for   loss   or   injury   to   goods. 

Other  cases 650 

462.  Principle  which  determines  when  a  promise  is  implied       ....  651 

463.  Method  of  indicating  election.     Averment  of  promise  as  a  test  .     .  652 

464.  No  difficulty  where  promise  is  express.       Summons  suggested  as 

means  of  indicating  election  in  case  of  implied  promise     .     .     .     653 


SECTION   FOURTH. 
The  Form  of  tiik  Comi-laixt  ok  Petition. 

4'i.'i.    Introductory 656 

466.  .Si'parat«*   statement  of   difi"crent  cau.scs  of  action.       Inducement 

and  prayer  need  not  be  repeated 657 

467.  Hule  as  to  statement  of  same  cause  of  action  in  different  counts     .     659 
408.    Effect  of  demurring  to  entire  complaint  when  made  up  of  several 

counts.     Joint  demurrers  by  two  or  more  defendants     ....  060 

469.    Adtniftsion  Ijv  failure  to  deny 662 

47<i.    Defective  complaint  aided  by  averments  in  answer 663 

471.    I'raver  for  relief 065 


TABLE   OF    CONTENTS.  xli 


CHAPTER   FOURTH. 

The   Defensive  Subject-Matter  of  the    Action;  The  Formal  Presentation  of  his 
Defence,  or  of  his  Claim  for  Affirmative  Relief,  by  the  Defendant. 

SECTION   FIRST. 

Statutory  Provisions  concerning  Matters  of  Defence. 

Section  Page 

472.  Statutory  provisions  relating  to  answers          691 

473.  Statutory  provisions  respecting  union  of  defences 692 

474.  Same  subject 696 

475.  Statutes  providing  for  set-off 698 

476.  Statutory  provisions  as  to  cross-complaints  and  sham  answers    .     .  700 

477.  Statutes  allowing  demurrer  to  entire  answer  or  to  separate  defence 

or  countei'-claim 701 

478.  Code  provisions  respecting  reply 701 

479.  Same  subject 702 

480.  Miscellaneous  statutory  provisions 703 

481.  Liberality  of  the  codes  in  furtherance  of  justice 704 

482.  Outline  of  treatment  of  code  theory  of  defence 705 

SECTION   SECOND. 

The   General  Requisites   of  an   Answer,  and  the  General   Rules 
Applicable  to  all  Answers. 

483.  Introductory 705 

484.  Two  kinds  of  answer — denials  and  new  matter 706 

485.  Two  kinds  of  questions.     Those  of  form 706 

486.  Questions  of  substance 707 

487.  Purpose  of  demurrer.     Special  demurrer  abolished.    Motion  sub- 

stituted       708 

488.  Conflict  of  decisions 714 

489.  Same  subject 716 

490.  Defects  of  form  are  curable  by  motion 717 

491.  Defects  of  form  are  waived  by  neglect  to  move,  and  going  to  trial. 

Test  of  formal  defects 719 

492.  Case  of  Simmons  v.  Sisson 720 

493.  Additional  cases 721 

494.  Doctrine  that  defects  of  substance  are  waived  by  failure  to  demur  723 

495.  Liberal  rule  of  construction  not  always  followed 723 

496.  Case  of  Lefler  v.  Field 724 

497.  Pleadings  by  joint  defendants 724 

498.  Partial  defences 725 

499.  Partial  defences  should  be  pleaded  as  such 726 

500.  Criticism  of  foregoing  rule 727 


xlii  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS, 


SECTION  THIRD. 


Section  The  Defenck  of  Denial.  Page 

501.  Species  of  denial 728 

502.  Outline  of  proposed  treatment 729 

503.  Same  subject 729 

504.  External  form  of  denials,  general  and  specific 729 

505.  Issuable  facts  as  distinguished  from  evidentiary  facts  and  from 

conclusions 731 

506.  Function  of  the  specific  denial 731 

507.  Illustrative  case 733 

508.  Allegations  admitted  by  failure  to  deny 734 

509.  Xegative.s  pregnant.      How  they  may  arise 737 

510.  Illustrations 738 

511.  Illustrations 738 

512.  Illustrations 739 

513.  Conflict  of  authority  as  to  whether  a  negative  pregnant  raises  an  issue  741 

514.  Tile  better  doctrine 742 

515.  Denials  cannot  properly  contain  new  matter 742 

516.  Pleading  new  matter  equivalent  to  a  denial 743 

517.  Same  subject 743 

518.  Remedy  for  such  a  denial  is  by  motion  under  the  codes     ....  744 

519.  Illustrations  of  argumentative  denials 744 

520.  Where  answer  contains  general  denial  and  also  a  special  defence 

of  new  matter  equivalent  to  general  denial 745 

521.  Combination  of  general  and  argumentative  denials 746 

522.  Practice  in  Indiana  in  respect  to  argumentative  denials    ....  747 

523.  Same  subject 747 

524.  General  denials  of  all  allegations  not  otherwise  admit  rod  or  re- 

ferred to " 748 

525.  Proper  distinction  to  be  observed  between   general   and   specific 

denials 749 

526.  Difficulty  arising  from  this  form  of  answer 750 

527.  This  form  sanctioned  by  some  courts 750 

528.  Facts,  not  conclusions  of  law,  should  be  denied 752 

529.  Illustrations 754 

530.  Denial  of  conclusions  of  law  is  unnecessary 754 

531.  Denials  of   knowledge  or  information.      Formula   prescribed  by 

statute  should  be  followed •     .     .     .  755 

.'>32.    When  a  denial  of  knowledge  or  information  is  not  allowed  .     .     .  757 

633.    Outline  of  proposed  treatment  of  i.s8ues  raised  by  denials       .  .  759 

534.    Iin|)ortance  of  questions  suggested 759 

5:i5.    The  general  denial.     McKyring  v.  Bull 760 

530.    Further  illustrations 761 

637.    Neci'ssity  of  reply  depends  upon  nature  of  defence 763 

53H.    Anything  tending  directly  to  controvert  allegations  in  complain i. 

a<lmls.sible  under  general  denial 763 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  xliii 

Section  Page 

5o9.   Same  subject 764 

540.  Same  subject 7G5 

541.  Construction  adopted  in  California 766 

542.  Twofold  office  of  general  denial.     No  exact  statement  possible  of 

particular  defences  admissible  under  it 7G7 

543.  Only  material  averments  put  in  issue  by  general  denial    ....  769 

544.  Only  issuable  facts  are  material.     Test  to  distinguish  them  from 

evidentiary  facts 770 

545.  Allegations  of  legal  conclusions  not  controverted  by  general  denial  771 

546.  General  nature  of  evidence  admissible  under  denials 772 

547.  Evidence  proper  under  denials  may  be  affirmative  or  negative    .     .  773 

548.  Distinction    between    general   issue   and   plea  of   confession    and 

avoidance  at  common  law  not  the  same  as  that  between  general 

denial  and  new  matter  under  the  code 774 

549.  Same  subject 775 

5.50.    Particular    defences    admissible    under   the  general   denial.      In 

actions  for  compensation  for  services 776 

551.  In  actions  for  negligent  injuries 777 

552.  Assignment,  want  of  consideration,  etc 778 

553.  In  actions  for  conversion 779 

554.  In  actions  to  recover  possession  of  goods 780 

555.  In  actions  to  recover  possession  of  land 781 

556.  In  actions  in  which  malice  is  an  essential  ingredient 782 

557.  In  actions  for  specific  performance 783 

558.  In  actions  on  covenants  and  judgments 784 

559.  Special  statutory  provisions  as  to  denying  existence  of  corporation 

and  partnership 785 

560.  Special   statutory  provisions  as  to  denials  in   actions   on   written 

instruments 786 

561.  General  denial  cannot  be  struck  out  as  sham 787 

SECTION   FOURTH. 

The  Defence  of  New  Matter. 

562.  Introdudtory 788 

I.  Hoio  Defences  of  New  Matter  should  be  pleaded. 

563.  Statement  of  new  matter  in  answer  governed  by  same  rule  as  state- 

ment of  cause  of  action  in  petition 788 

564.  Further  illustrations 790 

565.  Averments  of  new  matter  as  basis  for  affirmative  relief    ....  791 

II.    The  Getieral  Nature  of  New  Matter ;  Defences  in  Mitigation  of  Damac/es, 

and  in  Abatement. 

566.  Introductory     . 792 

567.  Denials  and  new  matter  distinguished 792 

568.  New  matter  as  confession  and  avoidance 794 


xliv  TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 

Section                             ^  Page 

bay.    Defences  in  mitigation  of  damages.     Common-law  theory     .     .     .  795 

r»70.    Theory  of  the  codes  as  to  pleading  matter  in  mitigation    ....  795 

571.  New  York  doctrine  as  to  pleading  matter  in  mitigation    ....  797 

572.  Doctrine  in  Indiana  and  Kentucky 798 

573.  Defences  in  abatement.     Common-law  doctrine 799 

574.  Formal  distinction  between  pleas  in  abatement  and  in  bar  removed 

by  the  codes 799 

III.   Some  Particular  Defences  of  New  Matter  Classified  and  Ai-ranged. 

575.  Introductory 801 

57G.    Payment 801 

577.  What  may  be  shown  under  the  defence  of  payment 803 

578.  Arbitrament  and  award.     Former  recovery 804 

579.  Actions  for  the  recovery  of  chattels 804 

580.  Actions  for  tort 805 

581.  Same  subject 80G 

582.  Actions  concerning  lands 807 

583.  Actions  upon  contract 809 

584.  Defence  of  illegality 810 

585.  Further  illustrations  of  new  matter 812 

586.  New    matter  distinguished   from  denials   by    Supreme    Court   of 

Missouri 813 

587.  Examples  of  defences  in  abatement 813 

588.  Miscellaneous  defences 815 

589.  Statute  of  Limitations 818 

590.  Same  subject 820 

SECTION   FIFTH. 
Thk  Union  of  Defences  in  the  Same  Answer. 

591.  Introductory 823 

I.  How  the  Separate  Defences  should  be  stated. 

592.  Each  defence  must  be  complete  in  itself 823 

593.  Suggested    method    of    pleading   specific   denials.      Common-law 

theory 825 

59 i.    Objections  to  the  code  answered 820 

595.  Same  subject 827 

596.  Same  subject 828 

II.     What  Kiruls  of  Defences  may  he  joined  in  one  Answer;  those  in  Abatement, 

and  those  in  Bar. 

597.  Defences  in  abatement  and  in  bar  may  be  joined  in  one  answer     .  829 
.'i98.    Inconsistent  defences 830 

599.  Same  subject 832 

600.  I'fTect  of  admissions  in  one  defence  upon  issues  raised  in  another  .  834 
•■"!      Facts  jtleaded  as  both  defence  and  ciunter-claim 834 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS.  xlv 


SECTION   SIXTH. 

Counter-Claim,  Set-off,  Cross-Complaint,  and  Cross-Demand. 

Section  Page 
G02.    Statutory  provisions.     Two  groups.    Special  provisions  of  Indiana 

and  Iowa  codes.     Similarity  of  code  provisions 835 

G03.    Arrangement  of  subject-matter  for  discussion 837 

604.  Counter-claim  to  be  compared  with  cross-demands  of  former  system  838 

605.  The  cross-demands  allowed  by  the  former  procedure 838 

606.  Discussion  of  New  York  statute  of  set-off        840 

607.  Origin  of  set-off  and  recoupment.     Resemblances  and  dissimilarities  S41 

608.  Illustrations  of  recoupment 842 

609.  Mere  defences  distiuj^uished  from  set-off  or  recoupment,  counter- 

claim or  cross-demand 844 

I.  A  General  Description  of  the  Counter- Claim;  its  Nature,  Objects  and  Uses. 

610.  Scope  of  inquiry  herein 845 

Oil.    One  class  of  cases  included  in  term  "set-off"  under  former  procedure 

not  included  in  counter-claim.     Mere  defence  Dot  a  counter-claim  846 
G12.    Recoupment  a  species  of  counter-claim.     How  modified  and   en- 
larged    846 

613.    Counter-claim    broader  than    set-off  au'l   recoupment.      Kinds   of 

causes  of  action  that  may  be  interposed  as  counter-claims       .     .  847 
014.    Essential  elements  and  test  of  counter-claim.     Must  be  a  cause  of 

action 849 

615.  Implies  an  opposing  claim       Limitation  herein 851 

616.  Cause  of  action  alleged  must  exist  in  favor  of  defendant  who  pleads 

it.     Exception  hereto  in  codes  of  Indiana  and  Iowa       ....  8.32 

617.  Cause  of  action  must  exist  against  the  plaintiff 853 

618.  Subject-matter  of  counter-claim.     General  classes.     Statutory  re- 

strictions  as   to   scope  and   character.      Analysis  of   statutory 

provisions 853 

619.  Illustrative  opinions 855 

620.  Doctrine  that  counter-claim  must  be  antagonistic  to,  and  tend  to 

defeat,  lessen  or  modify,  the  claim  of  plaintiff 8.56 

621.  Application    of  doctrine.     Limitation    established   by   New  York 

courts.     Purely  judicial.     Criticism 859 

622.  Decisions  in  other  States 860 

623.  Cause  of  limitation  upon  counter-claims 862 

624.  How  plead  counter-claim.     Characteristic  marks.     Reason  herein  863 

II.    The  Parties  in  their  Relations  icith  the  Counter-Claim. 

625.  Relations  of  defendant  to  counter-claim.     Must  be  a  demand  in 

favor  of  defendant  who  pleads  it.     Test 868 

626.  Case  of  surety.     Relief  in  equity 868 

627.  Rule  not  confined  to  sureties.     Other  instances 870 


xlvi  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

Section  Page 

G26.    Relations  of  plaintiff  to  couuter-claiin.    I\Iust  ])e  a  demand  against 

plaintiff.    Test.     Application  of  rule  nicst  fre(iueut  in  what  cases     871 

G29.    Counter-claim  must  be  a  cause  of  action ;  merely  defensive  matter 

not  sufficient 873 

03u.  In  actions  by  married  women  ;  by  widows.  Must  be  again.st  plain- 
tiff' in  capacity  in  which  he  sues.  Against  plaintiff'  alone  and 
against  all  the  plaintiff's.     Exception 873 

tJ31.  When  the  counter-claim  may  be  in  favor  of  one  or  more  of  several 
defendants,  and  against  one  or  more  of  several  plaintiffs.  When 
possible.     Question  herein  stated 875 

632.  Against  one  or  some  of  the  plaintiff's.     Illustrative  case    ....     876 

633.  Several  judgment  between  some  of  the  parties.     Inquiry  presented 

herein.     Conflict  of  opinion 878 

634.  In  favor  of  one  or  some  of  the  defendants.     Settled  rule  herein      .  880 

635.  Where  partnership  may  be  sued  in  firm  name.    Illustrative  cases  .  881 
630.    Construction   given   to  language  of   Iowa  code  in  Musselman  v. 

(ialligher 882 

637.  Rules  established  in  most  of  the  States 883 

638.  Counter-claim  may  fail  for  want  of  necessary  parties,  especially 

those  of  an  equitable  character.     Illustrative  case 884 

III.    The  Subject- Matter  of  Counter-Claims,   or  the  Nature    of  the    Causes    of 
Action  which  may  be  pleaded  as  Counter-Claims. 

639.  Introductory 885 

A.  Whether  a  Counter-Claim  may  he  an  Equitable  Cause  of  Action,  and  the 
Means  of  Obtaining  Equitable  Relief ;  or  whether  it  must  be  restricted  to  Legal 
Causes  of  Action  and  Reliefs. 

640.  An  equitable  counter-claim  may  be  interposed  in  an  equitable  or 

legal  action 885 

041.  Limitation  upon  equitable  relief  granted  to  defendant :  in  actions 
of  equitable  character ;  in  actions  of  legal  character.     Doctrine 

maintained  by  Supreme  Court  of  New  York.     Illustrative  case  887 

642.  Additional  instances 889 

643.  Is  counter-claim  possible  in  action  to  recover  possession  of  chattels  ?  890 

li.    77,r  I'urliculnr  Questions  which  arise  under  the  First  Clause  or  Branch  of  the 

Statutory  Definition. 

014  Language  of  the  first  clause.  The  three  subjects  embraced  within 
this  language.  Particular  phrases  requiring  construction. 
Method  of  interpretation  adopted  by  the  courts 892 

645.  Illustrativeca.se.     Meaning  of  term  "  Transaction  " 893 

646.  Case  of  Scheunert  v.  Kaehler.     Criticism 896 

647.  Cawes  in  Indiana  and  Kentucky.     Discussion  of  the  meaning  of 

the  phrases  "arising  out  of,"  "connected  with,"  and  "transac- 
tion "  in  these  cases 898 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  xlvii 

section  Page 
l;-18.    Cannot  defeat  counter-claim  by  choice  of  form  of  action.     Thomp- 
son r.  Kessel 900 

049.    Xenia  Branch  Bank  i-.  Lee 901 

(i.jO.    Meaning  of  term  "  transaction."      Diiferences  of  opinion  as  to  the 

import  of  statutory  terras 903 

051.    Meaning   of    "subject   of   action."      No    agreement   in    judicial 

opinions.     Construction  proposed  by  author 904 

652.    The  phrase  "  connected  with.''     Connection  must  be  immediate 

and  direct 906 

I.  Cases  in  which  the  Cause  of  Action  Allefjed  as  a  Coimter- Claim  arises  out  of 
the  Contract  Set  forth  in  the  Complaint  or  Petition  as  the  Foundation  of  the 
PlainiifTs  Claim. 

053.  First  and  second  subdivisions  of  statute  overlap  to  a  certain  extent  906 

054.  General  proposition  stated.     Illustrative  examples 90S 

055.  Examples  continued 910 

056.  Examples  continued 911 

II.  Cases  in  which  the  Cause  of  Action  AJlecjed  as  a  Counter-Claim  arises  out  of 
the  Transaction  Set  faith  in  the  Complaint  or  Petition  as  the  Foundation 
of  the  Plaintiffs   Claim. 

057.  Plan  of  discussing  this  subdivision 911 

658.  Classification  and  arrangement  of  cases  to  be  cited 912 

659.  First  class.     AVhere  tlie  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  the  defend- 

ant's counter-claim  are  in  form  debt  or  damages  upon  contract 

express  or  implied 912 

660.  Cases  in  which  the  plaintiffs  cause  of  action  is  upon  contract,  and 

the  defendant's  counter-claim  is  for  damages  arising  from  a  tort  913 

661.  Damages  from  trespas.ses,  nuisances,  negligences,  and  the  like  .     .  915 
062.    Same  subject 916 

663.  Damages  arising  fiom  fraud 917 

664.  Cases  in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  for  a  tort  and  the 

defendant's  counter-claim  is  in  form  upon  contract 917 

665.  Same  subject 919 

666.  Cases  in  which  the  demands  of  both  parties  are  for  damages  aris- 

ing from  tort 920 

667.  Second  class.      Legal  actions  in  which  the  judgment  is  other  than 

for  money 921 

068.    Third  class.     Cases  in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  or  the 

defendant's  counter-claim,  or  both,  are  equitable  in  tlieir  nature  .  923 

III.  Cases  in  ivhich  the  Cause  of  Action  Alleged  by  the  Defendant  as  a  Counter- 

claim is  or  is  not  connected  tvith  the  Subject  of  the  Action. 

669.  References  to  cases  already  cited 924 

670.  Construction  of  the  phrases  "  subject  of  the  action,"  "connected 

with,"  and  "arising  out  of." 925 


xlviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

C.    Counter-Claims  Embraced   within   the  Second  Subdivision   of  the   Statutory 

Dejinition  and  Set-offs, 
Section  Page 

671.    Statutory  provision.     Limitation  upon  the  discussion  herein      .     .     928 
G7l'.    Statute  enlarges  former  legal  "setoff  "  and  is  broader  in  its  opera- 
tion than  •'  equital)Ie  set-off."      Difficult  questions  herein.    Order 

of  treatment 928 

i»73.    Requisites  of  counter-claim  under  this  clause  of  the  statute  .     .     .     930 

674.  May,  but  need  not,  counter-claim  unliquidated  danoages.     Claim 

for  contribution  by  surety.     Pleading 932 

675.  May  set  up  as  a  counter-claim  the  following  :  A  judgment  against 

the  plaintiff  ;  rights  of  actions  allowed  only  by  statute  and  re- 
garded as  arising  on  an  implied  promise  ;  demand  growing  out 

of  unsettled  partnership  transactions 934 

670.    Counter-claim  against  an  executor  de  son  tort.      In  an  action  by  a 

pledgor 935 

677.  Statement  of  established  doctrine.     Question  of  doubt  herein    .     .     936 

678.  Illustrative  examples  in  equitable  actions 937 

079.    Counter-claim  of  money  demand  on   independent  contract  inter- 
posed in  action  to  foreclose  mortgage 937 

IV.    Some  Miscellaneous  Proi'isions  in  Relation  to  Counter-Claims. 

680.    Opportunity  to  interpose  counter-claim  not  a  bar  to  another  suit 

thereon 938 

6S1.    Form  of  verdict,  finding,  and  judgment 940 

682.  Cross-complaints.     Provisions  of  the  codes.     Difference  in  practice. 

Illustrative  cases 941 

683.  Illustrative  cases  continued 944 

084.    Code  provision  in  Indiana.     Procedure.     Iowa  and  California  .     .     945 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  kkferences  are  to  the  pages.] 


A. 


Abadie  v.  Carrillo,  02  Cal.  172  684 

Abba  V.  Smyth  (1899),  21  Utah,  109, 

59  Pac.  756  818 

Abbe  V.  Clarke,  Ol  Barb.  238         178,  818 

Abbot  V.  Chapman,  2  Lev.  81  701 

Abbott  V.  Blossom,  66  Barb.  353  049 

V.  Gaelics  (1899),  20  Wash.  517, 

56  Pac.  28  320,  754 

r.  Jewett,  25  IIuii,  603  412 

i;.  Monti,  il  Colo.  561  55,  942 

Abcel  V.  Van  Gelder,  36  N.  Y.  513       284 

Abell  Note,  etc.  Co.  r.  Ilurd,  52  N.  W. 

Kep.  488  94 

Abendroth  u.  Boardley,  27  Wis.  555  658 
Aberaman  Iron  C!o.  v.  Wickens,  L.  R. 

4  Ch.  App.  101  255 

Abiel  V.  Harrington,  18  Kan.  253  570 

Abilene  Nat.  Bank  r.  Nodine  (1894), 

26  Ore.  53,  37  Pac.  47  070 

Abrahanison  v.    Lamberson    (1898), 

72  Minn.  308,  75  N.  W.  226  917 

Acer  V.  Hotchkiss,  97  N.  Y.  395  805 

Achey  v.  Creech    (1899),  21  Wash. 

319,  58  Pac.  208  470 

Acker  v.  McCullough,  50  Ind.  447  007 
Ackley  v.  Tarbox,  31  N.  Y.  564  185,  224 
Ackroyd  v.  P.ri^ijs,  14  W.  R.  25  242 

Adair  v.  New  liivcr  Co.,  11  Ves.  429  363, 

885,  389 
Adams  v.  Adams,  25  Minn.  72  576 

y.  Adams  (1903),  —Ind.  —,66 

N.  E.  153  816 

V.  Baker  (1898),  24  Nev.  162,  55 

Pac.  8(i2  877,  881,  934 

V.  Bissell,  28  Barb.  382  485,  495 

V.  Castle  (1896),  64  Minn.  505,67 

N.  W.  687  618 

V.  Curtis,  4  Lans.  164    '  226 

V.  Farr,   5  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  59  218 

V.  Hall,  2  Vt.  9 
V.  Hayes  (1897),  120  N.  C.  383, 

27  S.  E.  47  594,  665 

V.  Holden  (1900),  111  la.  54,  82 

N.  W.  468  608 

V.  HoUey,  12  How.  Pr.  326  584 

V.  Honness,  62  Barb.  820         225,  315 


Adams  v.  Loomis,  8  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

17  928 

V.  Osgood  (1898),  55  Neb.  766, 

76  N.  W.  446  867 

V.  Rodarmel,  19  Ind.  339  131,  134 

V.  Trigg,  87  Mo.  141  881 

r.  Warren  (1900),  27  Col.  293,61 

Pac.  (!09  913 

Adams  Ex.  Co.  v.  Darnell,  31  Ind.  20   707, 

786,  778,  748,  769 

V.  Hill.  43  Ind.  157  78;". 

Adnms  Oil  Co.  v.  Christmas  (1897), 

101  Ky.  564,  41  S.  W.  545  640 

Adamson  c  Raymer  (189(i),  94  Wis. 

243,  68  N.  W.  1000  602 

r.  Wiggins,  45  Minn.  448  809,  880 
Addicken  w.  Schrubbe,  45  Iowa,  315  499 
Ades  V.  Levi  (1893),  137  Ind.  500,  37 

N.  E.  388  593 

Adkins  v.  Adkins,  48  Ind.  12  727 

r.  Loucks  (1900),  107  Wis.  587, 

83  N.  W.  934  466,  468,  493 

A.  K.  Johnson  Co.  v.  White  (1899), 

78  Minn.  48,  80  N.  W.  838  421,  661 

TEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Glasgow  Elec.  Co. 
(1899),  107  Ky.  77,  52  S.  W. 
975  672 

V.  Simmons  (1896),  49  Neb.  811, 

69  N.  W.  125  790 

A'ltna  Iron  Works  v.  Eirmenicli  Mfg. 
Co.  (1894),  90  la.  390,  57  N.  W. 
904  618 

^Etna  Life  Ins.  Co.  r.  Sellers  (1899), 

154  Ind.  37(1,  50  N.  E.  97  181 

A.  F.  Sli!i[)l('ig!i  ll.'irdware  Co.  v. 
Hamilton  (1902),  70  Ark.  319,  68 
S.  W.  490  626 

Agar  V.  Fairfax,  17  Ves.  542  308 

Agard  v.  Valencia,  39  Cal.  292  359 

Agate  V.  King,  17  Abb.  Pr.  159  868 

Ah  Doon  u.  Smith  (1893),  25  Ore. 

89,  34  Pac.  1093  810 

AIhtu  r.  Collins,  39  Mo.  145  641 

Aiken  c.  Bruen,  21  Ind.  137  661 

Aikeus  v.  Frank  ( 1898),  21  Mont.  192, 

63  Pac.  538  736 

Ainsley  r.  Mead,  3  Lans.  116  316 

Ainslie  r.  Boynton,  2  Barb.  258  122 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the   REFEaENCES    ARE  TO   THE  PAGES.] 


Ainswortli  v.  Bowen,  'J  Wis.  348  897, 

910,  915 

Akerlv  f.  Vilas.  15  Wis.  401  923 

r'Vilas,  21  Wis.  8S  897,937 

Albany  r.  Cunliff.  2  N.  Y.  ICo  663 

Albany  i  H.  Iron,  etc.  Co.  c.  Lund- 

berj.  121  r.  S.  451  150 

Alberc  r.  Kingsland,  13  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

794  113 

Albers  v.    Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 

(1896),  98  la.  51,  GO  N.  W.  1040        671 
Albion  Millinj:  Co.  v.  Firt;t  Nat.  Bank 

(1902),  04  Ni'b   110.  89  >".  W.  038      737 
Albrecht    I'.    Milwaukee,    etc.    Co. 

(1894),  87  Wis.  10.5,  58  N.  W.  72       069 
Alden    <•.    Christianson     (1901),    83 

Minn.  21,  85  N.  W.  824  850,  863 

Alexander,  AV,  37  Iowa,  454  226 

i:  Alexander,  85  Va  353,  303, 
7  S.  K.  335,  3.39,  1  L.  R.  A. 
125,  127  508 

V.  Barker,  2  Tvr.  140 
V.  Cana,  1  DeG.  .<:  Sm.  415  361 

V.  Gaar.  15  Ind.  89  178 

r.  Grs'.n.l   l.o.l-e  (1903),  119  la. 

519,  93  N.  W.  508  606 

f.  Hurd,  64  N.  Y.  228  218 

I'.  Jacoby,  23  Ohio  St.  358       206,  211 
V.  Overton  (1893),  36  Neb.  603, 

64X.  W.  825  117 

V.  Quiglev,  2  Duvall,  300  341 

V.  Thackcr,  3  Nebr.  614  452,  601 

Alford  r.  Bariium,   45  Cal.  482  815 

Alkire  r.  Alkire(  1892),  134  Ind.  350, 

32  N.  E.  571  709 

Allaire  i'.  Wliitnev,  1  Hill,  484  843 

Allen  r.  Brown,  44  X.  Y.  228  91,  97 

r.  Buffalo,  38  N.  Y.  280  181,  185 

1-.  Carolina  Cent.  Ky.  Co.  (1897), 

120  X.  C.  548,  27  S.  E.  76        599 
V.  Chicago  &  Xortliwestern  Ry. 
Co.  (1896),  94   Wis.  93,  68 
X.  W.  873  599,  709 

V.  Chouteau,  102  Mo.  309  665 

p.  Church  (1897),  101  la.  116,70 

X.  W.  l-_'7  717 

D.  City  of  Davenport  (1901),  115 

la.  211.  HI  N.  W.  743  433 

V.  Coates,  29  .Minn.  40  920 

r.  Cooley  (l8'.tHi,  53  S.  C.  414, 

81  S.  K.  034  177,  358 

V.  Cooley  (1898),  6;J  S.  C.  77,  30 

S.  K.  721  179 

f.  Douglass,  29  Kan.  412  873 

V.  Fosgate,  11  How.  I'r,  218    300,  402 
f.  Frawlev.  ( 19(Kl),  100  Wis.  038, 

h2  X.  W.  593  066 

r.  Hollingnhcad  (litOO),  165  Ind. 

\~x,  57  X.  ]•:.  917  717 

r.  Jerauld,  .31  Ind.  ;i72  310 

f.  Knight,  6  Han-,  272  252 

I'.  .Macon,  etc.  It.  R.  Co.  (1809), 

1(»7  (J«.  h;5K,  ;j:j  s.  E.  090        621 
V.  Madox,  •!(»  Iowa,  124  875 

w.  Miller,  11  Ohio  .St.  374  101 


Allen  V.  Olynipia  Light  &  Power  Co. 
(1895),  13  Wash.  307,  43 
Pac.  55  832 

V.  Patterson,  7  N.  Y.  476    26,  584,  586 
V.  Randolph,  48  Ind.  496        727,  748, 

918 
V.  Ranson,  44  Mo.  263  285 

V.  Saunders,  0  Neb.  436  793 

V.  Shackelton,  15  Ohio   St.  145   800, 

923 
V.  Smith,  10  N.  Y.  415  .357 

i\  State,  61  Ind.  208  499 

c.  Stephens  (1899),  107  Ga.  733, 

33  S.  E.  651  641 

V.  Thomas,  3  Mete.  198  105,  109 

AUend   v.    Spokane  Falls,  etc.  Ry. 

Co.  (1899),  21  Wash.  324  505,  643 

Alliance  Elevator  Co.  v.  Wells  (1890), 

93  Wis.  5,  00  X.  W.  796  494 

AUis  V.  Leonard,  46  N.  Y.  688       733,  751 
1-.  Nanson,  41  Ind.  154  798 

Allison  I'.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 

42  Iowa,  274  801 

V.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9  Bush, 

247  U9 

V.  Robinson,  78  N.  C.  222  240 

V.  Weller.  0  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  291  340 

Allred  i-.  Brav,  41  Mo.  484  301 

U.Tate  (1901),  113  Ga.  441,  39 

S.  E.  101  511 

Almance   Cy.   Com'rs   v.   Blair,   70 

N.  C.  136  037 

Alnutt  V.  Leper,  48  Mo.  319  276 

Alpert  V.  Bright  ( 1902),  74  Conn.  614, 

ylAtl.  521  773 

Alspaugh  r.  Ben  Franklin  Ir.  Ass.,  51 

Ind. 271  439 

V.  Reid  (1898),  0  Idaho,  223,  55 

Pac.  300  702 

Alston  V.  Wilson,  44  Iowa,  130  002 

Altenius  v.   Aslier    (1903),  Ky.,  74 

S.  W.  245  543 

Alter  f.  Bank  of  Stockham  (1897), 

63  Neb.  223,  73  N.  W.  667  35 

Althouse   1-.  Rice,  4  E.  D.   Smith, 

347  806 

V.  Town  of  Jamestown  (1895), 

91  Wis.  46,  04  N.  W.  423         751 
Alvey  V.  Wilson,  9  Kan.  401  290 

Alvonl  r.  Essner,  45  Ind.  150  727 

Alward  c.  Alwanl,  2  X.  Y.  Suppl.  42  226 
Alworth  r.  Seymour,  42  Minn.  520  067 
Amador  Cy.  r.  Butterfield,  51  Cal. 

526  709,  831,  834 

American    Accident   Co.    v.   Carson 

(IB'.iO),  9'.)  Kv.  441,  30  S.  W.  169    672 
American  B.  11.,   0.  S.  &  S.  Mach. 

Co.  V.  Gurnee,  44  Wis.  49        661 
V.  Thornton,  28  Minn.  418  471 

American  Book  Co.  r.  Kingdom 
Publishing  Co.  (1898),  71  Minn. 
303, 73  N.  W.  1089  003,  680 

Am.  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n  v.  Rain- 
bolt  (1896),  48  Neb.  434,  07  N.  W. 
493  768 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  a 


American   Contract   Co.    v.  Bullcn 

Bridge  Co.  (189G),  29  Ore.  549,  46 

Pac.  1.38. 
Am.  E.xch.  Bank  r.  Davidson  (1897), 

69  Minn.  .'JIB,  72  N.  W.  129 
American  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Landfaro 

(1898),   56    Neb.   482,  76   N.  \V. 

1068 
Am.  Freeliold  Co.  v.  McManus  (1900), 

68  Ark.  263,  58  S.  W.  2-50 
Am.  M.  A.  Sue.  v.  Helburn,  85  Ky.  1 
American  Savings  and  Loan  Associa- 
tion V.  Burgiiardt  (1897),  19  Mont. 

323,  48  Pac.  391 
American    Shoe    Co.    v.    O'Kourke 

(1900),  23  Mont.  530,  59  Pac.  910 
American  Trust,  etc.  Bank  «.  McGet- 

tigan  (1899),  152  Ind.  582,  52  N.  E. 

793 
American  Water  Works  Co.  v.  State 

(1895),  46  Neb.  194,  64  N.  W.  711 
Ammerman  v.  Crosby,  26  Ind.  451 


690 


942 


593 

543 

567 


474 


672 


181 

709 

769, 
783 


Amos  V.  Humboldt  Loan  Ass'n,  21 

Kan.  474  940 

Anders  v.  Life   Ins.  Co.  (1901),  62 

Neb.  585,  87  N.  W.  831  689 

Anderson  v.  Alsetli  (1895),  6  S.  D. 

566,  62  N.  W.  435  593,  625 

v.  Bank  (1895),  5  N.  D.  80,  64 

N.  W.  114  639 

V.  Bank  (1896),  5  N.  D.  451,  67 

N.  W.  821  649 

V.  Case,  28  Wis.  505        626,  630,  683 
V.  Chilson  (1895),  8  S.  D.  64,  65 

N.  W.  435  8,  89 

V.  Davis   (1898),  18  Utah,  200, 

55  Pac  363  231 

V.  Fitzgerald,  51  Fed.  Rep.  294      112 
V.  Foster  (1898),'  105  Ga.  563,  32 

S.  E.  373  656 

V.  Gaines   (1900),   156  Mo.  664, 

57  S.  W.  726  542 

V.  Groesbeck  (1899),  26  Colo.  3, 

55  Pac.  1086  639 

V.  Hayes  (1899),  101  Wis.  519, 

77  N.  W.  903  688 

V.  Hill,  53  Barb.  238        313,  458,  482, 
490,  492,  497 
V.  Hilton  &  Dodge  Co.   (1899), 

110  Ga.  263,  U  S.  E.  365        712 
V.  Hunn,  5  Hun,  79  15,  29 

V.  Joimson  (1900),  106  Wis.  218, 

82  N.  W.  177  98,  916 

I'.  Martindale.  1  East,  497  231 

V.  Mayfield,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  598       933 
V.  Nicholas,  28  N.  Y.  600  12.3,  124 

V.  Orient  Fire  Ins.    Co.  (1893), 

■  88  la.  579,  55  N.  W.  348         878 
V.  Rasmussen    (18941,  5   Wyo. 

44, 36  Pac.  820   '  782 

V.   Scandia     Bank     (1893),    53 

Minn.  191, 54  N.  W.  1062  444, 

4.58,  498,  503 

V.  Sutton,  2  Duv.  480  245 


RE   TO   THE  PAGES.] 

Anderson  v.  Union  Terminal  Rv.  Co. 
(1901),  161  Mo.  411,  61 
S.  W.  874  625 

r.  Wabash,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  65  Iowa, 

131  209 

V.  War  Eagle   IMin.  Co.  (1906), 

Idaho,  72  Pac  671  12,  17 

V.  Watson,  3  Mete.  509  160 

V.  Yosemite  Mining  Co.  (1894), 

9  Utai),  420,  3o  Pac.  502  96 

Andre  v.  Railway  Co.,  30  la.  107  714 

Andreas  c.  Holcombo,  22  Minn.  ?>^,9     bio 
Andres  ;;.  Kridler  (1896),  47  Neb. 

585,  66  N.  W.  649  671 

Andrews  v.  Bond,  16  Barb.  033     762,  772, 

778 
V.  Brown,  21  Ala.  437  248 

V.  Carlile  (1894),  20  Colo.  370, 

38  Pac.  465  283 

V.  Gillespie,  47  N.  Y.  487   52,  122,  357, 

V.  McDaniel,  68  N.  C.  385  90 

V.  Mokelumne  Hill    Co.,  7  Cal. 

330  175,  178,  204,  209 

I'.  Pratt,  44  Cal.  309  118 

V.  Runyon,  65  Cal.  629  234 

V.   School    District    (1896),    49 

Neb.  420,  68  N.  W.  631  608 

Angier  v.  Equitable  Bldg.  Ass'n 
(1899),  109  Ga.  625,  35  S.  E.  64        687, 

757,  818 
Angle  v.  Manchester  (1902),  — Neb. 

— ,91N.  W.  501  680 

Anglin   v.   Conley  (1903),  —  Ky. -, 

71  S.  W.  926  466 

Anglo-Am.  Land,  etc.  Co.    i\  Broh- 

man,  33  Neb.  409  809 

Angus    r.   Craven    (1901),  1.32   Cal. 

691,  64  Pac.  1091  40 

Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass'n  v. 
Peterson  (1894),  41  Neb.  897,  60 
N.  W.  373  819 

Ankrum    i^.    City   of    Marshalltown 

(1898),  105  la.  493,  75  N.  W.  360    638 

Annett  v.  Kerr,  28  How.  Pr.  324  152 

Anonymous,  3  Atk.  572  259 

8  How.  Pr.  434  798 

3  Swanst.  139  242 

1  Veru.  261  347 

1  Ves.  29  51 1 

Anson  r.  Anson,  20  Iowa,  55         326,  333, 

338,  379 
V.  Dwight,  18  Iowa,  241  789 

Anthony  v.  Norton  (1899),  60  Kan. 

341,  56  Pac.  529  220 

r.  Nve.  30  Cal.  401  333,  335,  336 

r.  Slayden  (1900),  27  Colo.  144, 

60  Pac.  826  640 

V.  Stinson,  4  Kan.  211  935 

Antisdel    v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  26  Wis.  145'  572,605 

Apperson's   Adm.  v.  Triplett,  13  S. 

W.  Rep.  791  916 

Applegate  v.  Tvson,  39  N.  J.  Eq. 
365  '  239 


lii 


TABLt:   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the   RtFERENCCS    ABE  TO   THE   PAGES.] 

r.    Fox    Hiver 
111   Wis.  465, 


Ali.lc-tMii    Mlg.   Co 
l'ui>LT  Co.  (1001) 

67  N.  \V.  4.J8  856 
Archibald   v.  Mut.   L.    Ins.  Co.,  38 

Wis.  542  88 

Aretuiell  r.  MLukwi'll.  Dl-v.  F.q.  354  249 

Argard  .•.  I'arkiT,  SI  Wis.  5»l  737 

ArgersingtT  c  i.t'vor,  54  Hun.  (il3  637 

ArgDtsinger  r.  \  ines,  82  N.  Y.  308  575 

Arguello" -•.  Eiliii;;er,  10  Cal.  150  52 
Arinionii  c  (ircen  IJay  &  Miss.  Canal 

Co..  31  Wis.  316  499 
Armagost  r.  Hising  (1898),  54  Neb. 

76;^.  75  N.  W,  534  686 
Armour     Packing     Co.     r.    (Jrrick 

( 1896),  4  Okla.  (KU.  46  Pac.  573  642 
Armstcad  r.  Neptune  (lt<H6),56  Kan. 

750,  44  Pac.  W8  710 

Armstrong  r.  Armstrong,  27  Ind.  186  890 
c.  Dunn  (IH'.to).  143  Ind.  433,  41 

N.  E.  540  662 

1-.  Hall.  17  How.  Pr  76  525 

V.  Hinds,  8  .Minn.  254               494,  516 
1-.  Huftv   (1901),  156  Ind.  600, 

55  N.  E.  443  326 
i;.   Mayer  (1903),  —  Neb. —,  95 

N.  W.  51                            887,  942 
j>.  Penn  (1898),  105  Ga.  229,  81 

S.  E.  158  659 

V.  Vroman,  11  Minn.  220  151 

V.  Warner,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  877  132 

Arnold  v.  Angell,  62  N.  Y.  508   38, 614, 620 

r.  Bainbrigge,  2  UeG.  F.  &  J.  92  247, 


334 
575 
832 
292 
111 


V.  Baker,  0  Neb.  1-34 

V.  Dimon,  4  Sandf.  680 

V.  Morris,  7  Daly,  498 

V.  Nicliols,  04  N.  Y.  117 

1-.  Passavant   (1897),   10   Mont. 

575.  49  Pac.  400  831 

v.  Suffolk  liank,  27  Barb.  424         300 
Arrington  r.  Arrinuton   (1894),   114 

N.  C.  116,  19  .S.  E.  278  624 

Arthur   r.  Homestead  Ins.   Co.,   78 

N.  Y.  402  40 

Arthurs  r.  Thompson  (1895), 97  Kv. 

218.  .30.S.  \V.  028  849,865 

Arts  r.  Guthrie,  75  Iowa,  674  190 

Ary  r.  Chesmore  (190D,  113  la.  63, 

84  N.  W.  965  071 

ARchermann  v.  Brewing  Co.,  45  Wis. 

'^^^  018 

Asevado  r.  Orr  (1893),  100  Cal.  293, 

04  Pac.  777  001,  602,  712 

A»li  r.  City  of  Independence  (1902), 

109  Mo.  77.  6H  .S.  W.  888  679 

Ashhy  r.  Win»ton.  20  Mo.  210  457 

Ashcraft    >:    Knobhwk    (1896),    146 

Ind.  169.  45  N.  E.  09  ,301   307 

Ashe  r.  Bfa«ley  (1890),  6  N.  D.  191. 

09N.  W.  IKH  G18 

Ajher  » .  .St.  Louis,  etc.  li.  Co.,  89 

-Mo  no  103 

Ashland  .'.  W.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  (1902), 
1 1 1  Wi».  104,  89  N.  W.  888  702 


Ashland    Land,    etc.    Co.    >•.     May 

(1897).  51  Neb.  474.  71  N.W.  67   802 
c.  Woodford  (1897),  50  Neb.  118, 

09  N    W.  709  866 

Ashley  v.  Little  Rock,  19  S.  W.  Rep. 

1058  358 

v.  Marshall.  29  N.  Y.  494  927 

Ashton  v.  Shepherd,  120  Ind.  69  587 

i:   Stuv    (lb95),  90  la.    197,  04 

N.  W.  804  003 

Askew  V.  Koonce  (1896),  118  N.  C. 

526,  24  S.  E.  218  703,  849 

Askins  v.  Hcarns,  3  Abb.  Pr.  184  894,920 
Asplund  r.  Mattson  (1896).  15  Wash. 

328,  4(i  Pac.  341  703 

Aspy  >:  HMiki:is  (1003),— Ind.— ,  66 

N.  E   402  673 

Atcheson.  Topeka,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Anderson  (1902),  65  Kan. 
202,  69  Pac.  158  305 

V.   Atchison   Grain    Co.    (1902), 

—  Kan.  — ,  70  Pac.  933  601 

r.  Benton,  42  Kan.  698  359 

I.  Coninir's  of  Sumner  Co. 
(1893),  51  Kan.  017,  33  Pac. 
312  444,  455,  498 

r.  Hucklebridge  (1901),  62  Kan. 

506,  04  Pac.  58  179 

v.  Marks  (1901),  11  Okla.  82,  65 

Pac.  996  613 

V.  Potter  (1899),  60  Kan.  808,  58 

Pac.  471  004 

Atkinson  v.  Cawley  (1900),  112  Ga. 

485,  37  S.  E.  715  155 

V.  Collins,  9  Abb.  Pr.  353  587 

i:  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  (1895),  143 

Ind.  501,  41  N.  E.  947  568 

Atlanta  Elevator  Co.  v.  Cotton  Mills 

(1898),  106  Ga.  427,  32  S.  E.  541        470 
Atlanta  Real  Est.  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Nat. 

Bank,  75  (ia.  40  388 

Atlantic  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bluthenthal 

(1897),  101  Ga.  541,  28  S.  E.  1003      641 
Atlantic,  etc.  R.   R.  Co.  v.  Southern 
Pine  Co.   (1902),  116  Ga.  224,  42 
S.  E.  .500  2.57 

Atteberry  r.  Powell,  29  Mo.  429  831 

Attorney-General     v.    Craddock,    3 

Mylno  &  C.  85  509 

r.  Mayor,  etc.,  3  Duer,  119  413 

V.  Stephens,  1  K.  &  J.  724  243 

V.  Wynne,  Mos.  126  241 

Atwater  >\  Schenck,  9  Wis.  160  932 

V.  Spalding  (1902),  80  Minn.  101, 

90  N.  W.  370  687 

Aubuchon  r.  Lory,. 33  Mo.  99  196 

Auburn,  Nat.  Bank  of,  r.  Lewis,  81 

N.  Y.  15  908 

Auburn  Theol.  Sem.  Trs.  i:  Kellogg, 

16  N.  Y.  83  .344 

Aucker  r.  Adams,  2)  Ohio  St.  543  270 
Audsley  ;•.  Horn,  26  Beav.  195  247,  334 
Aulbach  v.  Dahler  (1896),  Idaho,  43 

Pac.  322  058 

Auld  V.  Butcher,  2  Kan.  135  831 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[tqe  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


AuU  V.  Jones,  5  Xeb.  500 

AuU  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Lexington,  74  Mo. 

104 
Aultman  r.  Case,  68  Wis.  612 

V.    Mills    (1894),    y    Wash.   68, 

36  Pac.  1046 
r.  Shelton  (1894),  90  la.  288,  57 

N.  W.  857 
V.  Stichler,  21  Neb.  72 
Aultman    &   Taylor   Co.    v.    Mead 
(1901),  109  Ky.  583,  60  S.  W.  294 
Aultman  Co.  r.  McDonougli  (1901), 

110  Wis.  263,  85  N.  W.  980   890,  922, 
Aurora  v.  Co.x  (1895),  43  Neb.  727, 

62  N.  W.  66 
Aurora  Water  Co.  v.  Aurora  (1895), 

129  Mo.  540,  31  S.  W.  946 
Ausk!'.  KailwavCo.  (1901),  10  N.  D. 

215,  86  N.  W.  719 
Austin  V.  I^acon,  49  Hun,  386 

V.  Marcli   (1902),  86  Minn.  232, 

90  N.  W.  384 
17.  Munro,  47  N.  Y.  360 
V.   Murdock    (1900).  127   N 

454,  37  S.  E.  478 
V.  Rawdon,  44  N.  Y.  63 
V.  Schluyster,  7  Hun,  275 
Austin   Mfsr.  Co.  v.   Decker  (1899), 

109  1a.  277,  80  N.  W.  312 
Austin,    Tomlinson,  &  Webster  M. 
Co.  V.  Heiser  (1894),  6  S.  D.  429, 
61  N.  W.  445  455, 

Averbeck  r.  Hall,  14  Busli,  505 
Avery  v.  Dougherty,  102  Ind.  443 
Axiom  Mill.  Co.  v.  Little  (1894),  6 

S.  D.  438,  61  N.  W.  441 
Aydelott  v.  Collings  (1895),  144  lud. 

602,  43  N.  E.  867 
Ayers  v.  Lawrence,  59  N.  Y.  192     118, 
V.  Wolcott  ( 1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92 
N.  W.  1036 
Aylesworth  v.  Brown,  31  Ind.  270 
Ayres  v.  CoviU,  18  Barb.  264 
r.  Duggan   (1899),  57  Neb 

78  N.  W.  296 
V.  Lawrence,  63  Barb.  4.54 
V.  O'Farrell,  4  Robt.  668 
V.  Wiswall,  112  U.  S.  187 


B. 


505, 
C. 

628, 


750, 


597 

658 
911 

734 

638 

780 

753 
924 

683 

608 

570 
314 

410 
524 

302 
633 
576 

655 

456 
575 
916 

867 

643 
119 

625 
289 
663 

271 
118 
915 
327 


361 


B V.  Waif ord,  4  Russ.  372 

Baas  V.  Chicrtf,'o  &  N.   W.  Ry.  Co., 

39  Wis.  296  337,  412 

Babbage  v.  Sec.  Bap.  Church  of  Du- 
buque, 54  Iowa,  172  734 
Babbett  v.  Young,  51  Barb.  466             871 
Babcock  v.  Maxwell  (1898),  21  Mont. 

507,  54  Pac.  943        702,  849,  864 
V.  Murray  (1894),  58  Minn.  385, 

69  N.  W.  1038  812 

Bach   V.    Montana    Co.    (1894),   15 

Mont.  345,  39  Pac.  291  740 

Backus  V.  Clark,  1  Kan.  303  821 


Bacon  v.  O'Keefe  (1896),  13  Wash. 

655,  43  Pac.  886  332 

Badger  /•.  Benedict,  4  Abb.  Pr.  176  495 
Badgiey  v.  Decker,  44  Barb.  577  220,  225 
Badham  v.  Brabham  (1899),  54  S.  C. 

400,  .32  S.  E.  444  715 

Baggott  V.  Boulger,  2  Duer,  160  152 

Bagshaw  v.  E.  Union  R.  Co.,  7  Hare, 

114  240 

Bailey  v.  Bayne,  20  Kan.  657  784 

V.  Bergen,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  642       47 
V.  Inglee,  2  Paige,  278  348 

!'.  Myrick,  36  Me.  50  246,  379 

r.  Swain,  45  Ohio  St.  657        781,  805 
V.  Wilson   (1899),  34  Ore.  186, 

55  Pac.  973  641,  668 

Bailey  Loan  Co.  v.  Hall  (1895),  110 

Cal.  490,  42  Pac.  962  278 

Bainbridge  r.  Burton,  2  Beav.  539        261 
Baines  v.  Babcock,  27  Pac.  674     266,  355 
V.    Coos    Rav  Nav.  Co.    (1902), 

41  Ore.  "135,68  Pac.  397    832,  834 
Bains  r.    Bullock    (1895),    129   Mo. 

117,  31  S.  W.  342  230 

Baird   v.   Citizens'  Ry.  Co.    (1898), 

146  Mo.  265, 48  S.  W.  78  592,  594 
)•.  Morford,  29  Iowa,  531         831,  875 
Baken  v.  Harder,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  440       315 
Baker  r.  Bailey,  16  Barb.  54  738 

I'.  Bartol,  7  Cal.  551  115,  260 

V.  Brvan,  64  Iowa,  561  112 

V.  Connell,  1  Daly,  469  910 

V.  Dessauer,  49  Ind.  28  614 

V.  Hornick  (1897),  51  S.  C.  313, 

28  S.  E.  941  642 

V.  Jewell,  6  Mass.  460  233 

V.  Kistler,  13  Ind.  63  736,  801 

V.  Peterson  (1899),  57  Neb.  375, 

77  N.  W.  774  735 

V.  Riley;  16  Ind.  479  419 

V.  Union  Stock  Yards  Nat.  Bank 
(1902),  63  Neb.  801,  89 
N.  W.  269  819 

Balbach  v.  Frelinghuysen,  15  Fed. 

Rep. 685  132 

Balch  V.  Jones,  61  C.il.  234  200 

V.  Wilson,  25  Minn.  299  576 

Baldwin?'.  Boyce  (1898),  152  Ind. 46, 

51  N.  E.  334  676,  684 

V.  Burt   (1895),  43  Neb.  245,  61 

N.  W.  601  566,  754 

r.  Canfield,  26  Minn.43  178 

V.  Martin,  14  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  9  820 

V.  Second    St.  Cable   Ry.    Co., 

77  Cal.  390  234 

V.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.,  54  Barb.  505       824 
Baldwin  Fertilizer  Co.  u.  Carmichael 
(1902),    116    Ga.    762,    42   S.   E. 
1002  641 

Balk  V.  Harris  (1902),  130  N.  C.  381, 

41  S.  E.  940  433 

Ball  V.  Beaumont  (1900),  59 Neb.  631, 

81  N.  W.  858  25 

V.  Beaumont  (1901),  63  Neb.  215, 

88  N.  W.  173  752 


liv 


TABLE    OF  CASES    CITED. 


[tbe  references  i 

BaU  I'.  Beaumont  (1902),  63  Neb.  215, 

92  N.  W.  170  640 

r.  Bennett,  21  Ind.  427  313,  314 

V.  Ceiiar   Vallev  Creamery  Co. 

(lS'.'0),i'8  la.  Ib4,  07  N.  W. 

232  418 

V.  Dou<l  (1894),  26  ( »re.  14,  37 

Pac.  70  685 

p.  Fulton  Cy.,  31  Ark.  379  584,  597 
V.  Putnam  (1898),  12:3  Cal.  134, 

55  Pac.  773  770 
Ballard  v.  Burjiett.  40  X.  Y.  314  124,  126 
Balle  r.  Mosslev,  13  S.  C.  439  607 
Balletine  r.  .loplin  (1898),  105  Ky. 

70,  48S.  W.  417  202 

Ballin  v.  Dillaye.  37  N.  Y.  35  393 

c.  Merchants'  Excli.  Bank(1895), 
89  Wis.  278,  61  X.  W. 
1118  942,946 

Baltimore  v.  Gill.  31  Md.  562  118 

Baltimore,  etc.  R.  H.  Co.  i\  Glenn 
(1902),  H6  0.  St.  072,  64 
N   E.  438  229 

v.  Kreaper  (1899),  61  O.  St.  312, 

56  X.  E.  203  682 
V.  Young  (189U),  146  Ind.  374, 

45  X.  E.  479  673.  681,  682 

Bambrick  r.  Simms  (1895),  132  Mo. 

48,  3:)  S.  W.  445  65 

Hancrolt  Co.  r.    Haslett  (1895),  100 

Cal.  151,  39  I'ac.  602  569 

Bandmann  r.  Davis  (1899),  23  Mont. 

382,  59  Pac.  856  456,  458 

Banfield  c.  Rumsey,  4  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

:i:^2  316 

Bank  <■.  Rank  (1902),  64  Kan.  134, 

(t7  I'ac.  4r>8  619 

r.ank  ..f  Antipo  r.  Rvan  (1899),  105 

Wis.  37.  80  X.  W.  440  816 

Bank  of  Arkansas  City  r.  Hasie 
(1897),  57  Kan.  754,  48  Pac. 
22  836, 931 

Bank  of  Brit.  Xo.  Am.  v.  Grain  Co. 
(189b),  60  Kan.  30,  65  Pac- 
277  478 

V.  Kuvdam.  6  How.  Pr.  379  351 

Bank  of  California  v.  Dyer  (1896),  14 

Wa^li.  279,  44  Pac.  534  666 

Bank  of  ('iia<ir(in  r.  Anderson  (1895), 

0  Wyo.  518,  48  I'ac.  197  433 

Bank    of   (Miariotte   v.   Britton,  66 

X.  C.  :J05  810 

Bank     of     Columbia     v.     Gadsden 

( 1899).  m  S.  r.  .313,  .33  S.  E.  575      867 
Bank    of   f'onimerce   r.    Ilaldeman 
i\W\).    KK»    Ky.    222,    58 
S.  \V.  .087  734 

. .  Humphrev  (1894),6  S.  D.  415, 

01  N.  \V.  444  787 

r.  Timbrell    (1900).   113   Iowa, 

713.  H4  X.  W.  519  418 

Bank  of  f  ienogsee  i'.  Patchin  Bank, 

13  X.  Y.  :VKt  541 

liank  of  fJIrncoe  r.  Cain  (190.']), 
^9  Minn.  473,  95  N.  W.  :M)8  834 


BE   TO   THE    PAGES.] 

Bank  of  Havana  v.  Magee,  20  N.  Y. 

355  177 

Bank   of  Lowville  v.   Edwards,   11 

How.  Pr.  216  181 

Bank  of  Malvern  i;.  Burton  (1900), 

67  Ark.  426,  55  S.  W.  483  641 

Bank  of  Rome  ;,•.  Haselton,  15  Lea, 

210  389 

Bank  of  Shasta  r.  Boyd  (1893),  99 

Cal.  604,  34  Pac.  337  803 

Bank  of  Stockham  v.  Alter  (1901), 

01  Neb.  359,  85  N.  W.  300  95 

]5ank  of   Stockton   r.  Howland,  42 

Cal.  129  293 

Bank  of  Woodland  r.  Heron  (1898), 

122  Cal.  107,  54  Pac.  537  045 

Hanker's  Reserve  Life  Ass'n  r. 
Finn  (1902),  64  Xeb.  105,  89 
N.  W.  672  602 

Banks  v.  Johnson,  4  J.  J.  Marsh.  649     564 
V.  Moshier  (1900),  73  Conn.  448, 

47  Atl.  056  756 

Banning  r.  Marleau  (1894),  101  Cal. 

238,  35  Pac.  772  890,  922 

Bannister  v.  Bull,  16  S.  C.  220  198 

r.  Grassy  Fork  D.  Ass'n,  52  Ind. 

178  748 

Banta  v.  Siller  (1898),  121  Cal.  414, 

53  Pac.  9.35  831 

Baptist    Church    at    Lancaster    v. 

Presb.  Ch.,  18  B.  Mon.  635  262 

Barbee  -.  Green,  b6  X.  C.  158  874 

Barker  v.  Crowell   (1898),  55   Xeb. 

571,  75  X.  W.  1109  674 

Barbre   v.   Goodale   (1896),  28  Ore. 

465,  43  Pac.  378  661 

Barclay  v.  Quicksilver  Miniiiir  Co  , 

6  Lans.  25  ^  814 

V.  Yeomans,  27  Wis.  682  283 

Barden   v.  Columbia  Cv.  Sup.,  33 

AVis.  45  ■  821 

Bardes  v.  Hutchinson  (1901),  113  la 

610,  85  X.  W.  797  849,  867 

Bardstown  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Metcalf.  4 

Mete.  (Ky.)  499  154,384,387 

Barilwell-l^obinson    Co.    i:    Brown 

(1894),  r,-  .Minn.  140.  58  N.  W.  872     787 
Barham   >-.   Bell    (1893),   112  X.  C. 

131,  10  S.  K.  903  116 

V.  Hostetter,  67  Cal.  272  503 

Barhvte  v.   Ihighes,  .33  Barb.  .320.     SM, 

920 
Baring  v.  Nasli,  1  Ves.  &  B.  551   242,  ,368 
Barker  r.  Bradley,  42  X.  Y.  316     105,  111 
''.  Knickerbocker  Life  Ins.  Co., 

24  Wis.  030  910 

r.  Prizer  (1897),  150  Ind.  4,48 

X.  E.  4  432 

V.  Ring  (1897),  97  Wis.  53,  72 

N.  W.  222  864 

/■.  Walters,  8  Beav.  92  389 

V.  Wheeler  (1900),  60  Xeb.  470, 

83  X.  W.  678;  8.  c.  (1901), 

62  Xeb.  150,  87  N.  W.  20         802 

Barlow  /•.  Burns,  40  Cal.  351  658 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Iv 


[the   REPEaENCUS   ARE  TO  THE    PAGES.] 


Barlow  r.  Mvers,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

183  "    105,  109,  111,  131,  133,  135 
V.  Scott,  24  N.  Y.  40  36,  475,  623 

V.  Scott's  Adm.,  12  Iowa,  63  293 
Barnacle  v.  Henderson    (1894),   42 

Neb.  169,  60  N.  W.  382  942 

Barnard,  Rfi,  L.  K.  32  Cli.  D.  447  872 
V.  Gantz  (1893),  140  N.  Y.  249, 

35  N.  E.  430  433 

Earner  v.  Morehead,  22  Ind.  354  661 

Barnes  v.  Beloit,  19  Wis.  93  264 

f.  Blake,  59  Hun,  371  278 

V.  Crawford  (1894),  115  N.  C.  76, 

20  S.  E.  386  638 

V.  Hekla  F.  Ins.  Co.,  75  Iowa,  11  637 
V.  Hekla  Fire  Ins.   Co.   (1893), 

56  Minn.  38,  57  N.  W.  314  107 

V.  Martin.  15  Wis.  240  228 

V.  McMullins,  78  Mo.  260  936 
V.  Packwood   (1894),  10  Wash. 

50,  38  Fac.  857  639 
V.  Quigley,  59  N.  Y.  265  626,  629,  630 

V.  liacine,  4  Wis.  454  262 

u.  Smith,  16  Abb.  Fr.  420  501 

v..  Stephens,  02  Ind.  226  658 
V.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  54  Fed. 

Rep.  87  820 

Barnett  v.  Leonard,  66  Ind.  422    178,  229, 

234 
V.  Pratt  (1893),  37  Neb.  349,  55 

N.   W.  1050  107 
Barney   v.  Latham,   103  U.  S.  205, 

215  509 
Barnhart  v.  Ehrhart  (1898),  33  Ore. 

274,  54  Pac.  195  625 
Barnstead  v.  Empire  Min.  Co.,  5  Cal. 

299  38,  66 

Barr  v.  Birkner  (1895),  44  Neb.  197, 

62  N.  W.  494  734 
V.    City   of   Omaha    (1894),   42 

Neb.  341,  60  N.  W.  591  638 

V.  Deniston,  19  N.  H.  170  118 

V.  Hack,  46  Iowa.  308  831 
V.  Little  (1898),  54  Neb.  556,  74 

N.  W.  850  709 
V.  Post  (1898).  56  Neb.  698,  77 

N.  W.  123  806,  924 

V.  Shaw,  10  Hun,  580  496 
Barrere  v.  Somps   (1896),  113  Cal. 

97,  45  Pac.  177  585 

Barret  v.  Goodshaw,  12  Bush,  592  758 
Barrett  v.  Baker    (1896),   136  Mo. 

512,  37  S.  W.  130  719 

V.  Brown,  86  N.  E.  Rep.  556  261 
V.  Des    Moines,   etc.   Ins.    Co. 
(1903),  120  la.  184,  94  N.  W. 

473  689 

V.  Leonard,  66  N.  Y.  422  598 
V.  Tewksbury,  18  Cal.  334  227,  231 
V.  Village  of  Hammond  (1894), 

87  Wis.  654,  58  N.  W.  1053'  570 

V.  Watts,  13  S.  C.  441  470 

Barron  v.  Frink,  30  Cal.  486  563 
Barrv  v.  Equit.  L.  Ins.  Soc,  59  N.  Y. 

587  123 


Barry  v.  Wachosky  (1899),  57  Neb. 
534,  77  N.  W.  1080  444,  498 

Bartgcs  v.  O'Neil,  13  Ohio  St.  72   187,  227 

Barth  v.  Kansas  City  Ry.  Co.  (1897), 
142  Mo.  535,  44  S.  W.  778  041 

Barthol  r.  Blakin,  34  Iowa,  452     90,  99, 

596 

Bartholomew  Cy.  Com'rs  v.  Jame- 
son, 86  Ind.  154  89,  91,  95 

Bartlett  v.  Drew,  57  N.  Y.  587      260,  343 
V.  Iowa  State  Ins.  Co.,  77  Iowa, 

86  no 

V.  Judd,  21  N.  Y.  200  50,  55 

V.  Pickersgill,  1  C.>x,  15  239 

V.  Scott  (1898),  55  Neb.  477,  75 

N.  W.  1102  644 

Bartow  v.  Northern  Assurance  Co. 

(1897),  10  S.   D.   132,  72  N.   W. 

1135  757 

Bass  V.  Comstock,  38  N.  Y.  21       334,  455 

Bassett  v.  Crowell,  3  Robt.  72  287 

V.  Haren  (1895),  61   Minn.  346, 

63  N.  W.  713 
I'.  Hughes,  43  Wis.  319 
V.  Lederer,  1  Hun,  274 
V.  Shares  (1893),  63  Conn.  39,  27 

Atl.  421 

V.  Warner,  23  Wis.  673     345,  457,  473 
Rastable  v.  Poole,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  410     116 
Bate  V.  Graham,  11  N.  Y.  237        605,  664 
V.  Sheets,  50  Ind.  329  ^     769 

Bateman  v.  Margerison,  6  Hare,  496     254 
Bates  V.  Cobb,  5  Bosw.  29 

V.  Drake   (1902),  28  Wash.  447, 

68  Pac.  961 
V.  Richards  Lumber  Co.  (1893), 

56  Minn.  14,  'u  N.  W.  218 

V.  Rosekrans,  37  N.  Y.  409      865.  871 

V.  Ruddick,  2  Iowa,  423  326,  333 

Bates-Farley     Bank     v.    Dismukes 

(1899),  107  Ga.  212,  .33  S.  E.  175 
Bates-Smith  Inv.  Co.  c.  Scott  (1898) 

56  Neb.  475,  76  N.  W.  1063 
Bathgate  v.  Haskin,  59  N.  Y.  533 

930,  938 
Batterman  v.  Pierce,  3  Hill,  171  842 

Battery    Park    Bank    i'.    Loughran 

(1898),  122  N.  C.  668,  30  S.  E.  17      821 
Bauer  i'.  Dewey   (1901),  166  N.  Y. 

402,  60  N.  E.  30  413 

V.  Wagner.  39  Mo.  385  813,  833 

Baughman   v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R, 
Co.  (1893),  94  Ky.  150,  21  S.  W 
757 
Baum  V.  Mullen,  47  N.  Y.  577 

I'.  Trantham  (1895),  45  S.  C  291 
23  S.  C.  54 
Baxter   v.  Camp    (1898),    71    Conn. 

245,  41  Atl.  803         105,  466,  659 
V.  Hart  (1894),  104  Cal.  344,  37 

Pac.  941  89 

V.  McDonnell  (1897),  154  N.  Y. 

432,  48  N.  E.  816  709 

V.  Sherman    (1898).  73    Minn. 

434,  76  N.  W.  211  870 


615 

112 
801 

659 


584 


72 


153 


580 

179 
880, 


214 
314 

334 


ivi 


i.vi.j,    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  kepcbbnces 

Bav  View  Bn-wing  Co.  v.  Grubb 
(1901),  24  Wash.  163,  03  Pac. 
1001  567,  772 

Bavlev  r.  Best.  1  lluss.  &  My.  659        243 
Bavly'c  Muelie.  MS  Cal.  345  329,  330 

Bavnard  r.  Wool  lev.  20  Beav.  583        252 
Bav8  r.  Trulsoii  (18l'o),  25  Ore.  109, 

35  Pac.  20  816 

Bazemore  r.  Bridgers,  105  N.  C.  191, 

10  .S.  E.  t<88  897 

Beacanon  r.  Liebe,  11  Oreg.  443  310 

Beach  r.  Bra.llev.  8  I'aige,  140  348 

t:  Spokane  Hancli  Co.  (UK)1),  25 

Muut.  37y,  05  Pac.  Ill     190,  262, 
271 
Beagle  r.  Smith  (1897),  50  Neb.  440, 

69  N.  W.  956  702 

Beale  v.  Barneil's  Adm  (1901),  Ky., 

04  S.  W.  838  452 

Bealev  r.  Blake  (1900).  153  Mo.  657, 

55  .'^.  W.  288  809 

BeaU  V.  Cobb,  51  Me.  348  378 

Beaiiian  v.  Ward  (1903),  132  X.  C. 

08.  43  S.  E.  545  678 

Bean  f.  Edge,  84  X.  Y.  514  111 

V.  Gregfi.  7  Colo.  499  66 

v.   Laniprev    (1901).   82    Minn. 

320.  84  X.  W.  lUie  783,  818 

V.  Percival  Copper  Mining  Co. 
(1901),  111  Wis.  598,  87 
N.  W.  465  626 

V.  Stoneman  (1894),  104  Cal.  49, 

37  Pac.  777  038 

Beane  r.  Givens  (1898),  5  Idaho,  774, 

51  Pac.  987  498 

Beard  v.  Dedolph.  29  Wis.  136 

c.  Tilghinan,  20  X.  Y.  .Suppl.  7.36    744 
Beardslee  r.  Morgner,  73  Mo.  22  103 

Beardslev  ,:  Clem    (1902),  137  Cal. 

.•"ib,  70  Pac.  175  816 

V.   Morrison    (1899).    18    Utah, 

478,  50  Pnc.  .303  815 

Bearss  v.  Montponierv,  40  Ind.  544       102 
Bcattie  Mfg.  ("o.  r.  Gerardi  (1901), 

106  Mo.  142,  (w  S.  W.  1035  040 

Beatty    !•.   Bartholomew    Cy.   Agr. 

Soc,  70  Ind.  91  814 

Bealy   r.  Atlantic,   etc.   R.   R.   Co. 

(1890),  100  Ga.  12.3,  28  S.  E.  .32     042 
V.  JohnHton  (1899),  00  Ark.  529. 

52  S.  W.  129  933,  940 

r.  Swarihout,  32  Barb.  293    702,  772. 

815 
Beau  V.  Kiah,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  404  225 
Beaiidette  i;.  Fond  du  Lac,  40  Wis. 

44  229 

Beaver  Dam  r.  Frings,  17  Wis.  398       1.5.') 

Belx-e  I-.  IIiitc:hin>on,  17  B.  Mon.  496     218 

Beck  r.  Haas.  ."1  Mo.  A|ii>.  IW)  l.^O 

'•.  Milfopl.  '.KUn.l.  291  815 

Becker  -•.  Boon,  01  X.  Y.  317         71.j,  79] 

r.  Crow,  7  lUmh,  198  '  002 

r.  Xorthwnv,  44  Minn.  01  H70 

V.  Sanduikv  City  I5k.,  1  Minn. 

311      '  52 


AKE  TO   TBI   PAGES.] 

Becker  r.  Stmeher  (1902),  107  Mo. 

300,  00  8.  W.  1083 

r.  Sweetzer,  15  Minn.  427        728, 

Beckett  v.  Lawrence,  7  Abb.  Pr.  403 

Beckner  v.  Beckner  (1898),  104  Ga. 

219,  30  S.  E.  022 
Beckwith  v.  Dargets,  18  Iowa,  303 


371 
751 
797 


715 
270, 
364 

V.  Union  Bank,  9  N.  Y.  21 1     122, 131 , 

132 
Bee  Publishing  Co.  v.  World  Pub- 
lishing  Co.   (1900),  59   Xeb.  713, 
82  X.  W.  28  £68 

Beebe    v.  Latimer   (1899),  59   Xeb. 

305,  80  X.  W.  904  064,  718 

Beeler  v.  First  Xat.  Bk.  of  Larned, 

5  X.  W.  ]{ep.  857  178 

Beers  v.  Kuehn.  54  N.  W.  Rep.  109     455 

r.  Shannon,  73  X.  Y.  292  181 

r.  Wattrburv,  8  Bosw.  300  865 

Beeson  v.  Howard,  44  Ind.  413      727,  812 

Beetle  v.  Anderson   (1897),  98  Wis. 

5,  73  X.  W.  560  215 

Behlow    V.  Fischer   (1894),  102  Cal. 

208,  36  Pac.  509  504 

Belknap  i;.  Mclntyre,  2  Abb.  Pr.S66 

874,  877 
V.  Sealey,  14  N.  Y.  143  630 

Bell  1-.  Brown,  22  Cal.  071  831 

r.  City  of   Spokane   (1902),  30 

Wash.  508,  71  Pac.  31  619 

V.  Clark,  30  Mo.  App.  224  821 

V.  Donohoe,  8  Sawy.  435  372 

V.  Mendenhall    (1898),  71  Minn. 

331,  71  X.  W.  1086  179,  180 

V.  Oher  &  Sons  Co.  (1900),  111 
Ga.  008,  36  S.  E.  904      887 


r.  Peterson  (1900),  105  Wis.  007, 

81  X.  W.  279 
V.  Rice   (1897),  50  Xeb.  547,  70 

X.  W.  25 
V.  Stowe  (1895),  44  Xeb.  210,  62 
X.  W.  456 
Belleau  c.  Thompson,  33  Cal.  495 
Belleville    Sav.  Bk.  i:   Winslow,  30 

Fed.  Rep  488  290, 

Bellevue  Imp.  Co.  v.  Kaj'ser  (1903), 

_  Xeb.    — .  05  X.  W.  499 
Bellinger  i-.  Craigue,  31  Barb.  534 

Belloc  c.  Rogers,  9  Cal.  123  326, 

Bellows  v.  McCJinnis.  17  Ind.  04 

V.  Rosenthal,  31  Ind.  110 
Belmont  Nail  Co.  v.  Columbia  Iron, 

etc.  Co  ,  46  Fed.  Rep.  336 

Bern  I',  .^^hoemaker   (1895),  7  S.  D. 

510,  04  X.  W.  544 

V.    Shoomaker   (1898),   10  S.  D. 

453.  74  X.  W.  239 

Bender  ?-.  Zimmerman   (1896),   135 

Mo.  53,  .30  S.  W.  210  044, 

Benedict  v.  Benedict,  85  X.  Y.  025 
V.  Driggs,  34  Hun,  94 
V.  Farlow,  1  Ind.  App.  ICO 


918, 
928 

681 

822 

809 
845 

821 

567 
852, 
939 
327 


389 
181 

158 

715 
007 
1'20 
002 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ivii 


[the  keperences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Benjamin  v.  Loughborough,  31  Ark. 

210  350 

V.  Veith,  80  la.  149,  45  N.  W. 

731  716 

Benkard  v.  Bahcock,  2  llobt.  175  009 

Bennett;;.  Bennett (1902),  —Neb.—, 

91  N.  \V.  409  251,  G71,  680 

V.  Bennett,  116  N.  Y.  584  225 

V.  Edison  Elec.  Co.  (1900),  104 

N.  Y.  131,  58  N.  E.  7 
V.  Lathrop  (1899),  71  Conn.  613, 

42  Atl.  634 
V.  Mattingly,  10  N.  E.  Rep.  299 
V.  McGrade,  15  Minn.  132 
V.  McGulre,  5  Lans.  183- 
V.  Minott  (1896),  28  Ore.  3-39,  44 

Pac.  283 

V.  Preston,  17  Ind.  291  177,  666 

'v.  Titherington,  6  Bush,  192       42,  53 

V.  Whitcomb,  25  Minn.  148  428 

Benolkin  v.  Guthrie  (1901),  111  Wis. 

554,  87  N.  W.  466 
Bensieck  v.  Cook,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  642 
Bensley  v.  McMillan,  49  Iowa,  517 
Benson  v.  Keller  (1900),  37  Ore.  120, 

60  Pac.  918 
Bent  V.  Barnes  (1895),  90  Wis.  631, 

64  N.  W.  428 
Bentley  v.  Bustard,  16  B.  Men.  643 

V.  Jones,  7  Oreg.  108 
Benton  y.  ColHns   (1896),  118  N.  C. 

196,  24  S.  E.  122 
Benton   Cy.  Com'rs    v.   Templeton, 

51  Ind.  266 
Bentz  V.  Thurber,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

645 
Bercich  v.  Mayre,  9  Nev.  312 
Berdell  v.  Parkhurst,  19  Hun,  358 
Berdolt  v.  Berdolt   (1898),  56  Neb. 

792,  77  N.  W.  399 
Berg  V.  Stanwood,  43  Minn.  176 
Berkin   v.   Marsh   (1896),   18  Mont. 

152,  44  Pac.  528 
Berkshire  v.  Shultz,  25  Ind.  523     177 

187,  188,  246 
Borkson    v.    Kansas    City    Rv.    Co. 

(1898),  144  Mo.  211,  45  S.W.  1119     302 
Berly  v.  Taylor,  5  Hill,  577  648,  649 

Bernhardt   v.   Walls,    29   Mo.  App. 

206 
Bernheitner  v.  Wallis,  11  Hun,  16 
Bernstein  v.  Coburn  (1896),  49  Neb. 
734,  68  N.  W.  1021, 
V.  Downs  (1896),   112  Cal.  197, 
44  Pac.  557 
Beronio  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  86  Cal. 
415 
V.  Ventura  Lumber  Co.  (1900), 
129  Cal.  2.32,  61  Pac.  958 


840 

687 
327 
101 
341 

603 


592 
283 
662 

508 

656 
791 
576 

482 

119 

293 
127 

226 

942 

499 

181 

181, 


783 
895 

872 

659 

517 


Berry  r.  Barton  (1902),  12  Okla.  221, 
17  Pac.  1074 


473 


608 
935 
111 


V.  Brett,  6  Bosw.  627 

V.  Brown,  107  N.  Y.  659 

V.  Dole  (1902),  87  Minn.  471,  92 

N.  W.  334  601,  676 


Berthold  v.  O'Hara  (1893),  121  Mo. 

88,  25  S.  W.  845  887 

Bertles  (•.  Nunan,  92  N.  Y.  152  226 

Besser  v.  Hawthorne,  3  Ore.  129  333 
Best    v.    Zutavern    (1898),    53  Neb. 

604,  74  N.  W.  64  819 
Bethany  v.  Howard  (1899),  149  Mo. 

504,  51  S.  W,  94  104 
Bethel  v.  Wilson,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq. 

610  249 
Bethune  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 

(1899),  149  Mo.  587,  51  S.  W.  465  375 

Bettinger  v.  Bell,  65  Ind.  445  378 

Betts  1-.  Baclie,  14  Abb.  I'r.  279  584 

Beudell  v.  Hettrick,  45  How.  Pr.  198  207 

Bevier  v.  Dillingham,  18  Wis.  529  270 

Beville  r.  Cox,  109  N.  C.  265  181 
Bevins   v.    Eisman    (1900),  Ky.    56 

S.  W.  410  340,  341,  688 

Beyer  v.  Reid,  18  Kan.  86  637 
V.  Town  of  Crandon  (1898),  98 

Wis.  306,  73  N.  W.  771  180 

Biddle  v.  Ramsay,  52  Mo.  153  597 
('.  Spatz   (1903),  — Neb.   — ,  95 

N.  W.  357  684 
Bidwell  r.  Astor  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,   16 

N.  Y.  263    15, 17,  33,  34, 472,  497 

V.  Babcock,  87  Cal.  29  658 

V.  Madison,  10  Minn.  13  932 

V.  Overton,  26  Abb.  N.  Cas.  402  756 

Big  Blackfoot   Co.  r.  Bluebird  Co. 

(1897),  19  Mont.  454,  48  Pac.  778  677 

Bigelow  V.  Bush,  6  Paige,  343  326 

V.  Gove,  7  Cal.  133  527 
V.  Town  of  Washburn   (1898), 

98  Wis.  553,  74  N.  W.  362  606, 

714 

Biggs  V.  Biggs,  50  Wis.  443  352,  611 

V.  Penn,  4  Hare,  469  352 

V.  Williams.  66  N.  C.  427  100 

Bignold   V.  Carr   (1901),    24  Wash. 

413,  64  Pac.  519  271 

Bill  V.  Cureton,  2  M.  &  K.  503  258 

Billings  V.  Drew,  52  Cal.  505  831,  834 

Bilmver  v.  Sherman,  23  W.  Va.  656  389, 

392 
Bingham  i:  Kimball,  1 7  Ind.  396     769,  812 
V.  Lipman  (1902),  40  Ore.  363, 

67  Pac.  98  689 

Birch  V.  Hall,  3  N.  Y.  Suppl.  747  919 
V.  Metrop.   Elev.    Ry.     Co.,    8 
N.  Y.  S.  325 
Bird  V.  Kendall  (1901),  62  S.  C.  178, 

40  S.  E.  142  809 

V.  Mayer,  8  Wis.  362  544,  578 

V.  McCoy,  22  Iowa,  549  870,  881 

V.  Sellers,  21  S   W.  Rep.  91  821 
V.  St.  John's  Episcopal  Church 
(18J9),154Iud.  138,56N.E. 

129  543,  818 

Birdsall  i\  Birdsall,  52  Wis.  208  658 
Birlant  v.  Cleckley  (1896),  48  S.  C. 

298,  26  S.  E.  GOO  588 
Birmingham  v.  Cheetham  (1898),  19 

Wash.  657,  54  Pac.  37  181 


Iviii 


TAKLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[tas   REFERENCES   ARE  TO  THE  PAGES.] 


Biron  i-.  Scott,  t>0  Wis.  20(3 

V.  St.  Paul  \V.  Comrs,  41  Minn. 
519 
Bishop  r.  Averill  (1808),  19  Wash. 
400,  53  Pac.  72t) 
.-.  Baisley  (1895).  28  Ore.  110,  41 

Pac.  037 
V.  Bishop,  54  Conn.  232 
V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ky.  Co.,  67 

Wis.  610 
V.  Davis.  0  Hun.  342  627, 

r.  Edniistun,  16  Abb.  I'r.  46G 
r.  Gritiitli,  4  Col.  68  614, 

t:  H.irt   (1901),   114   la.   96,  86 

N.  \V.  218 
V.  Mathews  (1899),  109  Ga.  790, 

35  S.  K.  161  869, 

V.  Mi.l.lleton  (1894),  43 Neb.  10, 
61  N.  W.  129 
Bisiiop  of  Winchester  v.  Mid  Hants 

Rv.  Co..  L.  K.  5  Eq.  17 
Bitter  r.  IJatiiman,  61  N.  Y.  512 
Bitting  1-.  Thaxton,  72  N.  C.  541 

Blachford  v.  Frenzer  (1895),  44  Neb. 

829,  62  N.  W.  1101 
Black  c.  Drake,  28  Kan.  482 
V.  Duncan,  60  Ind.  522 
V.  Elmer,  54  Ind.  544 
Blackburn  v.  Sweet,  38  Wis.  578 
Black  Hills  Bank  r.  Kellogg  (1«93), 

4  S.  I).  312,  56  N.  W.  1071 
Black  River  Imp.  Co.  c.  Holway,  55 

N.  W.  Kep.  418 
Blackstorie  c.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry. 
Co.  (1H98),  105  Ga.  380,  31  S.  E. 
90 
Black  well  i-.  British-American  Co. 
(1902).   65   S.    C.    105,  43   S.  E. 
395 
Blaine  v.  Knapp  &  Co.  (1897),  140 

Mo.  241,  41  S.  W.  787  542, 

Blair  r.  Brown  (1897),  17  Wash.  570, 
50  Pac.  483 
v.  Puryear,  87  N.  C.  101 
1-.  Shelby  Cy.  Agr.  Soc.,28  Ind. 
175 
Blake  v.  Bufifalo  Creek  R.  Co.,  56 
N.  Y.  485 
V.  Johnson  Cy.  Com'rs,  18  Kan. 

266 
r.  .Jones,  3  Anst.  651 
r.  Van  'niborg,  21  Wis.  672   473, 
Blakeley  <:  Adams  (1902),—  Ky.  — , 
68  .S.  W.  393 
V.  I  a;  Due.  22  Minn.  476 
Blakely  .•.  Hlakelv,  Ht»  Cal.  324 
r.  BorufT,  71  'ln<l.  93 
V.  Frazicr.  2<)  S.  C.  144 
I-.  Smock  (1M!>7),  90  Wis.  611,71 
N.  W.  1052  443,  444, 

Blaker  ..  Morne  (1898),  60  Kan.  24, 

65  I'ac.  ii74 
BlakfHife  ,-.  MiHHoiirl  Pnc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1894),  43  Neb.  01.  61  N.  W.  118 


351  I  Blanc  v.  Paymaster  Min.  Co.,  95  Cal. 

524 
576    Blanchard  >:  Ely,  21  Wend.  342 

r.  Jefferson,  28  Abb.  N.  Cas.  236 
638    Bland  r.  Fleeman,  29  Fed.  Rep.  669 

r.  Winter,  1  Sim.  &  S.  246      372, 
818  '  Blanke  r.  Brvant,  55  N.  Y.  649 
66    Blankenship  r.  Rogers,  10  Ind.  333 

660  Blankman  v.  Vallejo,  15  Cal.  638 

629  Blanshard  v.  Schwartz  ( 1898),  7  Okla. 

201  23,  54  Pac.  303 

620  Blasdel  v.  Williams,  9  Nev.  161     596, 

810    Bledsoe  r.  Irvin,  35  Ind.  293 

V.  Rader,  30  Ind.  354 
,  870  V.  Simms,  53  Mo.  305      284,  781, 

Bless  r.  Jenkins  (1895),  129  Mo.  647, 

565  31  S.  W.  938 
Blethen  v.  Blake,  44  Cal.  117 

255  Blew  v.  Hoover,  30  Ind.  450 
225  Bliss  V.  Cottle,  32  Barb.  322 
019,  V.  Sneath  (1894),  103  Cal.  43,36 

927  Pac.  1029 

r.  Sneath  (1898),  1 19  Cal.  526,  51 
677  Pac.  848 

617    Blizzard  v.  Applegate,  61  Ind.  368 
271     Bloch    Queens  ware  Co.  i-.  Metzger 
908  (IWl),  70  Ark.  232.  65  S.  W.  929 

277    Blodgett  c  Mc.Murty  (1894), 39  Neb. 

210,  57  N.  W.  985  832, 

299    Blood  v.  Fairbanks,  48  Cal.  171      38, 

911     Bloomer  v.  Sturges,  58  N.  Y.  168 

Blossom  V.  Barrett,  37  N.  Y.  434 

566  Blotckv    r.    Miller  (1902),  Neb.,  91 
N    \V.  523 

Blount  V.  Burrow,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  90 
180  V.  Rick,  107  Ind.  238 

Blue  r.  Capital  Nat.  Bank  (1896), 
709        145  Ind.  518,  43  N.  E.  655     896,  903, 

Bluedorn  r.  Mo.  Pac.  ]{y.  Co.  (1893), 
822        121  Mo.  258,  25  S.  W.  943 
419    Blue  Valley  Lumber  Co.  r.  Couro 

(1900),  61  Neb.  39,  84  N.  W.  402 
387    Blum  r.  Robinson,  24  Cal.  127 

Bluinauer  r.  Clock  (1901),  24  Wash. 
47        596,  64  Pac.  844 

Blumenthal  v.  Pacific  Meat  Co. 
662  (1895),  12  Wash.  331,  41  Pac.  47 
240 

497  Bluthenthal    v.    Moore    (1898),    106 
Ga.  424,  32  S.  E.  ;344 

109    Bly den  burgh  v.  Thayer,   3   Keyes, 
178        293  122, 

942    Boales  v.  Ferguson   (1898),  55  Neb. 
852        565.  76  N.  W.  18 
415    Board  v.  First  Presbyterian  Church 
(1898).    19   Wash.  456,   63 

498  Pac.  671 
V.  Walbridge,  38  Wis.  179 

655    Board,    etc.     of    St.    Louis    Public 
Schools  V.  Broadway  Sav.  Bk.  Est., 
565       84  Mo.  58 


340 
842 
659 
249 
377 
315 
881, 
935 
739 

375 
598, 
599 
289 
845 
821 

783 
817 
935 
562 

853 

819 
784 

872 

833 
372, 
637 
333, 
379 
457 

668 
254 

866 

914 

819 

816 
52 

160 

692, 
695 


131 
816 


819 
470 


935 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 
[the  referbnces  are  to  the  pages.] 


lix 


Board  of  County  Commissioners  v. 

Candler  (1898),  123  N.  C.  (582,  31 

S.  E.  858 
Board  of  Education  r.  Prior  (1898), 

11  S.  I).  202,  77  N.  W.  106  740 

Board  of  Scliool   Commissioners  r. 

Center  Townsliip  (1805),  14-'}  Ind. 

391,  42  N.  K.  8n« 
Board  of  Supervisors  c.  Decker,  o4 

Wis.  378 
Boardman  v.  Beclvwitli,  18  Iowa,  292 
V.  Griffin.  52  Ind.  101 
V.  Lake  S.  &  M.  S.  K.  Co.,  84 
N.  Y.  157 

Boaz  V.  Taie,  43  Ind.  (iO  791,  805 

B()l)b  V.  Woodward,  42  Md.  482  20,  31 
Bockes  V.  Lansing,  74  N.  Y.  437  38,  637 
Bo.lali  V.  Town  of  Deer  Creek  (1898), 

yy  Wis.  509,  75  N.  W.  75 
Boden  V.  Maher  (1897),  95  Wis.  65, 

69  N.  W.  9S0 
Bodine  v.  Killeen,  53  N.  Y.  93 
Boeckler  v.  Mo.  Fac.  Rv.  Co.,  10  Mo. 

App.  448 
Boehme  v.  Snme,  5  Neb.  80 
Bogaard  v.  Ind.  Dist.  of  Plainview 

(1895) ,  93  la.  269, 61  N.  W.  859    565,  566 


640 


58 


54 

036 
153 
614 

470 


675 


671 
315 


658 
576 


Bogardus  v.  Parker,  7  How.  Fr.  305 


369, 
894 
151 


V.  O'Regan,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  590 
Bogart  r.  Bogart  (1896),  138  Mo.  419, 

40  S.  W.  91  371 

Bogert  V.  Gulick,  65  Barb.  322  315 

Boggess  V.  Boggess  (1894),  127  Mo. 

305,  29  S.  W.  1018  510 

Bohall  V.  Diller,  41  Cal.  532  575 

Bohannon  v.  Travis  (1893),  94  Ky. 

59,  21  S.  W.  354  233 

Bohart  v.   Buckingham    (1901),   62 

Kan.  658,  64  Pac.  627  96,  100,  419 

Boil  V.  Siraras,  60  N.  Y.  162  918 

Boland  v.   O'Neil  (1899),  72  Conn. 

217,  44  Atl.  15  643 

V.  Ross  (1893),  120  Mo.  208,  25 

S.  W.  524     ■  278 

Boldt  1-.  Budwig,  19  Neb.  739  177 

jBolen  V.  Crosby,  49  N.  Y.  183  101 

V.  San  Gorgonio  Fl.  Co.,  55  Cal. 

164  614 

Boles  V.  Bennington  (1896),  136  Mo. 

522,  38  S.  W.  306  735 

Boley  V.  Allred  (1903),  25  Utah  402, 

71  Pac.  869  202 

Bolles  V.  Bolles,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  385  (14 

Atl.  593)  509 

Bollman  v.  Gemmill  (1900),  155  Ind. 

33,  57  N.  E.  542  712 

Bolt  V.  Gray  (1898),  54  S.  C.  95,  32 

S.  E.  148  612 

Bolton  V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1903), 

172  Mo.  92,  72  S.  W.  53  764,  793 

Bomar  v.  Means  (1896),  47  S.  C.  190, 

25  S.  E.  60  433 

Bond  V.  Bond  (1903),  175  Mo.  112,  74 

S.  W.  975  783 


Bond  V.  Corbet,  2  Minn.  248  728,  763 

V.  Kenosiia,  17  Wis.  284  118 

V.  Smith,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  239      293, 

301 
V.  Wagner,  28  Ind.  462  801,  829 

Bondurant  v.  Bladen,  19  Ind.   160     300, 
310,  402,  748,  779 
Bone  V.  Tharp,  63  Iowa,  223  135 

Bonestecl  v.  Bonesteel,28  Wis.  245  II 

Bnnfoy  r.  Goar  (1894),  140  Ind.  292, 

39  N.  E.  56  718 

Bonham  v.  Craig,  84  N.  C.  224  662 

Bonnell  v.  Allen',  53  Ind.  130  667 

r.  Jacobs,  36  Wis.  59        736,  908,  910 
Bonney  v.  Reardin,  6  Rush,  34  457 

Booco  V.  Man.sficld  (1902),  66  O.  St. 

121,64  N.  E.  115  8.33 

Booher  v.  Goldsborough,  44  Ind.  490 
Bool  v.  Watson,  13  Ind.  387 
l)Oomer  v.  Carter,  19  Kan.  135 

V.  Koon,  6  Hun,  645  772, 

Boone  Cy.  v.  Keck,  31  Ark.  387 
Boornian  r.  Wis.,  etc.  Co.,  36  Wis.  207 
Boos  V.  Dulin  (1897),  103  la.  331,72 
N.  W.  533 
V.  Gomber,  24  Wis.  490 
V.  Morgan  (1806),  146  Ind.  Ill, 

43  N.  E.  947 
Booth  V.  Farmers'  &  Mecli.  Bank,  1 

N.  Y.  S.  C.  45   516,  523,  581, 

V.  Langlev  Co.  (1897),  51  S.  C. 

412,  29  S.  E.  204 
V.  Powers,  56  N.  Y.  22 
V.  Sherwood,  12  Minn.  426 
Borah  i\  Archers,  7  Dana,  176 
Borchsenius  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  etc. 

Ry.  Co.  (1897),  96  Wis.  448,  71 

N.  W.  884 
Bordeaux  v.  Greene  (1899),  22  Mont. 

254,  56  Pac.  218  565, 

Borden  v.  Gilbert,  13  Wis.  670 
Borders  v.  Williams  (1900),  155  Ind. 

36,  57  N.  E.  527 
Bort  ('.  Yaw,  46  Iowa,  323 
Bosch  I'.  Kassing,  64  la.  312 
Boseker  v.   Chamberlain  (1903),  — 

Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  448  179, 

Bosley  v.  Mattinglcy,  14  B.  Mon.  89 
Bostick  V.  Barnes  (1900),  59  S.  C.  22, 

37  S.  E.  24 
Boston  Mills  v.  Eull,  6  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

319 
Bostwick  V.  Bryant,  113  Ind.  448 

V.  McEvov,  62  Cal.  496 
Bosworth  V.  Allen  (1901),  168  N.  Y. 

157,  61  N.  E.  163 
Botey  V.  Griswold,  2  Mont.  447 
Botkin  V.  Cassody  (1898),  106  la.  334, 

76  N.  W.  722 
Botsford  r.  Burr,  2  Johns.  Ch.  409 
V.  Wallace  (1899),  72  Conn.  195, 

44  Atl.  10 
Bottorf  r.  Wise,  53  Ind.  32 
Bolts  c.  Patton,  10  B.  Mon.  452 


611 
935 
452 
779 
340 
376 

639 
231 

744 

651, 
653 

640 
780 
833 
242 


683 

566 
475 

676 
189 
603 

180 
53 

466 

855 

98 

293 

444 

662 

625 
239 

25 
517 
348 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  keferences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Bougher  v.  Scobev,  16  Ind.  151  457 
Buuscaren  v.  Brown  (1894),  40  Neb. 

722,  5y  N.  W.  385  735 

Bouslog  V.  Uarrett,  39  Ind.  338      584,  727 

Bouton  V.  Brooklyn,  15  Barb.  375  173 

r.  <  >rr,  51  Iowa.  473  178 

Bowdoin  i:  Coleniiin,  3  Abb.  I'r.  431  100 
Bowdoin  College  v.  Merritt,  54  Fed. 

Kep.  55                                         238,  248 

Bowen  r.  Aubroy.  22  Cal.  5G6  15,  25,  544 

r.  Crow,  10  Neb.  550  291 

r.  Emnierson.  3  Ore.  452         544,  oSo 

r.  Hoach,  78  Ind.  3(31  200 

1-.  State,  121  Ind.  235  29 

V.  Sweeney,  63  Hun,  224  G37 
Bower  v.  Cassels  (1900),  59  Neb.  620, 

81  X.  W.  022  271 

Bowers  i-.  Keeseclier,  9  Iowa,  422  269, 

345,  473 
f.  Schuler  (1893),  54  Minn.  99, 

55  N.  W.  817  600 

!•.  Smitli,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  101  502 
Bowles  i:  Sacramento   Turnp.  Co., 

5  Cal.  224  527 
Bowling  Green  Stone  Co.  v.  Capshaw 

(1901),  Kv.,  04  S.  W.  507  818 
Bowman  v.  Bowman  (1899),  153 Ind. 

498,  55  N.  E.  422  732 

V.  Bran.<nn,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  634  213 
1-.  Eur  .Mt':    Co.  (IH'.'o),  96  la. 

IHS.  04  X.  W.  77.J             726,  783 

V.  Slieldon.  5  Sandf.  007  610 

1-.  Van  Kiiren,  29  Wis.  209  636 
Bowser  c.  Mattler  (1893),  137  Ind. 

649,  35  X.  E.  701  96 
Box  r.  Cliicaco,  R.  I    &  P.  Ry.  Co. 

( 189',t),  107  la.  600, 78  N.  \V.  094  463, 493 
Bo.\     Butte    f'ouiitv     V.     Noleman 

(1898),  54  Xel..  239,  74  X.  AV.  582  615 

Boyce  v.  Bradv.  61  Ind.  432  598 

r.  Brown, '7  Barb.  80  541 

Bovd  r.  Beaudin.  54  Wis.  193  887 

'  c  Blaisdell.  15  Ind.  73  229 

r.  Foot,  5  B().*w.  110  872 

r.  Ilovt,  5  Paige,  65                  342,  506 

V.  Jon'es,  44  Ark.  314                239,  251 

v.   Mu(ual    Fire    Ass'n    (1903), 

116  Wit..  155,  94  X.  W.  171  643 
V.  Oddous  (181*3),  97  Cal.  510, 

32  Pac.  509  673 
V.   Paul  (1894).    125  Mo.  9,  28 

S.W.I  71  783 
V.  Roanoke  Lumber  Co.  (1903), 

132  X.  C.  184.  43  S.  E.  631  645 

V.  ScliIiMMger,  59  X.  Y.  301  908 
Bnvd'g    Adm'r    v.   Farmers'   Bank 

( 1902).  Ky..  69  S.  W.  964  625 

Boyer  v.  Clark,  3  Xeb.  161  933 
V.  Commercial     Building    Co. 
(1900),  110  la.  491,  81  N.W. 

"20  607 
r.   Robinson   (1901),  26   Wash. 

117. 66  Par.  110  929 
Boyle    V.     Mo  Williams     (1897),    69 

Conn.  201,  iil  Atl.  501  732 


Boyle  V.  Bobbins,  71  N.  C.  130        91,  103 
Bovnton  r.  Clinton,  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  16 

Barb.  254  207 

Brace  v.  Burr,  07  X.  Y.  237  831 

Bradburne  v.  Botfield,  14  M.  &  W.  559 

Bradbury  v.  Cronise,  46  Cal.  287  735, 

738  754 
Bradfield  v.  Sewall  (1899),  58  Neb.  ' 

637,  79  N.  W.  015  735 

Bradford  r.  Tonev.  30  Ark.  763  290 
Bradford  Inv.  Co.";-.  Joost  (1897),  117 

Cal.  204,  48  Pac.  1083  686 
Bradliurst    c.    Townsend,    11    Hun, 

104  895 

Bradley  v.  Aldrich,  40  X.  Y.  504     38,  575, 

667 

I'.  Angell,  3  N.  Y.  475  133 
1-.  Bailcv  (1895),  95  la.  745,  64 

X.  W.  758  343 
V.  Borin  (1894),  53  Kan.  628,  36 

Pac.  977  675 
r.  Bradlev  (1900),  165  N.  Y.  183, 

58  X.  E.  887  257 
V.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1896), 

138  Mo.  293,  39  S.  W.  763  613 
V.  Miller  (1890),  100  la.  169,  69 

X.  W.  426  712 

V.  Parkhurst,  20  Kan.  462  598 
i\  Piiuni.x    Ins.     Co.,    28     Mo. 

A pp.  7  637 

Bradshaw  v.  Outram,  13  Vcs.  234  329 

Brady  v.  Ball,  14  Ind.  317  301 

V.  Brennan,  25  Minn.  210      649,  894, 

901,  916 

V.  Chandler,  31  Mo.  28  104 

V.  Xally  (1890),  151  X.  Y.  258, 

45X.  E.  547  615,618 

V.  Nat.  Supply  Co.  (1901),  64(). 

St.  267,  60  N.  E.  218         674  818 
V.   Peck   (1896),   99  Ky.  42,  34 

S.  W.  906  542,  638 

V.  Pinal  County  (1903),  Ariz.,  71 

Pac.  910  638 

V.  Weeks,  3  Barb.  157  262 
Braithwaite  v.  Akin  (1893),  3  X.  D. 

365,  56  X.  W.  133     649,  654,  914 

i\  Britain,  1  Kern.  219  294 

V.  Power,  1  N.  Dak.  455  151 

Brake  r.  Corning.  19  Mo.  125  935 

V.  Payne  (189;3),  137  Ind.  479,  37 

N.  E.  140  661 

Braker  v.  Devereau.v,  8  Paige,  513  242 

Branch  v.  Booker,  8  Munf.  43  250 
V.    Chappeil   (1896),   119  N.  C. 

81,  25  S.  E.  783  924 

r.  Wiseman.  51  Ind.  1  784 
Brandenburg  r.  .Mc(;uire  (1898),  105 

Kv.  10,  44  .S.  W.  96  821 

Bran.lou  i-.  Allison,  66  N.  C.  532  874 
Brannaman    v.    Palmer,    Stanton's 

Code  (Ky.),  90  865 

Brannan  v.  Patv,  58  Cal.  330  865 
Brannon  v.  White  Lake  Tp.  (1903), 

—  la.—,  95  X.  W.  284  116 

Branskill  i:  James,  11  N.  Y.  294  291 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ixi 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Brashear  v.  Citv  of  Madison  (1895), 

142  Ind.  685,  30  N.  E.  252       569 
V.  Lacey,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  93  242 

Brass  i:  Ratlibone  (1807),  153  N.  Y. 

435,  47  N.  E.  905  080 

nrassell  o.  Silva  (1897),  50  S.  C.  181, 

27  S,  E.  622  853,  802 

Brassey  v.  Chalmers,  4  DeG.  M.  & 

G.  528  242 

Brauchle  v.  Notlilic4fer  (1900),  107 

Wis  457,  83  N.  W.  053  803 

Braxton  v.  State,  25  Ind.  82    269,  289,  294 
Bray  i-.  Blaclt,  57  Imi.  417  181,  415 

I'.  Booker  (1897),  6  N.  D.  526, 

72  N.  W.  933  418 

V.  Fromont,  6  Mad.  5  250 

V.  Marshall,  75  Mo.  327  815 

Brazil  v.  Isham,  12  N.  Y.  9  804 

V.  Moran,  8  Minn.  236  313,  314 

Breault  v.  Merrill  &  R'mg  Lumber 
Co.  (1898),  72  Minn.  143,  75  N.  VV. 
122  191 

Breeding  v.  Tobin,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  773     310 
Bretnner  v.  Leavitt  (1895),  109  Cal. 

130,  41  Pac.  859  474 

Brennan  v.  Ford,  46  Cal.  7  821 

P>renner  v.  Egly,  23  Kan.  123  499 

Brent  v.  Long  (1890),  99  Ivy.  245,  35 

S.  W.  640  781 

Brett   V.  First  Univ.    Soc,  5  Hun, 

149  1S9,  205,  211,  769,  778 

Brewer  v.  Maurer,  38  Ohio  St.  550       110 
V.  McCain  (1895),  21  Colo.  382, 

41  Pac.  822  455 

V.  Temple,  15  How.  Pr.  286    482,  497 
Brevfogle  t:  Stotsenburg  (1897),  148 

Ind.  552,  47  N.  E.  1057  726 

Bricken?'.  Cross  (1901),  163  Mo.  449, 

64  S.  W.  99  641,  642 

Brickey  v.  Irwin,  122  Ind.  51  684 

Bridge  v.  Payson,  5  Sandf.  210    271,  800, 

829 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Fowler  (1895),  55  Kan. 

17,  39  Pac.  727  179,  349 

V.  Wyandotte,  10  Kan.  326  265 

Bridges  v.  Paige,  13  Cal.  640  777 

V.  Thomas  (1899),  8  Okla.  620, 

58  Pac.  955  686 

Bridget  v.  Hames,  1  Col.  72  252 

Briggs  V.  Briggs,  15  N.  Y.  471      291,  879, 

881 

V.  Daughertv,  48  Ind.  247  65 

V.  Penninian,  8  Cow.  387  213 

r.  Seymour,  17  Wis.  255         871,  923 

I'.right  V.  Ecker  (1890),  9  S.  D.  192, 

69  N.  W.  824  613 

V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  106 

Ky.  702,  51  S.  W.  442  041 

Brighton,  etc.  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Little 

(1896),  14  Utah,  42,  46  Pac.  208        864 
Brinkerhoff  v.  Brown,  6  Johns.  Cli. 

139  -  342,  345,  378,  509 

Brinkman  v.  Hunter,  73  ]\Io.  172  660 

Brinsmead  v.  Harrison,  L.  R.  7  C.  P. 
547  307 


Briscoe  v.  Kenrick,  1  Coop.  871  .  247 

British  No.  Am.,  Bk.  of,  v.  Suydani. 

6  How.  Pr.  379  351 

Brittain  i:  Payne  (1890),  118  N.  C. 

989,  24  S.  E.  711  649 

Britton  i\  Ferrin  (1902),  171  N.  Y. 

235,  03  N.  E.  954  918 

Brock  V.  Des  Moines  Ins.  Co.  (1895), 

90  la.  39,  64  N.  W.  685  671 

Brockett  v.  Fair  Haven,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1900),  73  Conn.  428,  47  Atl. 
703  230,  466,  673 

Brockmeyer  v.  Wash.  Nat.  Bk.,  40 

Kan.  370  153 

Brodek  V.  Farnum  (1895),  11  Wash. 

505,  40  Pac.  189  881 

Broderick  v.  Poilton,  2  E.  D.  Smith, 

554  597 

Brodnax  y.  Groom,  64  N.  C.  244  118 

Brogden  r.  Henry,  83  N.  C  274  713 

Broiestedt  v.  South  Side   R.  Co.,  55 

N.  Y.  220  29 

Brokavv  v.  Brokaw's  Ex.,  41  N.  J. 

Eq.  215  251,  351 

Brook   V.  Bayless    (1898),  6   Okla. 

568,  52  Pac.  738  191 

Brooke  v.  Cole  (1899),  108  Ga.  251, 

33  S.  E.  849  626 

Brookfield  v.  Tooey  (1897),  141  Mo. 

619,  43  S.  W.  387  565 

Brookmire  r.  Rosa,  51  N.  W.  840  181 

Brooks  r.  Chilton,  6  Cal.  640         766,  788 

V.  Hager,  5  Cal.  281  428 

V.  Harris,  42  Ind.  177  147 

V.  Peck,  38  Barb.  519  386 

V.  Schwerin,  54  N.  Y.  343  225 

Brookville  &  C.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Pum- 

phrey,  59  Ind.  78  598 

Broome  v.  Taylor,  9  Hun,  155  576 

Brosnan  i\  Kramer  (1901),  135  Cal. 

36,  66  Pac.  979  907 

Brossard  v.  Morgan   (1900),  Idaho, 

61  Pac.  1031  644 

V.  Williams  (1902),  114  Wis.  89, 

89  N.  W.  832  98,  671,  676 

Brothers  v.  Brothers  (1901),  29  Colo. 

69,  66  Pac.  901  606 

Brotherton  v.  Downey,  21  Hun,  436    730, 

758 
Broughel  v.  So.  New  Eng.  Tel.  Co. 
(1900),   72    Conn.    617,    45    Atl. 
435  462 

Brower  Lumber  Co.  v.  Miller  (1896), 

28  Ore.  565,  43  Pac.  659  106 

Brown  v.  Allen,  35  Iowa,  306  203 

V.  Baker  (1901),  39  Ore.  66,  65 

Pac.  799  600,  703,  787 

V.  Baruch  (1901),  24  Wash.  572, 

64  Pac.  789  703 

17.  Benson  (1897),  101  Ga.  753, 

29  S.  E.  215  625 

r.  Birdsall,  29  Barb.  549  292 

V.  Board  of   Education   (1894), 

103Cal.  581,37Pac.  503   584,585 
r.  Bridges,  31  Iowa,  138  218 


Ixii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  ark  to  the  pages.] 


Brown  1-.  Brown  (1897),  121  N.  C.  8, 

27  S.  E.  1198  234 

V.  Brown,  4  Robt.  688  15,  29,  30,  475 
V.  Brown,  32  N.  Iv  Kep.  1128  576 
V.  Buckingham,  11  Abb.  Pr.  387  922 
V.   Canal    ami     Reservoir    Co. 

(1899),  26  Colo.  OU,  56  Pac. 

183  196,  2G2,  320 

V.  Champlin.  66  N.  Y.  214  576 

1-.  Ciierrv.  38  How.  Pr.  352  150 

V.  Citv  of  Webster  Citv  (1902), 

115  la.  511,  88  N.W.  1070      802 
V.  Coble,  76  N.  C.  391  499 

V.  College  Cor  Gt.  Co.,  56  Ind. 

110  773 

i;.  Curtis  (1900),  128  Cal.   193, 

60  Pac.  773  779 

r.  De  Tastet,  Jac.  384  2"0 

V.  Dowihwaite,  1  Mad.  446  347 

V.  Doyle  (1897),  69  Minn.  543, 

72  X.  W.  814  626,  679 

V.  Fldmunds  (1896),  9  S.  D.  273, 

68  X.  W.  734  639 

V.  Farnham  (1893),  55  Minn.  27, 

56  X.  W.  352  214 

i".  Freed,  43  Ind.  253  03,  782 

V.  Fresno  Raisin  Co.  (1894),  101 

Cal.  222.  35  Pac.  639  870 

r.  Gallaudet,  80  N.  Y.  413  939 

r.  (Jinn  (1902),  66  Ohio  St.  316, 

04  X.  E.  123  91,  98 

i;.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  99 

Mo.  310  575 

r.  Hotel  Ass'n  of  Omaha  (1901), 

63  Xeb.  181,  88  N.  W.  175 

323,  326 
r.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (1897),  100 

Ky.  525,  38  S.  W.  862  600 

r.  Iowa  Legion  of  Honor  (1899), 

107  la.  43'.t,  78  X.  W.  73  666 

r.  Kohout  (1895).  61  Minn.  113, 

63  X.  W.  248  102 

V.  Latham   (1893).  92  Ga.  280, 

18  S.  E.  421  29 

i:  I.eigh,  12  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  193  635 
r.  Leigh.  49  X.  Y.  78  636 

V.   Markland    (1898).    16    Utah, 

360,  52  Pac.  S97  109 

r.  Orr,  29  Cal.  120  766,767 

V.  Penfield.  36  X.  Y.  473  94 

V.  Perrv.  14  Ind.  32  584,  587 

r.  Phillips,  3  Bush,  656  936 

V.  Porter  (1893).  7   Wash.   327, 

34  Pac.  1105  787 

t-.  Railway  Co.  (1898),  59  Kan. 

70.  52  Pac.  65  015 

V.  Ready,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1036  812 
V.  Rhinehart    Bros.  (18'.)3).   112 

N.  C.  772.  16  S.  E.  840  645 

V.  Rice.  51  Cal.  489  520 

V.  Ricketts,  3  Jolins.  Ch.  553         249, 

385,  387 

V.  Shnrkov  (1894),  93  la.  157,  61 

X.  W'.  :>.(',  I  116,  149 

I'.  Stale,  44  Ind.  222  439 


Brown  v.  Stillman,  43  Minn.  126,  45 

N.  W.  2  108 

r.  Treat,  1  Hill,  225  650 
r.  Volkening,  64  X.  Y.  76        334,  337 

V.  Warren,  16  Xev.  228  196 

V.  Weatherby,  12  Sim.  6  2;)4 
1-.  Wilco.x  (1900),  73  Conn.  100, 

46  Atl.  827  659 
V.  Wilson   (1895),  21  Colo.  309, 

40  Pac.  688  30 
r.  Woods,  48  .Mo.  330              276,  278 

Browning  r.  .Marvin,  22  Hun,  547  88 
V.   Smith    (1894),   139  Ind.  280, 

37  X.  E.  510  362 
Brownwcll   &    Wriglit    Car    Co.  v. 
Barnard   (1897),  139  Mo.  142,  40 

S.  W.  762  410 
Broyhill  v.  Xorton  (1903),  175  Mo. 

190,  74  S.  W.  1024  593 

Bruce  r.  Benedict,  31  Ark.  301  725 

1-.  Kellv,  5  Hun,  229  27 
f.   Phoenix   Ins.  Co.    (1893),    24 

Ore.  486,  34  Pac.  16  816 

Bruck  V.  Tucker,  42  Cal.  346    46,  52,  748, 

781 

Brugman  v.  Burr,  30  Neb.  406  916 

Bruguier  v.  U.  S.,  1  Dak.  5  618 
Bruil  V.  Northwestern  M.  R.  Ass'n, 

72  Wis.  430,  39  N.  W.  529  462,  463 

Bruley  v.  Rose,  57  Iowa,  651  783 

Brumback  v.  Oldliam,  1  Idaho,  709  97 

Brumble  r.  Brown,  71  N.  C.  513  931 

Brumskill  i:  James,  11  N.  Y.  294  276 
Brundage  r.  Burke  (1895),  11  Wash. 

679,  40  Pac.  343  809 
V.  Domestic  &  For.  Miss.  Soc, 

60  Barb.  204  325 
Brunsden    r.  Humphrey,  L.  R.  [14 

Q.  B.  1).]  141  468,  470 

Brunson  r.  Ilenrv  (1894),  140  Ind. 

455,  39  N.  E.  256  188 
Brunswick  &  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hardey  (1900),  112   Ga.    604,    37 

S.  E.  888  687 
Bryant   v.   Davis  (1899),  22   Mont. 

534.  57  Pac.  143  643,  669 

r.  Erskine.  55  Me.  Ii53  378 
Buchanan  ;•.  BlackhawkCoal  Works 

(1903),  1191a.  118,93N.W. 51  608 
»;.  Tilden  (1899),  158  N.  Y.  109, 

52  X.  E.  724  107 

Buchtel  r.  Evans,  21  Ore.  315  811 

Buckingham  v.  Waters,  14  Cal.  146  456 

Buckles  f.  Lambert,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)330  301 
Buckley  v.  Carlisle.  2  Cal.  420           38,  66 

Bucklin  v.  Ford.  5  Barb.  393  463 
Buckman  v.  Hatch  (1903),  139  Cal. 

53,  72  Pac.  445  605,  680 

Buckmaster  v.  Kellev,  15  Fla.  180  526 

Bucknall  i-.  Story,  36  Cal.  67  118 

Bucknam  v.  Brett,  35  Barb.  596  205 

Buckner  v.  Ries,  34  Mo.  357  66 

Budd  V.  Bingham,  18  Barb.  494  526 
V.  Meriilen  Elec.  R.R.  Co.  (1897), 

69  Conn.  272,  37  Atl.  683  800 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


BiKlile  V.  Kebenack  (1896),  137  Mo. 

179,  38  S.  W.  910  371,  444,  510 

Buddington  v.  Davis,  G  How.  Pr.  401     541 
Budilress  c.  Schafer  (1895),  12  Wash. 

;}10,  41  Pac.  43  734 

Buechner    v.    Columbia    Slioe    Co. 

(1895),  60    Minn.  477,  62  N.    W. 

817  220 

Buell  V.  Brown  (1900),  131  Cal.  158, 

63  Pac.  167  624 

Buena    Vista,    etc.   Co.    v.    Tuohy 

(1895),  107  Cal.  243,  40  Pac.  386  676 
Ruftitigton  V.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  103  340 
Bufilkins  V.  Eason  (1893),  112  N.  C. 

162,  16  S.  E.  916  676 

Buff  mil  V.  Chad  wick,  8  Mass.  103         116 
Bugbee  v.  Sargent,  23  Me.  271  345 

Buhne  v.  Cliism,  48  Cal.  467  63 

V.  Corbett,  43  Cal.  264  831,  834 

Buie  (•.  Mech.  Ass'n,  74  N.  C.  117  279 

Building  &  Loan  Ass'n   r.  Cameron 

(1896),  48    Neb.    124,  66    N.  W. 

1109  456 

Buist  v.  Fitzsimons  (1891),  44  S.  C. 

130,  21  S.  E.  010  802 

c.  Melchers   (1894),  44  S.  C.  46, 

21  S.  E.  449  604 

V.  Salvo  (1H94),44  S.  C.  143,  21 

S.  E.  615  712 

Bull  V.  Read,  13  Gratt.  78  118 

BuUard  v.  Jolinson,  65  N.  C.  436  636 

V.  Raynor,  30  N.  Y.  196 

V.  Sherwood,  85  N.  Y.  253  667 

Buller  1-.  Sidell,  43  Fed.  Rep.  116        753, 

758 
Bullis  (.'.  Montgomery,  50  N.  Y.  352  301 
Buncq  v.  Pratt  (1893),  56  Minn.  8,  57 

N.  W.  160  278 

Bunch  V.  Potts  (1893),  57  Ark.  257, 

21  S.  W.  4.37  868 

Bungenstock  v.  Nishnabotna  Drain- 
age Dist.   (1901),  163  Mo.  198,  64 

S.  W.  149  718 

Bunker  v.  Tavlor  (1900),  13  S.  D. 

433,  83  N.  W.  555  158 

Bunnell   v.    Berlin  Iron  Bridge   Co. 

(1895),  66   Conn.  24,  33  Atl.  533     276, 

401,  683 
Bunting  v.  Foy,  66  N.  C.  193  376 

Burbank  v.  Beacli,  15  Barb.  326  157 

Burchard  v.  Roberts,  70  Wis.  Ill  283 

Burdsall  v.  Waggoner,  4  Cal.  256         614 
Burford  v.  Aldridge  (1901),  165  Mo. 

419,  63  S.  W.  109  346 

Burge  V.  Gandv  (1894),  41  Neb.  149, 

59  N.  W.  359  929,  981 

Burgess  v.  Helm  (1898),  24Nev.  242, 

51  Pac.  1025  588 

Burgoyne  i'.  Ohio  L.  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co., 

5  Ohio  St.  586  296,  400,  402 

Burhans    v.   Burhans,   2  Barb.   Ch. 

398  368 

Burhop  V.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  431        270 
Burke  r.  Baldwin  (1893),  54  Minn. 

514,  56  N.  W.  173  638 


Burke  r.  Inter-State  Savings  Ass'n 
(1901), 25  Mont.  315, 69  Pac. 
879  752 

V.  Thorn,  44  Barb.  363  845,  865 

V.   Unique  Printing  Co.    (1901), 

63  Neb.  264.  88  N.  W.  488       681 
Burkett   v.    Lehmen-Higginson    Co. 

(1899),  8  Okhv.  84,  56  Pac.  856  165 

Burkhani  v.  Beaver,  17  Ind.  367  326, 

327 
Burkliardt  v.  Burkhardt  (1899),  107 

la.  369,  77  N.  W.  1069  ^  638 

Burley  v.  German-Am.  Bk.,111  U.  S. 

216  751 

Burlington   Indep.   Dist.    v.   Merch. 

Bk.,  68  Iowa,  343  815 

Burlington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Campbell 
(1894),  42  Neb.  208,  60  N.W. 
699  689 

V.  Lowery  (1895),  61  Ark.  108, 

32  S.  W.  .383  217 
Burlington  Voluntary  Relief  Dept. 

*•.  Moore  (1897),  52  Neb.  719,  73 
N.  W.  15  642,  819 

Burlington  &  Mo.  Riv.  R.  Co.  v.  Lan- 
caster Cy.  Com'rs,  7  Neb.  33  793 
Burnap  v.  Cook,  16  Iowa,  149       316,  338, 

379 
Burnet  v.  Cavanagh  (1898),  56  Neb. 

190,  76  N.  W.  578  702 

Burnett  v.  Atlantic  Coast  Line  Ry. 
Co.   (1903),  132  N.  C.  261, 
43  S.  E.  797  676 

V.  Crandall,  63  Mo.  410  103 

V.  Hoffman  (1894),  40  Neb.  569, 

58N.  W.  1134  332 

V.  Milnes  (1897),  148  Ind.  230, 

46  N.  E.  464  6.38 

V.  Stearns,  33  Cal.  473  563 

Burney  v.  Spear,  17  Ga.  223  251 

Burnham  v.  Boyd   (1902),  167  Mo. 

185,  66  S.  W.  1088  678 

Burns  v.  Ashworth,  72  N.  C.  496  190 

V.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 

110  la.  385,  81  N.  W.  794        830 
V.  Iowa  Homestead  Co.,  48  Iowa, 

279  620 

V.  Scooffy   (1893),  98  Cal.  271, 

33  Pac.  86  645 
Burnside  v.  Matthews,  54  N.  Y.  78        814 

V.  Wayman,  49  Mo.  356  519 

Burr  V.  Beers,  24  N.  Y.  178  110 

V.  Brantley  (1893),  40  S.  C.  538, 

19  S.  E.  199  662 

V.  Woodrow,  1  Bush,  602  616 

Burrage   v.  Bonanza,  G.  &   Q.  Min. 

Co.,  12  Ore.  169  938 

Burrall  v.  De  Groot,  5  Duer,  379  865 

Burrell  v.  Hughes  (1895),  116  N.  C. 

430,  21  S.  E.  971  217,  498 

V.  Kern  (1899),  34  Ore.  501,  56 

Pac.  809  158 

Burris  v.  People's  Ditch  Co.  (1894), 

104  Cal.  248,  37  Pac.  922  746 

Burrows  v.  Holderman,  31  Ind.  412      458 


Ixiv 


TABLE    Or    CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  tub  pages.] 


Burrows     v.    McCiUev    (1897),    17 

Wash.  2<iy.  4!t  Tiie.  508 
Burriis  r.  Citv  of  Columbus  (1898), 

105  Ga.  •12.'31  S.  E.  124 
Burt  c.  Wilson,  2b  Cal.  (532 
Burton  «•.  Anderson,  Stanton's  (Ky.) 
Code,  34 
V.  Larkin,  .36  Kan.  246 
V.  Koseniarv  Co.  ( 1903),  132  N.  C. 
17,  43S.E.  480  684, 

r.  Speis.  5  Hun,  60  300,  402, 

r.  Wilkes,  m  N.  C.  604 
Burwell  Irrig.  Co.  c.  Laslimett  (1900), 

59  Ni-b.  60.'),  81  N.  W.  617 
Busenius  r.  Coffee,  14  Cal.  91 
Busii  r.  Brown,  49  Iiid.  573  784, 

v.  Cella,  52  A'k.  378 
V.  Froelifk  (1890),  8  S.  D.  353, 

66  \.  W.  939 
r.  Groom,  9  Bush,  675 
V.  Haeussler,  26  Mo.  App.  265 
V.  Hicks,  00  N.  Y.  298 
V.  Lathrop,  22  N.  Y.  535       122, 

Bushey  r.  Reynolds,  31  Ark.  057 

Butler  <•.  Ashworth  (1895),  110  Cal. 
614,  43  Pac.  386 
v.  Barnes,  61  Conn.  399 
v.  Dunham,  27  111.  474 
v.  Edgerton,  15  Ind.  15  748, 

i:  Gage,  23  I'ac  Rep.  462        359, 
V.  Kirbv,  53  Wis.  188 
V.  Lee,  33  How.  Vr.  251 
c.  Titus,  13  Wis.  429        843,  911, 
V.  Wentworth,  9  How.  Pr.  282 
r.  Williams,  27  S.  C.  221         327, 
Butt  r.  Cameron,  53  ISarb.  642 

1-.  Carson  (1896),  5  Okla.160,48 
Pac.  182 
Butte  V.  Peasley   (1890),  18  Mont. 

303,  45  Pac.  210 
Butte  &  Boston  Co.  v.  Montana  Co. 
(1900).  24  Mont.  125,  60  Pac.  1039 
Buttcrfield  >:  Graves  (1902),  138  Cal. 

l.>j,  71  Pac.  510 
Buttles  r.  DeBaun  (1903),  116  Wis. 

■,i-S4,  93  N.  W.  5 
Button  V.  McCauley,  38  Barb.  413 

Butts  r.  Collins.  13  Wend.  139 
v.  Genung,  5  Paige,  254 
V.  Kingman    &   Co.    (1900),   60 
Neb.  224.  82  N.  W.  854 
Buxton   V.  .Sargent  (1898),  7  N.  I). 

603.  75  N.  W.  811 
Byers  c  Ferguson  (1902),  41  Ore.  77, 
(\H  I'ac.  5 
V.  Hodabaugh,  17  Iowa.  53 
IJyington  '•,  Woods,  13  Iowa,  17 
HyliT  r.  .Jom-K,  79  Mo.  2<H 
P.yrd  r.  Byrd  (1895),  117  N.  C.  623, 

23  S.  E.  324 
Byxbie  v.  Wood,  24  X.  Y.  010    028, 

651 


710 

680 
519 

260 
112 

587 
499 
911 

816 
739 
791 

'  598 

494 
202 
213 
364 
123, 
124 
592, 
713 

307 
29 
118 
779 
360 
471 
14 
913 
831 
329 
520 

642 

612 

669 

669 

566 
769, 
810 
052 
372 

593 

645 

685 
270 
520 
830 

346 

033, 
653 


Cabe  2-.  Vanbook  (1900),  127  N.  C. 

424,  37  S.  E.  464  117 

Cable  c.  yt.  Louis  Marine  Ry.  Co., 

21  Mo.  133  102,  103 

Cade  r.  Head  Camp  W.  0.  W.  (1902), 

27  Wash.  218,  07  Pac.  603  678 

Cadematori   v.   Gauger    (1901),    160 

Mo.  352,  01  S.  W.  195  816 

Cadiz  V.  Majors,  33  CaL  288  46 

Cady  r.  Case  (1895),  11  Wash.  124, 

39  Pac.  375  669 

V.  South  Omaha  Nat.  Bank 
(1896),  46  Neb.  756,  65 
N.  W.  900  793,  802 

Cagger  v.  Lansing,  64  N.  Y.  417      28,  28  H 
Cahill  >:  Palmer,  17  Abb.  Pr.  196  611 

Gaboon  v.  Bk.   of  Utica,   7    N.  Y. 

486  29,  471 

Cain  v.  Codv,  29  Pac.  Rep.  778  637 

V.  Hunt,  41  Ind.  406  748 

Caine  v.  Seattle  &  Northern  Rv.  Co. 

(1894),  12  Wash.  596,  41  Pac.  904     815 
Cairns  v.   O'Bleness,  40   Wis.  469      155, 

293 
Calderwood  v.  Pyser,  31  Cal.  333 
Caldwell  V.  Auger,  4  Minn.  217  815 

r.  Bruggerman,  4  Minn.  270   728,  763, 

780 
v.  Mcshew,  44  Ark.  564,  53  Ark. 

263  637 

Caleb  i:  Morgan,  83  N.  C.  211  908 

Calhoun  v,  Ilallen,  25  Hun,  155  751 

California  v.  Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 

157  U.  8.  229  318 

California  Navigation  Co.  v.  Union 
Transp.  Co.  (1898),  122  Cal.  641, 
55  Pac.  591  594 

California    State    Bank   r.   Webber 

(1«95),  110  Cal.  538,  42  Pac.  1000     810 
Cal.   Steam  Nav.  Co.   r.  Wright,  8 

Cal.  585  814 

Calkins  v.  Smith,  48  N.  Y.  614  190 

Callaghan  r.  McMahan,  33  Mo.  Ill      496 

Callaiian  v.  Davis,  90  Mo.  78  283 

V.   Longhran    (1894),    102    Cal. 

476,  .'16  Pac.  835  594 

Callanan  i;.  Edwards.  32  N.  Y.  483        122 
V.  Williams,  71  Iowa,  363  753 

Callcn  V.  Rose  (1896),  47  Neb.  038, 

00  N.  W.  039  625 

Calnan  Construction   Co.   i*.  Brown 

(1899),  110  la.  37,  81  N.  W.  163         714 
Calteaux  r.  Mueller  (1899),  102  Wis. 

525,  78  N.  W.  1082  815 

Calverley  v.  Phelp,  6  Mad.  229     252,  837 
Calvin  r.  Duncan,  12  Bush,  101  676 

V.  Woollen,  60  Ind.  464  439 

Calvo  i:  Davies.  73  N.  Y.  211  598 

Cameron  i-.  Brvan  (1893),  89  la.  214, 

66  N.  W.  434  625 

r.  Mount  (1893),  86  Wis.  477, 

56  N.  W.  1094  678 

Camp  r.  ,McGillicu(My,  10  Iowa,  201    412 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixv 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Camp  V.  Pollock  (1805),  45  Neb.  771, 

64  N.  W.  231  688 

V.  Pulver,  5  Barb.  91  652 

Campbell  v.  Brosius  (1893),  30  Neb. 

792,  55  N.  W.  215  570,  689 

V.  Campbell,  121  Iiul.  178  181 

V.  Equitable  Loan  &  Trust  Co. 
(1901),  14  S.  D.  483,  85 
N.  W.  1015  520,  612 

V.  Fox,  11  Iowa,  318  936 

V.  Genet,  2  Hilt.  290  870 

V.  Irvine  (1895),  17  Mont.  476, 

43  Fao.  626  103 

V.  Jones,  25  Minn.  155  340,  866 

V.  Linder  (1897),  50  S.  C.  169,  27 

S.  E.  648  809 

V.  Mackay,  1  Myl.  &   Cr.  603    507, 
508,  510 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1893),  121 

Mo.  340,  25  S.  W.  036  612 

V.  PattOM  (1893),  113  N.  C.  481, 

18  S.  E.  687  787 

V.  Perkins,  8  N.  Y.  430  650 

V.  Perry,  9  N.  Y.  Suppl.  3.30 
V.  Routt,  42  Ind.  410        835,  862,  867 
V.  Stakes,  2  Wend.  137  650 

V.  Stokes  (1894),  142  N.  Y.  23, 

36  N.  E.  811  371 

Candrian  v.  Miller,  98  Wis.  168  519 

Canefox  v.  Anderson,  22  Mo.  347  89 

Cannon  v.  McManus,  17  Mo.  345  829 

V.  Smith  (1896),  47  Neb.  917,  66 

N.  W.  999  614 

Cantwell    v.    Herring    (1900),    127 

N.  C.  81,  37  S.  E.  140  669 

Cape  V.  Plymouth  Congregational 
Church  (1903),  117  Wis.  150,  93 
N.  W.  449  239 

Capitol  Lumbering  Co.  v.  Learned 

(1899),  36  Ore.  544,  59  Pac.  454        735 
Caplis  V.  Am.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1894), 

60  Minn.  376,  62  N.  W.  440  790 

Capuro  V.  Builders'  Ins.  Co.,  39  Cal. 

123  789 

Carder  v.  Weisenburgh   (1893),  95 

Ky.  135,  23  S.  W.  964  42 

Carey  v.  Brown,  92  U.  S.  172  253 

V.  Cranston  (1896),  99  Ga.  77,  24 

S.  E.  869  641 

Carey-Lombard  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bier- 
bauer  (1899),  76  Minn.  434,  79 
N.  W.  541  326 

Cargar  v.  Fee  (1894),  140  Ind.  572,  39 

N.  E.  93  191,455,459 

Carkeek  v.  Boston  Nat.  Bank  (1897), 

16  Wash.  399,  47  Pac.  884  781 

Carle  v.  Wall,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  293  200 

Carlile   v.   The    People    (1899),    27 

Colo.  116,  59  Pac.  48  831 

Carlson  c.  Presbyterian  Board  (1897), 

67  Minn.  436,  70  N.  W.  3  601 

Carman  v.  Plass,  23  N.  Y.  286    398,  402, 

403 

Carmichael  v.  Dolan,  25  Neb.  335         637 

V.  Moore,  88  N.  C.  29  152 


Carmien  v.  Cornell  (1897),  148  Ind. 

83,  47  N.  E.  216  830 

V.  Whitaker,  36  Ind.  509  277 

Carnahan  v.  Tousey,  93  Ind.  561  112 

Carney  v.  Gleissner,  62  Wis.  493  233 

V.  Lacrosse  &  M.  K.  Co.,  15  Wis. 

503  270,  375 

Carpenter  v.  Brenham,  50  Cal.  549        667 
V.  Chicago,  etc.  Ky.  Co.  (1895), 

7  S.  1).  584,  64  N.W.  1120       816 
V.  Cincinnati,   etc.   Ry.   Co.,  35 

Ohio  St.  307  387 

V.  Hewel,  67  Cal.  589  865,  922 

V.  Ingalls,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  948         333 
V.  Leonard,  5  Minn.  155  858,  871 

V.  Manhattan   L.    Ins.    Co.,   22 

Hun,  49  895 

V.   Manhattan   L.    Ins.    Co.,   93 

N.  Y.  552  928 

V.  Mann,  17  Wis.  155  118 

V.  McCord  Lumber  Co.  (1000), 

107  Wis.  611,  83  N.  W.  764     674 
V.  Miles,  17  B.  Mon.  598  95 

V.  O'Doughertv,  50  N.  Y.  660         315 
V.  Ritchie,  2  Wash.  St.  512  753 

V.  Smith  (1894),  20  Colo.  39,  36 

Pac.  739  602 

V.  Stilwell,  3  Abb.  Pr.  459  650 

V.  Tatro,  36  Wis.  297  88 

V.  Town  of  Rolling  (1900),  107 

Wis.  559,  83  N.  W.  953  740 

Carpentier  v.    Williamson,   25  Cal. 

161  326 

Carr  v.  Collins,  27  Ind.  306  414 

V.  Waldron,  44  Mo.  393  270,  377 

Carrere  v.  Spofford,  15  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

47  205 

Carrico  v.  Tomlinson,  17  Mo.  499  14 

Carriers.  Bernstein  (1898),  104  1a. 
572,  73  N.  W.    1076        444,  498,  503, 

569 
Carrillo  v.  McPhillips,  65  Cal.  130  160 
Carrington    v.     Omaha   Life    Ass'n 

(1899),  59  Neb.  116,  80  N.  W.  491  678 
Carroll  v.  Fethers,  82  Wis.  67  304 

V.  Fethers  (1899),  102  Wis.  436. 

78  N.  W.  604  639,  655 

V.  Paul's  Ex.,  16  Mo.  226         584,  587 
Carskaddon  r.  Pine  (1899),  154  Ind. 

410,  56  N.  E.  844  178,  180 

Carson  v.  Butt  (1896),  4  Okla.  133, 

46  Pac.  596  666 

V.  Fears  (1893),  91  Ga.  482,17 

S.  E.  342  641,  662 

Carson-Rand  Co.  v.  Stern  (1895),  129 

Mo.  381,  31  S.  W.  772  815 

Carson's     Executors     v.    BuckstafE 

(1898),  57  Neb.  262,  77  N.  W.  670  914 
Carswell  v.  Neville,  12  How.  Pr.  445  417 
Carter  v.  Dilley  (1002),  167  Mo.  564, 

67  S.  W.  232  643 

V.  Gibson  (1896),  47  Neb.  655,  66 

N.  W.  631  614 

I'.  Mills,  30  Mo.  4.32         256,417,419 
V.  Sanders,  2  Drew,  248  258 


Ixvi 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


Carter  r.  Seattle  (1898),  19  Wash. 
597,  5;;  Pac.  1102 
V.  Southern  Uy.  Co.  (1900),  111 

Ga.  38,  3G  S.  E.  308 
r.  Tipping  ( l'.H)l ),  1 13  Ga.  636, 38 

S.  E.  y46 
r.  Wakenian  (1902),  42  Ore.  147, 

70  Pac.  393 
1-.  Wann  (Ib^'J),  Idaho,  67  Pac. 

314 
V.  Wilmington,  etc.   R.  R.  Co. 
(1900).  126   N.    C.   437,  36 
S.  E.  14 
I'.  Zenblin,  68  Ind.  436 
Carver  v.  Carver,  97  Ind.  497 

V.  Shellev,  17  Kan.  472 
Cary  r.  Allen,  39  Wis.  481 

.-.  Wiieeler,  14  Wis.  281 
Casad  v.  Iloldri.li:e,  50  Ind.  529 

V.  Hughe.<,  27  Ind.  141 
Case  f.  Carroll.  35  X.  Y.  385 


673 
152 
870 
687 
661 


217 

661 

602 

930 

576 

458,  475 

784,811 

138 

177.261 


Casey  r.  Gibbons  (1902),   136   Cal. 
368.  68  Pac.  1032 
c.  Mason  (1899),  8  Okla.  665,  59 

Pac.  252  •  688 

Casgrain  r.  Hamilton  ( 1896),  92  Wis. 

179.  66  N.  W.  118  872 

Cashman  r.  Wood,  6  Ilun,  520      159,  219 
easier  i-.  Chase  (1901),  160  Mo.  418, 

60  S.  W.  1040 
Cason  V.  Cason.  79  Ky.  558 
Cass  r.  Higenbotam,  100  N.  Y.  248 
Cass  Cy.  Com'rs  v.  Adams,  76  Ind. 

504 
Cassiday  i-.  McDaniel,  8  B.  Mon.  519   238. 

348 
Cassidy  v.  Caton,  47  Iowa,  22 

V.  Woodward,  77  Iowa,  354 
Cassin  v.  Delaney,  38  N.  Y.  178 
Ca.>*tagnino  r.  Balletta,  82  Cal.  250 
Castile  i-.  Ford  (1897),  53  Neb.  507, 

73  N.  W.  945 
Castle  V.  Houston,  19  Kan.  417 

1-.  Madison  (1902),  113  Wis.  346, 
89  N.  W.  156  183,  188 

382,  392 
Castleberry  c.  Johnston   (1893),  92 

Ga.  499,  17  S.  E.  772 
Castner  r.  .Sumner,  2  Minn.  44 
Caswell  V.  West,  3  N.  Y.  8up.  Ct.  383 


Cate  V.  Hutchinson  (1899),  68  Neb. 

232,  78  N.  W.  500  644,  832,  833 

Catlin  r.  f Junior,  1  Duer.  253         769,  809 

I'.  Pedrick,  17  Wis.  8«  658 

r.  Wheeler,  49  Wis.  507  219 

Caulfleld  /•.  Sanders,  17  Cal.  669  739 

Cauoey    c.  Causey  (1H98),    106  Ga. 

188,  32  S.  E.  i:]8  640 

Cavnllaro    v.   Texas,   etc.   Ry.   Co. 

(1896),  110  Cal.  348,42  Pac.  918 


[the   REFEKCNCeS    ARE   TO   TUB    PAGES.] 

Cave   c.  Gill  (1900),  59  S.   C.   256, 

37  S.  E.  817 
Cavender  v.  Smith,  8  Iowa,  360 
Cavitt  i:  Tiiarp,  30  Mo.  App.  131 
Cawtteld  r.  Owens  (1902),  130  N.  C. 

641,  41  S.  E.  «91 
Cawker    City    Bank     v.    Jennings 

(1^93),  89  la.  230,  56  N.  W.  494 
Ca wood's  Adm.  v.  Lee,  32  Ind.  44 
Cedar  Rapids  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lavery 

(1900),  110  Iowa,  575,  81  N.  W. 

775  177, 

Cederson  r.  Oregon  Nav.  Co.  (1900), 

38  (Jre.  343,  02  Pac.  637 
Center  Creek  Water  Co.  v.  Lindsay 

(1900),  21  Utah,  192,  60  Pac.  659 
Center  School  Tp.   v.  State  ex   rel. 
(1897),  150  Ind.  168,  49  N.  E.  961 
Central  Bank  of   Wis.'u.  Knowlton, 

12  Wis.  624 
Central  City  v.  Treat  (1897),  101  la. 

109,  70  N.  W.  110 
Central  City  Bank  r.  Rice  (1895), 

44  Neb.  594,  63  N.  W.  60  638, 

Central  City  First  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Hum- 
mel, 14  Colo.  259 
Central  Kentucky  Asvlum  v.  Penick 

(1898),  102  Ky.  633',  44  S.  W.  92 
Central  Nat.  Bank  v.  Doran,  109  Mo. 
40 
i;.  Haseltine  (1900),  155  Mo.  58. 
55  S.  W.  1015 
Central  of  Georgia  Ry.  Co.  i-.  Brown 

(1901),  113  Ga.  414,  38  S.  E.  989 
Central   R.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper  (1894), 
95  Ga.  406.  22  S.  E.  549 
V.  Ha.sselkus  (1893),  91  Ga.  382, 
17  S.  E.  838 
Centre   Turnpike   Co.  v.   Smith,  12 

Vt.  217 
Cerf  r.  Ashley,  68  Cal.  409 
Certwell  r.  Hoyt,  6  Hun,  575 
Chadbourn    r.  Johnston    (1890),  119 

N.  C.  282,  25  S.  E.  705  329, 

Chadbourne   v.   Coe,  51  Fed.   Rep. 

479 
Chadwick  v.  Hopkins  (1893),  4  Wyo. 
379.  34  Pac.  899 
V.  Maden,  9  Hare,  188  256 

Challiss  V.  Wvlie,  35  Kan.  506 
Chalmers  v.  Trent   (1894),  11  Utah 
88,  39  Pac.  488  368,  371 

Chamballe  v.  McKenzie,  31  Ark.  155 


245 


664 

865 
915 

821 


702 
147 
314 
584 

178 
609 

235, 


375 
97 

33, 
34 


Cavalli  i-.  Allen,  67  N.  Y. 
Cave  V.  Crapto,  63  Cal.  135 


619. 

623 

508        61,52, 

869,  886,  891 

804 


Chamberlain  r.  Burlington,  19  Iowa, 
395 
V.  Hihhiird   (1894),  26  Ore.  428, 

:'.S  I'ac.  437 
V.  Mensing,  51  Fed.  Rep.  511 
V.  Painesvilie  &  H.   R.  Co.,  15 

Ohio  St.  225 
I'.  Woolsev  (1903),  —  Neb. — , 
95N.W.  38 
Cli.imberlin   v.  Winn,  1    Wash.  St. 
oOl 


643 
285 
833 

782 

6.59 
780 


191 

682 

849 

816 

785 

666 

734 

167 

677 

815 

936 

302 

615 

625 

652 
214 
220 

336 

340 

295 
361 
936 

413 
618, 
649 

118 

800 
637 

722 

115 

780 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixv 


[the  referencks 

Chamberlin  Banking  House  i\  Kem- 
per, etc.  Co.  (1"J02),  Neb.,  92 
N.  W.  175  785 

V.  Noyes   (1002),  —  Neb.— ,  92 

N.  W.  175  684,  754 

Chambers  i\  Gold  win,  9  Ves.  269  378 

V.  Lewis,  2  Hilt.  591         (548,  649,  653 
V.  Lewis,  28  N.  Y.  454,  11  Abb. 

Pr.  210  918 

V.  Nicholson,  30  Ind,  349         325,  335 
Chanibersbiirtr,  N.  Bk.  of,  i'.  Grimm, 

109  N.  C.  93  872 

Chamblee    v.    McKenzie,    31    Ark. 

411  112 

Chambovet  v.  Cagney,  35  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  474  226 

Champion  v.  Brown,  6  Johns.  Ch. 

402  360 

Cliance  v.  Indianapolis  &  W.  G.  Road 

Co.,  32  Ind.  472  785 

V.  Isaacs,  5  Paige,  592  133 

V.  Jennings  (1901),  159  Mo.  544, 

61  S.  VV.  177  640 

Chancellor   v.  Morecraft,    11   Beav. 

252,  352 
51 


Chandler  v.  Neil,  46  Kan.  67 

V.  Parker   (1902),  65  Kan.  860, 

70  Pac.  368  641 

Channon  v.  Lusk,  2  Lans.  213  199 

Chan  Sing  v.  City  of  Portland  (1900), 

37  Ore.  68,  60  Pac.  718  593 

Chaperon    v.    Portland     Elec.     Co. 

(1902),  41  Ore.  39,  67  Pac.  928  682 

Chapin  v.  Babcock  (1896),  67  Conn. 

255,  34  Atl.  1039  302 

Chapman  v.  Callahan,  66  Mo.  299         376 

V.  Forbes,  123  N.  Y.  532  406,  412, 

414,  417 

;;.  Hunt,  1  McCarter,  149  246 

V.  J.iraes  (1895),  96  la.  233,  64 

N.  W.  795  626 

V.   Jones  (1897),  149  Ind.  434, 

47  N.  E.  1065      433,  641,  685 
i>.  Plummer,  36  Wis.  262    131,930, 

931 
361 


V.  West,  17  N.  Y.  125 
Chappell  V.  Rees,  1   DeG.  M.  &  G. 

393 
Charboneau  v.  Henni,  24  Wis.  250 
Cliarles    v.    Halleck     Lumber    Co. 
(1896),  22  Colo.  283, 43  Pac. 
548 
V.  Haskins,  11  Iowa,  329 
Charles     Baumback    Co.    v.    Laube 
(1898),  99  Wis.  171,  74  N.  W.  96 


379 
310 


375 
100 

642, 
671 
Charleston,  etc.  Ry.   Co.    i>.   Miller 

(1901),  113  Ga.  15,  38  S.  E.  338  641 
Charlcstown  School  District  v.  Hay, 

74  Ind.  127  610 

Charlotte,  Bank   of,  v.  Britton,  66 

N.  C.  365  810 

Charlton  v.  Tardy,  28  Ind.  452  886,  938 
Charter   Oak    L.    Ins.   Co.   v.   Cum- 

mings,  90  Mo.  267  283 


ARE   TO   THE  PAGES.] 

I  Chase  o.  Abbott,  20  Iowa,  154      316,  326, 

333,  335 
V.  Dodge  (1901),  111  Wis.  70,  86 

N.  W.  548  98 

V.  Long,  44  Ind.  427  815 

V.  Peck,  21  N.  Y.  581  51 

V.  Vandi'rbilt,  62  N.  Y.  .307  354 

Chatfield  v.  Frost,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C.  357      617 

Chautauqua  v.  Gifford,  8  Hun,  152        165 

Chautauqua   Cy.  Bk.    v.    White,   6 

N.  Y.  236  473 

Cheatham  v.  Young  (1893),  113  N.  C. 

161,  18  S.  E.  92  781 

Cheelv's  Adm.  v.  Wells,  33  Mo.  106    458, 

504 
Cheeseman  v.  Wiggins,  1  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  595  249 

Cheltenham  Fire-brick  Co.  v.  Cook, 

44  Mo.  29  149 

Chenault  v.  Bu.sh,  84  Ky.  528  134 

Cheney  v.  Crandell  (1901),  28  Colo. 

383,  05  Pac.  56  49 

Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Rv.  Co.  v.  Han- 
mer  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W. 
375  601 

r.  Riddle's  Adm'x    (1903),  Ky., 

72  S.  W.  22  709 

V.  Smith  (1897).  101  Ky.  104,  42 

S.  W.  5:!8  817 

V.  Thieman   (1895),  96  Ky.  507, 

29  S.  W.  357  665,  668 

Cheshire  Iron  Works  v.  Gay,  3  Gray, 

531  259 

Chester  v.  Dickerson,  52  Barb.  349       301 
V.  Halliard,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  113  388 

V.  Leonard  (1897),  68  Conn.  495, 

37  At).  397  816 

Chesterson  r.  Munson,  27  Minn.  498     609 
Clietwood    V.   California  Nat.   Bank 

(189(;),  IL'j  Cal.  414,  45  la.  704  623 

Chicago,  etc.  Land  Co.  v.  Peck,  112 

III.  408  387 

Chicago  &   O.  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v.  Nor- 
man, 32  N.  E.  Rep.  857  576 
Chicago   &  S.   W.  K.  Co.  v.  N.  W. 

Union  Packet  Co.,  38  Iowa,  377  544,  663 
Chicago  Bldg.  Co.  c.  Creamery  Co. 

(1898),  106  Ga.  84,  31  S.  E.  809         712 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Grab- 
lin    (1893),   38  Neb.  90.  56 
N.  W.  796  682,  683 

V.  Haywood  (1897),  102  la.  392, 

71  N.  W.  358  466,  594 

V.  Kelloffg  (1898),  55  Neb.  748, 

76  N.  W.  462  683 

V.   Martelle    (1902),    —Neb.—. 

91  N.  W.  364  638,  666 

V.   Oyster   (1899),  58  Neb.  1,  78 

N.  W.  359  602,  082,  683,  818 

V.  Spirk  {18'.)7),  51  Neb.  167,  70 

N.  W.  926  593,  612 

V.  Thomas  (1896),  147  Ind.  35, 

46  N.  E.  73  681 

V.  Thomas  (1900),  155  Ind.  634, 

58  N.  E.  1040  683 


Ixviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references 

Chicago,  Cin  ,  &  L.  R.  Co.  i-.  West, 

37Ind.  211  745,748,772 

Chicago  House  Wrecking  Co.  r.  Lum- 
ber Co.  (1902),—  Neb.  —,'J2  N.  W. 
1009  615 

Chicago,  K.  &   W.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Evans 

(ISiHil,  57  Kan.  286,  46  Pac.  303        G24 
Chicago,  -M.  &  St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.  >: 
Phillips   (1900),    111   la.   377,   82 
N.  W.  787  732 

Chicago,  R.  L  &  Pac.  liy.  Co.  r. 
Frazier  (1903),  —  Kan.  — , 
71  I'ac.  8:51  704 

v.  O'Neill   (1899),  58  Neb.  239, 

78  N.  W.  521  456 
V.  Sliaw  (1901),  63  Neb.  380,  88 

N.  W.  508  638,  817 

V.  Shepherd  (1894),  39  Neb.  523, 

58  N.  W.  189  607,  688 

r.  Young  (1899),  58  Neb.  678, 

79  N.  W.  556  683 
V.  Young   (1903),  — Neb.— ,93 

N.  W.  922  639,  642 

Chicago,  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wolcott  (1894),  141  Ind.  267,  39 
N.  E. 451  601 

Childers  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1896), 

147  Ind.  430,  46  N.E.  825        744, 
751 
V.  Verner,  12  8.  C.  1  592 

Childsr.  Alexander. 22  S.C.  169  90,91,104 
c.  Harris  .Man.  Co.,  68  Wis.  231  515 
c.  Hyde,  10  Iowa,  294  293 

r.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1893),  117  Mo.  414,  23 
S.  W.  373  433,  455 

V.  Ptomcy  (1895),  17  Mont.  502, 

43  Pac.  714  818 

Childs  Lumber  Co.   v.  Page  (1902), 

28  Wash.  128.  68  Pac.  373  703 

Chiles  V.  Drake,  2  Mete.  146  457 

ChiUon  V.  Bank  (1899),  9  N.  D.  96, 

84  N.  W.  354  606 

Chin  Kem  You  c.  Ah  Joan,  75  Cal. 

124  153 

Chinn  -•.  Trustees,  32  r)),io  St.  236         15 
Chipman  v.  Montgomery,  63  N.  Y. 

^21  240,  256 

Ciiippewa  Falls  r.  Hopkins  (1901), 

109  Wis.  611,  85  N.  W.  553  816 

Chitlv  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Rv.  Co. 
( 1899),  148  Mo.  64,  49  S.  W.  868      614, 

682 
Cholniondelev  v.  Clinton,  2  Jac.   & 

W.  i:}4  246,  258,  379 

Chouquette  v.  Southern  Elec.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1899),  152  Mo.  257,  63  S.  W. 
897  618 

ChriBtennen  v.  Hollingsworth  (1898), 

0  Idaho.  87.  53  I'ac.  211  4^55,  472 

Chri«Ujn8(>n    <•.    Nelson    (1901),    38 

Ore.  473,  63  Pac.  0^18  042 

Christian  r.  Conn.  Mut.  Ins.  Co. 
(1K)8),  14.'i  Mo.  460,  45  S.  W. 
268  616 


ARE  TO  TUE  PAGES.] 

Christian  v.  Williams,  20  S.  W.  Rep. 

96  830 
Christie  v.  Iowa  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1900), 

111  la.  177,82  N.  W.  499  433 

Christy  v.  Dana,  42  Cal.  174  754 
Chun  c.  Receivers    (1901),    Ky.,  64 

S.  W.  649  623 

Chung  Kee  v.  Davidson,  73  Cal.  522  112 

Chunot  c.  Larson,  43  Wis.  536  018 
Church  V.  Pearne  (1903),  75  Conn. 

350,  53  Atl  955  704,  834 

7-.  Smith,  ?>0  Wi.<.  492      244,  326,  376 

r.  Spiegelberg,  31  Fed.  Rep.  601  911 

Churchill  c.  Baumann,  95  Cal.  541  815 

V.  Churchill,  9  How.  Pr.  552  660 

r.  Lauer,  b4  Cal.  233  262 
V.  Stephenson  (1896),  14  Wash. 

620,  45  I'ac.  28  418 

r.  Trapp,  3  Abb.  Pr.  306  400 
Cicero  Hvg.  Dr.  Co.  r.  Craighead, 

28  In(l.'-.i74  785 
Cincinnati  v.  Emerson  (1897),  57  0. 

St.  132,  48  N.  E.  667  656 

Cincinnati    &    Chicago     R.  Co.     v. 

Washburn,  25  Ind.  259 
Cincinnati    Dailv    Tribune    Co.    v. 
Bruck  (1900),  61  Ohio  St.  489,  56 
N.  E.  1^8  924 

Cincinnati,  H.,  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Ches- 
ter, 57  Ind.  297  525 
Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Barker 
(1893),  94  Ky.  71,21  S.  W. 
347                                             741 
V.  McLain  (1897),  148  Ind.   188, 

44  N.  E.  306  570 

Cincinnati  Tobacco  Warehouse  Co. 
V.    Matthews    (1903),    Ky.,    74 

S.  W.  242  641 

Cinfel  V.  Malena  (1903),  —  Neb. —, 

93  N.  W. 165  201 

Citizens'  Bank  v.  Closson,  29  Ohio 

St.  78  831 

V.  Pence  (1900),  59  Neb.  579,  81 

N.  W.  623  711,819 

V.  Stewart  (1894),  90  la.  407,  57 

N.  W.  957  676 

V.  Tiger    Tail    Mill    Co.  (1899), 

152  Mo.  145,  53  S.  W.  902         24 
Citizens'  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Witte 
(1901),   110   Wis.  545,  86  N.   W. 
173  666 

Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  r.  City  Nat. 
Baidi  (1900),  HI  Iowa,  211, 
82  N.  W.  464  423 

V.  Judy  (1896),  146  Ind.  322,  43 

N.  E.  259  685 

Citizens'  St.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton 
(1897),  148  Ind.  169,  46  N.E. 
462  682 

V.  Willoeby    (1893),     134    Ind. 

563.  33  N.  E.  627  665 

City  Bank  of  New  Haven  v.  Perkin.s, 

29  N.  Y.  554  93 
City  Carpet  Beating  Works  v.  Jones 

(1894),  102  Cal.  506,  36  Pac.  841       455 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED, 


Ixix 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Thomas  (1896),  46 

Neb.  861,  65  N.  W.  895  810 

Claflin  V.  Jaroslauski,  0 1  Barb.  463       788 

V.  Ostrom,  54  N.  Y.  581    105,  109,  111 

V.  Reese,  54  Iowa,  544  756 

V.  Taussig,  7  Hun,  223    562,  568,  651, 

704 
V.  Van  Wagoner,  32  Mo.  252 
Clague  V.  Hodgson,  16  Minn.  329  611 

Claiborne  v.  Castle   (1893),  98  Cal. 

30,  32  Pac.  807  669 

Clapp  V.  Cunningham,  50  Iowa,  307      702 
V.  Greenlee  (1897),  100  la.  586, 

69  N.  W.  1049  641 

V.  Preston,  15  Wis.  543  299,  402 

V.  Wright,  21  Hun,  240  930 

Cliirissy  i'.  Metrop.  Fire  Dep.,  7  Abb. 

Pr.  N.  s.  352  156 

Clark  V.  Allen  (1899),  125  Cal.  276, 

57  Pac.  985  625 

V.  Bates,  1  Dak.  42  74,  541,  546 

V.  Boyer,  32  Ohio  St.  299         314,  806 
V.  Cable,  21  Mo.  223  204,  209 

V.  Carey  (1894),  41  Neb.  780,  60 

N.  W.  78  180 

V.  Clark,  5  Hun,  340  791 

V.  Commercial  Nat.  Bank  (1903), 

—  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W.  958  288 
V.  Crawfordsville  Coffin  Co.,  125 

Ind.  277  177 

V.  Dillon,  97  N.  Y.  370  751 

V.  Eltinge  (1902),  29  Wash.  215, 

69  Pac.  736  317 

V.  Fensky,  3  Kan.  389  584 

V.  Finnell,  16  B.  Mon.  337       753,  936 
V.  Fosdick,  118  N.  Y.  7  154 

V.  Harwood,  8  How.  Pr.  470  611 

V.  Langwortiiy,  12  Wis.  441  633 

V.  Lineberger,  44  Ind.  223       454,  561 
V.  Lock  wood,  21  Cal.  222  46,  63 

V.  Reyburn,  8  Wall.  318  337 

V.  Ross   (1895),   96  la.  402,  65 

N.  W.  340  657,  715 

V.  St.  Louis  Transfer  Co.  (1894), 

127  Mo.  255,  30  S.  W.  121  641 
V.  Sherman,  32  Pac.  Rep.  771  620 
V.  Stanton,  24  Minn.  232  412 

V.  Storv,  29  Barb.  295  934 

V.  Siilli'vau,  2  N.  Dak.  103  870 

V.  Taylor,  91  Cal.  552  942 

V.  Wick  (1894),  25  Ore.  446,  36 

Pac.  165  684,  802 

Clark  et  al.  v.  Ins.  Co.,  52  Mo.  272        510 
Clark's  Adm.  v.  Han.  &  St.  Jo.  R. 

Co.,  36  Mo.  202  455,  517 

Clarke  v.  Baird  (1893),  98  Cal.  642, 

33  Pac.  756  417 

V.  East  Atlanta  Land  Co.  (1901), 

113  Ga.  21,  38S.  E.  323  715 

r.  Hancock  Cy.  Sup.,  27  III.  305     118 
V.  Huber,  25  Cal.  593  52,  815 

V.  Railroad  Co.,  28  Minn.  71  565 

Clarkson  u.  De  Peyster,  3  Paige,  320     260 
V.  Kennett  (1895),  17  Mont,  563, 

44  Pac.  88  025 


285 


Clason  V.  Baldwin,  129  N.  Y.  183 
Clause  Printing  Co.  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
Bank  (1896),  145  Ind.  682,  44  N.  E. 
256 
Claussen  v.  La  Franz,  4  Greene,  224 
Clay  V.  Edgerton,  19  Ohio  St.  549 

592,  596, 
V.  Mayr  (1898),  144  Mo.  376,  46 
S.  W.  157 
Clay  Cy.  v.  Simonsen,  1  Dak.  403 

540,  562, 
Clay  Cy.  Com'rs  v  Markle,  46  Ind. 

90 
Clay    County    Land    Co.    v.    Alco.x 
1902,  88  Minn.    4,  92  N.  W.  464 

Clayes  v.  Hooker,  4  Hun,  231         618, 
Clayton  v.  City  of  Hemlerson  ( 1898), 
103  Ky.  228,  44  S.  W.  667 

V.  School  District,  20  Kan.  206 
Clayton   County   v.   Herwig    (1897), 

100  la.  631,69  N.  W.  1035 
Clegg  V.  Rowland,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  368 
Oleghorn  v.  Postlewaite,  43  111.  428 
Clemens  v.  Clemens,  37  N.  Y.  59 

V.  Hanley  (1895),  27  Ore.  326, 

41  Pac.  658 
V.  Luce  (1894),  101  Cal.  432,  35 
Pac.  1032 
Clemons  v.  Elder,  9  Iowa,  272       351 
Cleveland  '-.  Barrows,  59  Barb.  364 
V.  McCanna  (1898),  7  N.  D.  455, 
75  N.  W.  <)08 
Cleveland,   etc.    Ry.    Co.    v.    Berrv 
(1898),  152  Ind.  007,  53  N.E. 
415  599,  682 

V.  Gray  (1897),  148  Ind.  206,  46 

N.  E.  657  677 

V.  Kiee  (18'.)9),  154  Ind.  430,  56 

N.  E.  234  673 

V.  Miller  (1897),  149  Ind.  490,  49 

N.  E.  445  673 

V.  Parker  (1899),  154  Ind.  153, 

56  N.  E.  86  664 

Clifford  V.  Dam,  81  N.  Y.  52  806 

Clift  V.  Newell   (1898),  104  Ky.  396, 

47  S.  W.  270  681 

V.  Northrup,  6  Lans.  330  934 

Clifton  V.  Lange  (1899),  108  la.  472, 

79  N.  W.  276  806 

Cline  V.  Cline,  3  Ore.  355  544,  545 

Clink  V.  Thurston,  47  Cal.  21         745,  815 
Clinton  i-.  Eddv,  1  Lans.  61  855,  913 

Cloon  V.  City  Ins.  Co..  1  Handy,  32      288 
Close  V.  Hodges,  44  Minn.  204  150 

CIosz  V.  Miracle  (1897),  103  la.  198, 

72  N.  W.  502  671,  689 

Cloud  V.  Malvin  (1899).  108  la.  52, 

75  N.  W.  645,  78  N.  W.  791  676 

Clough  V.  Bennett  (1896),  99  la.  69, 

68  N.  W.  578  638 

V.  Holden  (1893),  115  Mo.  336, 

21  S.  W.  107  678,  790 


712 

11 

573, 

598 

63 
541, 
508 

119 

109, 

410 

.791 

444, 

41)8 
784 

520 
347 
118 
366, 

368 

638 

754 

,  374 

518 

934 


Ixx 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[tbe  repe&enxes  a&e  to  the  pages.] 


Ciciugli  V.  Rocky  Mountain  t»il  Co. 
(Ibyb).  25  Colo.  620,  55 
Fac.  bUO  521 

f.  Tliomas,  53  Ind.  24  310 

riow  c.  Brown  (1897),  150  Ind.  185, 

4^  N.  E.  1034  599 

CiMif  t:  Johnson  (18ti4),  4  N.  1).  92, 

'm  N.  \V.  512  506,  687 

CoiikU-v  f.  Chamberlain,  8  Abb.  Pr. 

N.  s.';;:  276,286 

Coales  l:  Day,  9  Mo.  315  341 

Coats  (.  McKee.  22  Inii.  223 
Coatsworth  r.  Leiiijrli  Vallev  Ky.  Co. 

( Ib'Jc'j.  loo  N.  Y.  401,  61  N.  E.  301     592 

Cobl)  . .  Dows,  9  Barb.  230  622 

V.  111.  Cent.  K.  Co.,  38  Iowa,  601     453, 

457 
r.  Lindell   Ry.  Co.  (1899).  149 

Mo.  135.  50  «.  W.  310  593 

V.  Smith,  38  Wis.  21  301,  305 

Cobbev  r.  Buchanan  (1890),  48  Neb. 

391,  07  N.  \V.  176  816 

Coburn  i:  Smart,  53  Cal.  742  428 

C<K'hise   County    v.   Copper    Queen 

Mill.  Co.  (19(33).  Ariz.,  71  Pac  940     678 
Cochran  v.  Coodell,  131  Mass.  464        244 
/ .  Thomas  (1895),  131  Mo.  258, 

33  S.  W.  6  371 

Ciifhrane  /■.  Qnackenbush,  29  Min. 

376  215 

Cock  f  Evans,  9  Yerp.  287  360 

Cockburn  >:  Thompson,  16  Ves.  328   249, 

388,  392,  511 

Cocker.  '^lausen  (1900),  67  Ark.  455, 

55  S.  W.  846  54 

CockeriU  V.  Stafford,  102  Mo.  571         598 
Cockrill  .-.   Hutchinson    (1896),   135 

Mo.  67.  30  S.  W.  375  816 

V.  Jovce  ( 1896).  62  Ark.  216,  35 

S.  W.  221  613 

Codd  /•.  Rathbone,  19  N.  Y.  37  817 

Coddint'  '•.  Mimson  (1897),  52  Neb. 

5H0.  72  N.  W   846  656 

Coddinirton  r    Canadav  (1901),  157 

Ind.  248,  61  N.  K.  567         181.  271.  302. 

621,  699,613,  711 

Co.ly  V.  Remis,  40  Wis.  666  018 

Coe  V.   Anderson    (1894).  '.^   Iowa, 

516,  01  N.  W.  177  179 

r.  R..ckwith.  10  Abb.  Pr.  296         387 
<•.  Lindlev.  32  Iowa.  437  946 

Ci.for  V.   Riselinir   (1900),    153  Mo. 

«.!.i.  66  S.  \V.  236  715 

CofTcv  r.  C,r«-i'nflcld.  65  Cal.  382  423 

r.  Norwood.  81  Ala.  512  340,  360 

Coffin  v.  Black  {\Hm),  67  Ark.  219, 

64  S    W.  212  731 

I'.  Grand  Rapids  Hvdr.  Co.,  18 

N.  Y.  Suppl.  782  150 

r.  McLean,  W)  N.  Y.  660  809 

Coffmnn  r.  KciKhtley.  24  Ind.  509        118 
Coifdcll  I'.    Wilminftton.  etc.  R.   R. 
Co.  (IWJ).  130  N.  C.  313.  41  S.  E. 
641.  817  (VM'j),  132  N.  C.  852,  44 
S   E.  018  817 


Coggswell  V.  Griffith,  36  N.  W.  Rep. 

538  364 

Coghill  V.  Marks,  29  Cal.  673  428 

Cogswell  V.  Murphy,  46  Iowa,  44     279, 

303,  499 
Cohen  v.  Cont.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  69  N,  Y. 

300  502,  568 

1-.  Kno.x,  90  Cal.  266  665 

c.  Wolti-  (1893),  92  Ga.  199,  17 

S.  E.  1029  215 

Cohn  i:  Lehman,  93  Mo.  574  830 

r.  Wright,  89  Cal.  86  570 

Cohoon   r.  Fisher    (1890),    140   Ind. 

583,  44  N.  E.  004  641 

Cohu  i:  Hussoii,  113  N.  Y.  062  665 

Colbv  r.  Spokane  (1895),  12  Wash. 

090,  42Pac.  112  755 

Colcord  V.  Conger  (1900),  10  Okla. 

458,  02  Pac.  276  934 

Cole  c.  Bovd   (1899),  125  N.  C.  496, 

34  S.  E.  557  669 

i;.  Getzinger  (1897),  96  Wis.  559, 

71  X.  W.  75  266 

V.  Noerdlinger  (1900),  22  Wash. 

51,  00  Pac.  57  740 

V.  Reynolds,  18  N.  Y.  74     11.  16,  173, 
210,  310 
V.  Turner.  6  Mod.  149 
Colegrove  v.  N.  Y.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20 

N.  Y.  492  302 

Coleman  /•.  Burr,  93  N.  Y.  17  22t) 

c.  Drnne  (1893),  116  Mo.  387,22 

S.  W.  801  781,  783 

V.  Elmore,  31  Fed.  Rep.  391  881 

V.  nines  (1902),  24  Utah,. 360,  07 

Pac.   1122  688 

V.   Perry  (1903),  28  Mont.    1,72 

Pac.  42  703 

Coles  r.  Forrest,  10  Beav.  562  337 

V.  Soulsby,  21  Cal.  47  759,  816 

Colgrove  V.  Koonce,  76  N.  C.  363  417 

Collart  V.  Fisk,  38  Wis.  238  758 

CoUett  V.  Hover,  1  Coll.  227  256 

V.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 

23  Wash.  000,  63  Pac.  225      081 
V.  Wollaston,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  228 
Collev  r.  Gate    Citv   Co.   (1893),  92 

Ga.  064,  18  S.  E.  817  640 

Collier  v.  Ervin,  3  Mont.  142        061,  917, 

926 
Collins  V.  Butler.  14  Cal.  223  930 

V.  Cowen.  62  Wis.  634  470 

V.  Gregg  (lb99),  109  la.  506,  80 

N.  W.  602  703 

V.  Groseclose,  40  Ind.  144  935 

V.  Morrison  (1895),  91  Wis.  324, 

G4N.  W.  1000  890,919 

V.  O'Laverty  (1902),  130  Cal.  31, 

68  Pac.  327  671 

V.  Rogers,  63  Mo.  615  49 

Colorado  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  MoUandin, 

4  Colo.  154  748 

Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Four 
Mile  Ry.  Co.  (1901),  29  Colo.  90, 
66  Pac.  902  600 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ixxi 


[toe  refebences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Colorado  Man.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  15 

Colo.  510  373 

Colton  r.  Hanchett.  13  111.  615  119 

V.  Onderdonk,  (39  Cal.  155  219 

Colton  L.  &  VV.  Co.  v.  Kaynor,  57 

Cal.  588  704 

Coltzhauser  i\  Simon,  47  Wis.  103         713 
Columbia  Nat.  Bank  v.  German  Nat. 
Bank  (1898),  5<)  Neb.  803, 
77  N.  W.  ;i4(j  832 

V.  Western  Iron  &  Steel  (^o. 
(1896),  14  Wash.  1G2,  44 
Pac.  145  738,802 

■Columbia  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Elec- 
tric Co.  (18'.t4),  4:3  S.  C.  154,  20 
S.  E.  1002  243 

Columbus,  etc.    llv.   Co.   >•.  Gaffnev 

(P»01),  d5  O.  St"  104,  64  N.  K    152     (324 
Colvvell  V.  N.  Y.  &E.  U.  Co.,  9  How. 

Pr.  311  5-22 

Combes  v.  Chandler,  33  Ohio  St.  178     123 
€ombs  V.  Union   Trust  Co.   (1896), 

146  Ind.  688,  46  N.  E.  16  800 

V.  Watson,  32  Ohio  St.  228  821 

Comer  v.  Knosvles,  17  Kan.  436  575 

Comins  y.  Jefferson  Cy.  Sup.,  3  N.  Y. 

Sup.  Ct.  296  118 

-Commercial   Bank  v.  Colt,  15  Barb. 

506  122 

V.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  of  Phil.,  54  N.  W. 

Rep.  109  910 

V.  Red    River   Bank    (1899),    8 

N.  D.  382,  79  N.  W.  859  95 

Com.  Elec.  Light  &  Power  Co.  v. 
Tacoma  (1897),  17  Wash.  661,  50 
Pac.  592  703 

-Commercial    Nat.    Bank    v.   Gibson 

(1893),  37  Neb.  750,  56  N.  W.  616     638 
Commercial   State  Bank  v.  Rowley 

(1902),  Neb.,  89  N.  W.  765  94 

Commercial  Union  Assurance  Co.  v. 
Shoemaker  (1901),  63  Neb.  173,88 
N.  W.  156  478 

Commissioners  of  Almance  County, 
etc. ;    Bartholomew    County,    etc. 
See  Almance  Cy.  Com'rs,  etc. 
Commonwealth  v.  Cook,  8  Bush.  220    561, 

594 
V.  Robinson  (1895),  96  Ky.  553, 

29  S.  W.  306  333 

V.   Scott  (1901),  112  Ky.  252,  65 

S.  W.  596  263,  378,  385,  388 

V.  Todd,  9  Bush,  708  873 

Commonwealth    Title    Ins.    Co.    v. 
Dokko  (1898),  71  Minn.  533. 

74  N.  W.  891  593,  651 
r.  Dokko   (1898),  72  Minn.  229, 

75  N.  W.  106  781 
Compton  V.  Davidson,  31  Ind.  62  113 
Computing    Scale   Co.    v.  Churchill 

(1901),    109    Wis.   303,   85 
N.  W.  337  868,  871 

V.  Long  (1903),  —  S.  C.  —    44 

S.  E.  963  600 

Comstock  V.  Hier,  73  N.  Y.  269  649 


Conant  v.  Barnard,  103  N.  C.  315  662 

?;.  Frary,  49  Ind.  530  417 

V.  Jones  (1893),  Idaho,  32  Pac. 

250  737 

I'.  Storthz   (1901),  69  Ark.  200, 

62  S.  W.  415  521 

Conaughty  i;.  Nichols,  42  N.  Y.  83         75, 

628,  630,  633 

Conawav  i\  Carpenter,  58  Ind.  477       887 

Cone  f.  Cone  (1901),  61  S.  C.  512,  39 

S.  E.  748  179,  813 

V.  Ivinson  (1893),  4  Wyo.  203, 

33  Pac.  31     •^o,  566,  592,  (iOO,  815 
V.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.,  60  N.  Y. 

619  29,34,110,111 

Conev  V.  Home  (1894),  93  Ga.  723, 

20S.  E.  213  822 

Conger  v.   Crabtree,  83  la.  536,  55 

N.  W.  335  716 

V.  Parker,  29  Ind.  380  46,  727 

Conklin  v   Bishop.  3  Duer,  646  419 

Conley  v.  Arnold  (1894),  93  Ga.  823, 

20  S.  E.  762  796 

r.  Buck  (1896),  100  Ga.  187,  28 

S.  E.  97  509 

Conlin  V.  Cantrell.  64  N.  Y.  217  316 

Conn.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Erie  R.  Co., 

73  N.  Y.  399  117,  217 

V.  O'Fallon   (1896),  49  Neb.  740, 

69  N.  W.  118  804 

Conn.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cross,  18 

Wis.  lOit  474 

V.  McCormick,  45  Cal.  580  790 

Connell  v.  Che.sapeake,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 

(1900),  Ky.,  58  S.  W.  374  681 

Conner  v.  Ashlev    (1897),  49  S.  C. 

478,  27  S.  E.  473  660 

V.  Scott  (1897),  16  Wash.  371,47 

Pac   761  928,  932 

V.  Win  ton,  7  Ind.  523'     899,  911,  914, 

916 
Connor   v.    Becker  (1901),  62  Neb. 

850,  87  N.W.  1005  593 

V.  Knott  (1896),  8  S.  I).  304,  66 

N.W.  461  781 

t'.  Raddon  (1898),  16  Utah,  418, 

52  Pac.  764  640 

V.  St.   Anthony  Bd.  of  Ed.,  10 

Minn.  439  472 

Connor's   Adm.   v.  Paul,    12   Busli, 

144  159 

Connoss  i'.  Meir,  2  E.  D.  Smith,  314     663 
Conolly  V.  Wells,  33  Fed.  Rep.  205       343, 

347 
Conrad  v.  De  Montcourt  (1896),  138 

Mo.  311,  39  S.  W.  805  681,  682 

Conrad  Nat.  Bank  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.  (1900),  24  Mont.  178,  61 
Pac.  1  579,  584,  595 

Conro  V.  Port  Henry  Iron  Co.,   12 

Barb.  27  259,  260 

Considerant  v.  Brisbane,  22  N.  Y. 

389  147,  149 

Considine  v.  Gallagher  (1903  ,  31 
Wash.  669,  72  Pac.  469  072 


Lwii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[IBE   REFERE.NCES    ARE  TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Consol.  Barb-wire  Co.  r.  Piircell,  48 

Kan. 2U7  150 

Con*olidated    Canal    Co.    r.    I'eters 

(1896),  Ariz.  4o  Pac.  74  007 

Contolidateil  Steel  &.  Wire  Co.  r. 
liurnhani  (1899),  8  Okla.  514,  58 
Tac.  054  038,  645 

Continental   Ins.  Co.  r.  Phillips,  53 

N.  W.  Kep.  774  637 

Converse  c.  .^cott  (1902),   137  Cal. 

•J3'J,  70  Pac.  13  668 

Conway  r.  Mitcliell  (1807),  97  Wis. 

290,  72  N.  W.  752  804 

r.  Smith.  13  Wis.  125  932 

r.  Wharton,  13  Minn.  158  831 

Conyngham  c.  Smith,  10  Iowa,  471       00, 

113,931 
Cook  r.  Am.  Ex.   Bank   (1901),  129 

N.  C.  149.  39  S.  E.  746  605 

V.  Basom   (1901),  164  Mo.  594, 

65  S.  W.  227  351 

V.  Chambers,  107  Ind.  07  821 

1-.  Citv  of  Menasiia  (1899),  103 

Wis.  6,  79  N.  W.  26  104 

V.  Doty   (1894),   91  la.  721,  59 

N.  W.  35  608 

Estate  of  (l'.»02),  137  Cal.  184, 

69  Pac. 1124  543 

V.  Find),  19  Minn.  407  831 

V.  Guirkin  (1890),  119  X.  C.  13, 

25  S.  i:.  715  736 

V.  llorwitz,  10  Hun.  586  499 

r.  .Ii-nkins.  79  N.  Y.  575  886,  908 

f.  Kittson  (1897),  08  Minn.  474, 

71  N.  W.  070  608 

V.  Klink,  8  Cal.  347  231 

V.  Lovell.  11  Iowa.  81  936 

r.  Morris  (1895),  06  Conn.  196, 

;«  Atl.  994  607 

V.  Putniim  Cy.,  70  Mo.  668  508 

V.  Smith,  54  Iowa,  636  736 

V.  Smith  (1896),  119  N.  C.  350, 

25  S.  E.  958  498 

V.  Smith    (1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  72 

Pac.  524  712 

r.  Soule,  50  N.  Y.  420  909 

V.  St.   Paul's  Church  Wardens, 

5  Hun.  293  198 

Cookinjiliani  r   Laslier,  2  Keyes,  454    292 
Coolev   .-.    AhlK'V    (1900),    111    Ga. 

4.39,  36  S.  E.  780  730 

r.  Brown,  30  Iowa,  470  253 

r.  Howe    Mach.   Co.,  53  N.  Y. 

020  105 

CoolidKe  I'.  Parrig,  8  Ohio  St.  694    313, 

317 
Coomlie  r.  Kno.x  (UXJ3),28  Mont.  202, 

72  Pac.  041  375 

Coomb*   CommisBion   Co.  v.  Block 
(1895),  130  Mo.  668,  82  8.  W.  1139  543, 
703,  800 
Coon  l)i«t.  Tp.  !•.  I'rovidence  Dist. 

Tp.  Dir,.  .^2  Iowa,  2H7  597 

Cooniz  '■.  .Mifhouri  i'ac.  Kv.  Co. 
(1893),  115  Mo.  669,  22  S.  W.  572     075 


Cooper  V.  Birch  (1902),  137  Cal.  472, 

70  Pac.  291  685,  687 

f.  Blair,  14  Ore.  255  303 

V.  Frencl),  .52  Iowa,  531  502,  611 

r.  Mohler  (1898),  104  Iowa,  301, 

73  N.  W.  828  421 

r.  The  People   (1900),  28  Colo. 

87,  03  Pac.  314  180 

r.  Portner  Brewing  Co.  (1900), 

112  Ga.  894,  38  S.  E.  91  658 

r.  Thomason  (1896),  30  Ore.  161, 

45  Pac.  295  178 

Coos  Bay  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Siglin  (1894), 

20  Ore.  387,  38 -Pac.  192  805 

Cope  V.  Parrv,  2  Jac.  &  W.  538     2.39,  256 
V.  Tvpe  Foundry  Co.  (1897),  20 

Mont.  07,  49  Pac.  387  671 

Copeland  v.  Cheney  (1902),  116  Ga. 

085,  43  S.  E.  59  666 

V.  Young,  21  S.  C.  275  881 

Copis  V.  Middleton,  2  Mad.  410  342 

Coppard  v.  Allen,  2  DeG.  J.  &  S. 

173  348,  354 

Corbett  i-.  Hughes,  75  Iowa,  281  882 

V.  Wrenn  (1894),  25  Ore.  305,  35 

Pac.  658  452,  521 

Corbev   c.  Rogers  (1898),   152  Ind. 

169,  52  N.  E.  748  058,  822 

Corbitt    V.    Harrington    (IS'.fO),    14 

Wash.  197,  44  Pac.  132  833 

Corby  V.  Weddle,  57  Mo.  452  778 

Corcor;m  i:  Sonera  Mm.  <^  .Mill  Co. 

(1902),  Idalio,  71  Pac.  127  711 

Cord  V.  Ilirsch,  17  Wis.  403  270,  326 

Cordill  V.  Minn.  Elevator  Co.  (1903), 

89  Minn.  442,  95  X.  W.  306  674 

Corey  v.  Rice,  4  Lans.  141  213 

V.  Sherman  (1895),  96  la.  114, 

64  N.  W.  828  387 

Corkery  v.  Security  Ins.  Co.   (1890), 

99  la.  382,  68  N.  W.  792  818 

Corlett  V.  Ins.  Co.   (1899),  00   Kan. 

134,  55  Pac.  844  822 

Corn  Exch.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Babcock,  42 

N.  Y.  613  315 

Cornelison    r.   Foushee    (1897),  101 

Ky.  257,  40  S.  W.  680  085 

Cornelius  i:  Kessel,  58  Wis  237  928 

Cornell  V.  Dakin,  .38  X.  Y.  253  816 

V.  Donovan,  14  Dalv,  295        933,  934 

r.  Radway,  22  Wis.' 200  346 

Corning  r.  (  orning,  0  \.  Y.  97  719 

V.  Smitli,  6  N.  Y.  82  3-37 

Cornish  v.  Gest,  2  Cox,  27  242 

Cornley  )•.  Dazian,  114  N.  Y.  101  153 

Corns  i-.CIouser(  1893),  137  Ind.  201, 

30  N.  E.  848  001 

Cornwall  v.  McKinney  (1896),  9 S.  D. 

213,  08  N.  W.  .333  702 

Corpeiuiy  v.  Sedalia,  57  Mo.  88      596,  598 
Cortelyou  v.  Jones  (1901),  132  Cal. 

1.31,  64  Pac.  119  94,97 

V.  McCarth  V  ( ls!)8),  53  Neb.  479, 

73  X.  \V.  921  0(i2 

Cor  win  V.  Ward,  .35  Cal.  195  936 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxiii 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Coryell  v.  Cain,  16  Cal.  567 

Cosby 's    Heirs    r.    Wickliffe,    7    B. 

Moil.  120 
Coster  V.  Brown,  23  Cal.  142 
c.  Mavor,  43  N.  Y.  399 
V.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  3  Abb 

QOO 

Cottle  V.  Cole,  20  Iowa,  481 


Co. 


105, 

I'r. 

201, 

DO,  1)4 

113,  426, 

Raynor,  57 


Cotton  L.  &  W 

Cal.  588 
Cottrell  V.  Cramer,  40  Wis.  555 
Couglianour    r.   Hutchinson  (1902), 

41  Ore.  419,  09  Pac.  68 

Coulter  V.  Great  Northern  Rv.  Co. 

(189G),  5  N.  D.  568,  67  N.  W.  1046 

Council    Bluffs    Savings    Bank    v. 

Griswokl  (1897),  50  Neb.  753,  70 

N.  W.  376.  290,  298, 

County  of  Cochise  v.  Copper  Queen 

Min.  Co.  (1903),  Ariz.,  71  Pac  946 

County  of  Mono  v.  Flanigan  (1900), 

130  Cal.  105,  62  Pac.  293 
Coursen  v.  Hamlin,  2  Duer,  513 
Courtney  v.   Black  well  (1899),   150 

Mo.  245,  51  S.  W.  668 
Covert  V.  Hughes,  8  Hun,  .305 
Covington  &  Lex.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowler's 

Heirs,  9  Bush,  468  238, 

Cowan  V.  Abbott,  92  Cal.  100 
Cowhick  V.  Shingle  (1894),  5  Wyo. 

87,  37  Pac.  689 
Cowin  i;.  Toole,  31  Iowa,  513        544, 
Cowles  V.  Cowles,  9  How.  Pr.  361 

V.  Warner,  22  Minn.  449 
Cow  Run  Co.  V.  Lehmer,  41  Ohio 

St.  384 
Cox  V.  Bird,  65  Ind.  277 

V.  Gille    Hardware    Co.    (1899), 

8  Okla.  483,  58  Pac.  645 
V.  Henry   (1901),   113    Ga.  259, 

38  S.  E.  856  543, 

V.  Jordan,  86  111.  560 
V.  Peltier  (1902),  159  Ind.  355, 

65  N.  E.  6 
V.  Ratcliffe,  105  Ind.  374 
V.  West  Pac.  R.  Co.,  47  Cal.  89 
V.  Yeazel  ( 1896),  49  Neb.  343,  68 
N.  W.  483 
Coy  V.  Downie,  14  Fla.  544 
Coyle  V.  Ward  (1901),  167  N.  Y.  240, 

60  N.  E.  596 
Craft  V.  Jackson  Cv.  Com'rs,  5  Kan. 

518 
Craft  Refrigerating  Machine  Co.   v. 
Quinnipiac    Brewing   Co.    (1893), 
63  Conn.  551,  29  Atl.  76      466,  491, 
Cragg  V.  Arendale   (1901),  113  Ga. 

181,  38  S.  E.  399 
Craig    f.    Chipman    (1900),   Ky.,  57 
S.  W.  244 
V.  Cook,  28  Minn.  232 
V.  Frazier,  127  Ind.  286 
V.  Fry,  68  Cal.  363 
V.  Heis,  30  Ohio  St.  550 


544 

259 
428 
110 

521 
97, 
931 

704 

713 

615 
570 

395 

678 

641 

885 

640 
316 

251 
519 

819 

568 
878 
620 

919 

178 

288 

641 

866 

579 

52 

457 

606 

987 

726 
118 


493 

649 

734 
518 

748 
213 
908 


Craig  V.  Miller  (1893),  41  S.  C.  37,  19 
S.  E.  192 
V.  Welch-Ilaekley   Coal   &   Oil 
Co.   (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W. 
1097 
Cramer  v.  Benton,  60  Barb.  216 
V.  Morton,  2  .Molloy,  108 
0.  Oppensteiii,  16  Colo.  504 
Crandall   v.   Goodrich  Transp.  Co., 
16  Fed.  Rep.  75 
V.  Great    Northern     Ry.      Co. 
(1901),    83   Minn.    190,   86 
N.  W.  10 
Crane  v.  Crane,  43  Hun,  309 

V.  Hardman,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  448 

V.  Morse,  49  Wis.  368 

V.  Powell  (1893),  139  N.  Y.  379, 

34  N.  E.  911 
V.  Ring,  48  Kan.  58 
r.  Turner,  67  N.  Y.  437 
Cranmer  r.  Kohn   (1898),  11  S. 

245,  76  N.  W.  937 
Crary  v.  Goodman,  12  N.  Y.  266 


379 


46 
253 

660 

217 


678 
751 

807 

737 


714,  818 
290 
123 
D. 

543 
15,  17, 
50 
Craven  v.  Russell  (1896),  118  N.  C. 

564.  24  S.  E.  361  640 

f.  Walker  (1897),  101  Ga.  845, 

29  S.  E.  1.52  640 

Graver  v.  Norton  (1901),  114  la.  46, 

86  N.  W.  54  799 

Crawford  v.  Adams,  Stanton's  Code 

(Kv.),  91  831 

V.  Aultman  &  Co.   (1897),    1.39 

Mo.  262,  40  S.  W.  952  614 

i".  Furlong,  21  Kan.  698  576 

V.  Gunn,  35  Iowa,  543  195 

V.  Neal,  56  (^al.  321  160,  576 

v.    Whitmore    (1893),    120   Mo. 

144,  25  S.  W.  365  32,  63 

Crawfordsville  i\  Barr,  65  Ind.  367       37S 
Creager  v.  Walker,  7  Bush,  1  42,  51 

Creecy  r.  Joy  (1901),  40  Ore.  28,  66 

Pac.  295  566 

V.  Pearce,  69  N.  C.  67 
Creed  v.  Hartman,  29  N.  Y.  591  .301 

Creighton  v.  Newton,  5  Neb.  100  784 

Cremer  v.  Miller  (189.3),  56  Minn. 

52,  57  N.  W.  318  624 

V.  Wimmer,  40  Minn.  511  150 

Crete  v.  Hendricks  (1902),  Neb.,  90 

N.  \V.  215  730 

Crew  V.  Hutcheson  (1902),  115  Ga. 

511,  42  S.  E.  16  607,  708 

Crews  V.  Lackland,  67  Mo.  619  277 

Crittenden  r.  Southern  Home  Ass'n 

(1900),  111  Ga.  266,  36  S.  E.  643       711 
Crocker  v.  Craig,  46  Me.  327  258 

Croco  V.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  R. 
Co.  (1898),  18  Utah,  311,  54  Pac. 
985  679,  817 

Croft  V.  Northwestern  Steamship 
Co.  (1898),  20  Wash.  175, 55 
Pac.  42  683 

V.  Waterton,  13  Sim.  653  240 

Crogau  V.  Spence,  53  Cal.  15  237 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the   BKFEREN'CKS   ABE  TO  TUB    PAGES.] 


Croniartie  v.  Parker  (1897),  121  N.  C. 

198,  28  S.  E.  2'J'  452 

Crone  v.  Stiiide  (I'JOO),  156  Mo.  2G2, 

55  S.  W.  8<}.S  108 

Crook  V.  TuU,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  8  203 

Cropsev  v.  Sweeney,  27  Barb.  310         11, 

578,  581 
Crosby  V.  Clark  (1901),  132  Cal.   1, 

03  I'ac.  1U22  54 

V.  Davis,  '.» Iowa,  98  361 

V.  FaniKTs'  Bank,  107  Mo.  436      667 
V.  Uitcliev  (1^96),  47  Neb.  924, 

60  N.  \V.  1005  678 

r.  Timolit,  52  N.  \V.  Kep.  526        310 
V.  Wriglit  (1897),  70  Minn.  251, 

7o  N.  \V.  102  688 

Crosier  v.  Mcl.augliliii,  1  Nov.  348    15,  69 

200 
105 
213 


666 

737 
65 

908 
326 

664 


Cross  «-.  Huleit,  53  Mo.  397 
V.  Trnes<lale,  28  Ind.  44 
r.  Williams,  72  Mo.  577 
Crossen    c.  Grandy   (1902),  42  Ore. 

282,  70  I'ac.  906 
Crossland  r.  Admire  (1899),  149  Mo. 

650,  51  S.  W.  463 
Crossley  c.  Taylor,  83  Ind.  337 
Croiimger  v.  Parze,  48  Wis.  229 
Crow  V.  Vance,  4  Iowa,  434 
Crowder  v.    McDonnell   (1898),  21 

Mont.  367,  54  Pac.  43 
Crowley   v.  Hicks   (1898),   98  Wis. 

566,  74  N.  W.  348     524,  602, 678, 
820 
V.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty  Co. 
(1902),   29  Wash.   268,   69 
Pac.  784  869 

Crown  Cycle  Co.  r.  Brown  (1901), 

3'.t  Ore.  285,  46  Pac.  451  649,  703 

Crowns  V.  Forest  Land  Co.  (1898), 

99  Wis.  103,  74  N.  W.  546  98,  800 

Cruger  v.  .McLaurv,  41  N.  Y.  219    195,  197 
Crum   V.   Stanley    (1898),    55  Neb. 

351,  75  N.  W.  851  89 

Cudlipp  V.  Whipple,  4  Duer,610  584,  597 
Cuff  r.  Dorlan.i,  55  Burl),  481  37 

Culberijoii  Irrigating,  etc.  Co.  r. 
Cox  (1897),  52  Neb.  684,  73 
N.  W.  y  568,  802 

Cuibert8(jn,  etc.  Power  Co.  v.  Wild- 
man  (1895),  45  Neb.  663,  03  N.  W. 
947  685 

Cullen  V.  Qucensbury,  1  Bro.  C.  C. 

101  248,  385 

Cullison  r.  Downing  (1903),  42  Ore. 

377,  71  Pac.  70  810 

Culp  r.  Stocre,  47  Kan.  746  626,  636 

Cumber  v.  Sclim-nfeld.  16  Daly,  454     637 
Cumberland     Tel.     Co.    r.    Ware's 
Admx.  ( 1903),  —  Ky.  — ,  74  S.  W. 
289 
Cumberland  Valley  I'.ank's  Assignee 
r.  Slusher  (1897),  102  Ky.  415,  43 
S.  W.  472 
Cumbey  c  Lovett  (1899),  76  Minn. 

'227,  79  N.  W.  99 
Cumings  v.  Morris,  3  Bosw.  560 


302 


600 

780 
872 


Cumins  r.  Lawrence  Cy.,  46  N.  W. 

Kep.  182  766 

Cumisky  v.  Williams,  20  Mo.  App. 

006  811 

Cummings    v.    Gleason    (1900),    72 

Conn.  587,  45  Atl.  353  585 

i".  Helena,  etc.  Smelting  Co. 
(1902),  26  Mont.  434,  68 
Pac.  852  673 

r.  Hoffman    (1893),   113    N.    C. 

267,  18  S.  K.  170  643 

V.  Long,  25  Minn.  337  620 

v.  Morris,  25  N.  Y.  625     173,  872,  885 
i\  Thonipson,  18  Minn.  246  790 

r.  Town  of  L;ike  Uralty  Co. 
(1893),  bt)  Wis.  382,  57 
N.  W.  43  662 

V.  Vorce,  3  Hill,  282  052 

Cummins  v.  Barkalow,  4  Keyes,  514     153 
Cunningham  v.  Pell,  5  Paige,  607         252 
V.  Uoush  (1900),  157  Mo.  336,  57 

S.  W.  769  764 

Curd  V.  Dodds,  6  Bush,  681  313,  314 

V.  Lackland,  43  Mo.  139      20,  31,  477 
Curl  V.  Foehler  (1901),  113  la.  597, 

85N.  W.  811  642 

Curnow  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (1895), 

46  S.  C.  79,  24  S.  E.  74  737 

Curran  v.  A.  H.  Stange  Co.  (1898), 

98  Wis.  598,  74  N.  W.  377  679 
V.  Curran,  40  Ind.  473  584,  727,  935 
V.  Stein  (1901),  —  Ky.  — ,   60 

5.  W.  839  276,  278.  395 
Currie  v.  Cuwles,  6  Bosw.  453       855,  937 

V.  Fowler,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  145  564 

Curry  r.  Gila  County  (1898),  Ariz., 

53  Pac.  4  115 

V.  Keyser,  30  Ind.  214  790 

V.  Railway  Co.  (1897),  58  Kan. 

6,  48  Pac.  579  206 
V.  Roundtree,  51  Cal.  184  277 

Curtis  r.  Barnes,  30  Barb.  225  932 

V.  Del.,  L.  &  AV.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  Y. 

116  225,232 

1-.  Gooding,  99  Ind.  45  814 

I'.  Herrick,  14  Cal.  117  159 

1-.  Lathrop,  12  Colo.  169  426,  428 

r.  .Mohr,  18  Wis.  015  97 

V.  Moore,  15  Wis.  134  658,  060 

r.  Riciiards,  9  Cal.  33      753,  756,  758 
r.  Sprague,  51  Cal.  239  94 

Cuslinian  r.  Henry,  75  N.  Y.  103  316 

f.  Jewell,  7  Hun,  525  649 

Cutts  V.  Guild,  57  N.  Y.  229  123,  124 

V.  Thodey,  13  Sim.  206  256 

Cythe  V.  La  Fontain,  51  Barb.  186  51 


D. 


Daby  v.  Ericsson,  45  N.  Y.  786  205 

Daggett  V.  Gray  (1895),  110  Cal.  169, 

42  Pac.  568  6G4 

Daggs  V.  Phoenix  Nat.  Bank  (1898), 

Ariz.,  53  Pac.  201  787,  850 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxv 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Dahms  i\  Sears,  K>  Ore.  47 
Dahoney  v.  Hall,  20  Ind.  264 
Dail  V.  Harper,  83  N.  C.  4 
Dailey  r.  Burlington,  etc.   Ry.  Co. 
(1899),    58    Neb.    396,    78 
N.  W.  722  502, 

i;.  Houston,  58  Mo.  361     178,228, 
314,  601,  503, 
V.  Kinsler,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1045 
Daily  v.  Litchfield,  10  Mich.  29 
Daisy  Roller  Mills  v.  Ward  (1897), 

6  N.  D.  817,  70  N.  W.  271 
Daking  r.  Wliimper,  26  Beav.  568 
Dale  V.  Hall  (1897),  64  Ark.  221,  41 
S.  W.  761 
V.  Hunneman,  12  Nebr.  221 
V.  Masters,  Stanton's  Code  (Ky.), 
97  911, 

V.  Tliomas,  67  Ind.  570 
Daley  u.  Cunningham,  60  Cal.  580 

V.  Russ,  86  Cal.  114 
Dalryniple  v.  Hillenbrand,  62  N.  Y.  5 
u.  Hunt,  5  Hun,  111  784, 

V.  Security  Loan  Co.   (1900),  9 
N.  D.  306,  83  N.  W.  245 

662, 
Daly  V.  Brennan  (1894),  87  Wis.  36, 
57  N.  W.  963 
V.  Burchell,  13  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.264 
V.   Everett  Pulp    &   Paper  Co. 
(1903),   31    Wash.   252,  71 
Pac.  1014 
V.  Nat.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  64  Ind.  1 
V.  New  Haven  (1897),  69  Conn. 

644,  38  Atl.  397 
V.  Proetz,  20  Minn.  411 
V.  Ruddell  (1902),  137  Cal.  671, 
20  Pac.  784 
Dambnian  v.  Schulting,  4  Hun,  50 

V.  White,  48  Cal.  439 
Damon  v.  Damon.  28  Wis.  510 

V.  Leque  (1896),  14  Wash.  253, 
44  Pac.  261 
Dandridge  v.   Washington's  Ex.,  2 

Pet.  370 
Danenbaum  v.  Person,  3  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

129 
Daniels  v.  Clark,  38  Iowa,  556 

V.  Fowler  (1897),  120  N.  C.  14, 
26  S.  E.  635       493,  610,  600, 
Danihee  v.  Hyatt  (1897),  151  N.  Y. 

493,  45  N.  E.  939 
Dann  n.  Gibson,  9  Neb.  513 
Darby  v.  Callaghan,  16  N.  Y.  71 

V.  M.   K.  &   T.  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 
156  Mo.  391,  57  S.  W.  550 
Dare  ".  Allen,  1  Green,  Ch.  288 
Darlington  v.  Effey,  13  Iowa,  177 

329, 
Darnall  v.  Bennett  (1896),  98  la.  410, 

67  N.  W.  273 
Darrah  v.  Gow,  77  Mich.  16 
Dart  V.  McQuilty,  6  Ind.  391 
Darwent  v.  Walton,  2  Atk.  510 
Dashavvay  Ass.  v.  Rogers,  79  Cal.  211 


303 
361 
713 


593 
229, 
617 
373 
359 

343 
255 

925 
52 

913 
598 
207 
620 
811 
811 

160, 
671 

887 
326 


642 
942 

615 
811 

255 
704 
568 
471 

17 

347 

810 
426 

601 

285 
661 
225 

466 
254 
326, 
338, 

626 
576 
415 
248 

684 


Daugherty  v.  Deardorf,  107  Ind.  627     327 
Daulton  v.  Stuart  (1902),  30  Wash. 

562,  70  Pac.  1096  410 

Davanay  i-.  Eggenhoff,  43  Cal.  395      766, 

767,  803 

Davenport  i\  Ladd,  38  Minn.  545  751 

i:  Murray,  68  Mo.  198  470 

V.  Short,  17  Minn.  24  821 

V.  Turpin,  43  Cal.  597  325,  782 

David  V.  Frowd,  1  Myl.  &  K.  200  392 

Davidson  v.  Elms,  67  N.  C.  228  154 

V.  Gregory   (1903),    132    N.    C. 

389,  43  S.  E.  916  543,712 


V.  King,  47  Ind.  372 

V.  Remington,  12  How.  Pr.  310 


725 
855, 
872 
232 
227 
249 
253 


123,178 
112 


565 


112 


02 


V.  Smith,  20  Iowa,  466 
Davies  v.  Cole,  28  Kan.  259 

V.  Davies,  11  Engl.  &  Eq.  R.  199 
V.  Williams,  1  Sim.  5 
Davis  V.  Bechstein,  69  N.  Y.  440 
v.  Calloway,  30  Ind.  112 
V.  Clements  (1897),  148  Ind.  605, 

47  N.  E.  1056 
V.  Clinton  W.  Works,  54  Iowa, 

59 
V.  Crookston,  etc.  Co.  (1894),  57 

Minn.  402,  59  N.  W.  482 
V.  Culver  (1899),  58  Neb.  265,  78 

N.  W.  504  780,  890,  922 

V.  C.  &  W.  W.  R.  Co.,  46  Iowa, 

389  611 

V.  Davis,  26  Cal.  23  815 

V.  Davis,  20  Ore.  78  820 

V.  Eppinger,  18  Cal.  378  428 

V.  Erickson,  3  Wash.  654  94,  104 

V.  First   Nat.    Bank    (1899),   57 

Neb.  373,  77  N.  W.  775 
V.  Ford  (1896),  15  Wash.  107,  45 

Pac.  739  704,  832,  834 

V.  Goodman  (1896),  62  Ark.  262, 

35  S.  W.  231 
V.  Hadden  (1902),  115  Ga.  466, 

41  S.  E.  608 
V.  Hamilton  (1902),  85  Minn.  209, 

88  N.  W.  744 
V.  Hardy,  76  Ind.  272 
V.  Holbrook  (1898),  25  Colo.  493, 

55  Pac.  730 
V.  Hoppock,  6  Duer,  254 
V.  Jacksonville,  etc.  Line  (1894), 

126  Mo.  69,  28  S.  W.  965 
V.  John  Mouat  Lumber  Co.,  31 

Pac.  Rep.  187 


735 


646 

871 

680 
311 


49 
779 


67 


375 


V.  Lamberton,  66  Barb.  480       29,  30, 

475 
V.  Leeper  (1900),  Ky.,  66  S.  W. 

712  624 

V.  Lottich,  46  N.  Y.  393  200 

I'.  Mason,  3  Ore.  154  587 

V.  Mayor,  etc.,  2  Duer,  663  413 

V.  Milburn,  3  Iowa,  163  936 

V.  Morris,  36  N.  Y.  569  19,  36,  41 

V.  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1895), 

96  la.  70,  64  N.  W.  687  818 


Ixxvi 


TABLb:    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  reteresces  are  to  tqb  pages.] 


Davis  r.  Nebraska  Nat.  Bank  (1897), 

51  Neb.  401,  70  N.  W.  063      734 
r.  Xeligli,  7  Neb.  !54  131 

V.  N.  Y.,  L.  K.  &  W.  K.  Co.,  110 

N.  V.  040  637 

V.  Netware.  13  Nev.  421  880 

V.  Novutiiev  (li'Ol),  15  S.  D.  118, 

87  N.  \V.  oS-J  502 

V.  Payne,  45  Iowa,  VH  702 

V.  Ueynolds,  5  lliiii.  051  93 

V.  Seattle  National  Bank  (1898), 

19  Wa.^li.  05,  b-J.  Vac.  526         852 
r.  Shuler,  14  Fla.  438  748 

r.  Stovi-r,  5^  N.  Y.  473  874,  935 

V.  Sutton,  23  Minn.  307  131 

V.  Toiilniin.  77  N.  Y.  280         852,  869 
V.  Tubbs  (1^95),  7  .S.  D.  488,  64 

N.  W.  534  656 

V.  Van  Buren,  72  N.  Y.  587  293 

V.  Van  de  Mark,  45  Kan.  130         286 
V.  \Vartielil,  38  Ind.  401  779 

Davison  ;-.  Associates,  71  N.  Y.  333        42 
r.  Harmon  (1896),  05  Minn.  402, 

67  N.  \V.  1015  289 

V.  Rake,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  767  347 

Davoue  c.  Fanning,  4  Johns.  Cli.  199   249 

Dawlev  v.  Brown,  9  Hun,  461  801 

Dawson  v.  Kads  (lb94),  140  Ind.  208, 

39  N.  E.  919  714 

r.  Equitable  Mortgage  Co.  (1899), 

109  Ga.  389.  34  S.  E  608         179 
V.  Graliam,  48  Iowa,  378  667 

I'.  Marjli  (1902),  74  Conn.  498, 51 

Atl.  529  466 

Day  V.  Brenton  (1897),  102  la.  482, 

71  N.  W.  538  470 

V.  Buckingbam,  87  Wis.  215  384 

V.  Goodwin   (1898),   104  la.  374, 

73  N.  W.  804  374 

V.  HaninioMJ,  57  N.  Y.  479  817 

V.  Mountin   ( 1903),  89  Minn.  297, 

94  N.  \V.  S87  710 

V.  Palter.-ion.  IH  Ind.  114  105 

V.  Pool,  52  N.  Y.  416  91) 

V.  Scbnei.ler  (18!)6),  28  Ore.  457, 

43  Pnc.  650  460 

V.  Vallettc,  25  Ind.  42  058,  824 

V.  Wamsley,  33  Ind.  145         746,  748. 

779 
Dayhuff  i-  DayliuflPs  Adm'r,  27  Ind. 

158  ■  935 

Dayton  r.  Wilkes,  5  Bosw.  ({55  418 

Dayton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  24  Ohio  St. 

345  604 

Deacon  v.  Central  la.  In  v.  Co.  (1895), 

95  la.  180,  03  N    W.  673  085 

Dean  v.  Chamberlin,  6  Dner.  091  208 

V.  Knglisb,  18  B.  Mon.  135     101,  218, 

453 
f.  God<lard  (1893).  55  Minn.  290, 

56  N.  W.  10(KJ  618 

V.  Ix-onard,  9  Minn.  190  737 

V.  St.  Paul,  etc.  By.  Co.  (1803), 

53  Minn.  504,  55  N.  W.  628     104 
r.  Yates,  22  Ohio  St.  388        026,  GSl 


De  Baker  i-.  Southern  Cal.  Rv.  Co. 

(1895),  100  Cal.  257,  39  Pac.  010       008 
Debolt  V.  Carter,  31  lud.  355        181,  187, 

188 
De   Camp  v.   Thomson   (1899),   159 

N.  Y.  444,  54N.  E.  11  934 

Decatur  r.   Simpson   (1902),   115  la. 

348,  88  N.  W.  839  673 

Decker  v.  Gaylord,  8  Hun,  110  402 

I'.  Mathews,  12  N.  Y.  313  611 

V.  McSorley  (1901),  111  Wis.  91, 

86  N.  W.  554  684 

r.  Schuize   (1895),  11  Wash.  47, 

39  Pac.  261  688 

I'.  Trilling,  24  Wis.  610   398,  401,  402 
Deegan  v.  Capner,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  3.',9       347 
V.  Deegan  (1894),  22  Nev.  185,  37 

Pac.  300  178,  813 

Deere  v.  Eagle  Mfg.  Co.   (1896),  49 

Neb.  385,  08  N.  W.  504  417,  422 

Deere,  Wells  &  Co.  v.  Morgan  (1901), 

114  la.  287,  80  N.W.  271  655 

Deering  v.   Keilly  (1901),  167  N.  Y. 

184,  00  N.  E.  417  197 

Deery  v.  McClintock,  31  Wis.  196  37 

Deford  v.  Hutchinson,  45  Kan.  318       780 
De  Forest  v.  Holum,  38  Wis.  516         326, 

329  876 
De  Golls  V.  Ward,  3  P.  Wms.  311  '  254 
De  Graw  v.  Elmore,  50  N.  Y.  1     544,  620, 

020,  631 
De  Hart  v.  Etnire,  121  Ind.  242  598 

De  Haven     v.     De  Haven's      Adm'r 

(1898),  104  Kv.  41,  46  S.  W.  215       687 
De  Iloghton   v.  Money,  L.  R.  2  Ch. 

App.  164  255,  256 

Delabere  v.  Norwood,  3  Swanst.  144     334 
De  la  Gucrra  v.  Newliall,  55  Cal.  21     578, 


De  la  Mar  v.  Hurd,  4  Col.  442 
Delancy  v.  Murphy,  24  Hun,  503 
Delaplaine  v.  Lewis,  19  Wis.  470 


581 
065 
412 
326, 
327 
018 


r.  Turnley,  45  Wis  31 
Delashmutt     v.    Sellwood,     10    Ore. 

319  333 

De  la  Vergne   i\  Evcrtson,   1  Paige, 

181  201 

De   Lay  r.    Carney   (1897),    100   la. 

687,  69  N.  W.  1053  026 

De  Leyer   t-.   Michaels,   5  Abb.   Vr. 

203  867, 891 

De  Lissa  v.  Coal  Co.  (1898),  59  Kan. 

319,  52  Pac.  880  831,  832 

De  Loach  Mill  To.  r.  Bonner  (1897), 

64  Ark.  510,  43  S.  W.  504  605 

Delsman    /•.    Friodlander    (1901),   40 

Ore.  33,  06  Pac.  297  570 

Demarest   v.   Holdeman   (1901),    157 

Ind.  407,  62  N.  E.  17        269,  510 
V.  AVickham,  63  N.  Y.  320  118 

Demartin  i;.  Albert,  68  Cal.  277  942 

Diinby  r.  Kingston,  60  Hun,  294  228 

Diiiiing  c.  Kemp,  4  Saiulf.  147  843 

Dempsey  v.  Rhodes,  93  N.  C.  120         817 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


Ixxvii 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Donn   r.  Peters  (1900),  30  Ore.  4cSG, 

5it  I'ac.  1100  570 

DcMiney   v.   Cole,  .22  Wash.  372,  Gl 

Pac.  38  323 

V.  Stout  (1900),  59  Neb.  731,  82 

N.  W.  18  793 

Dennis  v.  Belt,  30  Cal.  247  911,  913 

V.  Kolni   (1901),   131   Cal.  91,  63 

Pac.  141  423 

V.  Nelson  (1893),  55  Minn.  144, 

66  N.  W.  589  565 

V.  Spencer,  45  Minn.  250  428 

Dennison    v.    Chapman    (1895),    105 

Cal.  447,  39  Pac.  61  665 

t'.  Willcut  (1894),  Idaho,  35  Pac. 
698  161 

Dent  V.  Railroad  (1901),  Gl  S.  C.  329, 

39  S.  E.  527  612 

Denten  v.  Logan,  3  Mete.  (Ivy.)  434     811 
Denton  v.  Nanny,  8  Barb.  624  326 

Denver  i:  Spokane  Falls    (1893),    7 

Wasli.  226,  34  Pac.  926  730,  785 

Denver,   etc.   K.    R.    Co.    v.    Smock 

(1897),  23  Colo.  456,  48  Pac.  681       817 
Denver    Power    &   Irrigation    Co.  v. 
Denver,  etc.  Co.  (1902),  —  Col.  — , 
69  Pac.  568  418 

Denzler  r.   Kieckhoff   (1896),  97    la. 

75,  66  N.  W.  147  639 

I)e  Pay  r.  Strong,  37  N.  Y.  372      178,  195 
Di-rbv  r.  (J.dliip.  5  Minn.  119  831 

Derham  v.  Lee,  87  N.  Y.  599  412 

De  Uid;i(.-r  v.  Schernierliorn,  10  Barb. 

638  300,  402 

Derr  v.  Stubbs,  83  N.  C.  539  940 

Derrick  n.  Cole  (1894),  60  Ark.  394, 

30  S.  VV.  700  570,  689 

De  Silver  v.  Holden,  50  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  2.%  518 

Des   Moines   v.  Polk  County  (1899), 

107  Iowa,  525,  7»  N.  VV.  249  117 

Des  Moines  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lent,  75  Iowa, 

522  428 

Desmond  v.  Brown,  33  Iowa,  13  799 

Despard  v.  Walbridge,  15  N.  Y.  S74       53, 

54 
Detroit  Heating  Co.  v.  Stevens  (1897), 

16  Utali,  177,  52  Pac.  379  624 

Deuel  V.  Newiin,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  795  95 

De  Upvev  r.  De  Uprev,  27  Cal.  329      316, 

371 
Denster    r.   Mittag  (1900),   105  Wis. 

459,  81  N.  W.  643  689 

Devaynes  v.  Robinson,  24  Beav.  86      352 
Devereux    v.    McCrady     (1895),    46 

S.  C.  133,  24  S.  E.  77  714 

Devin  v.  Walsh  (1899),   108  la.  428, 

79  N.  W.  133  520 

Devlin  v.  Mavor,  etc.,  63  N.  Y.  8  88 

Devol  V.  Barnes,  7  Hun,  342  93 

V.  Mcintosh,  23  Ind.  529         105, 109, 

110 
Devor  v.  Rerick,  87  Ind.  337  821 

Devore   v.    Devore   (1896),   138  Mo. 
181.  39  S.  W.  68  783 


Devotie  v.  McGerr,  15  Colo.  467  815 

Devries  r.  Warren,  82  N.  C.  356  916 

Devvr  v.  Schaefer,  55  N.  Y.  446  725 

Dewey  v.  Hoag,  15  Barb.  365  46 

V.  Lambier,  7  Cal.  347 
V.  Moyer,  9  Hun,  473     238,  260,  340, 

350 
De  Witt  V.  Cliandlcr,  11  Abb.  Pr. 

459  157 

V.  Hays,  2  Cal.  463  11, 15 

De    Wolfe   v.   Abraham    (1896),    151 

N.  Y.  186,  45  N.  E.  455  489 

D'Wolf  V.  D'Wolf,  4  R.  I.  450  250 

Dexter  v.  Iviors,  183  N.  Y.  551  637 

Deyo  V.  Morss  (1894),  144  N.  Y.  216, 

39  N.  E.  81  635 

Dezell   V.   Fidelity    &    Casualty    Co. 

(1903),  176  Mo.  253,  75  S.  W.  1102  752 
Dezengremel     v.     Dezengremel,     24 

Hun,   457  820 

Dias  I'.  Bouchaud,  10  Paige,  445  348 

V.  Merle,  4  Paige,  259  338,  379 

Dice  V.  Morris,  32  Ind.  283  944 

Dickens  v.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  Co.,  13  How. 

Pr.  228  505 

Dickerman  v.  New  York,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1899),  72  Conn.  271,  44  Atl. 
228  714 

Dickerson     v.     Spokane    (1901),    26 

Wiish.  292,  66  Pac.  381  15,  271 

Dickey  r   Gibson  (1898),  121  Cal.  276, 

53  Pile.  704  329 

r.  Northern  I'ac    Rv.  Co.  (1898), 

10  Wasli.  3o0,  53  I'ac.  347       625 
Dickinson  r.  Vanderpoel,  6  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  168  179 

Dickinson  Co.  v  Fitterling  (1898),  72 

Minn.  483,  75  N.  W.  731  107 

Dickson  ;;.  Cole,  34  Wis.  621      11,  18,  37, 

663 
V.  Do-.vs  (1902),  11  N.  D.404, 407, 

92  N.  VV.  798  418 

V.  Mercliants'  Elev.  Co.,  44  Mo. 

A  pp.  498 

Diddell  v.  Diddell,  3  Abb.  Pr.  167         890 

Dietrich  v.  Koch,  35  Wis.  618  859 

V.    Steam     Dredge     (1894),     14 

Mont.  261,36  Pac.  81  418 

Dietrichs  v.  Lincoln  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 

13  Neb.  43  814 

Dieiz  V.  City  Nat.  Bank  (1894),  42 

Neb.  584,  60  N.  W.  896  640 

Dill  V.  Yoss,  94  Ind.  590  189 

Dillahunty  r.  Railway  Co.  (1894),  59 

Ark.  629,  28  S.  W.  657  569 

Dillaye  v.  Niles,  4  Abb.  Pr.  253  872 

V.  Parks,  31  Barb.  132  178,  814 

Dillon  V.  Bates,  39  Mo.  292  347,  352 

V.  Darst   (1896),  48  Neb.  803,  67 

N.  W.  783  779,  811 

V.   Lee    (1899),    110  la.   156,  81 

N.  W.  245  769 

V.   Starin  (1895),  44  Neb.  881, 

63  N.  W.  12  625 

Dimmock  v.  Bixby,  20  Pick.  368  607 


Ixxviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Dimond    v.    Minnesota    Sav.    Bank 

(l^yi).  70  Min.  2'J8.  73  N.  W.  1^2    684 
Dinan  r.  Coneys  (1894),  143  N.  Y. 

544,  08  N.  E.  715  493,  923 

Dinees  v.  Riggs  (1895),  43  Neb.  710, 

02N.  W.  74  478.494, 

Dinkkr '■    \hwr  (1893),  02  Ga.  432, 

17  S.  I.:  •.•.3:5  640 

Dirk»  r.l'alitDniia  Safe  Deposit  Co. 

( l'.MJ2),  13(5  Cal.  84.  (38  Pac.  487         681 
Di.»l)r<i\v    c.    B>i:iril    of    Supervisors 

(I'J()3),  119  la.  538,  93  N.  W.  585       817 
Dislineau  r.  Newton  (1895),  91  Wis. 

199.  04  N.  W.  879  293,  604 

l)i.stii-r  r.  Dabney,  3  Wash.  200  620 

District  Township      -ice  Coon  Dist. 
Tp.,  etc. ;  Wliitc  Oak  Dist.  Tp.,  etc. 
Dix  r.  Akers.  30  liul.  431  153 

r.  Briggs,  9  I'aige,  595  342 

Dixey  v.  Pollock,  8  Cal.  570  428 

Dixon  V.  Cardozo  (1895),   106  Cal. 

506,  39  Pac.  857  160 

V.  Caster  ( 1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  70 

Pac.  871  804 

Dlaubi  V.  St.   Louis,   etc.   Ry.   Co. 

(1897),  139  Mo.  291,  40  S.  W.  890     682 
Doan  r.  Hollv,  26  Mo.  186  475 

Dobhcrstein'--.  Murphy  (1896),  64    . 

Minn.  127,  66  N.  W.  204  99 

Dobb.-i  r.  Kellogg,  53  Wis.  448        52,  865 
V.  Puriiigton  (1902),  136  Cal.  70, 

68  Pac.  323  278 

Dobrv  r.  Western  Mfg.  Co.  (1899), 

58  Neb.  667,  79  N.  W.  559  718 

Dobson  r.   Diickpond   D.   Ass ,  42 

Ind.  312  439 

V.   llallowell    (1893),  53  Minn. 

98,  54  N.  W.  939  787 

V.  Owens  (1895),  5  Wyo.  325,  40 

Pac.  412  781 

V.  Pearce,  12  N'.  Y.  156         15,45,46, 
49,  54 
r.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1901),  129 

N.  C.  289,  40  S.  E.  42  415 

Dodd  r.  Denney,  6  Ore.  156  618 

Dodds  r.  McCorniick  Harvesting 
Macii.  Co.  (1901),  62  Neb.  759,  87 
N.  W.  911  604 

Dodge  r.  Cornelius  (1901),  168  N.  Y. 

242,  01  N.  E.  244  815 

V.  Dunham.  41  Ind.  186  727 

V.  Kimple  (1H98),  121  Cal.  580, 

54  Pac.  94  684 

V.   McMahan   (1895),  61  Minn. 

175,  (;3  N.  W.  487  763 

Dodge's  Adin.  v.  Moss,  82  Ky.  441        112 
Dodson   r.  Loinax,   21   S.  VV.  Rep. 

'25  117 

Doeg  .-.  Cook  (1899),  126  Cal.  213, 

58  I'ac.  7<t7  302 

Dotring  r.  Kenainore,  86  Mo.  588 
Doernor  I'.  Doi-rner  (1901),  161  Mo. 

407.  01  S.  W.  H02  064 

Dohcrtv  .•.  Holliday  (1893),  137  Ind. 
282.  .-'/J  N.  E.  315  259 


Dolan  V.  Citv  of  Milwaukee  (1895), 
89  Wis.  497,  61  N.  W.  564 
r.   Hubiiiger  (1899),  109  Iowa, 
408,  80  N.  W.  514  177, 

Dolbeer  r.  Stout  (1893),  139  N.  Y. 

480,  34  N.  E.  1102  853, 

Dole  V.  Burleigh,  1  Dak.  227  662, 

Doll  V.  Crume  ( 1894),  41  Neb.  655, 

59  N.  W.  806 
Dolph  V.  nice,  21  Wis.  590 
Donahue  r.  Meister,  88  Cal.  121 

r.  Prosser,  10  Iowa,  276 
Donald  i:  Bather,  10  Beav.  20 
Donaldson  r.  Butler  Cy.,  98  Mo.  103 
Donellan  v.  Hardy,  57  Ind.  393 
Doniian  r.  Intelligencer  Co.,  70  Mo. 

108 
Donnell  v.  Walsh,  33  N.  Y.  43      179, 
V.   Wright   (1899),   147  Mo.  639, 
49  S.  W.  874 
Donnelly  v-  San   Francisco  Bridge 
Co.  (1897),  117  CaL  417,  49  Pac. 
559 
Donovan  v.  Dunning,  69  Mo.  436 
V.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  Ry.  Co.,  89 

Mo.  147 
V.  Kibbler  (1902),  Neb.,  92  N.  W. 
637 
Doody  r.  Higgins,  9  Hare,  Ap.  .32 
Doolittle   V.    Broome   Cy.    Sup.,  18 
N.  Y.  155 
V.  Greene,  32  Iowa,  123  592, 

V.  Lay  cock  (1899),  103  Wis.  334, 
79  N.  W.  408 
Doran  v.  Cohen,  147  Mass.  342 
Dormitzer  v.  German  Savings  Bank 
(1900),  23  Wash.  132,  62  Pac.  802 
Dorothy   v.  Pierce   (1895),  27  Ore. 

373,  41  Pac.  668 
Dorr  Cattle  Co.  r.  Jewett  (1902),  116 

la.  93,  89  N.  W.  109 
Dorris  v.  Sullivan,  90  Cal.  279 
Dorsett  c  Adams,  50  Ind.  129 

V.  Clement-Hoss  Mfg.  Co.  (1902), 
131  N.  C.  254.  42  S.  E.  012 
i:  Hall,  7  Neb.  400 
V.  Reese,  14  B.  Mon.  157  53, 

Dorsey    Macli.    Co.    c.    McCaffrey 
(1894),  139  Ind.  545,  38  N.  E.  208 
Dor  win  v.  Potter,  5  Denio,  300 
Doud  r.  Duluth  .Milling  Co.  (1893); 

55  Minn.  53,  56  N.  W.  463 
Doughty  r.  Atlantic  &  N.  C.  R.  Co., 

78  N.  C.  22 
Douglas  ('.  Coonley  (1898),  156  N.  Y. 
521,  51  N.  E.  283 
V.  Corry,  40  Oiiio  St.  349 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank,  17  Minn.  35 
V.  Forrest,  4  Bing.  704 
V.  Haberstro,  25  Him,  202        55, 
V.  Horsfall,  2  S.  &  S.  184 
Douglas  County  v.  Bennett   (1901), 

01  Nob.  000,  85  N.  W.  833 
Douglas  Cy.  Sup.  v.  Wallbridge,  38 
Wis.  179  321, 


623 

191 

856 
737 

106 
871 
42 
936 
240 
(505 
609 

178 
201 

470 


677 
470 

778 

639 
254 

118 
741 

682 
468 

605 

087 

113 

52 

576 

817 
597 
936 

821 
843 

736 

521 

712 
820 
932 
403 
793 
252 

735 

482 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxix 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Douglass  V.  Bisliop,  27  Iowa,  214    r.25,  327 
V.  Ins.  Co.  (1893),  138  N.  Y.  200, 

33  N.  E.  938  825,  834 

V.  Placerville,  18  Cal.  GI3  118 

V.  Railway  Co.  (1894),  91  la.  94, 

58  N.  W.  1070  302 

Dounce  v.  Dow,  57  N.  Y.  IG  910 

Dousman  v.  Wis.,  etc.  Min.  Co.,  40 

Wis.  418  265,  388 

Doutliit  V.  Hipp,  23  S.  C.  205  333 

Douthitt  r.  Smith,  69  Iiul.  463  895 

Dowdell  V.  Carpy   (1902),  137  Cal. 

333,  70  Pac.  167  913,  926 

Downer  v.  Smith,  24  Cal.  114  52 

Downey  v.  Dillon,  52^Ilul.  442  576 

Downing  i\  Gibson,  53  Iowa,  617  131 

V.  Le  Du,  82  Cal.  471  42 

Downs  V.  Finnesjan  (1894,)  58  IVIinn. 

112,  59  N.  W.  981  646 

V.  McComlis,  16  Ind.  211  786 

Dows  V.  Chicago,  11  Wall.  108  119 

V.  Kidder,  84  N.  Y.  121  412 

Doyle  V.  Franklin,  48  Cal.  537  663 

V.  rhffinix  Ins.  Co.,  44  Cal.  264, 

268  563,  595,  608,  609 

Drage   v.  Hartopp,  L.  R.  28  Ch.  I). 

414  248,  251 

Dragoo  v.  Levi,  2  Duv.  520     457,482,  497 
Drais  v.  Hogan,  50  Cal.  121  598 

Drake  v.   Avanzini   (1894),  20  Col. 

104,  36  I'ac.  846  875 

V.  Cockroft,  4  E.  1).  Smitli,  34      894, 

916 
V.  Phillips,  40  111.  388  119 

Draper  v.  Brown    (1902),  115  Wis. 

361,  91  N.  W.  1001    9,  11,  12,19, 
33,  72,  444,  498 
V.  Clarendon,  2  Vern.  518  333 

V.  Macon  Dry  Goods  Co.  (1898), 

103  Ga.  661,  30  S.  E.  566         686 
V.  Stouvenel,  35  N.  Y.  507  224 

r.   Taylor   (1899),  58  Neb.  787, 

79  N.  W.  709  718 

V.  Van  Horn,  15  Ind.  155  373 

Drew  V.  Ferson,  22  Wis.  651  39 

L\  Harman,  5  Price,  319  378 

Dreyer  v.  Hart  (1896),  147  Ind.  604, 

47  N.  E.  174  17 

Driver  v.  Salt  Lake  Gas  Co.  (1900), 

22  Utah,  143,  61  Pac.  733  909 

Drury  v.  Clark,  16  How.  Pr.  424  326,327 
Drvden  v.  Parrotte   (1901),  61  Neb. 

339,  85  N.  W.  287  819 

Dry  Dock  E.  B.  &  B.  R  Co.  v.  N.  & 

E.  R.  Ry.  Co.,  22  N.  Y.  Suppl.  556    803 
Duanesburgh  v.  Jenkins,  46   Barb. 

2'.i4  155 

Dubbers  v.  Goux,  51  Cal.  153  412 

Dul)ois  V.  Hermance,  56  N.  Y.  673       779, 

790,  812 
Dubuque    Lumber   Co.    v.   Kimball 

(1900),  111  la.  48,  82  N.  W.  458        606 
Duck  V.  Abbott,  24  Ind.  349  65,  357 

Duckwail  r.  Brooke  (1901),  Ky.,  65 
H.  W.  357  "  640 


Duckw^orth  v.  McKinney  (1900),  58 

S.  C.  418,  36  S.  E.  730  812 

Dudenhofer  v.  Johnson  (1895),  144 

Ind.  631,  43  N.  E.  868  946 

Dudley   v.   Duval   (1902),  29  Wash. 

528,  70  Pac.  68        456,  515,  615, 
616,703 
V.  Johnson  (1897),  102  Ga.  1,  29 

S.  E.  50  923 

V.  Pigg  (1897),  149  Ind.  .363,  48 

N.  E.  642  816 

V.  Scranton,  57  N.  Y.  424  909 

Duell  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co. 

(1902),  115  Wis.  516,  92  N.  W.  269    625 
Duerst  v.   St.   Louis   Stamping  Co. 

(1901),  163  Mo.  607,  63  S.  W.  827     605 
Duff  V.  Fire  Ass'n  (1895),  129  Mo. 

4(iO,  30  S.  W.  1034  672,  689 

Duffy  c.  Duncan,  35  N.  Y.  187  873 

V.  O'Donovan,  46  N.  Y.  227  51 

Dufrene  v.  Anderson  (1902),   Neb., 

90  N.  W.  221  639 

V.  Anderson   (1903),  —  Neb. —, 

93  N.  W.  139  605,  822 

Duggeri;.  Dempsey  (1895),  13  Wash. 

396,  43  Pac.  357  924 

Duke  L-.  Brown  (1901),  113  Ga.  310, 

38  S.  E.  764  612 

V.  Griffith  (1894),  9  Utah,  469,  35 

Pac.  512  50 

Dulaney  v.  Buffum  (1903),  173  Mo,  1, 

73  N.  W.  125  307 

Duncan  r.  Berlin,  5  Robt.  457  291 

V.  Gray  (1899),  108  la.  599,  79 

N.  W.  362  •  587 

V.  Stanton,  30  Barb.  533  •  872 

V.  Whedbee,  4  Col.  143  159 

V.  Wickliffe,  4  Scam.  452  360 

V.  Willis  (1894),  51  0.  St.  433, 

38  N.  E.  13  213 

Duncombe  v.  Hansley,  3   P.  Wms. 

333  329 

Dundee  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  20 

Fed.  Rep.  39  112 

Dunderdale  v.  Grymes,  16  How.  Pr. 

195  177 

Dunham  v.  Bower,  77  N.  Y.  76  778 

V.  Greenbaum,  56  Iowa,  .303  428 

V.  Holloway  (1895),  3  Okla.  244, 

41  S.  W.  140  543,  677,  679 

V.  Ramsey,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  388  872 

V.  Travis  (1902),  25  Utah,  65,  69 

Pac.  468  866 

Dunlap  r.  Snvder,  17  Barb.  561  798 

Dunn  V.  Bozarih  (I8'.i9),  59  Neb.  244, 

80N.  W.  811      638,646,832,833 
V.  Dewey  (1898),  75  Minn.  153, 

77  N. W.  793  379 

V.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co.,  68 

Mo.  268  178 

V.  McCoy  (1899),  150  Mo.  548, 

52  S  W  21  32 

V.  Nat.  Bank   (1898),   11  S.  D. 

305,  77N.W.  Ill  421 

V.  Remington,  9  Neb.  82  541,  546 


Ixx 


TAlJLi;    uF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  referemccs  are  to  thb  pages.] 


Dunn    V.    Uvalde    Asphalt    Paving 
(l'.H)8|.    175  X.  Y.  214,   67 
N.  K.  4r.O 
r.  Wolf.  81  I(iwa.  f.88 
Dunnett  i-.Tliornton  (1900), 73  Conn. 

1.  4(")  At).  l.')8 
Dunning'  '••  Leavitt,  85  X.  Y.  30 
r.  ( >cean  Nat.  Bk.,  Ul  N.  Y.  497 


9.34 
340 

25 
111 
117. 
219 

V.  Rumbaugli,  ."(i  Iowa,  500    734,  778 
V.  Thomas.  11  How.  Pr.  281  600 

Dupoiit  r.  Amos  (1896),  97  la.  484, 

•  iO  N.  \V.  774  417 

l)u  Pont  i:  Davis,  35  Wis.  6-34   42,  46, 885, 

886 
Durant  r.  Gardner,  10  Abb.  Pr.  445 
Durbon  >:  Ki-llv's  A.lm.,  22  Ind.  183 
Durell  r.  Al.l.oU  (1805),  0  Wvo.  265, 

44  Pac.  647 
DurHinjier  r.  Baker  (1897),  149  Ind. 

375.  49  N.  E.  276 
Durgin  r.  Ireland,  14  N.  Y.  -322 

r.  Neal,  82  Cal.  oii5 
Durham  r.  Bischof,  47  Ind.  211    112 


505 
935 


568 


690 
01,  97 
575 
311, 
3(i4 
212 


r.  Hall.  67  Ind.  123 
Durham    Fertilizer    Co.    r.   Pagett 

(1893),  39  S.  C.  69,  17  S.  E.  563         810 
Durkee  r.  Citv  Bk.  of  Kenosha,  13 

Wis.  216,  222  658,  661 

Diirlaiid  r.  I'itcairn,  51  Ind.  426  576 

Durnford  /•.  Weaver,  84  X.  Y.  445  618 
Durnherr  .-.  Kau,  32  X.  E.  Rep.  491  111 
Duryee  r.  Friars  (1897),  18  Wash. 

55.  50  Pac.  583  608 

Dutcher  >:  Dutcher,.39  Wis.  651    155,  785, 

801,  813,  821,830 

Dutil  r.  Pacheco,  21  Cal.  438  428 

Duval  r.  Am.T.  &  T.  Co.  (1902),  113 

Wis.  504,  89  X.  \V.  482  625 

Duvall  V.  Tinslev,  54  Mo.  93  475,  477 

Duzan  /•.   Meserve    (1893),  24  Ore. 

52:^,  34  l^ac.  548  687 

Dwelling  House  Ins.  Co.  i;.  Brewster 

(1895),  43  Neb.  528,  61  N.  W.  746 


832, 
834 
526 
254 


Dyer  r.  Barstow,  5  Cal.  052 
Dyson  v.  H..rnby.  7  DeG.  M.  &  G.  1 

V.  .Morris,  1  Hare,  413  253,  347 

>•.  Ream,  9  Iowa.  51         769,  780,  806 


E. 


Engle  '•.  Swayze,  2  Daly,  140  314 

ICagle  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lent,  6  Paige, 

6;i7  337 

Eagle   Iron  Works  )•,  Railway   Co. 

(1H97).  101  la.  289,  70  X.  \V'.  193  466 
Ean  r.  Chicago.  .M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

(1897),  95  Win.  70,  69  X.  W.  997  083 
Earl  Orchard    Co.  v.   Fava  (1902), 

138  Cal.  76.  70  Pac.  1073  043 

Earle  >:  Hull.  15  Cal.  421  910 

r.  Burch,  21  Neb.  702  173 


Earle  v.  Hale,  31  Ark.  473  942 

r.  Patterson,  67  Ind.  503  598 
V.  Sayre  (1806),  99  Ga.  617,  25 

S.  E.  943  800 

Earlc's  Adni.  ;-.  Hale,  31  Ark.  473  55 
East   Georgia    R.  R.    Co.    v.    King 

(1893),  91  Ga.  519,  17  S.  E  939  600 

Eastman  v.  Linn,  20  Minn.  433     862,  886, 

923,  927 
V.  St.  Anthony's   Falls    W.    P. 

Co.,  12  Minn.  137  821 

V.  Turman,  24  Cal.  379  474 
I'^aston  r.  Somerville  (1900),  111  la. 

164,  82  X.  W.  475                655,  656,  821 
East  River  Hank  r.  Rogers,  7  Bosw. 

493  869 
East  Riverside  Irrigation  District  ?•. 
Holcomb  (1899),  126  Cal.  315,  58 
Pac.  817                                          409,411 

Eaton  V.  Alger,  47  N.  Y.  345     93,  94,  400 

V.  Burns,  31  Ind.  390  294 

V.  Smith,  19  Wi.s.  537  63 

r.  Tallmadge,  22  Wis.  526  937 
Eayrs  v.  Xason  (1898),  54  Neb.  143, 

74N.W.  408  819 

Eddie  v.  Parke,  31  Mo.  513  347 

Edcrlin  r.  Judge,  .36  :\Io.  350         458,  523 

ICdgell  V.  Sigersoii,  20  Mo.  494  790 
Ed'.'erlv   '•.   Farmers'   Ins.   Co.,    43 

Iowa",  587  COO 

Edgerton  i-.  Pace,  20  N.  Y.  281      894,  916 
V.  Power  (1896),  18  Mont.  350, 

45  Pac.  204  740 

I'.  Smith,  3  Duer,  614  61 1 

Edic  7-.  Green,  38  Hun,  202  112 
Edmunds  v.  Black  (1896),  13  Wash. 

490,  43  Pac.  330  804 

Edwards  r.  Bohannon,  2  Dana,  98  245 

V.  Campbell,  23  Barb  423  93 

V.  Edwards,  24  Ohio  St.  402  808 

V.  Hellings  (1893),  99  Cal.  214, 

33  Pac.  799  680 
V.  Smith  (1897),  102  Ga.  19,  29 

S.  E.  129                            565,  566 
r.  Williams  (1893),  39  S.  C.  86, 

17  S.  E.  457  871 
Eel  River  R.  R.  Co.  r.  State  er  rel. 
(1895),    143   Ind.   231,  42    N.   E. 

617  819 
Efird  >:  Land  Co.  (1899),  55  S.  C. 

78,  32  S.  E.  758  872 
E.  G.  L.  Co.  !•   McKcige  (1893),  139 

N.Y.  273,  34  X.  E.  898  410 
Egaard  r.  Dahlko  (1901),  109  Wis. 

366,  85  X.  W.  369  444,  498 

Egberts  v.  Woods,  3  Paige,  517  249 

Egdell  r.  Haywood,  5  Atk.  357  260 

Ehle  V.  Haller,  6  Bosw.  661  523 
Ehrlich  r.  ^Etna  L.  Ins.  Co.,  103  Mo. 

231  576,  620 

Eisely  r.  Taggart   (1897),  52  Neb. 

658,  72  X.  W.  10,39  681 

Eisenhouer  r.  Stein,  37  Kan.  281  455 

Elam  r.  Garrard,  25  Ga.  557  261 

Elder  v.  Frevert,  18  Xev.  446  306 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxi 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Elder  v.  Rourke  (1895),  27  Ore.  363, 

41  Pac.  6  814 

V.  Spinks,  53  Cal.  293  568,  769 

V.  Webber  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92 

N.  W.  126  704 

Eldredge  v.  Putnam,  46  Wi8.  205         211, 

238,  248 

71 

779 


673 

597 
576 

709 

818 
284 

543 


614 
655 


215 


Eldridge  v.  Adnms,  54  Barb.  417 

V.  Mather,  2  N.  Y.  127 
Elenz  V.  Conrad  (1901),  115  la.  183, 

88  N.  W.  337 
Elfrank  r.  Si-iler,  54  Mo.  134 
Eliot  I'.  Eliot,  77  Wis.  634 
Eliot's  Appeal  (1902),  74  Conn.  58(3, 

51  Atl.  558 
Eller  V.  Lootnis  (1898),  106  la.  276, 

76  N.  W.  686 
EUicott  V.  Mosier,  7  N.  Y.  201 
Elliot  r.  Roche  (1896),  64  Minn.  482, 

67  X.  W.  539 
Elliott  V.  Carter    White-Lead    Co. 
(1898),    53    Neb.    458,    73 
N.  W.  948 
V.  Collins  (1898),  Idaho,  65  Pac. 

301 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank    (1902),    30 

Colo.  279,  70  Pac.  421 
V.  Pontius  (1893),  136  Ind.  641, 
35  N.  E.  562 
Ellis  V.  City  of  Indianapolis  (1897), 

148  Ind.  70,  47  N.  E.  218        432, 
433,  644 
V.  Flaherty  (1902),  65  Kan.  621 

70  Pac.  586  626,  639 

i".  Harrison,  104  Mo.  270  112 

V.  No.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  77  Wis.  114      365 
V.  Pullman    (1894),  95  Ga.  445, 

22  S.  E.  568 
V.  Soper  (1900),  110  la.  631,  82 
N.  W.  1041 
Ellison  V.  Rix,  85  N.  C.  77 
EUithorpe  v.  Buck,  17  Ohio  St.  72 
Ells  V.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  55  Mo.  278 
Ellsworth  V.  Rossiter,  46  Kan.  237 
Elmore  v.  Elmore  (1896),  114  Cal. 
516,  46  Pac.  458 
r.  Hill,  46  Wis.  618 
Elmquist  v.  Markoe,  45  Minn.  305 
EUon  V.  O'Dowd,  40  Iiul.  300 
Elwell  V.  Skiddv,  8  Hiin,  73 
Emeric  i'.  Penniman,  26  Cal.  119    63,  159 
Emerson  >:  Miller  (1902),  115  la.  31-3, 
88  N.  \V.  803 
V.  Schwindt    (1900),    108   Wis. 
167,   84   N.    W.    186       179, 


260 

703 
801 
18 
742 
455 

624 

713 

94 

814 

908 


619 


413, 
868 
V.  Schwindt  (1902),  114  Wis.  124, 

89  N.  W.  822  642 

Emery  v.  Pease,  20  N.  Y.  62       17,  38,  39, 

66,  633 
Emigrant  I.  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Goldman,  75 

N.  Y.  127  334 

Emily  v.  Harding,  53  Ind.  102       784,  807 
Emison  v.  Owyhee  Ditch  Co.  (1900), 
37  Ore.  577,  62  Pac.  13  601 


Emmerson's  Adm'r  v.  Herriford,  8 

Bush,  229 
Emniert  ;-.  De  Long,  12  Kan.  67 
Emmitt  c.  Brophy,  42  Ohio  St.  82 
Emmons  v.  Kiger,  23  Ind.  483 
Empire    Canal    Co.    v.   Rio  Grande 

County    (1895),  21   Colo.  244,  40 

Pac.  449 
Empire  Transp.  Co.  v.  Boggiano,  52 

Mo.  294  91 L 

Emporia    Nat.     Bank     i\    Layfeth 

(1901),  63  Kan.  17,  64  Pac.  973 
Eniry  r.  Parker,  111  N.  C.  261 
Emslie  i:  Leavenworth,  20  Kan.  562 

681, 
Enderby,  Ex  p.,  2  Barn.  &  C.  389 
Enders  v.  Beck,  18  Iowa,  86 
Endress  v.  Shove  (1901),   110  Wis. 

133,  85  N.  W.  653  474, 

Enewold  v.   Oisen  (1894),   39  Neb. 

59,  57  N.  W.  765 
Engel   V.   Dado   (1902),  —  Neb.—. 

92  N.  W.  629  179. 

Enger  r,  Lofland  (1896),  100  Iowa, 

303,  69  N.  W.  526 
Engi.mder  v.  iiogers,  41  Cal.  420 
Eniilebreciit   r.    Rickert,    14  Minn. 

140 
Englis  V.  Furniss,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  587 
English  V.  Grant  (1897),  102  Ga.  35, 

29  S.  E.  157  734. 

Enix  V.  Iowa  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (1901), 

1 14  la.  508,  87  N.  W.  417 
Ennis    v.   Harmony   F.    Ins.   Co.,  3 

Bosw.  516 
Enos  V.  Sanger  (1897),  96  Wis.  150, 

70  N.  W.  1069 
Enright  v.  Grant,  5  Utah,  334 
Enter  v.  Quesse,  30  S.  C.  126 
Epperson  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co.  (1900), 

155  Mo.  346,  50  S.  W.  795 
Equitable  Building,  etc.  Ass.  v.  Hol- 
lo wav  (1901),  114  Ga.780,  40  S.  E. 

742 
Equitable  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stout  (1893), 

1.35  Ind.  444,  33  N.  E.  623 
Equitable  Life  Ass.  Soc.  v.  Cuvler, 

75  N.  Y.  511 
Equitable     Trust    Co.     r.    O'Brien 

(1898),   55  Neb.   735,   76   N.    W. 

417 
Erickson    r.    Compton,  6  How.  Pr. 
471 
V.   First   Nat.    Bank  (1895),  44 
Neb.  622,  62  N.  W.  1078 
Erie  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ramsey,  45  N.  Y.  637 
Ermentrout  v.  American   Fire   Ins. 

Co.  (1895),  60  Minn.  418,  62  N.  W. 

543,  63  Minn.  194,  65  N.  W.  270 

Ernst  V.  Kunkle,  5  Ohio  St.  520 
Ervin  v.  Oregon  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  35 

Hun,  544 
V.  State  ex  rel.  (1897),  150  Ind. 

332,  48  N.  E.  249 


932 

351 

111 

11 


276 
933 

641 

277 
678, 
584 
877 
229 

482 

680 

,286 

423 

575 

890 
310 

757 

606 

217 

108 
260 
9.30 

605 

641 

601 

865 

735 

152 

818 
46 

207, 
645 
871 

97 

686 


/ 


Ixxxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the   RErE&EKC£8 

Erwin  i-.  Cent.  Union  Tel.  Co.  (1897), 

148  Ind.  305.  4G  N.  E.  607       601 
V.  Scotten,  40  Ind.  3S\)  277 

Esch  f.  Home  ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  78 

lovvH,  334  637 

c.  Wliite  (liKJl),  82  Minn.  462, 

«5N.  \V.  238,  718  95,814 

Eskridge  v.  Lewis  (1893),  51  Kan. 

376,  32  Pac.  1 1U4  229 

Ess  V.  Griffith  (1804),  128  Mo.  50,  30 

S.  \V.  343  304 

Estabrook  u.  Messersmith,  18  Wis. 

545  187,  204 

r.  Omaha  Hotel  Co.,  5  Neb.  76      576 
Estate  of,  see  name  of  party. 
Estep  r.  llammons  (1898),  104  Ky. 

144,  4G  S.  \V.  715  444 

Esterlv    Harv.    Mach.   Co.  v.   Berg 

(1»<J7|,  52  Neb.  147,  71  N.  W.  952      614 
Estes  V.  Desnovers  Siioe  Co.  (1900), 
155  .M'o.  677,  56  S.  \V.  310 


ARE  TO  THE  PAGES.] 

Everett  ;;.  Lockwood,  8  Hun,  856 
V.  O'Leary  (1903),  —  Minn.  — , 

95  N.  W.  901 
i:  Waymire,  30  Oliio  St.  308 
Eversdon  v.  .Mayiiew,  85  Cal.  1 
Eversole  v.  Moore,  3  Busli,  49 
Ewen  V.  Chicago  &  N.  \V.  Ky.  Co., 

38  Wis.  64 
Ewing  r.  Patterson,  35  Ind.  326    942, 
Excelsior  Coal  Co.  i\  Virfiinia  Coal 

Co.  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  373 
Excelsior  I)raiiiin<,'  Co.  i-.  Brown,  38 
Ind.  384 
I'.  Brown,  47  Ind.  19 
E.xcelsior  Petroleum   Co.  v.  Lacey, 

63  N.  Y.  422 
Exchange  Bk.  i-.  Ford,  7  Colo.  314 


536, 
542 
V.  Nell  (1897),  140  Mo.  639,  41 

S.  W.  940  371 

Estrada  v.  Murphy,  19  Cal.  272  52 

Estrella    V'iiievard    Co.    v.    Butler 

(1899),  125  Cal.  232,  57  Pac.  980  059 
Etcheborne  r.  Auzerais,  45  Cal.  121  815 
Etchison    Ditchin}^    Ass.    v.  Busen- 

l.ack.  39  Ind.  302  4.39 

Etheridge  i:  Vernoy,  71  N.  C.  184     245, 
329.  335,  336 
Etscheid  v.  Baker  (1901),  112  Wis. 

129,  88  N.  W.  62  108 

Ettlinger  i:  P.  R.  &  C.  Co.  (1894), 

142  N.  Y.  189,  36  N.  E.  1055  117 

Eureka  v.  Gates  (1898),  120  Cal.  54, 

52  Pac.  125  413 

Evans  v.  Clermont,  etc.  Co.,  51  Ind. 

160  4.39 

i:  Fall   River  County  (1896),  9 

S.  D.  130.  68  X.  W.  196  662 

1-.  Fulton   (1896),  1.34  Mo.  653. 

36  .S.  W.  230  638,  670 

V.  Harris,  19  Barb.   416  584,  587 

r.  lluphisCountv  (1893), 4. S.D. 

33.  5}  N.  \V.'  1U49  643 

r.  Job,  8  Xev.  322  562 

V.  M(:(\)nn{-ll  (1896),  99  Iowa, 

.3:i6,  68  X.  \V.  790  6 

f.  Xeale,  69  Ind.  148  592 

V.  Schafer,  119  Ind.  49  177 

V.  '  outhern  Tump.  Co.,  18  Ind. 

101  786 

r.  Tripp,  35  Iowa.  .371  376 

r.  Willijims,  60  Barb.  346         765,  779 

Evansville  «;.  Evans  37  Ind.  229     769,809 

r.  Tliayer,  69  Ind.  324  598 

Evam^villi-,  etc.   U.  (;<>.  v.  lliatt,  17 

Ind.  Ui2  778 

<•.  Krapf  (1895),  143  Ind.  047,  .30 

N.  i;.  901  673 

t:  Mnd.lox  (189.3),  134  Ind.  671, 

33  X.  E.  .345  643 

Evenu  f  Hall,  1  Handy,  434  933,9.35 


r.  Kice,  107  Mass.  37 
Exline  r.  Lower^-,  46  Iowa,  556 
Eyre  (•.  Cook,  10  Iowa,  6b6 


Fabricotti  r.  Lannitz,  3  Sandf.  743 
Faesi  v.  Goeiz,  15  Wis.  231 
Fagan  v.  Barnes,  14  Fla.  53  358, 

504, 
Fain  v.  Hughes  (1899),  108  Ga.  637, 

33  S.  E.  1012 
Fairbanks  v.  Long,  91  Mo.  628       781, 
Fairchild  v.  Amsbaugh,  22  Cal.  572 

Fairfield  c  Adams,  16  Pick.  .381 
Fairlee  v.  Bloomingdale,  67  How.  Pr. 

292 
Fairmont  v.  Meyer  (1901),  83  .Minn. 

456,  86  N.  W.  467 
Fairplay  v.  Board  of  Comm'rs  (1901), 

29  Colo.  57,  67  Pac.  152 
Faithful  r.  Hunt,  3  Anst.  751 
Faivre  v.  Gillan,  51  N.  W.  Kep.46  499 
y.  Mandirsdiied   (1902),  117  1a. 
724,  90  N.  W.  76 
Falck  V.  Mar^ll  (1894),  88  Wis.  680, 

61  N.  W.  287 
Falconio  i'.   Larsen  (1897),  31  Ore. 

137,  48  Pac.  703 
Fall  V.  Jolm-son  (1890),  8  S.  D.  163, 

66  N.  W.  909 
Falls  of  Neuse  Man.  Co.  t'.  Brooks, 

106  X.  C.  107 
Fankboner  t-.  Fankboner,  20  Ind.  62 

789, 
Fanning  i-.  Ilibernia  Ins.  Co.,  37 Oliio 

St.  344 
Fares  r.   Gleason  (1896),  14  Wash. 

657,  45  Pac.  314 
Fargo  V.  Ames,  45  Iowa,  494 

V.  Vincent  (1894),  6  S.  D.  209, 
60  N.  W.  868 
Farley  v.   Basket  and  Veneer   Co. 

(1897),  61  S.  C.  222,  28  S.  E.  193 
Farlow  c.  Stott,  24  .\.  Y.  40 


801 

819 
725 
457 
936 

787 
946 

816 

439 
725 

181 
290, 
396 
111 
852 
936 


611 
475 
414. 
517 

710 
,  821 
7li6. 
803 
116 

226 

684 

818 

337 

,520 

303 

923 

97 

802 

821 
661, 
935 

804 

599 
736 

787 

466 
17 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxiii 


[tkb  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Farman  v.  Chamberlain,  74  Ind  82 
Farmer  v.  Calvert,  44  liul.  209     211, 

V.  Curtis,  2  Sim.  4fJ(J  247, 

Farmers',  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Peterson 
(1896),    47    Neb.    747,   66 
N.  W.  847 
V.  Wiard  (18i)9),oy  Neb.  451,  81 
N.  W.  3\2 
Farmers'  &  Cit.  Bk.  v.  Sherman,  33 

N.  Y.  69  722, 

Farmers'  &  Morch.  Bk.  of  Baltimore 

V.  Charlotte  Bd.  of  A  Id. ,75  N.C.45 

Farmers'  &   Merchants'   Ins.  Co.  n. 

Dobney   (1901),  62    Neb.  213,   86 

N.  W.  1070 

Farmers'  Bank  v.  Saling  (1898),  33 

Ore.  394,  .54  Pac.  190 
Farmers'  Bank  of  Mo.  v.  Bayliss,  41 

Mo.  274  465, 

Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  San  Diego 

Street-car  Co.,  40  Fed.  Kep.  105 
Farmers'  Nat.   Bank  v.  Fletcher,  44 
Iowa,  252 
V.  Fonda,  65  Mich.  533 
V.  Hunter   (1899),   35  Ore.  188, 
57  Pac.  424  801, 

Farnham  v.  Campbell,  10  Paige,  598 
Farrar  v.  Triplet,  7  Neb.  287 
Farrell  v.  Burbank  (1894),  57 
395,  59  N.  W.  485 
V.  Cook,  16  Neb.  483 
V.  Hennesy,  21  Wis.  632 
V.  Smith,  2  Ball  &  B.  337 
Farris  v.  Jones,  112  Ind.  498 
Farron  i:  Sherwood,   17  N.  Y.  227 

578,  581,  584, 
Farwell  v.  Davis,  60  Barb.  73 
V.  Jackson,  28  Cal.  105 
;;.  Murray  (1894),  104  Cal.  464, 
38  Pac.  199 
Farwell  Co.  v.  Lykins  (1898),  59  Kan. 

96,  52  Pac.  99 
Fasnacht  v.  Stehn,  53  Barb.  650 
Fauble  v.  Davis,  48  Iowa,  462 
Faulkner    v.    Mammoth    Min.    Co. 
(1901),  23  Utah,  437,  66  Pac.  799 
Fay  V.  Cobb,  51  Cal.  313 

V.  Davidson,  13  Minn.  523 
V.  Grimsteed,  10  Barb.  321 
V.  Steubenraucli  (1903),  138  Cal. 
656,  72  Pac.  156 
Fayetteville  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Til- 
linghast  (1896),  119  N.  C.  .343,  25 
S.  E.  960 
Fear  v.  Jones,  6  Iowa,  169 
Feder  v.  Abrahams,  28  Mo.  App.  354 
Feeley  v.  Shirley,  43  Cal.  369 
Felch  V.  Beaudry,  40  Cal.  439 
Feldman  v.  McGuire  (1899),  34  Ore. 

309,  55  Pac.  872 
Feldmann  v.  Shea  (1899),  Idaho,  59 

Pac.  537 
Fell  v.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  278     247, 


Minn. 
849, 


347. 


661 

779, 
780 
379 


817 
817 
804 
756 

703 

642 

502 

337 

123 
651 

835 
260 
597 

865 
181 
663 
392 
658 
544, 
587 
292 
474 

584 

665 
610 
620 

817 
713 
301 
809 

102 


831 
116 
286 
739 
754 

107 

742 
829, 
379 


Fellows  V.  Fellows,  4  Cowen,  082 

V.  Webb,  43  Iowa,  133 
Fells  V.  Vestvali,  2  Keyes,  152      584, 
Feltou  V.  Dunn  (1901),  Ky.,  00  S.  W. 

298 
Fenncr  r.  Crips  (1899),  109  la.  455, 

80  N.  W.  526 

Fenstermaker  v.  Tribune' Pub.   Co. 

(1895),  12  Utah,  439,  43  Pac.  112; 

.s.  c.  (1896)  13  Utah,  532,  45  Pac. 

1097  799 

Fenton  v.  Hughes,  7  Ves.  288 

Fenwick  u.  Bulman,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  165 

Fera  v.  Wickham,  01  Hun,  343      132 

Ferguson  v.  Daltou  (1900),  158  Mo. 

323,  59  S.  W.  88 

V.  Davidson  (1899),  147  Mo.  664, 

49  S.  W.  879 
V.  Ferguson,  1  Hayes  &  J.  300 
V.  Hogan,  25  Minn.  135 
v.  McMahon,  52  Ark.  433 
V.  Ramsey,  41  Ind.  511  748, 

V.  V.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  18  Nev.  184 
Fernside  v.  Rood  (1900),  73  Conn.  83, 

46  Atl.  275 
Ferreira  v.  De  Pew,  4  Abb.  Pr.  131 

Ferrer  v.  Barrett,  4  Jones  Eq.  455 

Ferrin  i'.  Myrick,  41  N.  Y.  315       505, 
Ferris  v.  Am.   Brewing  Co.  (1900), 
155  Ind.  539,  58  N.  E.  701 
V.  Armstrong  Man.  Co.,  10  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  750 
V.  Carson  W.  Co.,  16. Nev.  44 
V.  Dickerson,  47  Ind.  382 
Ferst's  Sons  v.  Bank  of  Waycross 
(1900),  111  Ga.  229,  30  S.  E. 
773 
V.  Powers  (1900),  58  S.  C.  398, 

36  S.  E.  744 
V.  Powers  (1902),  64  S.  C.  221, 
41  S.  E.  974  35, 

Fetherly  ;;.  Burke,  54  N.  Y.  646 
F.    G.   Oxlev    Stave  Co.    v.   Butler 
County    (1894),   121  Mo.    014,  20 
S.  W.  367 
Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  v.  Vandyke 

(189i3),  99  Ga.  542,  27  S.  E.  709 

Fidelity  &  Deposit  ('o.  v.  Parkinson 

.  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W.  120 


342, 

,510 

662 

587 

638 
603 


806 
572 
255 
133 

801 

704 

253 
575 
153 
779 
592 

832 
869, 
872 
372, 
377 
524 

107 

918 
112 
244 


Field  V.  Andrada  (1895),  106  Cal.  107, 
39  Pac.  323 
V.Austin   (1901),  131  Cal.  379, 

63  Pac.  292 
V.  Brown  ( 1896),  146  Ind.  293, 45 

N.  E.  464 
V.  Hahn,  65  Mo.  417 
V.  Hurst,  9  S.  C.  277 
V.  Mayor,  6  N.  Y.  179 
Fields  V.  Bland,  81  N.  Y.  2.39  75, 

V.  Fowler,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  598 
Fifield  V.  Sweeney,  62  Wis.  204 


819 

482 

200 
812 

350 

595 

107, 
830 

600 

872 

20 
877 
457 
140 
049 
161 
516 


Ixxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the   references  ABE  TO   THE  PAGES.] 


Filbey  r.  Carrier,  44  Wis.  469  219 

Filer  v.  N.  Y.  Central  K.  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 

47  503 

Finch  i:  Finch,  2  Ves.  Sen.  492  255 

V.  Gregg  (1900).  12G  N.  C.  176, 

o.j  S.  E.  251  415 

V.  Kent  (1900),  24  Mont.  268,  61 

I'ac.  65:i  623 

Findlay  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co. 
(1899),  104  Wis.  375,  80  N.  W. 
4;iO  645 

Finken  r.  FJm  City  Bras>  Co.  (1900), 

73  Conn.  423.  47  Atl.  070  659 

Finlev   v.   Citv    of  'i"iu>i)u    (1900), 

Ariz.,"  00  Pac.  872  607 

V.  Haves,  81  N.  C.  368  452 

V.  Quirk,  9  Minn.  194  763,  811 

Finncgan  -•.  Carnilicr,  47  N.  Y.  493  285 
Finnell  r.  Neshitt,  10  B.  Mon.  354  936 
Finiiey  c.  Brant,  19  Mo.  42  212 

Fiore  r.  Ladd  (1890),  29  Ore.  528,  46 

Pac.  144  714 

Fire  Ass'n  of  Philadelphia  r.  Kuby 
( 1900) ,  00  Neb.  216,  82  N.  W.  629     593, 
594,  670 
Fire    Extinguisher  Co.   i\   City  of 
Perry  (1899),  8  Okla.  429,  58  Pac. 
635  712,  790 

First  Div.  St.  Paul  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 

Rice,  25  Minn.  278  666 

First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Beebe  (1900),  62 

O.  St.  41,  56  N.  E.  485  410 

l:  Dakota  Eire  Ins.  Co.  (1894), 

6  S.  D.  424,  61  N.  W.  439        543 
r.  Engelbercht  (1899),  58  Neb. 

639,  79  N.  W.  556  5^3,718 

r.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank 
(1898),  56  Neb.  149,  77 
N.  W.  50  674 

V.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank 

(1903),  Neb.,  95  N  W.  1062     711 
V.  Gaddis  (1903),  31  Wash.  596, 

72  Pac.  400  074 

V.  Gibson  (1900),  60  Neb.  767, 

84  N.  W.  259  740 

V.  Gibson  (1903),  —  Xeb.  — ,  94 

N.  W.  905  340 

V.  Greger  (1901),  157  Ind.  479, 

62  N.  E.  21  543 

V.  Hattenbach  (1900),  13  S.  T>. 

365,  83  N.  W.  421  288,  681 

V.  Jones  (1894),  2  Okla.  353,  37 

Pac.  824  543 

1-.  Lambert  (1895),  03  Mmu.  263, 

05  N.  W. 451  474 

V.  Laughlin  (1894),  4  N.  D.  391, 

61  N.  W.  473  866 

V.  Lewis  (1895),  12  Utah,  84,  41 

I'ac.  712  353 

V.  McKinney   (1896),    47    Neb. 

149,  06  N.  W.  280  625,  656 

V.  Martin  (1898),  Idaiio,  55  Pac. 

802  757 

V.  Myers  (1895),  44  Neb.  306,  62 

N.  W.  459  505 


First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Pennington 
(1899>,  57  Neb.  404,  77 
N.  AV.  1084  593 

V.  Ragsdalp  ( 1900),  158  Mo.  668, 

5:^'  S.  W.  U«7  087 

V.  Renn  (1901),  63  Kan.  3-34,  65 

Pac.  098  920 

V.  Riggins  (1899),  124  N.  C.  534, 

32  S.  E.  801  930 

r.  Shuier  (1897).  153  N.  Y.  163. 

47  N.  E.  202  340,  341 

V.  Smith  (1893),  36  Neb.  199,  54 

N.  W.  254  599 

V.  Stoll   (18U9),  57  Neb.  758,  78 

N.  W.  254  787 

V.  T<);npi<iiis  ( 1903),  —  Neb.— , 

OlN.  W.  717  593 

V.  Tootle  (1899),  59  Neb.  44,  80 

N.  W.  264  656 

V.  Watt  (1901),  Idaho,  64  Pac. 

223  757 

V.    Wisdom's  Ex'rs  (1901),  111 

Ky.  135,  03  S.  W.  461  833 

r.  Zeims  (1894),  93  la.  140,  61 

N.  W.  483  681,  715 

First  Nat.   Bank  of   Central  City  v. 

Hummel,  14  Colo.  259  167 

V.  O'Connell.  51  N.  W.  Rep.  162   913 
First  Nat.  Bank  of  Indianapohs  v. 
Indianapolis  Piano  Man.  Co.,  45 
Ind.  5  307 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Kansas  City  v. 

Hogan,  47  Mo.  472  742 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Memphis  r.  Kidd, 

20  r^Iinn.  234  873 

First  Nat.  Bank  of   Mt.  Vernon  v. 

Sarlis,  129  Ind.  201  262 

First   Nat.  Bank  of   New  BerHn  v. 

Church,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C.  10  718 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Northampton  v. 

Crafts,  145  Mass.  444  251 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Salem  v.  Salem 
Cap.  Flour  M.  Co.,  31  Fed.  Rep. 
580  334 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Snohomish  v. 
Parker  (1902),  28  Wash.  234,  68 
Pac.  756  926 

First  Nat.  Bank  of  Sutton  v.  Gross- 
bans  (1901),  61  Neb.  575,  85  N.  W. 
592  566 

Fischer  v.  Holmes,  123  Ind.  625  414 

r.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co. 
(1901),  167  N.  Y.  178,  60 
N.  E.  431  818 

Fish  V.  Berkcy,  10  Minn.  199  497 

V.  Howland,   1  Paige,  20    238,  251, 
385  387 
V.  Redington,  31  Cal.  185  '  739 

V.  Smith  (1900),  73  Conn.  377, 

47  Atl.  711  103 

Fisher  r.  Bouisson  (1893),  3  N.  D. 

493,  57  N.  W.  505  687 

V.  Hall,  41  N.  Y.  416  178,  197 

r.  Hamilton,  48  Ind.  2-39  778 

V.  Hepburn,  48  N.  Y.  41-55    284,  305 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


Ixxxv 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Fislier  v.  HubbcU,  65  Barb.  74      219,  241, 

289,  310 
V.  Kelly   (1896),  30  Ore.    1,   46 

Pac.  14(5  680 

V.  Moolick,  13  Wis.  321  886 

V.  Patton  (1895),  134  Mo.  32,  33 

S.  W.  451  669 

V.  Stevens  (1898),  143  Mo.  181, 

44  y.  \V.  769  834 

V.  Sweet.  67  Cal.  •228  66 

risk  ;;.  Guiliford  ( 1 '.)03) ,  —  Neb.  — , 

95  N.  W.  494  6S<1 

?;.Tank,12Wis.276,301    476,616,785 
Fitch  V.  Applegate  (1901),  24  Wash. 

25,  64  Pac.  147  543,  599 

I'.  Bvall  (1897),  149  Ind.  554,  49 

N.  E.  455  543 

V.  Cesser,  54  Mo.  267  218 

V.  Rathbuii,  61  N.  Y.  579  88,  225 

Fite  V.  Orr's  Ass.,  1  S.  W.  Rep.  580      562 
Fithian  v.  Monks,  43  Mo.  502  20,  31 

Fitzgerald  v.  Fitzgerald,  etc.  Co. 
(1895),  44  Neb.  463,  02 
N.    W.    899  271 

V.  Quann,  109  N.  Y.  441  314 

Fitzsrerald's    Estate  r.   Uiji<ji!   Bank 

(1902),  64  Neb.  260,  90  N.  W.  994     433 
FitZiribbon  v.  Barry,  78  Va.  755  351 

\'.  Chicago,  etc.  liy.  Co.  (1899), 

108  la.  614,  79  N.  W.  477         623 
Fitzpatrickr.  Simonson  Bros.  (1902), 

86  Minn.  140,  00  N.  W.  378         601,  751 
Fitzsimmons  v.  City  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  18 

Wis.  234  727 

Fitz water  v.  Bank  (1901),  62  Kan. 

163,  61  Pac.  684  421 

Flack  V.  Dawson,  69  N.  C.  42        309,  728 
Flanagan  v.  Tinen,  53  Barb.  587  314 

Flanders  u.  Cottrell,  36  Wis.  564     618,  636, 

637 

V.  McClanahan,  24  Iowa,  486         364 

V.  McVickar,  7  Wis.  372  596,  718 

Fleischman  v.  Stern,  90  N.  Y.  110       744 

F.  L.  &  T.  Co.  I-   Siefke  (1894),  144 

N.  Y.  354,  39  N.  E.  358  812 

Fleishman  r.  Woods  (1901),  135  Cal. 

256,  67  Pac.  276 
Fleming  v.  McDonald,  50  Ind.  278 


942 
301, 
307 
265 

791 


I'.  Mershon,  36  Iowa,  413 

V.  People,  27  N.  Y.  329 

r.  Roberts  (1901),  114Ga.  634,  40 

S.  E.  792 
Flesh  r.  Lindsay,  21  8.  W.  Rep.  907 
Fletcher  i'.  Brown,  53  N.  W.  577 
V.  Co-Operative  Publishing  Co. 

(1899),    58    Neb.    511,    78 

N.  W.  1070 
V.   German-American 

(1900),  79    Minn 

N.  W.  647 
V.  Holmes,  25  Ind.  458,  40  Me. 

364  258,  326,  336,  945 

Flint  V.  Nelson  (1894),  10  Utah,  261, 

37  Pac.  479  817 


607 
314 
517 


668,  674,  785 
Ins.    Co. 
337,   82 

672 


Flint  r.  Spurr,  17  R.  xMon.  499  389 

Florence  i:  Pattillo   (1898),  105  Ga. 

577,  32  S.E.642  661 

Flour  City  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Wechselberg, 

45  Fed.  Rep.  547  355 

Flowers  v.  Barker,  79  Ala.  445  336 

Flovd  V.  Wilev,  1  Mo.  430  649 

Flynn  v.  Bailev,  50  Barb  73  497 

Foerst  v.  Kel.so  (1901),  131  Cal.  376, 

63  Pac.  681  470 

Foerster    v.    Kirkpatrick,   2    Minn. 

210  585 

Fogle  ;;.  St.  Michaels  Church  (1896), 

48  S.  C.  86,  26  S.  E.  99  347 

Poland  V.  Johnson,  16  Abb.  Pr.  235      797 
v.Townof  Frankton  (1895),  142 

Ind.  546,  41  N.  E.  1031  565 

Foley  V.  Holtry  (1894),  43  Neb.  133, 

61  N.  W.  120  703 

Follendore  v.  Follendore  (1896),  99 

Ga.  71,  24S.   E.  407  887,918 

Follett  V.  Heat]),  15  Wis.  601  46 

Folsoni  V.  Carli,  6  Minn.  420  936 

V.  Palling  ( 1899),  58  Neb.  478,  78 

N.  W.  926  877 

Fond  du  Lac  Harrow  Co.  v.  Haskins, 

51  Wis.  135  326 

Foot  L\  Bronson,  4  Lans.  47  262 

Foote  V.  Burlington  Gaslight  Co. 
(1897),  1031a.  576,  72  N.W. 
755  432 

V.  Lathrop,  53  Barb.  183  317 

Foote  &  Davis  Co.  v.  Malony  (1902), 

llSGa.  985,  42  S.  E.  413  844 

Forbes  v.  Cooper,  88  Ky.  285  933 

V.  Petty  (1893),  37  Neb.  899,  56 

N.  W.'  730  600 

V.  Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co. 
(1898),  151  Ind.  89,  51  N.  E. 
84  543 

Ford  V.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1898), 

106  la.  85,  75  N.  W.  650         817 
V.  HoUoway  (1900),  112  Ga.  851, 

38  S.  E.  373  41 

V.  Ind.  Dist.  of  Stuart,  46  Iowa, 

294  265,  310 

V.  Mattice,  14  How.  Pr.  91  660 

r.  Steele,  31  Neb.  521  51 

V.  Williams  (1896),  98  Ga.  238, 

25  S.  E.  416  641 

Ford   Lumber  Co.  v.  Clark  (1902), 

Ky.,  68  S.  W.  443  640 

Fordvce  v.  Hathorn  (1874),  57  Mo. 

120  800,  829 

V.  Nix   (1893),  58  Ark.  136,  23 

S.  W.  967  458,  654 

Foreman  v.  Boyle,  88  Cal.  290       196,  503 
Forepaugli   i-.  Appold,  17  B.  Mon. 

632  412 

Forkner    v.   Hart,    Stanton's    Code 

(Ky.),  60  454 

Forsyth   v.  Edmiston,   2    Abb.    Pr. 

430  306 

Fort  V.  Penny  (1898)  122  N.  C.  230, 
29  S.  E.  362  470,  800 


Ixxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  referesces  are  to  the  pages.] 


Fort  Dearborn  Bank  v.  Security 
Bank  (1902).  87  Minn.  81,  91 
N.  W.  257  764 

Fort  Dodge,  F.  N.  Bk.  of,  r.  O'Con- 

nell,  51  N.  W.  Kep.  1G2  913 

Fort    Stanwix    Bk.   r.   Leggett,   51 

X.  Y.  552  238,  260,  271,  276 

Fort  Wavne  r.  Christie  (190C),  156 

Ind.  172,  5y  \.  E.  385  676 

Fort  Wavne,  J.  &  S.  K.  Co.  c.  Mc- 
Donald", 48  Ind.  241  584 
Fosgate  c.  Herkimer   Man.  Co.,  12 

X.  Y. 580  284,  285 

Foss  V.  Newburv.  20  Ore.  257  923 

Foste  f.   Standard  Ins.   Co.  (1894), 

26  Ore.  449,  38  Pac.  617  641 

Foster  v.  Brown,  65  Ind.  2:^4  153 

V.  Conger,  61  Barb.  145  315 

*-.  Elliott,  33  Iowa,  216     196.  218,  592 
I'.  Fidelity,  etc.  Co.  of  New  York 
(1898).    99    Wis.    447,    75 
N.  W.  69  689 

r.    Henderson    (1896),  29    Ore. 

210,  45  Pac.  898  642 

r.  Hickox.  38  Wis.  408  335,  336 

V.  Landon  (1898),  71  Minn.  494, 

74N.  W.  281  511 

I'.  Lvon  County  (1901),  63  Kan. 

■43,  64  Pac.  1037  178 

V.  Missouri  Pac.  Rv.  Co.  (1803), 

115  Mo.  165,  2'l  S.  W.  916  651 
i:  Posson  (1899).  105  Wis.  99,  81 

X.  W.  123  466,  493 

V.  Townshend,  12  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

469  342 

V.  Trowbridge,  44  Minn.  290  334 

V.  Wati-on,  1(3  15.  .Mon.  377  37,42 

Foulkes  c.  Davies,  L.  R.  7  Eq.  42  258 

Pniilks  /•.  Rli.Mk-^.  12  Xev.  225  930 

Fourtii  Xat.  Bunk  v.  Meyer  (189G), 

100  Ga.  87,  26  S.  E.  83  271 

Fowle  r.  House  (1896),  29  Ore.  114, 

44  Pac.  692  677 

Fowler  v.  Frisbie,  37  Cal.  34         206,  211 
V.  Houston,  1  Nev.  469  293 

V.    Plid-nix   Ins.    Co.  (1899),  35 

Ore.  559,  57  Pac.  421  593 

V.  Seaman,  40  N.  Y   592  315 

Fox  V.  Barker,  14  Ind.  309  935 

t:  Duff,  1  Dalv,  196  225 

f.  EaMer  (19(i0),  10  Okla.  527, 

62  Pac.  283  584 

V.  Graves  (1890),  46  Neb.  812, 

05  X.  W.  887  655,  666 
V.  Kerper,  61  Ind.  148  160 
1;.  Mackey  (1899),  125  Cal.  54, 

57  Pac.  672  594 

r.  Mover,  54  N.  Y.  125,  130    238, 
260,  340 
'•.  Rogers  (1899),  8  Idaho,  710, 

59  Pac.  638  455 

I .  Webster.  46  Mo.  181  790 

Foy  '.  Haughton,  8:',  X.  C.  467  791 

Fniin  f.  Burgeit  (1898),  152  Ind.  55, 

50  X.  E.  873  660,  599,  810 


Fraker  v.  Galium,  24  Kan.  679 
Fraler  v.  Sears   Union  W.  Co.,  12 

Cal.  555 
Francis  v.  Edwards,  77  N.  C.  271 


908 

518 
852, 
940 
753 
131 


V.  Francis,  18  B.  Mon.  57 
c.  Leak,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  807 
Francisco  v.  Hatch  (1903),  117  Wis. 

242,  93  N.  W.  1118  8,72 

Franco  v.  Franco,  3  Ves.  77  252 

Franey    v.    Wauwatosa     Park     Co. 

(1898),  99  Wis.  40,  74  X.  W.  548       655 
Frank  v.  Cobban  (1897),  20  Mont. 

168,  50  Pac.  423  818 

r.  Dunning,  38  Wis.  270  576 

V.  Jenkins  (1895),  11  Wash.  611, 

40  Pac.  220  734 

V.  Kessler,  30  Ind.  8  505 

V.  Pennie   (1897),  117  Cal.  254, 

49  Pac.  208  779 

Frankel   v.  Garrard  (1903),   —  Ind. 

— ,  06  N.  E.  687  662 

V.  Michigan  Mutual  Ins.  Co. 
(1902),  158  Ind.  304,  62 
X.  E.  703  543 

Franklin  v.  Kelley,  2  Neb.  79  781 

Franklin  Bank-Xote  Co.  r.  Augusta, 
etc.  Rv.  Co.  (1897),  102  Ga.  547, 
30  S.  E.  419  641 

Franklin  Tp.  Sup.  r.  Kirbv,  25  Wis. 

498  '  155,  573 

Frans  v.  Young,  24  Iowa,  375        187,  204 
Eraser  v.  Bean,  96  N.  C.  327  329 

V.  Charleston,  13  S.  C.  533  340 

Frazer  v.  Frazer,  70  Ind.  411  825 

Frear  v.  Bryan,  12  Ind.  343  414 

I'recking  v.  RoUand,  53  X.  Y.  422         315 
Fred  1:  Travlor  (1903),  —  Kv.  — .  72 

S,  W.  768  ■  518 

Fred  Miller  Brewing  Co.  r.  Capital 

Ins.  Co.,  1 1 1  la.  590  603 

Frederick  v.  Daniels  (1902),  74  Conn. 

710,  52  Atl.  414  909 

r.  Douglas  Co  ,  96  Wis.  411  384 

Fredrickson   v.  .Ji)linson    (1894),  60 

Minn.  337,  62  .\.  W.  388  080 

Freeman    r.    Brewster    (1897),    70 

Minn.  2(13.  72  X.  W.  1(»08  49 

r.  Brown  (1902),  115  Ga.  23,  41 

S.  E.  385  646 

V.  Carpenter,  17  Wis.  126        800,  829 
V.   City    of    Huron    (1^97),    10 

S.  I).  308,  73  X.  W.  260  507 

V.    Engelman    Transp.    Co.,   36 

Wis.  571  791 

r.  Grant,  132  X.  Y.  22      626,  636,637 
V.  Lazarus  (1895),  61  Ark.  247, 

32  S.  W.  080  639 

r.  Lorrillard,  61  N.  Y.  612      872,  877 
V.  Seitz  (1899),  126  Cal.  291,  58 

Pac.  69U  867 

V.  Sprague.  82  N.  C.  346  784 

V.  Webb.  21  Xeb.  160  478 

Freeman's  Ajjpeal  (1899),  71  Conn. 

708,  43  All.  185  659,712 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxvii 


[the   REFEEEN0E3    ABB   TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Freer  v.  Denton,  61  N.  Y.  492 


455, 

627, 


Freethy  v.  Freethy,  42  Barb.  641 
Freitag  v.  Burke,  45  Ind.  o8 
French  v.  Gifford,  30  Iowa,  148    2G1, 

V.  Saile,  Stanton's  Code  (Ky.), 

9(3 
V.  Salter,  17  Hiin,  546  482, 

V.  Turner,  15  Ind.  59       310,  326, 
V.    Woodruff   (1898),    25  Colo. 
339,  45Pac.  416       463,665, 
Freser  v.  Charleston,  11  S.  C.  486 
Friburk  r.  Standard  Oil  Co.  (1896)-, 

66  Minn.  277,  68  N.  W.  1090 
Frick  V.  Kabaker  ( 1902),  110  la.  494, 
90  N.  VV.  498 
V.  White,  57  N.  Y.  103  131, 

Friddle  v.  Crane,  68  Ind.  583 
Friend    v.    Allen   (1900),    Ky.,    56 

S.  W.  418 
Friermutii  v.  Friermuth,  46  Cal.  42 
Frisbee  v.  Langworthy,  11  Wis.  375 

Frisch  v.  Caler,  21  Cal.  71      766,  769, 
Fritz  V.  Fritz,  23  Ind.  388  458, 

Frobislier  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Transp.  Co. 
(1897),    151   N.   Y.  431,  45  N.   E. 
839 
Frost  V.  Hartford,  40  Cal.  165 

V.  Witter  (1901),  132  Cal.  421, 
64  Pac.  703  462,  636, 

Frout  V.  Hardin,  56  Ind.  165      74,  76, 
Frum  V.  Keeney  (1899),  109  la.  393, 

80  N.  W.  507 
Fry  V.  Bennett,  5  Sandf  54  541, 

V.  Evans,  8  Wend.  530  140, 

V.  Rush  (1901),  63  Kan.  429,  65 

Pac.  701 
V.  Street,  37  Ark.  39 
Frybarger  v.  Cokefair,  17  Ind.  404 

Fuchs  I'.  Treat,  41  Wis.  404 
Fugate  V.  Pierce,  49  Mo.  441 
FuUiani  v.  McCarthy,  1  H.  L.  Cas. 

703 
Fulkerson  v.  Davenport,  70  Mo.  511 
V.  Mitchell,  82  Mo.  13  781, 

Fuller  V.  Benjamin,  23  Me.  255 

V.  Cox  (1893),  135  Ind.  46,  34 

N.  E.  822 
V.  Fuller,  5  Hun,  595  189, 

V.  FuUerton,  14  Barb.  59 
V.  Seiglitz,  27  Ohio  St.  355 
Fuller  Warren  Co.  v.  Harter  (1901), 

110  Wis.  80,  85  N.  W.  698 
Fullerton  r.  Bailey  (1898),  17  Utah, 
85,  53  Pac.  1020 
V.  McCurdy,  4  Lans.  132 
Fulmer  v.  Mahaska  County  (1894), 

92  la.  20,  60  N.  W.  207 
Fulton  i:   llvau  (1900),  60  Neb.  9, 

82  N.  W.  iOj  703, 

Fulton   F.   lus.    Co.  v.  Baldwin,  37 
N.  Y.  648 


516, 
,649 
226 
723 
351, 
356 

910 
526 
331 

818 

784 

231 

608 
933 
676 

594 

587 
780, 
805 
803 
621 


603 
764 

639 

626 

608 
663 

874 

510 

190 
769, 
812 
865 
831 

258 
373 
821 

248 

543 
202 
162 
131 

655 

819 
369 

606 

814 

181 


Fultz  i:  Wycoff,  25  Ind.  321  718 

Furber  v.  McCarthy,  7  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

613  933 

Furbush  v.  Barker  (1894),  38  Neb. 

1,  56  N.  W.  996  615 

Furguson    v.    Henry  (1895),  95  la. 

439,  64  N.  W.  292  626 

Furman  v.  Van  Sise,  56  N.  Y.  435        220 


G. 


Gaar,    Scott,    &    Co.   v.   Brundage 

(1903),  89  Minn.  412, 94 N.  W.  1U91    625 
Gabe  V.  McGinnis,  68  Ind.  538  611 

Gadsden  v.  Thrush  (1898),  56  Neb. 

665,  76  N.  W.  1060  735 

Gagan  r.  City  of  Janesville  (1900), 

106  Wis.  662,  82  N.  W.  668  623 

Gage  I'.  West  (1901),  62  Neb.  612, 87 

N.  W.  344  638 

Gager  v.  Marsden  (1899),  101  Wis. 

598,  77  N.  W.  922  180,  234,  468 

Gaines  v.  Chew,  43  U.  S.  (2  How.) 

619  509,  610 

V.  Childers  (1901),  38  Ore.  200, 

63  Pac.  487  334 

V.Union  Ins.  Co.,  28  Ohio  St.  418   618 
V.  Walker,  16  Ind.  361  325,  333 

Gainey  v.  Gilson  (1897),  149  Ind.  58, 

48  N.  E.  633  365,  356 

Galbreath  v.  Gray,  20  Ind.  290  284 

Gale  V.  Battin,  16  Minn.  148  343 

V.  James,  11  Colo.  540  753 

V.  Shillock,  30  N.  W.  Rep.  138       426, 

428 
Gallagher  v.  Germania  Brewing  Co. 
(1893),    53  Minn.   214,  64 
N.  W.  1115  ,  871 

V.  Mjelde   (1898),  98  Wis.  509, 

74  N.  W.  340  313 

V.  Nichols,  60  N.  Y.  438  88,  101 

GaHick    v.     Bordeaux     (1899),    22 

Mont.  470,  56  Pac.  961  780 

Galliers    r.    Chicago,    etc.    Ry.    Co. 

(1902),  116  la.  319,  89  N.  W.  1109    734 
Galligan  ik  Fannan,  9  Allen,  192  866 

Gallimore  «.  Amnierman,  30  Ind.  323  791 
Galloway  v.  Jenkins,  63  N.  C.  147  118 

V.  Stewart,  49  Ind.  166  618 

Gallup  V.  Albany   R.   Co.,  7  Lans. 

471  916 

Galusha  v.  Galusha,  33  N.  E.  Rep. 

1062  629 

Galvin  V.  Britton  (1898),  161  Ind.  1, 

49  N.  E.  1064  605,  606 

v.    I\Iac  Mining  Co.  (1894),  14 

Mont.  608,  37  Pac.  366  649 

V.  Woollen,  66  Ind.  464  609 

Garnet  v.  Simmons   (1897),  103  la. 

163,  72  N.  W.  444  260 

Gammage  v.  Powell  (1897),  101  Ga. 

640,  28  S.  E.  969  419 

Gammon    v.    Johnson    (1900),    126 
N.  C.  64,  35  S.  E.  186  331 


l::.\xviii 


TALLK    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the   RErEREKCES 

Ganceart   v.  Henrv  (1893),  98  Cal. 

281,33Pac. 'J2   '  608 

Gantler  v.  State,  50  Ind.  539  G09 

Gandv  «•.  Pool,  14  Ntb.  98  780 

Gannon  c.  Dougherty,  41  Cal.  661  931 

V.  Laclede  Gas.  Co.  (1898),  145 

Mo.  502,  40  S.  W.  908  625 

Gansner  i*.  Franks,  75  Mo.  64  871 
Gjirardr.  G.irard  (1893),  135  Ind.  15, 

34  N.  E.  442  599 
Garberius  r.  Koberts  (1893),  109  Cal. 

125,  41  I'ac.  857  566 

Gardinier   v.   Kellogg,  14  Wis.  605  154 

Gardner  i-.  Clark,  21  N.  Y.  399  800, 

829,  830 
V.  Continental  Ins.   Co.   (1903), 

Kv.,  75  S.  VV.  283  543 
V.  Gardner  (1896),  23  Nev.  207, 

45  Tac.  139  452 

V.  Kebo,  80  Ala.  497  256 
V.  McWilliams  (1902),  42  Ore.  14, 

69  Pac.  915  825 

V.  Ogden,  22  N.  Y.  327  501 

v.  Uislier,  35  Kan.  93  933 
I.-.  Samuels  (1897),  116  Cal.  84, 

47  Pac.  9.35                       275,  277 
r.  Southern  liv.  Co.  (1903),  65 

S.  C.  341,43S.  E.  816  303 

V.  Walker,  2U  How.  Pr.  405  301 
Garland  v.  Gaines  (1900),  73  Conn. 

602,  49  Atl.  19  758 
Garneau  v.  Kendall  (1901),  61  Neb. 

396,  85  N.  W.  291  .329 

Garner  t:  Cook,  30  Ind.  331  113 
f.  Jones  (1893),  y4  Ky.  135,  21 

S.  W.  047  9.33 

V.  McCullough,  48  Mo.  318  563, 

572,  604 

V.  Wright,  24  How.  Pr.  144  351 

Garnsey  /■.  Rogers,  47  N.  Y.  ?33  111 

Garret  c.  Gault,13  B.  Mon.  378  11,  15 

Garretson   c.  Farrall    (1894),  92  la. 

728,  61  N.  \V.  251  830 

V.  Seaman,  54  N.  Y.  652  315 

Garrett  ;•.  Trotter,  65  N.  C.  4.30  664 
V.  Weinberg    (1897).   50   S.  C. 

310,  27  S.  E.  770               599,  606 
Garrison  r.  Clark,  11  Ind.  369  95,  748,  814 

V.  Howe,  17  N.  Y.  4.58  213 
r.     .Vlurphv     (1902),    Neb.,    89 

N.  \V.'766  802 
Gartin  r.  Meredith   (1899),  153  Ind. 

16,  53  N.  E.  836  673 

Gartlaiid  r.  Dunn,  11  Ark.  720      508,  509 
(Jartn.r  /•.  Corwine  (1897),  57  O.  St. 

'SU>,  4K  N.  E.  '.M5  17 

(Jarver  r.  Kent,  70  Ind.  428            15.3,  155 

C;arvey  v.  Jnrvis,  54  Barb.  179  889 

(iaa  Co.  i:  Snn  Francisco,  9  Cal.  453  755 

G.i*kell  r.  Gaskell,  0  Sim.  643  243 
(.a«.kin«  r.  Davin  (1804),  115  N.  C. 

H.">.  20  S.  E.  188  065 

(Jashiier  i .  Marquardf.  70  Wis.  679  286 

(;«8»<in  >•.  Bn>lu'ett,  0  Biisli,  '.tT  .395 

Gnston  v.  .McLeran,  3  Ore.  389      723,  791 


ARE  TO   THE  PAGES.] 

Gaston  v.  Owen,  43  Wis.  103  620 

Gatch    r.  Garretson  (1896),  100  la. 

252,  69  N.  W.  650  6 

Gates  1-.  Avery  (1901),  112  Wis.  271, 

87  N.  W.  1091  833 

V.  Boomer,  17  Wis.  455  258, 260, 

473 
V.  Kieff,  7  Cal.  124  29 

V.  Lane,  44  Cal.  392  374 

r.  No.  Pac.  11.  Co.,  64  Wis.  64  97,  102 
V.  Paul  (1903),  117  Wis.  170,  94 

N.  W.  55  640 

V.  Salmon,  46  Cal.  361  371,  544, 

568,  663 
Catling  )•.  Carteret  Cy.  Com'rs,   92 

N.  C.  536  933 

Gattis  r.  Kilgo  (1899),  125  N.  C.  133, 

34  S.  E.  240  452,  736 

V.  Kilgo  (1901).  128  N.  C.  402, 

38  .S.  E.  931  736 

Gay  r.  Havermale  (1902),  27  Wash. 

390,  07  Pac.  804  818 

Gaylc  V.  Johnston,  80  Ala.  395  243 

Gay  lord  l:  Neb    Sav.  Bank  (1898), 

54  Neb.  104,  74  N.  W.  415  816 

Gaylords  r.  Kelsiiaw,  1  Wall.  81  340 

Gaynor  r.  Clements,  10  Colo.  209  815 

Geer  v.  Holcomb  (lai'O),  92  Wis.  601, 

66  N.  AV.  793  639 

Geiger  v.  Payne  (1897),  102  la.  581, 

69  N.  W.  654,  71  N.  W.  571  670 

Geilfus  w.  Gales  (1894),  87  Wis.  395, 

58  N.  W.  742  715 

Gelatt  V.  Ridge  (189.3),  il7  Mo.  553, 

23  S.  W.  882  604 

Gelshenen  t-.   Harris,  26  Fed.  Rep. 

680  874 

Gem   Chemical  Co.  v.  Youngblood 

(1900),  58  S.  C.  56,  .36  S.  E.  437        678 
Gen.  Elec.  Co.  v.  Williams  (1898),  123 

N.  C.  51,  31  S.  E.  288  839,  845,  867 

Gen.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Benson,  5Duer. 

108  251 

Genesee,  Bank  of,  v.  Patcliin  Bank, 

13  N.  Y.  309 
Geneva  v.  Burnett  (1902),  —  Neb.  — , 

91  N.  W.  275  682 

Gentz  V.  Martin,  75  Ind.  228  598 

Geophegan  v.  Ditto,  2  Mete.  (Kv.) 

443  '        936 

George  v.  Benjamin  (1898),  100  Wis. 

622,  76  N.  W.  019     381,  384,  386  . 
V.   Edney    (1893),   36   Neb.   604, 

54  N.  W.  980  714 

r.  State  (1899),  59  Neb.  163,  80 

N.  W.  486  612 

George  Fowler,  Sons  &  Co.  v. 
Brooks  (1902),  65  Kan.  801, 70  Pac. 
COO  833 

Georgia  R.    R.    Co.    v.    Roughton 

(1899),  109  Ga.  604,  34  S.  E.1026       641 
Gcnltzen  v.  Cockrell  (1893),  62  Minn. 

501,55N.  W.  58  871 

German  Am.  Bk.  of  Hastings  r. 
White,  38  Minn.  471  737 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


Ixxxix 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Frederick  (1890), 

57  Neb.  538,  77  N.  W.  1106 
German    Nat.   Bank    r.    First   Nat. 
Bank  (1898),  55  Neb.  80,  75  N.  W. 
531 
German    Savings    Bank    v.    Cady 
(1901),lUla.228,86N.  W. 
277 
V.  Citizens  Nat.  Bank  (1897),  101 
Iowa,  530,  70  N.  W.  769 

Germania   Spar    &    Ban  Verein   v. 
Flynn    (1896),    92  Wis.    201,   60 
N.  W.  209 
Gerner  v.  Ciuirch  (1895),  43 Neb.  690, 

62  N.  W.  51 
Gertler  v.  Linscott,  26  Minn.  82    496, 
Gettings    r.   Buchanan     (1898),    17 

Mont.  581,  44  Pac.  77 
Getty  V.  Binsse,  49  N.  Y.  385 

V.  Devlin,  70  N.  Y.  504  248, 

V.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  6  How. 
Pr.  269 
Gharky,  Est.  of,  57  Cal.  274 
Ghirardelli  v.  Bourland,  32  Cal.  585 
Gianella  v.  Bigelow  (1897),  96  Wis. 

185,  71  N.  W.  Ill  259,  355, 

Gibbs  V.  Southern  (1893),  116  Mo. 

204,22  S.  W.  713 
Gibson  v.  Gibson,  41  Wis.  449         229 
V.   Trow   (1900),  105  Wis.  288, 
81  N.  W.  411 
Giffen   v.   City  of  Lewiston  (1898), 

Idaho,  55  Pac.  545 
Giffert  v.  West,  33  Wis.  617  617, 

Gila  Vallev,   etc.   Ry.    Co.    v.    Gila 
County  (1903),  Ariz.,  71  Pac.  913 
Gilbert  v.  Allen,  57  Ind.  524 

V.  Hewetson    (1900),  79    Minn. 

326,  82  N.  W.  655 
V.  James,  86  N.  C.  244 
V.  Loberg,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  500 
V.  Loberg  (1894),  86  Wis.  661, 57 

N.  W.  982  491,  612,  903, 

V.  Pritchard,  14  Hun,  46 
V.  Rounds,  14  How.  Pr.  46 
V.  Sage,  5  Lans.  287 
Gilbert's  Est.,  Be,  104  N.  Y.  200 
Gildersleeve  v.  Burrows,  24  Ohio  St. 

204 
Giles  v.  Austin,  62  N.  Y.  480      46,  51, 
V.  Bank  of  Georgia  (1897),  102 

Ga.  702,  29  S.  E.  600       887, 
V.  Lyon,  4  N.  Y.  600 
Gill  V.    Jolinson's    Adm.,    1     Mete. 

(Ky.)  649  101, 

Gillam  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1897),  121 
N.  C.  369,  28  S.  E.  470   642, 

V.  Sigman,  29  Cal.  637  271, 

Gilland  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1895), 

6  Wyo.  185,  43  Pac.  608 
Gillen waters  v.  Campbell  (1895),  142 

Ind.  529,  41  N.  E.  1041        455,  925, 


674 
816 

718 

117, 
422 

670 

100 

521 

645 

293 
,372 

15 

562 
502 

350 

600 
,667 

871 

229 
618, 
910 

780 
271 

822 

518 

920 
471 
798 
815 
331 

131 
939 

918 
15 

311 

645, 
665 
813 

179 

941 


Gillespie  ;;.  Alexander,  3  Russ.  130 
c.  Gillespie  (1896),  64  Minn.  381, 

67  N.  W.  20 
V.  Torrance,  25  N.  Y.  306        869, 
Gillett  V.  Hill,  32  Iowa,  220 

('.  Ins.  Co.   (Ib94),  53  Kan.  108, 

36  Pac.  52 
V.  Treganza,  13  Wis.  472  20,  63, 

Gilliam  v.  Black   (1895),  16  Mont. 

217,  40  Pac.  303 
Gillian  v.  McDowell  (1902),  — Neb. 

— ,  92  N.  W.  991 
Gillies  V.  Improvement  Co.  (1895), 

147  N.  Y.  420,  42  N.  E.  196        615, 

Gillilan  i-.  Norton,  6  Robt.  546 
Gillis  V.  Hilton  &  Dodge  Co.  (1901), 

113  Ga.  622,  38  S.  E.  940 
Gillispie  c   Fort  Wayne  &   So.  R. 

Co.,  12  Ind.  398 
Gilman  >■.  Filmore,  7  Ore.  374 

V.   McClatchy    (1896),   111   Cal. 
606,  44  Pac.  241 
Gilmer  v.  Hill,  22  La.  Ann.  465 
Gilmore  r.  Fox,  10  Kan.  509 
V.  Norton,  10  Kan.  491 
V.       Skookum     Box     Factory 
(1899),   20   Wash.   703,    56 
Pac.    934 
Gilpin  V.  Wilson,  53  Ind.  443         865, 
Gilreath  v.  Furman  (1898),  53  S.  C. 
463,  31  S.  E.  291 
V.  Furman  (1900),  57  S.  C.  289, 
35  S.  E.  516  756, 

Gimbel  v.  Pignero,  62  Mo.  240 
Ginochio   v.   Amador   Can.  «&   Min. 

Co.,  67  Cal.  493 
Gipps   Brewing  Co.  v.    De   France 
(1894),  91  la.  108,  58  N.  W.  1087 
Giraldin  v.  Howard,  103  Mo.  40      95, 
Girard  v.  St.  Louis  Car  Wheel  Co. 
(1894),  123  Mo.  358,  27  S.  W.  648 
Giraud  v.  Beach,  3  E.  D.  Smith,  337 

Gise  V.  Cook  (1898),  152  Ind.  75,  52 

N.  E.  454 
Gjerstadengen  v.  Hartzell   (1899),  8 

N.  D.  424,  79  N.  W.  872  710, 

Glacken  v.  Brown,  39  Hun,  294 
Glade  v.  White  (1S94),  42  Neb.  336, 

60  N.  W.  556 
Glasgow  V.  Hobbs,  52  Ind.  239 
Glass  V.  Murphy  (Ind.  App.  1892), 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  1097 

Glaze  V.  Bogle  (1898),  105  Ga.  295, 

31  S.  E.  169 

Glazer  i'.  Clift,  10  Cal.  303 
Gleadell  v.  Thomson,  56  N.  Y.  194 
Gleason  v.  Moen,  2  Duer,  639   855, 

902, 
Gleckler  v.  Slavens  (1894),  5  S.  D. 

364,  69  N.  W.  323 
Glen  V.   Hope  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  66 

N.  Y.  379  105, 


392 

232 

939 
823 

689 
633, 
667 

375 

680 

618, 
624 
298 


95 

667 

818 
118 
265 
265 


403 

895 

709 

825 
178 

97 

567 
814 

702 
187, 
216 

668 

788 
50 

66 
618 

661 

641 

781 

911 

872, 

,940 

703 

111 


xc 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  beferekces 

Glen  &   Hall  .Man.  Co.  v.   Hall,  Gl 

X.  Y.  220  858,  88(3,  889,  927 

GlencToss  r.  Evans  (1894),  Ariz.,  36 

Vac.  212  730 
Glenn  i:  Gerald  (1902),  G4  S.  C.  236, 

42  S.  E.  155  6-42 
V.  Waddell,  23  Oliio  St.  605    263,  265 

Glide  r.  Dh yer,  83  Cal.  477  392 
Globe   Loan   &    Trust  C'o.   v.   EUer 

(1901),  61  Neb.  226,  85  N.  W.  48  334 
Glover      «-.      Hargadine-McKittrick 
Drv  (io.-ds  Co.   (1901),  62 
Nel).  488,  87  X.  W.  170    340,  714 
V.   Henderson   (1893).    120   Mo. 

367,  25  S.  W.  175  584 
f.  Narev   (1894),  92  la.  286,  60 

N.  W.  531  466 
V.  Keinley  (1898),  52  S.  C.  492, 

30  y.  E.  405  456 
r.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  (1896),  138 

Mo.  408,  40  S.  W.  110  815 
Goble  r.  Swobe  (1902),  64  Neb.  838, 

90  N.  W.  919  191,  239 

Gock  r.  Keneda,  29  Barb.  120        179,  202 

Goddard  r.  Fulton,  21  Cal.  430  769 

Godfrey  v.  Cliadwell,  2  Vern.  601  333 

i:  Town>.end,  8  How.  Pr.  398  419 

Goebel  v.  Hou^Oi,  26  Minn.  252  916 

Goelth  V.  Wliite,  35  Barb.  76  584 

Goetzman  r.  Whitakor,  81  Iowa,  527  428 
Gofif  V.  Marsden  Co.  (1900),  Ky.,  56 

S.  \V.  mi  594 
r.  Outagamie  Cy.  Sup.,  43  Wis. 

55                '  665 

Going  r.  Dinwiddle,  86  Cal.  633  562 

Goings  I'.  White,  33  Ind.  125  574 
Goldberg  i-.  Kidd  ( 18!»4),  5  S.  D.  169, 

58  N.  W.  574  49 

r.  Utlev.  60  N.  Y.  427  458 
Golden   i:   Hardesty   (1895),  98  la. 

022,  61  N.  \V.:nZ  816 

Goldman  v.  Bashore.  80  Cal.  146  942 
Goldsniid   v.    Stonehewer,   9    Hare 

A pp.  38  337 

Goldsmith  v.  Boersdi,  28  Iowa,  351  6:^2 
V.  Cbipps   (1899),   154  Ind.  28, 

55  N.  E.  855  709 

V.  Gilliland,  24  Fed.  Uep.  154  365 

I,-.  Saclis.  8  Sawy.  110  212 
Gold  water  v.  IJowen   (1000),  Ariz., 

62  I'ac.  091  607 
1-.   Burnside    (1900),   22    Wash. 

215,  60  I'ac.  409  735 

GoUer  v.  Fett,  30  Cal.  481  199 

Goneelier  r.  Forct,  4  Minn.  13  262 
(Jood  r.  Blewit,  19  Ves.  3.36  248,  389,  SCrj 
Goodall  1-.  Mopley,  45  Ind.  355     244,  245, 

am 

Goodell  I'.  Bloomer,  41  Wis.  436  758 

Gooding  V.   MeAllister,  9   How.  Pr. 

12:5  472 

Goodman  c.  Alexander   (1901),  165 

N.  Y.  289.  59  N.  E.  145  584 

Gooflnight  V.  Goar,  30  Ind.  418     172.  186, 

188,212,289 


ARE  TO   THE   PAGES.] 

Goodricli  v.  Alfred  (1899),  72  Conn. 

257,  43  Atl    1041  462 

V.  BIdg.  Ass'n  (1895),  96  Ga.  803, 

22  S.  K.  585  814 

V.  Milwaukee,  24  Wis.  422  153 

V.  Stanton  (1899),  71  Conn.  418, 

42  Atl.  74  659 

V.  Williamson   (1901),  10  Okla. 

588,  63  Pac.  974  418 

Goodson  V.  Goodson  (1897),  140  Mo. 

206,  41  S.  W.  737  678,  708 

Goodwin  I'.  Caraleigh,  etc.  Co. 
(1897),  121  N.  C.  91,  28 
S.  E.  192  643 

r.  Fertilizer  Works  (1898),  123 

N.  C.  162,  31  S.  E.  373  640 

V.  Mass.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  73 

N.  Y.  480  811 

V.  Tyrrell  (1903),  Ariz.,  71  Pac. 

906  326 

Good  wine    v.    Cadwallader     (1901), 

158  Ind.  202,  61  N.  E.  939       664 

Gordon  i-.  Bruner,  49  Mo.  570   648,  649. 

900,911,913,  916 

r.  Carter,  79  Ind.  386  310 

V.  City  of  San  Diego  (1895),  108 

Cal.  264,  41  Pac.  301  433 

V.  Horsfall,  5  Moore,  393  247 

V.  Swift,  46  Ind.  208  881 

Gores  v.  Field  (1901),  109  Wis.  408, 

84  N.  W.  867  340 

Gorham  v.  Gorham,  3  Barb.  Ch.  32      162 
Goring  r.  Fitzgerald   (1898),  105  la. 

507,'' 75  N.  W.  358  821 

Gorlcy  r.  City  of  Louisville  (1901), 

—  Kv.— ,  65  S.  W.  844  387 

Gorman  v.  Kussell,  14  Cal.  531      385,  388 
Gorrell  v.  Gates,  79  Iowa,  632  260 

Gosnian  v.  Cruger,  7  Hun,  60  316 

Goss  i;.  Boulder  Cv.  Com'rs,  4  Colo. 

468  ■  75,  626 

Gossard  v.  Ferguson,  54  Ind.  519  887 

Gossom  r.  Badgett,  6  Bush,  97  2!)() 

Gott  c.  Powell.  41  Mo.  416         20,  31,  477 
Gotthauer  i'.  Cunningham   (1896),  4 

Okla.  551,  47  Pac.  479  877 

Cottier  V.  Babcock,  7  Abb.  Pr.  392        922 
Gould  V.  Glass,  19  Barb.  179  155 

V.  Gleason  (1895),  10  Wash.  476, 

39  Pac.  123  639 

V.  Gould,  8  Cow.  168  225 

V.  Hayes,  19  Ala.  438  254,  261 

y.  Williams,  9  How.  Pr.  51  611 

Goulet  V.  Asseler,  22  N.  Y.  225  71 

Gourlev  >:  St.  L.  &,  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  35 

Mo.  App.  87  637 

Gowan  V.  Bensel  (1893),  53  Minn.  46, 

54  N.  W.  934  601 

Gowen  V.  Gilson  (1895),  142  Ind.  328, 

41  N.  E.  594  645 

Gower  v.   Howe,  20  Ind.  396     310,325, 

331 
Grace  v.  Ballon  (189:1),  4  S.  D.  333, 

56  N.  W.  1075  687 

V.  Terrington,  1  Coll.  3  249 


TABLK    OF    CASES    CITED. 


XCl 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Gradwohl  v.  Harris,  29  Cal.  160 


90,  97, 
428 


499 

227 
596 

637 

805 

277 

708 

378 


Grady  v.  Maloso  (1806),  92  Wis.  666, 

66  N.  W.  808 
Graff   v.   Kinney,   1  How.  Pr.  n.    s. 

59 
Graiiann  r.  Catnman,  5  Dner,  697 
V.  Cliicasjo,  etc.  Ky.  Co.,  49  Wis. 

532^ 
V.  Harrower,  18  Hnw.  Pr.  144 
V.  Heniierson,  od  Ind.  195 
!;.  Marks   (1893),  98   Ga.  67,  25 

S.  E.  931 

V.  Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  436 

i;.  Hinyo,  67  Mo.  824        300,  376,  402 

V.  Tilford,  Stanton's  Code,  98         936 

Graham    Tp.    Indep.    Scli.    Dist.   r. 

Indep.  Sch.  Dist.  No.  2,  50  Iowa, 

322  189,  212 

Grain  i-.  Aldricli,  38  Cal.  514       11,  17,  90, 

104 
Gran  v.  Houston  (1895),  45  Neb.  813, 

64  N.  W.  245 
Granby  Mining  Co.  ;•.  Davis  (1900), 

156  Mo.  422,  57  S.  W.  126 
Grand  c.  Drevfus  (1898),  122   Cal. 

58,  54  Pac.  369 
Grand  Lodjie  v.  Hall  (1903),  —  Ind. 

App.  — ,  67  N.  E.  272 
Grand    Valley     Irrigation     Co.    v. 
Lesher  (1901),  28  Col.  273, 65  Pac. 
44  740,  756 

Grandona  v.  Lovdall,  70  Cal.  161  470 

Grange  r.  Gilbert,  44  Hun,  9  927 

Granger  v.  Granger,  2  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

211 
Grannis  v.  Hooker,  29  Wis.  65 
Grant  v.  Baker,  12  Ore.  329 

V.  Bartholomew  (1899),  57  Neb. 

673,  78  N.  W.  314 
V.  Clarke  (1899),  58  Neb.  72,  78 

N.  W.  364 
V.  Commercial  Nat.  Bank  (1903) 

—  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W.  185 
V.  Grant  (1893),  53  Minn.  181, 


793 
615 
680 
671 


226 
584 
778 

702 

735 

600 


54  N.  W.  1059 
V.  McCarty,  38  Iowa, 


525,  666 
453,  457, 
495,  520 
576 


16 


834 
159 


603 


V.  Sheerin,  84  Cal.  197 
Crash  v.  Sater,  6  Iowa,  301 
Grattan  v.  Wiggins,  23  Cal 
Graves  v.  Barrett  (1900),    126  N.  C 
267,  35  S.  E.  539 
V.  Clark  (1897),  101  la.  738,  69 

N.  W.  1046  686,  714 

V.  Merchants'  &  B.  Ins.  Co.,  82 

Iowa,  6-37  209 

V.  Norfolk  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  49 

Neb.  437,  68  N.  W.  612  768 

V.  Spier,  58  Barb.  349  36,  37,  575 

V.  Waite,  59  N.  Y.  156       75,  627,  630 
Gray  v.  Coan,  23  Iowa,  -344  592 

V.  Dougherty,  25  Cal.  266         29,  496 
V.  Durland.  50  Barb.  100  220 

V.  Fretwell,  9  Wis,  186  805 


Gray  v.  Garrison,  9  Cal.  325 
V.  Givens,  26  Mo.  291 
V.  Palmer,  9  Cal.  616 
V.  Payne,  43  Mo.  203  20,  31, 

V.  Scbenck,  4  N.  Y.  460 
V.  Tyler,  40  Wis.  579 
V.  Worst  (1895),  129  Mo.  122,31 
S.  W.  585 
Greason  v.  Keteltas,  17  N.  Y.  491 
Great  West.  Compound  Co.  v.JEtna 
Ins.  Co.,  40  Wis.  373  177,  189, 

211, 
Great  West.    Ins.    Co.    v.   Pierce,  1 

Wyom.  45  870, 

Greely  v.  McCoy  (1893),  3  S.  D.624. 

64  N.  W  659 
Green  v.  Clark,  12  N.  Y.  343 

V.  Clifford,  94  Cal.  49  375, 

V.  Conrad,  21  S.  W.  Kep.  839 

870, 
V.  Dixon,  9  Wis.  532  325, 

V.  Gilbert,  21  Wis.  395  584, 

V.  Green,  69  N.  C.  294  190, 

V.  Green    (1897),  50  S.  C.  514, 

27  S.  E.  952 
I'.  Hughitt   School    Tp.    (1894), 
5  S.  D.  452,  59  N.  W.  224 

V.  Lake  Sup.  &  Pac.  Fuse  Co., 

46  Cal.  408 
V.  Louthain,  49  Ind.  139 
V.  Lyndes,  12  Wis.  404 
V.  Marble,  37  Iowa,  95 
V.  Morrison,  5  Colo.  18 
V.  Palmer,  15  Cal.  411 
V.  Putnam,  1  Barb.  500 
V.  Richardson,  4  Col.  584 
V.  Southain,  49  Ind.  139 
V.  Tidball  (1901),  26  Wash.  338, 

67  Pac.  84 
V.  Tierney  (1901),  62  Neb.  661, 

87  N.  W.  331 
V.  Walkill  Nat.  Bk.,  7  Hun,  63 
261 
Green's  Adm'r  v.  Irvine  (1902),  Ky., 

66  S.  W.  278 
Greenbaum  v.  Turrill,  57  Cal.  285 
Green  Bay,  etc.   Canal  Co.  v.  Kau- 
kauna,   etc.  Co.  (1901),  112  Wis. 
32.3,  87  N.  W.  864 
Green   Bav  Lumber   Co.  v.   School 
Dist.    (1902),  —  la.  — ,  90  N.  W. 
504 
Greenbergr.  Whitcomb  Lumber  Co. 

(1895),  00  Wis.  225,  63  N.  W.  93       302 
Greene  v.  Breck,  10  Abb.  Pr.  42  386 

V.  Finnell  (1900),  22  Wash.  186, 

60  Pac.  144  271 

r.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.,  6  Hun,  128    88. 

93 
r.  Nunnemacher,  36  Wis.  50  301, 303, 

499 
r.  Republic  F.  Ins.  Co.,  84  N.  Y. 

572  117 

V.  Sisson,  2  Curtis,  171  261 


99 
197 

358 
477 
341 
2»3 

656 
633 

207, 
,270 

880 

643 

149 
658 
132, 
9.36 
333 
587 
274 

606 

787, 
830 

718 
609 
234 
90 
112 
544 
368 
111 
576 

602 

833 
260, 
.340 

819 
713 


679 


107 


XCll 


TALLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[tBE   REFfaENCES   ARE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Greene  <•.  Warwick,  64  N.  Y.  220  123 

Greenebaum  <•.    lavlor  (1894),   102 

Cal.  024,  36  Pae.  057  699 

Greeiifielil  r.  Mass.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co., 

47  N.  V.  4.)0  150,  751,  764 

Greenfield    Lumber   Co.    v.   Parker 

( 1902),  159  Ind.  571,  65  N.  E.  747     106 
Greenlee  r.  Home   Ins.  Co.  (1897), 

103  la.  484,  72  X.  W.  676  638 

Greeuman  v.  Chicago  Nortiiwestern 
U.  K.  Co.  (1898),  100  Wis.  188,  75 
N.  W.  998  676 

Greentlial  r.  Lincoln,  Sevms,  &  Co. 
(1896),  67  Conn.  372,  3o  Atl.  266      615, 

828 
Greentree   r.   Rosenstock,  61  N.  Y. 

bb-.i  75,  627,  628 

Greenville  Nat.  Bank  r.  Evans  Co. 

(I'.HX)),  9  Okla.  353,  60  Pac.  249        678 
Greenwood  r.  Atkinson,  5  Sim.  419      321 
v.  Inpersoll  (1901),  61  Neb.  785, 

»6  N.  W.  476  422 

Greer  *-.  Covington,  bo  Ky.  410  756 

I'.  Greer,  24  Kan.  10  930 

V.  Laiimer  (lb96),  47  S.  C.  176, 

25  S.  E.  136  565,  812 

V.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(18931,94  Ky.  169,  21  S.  W. 
64'.i  C39 

r.  Waxell.num   (1902),   115  Ga. 

866,  42  S.  E.  200  288 

Gregoire  ;•.  IJourke  (lb95),  28  Ore. 

275.  42  Pac.  '.'90  673 

Gregorv  v.  Greuory,  09  X.  Y.  522         368 
i:  High.  29  Ind.  527  371 

1-.  Kaar  (lb93),  36  Neb.  533,  54 

N.  W.  b59  703 

V.  McCormick   (1893),  120  Mo. 

657.  25  S.  W.  505  159 

1-.  Woodwortii  (1895),  93  la.  246, 

61  N.  W.  962  673 

/•.  Woodwf)rili    (1899),    107   la. 

151,  77  N.  W.  837  711 

Greifs  V.  State  Inv.  Co.   (1893),  98 

(^il.  241,33  Pac.  195  790 

Grciiher    v.    Alexander,    15    Iowa, 

470  474 

fJr.iitner  >•  Fi-hrenscliield  (1902),  04 

Kan.  704,  08  Pac.  619  056 

Gress  r.  Evans.  1  Dak.  387  15 

Grever  &  Son.*  r.  Taylor  (1895),  53 

<».  Sf.  021,42  N.  E.  829  685 

Grihitic   r.  '  oliinil)U8    Brewing    Co. 

(1893).  100  Cal.  07.  34  Pac.  527  757 

Gridler  r.  Farmers'  &  1).  Bank,  12 

Bu8h,  .'i^i:]  758 

Gridley  »•.  Gridley.  24  N.  Y.  130  515 

Griffin  >:  Cox,  30  Ind.  242  935 

i:  Curtis  (1K07),  50  Neb.  334. 

09  N.  W.  964  566,  688 

V.  Griffin,  23  How.  Pr.  183  890 

r.  L.  I.  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.848   751,  780 

I'.  .Moore,  52  Iixi.  295  908 

Griffith  r.  ("romlev  (1900),  58  S.  C. 

448,  36  S.  E.  73»  715 


Griffith  V.  Maxwell  (1898),  20  Wash. 

403,  55  I'ac.  571  619 

)•.  Vanlievthuysen,  9  Hare,  85        258 
V.  Wright  ( 18119),  21  Wash.  494, 

58  Pac.  582  565,  812 

Griggs  v.  Staplee,  2  DeG.  &  S.  572        258 

Grignon  v.  Black,  76  Wis.  674  923 

Grigsby  v.  Barr,  14  Bush,  330  665 

V.   Barton    County    (1902),    169 

Mo.  221,  69  S.  W.  296      375,  644 
Grimes  v.  Cullison   (1895),  3  Okla. 

268.  41  S.  W.  355  543,  000 

?-.  Duzan,  32  Ind.  301  886,923 

1-.  Grimes.  88  Ky.  20  942 

Grimm  v.  Town  of  Washburn  (1898), 

100  Wis.  229,  75  N.  W.  964  740 

Grinnell  v.  Buchanan,  1  Daly,  538  15 

r.  Schmidt.  2  Sandf.  706  152,  173 

Griswold  v.  Pieratt  (1895),  110  Cal. 

259,  42  Pac.  821  b07,  913 

Groat  V.  Phillips,  0  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

42 
Grocers'  Bk.  v.  O'Korke,  6  Hun,  18 


291 
756, 

787 


Grosovsky  v.  Goldenberg  (1902),  86 

Minn.  378,  90  N.  W.  282 
Gross  V.  Miller  (1894),  93  la.  72,  61 
N   W.  385 
V.   Sclieel    (1103),  — Neb.— ,93 
N.  W.  418  676 

Grossman  r.  Lauber,  29  Ind.  018 
Grosvenor  v.  Allen,  9  Paige,  74 

V.  Atlantic  F.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Bosw. 
469 
Grotte  V.  Nagle  (1897),  50  Neb.  363, 

69  N.  W.  973 
Grove  ?'.  Schweitzer,  36  Wis.  553 
Grover   &    B.  S.  JI.  Co.  v.  Newbv, 

58  Ind.  570 
Groves  v.  Marks,  32  Ind.  319 

V.  Tallman,  8  Nev.  178 
Grubb  V.  Elder  (1903).  — Kan.— 
Pac.  790 
V.  Lookabill,  100  N.  C  207 
Grubbe  r.  Grubbe  (1894),  26  Ore.  363, 

38  Pac.  182 
Grulm  V.  Stanley,  92  Cal.  86 
Gude  r.  Dakota'pire  Ins.  Co.  (1895), 

7  S.  T)  044,  65  N.  W.  27 
Gudgcr  r.  Western  N.  C.  H.  Co.,  2l 

Fed.  Rep.  81 
Guedici  v.  Boots,  42  Cal.  452 
Guernev  r.  Moore  (1895),  131  Mo. 

050,  32  S.  W.  1132 
Guernsey  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co..  17  Minn. 
"104  20,  41 

V.  Tuthill  (1900),  12  8.  D.  5b4, 
82  N.  W.  190 
Guidery  v.  Green,  95  Cal.  630 
Guild  V.  Railroad  Co.  (1896),  57  Kan. 

70,  45  Pac.  82 
Guilford  v.  Cooley,  58  N.  Y.  116 
Guille  /-.  Wong  Fook,  13  Ore.  577 
Guirxl  v.  Giiiod,  14  Cal.  506 
Gulick  V.  Connely,  42  Ind.  134 


160 

711 

752 
935 

260 

810 

042 
940 


930 
03 
544,  5C2 
72 

080 
219,  360 


233 
278 

080 

301 
50 

96 

472 

104 
637 

790 
155 

805 
231 
727 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


xcni 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Gullickson  v.  Madsen  (1894),  87  Wis. 

19,  57  N.  W.  905  714 

Gulliver  u.  Fowler  (1894),  64  Conn. 

55(5,  ;50  Atl.  852  638,  849 

Gund  ('.  Parke  (189G),  15  Wash.  393, 

46  I'ac.  408  421 

Gunder  v.  Tibbits   (1899),  153  Ind. 

591,  55  N.  E.  762  466 

Gunderson  v.  Tliomas  (1894),  87  Wis. 

406,  58  N.  W.  750  89. 444,  515,  657,  670 
Giinn  V.  Madigan,  28  Wis.  158  571,  592 
Giiptill  r.  City  of  Red  Wing  (1899), 

76  Minn.  129,  78  N.  W.  970  433 

Gurney  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  K.  Co.,  58 

N.  Y.  358  910 

Gurske  v.  Kelpin  (1901),  61  Neb.  517, 

85  N.  W.  557  836,  849,  863,  906,  928 
Gustin  r.  Concordia  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 

164  Mo.  172,  64  S.  W.  128  593 

Gutchess  ('.  Whiting,  46  Barb.  139        629 
Guthrie  v.  Bacon,  107  N.  C.  337  820 

V.  Siiaffer  (1898),  7  Okla.   459, 

54  Bac.  698  599 

V.  Treat    (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92 

N.  W.  595  332 

Guthrie,  City  of  v.  Lumber  Co. 
(189"7),  5  Okla.  774,  50  Pac. 
84  733 

V.  Nix  (1895),  3  Okla.  136,   41 

Pac.  343  605 

Guttman  v.  Scannell,  7  Cal.  455 
Gutzman  v.  Clancy  (1902.),  114  Wis. 

589,  90  N.  W.  1081  491,  921 

Guy  V.  Blue  (1896),  146  Ind.  629,  45 

N.  E.  1052  678 

V.  McDaniel  (1897),  51  S.  C.  436, 

29  S.  E.  196  592 

Guyer  v.  Minn.  Thresher  Co.  (1896), 

97  la.  132,  66  N.  W.  83  638 

Gwaltney  r.  Cannon,  31  Ind.  227    580,  584 

Gwathney  v.  Clieatham,  21  Hun,  576   940 

Gyger  v.  Courtney  (1900),  59  Neb. 

555,  81  N.  W.  437  115,  288 


H. 


Haasler  v.  Hefele  (1898),   151   Ind. 

391,  50  N.  E.  361  401 

Habel  v.  Union   Depot  Co.   (1897), 

140  Mo.  159,  41  S.  W.  459  641 

Habicht  V.  Pemberton,  4  Sandf.  657     175, 

386 
Hivblitzel  v.  Latliam,  35  Iowa,  550  53,  55 
llacliett  V.  Bank  of  California,  57  Cal. 

335  626 

Hackett  v.  Carter,  38  Wis.  394      499,  517 
V.   Louisville,    etc.    R.    R.    Co. 
(1894),  95  Ivy.  236,  24  S.  W. 
871  656 

V.  Schad,  3  Bush,  353  799 

V.  Watts  (1896),  138  Mo.  502,  40 

S.  W.  113  783 

Hackley  v.  Draper,  60  N.  Y.  88  354 

l:  Ogmun,  10  Plow.  Pr.  44  833 


Haddix  v.  Wilson,  3  Busli,  523  936 
Haddock  v.  Salt  Lake  City  (1901), 

23  Utah.  521,  65  Pac.  491  810 

Hade  V.  McVay,  31  Ohio  St.  231  908 
Haden  c.  Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

(1896),  99  la.  735,  68  N.  W.  733  606 

Plagadorn  v.  Raux,  72  N.  Y.  583  155 

Hagan  v.  Burch,  8  Iowa,  309  815 

r.  Walker,  14  How.  U.  S.  37  334 

Hagely  v.  llagely,  68  Cal.  348  718 
Hagerman  v.  Thomas  (1901),  —  Neb 

— ,  96  N.  W.  631  685 

Haggard  v.  Hay,  13  B.  Mon.  175  753 

V.  Wallen,  6  Neb.  271  665 

Haggerson  v.  Phillips,  37  Wis.  364  246 

Haggerty    r.    Wagner    (1897),    148 

Ind.  Qio,  48  N.  E.  366  370 

Haggin  v.  Clark,  51  Cal.  112  922 
V.  Lorenz  (1895),  15  Mont.  309, 

39  Pac.  285  676 

Hagman  r.  Williams,  88  Cal.  146  758 
Hague  V.  Niphi  Irrigation  Co.  (1898), 

10  Utah,  421,  52  Pac.  765  687 
Hahl  V.  Sugo  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  109, 

62  N.  E.  135     15,  16,  27,  29,  41, 461,  470, 

473 

Haigiit  V.  Badgeley,  15  Barb.  499  815 
Hain  w.  N.  W.  Gravel  R.  Co.,  41  Ind. 

196  563 

Haines  v.  Beach,  3  Johns.  Ch.  459  .333 
i:  HoUister  CA  N.  Y.  1  260,  340,  470 
V.  Stewart  (1902),  — Neb. —,  91 

N.  W.  539  418 
Hairalson  r.  Carson  (1900),  111  Ga. 

57,  36  S.  E.  319  666 
Haire  v.  Baker,  5  N.  Y.  357  48,  54,  181 
Hale  V.  Grogan   (1896),  99  Ky.  170, 

35  S.  W.  282  810,  818 

V.  Hale  (1901),  14  S.  D.  644,  86 

N.  W.  650  608 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1893),  36 

Neb.  266,  54  N.  W.  517  677 
V.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank.  49  N.  Y. 

626  29,  596,  660,  666,  667 

V.  Walker,  31  Iowa,  344  790 

Haley  v.  Baglev,  37  Mo.  363  364 

Hall  V.  iEtna  Man.  Co.,  30  Iowa,  215  786 

V.  Austin,  2  Coll.  570  352 

V.  Bank  (1^98),  145  Mo.  418,  46 

S.  W.  1000  345 

r.  Clayton,  42  Iowa,  526  940 

V.  Gale,  14  Wis.  54  937 

V.  Hall,  .38  How.  Pr.  97  475 

V.  Klepzig,  99  Mo.  83  329 
V.    Law    Guarantee,    etc.    Co. 
(1900),   22   Wash.   305,   60 

Pac.  643  604 

V.  Lonkev,  57  Cal.  80  667 

V.  Nelson,  23  Barb.  88  326 

V.  Olney,  65  Barb.  27  801 

V.  Plaine,  14  Ohio  St.  417     104,  116, 

151 

V.  Roberts,  61  Barb.  33  110 
V.  Roberts  (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W. 

199  688 


XCIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  REFERE.NCE3  ABB  TO  THS  PAOES.] 


Hull  c.    Soutliern  T'iic.   Co.  (1899), 

Ariz.,  57  I'ac  617  593 

r.  Woodward,  oU  S.  C.  504      635,  758 
.-.  Woolory  (lb9b),  20  \Vasli.440, 

55  Pac.  602  592 

Hall  Jt  Brown  Co.  r.  Barnes  (1902), 

1 15  (Ja.  it45.  42  S.  E.  270  625 

Hallalian  r.  Uerhert,  57  N.  Y.  409  88 

Hallani  c.  Asliford  (1902),  Ky.,  70 

S.  \V.  197  354 

Halleck  v    Streeter  (1897),  52  Neb. 


827.  78  N.  W.  219 


CO 


Halleit  c.  Hallett,  2  Paige.  15       249.  254, 
385,  387,  889,  392 
V.  Larcoin  (1897),  Idalio,  51  Pac. 

108  039 

Hallock  V.  De  Munn,  2  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

350  315 

V.  Smith,  4  Johns.  Cli.  049  247 

Ham  r.  Greve,  34  Iiid.  18  790 

I'.  Henderson,  50  Cal.  367  159 

Hamill  r.  Bank  of  Clear  Creek 
County  (1890),  22  Colo.  384, 
45  Pac.  411  48 

r.  Copcland  (1899),  20  Colo.  178, 

50  Pac.  901  834 

r.  Thompson,  3  Colo.  518     18,  37,  38, 

39,  321 

Hamilton  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  40,Wis.  47     310 

V.  Great  Falls  Ky.  Co.  (1895), 

17  Mont.  334,  42  Pac.  860    605 
r.  Huson  (1898),  21  Mont.  9,  53 

Pac.  101  752 

V.  Lamphear,  54  Conn.  237  103 

V.  Love  (1898),  152  Ind.  641,  53 

N.  E.  181  669 

1-.  Mclndoo  (1900),  81  Minn.  324, 

84  X.  W.  118  671 

1-.  Mandle  (1898),  103  Ga.  788, 

30  S.  E.  058  20,  72 

V.  Wright,  30  N.  Y.  502  119 

Hamlin  r.  Wriglit,  23  Wis.  491      260,  342 
Hainiii  '■.  Honiiiie,  98  Ind.  77 
Hammell  c.  Queen  Ins.  Co.,  50  Wis. 

240  207,  217 

Hammer  v.  Downing  (1901),  39  Ore. 

604,  65  Pac.  17         136,  585,  668, 
703,  867 
1-.  Hammer,  39  Wis.  182  63 

Hammon.l  /■.  .Muskwa,  40  Wis.  35  229 
V.  Pennock,  61  N.  Y.  145  248,  373 
V.  Perry,  38  Iowa,  217  49,  55 

I'.  S.  C.  &  P.  U.  Co.,  49  Iowa, 

450  637 

'•.  Terry,  3  Lans.  186  934,  935 

I  lamp  c.  Uobinuon,  3  DeG.,  J.  &  S. 

97  347 

Hampson  i'.  Fall.  64  Ind.  382  887 

Hampton  >:  Webster  (1898),  66  Neb. 

02H,  77  N.  W.  50  670,  678 

Hancock  >:  Hancock's  Adm'r  (1902). 

—  Ky.  — .  09  S.  W.  757    913,  932 
»'.  Johnson,  1  Mete.  242  457 

r.  IJitchie,  11  Ind.  48  99 

I'.  Woolen,  107  N.  C.  9  351 


Hand  i-.  City  of  St.  Louis  (1900),  158 

Mo.  204,  59  S.  W.  92  709 

1-.    Scodeletti    (1900),    128    Cal. 

074,  61  Pac.  373  231 

Hanenkratt    r.     llamil    (1900),    10 

(»kla.  219,  (jl  Pac.  1050  661 

Haner    r.    Nortliern    Pac.    Ky.   Co. 

(1900),  62  Pac.  1028  673 

Haney  r.  People,  12  Colo.  345  756 

Hankinson  c.  Ciiarlotte,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1893),  41  iS.  C.  1,  19  S.  E. 
206  180,  785 

Hanley    v.  Banks    (1897),  6   Okla. 

79,  51  Pac.  664  909 

Ilanlin  v.  Martin,  53  Cal.  321  010 

Hann  ;;.  Van  Voorhis,  5  Hun,  425        260 
Hanna  v.  Emerson  (1895),  45  Neb. 

708,  04  N.  W.  229  822 

I'.  Jeffersonville,  etc.  R   Co.,  32 

Ind. 113  821 

v.  Reeves   (1900),  22  Wash.  6, 

60  Pac.  62  53 

Hannan  r.  Greenfield  (1899),  36  Ore. 

97,  58  I'ac.  888  689 

Hannegan  v.  Roth  (1896),  12  Wash. 
695,  44  Pac.  256  179,  242,  272,  274, 

413,  417 
Hannibal  &  St.  Jos.  R.  Co.  i-.  Knud- 

son,  62  Mo.  569  439 

V.  Nortoni  (1900),  154  Mo.  142, 

55  S.  AV.  220  364 

Hanning  i*.  Bassett,  12  Bush,  361         575, 

737 
Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ?•.   Stoddard 

(1897),  52  Neb.  745,  73  N.  W.  291  642 
Hansford  v.  Iloldam,  14  Bush,  210  667 
Hanson  v.  Anderson  (1895),  90  Wis. 

195,  62  N.  W.  1055    470,  679,  683 
V.  Cheatovich,  13  Nev.  395  815 

V.  Cruse   (1900),  155  Ind.  176, 

57  N.  E.  904  712 

r.  Vernon,  27  Iowa,  28  118 

Hansteiii  r.  Jolinson  (1893),  112  N.  C. 

253,  17  S.  E.  155  290 

Harbison  v.  Sanford,  90  Mo.  477  369 

Hardcastle  v.  Smithson,  3  Atk.  245       363 
Hardee  v.  Hall.  12  Bush,  327  271 

Harden  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4 

Neb.  321  737 

V.  Corbett,  6  Hun,  522  627,  628 

V.  Lang  (I'.tOO),  110  Ga.  392,  36 

S.  E.  100  887,  918,  928 

Hardin  v.  Emmons  (1898),  24  Nev. 

329,  53  Pac.  854  711 

V.  Helton,  50  Ind.  319  88,  95 

V.  Mullin  (1897),  16  Wash.  647, 

48  Pac.  349  605,  600 

Hardin  County  r.  Wells  (1899),   108 

la.  174,  78  N.  W.  908  802 

Hard  wick    v.    Atkinson    (1899),    8 

Okhi.  008,  58  Pac.  747  787 

r.  Ickler   (1K'.)7),  71    Minn.    25, 

73  N.  W.  519  822 

Hardwood  Log  Co.  r.  Coffin  (1902), 
130  N.  C.  432,  41  S.  E.  931         203,  205 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


XCV 


[the  referencbs  are  to  the  pages.] 


Hardy  v.  Blazer,  29  Ind.  220  289,  311 

;;.  Miles,  91  N.  C.  lol  241 

V.  Milkr,  11  Neb.  395       271,  452,  455 
c.  Mitchell,  67  Ind.  485  260 

V.  Purinston  (1894),  0  S.  D.  382, 

61  N.  \V.  158  752 
Hardy  Implement  Co.  v.  South  Bend 

Iron  Works   (1895),  129  Mo.  222, 
31  S.  W.  590  810 

Hare  v.  Murphy  (1895),  45  Neb.  809, 

64  N.  W. 211  108 

Hares  v.  Strinj^er,  15  Ueav.  206     249,  250 
Hargadine  c.  Gibbons,  45  ]\lo.  App. 

460  203 

Hargadine-McKittrick  Dry  Goods 
Co.  ('.  Warden  (1899),  151  Mo. 
578,  52  S.  W.  593  656 

Hargan  v.  Purdy,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  432     519 
Hargreaves  v.  Tennis  (1901),  63  Neb. 

356,  88  N.  W.  486  946 

Harkey  v.  Tillman,  40  Ark.  551  286 

Harlan  v.  Moore  (1895),  132  Mo.  483, 

34  S.  W.  70  641 

V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  31 

Minn.  427  911 

Harlan  County  v.  Hogsett  (1900),  00 

Neb.  862,  83  N.  W.  171  735 

Harlin  v.  Stevenson,  30  Iowa,  371  341 

Harlow  d.  Hamilton,  6  How.  Pr.  475     603 

V.  Mills,  58  Hun,  391  628 

V.  Mister,  04  Miss.  25  239 

V.  Supreme  Lodge  (1901),  Ky., 

62  S.  W.  1030  507 
Harman  v.  Harman  (1899),  54  S.  C. 

100,  31  S. E.  881  825 

Harney  v.  Charles,  45  Mo.  157  118 

V.  Dutcher,  15  Mo.  89  150 

V.  Indianapolis,  C.  &  D.  R.  Co., 

32  Ind.  244  118 

Harp  V.  Abbeville  Investment   Co. 

(1899),  108  Ga.  108,  33  S.  E.  998         29 
Harpending  v.  Shoemaker,  37  Barb. 

270  648 

Harper  v.  Carroll  (1895),  62  Minn. 

152,  64  N.  W.  145  387 

V.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  365  617 

V.  Pinkston   (1893),   112  N.  C. 

293,  17  S.  E.  101  229 

Harrall  v.  Gray,  10  Neb.  186        20,  37,  38 
Harrell  v.  Davis  (1899),  108  Ga.  789, 

.33  S.  E.  852  191 

V.  Warren  (1898),  105  Ga.  476, 

30  S.  E.  426  309 

Harrington  v.  Bruce,  84  N.  Y.  103     75,  627 
V.  Connor  (1897),  51  Neb.  214, 70 

N.  W.  911  638 

V.  Foley  (1899),  108  la.  287,  79 

N.  W.  64  818 

V.  Eortner,  58  Mo.  468  49 

V.  Higliam,  15  Barb.  524         276,  299 
Harris  v.  Avery,  5  Kan.  146    482,  492,  497 
V.  Bryant,  83  N.  C.  568  240,  343 

V.  Burwell,  65  N.  C.  584     135,878, 

879 
1-.  Frank,  81  Cal.  280  816 


Harris  r.  Ilalverson  (1901),  23  Wash. 

779,  63  Pac.  549  505,  567 

V.  Harris,  61  Ind.  117  193,  219 

r.  HiUegass,  54  Cal.  463  568 

V.  Kasson,  79  N.  Y  381  620 

V.  Randolph  County  Bank 
(1901),  157  Ind.  120,  00 
N.  E.  1025  849,  863,  917 

r.  Rivers,  53  Ind.  216      869,  870,  916 
;;.  Shontz,  1  Mont.  212  739 

V.  Tavlor,  53  Conn.  .500  874 

r.  Todd,  16  Ilnn,  248  611,  027 

V.  Turnbridge,  83  N.  Y.  92  637 

I'.  Vinyard,  42  Mo.  .568  61,  55 

V.  White,  81  N.  Y.  532  791 

V.  Zanone,  93  Cal.  59  575 

Harris  County  v.  Brady  (1902),  115 

Ga.  767,  42  S.  E.  71  661 

Harris  Man.  Co.  v.  Marsh,  49  Iowa, 

11  576 

Harrison  v.  Garrett  (1903),  132  N.  C. 

172,  43  S.  E.  594  664 

r  Juneau  Bk..  17  Wis  340       42,  472 
V.  Martinsville  &  F.  R.  Co.,  16 

Ind.  505  786 

V.  McCormick,  69  Cal.  616  942 

1-.  McCormick  (1898),  122  Cal. 

651,  55  Pac.  592  276 

V.  Pusteoska  (1890),  97  la.  166, 

66  N.  W.  93  588 

V.  State  Banking  &  Trust  Co. 
(1902),  15  S.  D.  304,  89 
N.  W.  477  863,  872 

V.  Stewardson,  2  Hare,  530     26],  351, 
363,  386,  387 
Harrison  Bldg.  Co.  r.  Lackey  (1897), 

149  Ind.  10,  48  N.  E.  254  690 

Harrison  Cy.  Com'rs  v.  McCarty,  27 

Ind.  475  lis 

Harsh  v.  Griffin,  72  Iowa,  608  329 

V.  Morgan,  1  Kan.  293  265,  503 

Harshman   v.    Rose  (1897),  50  Neb. 

113,  69  N.  W.  755  675 

Hart  v.  Accident  Ass'n  (1898),  105 

la.  717,  75  N.  W.  508  671 

V.  Coffee,  4  Jones  Eq.  321       372,  377 
V.  Crawford,  41  Ind.  197  718,  804 

V.  Cundiff,  Stanton's  Code,  61        457 
V.  Metrop.    Elev.    Ry.    Co.,   15 

Daly,  391  196,  525 

V.  Phenix  Ins.   Co.   (1901),  113 

Ga.  8.59,  39  S.  E.  304  819 

V.  Robertson,  21  Cal.  346  196 

V.  Young,  1  Lans.  417  315 

Hart  Lumber  Co.  i'.  Everett  Land 
Co.  (1898),  20  Wash.  71,54 
Pac.  767  689 

V.  Rucker  (1898),  20  Wash.  383, 

55  Pac.  320  638 

Harte  v.  Houchin,  50  Ind.  327       131,  159, 

791,  874,  930 

Ilarter  v.  Crill,  33  Barb.  283  798 

Hartford    Fire    Ins.    Co.    v.    Kahn 

(1893),  4  Wyo.  364,  34  Pac.  895    543, 

565 


XCVl 


TABLE   OF   C.VSES    CITED. 


[the   REFEREXCES   ABE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Hartfoni   Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Landfare 
(l!t<.»2),  ti3  Neb.  559,  i>8  N.  W.  779 
Ilarttorii  Lite  &  Aniiuitv  Ins.  Co.  :: 
Cuniinings  (1897),  50  Neb.  236,  69 
N.  \V.  782 
Hartley  v.  Brown,  46  Cal.  201  03, 

Hartso'n  /•.  Haniin,  40  Cal.  264 
Hartwell  r.  Vage,  14  Wis.  49 
Hartzell  r.  MrC'lursj  (1898),  54  Neb. 

ai3,  74  N.  W.  025  90,  592, 

Harvar.l  r.  Stiles  (1898),  54  Neb.  26, 

74  N.  W.  :;'.I9 
Harvey  v.  K.xclianjjc  Bank  (1896), 
97  la.  187.  GO  N.  W.  152 
r.  Harvev,  4  Beav.  215 
V.  \Vjilke'r,59  Hun,  114 
V.  Wilson,  44  In.l.  231 
Harwell  '•.  Leliman,  72  Ala.  344 
Uarwood  v.   Davenport  (1898),   105 
la.  592,  7o  N.  W.  487 
V.  Kirby,  1  I'aige,  40'.> 
V.  Marve,  8  Cal.  580  326, 

r.  Quinby,  44  Iowa,  385 
Hasbrouck  v.  Bunce,  3  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  309 
Haseltine  v.  Smith  (1900),   154  Mo. 

404,  55  S.  W.  633 
Haslieagen  r.  Speaker,  36  Ind.  413 
Haskell  r.  Haskell,  54  Cal.  262      526, 

/•.  Moore,  29  Cal.  437 
Haskell  Co.  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Santa 
Fe  (1893),  51  Kan.  39,  32  Pac.  624 
458,  499, 
Haslnm  r.  Haslain  (1899),  19  Utah, 

1,  56  I'ac.  243 
Has.-ler  ..-.  Helele  (1898),   151   Ind. 

391,  50  N.  E.  361  276,  278, 

Hastings  >•.  Anacortos  Packing  Co. 

(1902),  2'.*  Wash.  224,  69  Pac.  776 

Hatch  i:  Central  Bank,  78  N.  Y,  487 

1-.  Dana,  101  U.  S.  210 

V.  Leonard    (1901),    165    N.    Y. 

4.35.  59  N.  E.  270 
r.  Thompson    (1895),  67  Conn. 
74,  .34  All.  770 
Hatcher  v.  Briggs,  6  Ore.  31       47, 55, 
HatHeld    >:   Cummings   (1898),    162 

In.l.  280,  50  N.  E.  217 
Hathaway  r.  Baldwin,  17  Wis.  616 
V.  Cincinnatus,  62  N.  Y.  434 
V.  Quinby,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  386 

595,  608, 
r.  Toledo,  etc.  Ky.  Co.,  46  Ind. 
25  ^75, 

HauenRtein  '■.  Kull,  59  How.  Pr.  24 
Hang  V.  Kail  way  Co.  (1898),  8  N.  I). 

23,  77  N.  W.  97 
Hauger  >:   Bonua  (1899),    153   Ind. 

642,  53  N. E.  942 
Haughton  c  Newberry,  09  N.  C.  450 

Haun  r.   Burreil   (1896),  119  N.   C. 

544.  26  S.  E.  Ill 
Haiipt   V.   Burton  (1898),  21  Mont. 

672,  56  Pac.  no 


089 


410 
807 
821 
663 

735 

674 


254 
758 
310 
334 

025 

367 
330 

428 

197 

604 

658 
935 

443, 
501 

942 

301 

604 
636 
355 

584 

832 
942 

685 
758 
155 
574, 
609 

,778 
100 

683 

806 
72, 
286 

783 

100 


Ilaupt  V.  Independent  Tel  Co.  (1900), 

25  Mont.  122,  63  Pac.  1033  639 

Hausman   v.    Mulheran    (1S97),    68 

Minn.  48,  70  N.  W.  866  834 

Ilausniann  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  r.  Komp- 
fert  (1896),  93  Wis.  587,  67  N.  W. 
1136  336 

Havana,  Bk.  of,  v.  Magee,  20  N.  Y. 

355  177 

Hawarden  v.  The  Yonghioghenv  & 
Lehigh  Coal  Co.  (1901),  111  Wis. 
545,  87  N.  W.  474       381,  382,  444,  501, 

523 

Hawk  V.  Thorn,  64  Barb.  164  516 

Hawkins  v.  Borland,  14  Cal.  413    769,  779 

V.  Craig,  1  B   Mon.  27  254,  261 

r.  Donnerherg   (1901),  40   Ore. 

97,  66  Pac.  691  821 

V.  Hawkins,  1  Hare,  543  249 

1-.  Overstrcet     (1898),    7     Okla. 

277,  54  Pac.  472  25 

Hawley  v.  Bank   (1896),  97   la.  187, 

66  N.  W.  1.52  107 

r.  Favetteville,  82  N.  C.  22  310 

r.  Wilkinson,  18  Minn.  525  660 

Hawley  Bios.  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Brownstone  (1899),  123  Cal.  643, 
56  Pac.  4(18  915 

Hawse  r.  Burgmere,  4  Colo.  313  609 

Hawthorne  c.  State  (1895),  45  Neb. 

871,  64  N.  W.  359  709 

Hay  V.  I  lav,  13  Hun,  315  482,  519 

V.  Siiort,  40  Mo.  139       844,  861,  911, 

913,  940 

Haycock  v.  Haycock, 2  Ch.  Cas.  124    242, 

244,  347 
Hay  den  r.  Pearce  (1898),  33  Ore.  89, 

52  Pac.  1049  456,  498 

Hayes  v.  Candee  (1902),  75   Conn. 

131.  52  Atl.  826  619 

V.  Hill,  17  Kan.  360  378 

I'.  Lavagnino    (1898),   17    Utah, 

185,  53  Pac.  1029  821 

Haygood  v.  Boney   (1894),  43  S.  C. 

63,  20S.  E.  803  868,910 

Haynes  r.  Harris.  33  Iowa,  516     219,  241 
r.  Spokane  Chronicle  Pub.  Co. 
(1895),    11    Wash.   503,   39 
Pac.  969  799 

Hays  r.  Crist,  4  Kan.  350  202 

r.  Crutcher,  54  Ind.  260  295 

V.  Dennis  (1895),  11  Wash.  360, 

39  Pac.  658  543 

V.  Hathorne,  74  N.  Y.  486  93 

t;.  McLain   (1899),  66  Ark.  400, 

50  S.  W.  1006  906,  925,  928 

V.  Miller,  12  Ind.  187  439 

Ilavsler  i-.  Dawson,  28  Mo.  App.  631  97 
Ha'yward  r.  Stearns,  39  Cal.  58  326,  333 
Haywood  r.  Ovey,  6  Mad.  113  377 

Hazard  v.  Duraiit,  19  Fed.  Hep.  471 
Hazleton  v.  Union  Bank,  32  Wis.  34    592, 

596,  598 
H.  B.  C.Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1895),  145  N.  Y.  .390,  40  N.  E.  86      375 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


XCVll 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


II.  B.  Claflin  Co.  v.  Simon  (1898),  18 

Utah,  153,  55  Pac.  370  659,  790 

Heacock  v.  Heacock  (1899),  108  la. 

540,  79  N.  W.  353  233 

Headington  v.  Smith  (1901),  113  la. 

107,  84  N,  W.  982  871 

Healy  v.  O'Brien,  66  Cal.  517  782 

In  re  Healy 's  Estate  (1902),  137  Cal. 

474,  70  Pac.  455  345 

Hearst  c.  Hart  (1900),  128  Cal.  327, 

60  Pac.  846  669 

Heartman  u.  Franks,  86  Ark.  501  99 

Hearty  u.  Klinkhammer,  39  Minn. 

488  304 

Heaston   v.  Cincinnati   &  Ft.  W.  Jl. 

Co.,  16  Ind.  275  786,  792 

Heath  v.  Heath,  31  Wis.  223  821 

V.  Morgan  (1895),  117  N.  C.  504, 

23  S.  E.  489  314,  681 

V.  Silverthorn  Min.  Co.,  39  Wis. 

146  334,  499 

V.  White,  3  Utah,  474  753 

Heaton  v.  Dearden,  16  Beav.  147  242 

Heavenridge  v.  Mondy,  34  Ind.  28       181, 

147,  660 
Heavilon  ;'.  Heavilon,  29  Ind.  509  65 

Heclit  V.  Caugron,46  Ark.  132  112 

V.  Snook  (1902),  114  Ga.  921,41 

S.  E.  74  914,  918 

V.  Stanton  (1895),  6  Wyo.  84,  42 

Pac.  749  624 

Heckman  v.  Swartz,  55  Wis.  173  920 

V.  Swett  (1893),  99  Cal.  303,  33 

l^ac.  1099  365 

Hecla  Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Gisborn 

(1899),  21  Utah,  68,  59  Pac.  518         587 
Hector    Min.    Co.    v.    Valley    View 
Min.  Co.   (1901),  28  Colo.  315,  64 
Pac.  205  816 

Hedees  r.  Pollard  (1899),  149  Mo. 

216,  50  S.  W.  781 

Heebner  v.  Shepard   (1895),  5  N.  T>. 

56,  63  N.  W.  892  910 

Heegaard  v.  Dakota  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.  (1893),  3  S.  D.  569,  54  N.  W. 
656  638 

Heenev  v.  Kilbane  (1899),  59  O.  St. 

499,  53  N.  E.  262  •  680 

Heermans  v.  Robertson,  64  N.  Y.  332      49 
Hees  V.  Nellis,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  118     178, 

213 
Heffernan  v.  Howell,  90  Mo.  844  820 

Hefner  v.  Urton,  71  Cal.  479  337 

Hegard  v.  Cal.  Ins.  Co.,  11  Pac,  Rep. 

594  665 

Hegier  v.  Eddy,  53  Cal.  597     801,  811, 816 
Heidel  v.  Benedict  (1894),  61  Minn. 

170,  63  N.  W.  490  717 

Heidenreich  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (1894), 

26  Ore.  70,  37  Pac.  64  818 

Heigel  v.  Willis,  3  N.  Y.  Suppl.  497      921 
Heilbron  v.  King's  River  &  F.  Canal 

Co.,  76  Cal.  11  942 

Heimstreet  r.  Winnie,  19  Iowa,  480    326, 

333,  334 


Heine  r.  Meyer,  61  N.  Y.  171  940 

HcinmuUer  r.  Gray,  13  Abb.  Pr.  N.  s. 

299  301 

Helena  Nat.  Bank  v.  Tel.  Co.  (1898), 

20  Mont.  379,  51  Pac.  829  608 

Hellams  v.  Prior  (1902),  04  S.  C.  296, 

548,  48S.  E.  25  179 

r.  Switzer,  24  S.  C.  39     189,  196,  216 
Heller  r.  Dverville  Mfg.  Co.  (1897), 

116  Cal.  127,  47  Pac.  1010  594 

Hellstern  r.  Katzor  (1899),  103  Wis. 

391,  79  N.  W.  429  518 

Helm  r.  Hardin,  2  B.  Mon.  232  251,  351 
Helman  v.  Withers,  30  N.  E.  Rep  5  280 
Helmer  v.  Yetzer  (1894),  92  la.  027, 

61  N.  W.  206  849,  863 

Helms  (;.  Harclerode  (1902),  65  Kan. 

736,  70  Pac.  866  930 

Helphrey    r.    Strobach    (1895),    13 

Wasli.  128,  42Pac.  537  043 

Heman  v.  Glann  (1895),  129  Mo.  325. 

31  S.  W^  589  608,  640 

Hembrock  v.  Stark,  53  Mo.  588  911 

Hemine  v.  Hays,  55  Cal.  337  713 

Hemmings  v.  Doss  (1899),  125  N.  C. 

400,  34^S.  E.  511  714 

Henderson  v.  Dickey,  50  Mo.  151     20,  29, 
31,87,61,477 
V.  Henshall,  54  Fed.  Rep.  320 
V.  Keutzer  (1898)  50  Neb.  400, 

70  N.  W.  881  816 

V.  Tiirngren  (1894),  9  Utah,  432, 

35  I'ac.  495  271,  606 

Hendon    v.   North    Carolina    R.    R. 

Co.  (1900),  127  N.  C.  110,  37  S.  E. 

155  665 

Hendrick  r.  Lindsay,  93  U.  S.  143         105 

Hendricks  v.  Decker,  35  Barb.  298      769, 

804 

V.  Robinson,  2  Johns.  Ch.  283        .392 

Hendrix  v.  Gore,  8  Ore.  406  791 

;;.  Money,  1  Bush,  306  387 

Hendry  v.  Hendry,  32  Ind.  349      455,  934 

Henke  v.  Eureka  Endowment  Ass'n 

(1893),  100  Cal.  429,  34  Pac.  1089    565, 

600 
Henkle.     See  Hinkle. 
Henley  v.  Stone,  3  Beav.  355  379 

V.  Wilson,  77  N.  C.  216  594 

V.  Wilson  (1902),  137  Cal.  278, 

70  Pac.  21  313 

Hennessey   v.   Paulsen    (1895),  147 

N.  Y.  255,  41  N.  E.  516  285 

Hennessy  v.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins. 
Co.  (1902),  74  Conn.  699,  52  Atl. 
490  825 

Henricus  v.  Englert,  83  N.  E.  Rep. 

550  104 

Henry  v.  Cass  Cv.  Mill,  etc.  Co.,  42 

Iowa,  3.3  428 

V.  Earl,  8  Mees.  &  W.  228  701 

V.  Henry,  3  Robt.  614       525,  890,  920 
V.  Marvin,  3  E.  D.  Smith,  71  649 

V.  Mt.  Pleasant  Tp.,  70  Mo.  500    205 
V.  Sneed,  99  Mo.  407  065 


XCVIU 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[tqi  references  arb  to  the  pages.] 


Henshaw   v.  Salt   Kiver  Canal  Co. 

(1S98).  Ariz.,  54  Tac.  577 
Ilensley  r.  Whiffin,  54  Iowa,  555 
Hentz  c.  Miner,  58  Hun,  428 
Heppe  i:  Johnson.  73  Cal.  265 
Herbert   c.  Wortendvke   (1896),   49 

Neb.  182.  6!^  N.  W.  350 
Herbst    Importing    Co.     v.     Hogan 
(1895),  16  Mont.  384,  41  Pac.  lo5 
Hereth  i-.  Smith,  33  Ind.  514  95,  791 , 

814 
Herman  J'.  Citv  of  Oconto  (1898),  100 

Wis.  "391,  70  N.  W.  364    116,  149 
f.  Felthoiisen  (1902),   114  Wis. 
42;3,  90  N.  W.  432 
Hermiston  i:  Green  (1898),  11  S.  D. 

81.  75  X.  W.  819 
Herrick  r.  Ward  well  (1898).  58  O. 
St.  294,  50  N.  I-:.  903 
r.  Woolverton,  41  N.  Y.  581 
Herring  c.  Xeely,  43  Iowa,  157 

V.  Yoe,  1  Atk.  290 
Herrine-lIall-Marvin    Co.   v.   Smith 

(1903),  43  Ur*!.  315.  72  Pac.  704 
Herrington  v.  Robertson,  71  N.  Y. 

280 
Ilerron  >:  Cole.  25  Xeb.  692 
Herschfield  v.  Aiken,  3  Mont.  442 
Ilervey  i-.  Saverv.  48  Iowa,  313 
Hess  1-.  Adler  (1900),  67  Ark.  444, 
55  S.  W.  843 
<■.  Union  State  Bank  (1900),  156 

Ind.  523,  60  N.  E.  305 
I'.  Young,  59  Ind.  379  575,  918 

Hession  v.  Linastruth  (1895),  96  la. 

483,  05  X.  W.  399  666 

Heusinkveid  r.  Capital  Ins.  Co.  (1895), 

95  la.  504,  04  N.  W.  594  689 

lleutig  r.  S.  W.  Mut.  Benev.  Ass.,  45 

Kan.  462  499 

Hewett  V.  Swift,  3  Allen,  420  306 

Hewlett  V.  Owens,  51  Cal.  570       200,  202 
Hevdenfeldt    c.   Jacobs    (1895),    107 

Cal.  373,  40  Pac.  492 
Heyer  >:  Rivenbark  (1901),  128  N.  C. 

270,  38  S.  E.  875 
1  lev  wood  r.  Huffalo,  14  N.  Y.  534 


511 
333 

811 
402 

819 

599 


467 
619 


137 

18,  667 

255 

735 

37 

94 

665 

942 

664 

773 


11.  Feltman  Co.  r.  Tiiompson  (1900), 
Ky.,  58  S.  W.  693 
(lit  r.  Town  of   Darlington  (1898), 
152  Ind.  570,  53  X.  E.  825  719, 


752 

822 
37 


641 


Ilifitt 

1 
Hil.bard  r.  Trask  (1903),  —  Ind.  — , 

67  N.  E.  179 
Hibben  V.  Soyer,  33  Wis.  319 
Hibernia  Savings  and   Loan  Society 
r.  ('hurciiili  (litOO),  128  Cal. 
'■-33,  61  Pac.  278 
f.  Herbert,  53  Cal.  375 
p.  Ordway.  3H  Cal.  679  457,  458 

Hichcns  >:  Kelly,  2  Sm.  &  G.  264  239 

Hickman  v.  Link,  97  Mo.  482  781 

Hickory  County  >:  Fugate  (1898),  143 

Mo.  71,  44  S.  W.  7H9  543,  670 

Hickox  i:  Elliott,  10  Sawy.  415  253, 

340 


744 

702 

784 


417 
329 


Hicks  r.  Ream  (1893),  112  N.  C.  642, 

17  S.  E.  490  180,  785 

V.  Doty,  4  Bush,  420  101 

1-.  Drew  (1897),  117  Cal.  305,  49 

Pac.  189  798 

V.  Hamilton  (1898),  144  Mo.  495, 

46  S.  W.  432  108 

V.  Reigle,  32  Ind.  360  786 

V.  Sheppard,  4  Lans.  335  46,  886 

V.  Southern  Ry.   (1902),  03  S.  C. 

559,  41  S.  E.  753  612 

r.  Whitmore,  12  Wend.  548  116 

Hicksville  &  C.  S.  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Long 

Island  R.  Co.,  48  Barb.  355  886 

Hier  v.  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing 
Ass'n  (1900),  60  Neb.  320, 
83  N.  W.  77  934 

V.  Grant,  47  N.  Y.  278      769,  773,' 779 
r.  Staples,  51  N.  Y.  136  271,  315 

Higbee  v.  Trumbauer  (1900),  112  la. 

74,  83  N.  W.  812  668 

Higert  v.  Trustees,  53  Ind.  326  684 

Higgins  V.  Crichton,  11  Daly,  114         499 

i:  Germaine,  1  Mont.  230      579,  584, 

734,  753 

V.  Havden  (1897),  53  Xeb.  61,  73 

X.  W.  280  626 

V.  Jeffersonville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 

Ind.  110  575 

V.  Senior,  8  M.  &  W.  834  116,  152 

r.  Wortel,  18  Cal.  330  754 

High  r.  Worley,  32  Ala.  709  261 

Higler  v.  Eddy,  53  Cal.  597  807 

Higley  v.  Burlington,  etc.  Rj'.  Co. 
(1896),  99  la.  503,  68  N.  W. 
829  702 

v.  Gilmer,  3  Mont.  90  575 

Hildebrand  v.  Tarbell  (1897),  97  Wis. 

446,  73  X.  W.  53  655 

Hiles  V.  Johnson,  67  Wis.  517  517 

V.  Rule  (1893),  121  Mo.  248,  25 

S.  W.  959  371 

Hill  r.  Adams,  2  Atk.  39  378 

r.  Barrett,  14  H.  Mon.  83     71,  72,  544 
V.  Butler,  6  ( )hio  St.  207  860,  923 

V.  Campbell  Commission  Co. 
(1898),  54  Xeb.  59,  74  N.  W. 
388  566,  688 

V.  Dade  (1900),  08  Ark.  409,  59 

S.  W.  39  347 

V.  Davis,  3  N.  II.  884  649 

V.   Den   (1898),    121    Cal.   42,  53 

Pac.  642  433 

V.  Duraiid,  50  Wis.  354  350 

V.  Fairhaven,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1902),  75  Conn.  177,  52  Atl. 
725  682,  683 

V.   Frink   (1805),    11  Wash.  562, 

40  Pac.  128  942 

r.  Gibbs,  5  Hill,  56  195 

'     V.  (iolden,  16  15.  Mon.  551  874 

V.  Groesbeck  (1901),  29  Colo.  161, 

67  Pac.  167  831 

V.  Hill  (1893),  24  Ore.  416,  33  Pac. 

809  785 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


XCIX 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Hill  V.  Lewis,  45  Kan.  162  373 

V.  Livingston  Cv.  Sup.,  12  N.  Y. 

52  '  155,  310 

V.  Marsh,  46  Ind.  216      174,  177,  204, 
209,  270 
V.  Meyer  Bros.  Drug  Co.  (1807), 

140  Mo.  A?,Z,  41  S.  W.  OOU       817 
V.  Perrott,  3  Taunt.  274  652 

V.  Ragland  (1002),  —  Ky.  — ,  70 

S.  W.  634  593 

V.  Road  Sup.,  10  Ohio  St.  621         622 
V.  Rosselle,  6  Hun,  631  316 

V.  Smith,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  473  256 

V.  Townley,  45  j\Iinn.  167  329 

V.  Walsh  (1804),  6  S.  I).  421,  61 

N.  W.  440  713,  733 

V.  Wilson  (1899),  8  N.  D.  309,  79 

N.  W.  150  675 

Hillhouse    v.    Jennings    (1901),  60 

S.  C.  373,  38  S.  E.  599         606,  783,  818 
Hillman   v.  Allen    (1898),   145  Mo. 

638,  47  S.  W.  509  783 

V.  Hillman,  14  How.  Pr.  456  225,  660 
V.  Mcwington,  57  Cal.  56  301 

Hills  V.  Barnard,  152  Mass.  67 
V.  McRae,  9  Hare,  297 
V.  Nash,  1  Phil.  594 
V.  Putnam,  152  Mass.  123 
V.  Sherwood,  48  Cal.  386 


372 
248,  250 
387 
46,241, 
259,  260 
Hilton  V.  Hilton's  Adm'r  (1901),  110 

Ky.  522,  62  S.  W.  6         444,  498 
V.  Lothrop,  46  Me.  297  379 

V.  Waring,  7  Wis.  492  97 

Himes  v.  Jarrett,  2  S.  E.  Rep.  393         499 
Hincliman    i'.  Point    Defiance    Ry. 
Co.  (1896),  14  Wash.  349,  44  Pac. 
152  619 

Hinckley  ;;.  Smith,  51  N.  Y.  21  315 

Hindman   v.  Eilgar  (1888),  24  Ore. 

581,  17  Pac.  862  825 

Hinds  V.  Tweddle,  7  How.  Pr.  278       648, 

649 

Hinkle  v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa,  355      216, 

453,  457,  520 

V.  Margerura,  50  Ind.  240  47,  52, 

439,886,  908 

V.  San  Francisco  &  N.  P.  R.  Co., 

55  Cal.  627  620 

Hinman  i\  Bowen,  5  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

234  111 

Hinson  ;;.  Adrian,  86  N.  C.  61  334 

Hinton  v.  Pritchard,  102  N.  C.  94  52 

Hintrager  v.  Richter,  52  N.  W.  Rep. 

188  I'S? 

Hirsch  V.  Mayer  (1901),  165  N.  Y. 

236,  59  N.  E.  89  410 

Hirsheld   v.   Fitzgerald    (1898),  157 

N.  Y.  166,  51  N.  E.  997  102 

V.  Weill  (1898),  121  Cal.  13,  53 

Pac.  402  662 

Hirshfeld  v.  Bopp  (1895),  145  N.  Y. 

84,  .39  N.  E.  817  686 

Hirst    r.    Ringen    Real   Estate   Co. 
(1902),  169  Mo.  194,  69  S.  W.  368     684 


Hitchcock  r.  Baughan,  44  Mo.  App. 

42  940 

Hitc   V.    Metropolitan    St.    Ry.   Co. 

( 1895),  130  Mo.  132,  31  S.  W.  262     614 
Hixon  V.  Gurge,  18  Kan.  253  702 

Hoagland  i\  Han.  &  St.  Jos.  R.  Co., 

39  Mo.  451  455,  522 

r.  Van  Etten,  23  Neb.  462  98 

Honglin  v.  Henderson  (1903),  119  la. 

720,  94  N.  W.  247  871 

Hobart  v.  Abbott,  2  P.  Wnis.  643         379 
V.  Frost,  5  Duer,  672  181 

Hobbs  V.  Bland   (1899),  124  N.   C. 

284,  32  S.  E.  683  911 

V.  Duff,  23  Cal.  596  936 

Hobson  V.  Cummins  (1899),  57  Neb. 

611,  78  N.  VV.  295  822 

V.  Ogden,  16  Kan.  388  637 

Hockaday  v.   Drve  (1898),  7  Okla. 

288,  54  Pac.  495  410 

Hocks  V.  Sprangers  (1902),  113  Wis. 

123,  87  Pac.  1101  643 

Hocutt  r.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1899),  121  N.  C.  214,  32  S.  E. 
681  191 

Hodgdon  v.  Heidman,  QQ  Iowa,  645     329 
Hodge  V.  Sawyer,  34  \\'is.  397  636 

Hodges  V.  Kimball,  49  Iowa,  577  412 

V.  Nalty  (1899),    104  Wis.  464. 

80N.  W.  726     117,381,382,384, 
386,  392,  398,  399 
V.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co.,  105 

N.  C.  170  522 

Hodgman   v.   Chicago    &   St.  P.  R. 

Co.,  28  Minn.  48  119 

Hodgson,  Re,  L.  R.  31  Ch.  D.  177         372 
Hodowal  ('.  Yearous  (1897),  103  la. 

32,  72  N.  W.  294  6 

Hoester  v.  Sammelmann,  101  Mo.  619  575 

Hoffa  V.  Hoffman,  33  Ind.  172        909,  910 

Hoffman  v.  Eppers,  41  Wis.  251  730 

V.   Hoffman's  Executor  (1894), 

126  Mo.  486,  29  S.  W.  603      470 
V.  McCracken  (1902),  168  Mo. 

337,  67  S.  W.  878  605 

Hoffmann  v.  Koppelkora,  8  Neb.  344    611 
V.  Wheelock,  62  Wis.  434       457,  499 
Ilofmann  r.  Tucker  (1899),  58  Neb. 

457,  78  N.  W.  941  625 

Hogan  V.  Black,  66  Cal.  41  140 

V.  Shorb,  24  Wend.  458  877 

r.  Shuart,  11  Mont.  498  940 

Hogendobler  v.  Lvon,  12  Kan.  276        209 

Hogueland    v.  Arts    (1901),  113  la. 

634,  85  N.  \V.  818  646 

Holbrook  v.  N.  J.  Zinc.  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 

616  126 

Ilolcraft  V.  Mellott,  57  Ind.  539  713 

Holden  i\  Great  Western  Elevator 
Co.  (1897).  69  Minn.  527,  72 
N.  W.  805  674 

V.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  Bk.,  72  N.  Y. 

286  154,  238 

Holdridge  v.  Sweet,  23  Ind.  118  310, 

325,  331 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  references 

Holeran  i-.  Scliool  Dist.,  10  Neb.  406    499 

Holgate  r.  Broome,  8  Minn.  243  933 

c.  Downer  (1899),  8  Wyo.  334, 

57  Pac.  918  607,  875 
Holland  r.  Baker.  3  Hare,  68         351,  363 

v.  Drake,  "29  i)!)io  St.  441  340 

V.  Johnson,  51  Ind.  346  46,  52 

V.  Oregon  81iurt  Line  U.  R.  Co. 
(1903),  —  Utah  — ,  72  Pac. 
940  817 

Hollenbeck  r.  Clow,  9  How.  Pr.  289      831 
Hollidav  r.  Hrown.  33  Neb.  657  317 

l:  MoMullan,  83  N.  C.  270      872,  918 
HoUings  r.  Bankers'  Union  (1902), 

63  S.  C.  192,  41  S.  E.  90  819 
Hollingswortii    r.    Howard    (1901), 

1 13  Ga.  1099,  39  S.  E.  465  307 

r.  Moulton,  53  Hun.  91  150 

r.  Swedenbortr,  49  Ind.  378  220 
1-.  Warnock  (19(11),  112  Ky.  96, 

65  S.  W.  163  832,  834 

HolHster   ;•.   Bell   (1900),  107   Wis. 

198,  83  N.  W.  297  20,  312 

V.  Hubbard  (1899),  US.  D.  461, 

78  N.  W.  949  104 
Hollmann  r.  Lange  (1898),  143  Mo. 

100,  44  S.  W.  752  626 
Holman  v.  De  Lin  (1897),  30  Ore. 

428,  47  Pac.  708  603 

Holmberg  >:  Dean,  21  Kan.  73      781,  805 

Holmes  i-.  Abbott,  53  Hun,  617  494 

V.  Bovd,  90  Ind.  332  150 

V.  Davis,  21  Barb.  265  516 

V.  Fond  du  Lac,  42  Wis.  282  228 

r.  Kring,  93  Mo.  452  781 
V.  Lincoln  Salt  Lake  Co.  (1899), 

58  Neb.  74,  78  N.  W.  379  816 
V.  Richet,  56  Cal.  307  865 
V.  Williams,  16  Minn.  164,  168  504, 

517,  595,  605,  608 
Holt  r.  Pearson  (1895),  12  Utah,  63, 

41  Pac.  560  594 

Ilolt    County    Bank    r.    Holt    Co. 

( 1898),  53  Neb.  827,  74  N.  W.  259  543 
Holter   Hardware    Co.    r.    Ontario 

-Mining  Co.  (1900),  24  Mont.  184, 

01  Pac.  3  645 

Holton  r.  Waller  (1895),  95  la.  545, 

64  N.  W.  6.33  625 
Holtz  >:   Hanson    (1902),   115  Wis. 

2.36,  91  N.  W.  663  593 

Holwersun  r.  St    Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 

(1!H)0).  157  Mo.  216,  57  S.  W.  770     689 
Holzbauer  >■.  Heine.  37  Mo.  443    861,  873 
Home    Fire    In.s.     Co.    ?•.    Arthur 
(1K90),  48  Neb.  401,  07  N.  W. 
440  543 

V.  Berg  (1890).  46  Neb.  600,  05 

N.  \V.  780  793 

V.  Decker   (1898),  55  Neb.  346, 

75  X.  W.  841  832,  833 

V.  Johansen  (18(K^),59  Neb.  349, 

80  N.  W.  1047  794 

V.  Murray  (1894).  40  Neb.  001, 

59  N.  W.  102  638 


ARE  TO  THE   PAGES.] 

Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(1893),  19  Colo.  46,  34  Pac.  281  40 

Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gilman,  112  Ind.  7    172, 

173,207 
Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Oregon  Rv. 

&  Nav.  Co.,  20  Ore.  569  '       217 

Homer  r.  Bank  of  Commerce  (1897), 

140  Mo.  225,  41  S.  W.  790  131 

Hood  V.  Cal.  Wine  Co.,  4  Wash.  88      310 
v.    Nicholson    (1896),    137    Mo. 

400,  38  S.  W.  1U95  592,  594 

Hook  r.  Craighead,  ."2  Mo.  405  792 

V.  Garfield  Coal  Co.  (1900), 
112  la.  210,  83  N.  W. 
963  158 

r.  Turner,  22  Mo.  333  783 

V.  White,  36  Cal.  299  767 

Hooker  r.  Green,  50  Wis.  271  830 

Hooper  r.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

27  Wis.  91  149 

Hoosier    Stone   Co.    v.  McCain,  31 

N.  E.  956  748 

Hoover   v.  Donnally,  3  Hen.  &  M. 

316  255 

Hope  L.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Taylor,  2  Robt. 

278  153 

Hopewell  v.  McGrew  (1897),  50  Neb. 

789,  70  N.  W.  397  606 

Hopf  V.  U.  S.  Baking  Co.,  21  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  589  636,  637 

Hopkins  r.  Contra  Costa  Co.  (1895), 

106  Cal.  566,  39  Pac.  933         658 
v.   Dipert   (1901),  11  Okla.  630, 

69  Pac.  883  779,  825 

V.  Gilman,  22  Wis.  481  633,  942 

V.  Lane,  87  N.  Y.  501  881 

V.  Orcutt,  51  Cal.  537  614 

V.  Organ,  15  Ind.  188  310 

V.  Warner  (1895),  109  Cal.  133, 

41  Pac.  868  326.  327,  328 

V.  Washington  Cotmty  (1898), 

56  Neb.  596,  77  N.W.  53  11 

Hopkinson  v.  Lee,  6  Q.  B.  971 
Hoppe  V.  Fountain  (1894),  104  Cal. 

94,  37  Pac.  894  337,  418 

Hopper  r.  Hopper  (1901),  61  S.  C. 

124,  .39  S.  E.  366  801 

Iloppough    v.    Struble,    60    N.    Y. 

430  49,  50 

Hopwood  V.  Patterson,  2  Ore.  49  829 

Horbach    v.  Marsh   (1893),  37  Neb. 

22,  55  N.  W.  286  639 

Ilord  V.  Bradbury  (1900),  156  Ind. 

.30,  59  N.  E.  31  14 

V.  Chandler,  13  B.  Mon.  403      71,  457 
Horkey  v.  Kendall   (1898),  53  Neb. 

522,  73  N.  W.  953  768 

Horn  V.  (^hicago  &  N.  W.  Rv.  Co.,  38 

Wis.  463  576 

V.  Ludington,  32  Wis.  73  37,  544, 

548,  559,  596 
V.  Volcano  Water  Co.,  13  Cal. 

02  409,  426 

Hornby  v.  Gordon,  9  Bosw.  656    417,  418, 

419 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 
[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Horner  v.  Bramwell  (189fi),  23  Colo. 

238,  47  Pac.  402  375 

V.  IMcConnell    (1002),  158   Ind. 

280,  63  N.  E.  472  686 

Hornisli  v.  Ringen  Stove  Co.  (1902), 

116  la.  1,  89  N.  W.  95  191 

Horsley  v.  Fawcett,  11  Beav.  565    252, 253 
Horstkotte  v.  Menier,  50  Mo.  158  3/5 

Horton  v.  Pintchunck  (1900),  110  Ga. 

355,  35  S.  E.  663  921 

V.  Ruhling,  3  Nev.  498  810 

V.  Smith  (1902),  115  Ga.  66,  41 

S.  E.  253  641 

Hortzell  i:  McClurg  (1898),  54  Neb. 

313,  74  N.  W.  625  802 

Hoskins    v.    Southern     Nat.    Bank 

(1903),  Kv.,  73  S.  W.  786  709 

Hosley  v.  Black,  28  N.  Y.  438       271,  584, 

587 
V.  Wisconsin  Odd  Fellows  Mu- 
tual Life  Ins.  Co.  (1893),  86 
Wis.  463,  57  N.  W.  48  462 

Hotaling  v.    Tecuraseh    Nat.    Bank 

(1898),  55  Neb.  5,  75  N.  W.  242         887 
Hough   V.  Grant's   Pass   Power  Co. 
(1902),  41  Ore.  531,69  Pac. 
655  682 

V.  Hough  (1894),  25  Ore.  218,  35 

Pac.  249  466 

Houghton  r.  Allen,  75  Cal.  102  337 

V.  Lvnch,  13  Minn.  85  151 

V.  Townsend,  8  How.  Pr.  447  541 

House  V.  Dexter,  9  Mich.  246  360 

V.  Lowell,  45  Mo.  381  455,  458 

V.  Marshall,  18  Mo.  368  935 

V.  Meyer  (1893),  100  Cal.  592,  35 

Pac.  308  673,  681,  682 

Houston  V.  Blackinan,  66  Ala.  559         360 
r.  Levy's  Ex.,  44  N.  .J.  Eq.  6  347 

Houts  V.  Bartle  (1901),  14  S.  D.  322, 

85  N.  W.  591  643 

Hovland  v.  Burrows  (1893),  38  Neb. 

119,  56  N.  W.  800  825 

Howard  v.  Johnston,  82  N.  Y.  271         908 
V.  Seattle  Nat.  Bank  (1894),  10 

Wash.  280,  38  Pac.  1040  666 

y.  Shores,  20  Cal.  277  936 

V.  Singleton  (1893),  94  Ky.  336, 

22  S.  W.  337  63,  161 

?'.  Tlirockmorton,  48    Cal.   482, 

490  735 

r.  Tiffany,  3  Sandf.  695  541 

Howard  Iron  Works  i:  Buffalo  Ele- 
vating Co.  (1903),  176  N.  Y.  1,  68 
N.  E.  66  867 

Howe  V.  Gregg  (1897),  52  S.  C.  88, 

29  S.  E.  394  351 
V.  Harper  (1900),  127  N.  C.  356, 

37  S.  E.  505  179 

V.  Northern  Pac.  Rv.  Co.  (1902), 

30  Wash  569,  70  Pac.  1100     302 
V.  Peckham,  10  Barb.  656        476,  497 

Howell  V.  Howell,  15  Wis.  55  821 

Howe  Machine  Co.  v.  Reber,  66  Ind. 
489  908 


Howes  r.  Racine,  21  Wis.  514 
Howie   r.  Bratrud  (1901),  14  S.  D. 

648,  86  N.  W.  747 
Howland  r.  Fish,  1  Paige,  20 
V.  Howland,  20  Hun,  472 
V.  Jeuel  (1893),  55  Minn.  102,  56 

N.  W.  581 
V.  Needham,  10  Wis.  495  71, 

Howland  Coal,  etc.  Works  v.  Brown, 

13  Bush,  681 
Ilowse  V.  Moody,  14  Fla.  59,  449 


CI 


118 

600 
254 
226 

674 
633 

665 

374,  473, 

502 


Howsmon    v.    Trenton    Water    Co. 
(1893),  119  Mo.  304,  24  S.  W.  784 

Ilowtli 


106, 
107 

343, 
348 


Owens,  29  Fed.  Rep.  722 
34 
Hoxsie  V.  Kempton  (1899),  77  Minn. 

462,  80  N.  W.  353  703 

Hoye  i\  Raymond,  25  Kan.  665  499 

Hoyer  r.  Ludington  (1898),  100  Wis. 

441,  76  N.  W.  348  565,  567 

Hoyt  V.  Beach  (1897),  104  la.  257,  73 
N.  W.  492 
r.  McNeil,  13  Minn.  390 
Hubbard  v.  Burrell,  41  Wis.  365 


710 
821 
211, 
251 

277 


612 


118 


340 

310 

51 

49 

639 


V.  Gurney,  64  N.  Y.  457 

V.  Haley  (1897),  96  Wis.  578,  71 

N.  W.  1036 
V.  Johnson  Cy.  Sup.,  23  Iowa, 

130 

V.  Moore,  132  Ind.  178  375 

Hubbell  V.  Lerch,  58  N.  Y.  2.37      197,  504 

«      i>.  Medburv,  53  N.  Y.  98  149,261 

V.  Meigs,  50  N.  Y.  480  301,  523 

V.  Merchants'  Bk.  of  Sj'racuse, 

42  Hun,  200 
V.  Skiles,  16  Ind.  138 
V.  Von  Schoening,  49  N.  Y.  330 
Hubble  I'.  Vaughan,  42  Mo.  138 
Hubenka  v.  Vach  (1902),  64  Neb.  170, 

89  N.  W.  789 
Huber  v.  Egner  (1901),  Ky.,  61  S.  W. 

353  137,  933 

Hubler  v.  PuUen,  9  Ind.  273  801 

Huckelbridge  v.  Atcheson,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  (1903),  66  Kan.  443,  71  Pac. 
814  642,  819 

Hudelson  >;.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1897), 

51  Neb.  557,  71  N.  W.  304      605, 
684,  688,  802 
V.   First   Nat.    Bank  (1898),  56 

Neb.  247,  76  N.  W.  570        613, 
718 
Hudson  V.  Archer  (1893),  4  S.  D.  128, 

55  N.  W.  1099  149,  666,  713 

V.  Atchison  Cy.  Coni'rs,  12  Kan. 

140  265 

V.  Baratt  (1901),  62  Kan.  137,  61 

Pac.  737  96,  102,  646 

V.  Caryl,  44  N.  Y.  553  29,  30 

V.  Eisenmayer  Milling,  etc.  Co., 

79  Tex. 401  351 

V.  McCartney,  33  Wis.  331  621 


Cll 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  references 
Hudson  V.  Scottish  Union  Ins.  Co. 
(UK)l),    110    Kv.    7-J2,    62 
S.  \V.  513 
V.  Wabash  W.  Ky.  Co.,  101  Mo. 

lo 
Ilueston  1-.  Mississippi  &  liuni  River 

Boom  Co.  (180'.*),  70  Minn.   251, 

T'.i  X.  \V.  92 
llulT.iiverc.  Nat.  Bank.  12  Busli,  287 
liuffinim  r.   Knitjiit  (1900),  36  Ore. 

581,  00  I'lic.  207 
llufnagel   c.  Mt.  Vernon,  49   Hun, 

2b0 
Hughes  t:  Boone,  81  N.  C.  204 


54i 


466 

758 


470 


225 
173,  219, 

248 


Co. 
30 


52,78 


1-.  Chicaco  &  Alton   R.   R 
(1894),    127    xMo.    447 
S.  W.  127 
V.  Davis,  40  Cal.  117 
V.  Diinlap,  91  Cal.  385 
r.  Uav  (1903),  132  N.  C.  50,  43 

S".  E.  539 
r.  Ilunner  (1895),  91  Wis.   116, 

04  N.  W.  887  444,  408,  711 

V.  Lansing  (1898),  34  Ore.  118, 

55  Pac.  95 
V.  McCollough   (1901),   39  Ore. 

372.  65  Pac.  85 
V.  McUivitt,  102  Mo.  107 
V.  Oregon   I^v.  &  Nav.  Co.,  11 

Ore.  437' 
i>.  Pratt  (l'.)OO),  37  Ore.  45,  GO 
Pac.  707 
Huchsen  /•.  Cookson,  3  Y.  &  C.  578 
llulbert  r.  Brackett  (1894),  8  Wash. 
438,  .30  I'ac.  264 
c.  New  Nonpareil  Co.  (1900),  111 
la.  490,  «2  N.  W.  928 
llulce  i".  'rh(ini])son,  9  How.  Pr.  113 
Hull  l:  Carter,  83  N.  C.  249 

V.  Vreeland.  18  Abb.  Pr.  182 
Humbert  c.  Brisbane,  25  S.  C.  500 


817 
82 
42 

338 


689 

604 
037 

298 

712 
244 

638 


818 
526 
713 
519 
916, 
928 
661 


Hume  r.  Dessar.  29  Ind.  112 

V.  Kelly  (1896),  28  Ore.  398,  43 

Pac.  380  638,  644 

Hunimel  r.  Moore,  25  Fed.  Rep.  380     831 
lliiniphrev   r.  Carpenter,   39  Minn. 

l"l5  820 

r.  Fair,  79  Ind.  410  576 

I'.  .Mcrritt,  51  N.  Y.  197  918,  930 

V.  Ringler  (1H95),  94  la.  182,  62 

N.  W.  685 

Humphrevs  v.  Crane,  5  Cal.  173 

.-.  Hullis,  .lac.  73 
Humplon  r.  Unterkircher  (1896),  97 

la.  509,  60  N.  W.  776 

Hun  (•  Cary,  H2  N.  Y.  65  301,  354 

Hunt  V.  AtTf,  2H  Ala.  580  257 

V.  Brown,  146  Mass.  253  939 

V.  Chapman,  51  N.  Y.  555      858,  87.3, 

' .  City  of  Dubuque  (1895),  96 

la.  314,  65  N.  W.  319  026 

I'.  Ilayt,  15  Pac.  410  b20 


056 
293 
255 

670 


ARE  TO  TUE   PAGES.] 

Hunt  r.  Johnston  (1898),  1051a.  311, 

75  N.  W.  103  703 

V.  Peacock,  0  Hare,  361  250 

I'.  Rooney,  77  Wis.  258  379 

r.  Winfield,  36  Wis   154  229 

Hunter  v.  Grande  Ronde  Lumber 
Co.  (1901),  39  Ore.  448,  65 
Pac.  598  778,  817 

I'.  Hathawav  (1900),   108  Wis. 

620,  84  N.  W.  9'.t6  (909,  913 

v.   Hunter  (1900),  58  S.  C.  382, 

36  S.  E.  743  818 

r.  Macklew.  5  Hare,  238  247 

r.  Martin,  57  Cal.  365  753 

r.  .Matliis,  40  Ind.  356  769,  783 

>:  McCoy,  14  Ind.  528  472 

c.  McLaughlin,  43  Ind.  38  792 

V.  Mercer  Cv.  Cora'rs,  10  Ohio 

St.  515  "  151 

r.  Powell,  15  How.  Pr.  221     522,  610 
Hunter's   Appeal   (1898),    71    Conn. 

189,41  Atl.  557  711 

Huntington  v.  Folk  (1899),  154  Ind. 

91,44N.  E.  759  643 

r.  Lombard    (1900),   22    AYasli. 

202,  60  Pac.  414  812 

i:  Mendenhall,  73  Ind.  460  618 

Ilurd  r.  llotchkiss  (1900),  72  Conn. 

472,  45  Atl.  11  191 

>•.  Simpson,  47  Kan.  372  190 

llurlburt  r.  Palmer  (1894),  39  Neb. 

158,  57  N.  W.  1019  819 

Hurlbut  c   Leper  (1900),   12  S.  D. 

321,  81  N.  W.  631  579,  584 

v.  Post,  1  Bosw.  28  292 

Hurlbutt  V.   N.   W.  Spaulding  Saw 

Co.,  93  Cal.  55  38 

Hurley  ;;.  Rvan  (1897),  119  Cal.  71, 

51  Pac.  20  684 

V.   Ryan   (1902),  137  Cal.  461, 

70  Pac.  292  683 

Huron  v.  Mevers   (1900),    13  S.  D. 

420,  83  N.  W.  553  865,  866 

Hurst  V.  Litchfield,  39  N.  Y.  377      584,  587 
V.  Sawyer  (1894),  2  Okla.  470,  37 

Pac.  817  661 

Hurt  r.  Barnes,  24  Neb.  782  651 

Huse  V.  Ames,  104  Mo.  91  131,  135 

Huson  V.  McKenzie,  Dev.  Eq.  463,       249 
Huston    r.   Craisrhead,   23  Oliio  St. 

198       ^  821 

V.  Plato,  3  Colo  402  ■  649 

V.  Stringham,  21  Iowa,  36       326,  327, 

329 
V.  Twin  &  C.  C.  Turnp.  Co  ,  45 

Cal.  550  754 

V.  Tyler  (1897),  140  Mo.  252,  36 

S.  W.  054  24,  588 

Ilutchcroft  r.  Herren  (1898),  33  Ore. 

1,52  Pac.  692  629 

Ilutchcrson   v.  Durden   (1901),    113 

Ga.  987,  39  S.  E.  495  679 

HutchiuKs  r.  Castle,  48  Cal.  152      718,  724 

v.  Moore,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  110  865 

V.  Weems,  35  .Mo.  285  104 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cm 


[tee  references 

Hutchinson   v.   Ainsworth,  73   Cal. 

4o2,  15  Vnc.  Hep.  82  463 

V.  Hoberts,  67  N.  C.  223  250 
Hutchison  V.  Myers  (1893),  52  Kan. 

290,  34  Pac.  742  141,  607 

Hutson  V.   King  (1894),  95  Ga.  271, 

22  S.  E.  G15  658 

Hyatt  V.  Cocliran,  85  Ind.  231  189 

Hyde  v.  Hazel,  43  Md.  App.  668  801 
V.    Kenosha  Cv.    Sup.  43  Wis. 

129             "  6(51 

V.  Lambersoi).  1  Malio,  536  820 

V.  Mansran,  88  Cal.  319  51,  782 

Hynds  v.  Hays,  25  Ind.  31  611 

Hynes  v.  Farmer's   L.  &  T.  Co.,  9 

N.  Y.  Siippl.  260  499 


Iba  V.  Central   Ass'n   of  Wyoming 

(1895),  5  Wyo.  355,  40  Pac.  527         781 
Idaho  Gold  Reduction  Co.   v.    Cro- 
ghan  (1899),  6  Idaho,  471,  56  Pac. 
164  354 

Iliff  r.  Brazill,  27  Iowa,  131  935 

Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mat- 
thews (1903),  —  Ky.  — ,  72  S.  W. 
302  117 

Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Budzisz  (1900), 

106  Wis.  499,  82  N.  W.  534  638 

lUsly  V.  Grayson  (1898),  105  la.  685 

75  N.  W.  518  866,  909 

Imhoff  V.  House  (1893),  36  Neb.  28, 

53  N.  W.  1032  614 

Imperial  Shale  Rrick  Co.  v.  Jewetc 
( 1901),  169  N.  Y.  143,  62  N.  E.  167      20, 
30,  466,  473 
Indep.  Sch.  Dist.,  etc.     See  Graham, 

etc. 
Indiana,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Crawley  (1898), 

151  Ind.  413,  51  N.  E.  466      850, 
863 
r.  Plank   (1898),  152  Ind.  197, 

52  N.  E.  991  543 

In  re.     See  name  of  party. 
Indiana  &  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  McKer- 

nan,  24  Ind.  62  310,  357 

Indiana  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  O'Brien 

(1903),  —  Ind.  —  66  N.  E.  742  778 

Indiana  Trust  Co.  i:  Finitzer  (1903), 

—  Ind.  — ,  67  N.  E.  520  783 

Indianapolis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Center 
Townsliip  (1895),  143  Ind. 
6.3,  40  N.  E.  134  643 

V.  Price  (1899),  153  Ind.  31,  53 

N.  E.  1018  196 

Indianapolis,  First  Nat.  Bank  of,  v. 
Indianapolis  Piano  Man.  Co.,  45 
Ind.  5  307 

Indianapolis  &  Cin.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballard, 

22  Ind.  448  935 

r.  Rutherford,  29  Ind.  82        748,  778 
Indianapolis  &  V.  R.  Co.  v.  McCaf- 
ferv,  72  Ind.  307  609 


ARE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 

Indianapolis,   B.   &    W.    R.    Co.    v. 
Adamson,  114  Ind.  282 
V.  Milligan,  50  Ind.  393 
v.  Risley,  50  Ind.  60  713, 

Indianapolis,  C.  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son, 35  Ind.  380 
Indianapolis,  E.  R.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co. 

r.  Hyde,  122  Ind.  188 
IndiauMpolis    F.   &    M.   Co.   v.   Her- 
kimer, 46  Ind.  142 
Indianapolis  St.  Uy.  Co.  v.  Robinson 
(1901),  157  Ind.  414,  61  N.  E.  936 


Ingle  V.  Jones,  43  Iowa,  286 
Ingles 


428, 
546, 
Patterson,   36   Wis.   373 


Ingols  V.  Plimpton,  10  Colo.  535 
Ingraham  v.  Disbrough,47  N.  Y.  421 

V.  Lyon  (1894),  105  Cal.  254,  38 
Pac.  892  592, 

Inslee  v.  Hampton,  8  Hun,  230      939, 
Insley  v.  Shire  (1895),  54  Kan.  793, 

39  Pac.  713 
Insurance  Co.  /-.  Bonner  (1897),  24 
Colo.  220,  49  Pac.  366      605, 
V.  BuUene  (1893),  51    Kan.  764, 

33  Pac.  467 
V.  McLeod  (1896),   57  Kan.  95, 
45  Pac.  73 
Internal  Imp.  Fund  Trs.  v.  Gleason, 

15  Fla.  384 
International    Bank    of    St.    L.    n. 

Franklin  Cy.,  65  Mo.  105 
Interstate    Savings,    etc.    Ass'n    v. 
Knapp  (1898),  20  Wash.  225,   55 
Pac.  48 
Iowa  &  Cal.  Land  Co.  v.  Hoag  (1901), 

132  Cal.  627,  64  Pac.  1073 
Iowa  &  Minn.  R.  Co.  v.  Perkins,  28 

Iowa,  281 
Iowa,   etc.    Tel.    Co.    v.    Schamber 

(1902),  15  S.  D.  588,  91  N.  W.  78 

Iowa  Savings,  etc.   Ass'n   v.   Selby 

(1900),  111  la.  402,  82  N.  W.  968 

Iowa    Sav.    Bank    v.    Frink    (1902), 

Neb.,  92  N.  W.  916 
Ireland  v.  Nichols,  1  Sweeney,  208    . 
Ireson  v.  Denn,  2  Cox,  425 
Ireton  v.  Lewes,  Finch,  96 
Irish  V.  Snelson,  16  Ind.  365 

V.  Sunderhaus   (1898),  122  Cal. 
308,  54  Pac.  1113 
Irvin  V.  Wood,  4  Robt.  138 
Irwin  V.  Richardson  (1894),  88  Wis. 
429,  60  N.  W.  786 
V.  Walling  (1896),  4  Okla.  128, 
44  Pac.  219 
Isaacs  V.  Holland,  1  Wash.  54 
Iselin  V.  Rowlands,  30  Hun,  488 
V.  Simon  (1895),  62  Minn.  128, 
64  N.  W.  143 
Isham  V.  Davidson,  52  N.   Y.  237 


205 
575 

753 

563 

727 
785 

am, 

673 
541. 
751 
51, 
886 
878 
122, 
124, 

,594 
,940 

498 

,606 

470 

672 

350 

609 

816 

91 

520 

711 

758 

780 
15 
246 
248 
935 

687 
305 

20 

286 

592 

93 

764 
874, 
911 


CIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  bcfeeences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Islais,  etc.  Water  Co.  v.  Allen  (I'JOl), 

132  Cal.  432,  G4  Pac.  713  867 
Island     Coal     Co.    v.     Streitlemier 

( 18144),  13y  Ind.  88,  37  N.  E.  340  946 

Isler  c.  Koonce,  bi  N.  C.  55  412 

Islev  r.  lluher,  45  Ind.  421  701,  805 

Iverson   c.  Cirkel  (18D4),  56  Minn. 

25iy,  57  N.  W.  800  818 

Ives  V.  Miller,  lit  Barb.  196  935 
r.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 

12y  X.  C.  28,  39  8.  E.  031  158 

1-.  Van  Epps,  22  Wend.  155  842 


Jack  v.  Ilosmer  (1806),  97  la.  17,  65 

N.  \V.  1009  930 

Jackins  i-.  Dickinson  (1893),  39  S.  C. 

436,  17  S.  E.  990  455,  466 

Jackson  r.  Allen,  30  Ark.  110  283 

V.  Dacigett,  24  Ilun.  204  88 

V.  Featiier  River  Co.,  14  Cal.  18      778 
V.  Fosbender.  45  Ind.  305  727 

V.  Ha  mm,  14  Colo.  58  97 

V.  Jackson,  94  Cal.  446  637 

V.  McAulev    (1895),    13   Wash. 

2;tt<,  43  Pac.  41  276,  715 

V.  Rawlins,  2  Veni.  195  372,  377 

1-.  .Scliool  Dist.  (1900),   110  la. 

313.  81  N.  \V.  596  794,  825 

V.  Whedon,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  141      814 
Jackson  Sliarp  Co.    v.  Holland,    14 

Fla.  384  718,  758 

Jacob  c.  Lorenz  (1893),  98  Cal.  332, 

33  I'ac.  119  4.33 

-•.  Lucas,  1  Beav.  436  258 

Jacob  .Sultan  Co.  r.  Union  Co.  (1895), 

17  Mont.  61,  42  Pac.  109  599,  600 

Jacobi  r.  .Mifkle  (1894),  144  N.  Y. 

237,  39  N.  E.  66  334 

Jacobs  r.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  15 

Wash.  3o8,  46  Pac.  306  816 

I'.  Gilreatii  (1893),  41  S.  C.  143, 

19  S.  E.  .308  644 

V.  Ho^'an  {UiOO),  73  Conn.  740, 

49  Atl.  202  676,  757 

r.  Oren    (1897),    .30    Ore.     693, 

48  Pac.  431  687 

r.  Remsen,  12  Abb.  Pr.  390  805 

1-.  Vaill  (1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  72 

Pac.  530  709 

Jacobson  >■.  Tallard  (1903),  116  Wis. 

602,  93  X.  W.  841  639 

Jacot  .•.  Boyle,  18  How.  Pr.  106  342 

Jat'ircr  r.   .Sunde   (1807),   70   Minn. 

:W,.  73  X.  W.  171  271 

Jaffe  I-.  I>ilientlial,  Hf,  Cal.  91  594 

Ja^'l•r»  r.  .lagers,  40  In<l.  165  439 

Janus  - .  (  halmers,  6  X.  V.  209  93 

I-.  City  of  St.   Paul  (1898),  72 

Minn.  138,  75  X.  W.  5  703 

V.  Cutter,  03  Cal.  31  895 

V.  Kellcy  (1H!>9),  107  Ga.  446,  33 

«.  E.  425  678 


James  v.  McPhee,  9  Colo.  486        737, 
v.  Mutual  Lite  Ass'n  (1899),  148 

Mo.  1,  49  S.  W.  978 
V.  Western  N.  C.  IJ.  K.  Co.  (1897), 

121  N.  C.  530,  2b  S.  E.  537 
r.  A\'ilder,  25  Minn.  .305 
James  River  Bank  r.  Purchase  (1900), 
9  ^^  D.  280,  83  X.  W.  7  606, 

Jameson  r.  Bartlett  (1002),  03  Xeb. 
638,  88  X.  W.  860  205, 

V.  Coldwell.  31  Pac.  Rep.  279 
V.  King,  50  Cal.  1-32 
Jamison   v.   Coplier,   35    Mo.   483 

V.  Culligan  (1899),  151  Mo.  410, 
52  S.  W.  224  444, 

Janes  v.  Williams,  31  Ark.  175      321, 
Jaques  v.  Dawes  (1902),  —  Neb.  — , 

92  N.  W.  570 
Jarrell   v.   Railroad   Co.  (1000),   58 

S.  C.  491,  .36  S.  E.  910 
Jarvis  v.  Xorthwestern  Mutual  Re- 
lief Ass'n  (1899),  102  Wis. 
546,  78  X.  W.  1089 
V.  Peck,  10  Wis.  74  861, 

Jaseph   V.   People's   Sav.   Bank,  22 

N.  E.  Rep.  980 
Jasper  r.  Hazen,  2  X.  Dak.  401 
Jasper    County    Rv.   Co.    r.    Curtis 

( 1900),  154  Mo.  iO,  55  S.  W.  222 
Jaucli  V.  Jaucli,  50  Ind.  1.35 
Javcox  V.  Caldwell,  51  N.  Y.  395 
.Jeffers  v.  Forbes,  28  Kan.  174         242, 
Jefferson   v.  Asch   (1893),  53  Minn. 
446,  65  X.  W.  604  106, 

V.  Hale,  31  Ark.  :^86 
Jefferson  Cy.  Com'rs  r.  Lineberger, 
3  Mont.  31 
V.  Swain,  5  Kan.  376  290, 

Jeffersonville.  etc.  Co.  r.  Riter  (1896), 

14(1  Ind.  521,  45  X.  E.  697 
Jeffersonville     M.    &   I.    R.    Co.    r. 
Bowen,  40  Ind.  545 
r.  Dunlap,  29  Ind.  426 
V.  Oyler,  60  Ind.. 383 
V.  Vancant,  40  Ind.  233 
V.  Worland,  50  Ind.  .339 
Jeffrie  r.  Walsh,  14  Xev.  143 
.Jemison  ;•.  Walsli,  30  Ind.  167 
Jenkins  r.  Long,  19  Ind.  '28 

V.  McCarthy    (1895),   45    S. 

278,  22  S.  E.  883 
V.  Mitcliell  (1804),  40  Xeb.  004, 

59  N.  W.  90 
V.  N.  C.  Ore  Dressing  Co.,   65 

N.  C.  663 
V.  Smith,  4  Met.  (Ky.)  380 
r.  Steanka,  19  Wis.  126 
V.  Taylor  (1900),  Ky.,  59  S.  W. 

853 
V.  Thompson,  32  S.  C.  254 
Jcnks  y.  Lansing  Lumber  Co.  (1890), 
07  la.  342,  66  X.  W.  231    520, 

V.  Opp,  43  Ind.  108 


btb, 
748, 


060, 


789, 
C. 


874 

689 

703 
452 

607 

461 
811 
598 
457, 
523 

498 
,343 

410 

608 


642 

886 

29 
658 

816 
707 
316 
503 

107 
609 

155 
299 


620 
778 
887 
725 
614 
637 
65 
811 

625 

780 

662 
245 
736 

473 
457 

796. 

822 
289 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CUED. 


CV 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Jenney  Electric  Co.  v.  Branhai) 
(1896),  145  Ind.  314,  41  N.  E.  448    584, 

587 
Jennings  v.  Kiernan  (18U8),  35  Ore. 

349,  55  Pac.  443  670 

i;.  Parr  (1808),  54  S.  C.  109,  32 

S.  E.  73  035 

r.  Paterson,  15  Bcav.  "28  347 

r.  Reeves,  101  N.  C.  447  29 

Jennings  Cy.  Coni'rs  v.  Verbarg,  63 

Ind.  107  584 

Jepsen  r.  Beck,  78  Cal.  540  66 

Jerome  c.  McCarter,  94  U.  S.  734  334 

Je.sse  V.   Bennett,  6  DeG.  M.  &  G. 

600  253,  352 

Jessup  V.  City  Bank,  14  Wis.  331  475 

Jewett  r.  Honey  Creek  Dr.  Co.,   89 

Ind.  245  661 

V.  Maloct,  (1899),  60  Kan.  509, 

57  Pac.  100  641 
r.  Tucker,  1.39  Mass.  566  254 

J.  I.  Case  Thresliing  Co.  ;;.  Pederson 
(1894), 6S.  D.  140, 60  N.  W.  747     96,  714 

J.  K.  Orr  Co.  r.  Kimbrough  (1896), 
99  Ga.  143,  25  S.  E.  204  356 

Joergenson  v.  Joergenson  (1902),  28 
Wasli.  477,  68  Pac.  913  819 

Joest  V.  Williams,  42  Ind.  565  790 

Johannesson  i\  Borsclienius,  35  Wis. 
131  69,  72,  626,  631 

John  D.  Park  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Drug- 
gists' Ass'n  (1903),  175  N.  Y.  1, 
67  N.  E.  136  709 

John  R.  Davis  Lumber  Co.  v.  The 
First  National  Bank  of  Mil- 
waukee (1894),  87  Wis.  435, 

58  N.  W.  743  410,  642 
V.  Home  Insurance  Co.  of  New 

York  (1897),  95  Wis.  542,70 
N.  W.  84  498 

Johns  V.  Northwestern  Mut.  Relief 
Ass.  (1891),  87  Wis.  111,58 

N.  w.  76  657,  em 

V.  Potter,  55  Iowa,  665  611 

V.  Wilson  (1898),  Ariz.,  53  Pac. 

583  328 

Johnson  v.  Ashland  Lumber  Co.,  44 

Wis.  119  576 

V.  Bamberger,    19   S.   W.   Rep. 

920  112 

V.  Bank  (1898),  59  Kan.  250,  52 

Pac.  860  703 

V.  Bellingham    Bay  Co.   (1896), 

13  Wash.  455,  43  Pac.  370  673 
V.  Britton,  23  Ind.  105  271,  325,  333 
V.  Chandler,  15  B.  Mon.  584  413 

V.  C.  R.  L  &  P.  R.  Co.,  50  Iowa, 

25  575 

V.  Cuddington,  35  Ind.  43      769,  805, 

806 
V.  Detrick  (1899),  152  Mo.  243, 

53  S.  W.  891  819,  830 

V.  Dicken,  25  Mo.  580  229 

V.  Douglass  (1894),  60  Ark.  39, 

28  S.  W.  515  600 


Johnson  v.  Filkington,  39  Wis.  62         637 
V.  Foster,  60  Iowa,  140  327 

V.  Geneva  Pub.  Co.  (1894),  122 

Mo.  102,  26  S.  W.  676  872 

V.  Colder,  132  N.  Y.  116  470,  473 

V.  Gooch  ( 1894),  114  N.  C.  62, 19 

S.  E.62  178,170,813 

V.  Gunter,  6  Bush,  534  870 

V.  Ilesser  (1901),  61  Neb.  631,  85 

N.  W.  894  794 

V.  Hosford,  10  N.  E.  Rep.  407         333 
V.  Keeler,  46  Kan.  304  375 

V.  Kent,  9  Ind.  252  881,  936 

V.  Kilgore,  39  Ind.  147  564,  584 

V.  Kirby,  65  Cal.  482  499 

V.  Knapp,  ."'6  Iowa,  616  105 

V.  Miller,  47  Ind.  376  814 

V.  Monell,  13  Iowa,  300  326, 327 

V.  Moss,  45  Cal.  515  622 

V.  Greg.  Nav.  Co.,  8  Ore.  35  576 

V.  Oswald,  88  Minn.  550  779 

V.  Polliemus  (1893),  99  Cal.  240, 

38  Pac.  908  665 

V.  Puritan  Min.  Co.   (1.^96),  19 

Mont.  30,  47  Pac.  837  669 

V.  Reed  (1896),  47  Neb.  322,  66 

N.  W.  405  735 

V.  Robinson,  20  Minn.  170      365,  596, 

599 
V.  Strader,  3  Mo.  359  649 

V.  Tyler,  1  Ind.  App.  387  801 

V.  Vance,  86  Cal.  128  562 

V.  White,  6  Hun,  587  704 

V.  Wynne  (1902),  64  Kan.  138, 

67  Pac.  549  709,  822 

Johnson-Brinkman     Co.     v.    Bank 

(1893),  116  Mo.  558,22S.W. 

813  584 

V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1894),  126 

Mo.  344,  28  S.  W.  870  656 

Johnston  y.  Don  van,  106N.  Y.269    326,406 
V.  McDuffee,  83  Cal.  30  332 

V.  Meaghr  (1897),  14  Utah,  426, 

47  Pac.  861  594 

r.  Neville,  68  N.  C.  177  413,  414 

V.  Northwestern  Live  Stock  Ins. 

Co.  (1896),  94  Wis.  117,68 

N.  W.  868  599,  817 

V.  Ohver    (1894),    51    0.    St.    6, 

36  N.  E.  458  410 

V.  Pate,  83  N.  C.  110  576 

V.  Spencer  (1897),  51  Neb.  198, 

70  N.  W.  982  693,  678 

Joliet  Iron,  etc.  Co.  v.  Chic.  C.  &  W. 

R.  Co.,  51  Iowa,  300  428 

Jolly  V.  Terre  Haute,  etc.  Co.,  9  Ind. 

421  541 

Jones,  A'e  (Supreme,  1888),  1  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  127  870 

V.  Accident  Ass'n  (1894),  92  la. 

652,  61  N.  W.  485  672 

V.  Billstein,  28  Wis.  221  240 

v.  Burtis  (1894),  88  Wis.  478,  60 

N.  W.  785  676 

V.  Cin.  Type  Foundry,  14  Ind.  89     786 


CVl 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


[thb  referesces  are  to  the  pages.] 


Jones  I'.  Citv  of  rortland  (1899),  35 

Ore.  512.  58  Pac.  657  682 

V.  Driscoll  (18Ho),  40  Neb.  575,65 

N.  W.  104  OSl 

r.  Ed.lv,  90  Cal.  147  739 

V.  Feldi.  3  Bosw   63  195 

V.  Frust,  51  Ind.  69         675,  713,  727, 

791 
V.  Goo(lcliil(l,  3  P.  Wms.  33  253 

V.  H-.ar,  5  Pick.  285  649 

V.  How,  7  Hare,  2(57  347 

v.  Jones,  3  Atk.  110  348 

V.  Keep,  23  Wis.  45  293 

V.  Lantihorne  ( 1893),  19  Colo.  206, 

34  Phc.  997  288 

V.  Lu.Uum.  74  N.  Y.  61  730 

V.  McQuueii  (1896),  13  Utah,  178, 

45  Pac.  202  780 

V.  Mial,  79  N.  C.  164        578,  581,  584 

V.  Moore,  42  Mo.  419      861,  886,  917, 

927,  935 

V.  Pacific   Drerlfring  Co.   (1903), 

Idaho,  72  I'ac.  95t)  674 

1-.  Palmer.  1  Abb.  Pr.  442  6(;0 

r.  Pearl  Min.  Co.  (1894),  20  Colo. 

417,  38  Pac.  700  002 

r.  Perot  (1893),  19  Col.   141,  34 

Pac.  728  756 

V.  Piening,  55  X.  W.  Rep.  413        132 
V.  Rahillv,  16  Minn.  320  779 

V.  Rush  "(1900),  156  Mo.  364,  57 

S.  W.  118  •        764,  773 

V.  Seward  Cy.  Com'rs,  10  Neb. 

154  769,  772 

r.  Shaw,  67  Mo.  667  791 

v.  Sheboj-gan,  etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Wis. 

307  778, 785 

1-.  Smith,  2  Ves.  372  ,  246 

V.  Steamship  Cortes,  17  Cal.  487     71, 

488,  495 

V.  Stoddart  (1902),  Idaho,  67  Pac. 

650  638 

V.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Rv.  Co.  (1896), 

16  Wash.  25,  47  Pac.  226         605 
f.  Swank  (18!);;),  54  Minn.  259, 

55  N.  W.  1126  913,  928,931 

V.  Vantress,  23  In.l.  533  413,  415 

V.  Williinns,  31  Ark.  175  238 

r.  Witousi-k   (1901),  114   la.    14, 

86  N.  W.  59  938 

Jones'  Admr.  «•.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

(1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  609  641 

Jone.s  Co.  ,-.   Daniel  (1899),  67  Ark. 

20<}.  53  S.  W.890  655 

Jonesbfiro  &  F.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Bald- 
win. 57  Ind   86  778 
Jopp  -•.  Wood,  2  DeG.  J.  &  S.  323        258 
Jordan  r.  Coulter  (1902),  30  Wash. 

110,  70  Pac.  257  612 

r.  Estate  of  Warner  (1900),  107 

Wis.  539,  83  X.  W.  940     466,  493 

V.  Kavanaugh,  03  Iowa,  152  112 

V.  While,  20  Minn.  91  105 

JofRenson    r.    Btitte   Co.    (1803),    13 

Mont.  288,  34  Pac.  37  643 


Joseph  Des-xert  Lumber  Co.  i-.  Wad- 
leigh  ( 1899),  103  Wis.  318, 79  N.  W. 
237  8. 72 

Josey   I'.   Union    Loan    &   Trust  Co. 

(1898),  106  Ga.  608,  32  S.  E.  628       292 
Joshua  Hendv,  etc.  Works  c.  Dillon 

(1901),  135 "Cal.  9,  66  Pac.  960  422 

Joslin  V.  Williams  (1901),  61  Neb.  859, 

86  N.  W.  473  337 

Joubert  v.  Carli,  26  Wis.  594  573.  592 

Joyce   !-•.    Growney   (1900),   154  Mo. 

253,  55  S.  W.  466  943 

V.  Whitney,  57  Ind.  550  942 

Judah    r.  Vincennes    Univ.    Trs.,  16 

Ind.  56  919,927.937 

V.  Vincennes  Univ.  Trs  ,  23  Ind. 

272  745 

Judd  V.  Grav  (1900),  156  Ind.  278,  59 

N.  H.  849  807 

V.  MosL-lev,  30  Iowa,  423  360 

r.  Young,"  7  How.  Pr.  79  418 

Judv  r.  Farmers'  &  Tr.  Bk.,  70  Mo. 

407  412 

Julian  V.   Hoosier  Drill  Co.,  78  Ind. 

408 
Justice  V.  Phillips,  3  Bush,  200      178,  202 


Kahier  v.  Iowa,  etc.  Ins.  Co.    (1898). 

106  la.  380,  76  X.  W.  734  816,  819 

Kahn  v.  Kahn,  15  Fla.  400  29,  470 

V.  Southern  Bldg.  Ass'n    (1902), 

115  Ga.  459,  41  S.  E.  648         819 
V.   Traders'    Ins.    Co.    (1893),   4 

Wyo.  419,  34  Pac.  1059         804 
Kahnweiler   v.   Anderson,   78   N.   C. 

133  117 

Kahrs  r.   Kahrs  (1902),  115  Ga.  288, 

41  S.  E.  049  849,  864 

Kain  v.  Larkin  (1894),  141  X.  Y.  144. 

39  X.  E.  9  592 

Kalckhoff  v.  Zoehrlaut,  40  Wis.  427 

597,  649 
Kalfus  V.  Kalfus,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  366  232 
Kaline  v.  Stover  (1893),  88  la.  245, 

55  X.  W.  346  625 

Kamerick  v.  Castleman,  23  Mo.  App. 

481  901,918 

Kaniinski   v.     Tudor    Iron     Works 
(1902),  167  Mo.  462,  67  S.  W.  221    778, 

818 
Kanini  v.  Ilarkcr,  3  Ore.  208  289 

Kansas    &    C.  P.  Ry.    Co.    v.   Fitz- 
gerald, 33  Xeb.  137  428 
Kansas  City  v.  File  (1899),  60  Kan. 

157,  55  Pac.  877  303 

r.  Gamier  (1896),  57  Kan.  412, 

46  Pac.  707  677 

V.  Hart  (1899),  60  Kan.  684,  57 

Pac.  938  ■       041 

1-.  King  (1902),  05  Kan.  64,  68 

Pac.  1093  96 

V.  Ridenour,  84  Mo.  253  933 


TABL?:    OF   CASES    CITED. 


evil 


[the  repbrences  are  to  the  pages  ] 


Kansas    City,   etc.    Co.    r.    Osborne 

(1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  71  Pac.  838  70.3 

Kansas  City,  etc.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Becker 
(1899),  67  Ark.  1,  53  S.  W. 
406  051 

V.  Pace  (1901),  69  Ark.  256,  63 

S.  W.  62  817 

Kansas    City,  First  Nat.  Bk.   of,  v. 

Hogan,  47  Mo.  472  742 

Kansas  City  Hotel  Co.  v.  Sauer,  65 

Mo.  279  662 

r.  Sigement,  53  Mo.  176  476 

Kansas  City  Sewer  Pipe  Co.  v. 
Thompson  (1893),  120  Mo.  218,  25 
S.  W.  522  107 

Kansas  Loan,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hutto,  48 

Kan.  166  895 

Kansas  Nat.  Bank  v.  Quinton  (1897), 

57  Kan.  750,  48  Pac.  20  831 

Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McBratney, 

12  Kan.  9  64 

V.  McCormick,  20  Kan.  107  568 

Karnes   v.   Rochester  &  G.  Val.  R. 

Co.,  4  Abb.  Pr.  N.  s.  107  355 

Kassing  v.  Ordway  (1897),  100  la. 

611,  69  N.  W.  1013  6 

Kasson  v.  People,  44  Barb.  .347       301,  307 
Kaster  v.  Kaster,  52  Ind.  531  598 

Katzhausen  v.  Koeiiler,  42  Wis.  232     736 
Kaufman  v.  Schoefliel,  37  Hun,  140       226 
('.  U.  S.  Nat.  Bk.,  31  Neb.  661         112 
Kaufmann  v.  Cooper  (1896),  46  Neb. 

644,  65  N.  W.  796  106 

Kaukauna  Co.  v.  Kaukauna  (1902), 

114  Wis.  327,  89  N.  W.  542  856 

Kausal  v.  Minn.  Farm.  Mut.  F.  Ins. 

Ass.,  31  Minn.  17  209 

Kavanaugii  v.  Barber,  131  N.  Y.  211     225 
I'.  -Janesville,  24  Wis.  618  228 

V.  Oberfelder  ( 1893),  37  Neb.  647, 

56  N.  W.  316  687 

Kay  V.  Pruden  (1897),  101  la.  60,  69 

N.  W.  1137  643 

V.  Whittaker,  44  N.  Y.  565    325, '333, 

740 
Kaye  v.  Fosbrooke,  8  Sim.  28  254 

Kayser  v.  Sichel,  34  Barb.  89         562,  651 
Keairnes   v.   Durst   (1899),    110    la. 

114,  81  N.  W.  288  612 

Kearney  Stone  Works  v.  McPherson 
(1894),  5  Wyo.  178,  38 Pac.  920       455, 
515,  661,  702 
Kear}'  v.  Mut.  Res.   Fund  L.  Ass., 

30  Fed.  Rep.  .359  213 

Keehn  v.  Keehn  (1902),  115  la.  467, 

88  N.  W.  9.57  417 

Keeler  v.  Keeler,  3  Stockt.  458      254,  261 
Keens  v.  Gaslin,  24  Neb.  310  365 

I'.  Robertson  (1896),  46  Neb.  837, 

65  N.  W.  897  776 

Keen  v.  Kaufman,  56  N.  Y.  332  522 

Keifer  v.  Summers  (1893),  137  Ind. 

106,  35  N.  E.  1103  934 

Keightley  v.  Walls,  24  Ind.  205  9.35 

Keim  v.  Avery,  7  Neb.  54  791 


Roister  r.  Myers,  115  Ind.  312 
Keitel  v  St.  Louis  Cable  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  28  Mo.  Ai)p.  (i57 
Kell  V.  Lund  (1896),  99  la.  15-3,  68 

N.  W.  593  355, 

Kellar  v.  Beelor,  5  Monr.  573 

V.  Pagan   (1899),  54  S.  C.  255, 
32  S.  E.  352 
Keller   v.  B.   F.   Goodrich   Co.,   117 
Ind.  556 
V.  Blasdel,  1  Nev.  491 
V.  Boatman,  49  Ind.   104       452, 

r.  CitvofSt.  Louis  (1899),  152 

Mo.  596,  54  S.  W.  438 
V.  Hicks,  22  Cal.  457 
V.  Johnson, 11  Ind.  337 
V.  Strong  (1898),  1041a.  685,  73 

N.  W.  1071 
V.  Tracy,  11  Iowa,  5.30 
V.  Williams,  49  Ind.  504 
Kelley    v.    Nebraska     Exp.    Ass'n 

(1897),   52    Neb.    355,   72 

N.  W.  856 
V.  Thornton,  56  Mo.  .325 
V.  Wehn  (1902),  63  Neb.  410,  88 

N.  W.  682 
Kellogg  V.  Adams,  51  Wis.  138 

V.  Aherin,  48  Iowa,  299  55, 

V.  Baker,  15  Abb.  Pr.  286 

V.  Malin,  62  Mo.  429 

V.  Olmsted,  0  How.  Pr.  487 

V.  Oshkosli,  14  Wis.  623 

V.  Scheuerman  (1897),  18  Wash. 

293,  51  Pac.  344 
V.  Schuyler,  2  Uenio,  73 
V.  Sweeney  1  Lans.  397 
V.  Window  (1897),  100  la.  552, 

69  N.  W.  875  290, 

Kelly  V.  Bernheimer,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

140 
V.  Cable  Co.    (1893),  13   Mont. 

411,34  Pac.  611 
V.  Clark  (1898),  21  Mont.  291, 

53  Pac.  959 
V.  Dee,  2  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  286 
V.  Newman,  62  How.  Pr.  156 


•356 
249 

734 

920 
289 
521, 
727 

220 
516 
789 

655 
3^6 
310 


785 


V.   Perrault    (1897),   Idaho,    48 

Pac.  45 
V.  Strouse  (1903),  116  Ga.  872,  43 

S  E   280 
V.  Thuey,  102  Mo.  522  104, 

V.  Town  of  Darlington   (1893), 

86  Wis.  482,  57  N.  W.  51 
V.  Town  of  West  Bend  (1897), 
101  la.  669,  70  N.  W.  720 
Kelsey  i^.  Bradbury,  21  Barb.  531 
V.  Henry,  48  Ind.  37  562, 

r.  Murray,  28  How.  Pr.  243    417, 
V.  Welch  (1896),  8  S.  D.  255,  m 
N.  W.  890  329, 

Kelty  V.  Long,  4  N.  Y.  S.  C.  163 
Kemp  V.  Folsom    (1896),   14  Wash. 
16,  43  Pac.  1100 


665 
117 

942 
833 
178 
308 
118 

783 

151 

395 

833 

625 

612 

49 

499, 

502 

819 

607 
153 

683 

602 

400 
661 
418 

330 
31 -^ 

667 


CYUl 


TArSLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  a 

Kemper  v.  Renshave  (1899),  58  Neb. 

513,  78  X.  W.  1071  605,678 

Kenastoi)  v.  Lnri;.'  (1900),  81   -Minn. 

454.  84  N.  \V.  ">23  666 

Ken.iig  r.  Marble,  55  Iowa.  SS6     _        791 
Kenniure  Slioe  Co.,  Ex  jmrte  (1897), 

50  S.  C.  140,  27  S.  K.  H82  421 

Kcnnan  v.  Smitli   (1902),  115  Wis. 

468.  91  N.  \V.  986  639,  643 

Kennard  <•.  Sax.  o  Ore.  263  814 

Kennedy  c.  Dickie  (1902),  27  Mont. 

'  70,  69  l^ac.  672  738 

V.  Eilau,  17  Abb.  Pr.  73  151 

r.  Gibson.  8  Wall.  498  261 

V.  McQuaid  (1894),  50  Minn.  450, 

58  N.  W.  35  809 

r.  Railway  Co  (1901),  59  S.  C. 

535,  38  S.  E.  169  778 

V.  School  Dist.  (1893),  20  Wash. 

399,  55  Pac.  567  818 

V.  Shaw,  38  Ind.  474  779,  780 

V.  Williams,  11  Minn.  314  821 

Kennenberg  c.  Neff  (1901),  74  Conn. 

62,  49  Atl  853  638 

Kennett  v.  Peters  (1894).  54  Kan. 

119.  37  Pac.  999  25,688 

Kenney  r.  Bevilheimer  (1902),  158 

Ind. '653,  64  N.  E.  215  671 

Kent  V.  Agard,  24  Wi.«.  378  46 

V.  Cantrali.  44  Ind.  452  873 

r.  Muscatine,  etc.  Uv.  Co.  (1902), 

115  Im.  383,  88"N.  W.  935        734 
r.  HoL'ers>.  24  .Mo.  306  935 

V.  Snvder,  30  Cal.  666  789 

v.  Tut  lie  (1897),  20  Mont.  203, 

50  l^ic.  559  672 

Kentfield  v.  Hayes,  57  Cal.  409  47 

Kentucky  Cent.  K.  Co.  v.  Thomas, 

79Ky.'l64  778 

Kentucky  Flour  Co.'s  Ass.  v.  Merch. 

Bk.,  13  S.  W.  Hep.  910  133 

Kwitucky   Uiver  Nay.  Co.  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 13  Bush,  435  753,  756 
Kenyon  v.  t^uinn,  41  Cal.  325  46 
V.  West  Union  Tel.  Co.  (1893), 

100  Cal.  454,  35  Pac.  75  666 

V.  Youlen,  53  Hun,  691  51 

Keown  r.  Vogel,  25  Mo.  App.  35  153 

Kerr  v.  Topping  (1899),  109  la.  150, 

80  N.  W.  .321  612 

Kerslake  r.  Mclnnis  (1902),  113  Wis. 

659.  89  N.  W.  895 
Kerstetter  r.  Haymond,  10  Ind.  199 


830 
584, 
587 


Kerstner  v.  Vorweg  (1895),  130  Mo 

VMV,  32  S.  W.  298  32 

Kcrwood  r.  Ayers  (1898),  59  Kan. 

343,53  Pac.  184  779 

Kettenbach    v.   Omaha   Life    Ass'n 

( IHfK!),  49  Neb.  842.  69  N.  W.  135  790 
Kettle  V.  Crary,  1  Paige,  417  249 

Kewaunee  (.'y.   Sup.  r.   Decker,  30 

Wis.  624  29,  37.  626,  630,  635,  030 

Kewaunee  Sup.  c.  Deiker,  30  Wis. 

624, 626  631 


RE   TO   THE   P.^GES.] 

Keyes  v.  Little  York  Gold,  etc.  Co., 

53  Cal.  724  262,  305 

Kevs  et  <il.  v.  MoDermott  (1903),  — 

Wis.  93  N.  W.  553  236,  473 

Kidder  County  -•.  Foye   (1901),   10 

N.  I).  424.  87  N.  W.'984  787 

Kiefer  v.  Klinsick  (1895),  144  Ind. 

46,  42  N.  K.  447  816 

Kiernan  r.  Kraiz  (1902),  42  Ore.  474, 

69  Pac.  1027  703 

V.    Terry   (1894),   26   Ore.  494, 

38  Pac.  671  676 

Kiff  r.  Weaver,  94  N.  C.  274  99 

Kill.ourn  >:  St.  John,  59  N.  Y.  21  118 

Killian  c.  Eigenuian,  57  Ind.  480  658 

Killman  r.  Gregory  (1895),  91  Wis. 

478,  65  X.  W.  53"  703 

Killmore  >:  Culv-..-,  24  Barb.  656  93 

Kilpatrick-Kocli  aDry-Goods  Co.  v. 
Box  (1^96),  Itriitah,  494,  45  Pac. 
629  23,  584,  686 

Kilsey  v.  Henry,  48  Ind.  47  576 

Kimball  v.  Darling,  32  Wis.  675     572,  596 
V.  Lyon  (1893),  19  Colo.  266,  35 

Pac.  44  586 

V.  Xoyes,  17  Wis.  695       105, 109,  110 

V.  Spfcer,  12  Wis.  668  154 

V.  Whitney,  15  Ind.  280  293 

Kimberlin  v.  Carter,  49  Ind.  Ill  702 

Kimble    r.  Bunny    (1900),    61    Kan. 

665,  60  Pac.  746  734 

Kincaid  v.  McGowan.  88  Ky.  91  366 

King  V.  Anderson.  20  Ind.  385  195 

c.  Chicago.  M.  &  St.  Paul  Ry. 
Co.  (1900),  80  Minn.  83.  82 
X.  W.  1113         461,468,460,  470 
1-.  Conn,  25  Ind.  425  935 

f.  (^itts,  24  Wis  625  161 

V.  Dudley  (1893),  113  X.  C.  167, 

18S.  E.  110  640 

V.  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.,  45  Ind. 

43  544,  568,  611 

V.  Hoare,  13  M.  &  W.  499 
V.  Howell  (1895),  94  la.  208,  62 

N.  W.  738  626 

V.  Kehoe  (1894),  91  la.  91,  58 

X.  W.  1071  206 

V.  Knapp,  59  N.  Y.  462  908,  91 1 

V.  Lawrence,  14  Wis.  238  84(i 

V.  Martin,  2  Ves.  643  512 

u.McGhee  (1896),  99  Ga.  621,  25 

S.  E.  849  641 

V.  Montgomery,  50  Cal.  115  610 

I'.  Orser,  4  Duer,  431  302 

V.  Pony  (iold  Mill.  Co.  (1903),  28 

Mont.  74,  72  Pac.  3(J9  730 

i".  Powell  (1900),  127  X.  C.  10, 

37  S.  E.  62  820 

r.  Talbot,  40  X.  Y.  76 
r.  Waite  (1K'.J7),  10  S.  I).  1,  70 

X.  W. 1056  787 

V.  Westbrooks   (1902),    116  Ga. 

753,  42  S.  E.  1002  679 

Kingman  r.  Pixloy  (1898),  7  Okla. 

351,  54  Pac.  494  711 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


CIX 


[the  references 

Kingman  r:  Sievers  (1898),  143  Mo. 

519,  45  S.  W.  266  32,  63 

KiriiTsbury  v.  Cliicago,  etc.  Hy.  Co. 

(1^97),  104  la.  03,  73  N.  W.  477  79.3 
Kingsland  v.  Braisted,  2  Lans.  17         271, 

273,  292 
Kingsley  r.  Oilman,  12  Minn.  515         728, 

751 
Kinkead  v.  Holmes,  etc.  Co.  (1901), 

24  VVasli.  216,  64  Pac.  157       822 
V.  MoCormick.  etc.  Co.   (1898), 

106  la.  222,  7G  N.  W.  663         702 
Kinsella    r.   Sliarp   (1896),  47   Neb. 

664,  6Q  N.  W.  634  87,  117 

Kiasev  v.  King.  53  N.  W.  Rep.  842       135 
Kinslev  r.  Kinslev  (1897),  150  Ind. 

67,  49N.  E.819  181 
Kipp  V.  Rullard,  30  Minn  84  782 
Kippen  r.  Ollasson  (1902),  136  Cal. 

640,  69  Pac.  293  229 

Kirby  v.  Jameson  (1896),  9  S.  D.  8, 

67  N.  W.  854  836,  932 

V.  Muencli  (1900),  12  S.  D.  616, 

82  N.  W.  93  432 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
(1893),4S.D.  463,57N.  W. 
202  566 

V.    Western    Union     Tel.     Co. 
(1894),  6  S.  D.  1,  60N.  W.  152 

684 
Kircher  r.  Peder^on  (1903),  117  Wis. 

68,  83N.  W.  813  118,318 
V.  Clark,  Prec.  Ch.  275 

Kirk  v.  Woodburv  Co.,  55  Iowa,  190    702 
V.  Youni?,  2  Abb.  Pr.  453  386 

Kirkland  v.  Dryfus  (1897),  103  Ga. 

127,  29  S.  E.  612  818 

Kirkpatrick  v.  Corning,  38  N.  J.  Eq. 

234  337 

V.  State,  5  Kan.  673  118 

Kirton  v.  Bull  (1902),   168  Mo.  622 

68  S.  W.  927  793 

Kischman  v.  Scott  (1901),  166  Mo. 

214,  65  S.  W.  1031  308 

Kiskadden  v.  Jones,  63  Mo.  190  800 

Kittle  V.  Fremont,  1  Neb.  329  118 

V.  Van  Dvck,  1  Siindf.  Cii.  76  331 

Klais  V.  Pulford,  36  Wis.  587  791 

Kleckner  r.  Turk  ( 1 895 ) ,45  Neb .  1 76, 
^  63  N.  W.  469  638 

Klein  v.  Liverpool  &  London  Ins.  Co. 

(1900),  Ky.,  57  S.  W.  250  783 

Kleineck  v.   Keiger  (1899),  107  la. 

325,  78  N.  W.  39  673 

Kleiner  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1900),  162  N.  Y.  193,  56  N.  E. 
497  675 

Kleinschmidt   r.   Binzel   (1893),   14 

Mont.  31,  35  Pac.  460  710 

V.  Kleinschmidt  (1893),  13  Mont. 

64,  32  Pac.  1  625 

r.  Steele  (1894),  15  Mont.  181, 

38  Pac.  827  665 

Kley  V.  Healey  (1896),  149  N.  Y.  346, 
44  N.  E.  150  623 


ARE   TO  THE  PAGES.] 

Kline  r.  Ilanke  (1894),  14  Mont.  361, 

36  Pac.  454 
Klinker  v.   Schmidt  (1898),  106  la. 

70,  75  N.  W.  672 
Klipsteii)  V.  Uaschein(1903),  117  Wis. 

248,94  N.  W.  63 
Klonnc  v.  Bradstreet,  7  Ohio  St.  322 


833 

28.3 

640 
11, 
55 


716 
294 
89 
803 
801 


276 

798 
798 


Klotz  V.  James  (1896),  97  la.  337,  66 

N.  W.  190 
Klussman  v.  Copeland,  18  Ind.  -306 
Knadler  v.  Sharp,  36  Iowa,  232 
Knapp  V.  Roche,  94  N.  V.  329 
V.  Ruimells,  37  Wi.«.  135 
V.  St.  Louis  (1900),  156  Mo.  343, 

56  S.  W.  1102  565,  566 

V.  Walker  (1900),  73  Conn.  459, 

47  Atl.  655  454,  491 

Knarr  r.  Conaway,  42  Ind.  260  824 

Knatz  V.  Wise  (1895),  16  Mont.  555, 

41  Pac.  710 
Kneedler  v.  Sternbergh,  10  How.  Pr. 

67 
Kniffen  ,:  McConnell,  30  N.  Y.  290 
Knii,dit  V.  Denman   (1902),  64   Neb. 

814,  90  N.  W.  863  730,  740 

V.  Denman  (1903),  —  Neb.  — , 

94  N.  W. 622         .  741 

V.  Finnev  (1899),  59  Neb.  274, 

80N.  W.  912  615,735,  812 

V.  Knight,  3  P.  Wms.  .333  321 

V.  Le  Bea  (1897),  19  Mont.  223, 

47  Pac.  952 
r.  Pocock,  24  Beav.  4.36 
Knott  V.  Dubuque  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  51 
N.  W.  Rep.  57 
V.  Stephens,  3  Ore.  269 
Knour  v.  Dick,  14  Ind.  20  881,  9.35 

Knowles  v.  Gee,  8  Barb.  300  541 

I'.  Murphy  (1895),  107  Cal.  107, 

40  Pac.  Ill  740 

V.  Rablin,  20  Iowa,  101     326,  333,  338, 

379 
i  Knowlton  r.  Mickles,  29  Barb.  465 

Kno.x  V.  Laird  (1893),  92  Ga.  123, 17 
I  S.  E.  988 

I  V.  Pearson  (1902),  64  Kan.  711, 

i  68  Pac.  613  678,  685 

Kno.xboro,  Presb.  Soc.  of,  r  Beach, 

8  Hun,  644  147,  149 

Koboliska  v.  Swehla  (1898),  107  la. 

124,  77  N.  W.  576 
Koch  V.  Peters  (18971,  97  Wis.  492, 

73  N.  W.  25 
Koempel  v.  Shaw,  13  Minn.  488     852,  911, 

913 
Koenig  r.  Steckel,  58  N.  Y.  475  307 

Koeniger  v.  Creed,  58  Ind.  554      206,  212 
Koepke    >:    Milwaukee    (1901),   112 

Wis.  475, 88  N.  W.  238  604 

Kolb  V.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac  (1903), 

118  Wis.  311,  95  N.  W.  149  623 

KoUock  r.  Scribner  (1897),  98  Wis. 
104,  73  N.  W.  776  11,  849,  888,  941, 

942 


181 
245 

112 
358 


373 
642 


604 


815 


ex 


TABLE    OF  -CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


KdiiigsbLTger   r.   Ilarvcv,     12    Ore. 

■286  '  806 

Korradv  >:  L.  S.  &   M.  S.   Ky.  Co., 

l:n  liid.  261  667 

Kor^.nu■ye^,    etc.     Co.    r.    McClay 

( ItiySi,  43  Neb.  649.  62  N.  W.  50  106 

Koshlaiid  r.  Fire  Ass.  (18'J7),  31  Ore. 

o02,  40  I'ac.  865  642 

Kostuba   r.  Miller  (1S96),    137  Mo. 

161.^8  S.  W.  946  47 

Kowing  r.  .Manly,  57  Barb.  579  313 

Kramer  r.  liebman,  9  Iowa,  114  15 

Krause  r.  Llov<l  (1897),  100  la.  666, 

69  N.  W.  1U62  608,  711 

Kreiclibaum  c.  Melton.  49  Ind.  50         942 
Kretser  r.  Carey,  52  Wis.  374  665 

Kreuger  v.  .Sylvester  (1897),  100  la. 

647.  Oy  N.  \V.  1059  641 

Krnizinski  r.  Neuendorf  (1898),  99 

Wis.  264.  74  N.  W.  974        362,  444,  498 
Kruider  v.  Kllison,  47  N.  Y.  36  149 

Kucera    v.   Kucera  (1893),  86  Wis. 

416,  57  N.  W.  47  185 

Kuelm  V.  Wilson.  13  Wis.  104  596 

Kuli,  Nathan  &  Fisher  Co.  (•.  Gluck- 

liok  (1903),  120  la.  604,  94  K  W. 

1105  679 

Kuhl    r.   Pierce    County   (1895),  44 

Xeb.  584,  62  N.  W.  1066  40 

Kuhland  v.  Sedgwick,  17  Cal.  123         739 
Kulin  r.  McKay  (1897),  7  Wyo.  42, 

49  Pac.  473  615 

c.  Sol.    Havenrich    Co.    (1902), 

115  Wis.  447,  91  N.  W.  994    908, 
915,  924 
Kunneke  v.  iM.ipel  (1899),  60  O.  St. 

1.  53  N.  E.  259  66 

Ktinze  '■.  Kunze  (1896),  94  Wis.  54, 

08  N.  W.  .391  680 

Kupfer  r.  Sponhorst,  1  Kan.  75  299 

Kurtz  V.  McGuire,  5  Duer,  660  915 

Kyd  V.  Cok  (1898),  56  Neb.  71,  76 

N.  W.  524  599,  604 

r.  Kxcliange    Bank    (1898),    56 

Neb.  557.  75  N.  W.  524  819 

Kyes  r.  Wilcox  (1900),  13  S.  D.  228, 

83  N.  W.  93  415 


L. 


Lace  V.  Fixen  (1888),  39  Minn.-  46, 

38  \.  W.  762  866 

I^cev  r.   Lacey  (1893),  95  Kv.   110, 

2:\  .S.  W.  673  ■       849,  866 

Lackey  »■.  Vanderbilt,  10   How.   Pr. 

155  660 

Lackland  v.  Walker  (1899),  151  Mo. 

210,  .72  S.  W.  414  350 

La  Crosse  -•.  .Melrose,  22  Wis.  459      155 
Ladd  - .  .fame-.,  10  Ohio  St.  437  475 

i:  NvHtol  (1901).  63  Kan.  23,  64 

Pae  985  678 

r.  StevenHon.  112  N.  V.  325  406 

La  Farge  v.  Halsey,  1  IJ-jsw.  171  869 


La  Fayette  v.  Fowler,  34  Ind.  140        118 
Lafayette  &  I.  li.  Co.  v.  Ehman,  30 

Ind.  83  769 

V.  Huffman,  28  Ind.  287  575 

Lafayette  Cy.  v.  Ilixon,  69  Mo.  581     117. 

155 
La  fever  v.  Stone,  55  Iowa,  49  575 

La  France  v.  Kruger,  42  Iowa,  143        310 
Lago  V.  Walsh  (1898),  98  Wis.  348, 

74  N.  W.  212  676,  7>5 

Lahiff  V.  Hennepin  County,  etc. 
Ass'n  (1895),  61  Minn.  226,  63 
N.  W.  493  887,  925 

Lain  v.  Shepardson,  23  Wis.  274  781 

Laird  i.Farwell  (1899),  60  Kan.  512, 

57  Pac.  98  638 

Laird-Norton   Co.   r.  Herker  (1895), 

6  S.  D.  509,  62  N.  W.  104  Cm 

Lake  v.  Albert,  37  Minn.  453  150 

V.  Cruikshank,  31  Iowa,  395  786 

Lake  Erie  &  W.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  Char- 
man  (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  67 
N.  E.  923  661 

V.  Priest,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  77  22y 

Lake  Ontario  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Cur- 

tiss,  80  N.  Y.  219  HI 

Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Rv.  Co.  v.  Van 

Auken,  1  Ind.  A  pp.  492  920 

Lamb  v.  Brolaski,  38  Mo.  51  935 

V.  Elizabeth    City    (1902),    131 

N.  C.  241,  42  S.  E.  603  675 

V.  Harbaugh  (1895),  105Cal.  680, 

39  Pac.  56  229,  449,  527,  675 

V.  Ward  (1894),  114  N.  C.  255, 

19  S.  E.  230  830 

Lambert   v.   McKenzie   (1901),  135 

Cal.  100,  67  Pac.  6  640 

Lamberton    v.    Shannon    (1896),    13 

Wash.  404,  43  Pac.  336  832,  834 

Lamming  v.  Galuslia,  31  N.  E.  Rep. 

1024  458,  494 

Lamon  v.  Hackett,  49  Wis.  261  661 

Lanioreux  v.  Atlant.  M.  Ins.  Co.,  3 

Duer,  680  611 

Lanipkin  r.  Chisom,  10  Ohio  St.  450    276 
Lanipman  v.  Hammond,  3  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  293  '2'.:0 

Lamson  >■.  Fall.«.  6  Ind.  309  95,  814 

«;.Pfafif,  1  Handy,  449  11 

Lancashire       Ins.    Co.    v.    Monroe 

(1897),  101  Kv.  12,  39  S.  W.  434  744 
Lancaster  r.  Gould,  40  Ind.  397  241,  310 
Lancaster   liapt.   Church,   i".  Presb. 

Church,  18  B.  Mon.  (i.35  250,  251 

Lancaster  Cy.    v.   Rush,  52  N.   W. 

Rep.  390  100 

Lancaster,  etc.  Man.  Co.  v.  Colgate, 

12  Ohio  St.  344  835,  910 

Land,  etc.  Co.  of  G.  B.  v.  .Williams, 

14  S.  E.  Rep.  821  756 

Landau  v.  Levy,  1  Abb.  Pr.  376  524 

Landers  r.  Bolton.  20  Cal.  393  7:'.'.i 

r.  Douglas,  46  Ind  522  814 

Landes  r.  State  ( 1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  67 

N.  E.  189  567 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXI 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Laiidon  v.  Burke,  3G  Wis.  378  111 

Lane  v.  Hrvaiit  ( 1896),  100  Ky.  lo8, 

37'  S.  W.  584  832,  834 

V.  Cameron,  38  Wis.  013  020,  62!) 

r.  Doty,  4  Barb.  534  2y3 

v.  IJowd  (l'.M)3),  172  Mo.  167,  72 

S.  W.  032  443,  455,  456,  458 

r.  Gilbert,  9  Mow.  Pr.  150  798 

V.  Lane  (1899),  106  Ky.  530,  50 

S.W.  857  375 

y.  Miller,  27  Ind.  534  596 

V.  Salter,  51  N.  Y.  1  289 

f.  Sehomp,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  82  118 

V.  Spariis,  75  Ind.  278  780 

V.  State,  7  Ind.  426  661 

V.  State,  27  Ind.  108  458,  502 

Laney  v.  Ingalls  (1894),  5  S.  D.  183, 

58  N.  W.  572  910 

Lang  V.  Brady  (1900),  73  Conn.  707, 

49  Atl.  199  676,  682 

i;.  Oppenlieimer,  96  Ind.  47  65 

r.  Waring,  25  Ala.  625  248 

Lange  i'.  Benedict,  73  N.  Y.  12  662 

Lansievin  i-.  St.  Paul.  51  N.  W.  Hep. 

817  499 

Langford    v.   Langford    (1902),    136 

Cal.  507,  69  Pac.  235  946 

Langsdale  v.  Girton,  51  Ind.  99     181,  713 

V.  Woollen,  120  Ind.  16 
Langton  v.  Hagerty,  35  Wis.  150 


616 
799, 
805 
871 
293 


Lanier  v.  Branson,  21  S.  C.  41 
V.  Irvine,  24  Minn.  116 
V.  Union  Mortgage  Co.  (1897), 
64  Ark.  39,  40  S.  W.  466 
Lansdale  i-.  Mitchell,  14  B.  Mon.  350 
Lansing  v.   Commercial  Union  As- 
surance Co.  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93 
N.  W. 756 
Lansingh  v.  Parker,  9  How.  Pr.  288 
Lapham  v.  Osborne,  20  Nev.  168   922,  928 
La    Plant    v.     Firemen's    Ins.    Co. 
(1897),  68  Minn.  82,  70  N.  W.  856 
Lapointe   T.   Sup.   v.  O'Malley,  46 

Wis.  35 

Lapping  v.  Duffy,  47  Ind.  56  91, 103 

Large  v.  Van  Doren,  1  McCarter,  208  246, 

251,  378 
Larimore  v.  Wells,  29  Ohio  St. 
Larkin  v.  Noonan,  19  Wis.  82 
Lamed  i-.  Hudson,  57  N.  Y.  151 


565 
936 


657 
833 


800 
660 


13 


713 
683 

465,  494, 
517 

124, 


V.Jordan  (1895),  55  Kan, 

39  Pac.  1080 
V.  Renshaw,  ."JT  Mo.  458 
Larsen  v.  Oneslte  (1900),  21  Utah, 

38,  59  Pac.  234 
V.    Utah    Loan    &    Trust    Co. 

(1901),   23  Utah,    944,    05 

Pac.  208 
L;irson  i:.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1902),  — 

Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  729      669,  677 
r.  Reynolds,  13  Iowa,  579  316 

V.  Winder  (1896),  14  Wash.  647, 

45  Pac.  315  788 


655 
369 


6ri3 


Larue  i'.  Hays,  7  Bush,  50  564 

La  Kue  r.   Smith  (1897),  153  N.  Y. 

428,  47  N.  E.  796  624 

Larum  v.  Wilner,  35  Iowa,  244  815 

Lash  V.  Christie,  4  Neb.  262  597 

i:  McCormick,  17  Miim.  403  873 

r.  Kendell,  72  Ind.  475  826 

Lasher  v.  Williamson,  55  N.  Y.  019      869 
La  Societe'  Franyaisc   v.  W'eidmann 

(1893),  97  Cal.  507,  32  Pac.  583  643 

Lassitcr  v.  Roper  (1894),  114  N.  C. 

17,  18  S.  E.  946  -  23,  822 

Lataillade  v.  Orena,  91  Cal.  565  75 

Latenser  v.  Misner  (1898),  56  Neb. 

340,  76  N.  W.  897  605,  606 

Latham  v.  Harby  (1897),  50  S.  C. 

428,  27  S.  E.  862  35 

Lathrop  v.  Dearing  (1894),  59  Minn. 

234,  61  N.  W.  24  433 

V.  Godfrey,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  96     131, 
718,873 
V.  Heacock,  4  Lans.  1  317 

V.  Knapp,  37  Wis.  307  153 

I'.  Schutte  (1895),  61  Minn.  196, 

63  N.  W.  493  220 

Latimer  v.  Woodmen  (1901),  62  S.  C. 

145,  40  S.  E.  155  817,  818 

V.  York  Cotton  Mills  (1903),  66 

S.  C.  135, 44  S.  E.  559  796 

Latonia  v.  Hopkins  (1898),  104  Ky. 

419,  47  S.  W.  248  641 

Latshaw   v.  State    (1900),   156  Ind. 

194,  59  N.E.  471  684 

Lattin  v.  McCarty,  41  N.  Y.  107      11,  29, 

30,  473,  497 

Laub  ;;.  Buckrailler,  17  N.  Y.  620    15,  17, 

29,  30,  473,  497 

Laughlin  v.  Fariss  (1897),  7  Okla.  1, 

50  Pac.  254  75 

V.  Greene,  14  Iowa,  92  164 

Lauraglenn  Mills  v.  Ruff  (1900),  57 

S.  C.  53,  35  S.  E.  387  872 

Laurence  v.  Congregational  Church 
(1900),  164  N.  Y.  115,  58  N.  E.  24      97, 

271,  931 
Laurent  v.  Lanning  (1897),  32  Ore. 

11,  51  Pac.  80  677 

Lavery  v.  Arnold  (1899),  36  Ore.  84, 

58  Pac.  524  594 

Law  Trust  Society  v.  Hogue  (1900), 

37  Ore.  544,  62  Pac.  380  734,  756 

Lawe  V.  Plyde,  39  Wis.  345         29,  39,  47, 

886,  922 
Lawley  v.  Walden,  3  Swanst.  142  243 
Lawrence   v.    Bk.    of    liepublic,   35 

N.  Y.  320  340 

V.  Doolan,  68  Cal.  309  293 

V.  Fox,  20  N.  Y.  268  110 

V.  Montgomery,  37  Cal.  183     196,  207, 

457 
V.  Nelson,  21  N.  Y.  158  139 

V.  Peck  (1893),  3  S.  D.  645,  54 

N.  W.  808  830,  834 

r.  Rokes.  53Me.  110  248,251 

Lawson  v.  Barker,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  303       347 


CXll 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 
[the  refeeences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Lnv  Gas  ^I.u  iiine  Co.  v.  Neuse  Falls 

Man.  V,,.,  ill  N.  C.  74  756 

Lavboiirn    c.    Sevmour    (1893),   53 

Minn    105.  54  >f.  W.  H41  131,  132 

Liivin^'  '•.  Mt   Shasta  Mineral  Spring 

('"...  (I'.'Ol ),  135CmI.  141,07  Pac.48     818 
I^zar.l  r.  Wheeler,  22  Cal.  l-S'.t  !>'.» 

Leal.o  c.  Detrick,  18  In.l.  414        658,  824 
Leach  r.  Hill  (1H98),  100  Iowa,  171, 

7()  N.  W.  mi  140 

r.  Hill  (18(i«),»7  la.  81,  66  N.  W. 

■OH  64.J 

V.  Knndson  (1896),  97  la.  643,06 

N.  \y.  913  6 

V.  Leach,  2  N.  Y.  S.  C.  657  516. 

648 
V.  Rains  (1897),  149  Ind.  152,  48 

N.  E.  858  946 

r.  Ul.uiifcs,  49In.l.  2n  562,576 

Leader  rriiitiii^'  Co.  v.  Lowry  (1899), 

9()kla.  89.  59  Pac.  242 
Leadviile    Water    Co    v.   Leadville 
(1890),  22  Colo.  297,  45  Pac.  362 
Leahy  r.  Leahy  (1895),  97  Kv.  59,29 

S.  W.  852 
Lcaird  r.  Smith,  44  N.  Y.  618 
Leary  r.  Melcher,  14  N.  Y.  Suppl.  689    471 
Leasure  r.  Forquer  (1895),  27  Ore. 

334,  41  Pac.  665  678,  679 

Leavenson  v.  Lafontane,  3  Kan.  523     131, 

135,  138 
Leavenworth  v.  Packer,  52  Barb.  132    855, 

909 


674 

601 

566 
51 


Leavenworth,   etc.  Co.  v.  Atchison 

(1896),  137  Mo.  218,  37  S.  W.  913 

Leavenworth,  L.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Van 

Ril)er,  19  Kan.  317 
Leavenworth     Light,    etc.    Co.     v. 
Waller  ( 1902),  65  Kan.  514,  70  Pac. 
ot>5 
Leavitt  r  J\o]\  (1898),  55  Neb.  57,  75 
N.  W.  524 
r  Caller.  37  Wis.  46 
V.  S.  D    Mercer  Co.  (1902),  64 
Neb.  31,  )S9  N.  W.  42'i 
Lebanon   Steam  Lanndrv  '•.  Dyck- 

nian  ( 1900),  Ky.,  57  S.  W.  227     868,  876 
Lebanon  Trs.  v.  P'orrest,  15  B.  Mon. 

16K 
Lebcher  c  Lambert  (1900),  23  Utah, 

1, 03  Pac.  628 
Le  Clare  r.  Thibault  (1902),  41  Ore. 
601, 69  Pac.  552    850,  851 ,  863,  87 1 ,  888, 

927 
Lederer  v.  Union  Sav.  Bank  (1897), 

52  Neb.  133,  71  N.  W.  954  711,  714 

Lediard  r.  Boucher,  7  C.  &  P.  1  761 

Ledwieh  r.  McKim,  53  N.  Y.  307     75,  126, 

629 
Ledwith  r.  Campbell  (1903),— Neb. 

— ,  95  N.  W.  K3H 
Lee  /•.  Davis,  70  Ind  464 
r.  Khas  3  Sandf.  730 
f.  Meliew  (1K'.)9,,  H  Okla.  136,  50 
Pac.  U)4(S 


641 
637 


833 

353 
811 

829 


42 
656 


638 
598 
611 


733 


Lee  r.  Partridge,  2  Duer,  463  495 

I'.  Simpson,  29  Wis.  333          457,  633 

Lee  Bank  r.  Kitching,  7  Bosw.  664  Oil 

Leedy  v.  Nash,  67  Ind.  311             271,  310 

Leeke  /•.  Hancock,  76  Cal.  127  584 

Leese  r.  Sherwood.  21  Cal.  151  103 

Letter  r.  Field,  52  N.  Y.  621  724,  790 
Leggett  '■.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  64  Barh. 

23  325 
Lehigh  Val.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McFarlan, 

31  N.  J   F.q.  706.  758  509 
Lehinair  z\  Gi  iswold,  4U  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  lUO  927 

Lehman  v.  Schmidt,  87  Cal.  15  649 

Lehnen  v.  Purvis,  55  Hun,  535  471 
Lehnhardt  r.  Jennings   (1897),   119 

Cal.  192,  48  Pac.  66  666 

Leliow  V.  Simonton,  3  Colo.  346  112 

Leigh  V.  Thomas,  2  Ves.  312  392 

Leighton  v.  Grant.  20  Minn.  345  790 
Leihy   v.  AshLuid  Lumber  Co.,  49 

Wis.  165  576 

Leitch  r.  Wells,  48  N.  Y.  585  126 
Lo  May  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  105  Mo. 

361  575 

Lemon  v.  Trull,  13  How.  Pr  248  910 
Lenaghan  v.  Smith.  2  Phil.  .301  249,  250 
Lenhardt  v.  French  (1900),  57  S.  C. 

493,  35  S.  K.  701  655 
Lenno.x  v.  Eldred,  1  N.   Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

140  315 

Leno.x  >:  Reed,  12  Kan.  223  325 
Lent  r.  N.  Y.  &  Mass.  Ry.  Co.,  130 

N.  Y.  504  801 
Leonard  c.  Bovd  (1903),  Kv.,  71  S.  W. 

508  '                    ■  641 
V.  Roberts  (1894),  20  Colo.  88,  36 

Pac.  880  659 
V.  Rogan,  20  Wis.  5-10          17,  37,  633 
Leonhardt  >:  Citizens'  Hank  (1898), 

cl]  Neb.  38,  70  N.  W.  472  662 

Leopold  )\  Vankirk,  27  Wis.  152  617 
Lerdall  v.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.,  51 

Wis.  426  713 

Leroux  v.  Murdock,  51  Cal.  541  737 
Le  Roy  v.  Shaw,  2  Duer,  626  300,  402 
Le.sh  V.  Meyer  (1901),  03  Kan.  524, 

66  Pac.  245  95.  814 

Leslie  i'.  Maxey  (1902),  Ky.,  67  S.  W. 

8?9  735 

i\  Wiiev,  47  N.  Y.  648  292 
Lester  v.  Mcintosh  (1897),  161  Ga. 

675,  29  SE.  7  757 

Lestra.le  r.  Barth,  19  Cal.  660  52 
j  Lett  r.   ILinmiond   (1899),  59  Neb. 

339,  80  N.  W.  1042  20 

Leutv  r.  Ilillas,  2  De(;.  &  J.  110  256 
Level  Land  Co.  >:  Sivver  (1901 ),  1 12 

Wis.  442,  88  N.  W.  317    406,  407,  511,  666 

Levering  r.  Schnell,  78  Mo.  167  499 

Levi  >:  Haversteck,  51  Ind.  236  801 
Levister  r.  Railwav  Co.  (1899),  56 

S.  C.  508,  35  S.  E.  207  702 

Levy  V.   Brannan,  39  Cal.  4S5  783 

'r.  Loeb,  85  N.  Y.  305  908 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxin 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Levy  V.  Metropolis  Mfg.  Co.  (1900), 

73  Conn.  559,  48  Atl.  429         000 
V.  Noble  (190'2),  135  Cal.  559,  G7 

Pau.  1033  6G6 

Lewis  V.  Bortsfield,  75  Ind.  390  GIO 

V.   Clyde  S.  S.  Co    (1902),  131 

N.  C  052,  42  S.  lO.  909  819 

V.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co.  ( 1903),  —  N.  C. 

— ,  44  S.  K.  600  818 

V.  Duncan  (1903),  06  Kan.  300, 

71  Pac.  577  819 

V.  Dunne  (1901),  134  Cal.  291         445 
V.  Edwards,  44  Ind.  333  596,  748 

V.  Graham,  4  Abb.  Pr.  106  1-53 

V.  Greider,  51  N.  V.  231  207 

V.  Harwood,   28  Minn.  428,  10 

N.  W.  580  422,  426,  428 

V.  Henley,  2  Ind.  332  118 

V.  Hinson  (1902),  64  S.  C.  571,  43 

S.  E.  15  283,454,459 

V.  Marshall,  56  N.  Y.  663  155 

V.  McMillan,  41  Barb.  420  869 

V.  Piekeviuij  (1899),  58  Neb.  63, 

78  N.  \V  368  871 

V.  Rhodes  (1899),  150  Mo.  498, 52 

S.  \y.  11  32 

V.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1894), 

5  S.  D.  148,  58  N.  W.  580        154 
V.  Schultz  (1896),  98  la.  341,  67 

N.  W.  266  025 

V.  Scotia   Bldg.  &  Loan    Ass'n 

(1894),  42  Neb.  439, 60  N.W. 

881  614 

V.  Sheaman,  28  Ind.  427  935 

V.  Soule,  52  Iowa,  11  37,  42 

V.  Town  of  Brandenburg  (1898), 

105  Ky.  14,  47  S.  W.  862 
V.  Whitten,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  017 
V.  Williams,  3  Minn.  151      271 


712 
150 

278, 
375 


Lewis   Adm'r   v.   Taylor   Coal   Co. 

(1902) ,  112  Ky.  845, 66  S.  W.  1044 
Lexington  &  B.  S.  R.  Co.  i'.  Good- 
man, 15  How.  Pr.  85         35 
V.  Goodman,  5  Abb.  Pr.  493 
Ley  V.  Miller,  28  Neb.  822 
Levde  /•.  Martin,  16  Minn.  38 
Lilibv  '•.  Norri.s  142  Mass  246 
Liedersdorf  v.  Flint,  50  Wis.  401 

V.  Sec.  Ward  Bk.,  50  Wis.  406 
Liesc  V.  Meyer  (1898),  143  Mo,  .547, 

45  8.  W.  282  477,  644,  646 

Lieuallen  v  Mosgrove  (1898),  33  Ore. 
282,  54  Pac.  200 
V.  Mosgrove  (1900),  37  Ore.  446, 
61  i'nc.  1022 
Lifler  v.  Sherwood,  21  Hun,  573 
Lightly  V.  Clouston,  1  Taunt.  113 
Lignot  y.  Redding,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  285 


525 

501 
353 
113 
728,  751 
387 
29,  470 
458 


623 


636 
618 

652 
355, 

9:-;9 
178 


Lillie  V.  Case,  54  Iowa,  177 

Lilly  V.  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  (1900), 

Kv.,  56  S.  W.  722  822 

V.  Menke  (1894),  120  Mo.  100,  28 

S.  W.  643  252,  371,  005,  671 


Limberg  v.  Higginbotham,  11  Col. 

310  426,  428 

Limited  Inv.  Co.  ?•.  Glendale  Inv. 
Ass.  (1898),  99  Wis.  54,  74  N.  W. 
633  655 

Lincoln  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Ilutciiins  (1898),  55  Neb. 
158,  75  N.  W.  538  543,  013 

r.  Parker  (1902),  65  Kan.  819,  70 

Pac.  892  822 

Linden  w.  Green,  81  la.  365,  46  N.  W. 

1108  710 

V.  Hepburn,  3  Sandf.  668  29 

Linden  Land  Co.  v.  Milwaukee,  etc. 
Co.  (1900),  107  Wis.  493,  83  N.  W. 
851  196, 263 

Lindh  v.  Crowley,  26  Kan.  47  499 

Lindholm    r.    Itasca    Lumber    Co. 

(1896),  64  Minn.  40,  05  N.  W.  931     934 
Lindley  v.  Cross,  31  Ind.  106  352,  505 

Lindsay  r.  Mulqueen,  26  Hun,  485        626 
V.  Pettigrew  (lb'.>4),  5  S,  1).  500, 

59  N.  W.  726  618 

Lindsay,  etc.  Co.  v.  Carpenter  (1894), 

90  la.  529,  58  N.  W.  900  846,  849 

Liney  v.  Martin,  29  Mo.  28  504 

Lingeiifeiser  u.  Simon,  49  Ind.  82  290 

Linn  i:  Kugg,  19  Minn.  181  872 

Linton  v.  Jansen  (1903),  —  Neb.  — , 

95  N.  W.  675  814 

Lipman     r.    Jackson     Arch.     Iron 

Works,  128  N.  Y.  58  858 

Lipperd  v.  Edwards,  39  Ind.  165  187, 

188 
Lipprant  v.  Lipprant,  52  Ind.  273  576 

Litchfield  v.  Flint,  104  N.  Y.  543  111 

V.  Polk  Cy.,  18  Iowa,  70  118 

Littell  I'.  Harrington,  71  Mo.  390         830 
V.  Savre,  7  Hun,  485        277,  343,  372 
Little  V.  City  of  Portland  (1894),  26 

Ore.  235,  37  Pac.  911  470 

r.  Johnson,  26  Ind.  170  271 

V.  Va.  &  G.  H.  Water  Co.,  9  Nev. 

317  636 

Little  Ne.stucca  Road  Co.  v.  Tilla- 
mook County  (1897),  31  Ore.  1,  48 
Pac.  465  672 

Little's    Adm'r   r.   Citv  Nat.   Bank 

(IDOS),  —  Ky.  — ,  74 'S.  W.  699  932 

Littlefield   r.   Wm.   Bergenthal    Co. 

(1894),  87  Wis.  394,  58  N.  W.  743      715 
Littman  v.  Coulter,  23  Abb.  N.  Cas. 

60  916 

Livermore  r.  Biishiiell,  5  Hun,  285       293 
Livesey  v.  Livesey,  30  Ind.  398  783 

V.  Omalia  Hotel  Co.,  5  Neb.  50  575 
Livingston  v.  Tanner,  12  Barb.  481  510 
Livingstone   t:.   Lovgren   (1902),  27 

Wash   102,  67  Pac.  599  000 

r.  Ruff  (1903),  65  S.  C.  284,  43 

S.  E.  678  565,  687 

V.    School    Listrict    (1898),   11 

S.  D.  150,  70  N.  W.  301  584 

V.  Wagner,  23  Nev.  53,  42  Pac. 

290  588 


h 


CXIV 


TABLK    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  keperesces  are  to  the  pagbs] 


Llovd  V.  Liuuler,  o  Madd.  289  512 

V.  liawl  (l'JU2),  t)3  S.  C.  219,  41 

S.  E.  312  822 

Locke  c.  Chicago  Chronicle  Co. 
( 1899),  1071  a.  o90,  78  N.  W. 
49  783 

r.  Klunker  (1898),  123  Cal.  231, 

65  Pac.  993  159,  180 

V.  Mouhoii  (1895),  108  Cal.  49, 

41  Pac.  28  782 

i;.  Skow  (1902),  Neb.,  91  N.  W. 

572  G77 

Lockhart  v.  Bear  (1895),  117  N.  C. 

298,  23  S.  H  484  664 

Lockmaii  i-.  Heilly,  95  N.  Y.  64  334 

Lockwood  V.  Bridge  Co.  (1901),  60 

S.  C.  492,  38  S.  E.  112  599 

r.  Quackeiibush,  83  N.  Y.  600   75,  620, 

629 
r.  AVoods,  3  Ind.  App.  258  809 

Lodge  r.  Lewis  (1903),  32  Wash.  191, 

72  Pac.  1009  91 

Loehr  r.  Murpliy,  45  Mo.  App.  519      594 
Loewenberg    v.  Hosentiial,  18    Ore. 

178  918 

Loftus  I'.  Fischer  (1895),  106  Cal.  616, 

39  Pac.  1064  736 

Logan  V.  Hale,  42  Cal.  645  340 

r.  Smith,  70  Ind.  597  328 

r.  Wallis,  76  N.  C.  410     516,  521, 525, 

649 
Logan  Conntv  Nat.  Bank  v.  Barclay 

(1898),  KU'Ky.  97.  46  S.  \V.  675       802 
Lopan.^port  r.  Kihm  (1902),  159  Ind. 

68,  64  N.  E.  595  603 

Lohmiller  i-.  Indian  W.  Co.,  51  Wis. 

683  301,  305 

Lokken  v.  Miller  (1900),  9  X.  D.  512, 

84  N.  W.  368  802 

Loniax  r.  Bailev,  7  Blackf.  599  587 

r.  Hide,2  Vern.  185  333 

Lombard  v.  Cowham,  34  Wis.  486  46,  782, 

807,  880 
r.  McMillan  (1897),  95  Wis.  627, 

70  N.  W.  673  815 

London  v.  Perkins.  4  Bro.  P.  C.  158      363 
r.  Hiciimond,  2  Vern.  421  241 

Louergan    r.    LonLTgaii    (1898),    55 

Neb.  641,  76  N.  W.  16  735 

Long  V.  Collins  (1901).  15  S.  D.  259, 

88  N.  W.  571  934 

V.  Constant.  19  Mo.  320  99 

V.  Doxev,  50  Ind.  385  614 

V.    Eisenbeis   (1901),  23  Wash. 

556.  O.-i  Pac.  219  6.38 

i<.  Ilcinrich.  46  Mo.  603  89 

1-.  Mellftt  (1895),  94  la.  548,  63 

N    W.  190  608 

I'.  Morrison.  14  Ind.  .j95  229 

V.  Osborn  (1894),  91  la.  100,  59 

N.  W.  14  685 

V.  Hallway  Co.  (1897),  50  S.  C. 

49,  27  S.  E.  531  817 

v.lUuM  (1K'.(7),  148  Ind.  74,  47 

N.  E.  l.:0  718 


Long  V.  Scanlan  (1898),  105  Ga.424, 
31  S.  E.  436 
f.  Swindell,  77  N.  C.  176 
V.  Yancey  ville,  Bk.  of,  81  N.  C.  41 
Long  Beach,  etc.  District  c.  Dodge 

(1902),  135  Cal.  401,  67  Pac.  499 
Long  Creek  Bldg.  Ass'n  r.  State  Ins. 
Co.  (1896),  29  Ore.   569,  46  Pac. 
366  689, 

Longendyke  v.  Longendyke,44  Barb. 

366 
Longley  v.  Hudson,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

fJO'J 

V.  McVey  (1899),  109  la.  666,  81 
N.  W.  150 
Longshore   Printing  Co.   r.  Howell 

(1894),  26  Ore.  527,  38  Pac.  547    565, 
Looby  c.  West  Troy,  24  Hun,  78 
Lookabaugh  r.  La  Vance  (1897),  6 

Okla.  358,  49  Pac.  G5 
Lookout    Lumber    Co.   v.   Mansion 
Hotel  &  B.  Ky.  Co.,  109  N.  C.  568 
Loomer  v.  Thomas  (1893),  38  Neb. 

277,  56  N.  W.  973 
Loomis  V.  Brown,  16  Barb.  331     169, 

206, 
V.  Eagle  Bank,  10  Ohio  St.  327 
V.  Kollistcr  (1902),  75  Conn.  275, 

53  Atl.  579 
V.  Mowrv,  8  Hun,  311  627, 

V.  O'Neal,  73  Mich.  582 
V.  Kobinsoii,  76  Mo.  488 
V.  Ruck,  56  N.  Y.  620  123, 

V.  Youlc,  1  Minn.  175 
Loranger  v.  Big  Missouri  Mining  Co. 
(1895),  6  S.  D.  478,  61  N.  \V.  686 
Lord  V.  Dearing,  24  Minn.  110 

V.  Ilorr  (1902),  30  Wash.  477,  71 

Pac.  23  832, 

V.  Lindsay,  18  Hun,  489 
V.  Peaks  (1894),  41  Neb.  891,  60 

N.  W.  353 
V.  Russell  (1894),  64  Conn.  86, 

29  Atl.  242 
V.  Tiffany,  98  N.  Y.  412 
?-.  Underdunck,  1  Sandf.  Ch.  46 
Lorillard  i:  Clyde,  122  N.  Y.  498 
Lorney  v.  Cronan,  50  Cal.  610 
Los  Angeles  v.  Signoret,  50  Cal.  298 
Los  Angeles  Cv.  i-.  Babcock,  45  Cal. 

252 
Lottman  v.  Barnett,  62  Mo.  159 
Loughborough  v.  McNevin,  74  Cal. 

2.50 
Louis  V.  Brown,  7  Ore.  326 
Louis   Snyders    Sons    Co.  v.  Arm- 
strong, 37  Fed.  Rep.  18 
Louisville  v.  Snow's  Adm'r  (1900), 

107  Ky.  536,  54  S.  W.  860 
Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  r. 
Brantlcv's  Adm'r  (1894),  96 
Ky.  297,  28  S.  W.  477 
r.  Coi)as  (1894),  95  Ky.  460,  26 
S.  W.  179 
I  V.  Thompson,  18  B.  Mon.  735 


816 
303 
820 

675 


671 
226 
119 
64S 

709 

785 

642 
375 

913 

189, 
211 
138 

179 
649 
649 
103 
315 
611 

787 
517 

833 
891 

66- 

565 
307 
255 
111 
737 
598 

575 
637 

428 
753 

132 

665 

159 

817 
932 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxv 


[the  references  aSe  to  the  pages.] 


Louisville  &  P.  Canal  Co.  v.  Murphy, 

9  Bush,  522  544,  546,  005,  GG4 

Louisville  lly.  Co.  »•.  Will's  Adm'r 

( 1902),  —  Ky.  —  06  S^  W.  G28  525 

Louisville,  etc.  M.  K.  Co.  "  Bates 
(1896),14GLid.  5G4,45N.  E. 
108  682 

V.  Beauchamp  (1900),  108  Ky. 

47,  55  S.  W.  71G  6o9 

V.  Berkev  (180;;),  1^6  Ind.  181, 

35  N:  E.  3  082 

V.   Bloyd    (1900),  —  Ky.  — ,  55 

S.  VV.  694  681 

V.  Ft.  Wavne  Elec.  Co.  (1900), 

108  Ky.  113,  55  S.  W.  918       600 
V.  Kemper  (189G),  147  Ind.  561, 

47  N.  E.  214  601 

V.  Lawes  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W. 

426  590 

V.  Lynch  (1896),  147  Ind.  165, 

44  N.  E.  997  682 

V.  Pittman  (1901),  Kv.,  64  S.  W. 

460  '  664 

i>. Pointer's  Admr.  (1902),  — Ky. 

— ,  69  S.  W.  1108  642 

V.  Treadway,  143  Ind.  689  401 

Louisville,  N.  A.,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cau- 

ley,  119  Ind.  142  804 

Louisville,   St.  L.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

Neafus,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  1030  470 

Loustalot  V.  Calkins  (1898),  120  Cal. 

688,  53  Fac.  258  300,  398,  402 

Louvall  V.  Gridlev,  70  Cal.  570      470,  473 
Love  r.  Oldiiam,  22  Ind.  51  910 

Loveday    v.    Anderson    (1897),    18 

Wash.  322,  51  Pac.  463  613 

Lovejoj'   V.  Howe  (1893),  55  Minn. 

353,  57  N.  W.  57  107 

V.  Isbell  (1900),  73  Conn.  -368,  47 

Atl.  682  604 

V.  Robinson,  8  Ind.  399  920,  9.36 

Loveland  v.  Garnar,  74  Cal.  298  758 

V.  Garner,  71  Cal.  541  471 

Lovell  V.   Hammond  Co.  (1895),  66 

Conn.  500,  34  All.  511  688,  920 

Lovensohn  v.  Ward,  45  Cal.  8  892 

Lovering  v.  Kincr,  97  Ind.  130  329 

Lowber  v.  Connil,  36  Wis.  176  20 

Lowe  V.  Morgan,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  .368         244 
V.  Ozmnn  (1902),  137  Cal.  257, 

70  Pac.  87  674 

V.  Prospect  Hill  Cemetery  Ass'n 
(1899),  58  Neb.  94,  78  N.W. 
488  794 

V.  Riley  (1898),  57  Neb.  252,  77 

N.  W.  758  819 

V.  Turpie  (1896),  147  Ind.  6-52, 

44  N.  E.  25  686 

Lowell  V.  Lowell,  55  Cal.  316  734 

(;.  Parkinson,  4  Utah,  64  103 

Lower  v.  Denton,  9  Wis.  268  06 

Lowman  v.  West  (1894),  8  Wash.  355, 

36  Pac.  258  661,  815 

Lowry  v.  Button,  28  Ind.  473  666 

V.  Harris,  12  Minn.  255  270 


Lowry  v.  Hurd,  7  Minn.  356  937,  940 

V.  .Jackson,  27  S.  C.  318    177,  278,  348, 

360 
V.  Megee,  52  Ind.  107  570,  748 

V.  Moore  (1897),  IG  Wash.  476. 

48  Pac.  238  677,  678 

I).  8hane,  34  Ind.495  804 

Lowville,  Bank  of,  v.  Edwards,  11 

How.  Pr.  216  181 

Lubert  r.  Chauviteau,  3  Cal.  458     71,  936 
V.  East  Stroudsburg   Glass  Co. 

38  Hun,. 581  134 

Lubker  v.  Grand  Detour  I'low  Co. 

(1897),  53  Neb.  Ill,  73  N.  W.  457  615 
Lucas  V.  N.  Y.  C.  U.  Co.,  21  Barb.  245  525 
Luce  V.  Foster  (1894),  42  Neb.  818, 

60  N.  W.  1027  614 

Ludington  v.  Fatton  (1901),  111  Wis. 

208,  86  N.  W.  571  655 

Ludwig  V.  Blackshere  (1897),  102  la. 

36(),  71  N.  W.  356  643 

V.  Gillespie,  105  N.  Y.  653  153 

Luke  V.  Marshall,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  356    202 
Lull  V.  Anamosa  Nat.  Bank  (1900), 

110  la.  537,  81  N.  W.  784       191, 
276,  278,  39.5 
V.  Fox,  etc.  Co.,  19  Wis.  100    499,  502 
Lumbermen's  Ins.  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 
Paul    (1899),    77     Minn.   410,    80 
N.  W.  357  326 

Lumbert  v.  Palmer,  29  Iowa,  104  621 

Lundberg   v.   Davidson    (1897).    68 

Minn.  328,  71  N.  W.  71,  395  934 

Luse  V.  Oaks,  36  Iowa,  562  313 

Lustig  V.  N.  Y.,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co., 

65  Hun,  547  6-39 

Lutes  V.  Briggs,  64  N.  Y.  404         118,  262 
Lux  V.  McLeod  (1893),  19  Colo.  465, 

36  Pac.  246  787 

Lyford  v.   Martin  (1900),  79  Minn. 

243,  82  N.  W.  479  686,  704 

V.  No.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  92  Cal.  93         205 
Lyman  v.  City  of  Lincoln  (1894),  38 

Neb.  794,  57  N.  W.  531  106 

V.  Kurtz  (1901),  166  N.  Y.  274, 

59  N.  E.  903  642 

Lynch  v.  Bechtel  (1897),  19   Mont. 

548,  48  Pac.  1112  665 

v.  Free  (1896).  64  Minn.  277,  66 

N.  W.  277  853 

Lynd  v.  Picket,  7  ^linn.  184  737 

Lyon  i\  Bunn,  6  Iowa,  48  786 

V.  Powell,  78  Ala.  351  337 

Lytle  V.  Burgin,  82  N.  C.  301  283 

V.  Lytle,'  2  Mete.  (Ky  )  127     90,  101, 

104,  311 

V.  Lytle,  37  Ind.  281  544,  568 


M. 

Maas  V.  Goodman,  2  Hilt.  275 
Mabnry  v.  Ruiz,  58  Cal.  11 
McAhee  v.  Randall,  41  Cal.  136 


122,  131 
337 

865,  867, 
946 


CXVl 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  tbe  pages.] 


McAdam  v.  Scudder  (1894),  127  Mo. 

;>45,  30  S.  W.  1()8  599,  602 

McAdams  c.  Sutton,  24-  Oliio  St.  333  617 
McAdow  I-  Koss.  53  Mo.  199  833,  927 
McAllister  v.  Jolmson  (1899),  108  la. 

42.  78  X.  W.  790  783 

i:  AVi-lkiT.  89  Minn.  .J8.3  592 

McArdle  r.  McArdle.  12  Minn.  98  821 
McArthur  r.  (lark  (1902i,  SG  Minn. 

ItJ.j,  90  N.  W.  369  687 

V.  Clarke    Dnip  Co    (1896),  48 

Xeb.  899,  07  N.  W.  861    592,  068, 


v.  Drvden  (1897),  0  N.  1).  438, 

71  N.  W.  125 
V.  Franklin,  15  fJliio  St.  485    Sll 


709 

109 
,  325, 
335 
V.  Green  Bav  &  Miss.  Can.  Co  . 

34  Wis. "139  920,927 

c.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340  249,  350 

McBeth  V.  \'an  Sickle,  0  Nev.  l:!4         114 
McBrayer  r.  Dean  (1897),  100  Kv. 

398,  38  S.  W.  508  '        97 

McBride  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  20  N.  Y. 

450  100 

McCabe  v.  Grey,  20  Cal.  509  137 

V.  I-Iealv  (1902),  138  Cal.  81,  70 

I'ac.  1008  345 

McCall  V.  Porter  (1903),  42  Ore.  49, 

71  Pac.  926  604 

V.  Yard,  1  Stockt.  358  378 

McCallister's   Adm.  v.   Sav.  Bk.  of 

Louisville,  80  Ky.  684  178 

McCandless    v.   Inland    Acid      Co. 
(1902),  115  Ga.  968,  42  S-  E.  449    462, 

640 
McCann  i-.  City  of  Louisville  (1901). 

—  Ky.  — ,  63  S.  W.  446   263,  378, 

383,  388,  390 

V.  Pennie  (1893),  100  Cal.  517,  35 

I'ac.  158  712 

McCarnan  v.  Cocliran,  57  Ind.  106 

McCarthy  v.  Garraj^hty,  10  Uuio  St. 

438 
McCarlin  v.  Traphagen's  Adm.,  43 

N.  J.  Kq.  323 
McCartnev  /•   Welcli,  44  Barb.  271 
McCartv  r.  Fremont,  23  Cal.  106 
r.  Kinsey  (1899),  154  Ind.  447, 

57  N.  E.  108 
V.  IJoberts,  8  Ind.  150 
V.  Hood    Hotel    Co.  (1898),  144 
Mo.  397,  46  S.  W.  172 
McCarville  r.  Bovie  (1895),  89  Wis. 

651,62  N.  W.  517 
McCauKhey  i-.  Scliuette  (1897),  117 
Cal.  22.3,  40  Pac.  606,  48  Pac.  1088 


818 
658 


349 
316 


804 

808 

082 
568 


569, 
007 
McClaine   r.    Fairchild    (1901),    23 

Wanli.  758.  63  Pac.  517  043 

McClane  r.  White,  5  Minn.  178        46,  51 

McClellan  f.  Chippewa  Valley  Elec. 

Ky.  Co.  (1901),  110  Wis.  326,  85 

N.  W.  lOlH  625,089 

-McClellnnd  r.  Nichols,  24  Minn.  170     784 


McClendon  v.  Hernando  Co.  (1896), 

100  Ga.  219,  28  S.  E.  152  000,  674 

McClintic's  Adm.   v.   Cory,  22  Ind. 

170  940 

McCIoskey  r.  San  Francisco,  06  Cal. 

104  140 

McClure  v.  Dee  (1902),  115  la.  546, 

88  N.  VV.  1093  0 

1-.  La   Plata   Countv   (1896),  23 

Colo.  130,  46  Pac.  677  665 

McClurg  i:  Phillips,  49  Mo.  315  472 

V.  State  Bindery  Co.,  53  N.  W. 

Kep  428  426,  428 

McColgan  >•   Territory  of  Oklalioma 

( 1897),  5  (Jkla.  5<.7,'49  P.ic.  1018  081 
McCollister  r.  Willey,  52  Iml.  382  821 
McComb  v.  Spangler,  71  Cal.  418  337 

McConihe  v.  Hollister,  19  Wis.  269     -865, 

872  88.5 
McConnell  v.  Brayner,  68  Mo.  461      'l78, 

205 
r.  Spicker  (1901),  15  S.  D.  98, 

87  N.  W.  574  822 

McConniff  v.  Van  Dusen  (1898),  57 

Neb.  49,  77  N.  W.  348  417,  421 

McCord  r.  Hill  (1899),  104  Wis.  457, 

80  N.  W.  735  712 
V.  Seale,  56  Cal.  262                         614 

McCorkell  v.  Karhoff  (1894),  90  la. 

545,  58  N.  W.  013  606 

McCorkle  v.  Mallory  (1903),  30  Wash. 

632,  71  Pac.  186  515,  703 

McCorniick  r.  Basal,  46  Iowa,  236        598 
V.  Interstate,  etc.,  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 

154  Mo.  191,  55  S.  W.  252       587. 
624 
i:  Lawton,  3  Neb.  449  376 

v.  Penn.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 

303  232 

McCormick  Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  ". 
Belfanv  ( 1899),  78  Minn.  370, 

81  N.  W.  10  668 
V.  Cummins  (1899),  59  Neb.  330, 

80  N.  W.  1049  822 

r.  Gust;ifson  (1898),  54  Neb.  276, 

74  N.  W.  576  911 

V.    Iliatt     (1903),  —  Neb. —,  95 

N.  W.  627  838 

McCormick    Mach.    Co.   v.   Ilovey 

(1899).  36  Ore.  259,  59  Pac.  189  740 
McCormick,    etc    Co.    v.    Markert 

(1899;,  107  la.  340,  78  N.  W.  33  6 

McCotter  v.  Lawrenc,  6  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  392  239,  255,  256,  358 

McCown  V.  McSween,  29  S.  C.  130      718 
V.  Sims,  69  N.  C.  159  472 

McCoy  V.  Iowa  Ins.  Co.  (1898),  107 

la.  80,  77  N.  W.  520  819 

V.  Jones  (1899),  01  O.  St.  119, 

55  N.  K.  2 19  607 

V.  Yager.  34  Mo.  134  455 

McCrary  r.  Deming,  38  Iowa,  527        873 

McCreary  v.  Marston,  56  Cal.  403        807 

McCrorv  r.  Parks,  18  Ohio  St.  1  !« 

V.  Vibbard,  51  Hun,  227  872.  87!J 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


CXVU 


[the  references  are  to  tue  pages.] 


McCulloch's  Adai.  v.  lloUingsvvorth, 

27  Ind.  115  24U 

McCullougli  r.  Colfax  County 
( 1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W. 
29  671,  686 

V.  Dovey  (1001),  61  Neb.  G75,  85 

N.  W.  8'.io  102 

V.  Lewis,  1  Disnev,  564  935 

V.  Plioenix  Ins.  Co.,  113  Mo.  606     689 

McDiUiiel  V.  Carver,  40  Ind.  250  814 

I'.  Pressler,  3  Wasli.  636  94,  727 

McDearnian  r.  McClure,  31  Ark.  550     377 

McDearmott  r.  Sedgwick  (1897),  140 

Mo.  172,  39  S.  \V.  776  811 

McDevitt  V.  City  of  St.  Paul  (1896), 

66  Minn.  14,  68  N.  W.  178  228 

McDill  V.  Gunn,  43  Ind.  315  311 

McDonald  v.  American  Nat.  Bank 
{ 1901 ),  25  Mont.  456, 65  Pac. 
806  107 

V.  Backus,  45  Cal.  262  376 

V.   Bankers'  Life  Ass'n  (1900), 

154  Mo.  618,  55  S.  W.  999       678 
V.   Bice   (1901),  113  Li.  44,  84 

N.  W.  085  822 

V.  Davey  (1900),  22  Wasli.  366, 

60  Pac.  1116  106 

V.  Holmes,  22  Ore.  212  66 

V.  Kneeland,  5  Minn.  352  91 

V.  Mackenzie  (1887),  24  Ore.  573, 

14  Pac.  868  877 

V.  Plncus  (1893),  13  Mont,  83, 

32  Pac.  283  787 

V.  Second  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  106 

la.  517,  76  N.  \V.  1011     444,  453 
V.    Southern     Cal.    R.    K     Co. 
(1894),  101  Cal.  206, 35  Pac. 
643  825 

McDonell   v.  Buffum,  31  How.  Pr. 

154  778 

McDonough  v.  Carter  (1896),  98  Ga. 

703,  25  S.  E.  938  196 

V.  Craig  (1894),  10  Wash.  239, 

38  Mac.  11)34  317 

V.  Great  Nortiiern  Rv.  Co. 
(189ft),  15  Wash.  244,  46 
Pac.  334  639 

McDougal  V.  Maguire,  35  Cal.  274         920 
McDougald  v.  Hulet  (1901),  132  Cal. 

154,  64  Pac.  278  865 

McDoucjall  V.  Wallinur,  48  Barb.  -364     934 

McDowell  >:  Clark,  68  X.  C.  118  309 

V.  Hendrix,  67  Ind.  513  219 

V.  Law,  35  Wis.  171  111 

McEldowney  v.  Madden  (1899),  124 

Cal.  108,  oQ  Pac.  783  421 

McElfresh    v.   Kirkendall,  36  Iowa, 

224  313 

McElwaine  v.  Hosey  (1893),  135  Ind. 

481,  35  N.  E.  272  615 

McElwaine-Richards    Co.    v.    Wall 

(1902),  159  Ind.  557,  65  N.  E.  752    601 
McEntee  r.  Cook,  76  Cal.  187  562 

McFadden  v.  Santa  Ana,  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

87  Cal.  464  229 


McFadden  v.  Stark  (1893),  58  Ark. 

7,  22  S.  W.  884  699,  604 

V.  Swinerton  (1900),  36  Ore.  336, 

59  Pac.  816  410 

McFarland  r.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
(1894),  125  Mo  253,  28 
S.  W.  590  817 

V.  West  Side  Improvement 
Ass'n  (1898),  5b  Neb.  277, 
76  N.  W.  581  567 

McGannon  v.  Millers'  Nat.  Ins.  Co. 

(1902),  171  Mo.  143,  71  S.  W.  160     671 
McGavock  i'.  City  of  Omaha  (1894), 

40  Neb.  64,  58  N.  W.  543  615 

McGean  v.  Metrop.   Elev.   Ry.  Co., 

133  N.  Y.  9  103 

McGillivrav  v.  McGiilivray   (1896), 

9  S.  D.  187,  68  N.  W.  316  612,666 

McGlamory   v.    McCormick   (1896), 

99  Ga.  148,  24  S.  E.  941  198 

McGlasson  v.  Bradford,  7  Bush,  250     592 
McGlauriin    i-.    Wormser    (1903),— 

Mont.  —  ,  72  Pac.  428  671 

McGlothlin  v.  Hemery,  44  Mo.  350     476 

McGonigal  v.  Colter,  32  Wis.  614         276, 

278,  662,  725 

McGonigle  v.  Kane  (1894),  20  Colo. 

292,  38  Pac.  367  682 

McGovern  v.  Payn,  32  Barb.  83  630 

McGrath  v.  Balser,  6  B.  Mon.  141         635 
McGregor  v.  Auld,  53  N.  W.  Rep. 

845  911 

McGrew  v.  Armstrong,  5  Kan.  284       780 
V.  Lamb  (1903),  31   Wash.  485, 

72  Pac.  100 .  685 

McGuire  v.  Lamb,  17  Pac.  Rep.  749    931 
McHale  v.   Maloney  (1903),  — Neb. 

-^,  93  N.  W.  677  657 

McHard  v.  Williams  (1896),  8  S.  D. 

381,  66  N.  W.  930        492,  493,  913,  924 
McHugh   V.  Louisville   Bridge   Co. 

(1901),  Ky.,  65  S.  W.  456  666 

Mcllvame  v.  Egerton,  2  Robt.  422        872 
Mclntire   v.  Caliioun,  27  Mo.  App. 

513  830 

V.   Weioand,   24   Abb.  N.   Cas. 

312  832 

Mcintosh  V.  City  of  Omaha  (1002), 

Neb.  91  N.  W.  527  756 

I'.  Ensign,  28  N.  Y.  169    276,  299, 301, 

^  305 

V.  Mcintosh,  12  How.  Pr.  289     525, 

526 
V.  Rankin  (1896),  134  Mo.  310, 

35  S.  W.  995  466,  620 

V.  Zaring  (1897),  150  Ind.  301, 49 

N.  E.  164  185,  188,  203,  205, 

206,  215 
McKasy  r.  Huher  (1896),  65  Minn. 

9,  67  N.  W.  650  785 

McKay  v.  Broad,  70  Ala.  377  256 

V.  McDougal    (1897),  19  Mont. 

488,  48  Pac.  988  657 

u.  Ward  (1899),  20  Utah,  149,  57 

Pac.  1024  108 


cxvm 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  a 

McKee  r.  Eaton,  26  Kan.  226  177 

r.  Lineberger.  09  N.  C.  217  151 

c.  Pope,  18  B.  -Mon.  54S  457 

McKeen  c.  Naugliton,  b8  Cal.  462  815 

McKegnev  i:  "VVidekuul,  6  Bush,  107  911, 

913 
McKeighan    i-.    Hopkins,    10    Xeb. 

33  637 

McKensie  v.  Farrell,  4  Bosw.  192  916 
McKenzie  r.  L'Amoureux,  11  Barb. 

516  380,  384,  387 

f.   Pendleton's  Adm.,  1    Busli, 

164  935 

McKetlian  /•.  Kay,  71  N.  C.  165  348 
McKibbeii    r.  Worthington's    Ex'r 
(1898),    103  Kv.   356,   45   S.    W. 

233                    ■  333 
McKibbin    r.   Ellingson   (1894),   58 

Minn.  200,  59  X.  W.  1003  678 

McKillip  V.  McKillip,  8  Barb.  552  161, 

162 

McKinley  v.  Irvine,  13  Ala.  681  348 
^IcKinney  '■.  McKinney,  8  Ohio  St. 

423  821 

/•.  West.  Stage  Co.,  4  Iowa,  420  220 
McKinnon  v.  McKinnon,   81  N.  C. 

201  111,  154 

r.  Morrison,  104  N.  C.  354  913 
V.  Palen  (1895),  62  Minn.  188,  64 

N.  W.  387  870 

McKissen  v.  Sherman,  51  Wis.  303  791 
McKnight  v.  Bertram  Heating,  etc. 
Co.  (1902),  65  Kan.  850,  70 

Pac.  345  102 
c.  Dunlop,  4  Barb.  36              648,  649 

f.  M'Cutchen,  27  Mo.  436  66 

McKoon  V.  Ferguson,  47  Iowa,  636  620 
McKune   v    Santa  Clara,  etc.,  Co. 

(1805),  110  Cal.    480.  42  Pac.  980  228 

McKvriiig  V.  Bull,  16  N.  Y.  297     706,  797, 

798,  801,  802 

McLachlan  ;•.  Staples,  13  Wis.  448  476 

McLain  v    Maracle  (1900),  60  Neb. 

359,  83  N.  W.  820  025 
McLamb  r.  McPhail  (1900),  126  N.  C 

218.  35  S.  E.  426  831 
McLane  v.  Bovee,  35  Wis.  27        782,  807 
r.   Kellv   (1808),  72  Minn.  395, 

75'N.  W. 001  051 
McLaughlin  /•.  Deadwood  First  Nat. 

Bk.,  6  Dak.  406  150 
V.  Great  W.  Ins.  Co.,  20  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  536  153 

r.  McLaiighiin.  16  Mo.  242  504 
V.  Webster  (1804),  141  N.  Y.  76, 

35  N.  E.  1081  015,  642,  803 

r.  Wiueler,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  816  754 

I-.  Winner,  63  Wis.  120  874 
McLe»:n  v.  Baldwin  (1902),  136  Cal. 

565,  69  Pac.  259  804 
V.  City  of  Lewiston  (1902),  Ida- 
ho, 60  Pac.  478  509 
i:  Dean  (18961,  66  Minn.  369,  69 

N.  W.  140  160 

i;.  Leach,  68  N.  C.  95  874 


RE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 

.McLeod  i:  Scott,  38  Ark.  72  206 

r.  Snyder,  10  S.  W.  Rep.  494         103 

McMahan    i-.    Canadian     Ky.     Co. 

(1901)  40  Ore.  14b,  66  Pac. 

708  614,  615.  636 

V.  Miller,  82  N.  C.  317  618 

r.  Spinning,  51  Ind.  187  727,  908 

McMahon  r.  Allen,  3  Abb.  i'r.  89        412, 

414,  524 
McMaken  v.  McMaken,  18  Ala.  576  257 
McManamee  i\   Mo.   Pac.   Kv.  Co. 

(1896),  135  Mo.  440.  37  S.  W.  119     682 
McManus  v.  Smith,  53  Ind.  211       49,  887 
V.  Walters  (1901),  62  Kan.  128, 

61  Pac.  686  641 

McMaster  r.  Booth,  4  How.  Pr.  427  541 
McMenomy  r.  Talbot,  84  Cal.  279  576 
McMillan  v.  Baxley  (1893),  112  N.  C. 

578,  16  S.  E.  845  191 

V.  Boyles,  14  Iowa,  107  118 

V.  Gambill  (1894),  115  N.  C.  352, 

20  S.  E.  474  734 

McMurphy  i-.  Walker,  20  Minn.  382  738 
McMurrav,  In  re  Estate  of  (1899), 

107  la.  648,  78  N.  W.  691    612,  713,  822 
McMurray-Judge,  etc.  Co.  v.  City  of 
St.  Louis  (1896),  138  Mo.  608,  39 
S.  W.  467  565,  656 

McNamara  v.  Crystal  ^lining  Co. 
( 1900),  23  Wash.  26, 62  Pac. 
81  417,418 

v.  Lyon  (1897),  60  Conn.  447,  37 

Atl.  081  781 

V.  McDonald    (1897),  69  Conn. 

484,  38  Atl.  54  585 

r.  McNamara,  9  Abb.  Pr.  18  890 

McNamee  v.  Carpenter,  o(»  Iowa,  276    205 

McNeady  v.  Hyde.  47  Cal.  481  35 

McNear  r.  Williamson    (1902),  106 

Mo.  358,  66  S.  W.  160  198 

McNeil  V.  Tenth  Nat.  Bank,  46  N.  Y. 

325  123,  124,  126 

McNider  v.  Sirrine,  50  N.  W.  Kep. 

200  637 

McNulty  V.  Citv  of  New  York  (1001), 

168  N.  Y.  117,  61  N.  E.  Ill         777,  819 
McPeak  v.  Mo.  l^ac.  Kv.  Co.  (1895), 

128  Mo.  017,  30  S.  W.  170  605,  676 

McPhail  V.  Hyatt,  20  Iowa,  137  725 

McPherson  v.  I'eatherstone,  37  Wis. 

632  42 

V.  Meek,  30  Mo.  345  873.  874 

V.  Weston.  64  Cal.  275  15,  94 

McQuade  i'.  Chicago  &  N.  Y.  Ry. 

Co.,  68  Wis.  616  778 

r.  Collins  (1894),  03  la.  22,  61 

N.  W.  213  70.3,  710 

McQueen  v.  Babcock,  13  Abb.  I'r. 

268  635 

McKae,  Re,  L.  R.  25  Ch.  D.  16  372 

McReady  v.  Rogers,  1  Neb.  124  301,  307 
McRoberts  v.  So.  Minn.  R.  Co.,  18 

Minn.  108  178 

McVean  v.  Scott.  46  Barb.  370  301 

McVey  v.  Cantrell,  70  N.  Y.  295  316 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXIX 


[tbe  keferences  are  to  the  pages.] 


McWilliams   v.  Bannister,  40  Wis. 

489  769 

Macey  v.  Stark  (1893),  IIG  Mo.  481, 

21  S.  W.  1088  781 

Madien  v.  Tel.  Co.  (1902),  63  S.  C. 

363,  41  S.  E.  448  454 

Machinery  Co.  v.  Laev  (1898),  100 

Wis.  644,  76  N.  W.  596  681 

Mack  V.  Burt,  5  Hun,  28  284 

V.  Snell  (1893),  140  N.  Y.  193, 

35  N.  E.  493  908 
Mackay  v.  Sniitli  (1902),  27  Wash. 

442, 67  Pac.  982  665 

Mackenzie    v.   Edinburg  Scii.    Trs., 

72  Ind.  189  178 

Mackey  i'.  Auer,  8  Hun,  180  38,  581,  578, 

667 
Macon  v.  Paducah  St.  Ry.  Co.  (1901), 

110  Ky.  680,  62  S.  W.  496  674 

Maddox  v.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry. 
Co.  (1899),  110  Ga.  301,  34 
S.  E.  1036  641 

V.  Teague  (1896),  18  Mont.  593, 

47  Pac.  209  421 

V.  Teague  (1896),  18  Mont.  512, 

46  Pac.  535  703 

V.  Wagner  (1900),  111  Ga.  146, 

36  S.  E.  609  588 
Maders  v.  Lawrence,  49  Hun,  360  910 
Madison  Av.  Bp.  Ch.  v.  Oliver  St. 

Bp.  Ch.,  73  N.  Y.  83  29 

Madison  Cy.   Com'rs  v.  Brown,  28 

Ind.  161  118 

Madox  V.  Jackson,  3  Atk.  406  372,  377 
Maflfett  V.  Tliompson  (1898),  32  Ore. 

546.  52  Pac.  566  867,  887 


239 


155 

584 


611 
685 


817 


jee  V.  Cutler,  43  Barb 
V.  Kast,  49  Cal.  141 
V.  Waupaca  Cy.  Sup.,  38  Wis. 
247 
Maggs  V.  Morgan  (1903),  30  Wash. 

604,  71  Pac.  188 
Maguire  v.  Eichmeier  (1899),  109  la. 
301,  80  N.  W.  395 
V.  Vice,  20  Mo.  429  11,  20,  38 

Magwire  v.  Tyler,  47  Mo.  161     20,  29,  31 
Mahan  v.  Ross,  18  Mo.  121  935 

Mahaska  Cy.  State  Bk.  v.  Christ,  82 

Iowa,  56  942 

Maher  v.  Hibernia  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.  Y. 

283  34 

Mahoney  v.  Hardware  Co.  (1897),  19 

Mont.  877,  48  Pac.  545     735,  740 

I'.  McLean,  26  Minn.  415  279 

V.  Robins,  49  Ind.  146  791 

Mahon's  Adm'r  ;;.  Sawyer,  18  Ind. 

73 
Main   v.   Jolinson   (1893),   7  Wash. 
321,  35  Pac.  67 
V.  Ray  (1900),  Ky.,  57  S.  W.  7 
Maine   v.    Chicago,   etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1899),  109  la.  260,  80  N.  W.  315 
Maire  v.  Garrison,  83  N.  Y.  14 
Maisenbacker  v.  Society  Concordia 
(1899),  71  Conn.  369,  42  Atl.  67 


786 

398 
665 

604 
255 

451 


Maitland  v.  Zanga  (1896),  14  Wasli. 

92,  44  Pac.  117  811 

Maize   v.  Bradley   (1901),   Ky.,   64 

S.  W.  655  809 

Majors  v.  Taussig  (1894),  20  Colo. 

44,  36  Pac.  816  421 

Makepeace  v.  Davis,  27  Ind.  352  270,  278 
Maldaner   v.  Beurhaus    (1900),   108 

Wis.  25,  84  N.  W.  25  494 

Malin  v.  Malin,  2  Johns.  Ch.  238  238,  251 
Mallinckrodt    Chemi(;al    Works   v. 

Nemnich  (1902),  169  Mo.  388,  69 

S.  W.  355  565 

Mallory  Commission  Co.  v.  Elwood 

(1903),  120  la.  632,  95  N.  W.  176       911 
Malloy  V.  Chicago  &  Northwestern 

R.  R.  Co.  (1901),  109  Wis.  29,  85 

N.  W.  130  822 

Malm  V.  Thelin  (1896),  47  Neb.  686, 

66  N.  W.  650  677 

Malmsten   v.    Berryhill   (1895),   63 

Minn.  1,  65  N.  W.  88  433 

Malone  v.  Kelly  (1897),  101  Ga.  194, 

28  S.  E.  689  641 

V.  Stilwell,  15  Abb.  Pr.  421  501 

Manaudas  v.  Heilner  (1896),  29  Ore. 

222,  45  Pac.  758  671 

Manchester  v.  Sahler,  47  Barb.  155  315 
Manders  v.  Craft,  32  Pac.  Rep.  836  660 
Mandlebaum  v.  Russell,  4  Nev.  551  301 
Manette  v.  Simpson,  15  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

448  153 

Maney  v.  Hart  (1895),  11  Wash.  67, 

39  Pac.  268  639 

Mangles  v.  Dixon,  3  H.  L.  Cas.  702  123 
Mangold  v.  Oft  (1901),  63  Neb.  397, 

88  N.  W.  507  806 

Mangum  v.  Bullion,  etc.  Co.  (1897), 

15  Utah,  534,  50  Pac.  834     594,603,  629 
Manhattan  Brass  &.  M.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son, 58  N.  Y.  80  315 
Manly  v.  Howlett,  55  Cal.  94                  807 
Mann  v.  MinB.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  38  Wis. 

114  117 

V.  Fairchild,  2  Keyes,  106  37 

V.  Marsh,  35  Barb.  68  225 

V.  Pentz,  3  N.  Y.  415  213 

V.  Rich  Hill.  28  Mo.  App.  497        229 
Manney  v.  Ingram,  78  N.  C.  96      872,  918 
Manning  v.  Gasharie,  27  Ind.  399         945 
V.  Manning,  79  N.  C  293  232 

I'.  Monaghan,  23  N.  Y.  539  304 

V.  Tyler,  21  N.  Y.  567      723,  791,  809 
V.  Viers  (1894),  38  Neb.  32,  56 

N.  W.  719  638 

V.  Winter,  7  Hun,  482  772 

Manry   v.   Waxelbaum  Co.   (1899), 

108  Ga.  14,  33  S.  E.  701  565 

Mansur-Tebbetts     Co.      v.      Willet 

(1900),  lOOkla.  383,  61  Pac.  1066     678 
Manuf.  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Russell,  6  Hun, 

375  753 

Manwell  v.  Burlington,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 

(1894),  89  la.  708,  57  N.  W.  441  602,  606 
Maple  V.  Beach,  43  Ind.  51  172 


cxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references 

:Maples  r.  Oellcr.  1  Nev.  233  293 

Mares    r.    Woriniiipton    (1899),    8 

N.  1).  ;rJ9,  7!t  N.  \V.  441  640 

Margraf  c.  Muir,  57  N.  Y.  159  29 

Marie  i:  Garrison,  tio  N.  Y.  14      189,  205, 

598 
Jlarine  &  F.  Ins.  Bk.  of  Ga.  v.  Jaun- 

cey.  1  Barb.  486  122 

Marine  Ins.  Co.  r.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ky. 

Co..  41  Fed.  Hep.  64o  217 

Marion  Bond  Co   c.  Mexican  Coffee 

Co.  {190-!),—  Ind.  — ,  65N.E.  748    671 
Maris  c  Cle vender  (1902),  29  Wash. 

895,  6y  Pac.  1089  711 

Mark  r.  North  (1900),  155  Ind.  575, 

57  N.  E.  902  657 

Mark  Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Improve- 
ment Co.  (1«96),  94  Wis.  322,  68 
N.  W.  1013  662 

Marker  v.  School  District  (1899),  58 

Neb.'  47^1,  78  N.  W.  932  565,  568 

Marks  r.  Marsh,  9  Cal.  96  316 

r.  Savward,  50  Cal.  57  807 

Mark  well"  v.   Mark  well  (1900),  157 

Mo.  326.  57  S.  W.  1078  350 

Marley  v.  Smith,  4  Kan.  183         736,  769, 

801,  803 
Marlow  v.  Barlew,  53  Cal  456  316 

Marquat  i\  Marquat,  12  N.  Y.  336       17, 
36,  276,  475 
Marr  v.  Lewis,  31  Ark.  203  55,  942 

Marriott  v.  Ciise,  12  Colo.  561  942 

Marsii  V.  Backus,  16  Barb.  483      302,  306 
r.  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

413  119 

V.  Falker,  40  N.  Y.  562  629 

V.  Goodrell,  11  Iowa,  474  293 

V.  OHver,  1  McCarter,  262  253 

V.  Pugh,  43  Wis.  597  662 

i;.  Waupaca  Cy.  Sup.,  38  Wis. 

250  177,  240,  270 

Marshall  v.  Gray,  57  Barb.  414      629,  630 
V.  Mo8elev,"21  N.  Y.  280  195 

V.  Hugg  (1896),  6  Wyo.  270,  44 

Pac.  700  655 

V.  Shafter.  32  Cal.  176  781 

Marshall  &.  lUley  Bank  v.  Child 
(1899),  76  Minn.  173,  78  N.  W. 
1048  801 

Marshall  Field  Co.  v.  Oren  Kuffcorn 
Co.  (1902),  117  la.  157,  90  N.  W. 
618  734 

Marshburn   v.   Lashlie   (1898),    122 

N.  C.  237,  29  S.  E.  371  809 

Martin  v.  Am.  Exp.  Co.,  19  Wis.  336    785 
V.  Bank  (1902),  131  N.  C.  121, 

42  S.  E.  558  040 

V.  Clay  (1899),  8  Okla.  46,  56 

Pac.  715  191 

1-.  Eastman  (1901 ),  109  Wis.  286, 

H.',  N.  W.  359  867 

V.  Erie  Preserving  Co.,  48  Hun, 

HI  768 

V.  Home  Bank  (1809),  100  N.  Y. 

190.  54  N.  E.  717  642 


ARE  TO   THE  PAG«S.] 

Martin  v.  KunzmuUer,  37  X.  Y.  396      131, 

133 
V.  Luger  Furniture  Co.   (1898), 

8  N.  I).  220,  77  X.  W.  1003     638 
V.  Martin  (1902),  130  X.  C.  27, 

40  S.  E.  822  669 

V.  Mattison,  8  Abb.  Pr.  3  519 

V.  Mobile  &  O.  R.  Co.,  7  Bush, 

116  11 

!•.  Xoble,  29  Ind.  216  326,  333 

V.  Pillsbury,  23  Minn.  175  131 

V.  Pugh,  23  Wis.  184  801,  913 

i:  Railway  Co.  (1897),  51  S.  C. 

150,  28  S.  E.  .303  817 

r.  Richardson,  68  N.  C.  255  135 

r.  Shannon  (1897),  101  la.  620, 

70  X.  W.  720  643 

r.    Sherwood    (1902),   74  Conn. 

475,  50  Atl.  504  676 

V.  Thompson,  63  Cal.  3  428 

V.   Turnbaugh  (1899),' 153  Mo. 

172,  54  S.  W.  515  32,  48,  61 

V.  Wells  F.  &   Co.'s   Exp.,  28 

Pac.  Rep.  958  137 

Marvin  v.  Adamson,  11  Iowa,  371        300, 

403 
V.  Wilber,  52  X.  Y.  270  292 

V.  Yates  (1901),  26   Wash.  50, 

66  Pac.  131  455,  456 

Marx  V.  Gross,  58  X.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

221  832 

Marye  v.  Jones,  9  Cal.  335  936 

Mashburn  v.  Innian  (1895),  97  Ga. 

396  914 

Mason  r.  Hey  ward,  3  Minn.  182  843, 

852,  911,  913 
r.  Lord,  40  X.  Y.  476  123,  124 

V.  Mason,  102  Ind.  38  47 

V.  Ponieroy,  151  Mass.  164  387 

V.  St.  Paul  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 

82  Minn.  336,  85  X.  W.  13     178, 
179 
V.  Vestal,  88  Cal.  396  805 

Mass.     Benefit    Ass'n    v.     Richart 

(1896),  99  Ky.  302,  35  S.  W.  541        593 
Mass.  Loan  &  T.  Co.  r.  Welch,  47 

Minn.  183  910 

V.  Weston,  29  Ind.  561  658,  824 

V.  Whitelv,  1  Abb.  Pr.  84  635 

Massie  v.  Stradford,  17  Ohio  St.  596    42,  55 
Massillon  Engine  &  Thresher  Co.  ;•. 
Carr  (1903),  Ky.,  71  S.  W. 
859  703 

V.  Prouty  (1902),  — Xeb.—   91 

X.  W.  384  640,  669 

Masten  v.  Blackwell.  8  Hun,  313  293 

Masters   v.   P^reenian,   17   Ohio   St. 

323  187 

Masterson  v.  Botts,  4  Abb.  Pr.  130  157 
Masterton  v.  Hagan,  17  B.  Mon.  325  114 
Masury  v.   Southworth,  9  Ohio  St. 

340  101 

Mather   v.   Dunn    (1898),  11   S.  D. 

196,  76  X.  W.  922  179,  195 

?•.  llutciiinson,  25  Wis.  27  781 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


CXXl 


[the  refeben'ces  are  to  the  pages.] 


715 
821 

908 
232 
526 

229 


Mathews  ;;.  Ferrea,  45  Cal.  51  809 

V.  Weiler,  22  8.  VV.  Hep.  569         933 
Mathis  V.  Fordliam  (1901),  114  Ga. 

364,  40  S.  E.  824 
Matlock  V.  Todii,  25  Iiul.  128  12 

Matney  v.   Ferrill    (1897),   100  Ky. 

361,  38  S.  W.  4'.I4 
Matson  v.  Matsoii,  4  Met.  (Ky.)  262 
Mattair  v.  Payne,  15  Fla.  082 
Matthew  ;.•.  Cent.  Pac.  K.   Co.,  63 

Cal.  450 
Matthews  v.  Bank  (1901),  60  S.  C. 

183,  38  S.  E.  437       452,  456,  466 
V.  Cady,  61  N.  Y.  651        75,  626,  629, 

630 
V.  Cantey  (1896),  48  S.  C.  588, 

26  S.  E.  894  102 

V.  Copeland,  79  N.  C.  493  499 

V.  Matthews   (1897),   154  N.  Y. 

288,  48  N.  E.  631  686,  818 

V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  26  Mo.  App. 

75 
V.  O'Shea  (1895),  45  Neb.  299,  63 

N.  W.  820 
V.  Sheehan,  69  N.  Y.  585 
V.  Weiler  (1893),  57  Ark.  606,  22 
S.  W.  569 
Matthiesen  v.  Arata  (1897),  32  Ore. 
342,  50  Pac.  1015 
V.  Schomberg  (1896),  4  Wis.  1, 
68  N.  W.  416 
Mattis  V.  Boggs,  19  Neb.  698 
Mattison  i-.  Childs,  5  Colo.  78 
Mattoon  v.  Baker,  24  How.  Pr.  329 
V.  Fremont,  etc.  R.R.  Co.  (1894), 
6  S.  I).  301,  60  N.  W.  69 
Mauch  V.  Hartford  (1901),  112  Wis. 

40,  87  N.  W.  816 
Maule  V.  Beaufort,  1  Russ.  349 
Mauney  v.  Hamilton  (1903),  132  N.  C. 

295,  303,  43  S.  E.  903 
Mavrich  u.  Grier,  3  Nev.  52  325,  337 

Maxcy  v.  New  Hamp.shire  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  (1893),  54  Minn.  272,  55  N.  W. 
1130 
Maxon  v.  Scott,  55  N.  Y.  247 
Maxwell  v.  BoUes  (1895),  28  Ore.  1, 
41  Pac.  661 
V.  Campbell,  45  Ind.  360 
r.  Dudley,  13  Bush,  403 
V.  Farnain.  7  How.  Pr.  2-36 
V.  Foster  (1902),  64  S.  C.  1,  41 

S.  E.  776 
V.  Higgins   (1893),  38  Neb.  671, 

57  N.  W.  388 
V.  Northern   Trust   Co.    (1897), 
70  Minn.  .334,  73  N.  W.  173 
V.  Pratt,  24  Hun,  448 
May  V.  Hanson,  6  Cal.  642 
V.  Selby,  1  Y.  &  C.  565 
Maybee  v.  Moore,  90  Mo.  340        783,  815 
Mayes  v.   Stephens  (1901),  38  Ore. 

512,  63  Pac.  760  703 

Mavliew  v.  Robinson,  10  How.  Pr. 
162  800,  829 


220 

614 
123 

887 

542 

638 
197 
293 

858 

751 

679 
326 

939 


107 
315 

832 

49 

667 

526 

817 

735 

942 
179 
293 
252 


Maynard  v.  Locomotive,  etc.  Ass'n 
(1897),  16  Utah,  145,  51  Pac. 
259 
V.  Sigman   (1902),  —  Neb.  — , 

91  N.  W.  576 
1-.  Waidlich  (1900),  156  Ind.  562, 
60  N.  E.  348 
Mayo  V.  Davidge,  44  Hun,  342 
V.  Madden,  4  Cal.  27 
V.   Spartanburg,  etc.   R.  R.  Co. 
(1894),43S.  C.225,  21S.E. 
10 
Mavor  of  Albany  v.  Cunliff,  2  N.  Y. 

165 
Mayor  of  N.  Y.  v.  Mabie,  13  N.  Y. 

151  842,  843 

I'.  Parker  Vein  Stp.  Co.,  12  Abb. 

Pr.  300  852,  894,  916 

Mayor  v.  Cameron    (1900),  111  Ga. 

110,  36  S.  E.  462  600 

I'.  Smith   (1900),   111   Ga.  870, 

36  S.  E.  955  230. 661 

Mays w.  Carman  ( 1902),  Ky., 66  S.W 


603 

783 

661 
931 
527 


642 
663 


1019 
Mea  V.  Pierce,  63  Hun,  400 
Mead  v.  Bagnall,  15  Wis.  156 
V.  Brown,  65  Mo.  552 
V.  Mitchell,  17  N.  Y.  210 
V.  Pettigrew  (1899),  11  S.  D.  529 
78  N.  W.  945 
Meade  v.  Gilfoyle,  64  Wis.  18 
Meadowcraft   v.    Walsh    (189o),    15 

Mont.  544,  39  Pac.  914 
Meadows    v.   Goff,    14    S.    W.  Rep. 

535 
Meagher  v.  Morgan,  3  Kan.  372 
Mealey  r.  Nickerson,  44  Minn.  430 
Meating  v.  Tigerton  Co.  (1902),  113 

Wis.  379.  89  N.  W.  152 
Mebane  v.  Mebane,  66  N.  C.  3-34 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Gilpin,  105  Mo. 
17 
u.  Woodward  (1902),  74  Conn. 
689,  51  Atl.  1084  640 

Medano  Ditch  Co.  r.  Adams  (1902), 

29  Colo.  317.  68  Pac.  431 
Medland  r.  Connell  (1898),  57  Neb. 
10,  77  N.  W.  437 
V.  Walker  (1895),  96  la.  175,  64 
N.  W.  797  715, 

Medlock  v.  Merritt    (1897),   102  Ga. 

212,  29  S.  E.  185  188,  206 

Medsker  v.  Pogue,  1  Ind.  App.  197      821 
Meegan  v.  Gunsollis,  19  Mo.  417 
Meeh  ;;.  Railway  Co.  (1900),  61  Kan. 

630,  60  Pac.  319 
Meehan  v  Bank  (1895),  44  Neb.  213. 
62  N.  W.  490 
V.  Harlem  Sav.  Bank,  5  Hun, 

439 
V.  Watson  (1898),  65  Ark.  216, 47 

S.  W.  109  6 

Meeker  v.  Claghorn,  44  N.  Y.  349     91,  97 
V.  Waldron  (1901),  62  Neb.  689, 

87  N.  W.  539  94 


594 

626,  637 

457 

452 

05,  368 

752 
823 


95 

417 
584 
871 

802 
160 

178 

711 

179 

793 

867 


314 
702 
329 


756 


cxxu 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the 

BEFERENCES 

159 

48 

Wis. 

229 
151 

53 

804 

815 

S   ARE  TO   THE    PAOES.] 


Meeks  v.  Hahn,  20  Cal.  620 
Meese   r.   Fond   du   Lac, 

32.S 
Meier  «-.  Lester,  21  Mo.  112 
Meiss  r.  Gill,  44  Ohio  St.  253 
Melilrum  i:  Kenetiok  (1902),  15  S.  D. 

.>7i>,  89  X.  \V.  bo3 
Mellott  v.  Downing  !l901),  39  Ore. 

218,  C4  Pac.  3y.3  595,805 

Melson  r.  Thornton  (1901),  113  Ga. 

9".t,  oS  S.  E.  342 
Memphis,  First  Nat.  Bk.  of,  v.  Kidd, 

20  Minn.  2:J4 
Men.lelsulm  r.  Banov  (1900),  57  S.  C. 

174,  35  8.  E.  499 
Jlendenhall  i-.  Wilson.  54  Iowa,  589 

499,  520 
Mengert  r.  Brinkcrhoff  (1903),  — O. 

St.  — ,  66  N.  E.  530  823 

Mercein  v.  Smith,  2  Hill,  210         140,  874 
Mercer  i-.  Dyer  (1895),  15  Mont.  317, 

39  Pac.  314  9-30,  887 

Mercer  Cy.  Sup.  v.  Hubbard,  45  111. 

139  118 

Merchants  &  Mech.  Bk.  v.  Hewitt,  3 

Iowa.  93  99 

Merchants'  Bank  v.  McClelland,  9 

Col.  608  150 

V.  Thomson,  55  N.  Y.  7  326,  335 

V.    Union    &   T.  Co.,  69  N.  Y. 


615 


302 

873 

714 
279, 


804 


704 

134 

619 
945 


618 


Merchants'    Ins.    Co.    v.    Stephens 

(1901),  Ky.,  59S.  W.  511 
Merchants'    Nat.    Bank    v.   Barlow 
(1900),   79   Minn.    234,    82 
N.  \y.  364 
1-.  Robinson  (1895),  97  Ky.  552, 
31  S.  W.  1.36 
Mercier  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 

24  Wash.  147.  04  Pac.  158 
Meredith  v.  Lackev,  Ki  Ind.  1 

1-.  Lyon   (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92 
N.  W.  122 
Merguire  i;.  O'Donnell   (1894),  103 

Cal.  50.  36  Pac.  1033 
Merkle  r.  Bennington,  68  Mich.  133 
Merrick  v.  Gordon,  20  N.  Y.  93     856,  875 
Merrill  v.  Hearing,  22  Minn.  370  517 

V.  Equitable  Farm  &  Stock,  etc. 
Co.  (1896),  49  Neb.  198,68 
N.  W.  365  693 

f.  Green,  55  N.  Y.  270  111,131 

I'.  Miller  (1903),  28  Mont.  134,  72 

Pac.  423  641 

V.  Nightingale,  .39  Wis.  247     908,  910 
V.  Plainrteld,  45  N.  II.  126  118 

r.  Suing  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92 

N.  W.  018  703 

1-.  Wedgwood,  25  Neb.  283      780,  781, 

845 
Merrirnan  v.  McCormick  Harvesting 
M.  Co.  (1893),  86  Wis.  142, 
56  N.  W.  743  24 

V.  WalK.n  (is'.t.'d.  105  Cal.  40:?, 

38  Pac.  lioa  15 


Merritt  v.  Briggs,  57  N.  Y.  654  777 

V.  Gliddon,  39  Cal.  559  584 

V.  Gouley,  58  Hun,  372  937 

V.  Seaman,  6  Barb.  330  874 

V.  Seaman,  6  N.  Y.  168  140 

I'.  Walsh,  32  N.  Y.  6»5  179,  201 

V.  Wells,  18  Ind.  171  245 

Merritt  Milling  Co.   v.  Finlay,  110 

N.  C.  411  911,916 

Mertens  i'.  Loewcnberg,  69  Mo.  208 
Merwin  v.  Ballard,  65  N.  C.  168  396 

Mesechaert  v.  Kennedy,  4  McCrary, 

133  244 

Messenger  i-.  Northcutt   (1899),   26 

Colo.  527,  58  Pac.  1090  640 

Messmer  v.  Block  (1898),  100  Wis. 

664,  76  N.  W.  598  584 

Metropolis  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Lynch  (1896), 

68  Conn.  459,  36  Atl.  832  39 

Metrop.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Meeker,  85 

N.  Y.  614  562,  568,  704 

V.  Smith  (1900),  Ky.,  59  S.  W.  24 

638,  643 
Metropolitan  T.  Co.  v.  Tonawanda, 

etc.  K.  R.  Co.,  43  Hun,  521  927 

Metzger  v.  Attica  &  A.  Arc.  R.  Co., 

79  N.  Y.  171  119 

Mew  V.  Railway  Co.  (1899),  55  S.  C. 

90,  32  S.  E.  828  466 

Mewherter  v.  Ilatten,  42  Iowa,  288      225 

V.  Price,  11  Ind.  199  95 

Meyer  v.  Amidon,  45  N.  Y.  169     609,  629 

V.  Barth  (1897),  97  Wis.  352,  72 

N.  W.  748  96,  180,  714 

V.  Brooks  (1896),  29  Ore.  203,  44 

Pac.  281  645 

V.  Dubuque  Cy.,  43  Iowa,  592  39 

V.  First   Nat.   Bank    (1902),  63 

Neb.  079,  88  N.  W.  867  688 

V.  Garthwaite    (1896),    92  Wis. 

571,  66  N.  W.  704  714 

V.  Koehring  (1895),  129  Mo.  15, 

31  S.  W.  449  625 

!•.  Lowell,  44  Mo.  328  105,  109 

V.  McLean,  1  Johns.  509  719 

V.  McLean.  2  Johns.  183  721 

V.  School  District  (1893),4S.  D. 

420,  57  N.  W.  68  568 

V.  Shamp  (1897),  51    Neb.  424, 

71  N.  \y.  57  107 

v.  Zotel's  Adni'r  (1895),  96  Ky. 

362,  29  S.  W.  28  683 

Meyers  v.  Field,  37  Mo.  434       11,  20,  25, 

37  38 
I'.  Menter   (1902),  03  Neb.  427, 

88N.W.  062  688 

r.  Smith  (IbOlt),  59  Neb.  30,  80 

N.  \V.  273  35 

Michael  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co., 

17  Mo.  A  pp.  23  102,  207 

Michalitschke  Bros.  v.  Wells,  Fargo 
&  Co.  (1897),  118  Cal.  683,  60  Pac. 
847  817 

Michener  v.  Springfield,  etc.  Co. 
(1895),  142  Ind.  130,  40  N.  E.  679       35 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxxm 


[the  befebences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Mickle  V.  Heinlen,  92  Cal.  596  803 

Mickletliwait     v.     Winstanlev,     13 

W.  U.  -210  '  347 

Midland  Co.  v.  Broat,  52  N.  W.  Kep. 

972  932 

Milbank  r.  Jones,  127  N.  Y.  370  811 

V.  Jones  (1894),   141  N.  Y.  340, 

36  N.  K.  388  762 

Milburn  v.  Glynn  County  (1890),  109 

Ga.  473,  34  S.  E.  848  671 

Miles   V.  Du  Bey  (1894),  15  Mont. 

340,  39  I'ac.  313  320 

V.  Durnford,  2   DeG.   M.   &  G. 

641  258 

V.  Lingerman,  24  Ind.  385  781 

V.  Mutual  lieserve  Fund  Life 
Ass'n  (1901),  108  Wis.  421, 
84  N.  W.  159  667,  671 

V.  Smith,  22  Mo.  502  326,  329 

V.  Woodward    (1896),    115  Cal. 

308,  46  Pac.  1076  831 

Milford  Sch.  T.  v.  Powner,  126  Ind. 

528  748 

Miliani  v.  Tognini,  19  Nev.  133  112 

Millan  v.  Railway  Co.  (1899),  54  S.  C 

485,  32  S.  E.  539  831 

Miller   r.   Anderson,    19   Mo.   App. 

71  815 

V.  Ballerino  (1902)  135  Cal.  566, 

67  Pac.   1046  670 

V.  Bank  (1897),  49  S.  C.  427,  27 

S.  C.  514  335 

V.  Bayer  (1896),  94  Wis.  123,  68 

N.  W.  869  592,  593 

V.  Bear,  3  Paige,  467  357 

V.  Beck  (189'J),  108  la.  575,  79 

N.  W.  344  304 

V.  Bottenberg   (1895),  144  Ind. 

312,  41  N.  E.  804  543 

V.  Brigiiam,  50  Cal.  615  734 

V.  Crigler  (1899),  83  Mo.  App. 

895  202 

y.  Cross    (1900),   73  Conn.  538, 

48  Atl.  213  713,  800 

V.  Curry,  53  Cal.  665  299 

V.  Florer,  15  Ohio  St.  149       105,  138, 

935 
V.  Freeman  (1900),  111  Ga.  654, 

36  S.  E  961  65 

(;.  Fulton,  47  Cal.  146  46 

V.  Gaither,  3  Busli,  152  936 

V.  Hall,  70  N.  Y.  250  310 

V.  Hendig,  55  Iowa,  174  618 

w.  Hirsciiberg    (1895),    27    Ore. 

522,  40  Pac.  506         593,  626,  810 
V.  Hunt,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C    762  315 

V.  Losee,  9  How.  Pr.  ,3.56  866 

V.  Rapp  (1893),  135  Ind.  614,  34 

N.  E.  981  662,  665 

V.  Van  Tassel,  24  Cal.  458  71 

V.  Warmington,  1  Jao.  &  Walk. 

484  243 

V.  White,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  255  664 

Milligan  v.  Poole,  35  Ind.  64  369 

Millikin  v.  Cary,  5  How.  Pr.  272  25 


Mills  V.  Buttrick,  4  Col.  53        55,  364, 

942 
V.  Callahan  (1900),  126   N.    C. 

756,  36  S.  E.  164  415 

V.  Carrier,  30  8.  C.  617  933 

V.  Cartilage,  31  Mo.  App.  141        813 
r.  Collins,  67  Iowa,  164  790 

V.  Fletcher  (1893),  100  Cal.  142, 

34  Pac.  637  946 

V.  Geer  (1900),  111  Ga.  275,  36 

S.  E.  673  923 

V.  Malott,  43  Ind.  248  200 

V.  Murrv,  1  Neb.  327  89 

V.  Rice,'3  Neb.  76  596,  597 

V.  Rosenbaum,  103  Ind.  152       821, 

865 
V.  Van  Voorhies,  20  N.  Y.  412      326, 
335, 336 
Mills'  Estate  (1902),  40  Ore.  424,  67 

Pac.  107  757 

Milner  v.  Harris  (1903),  —  Neb.  — , 

95  N.  W.  682  593 

Milroy  V.  Quinn,  69  Ind.  406  598 

Milwaukee  v.  Zoehrlaut  Co.  (1902), 

114  Wis.  276,  90  N.  W.  187  714 

Minard  v.  McBee  (1896),  29  Ore.  225, 

44  Pac.  491  704 

Miner  v.  Bacon,  131  N.  Y.  677  637 

V.  Smith,  53  Vt.  551  327 

Ming  Yue  v.  Coos  Bay  R.  R.   Co. 

(1893),  24  Ore.  392,  33  Pac.  641  18 

Minier  r.  Minier,  4  Lans.  421  225 

Mining  Co.  v.  Huff  (1901),  62  Kan. 

405,  63  Pac.  442  689 

Minnaugh  v.  Partlin,  67  Mich.  391        939 
Minneapolis,    etc.   Ry.  Co.  i'.   Fire- 
men's Ins.   Co.    (1895),  62 
Minn.  315,  64  N.  W.  902         638 
V.  Home    Ins.    Co.    (1896),    64 

Minn.  61,  66  N.  W.  1.32  703 

Minneapolis    Harvester    Works    v. 

Libby,  24  Minn.  327  181 

V.  Smith,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  973  823 

V.  Smith  (1893),  36  Neb.  616,54 

N.  W.  973  678 

Minneapolis  Stockyards  Co.  v.  Cun- 
ningham   (1894),   59    Minn.   325, 

61  N.  W.  .329  639 
Minneapolis  Threshing  Co.  v.  Dar- 

nall  (1900),  13  S.  I).  279,  83  N.  W. 

266  890,  922 

Minnesota    Oil    Co.    v.    Palmer,   20 

Minn.  468  119 

Minnesota    Thresher    Man.    Co.    v. 

Heipler,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  .33  94 

Minor  r.  Baldridge  (1898),  123  Cal. 

187,  55  Cal.  783  584,586 

xMinturn  i:  Main,  7  N.  Y.  220  151 

Minzer  r.  Willman  Mercantile  Co. 

(1899),   59   Neb.   410,   81   N.   W. 

307  736 

Miser  v.  O'Shea  (1900),  37  Ore.  231, 

62  Pac.  491  737,  787 
Missoula  Co.  v.  O'Donnell  (1900),  24 

Mont.  65,  60  Pac.  594  737 


CXXIV 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITKD. 


[the   aEF£RE>'C£S    A 

Missouri,   etc.  Kv.  Co.   i'.  Garrison 

(l«X»;j),  —  Wan.  — ,  72  Pac.  225  623 

Missouri,  etc.  Trust  Co.  r.  Clark 
(I'JOO),  60  Neb.  406,  83 
N.  W.  202  639 

r.    Kiclianlson  (1899),  57  Neb. 

017,  78  N.  W.  273  334 

Missouri,    K.  &  T.  Hy.  r.  Bageley 

(l't02),  05  Kan.  188,  O'.l  Pac.  189       642 
M.  K.  &  T.  Hv.  Co.  I',  llaber  (1890), 

50  Kan.  094,  44  Pac.  632  303 

Missouri  Lumber,  etc.  Co.  v.  Zeitin- 

ger,  45  Mo.  -A pp.  114  637 

Missouri  Pac.  Uv.  Co.  v.  Heming- 
way (1902),  03  Neb.  610,88 
N.  W.  07.)  509,  819 

«.  Ilenrie   (1901),  63  Kan.  330, 

05  Pac.  665  507,  041,  655 

V.  :Moffat   (1899),  00  Kan.  113, 

55  Pac.  837  642 

r.  Palmer  (1898),  55  Neb.  559, 

76  N.  W.  109  703 

Missouri  Vallcv  Land  Co.  v.  Bush- 

nell,  11  Neb.' 192  600 

Mitchell  1-.  Allen,  25  Hun,  543      301,  303, 

308 
V.  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  51  Ind.  396  4.39 

V.  Bank  of  St.  Paul,  7  Minn.  252    270, 
278,  351,  356,  476 
V.  Clinton,  99  Mo.  153  502 

V.  Dickson,  53  Ind.  110  88 

1-.  Milwaukee,  18  Wis.  92  118 

V.  Mitchell,  61  N.Y.  398  570 

I'.  Mitciiell,  1  S.  E.  Rep.  648  499 

I'.  New  Farmers'  Bank's  Trus- 
tee (1901),  —  Kv.  — ,  60 
S.  W.  375  '  460 

r.  O'Neale,  4  Nev.  .504  41.3,414 

V.  St.  Marv  (1897),  148  Ind.  Ill, 

47N.K.  224  146,149 

V.  Smith  (1901),  74  Conn.  125, 

125,  49  All.  909  645 

V.  Thorne,  57  Hun,  405  242 

Mix    V.   Fairciiiid,    12   Iowa,   351        300, 

403 
Mizzell  r.  Kuffin    (1890),  118  N.  C. 

O'.i,  23  S.  !•:.  927  603,  005,  040,  644 

Moberly    >:     Alexander,    19    Iowa, 
162 
c.  Hugan  (1895),  131  Mo.  19,  32 
S.  \V.  1014 
Mobile  V.  Waring,  41  Ala.  1.39 
Modern   Wooiimen  i-    Noyes  (1901>, 

l.';8  Ind.  .Vi3.  61  N.  E.  21 
Modlin  r.  N.  W.  Turnp.  Co.,  48  Ind. 

■192 
Moen  r.  Eldred,  22  Minn.  538 
Moffat  c.  Karquharson,  2  Bro.  C.  C. 
338 

>:  Van  Doren,  4  Bosw.  009     891,  922 
Moffct  r.  Sackett.  18  N.  Y.  522  845 

Moffitt    r.    (  hicago   Chronicle     Co. 

(1899).  107  la.  407,  78  N.  W.  45         783 
Mohr  r.  Barnes.  4  f"olo.  ."..50  602 

Mole  V.  Smith,  Jacob,  490  358 


923 

684 

118 

672 


248 


RE   TO   THE   P.\OES.] 

Moline,  Milburn  &  Stoddard  Co.  v. 
Hamilton  (1898),  56  Neb.  132,  76 
N.  W.  455  419 

Molineux  c.  Powell,  3  P.  Wms.  268      255 
Molino    V.  Blake    (1898),  Ariz.,  52 

Pac.  366  704 

Mollvneaux   v.    Wittenberg  (1894), 

39  Neb.  547,  58  N.  W.  205  702 

Momsen  r.  Atkins  (1900),  105  Wis. 

557,  81  N.  W.  647  853,  936 

V.  Noyes   (1900),  105  Wis.  565, 

81  N.  W.  800  887,  931 

Monaglian  v.  Randall  Sch.  Dist.,  38 

Wis.  100  220 

Mondran  v.  Goux,  51  Cal.  151  614 

Mono  County  v.  Flanigan  (1900),  130 

Cal.  105,  62  Pac.  293  641 

Monroe  v.  Cannon   (1900),  24  Mont. 

316,  01  Pac.  863  051 

V.  Reid  (1895),  46  Neb.  316,  64 

N.  W.  983  815 

Monson  1-.  Lathrop  (1897),  90  Wis. 

380,  71  X.  W.  596  306 

Montana  Mining  Co.  v.  St.  Louis  Co. 

(1897),  19  Mont.  313,  48  Pac.  305       114 
Montesano  v.  Blair  (1895),  12  Wash. 

188, 40  Pac.  731  593 

Montfort  v.  Hughes,  3  E.  D.  Smith, 

59  306 

Montgomerie  v.  Bath,  3  Ves.  560  244 

Montgomery  v.  Gorrell,  51  Ind.  309      439 

V.  McEwen,  7  Minn.  351  29,  494 

V.  Rief  (1897),  15  Utah  495,  50 

Pac.  623  ;  106 

V.  Shockey,  37  Iowa,  107  617 

Monti  r.  Bishop.  3  Colo.  605  55,  942 

Montour  r.  Purdy,  11  Minn.  401  728 

Montserrat  Coal  Co.  v.  Coal  Mining 
Co.  (1897),  141  Mo.  149,  42  S.  W. 
822  510 

Moody  V.  Arthur.  10  Kan.  419  609 

V.  Belden,  00  Hun,  582  756 

V.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  52  O.  St.  12, 

38  N.  E.  1011  071,672 

Moomey  ';.  Maas,  22  Iowa.  380     326,  335 
Moon  V.  McKnight,  54  Wis.  551  471 

Mooney  v.  H.  Riv.  R.  Co.,  5  Robt. 

548  302 

V.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  Co.  (1900).  123 

N   Y.  242,  57  N.  E.  496  419 

Moore  r.  Beauthamp,  5  T^ana,  70         250 
1-.  Bevier  (1895).  00  Minn.  240, 

62  N   W.  281  179 

y.  Brownfield   (1894),   10  Wash. 

4-39.  39  Pac    113  816 

V.  Caruthers.  17  B.  Mon.  609  940 

V.  (ilea ton,  23  <;a.  142  254 

V.  Halliday   (1903),  43  Ore.  243, 

72  Pac.  801.  605,  657 

V.  Harmon  (1895),  142  Ind.  555, 

41,N.  E.  599  178,  800 

V.  Ilarrod  (1897),  101  Ky.  248, 

40  S.  W.  675  043 

V.  Hegeinar.  6  Hun,  290  850 

i;.  Hobbs,  79  N.  C.  535    562,  578,  581 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxxv 


[the   REFEllENCES 

Moore  v.  Flolmes  (1897),  68  Minn. 

108,  70  N.  W.  872  758 

V.  Jackson,  35  Ind.  oGO  20S 

V.  Lowry,  25  Iowa,  o3G  t'O 
V.  May  (lOOo).  117  Wis.  192,  94 

N.  W.  45  787 

V.  Metrop.  Nat.  Bk.,  55  N.  Y.  41  129 

V.  Moberly,  7  B.  Mon.  299  377 

V.  Moore,  47  N.  Y.  467  226 

V.  Moore,  56  Cal.  89  592 
1-.  Morris  (1895),  142  Ind.  .354,  41 

N.  E.  796  800 

V.  Noble,  53  Barb.  425     626,  629,  631 
V.  Parker  (1899),  59  Neb.  29,  80 

N.  W.  43  677 

V.  Bingo,  82  Mo.  468  811 
V.  Ripley  (1898),  106  Ga.  556,  32 

S.  E.  647  3.56 

V.  Smith,  10  How.  Pr.  361  496 
V.  Spurrier  (1899),  55  S.  C.  292, 

33  S.  E.  352  25 
V.  Willamette  Transp.  &  L.  Co., 

7  Oreg.  355  381 

Moorehead  v.  Hyde,  38  Iowa,  382  154, 

871 

Moorehouse  v.  Ballou,  16  Barb.  289  293 
Moorman  v.  Collier,  32  Iowa,  138  89, 114 
Moran  v.  Bentley  (1897),  69  Conn. 

392,  37  Atl.  1092  615 
Mordecai    v.    Seignious    (1898),    53 

S.  C.  95,  30  S.  E.  717  35 

More    V.    Elmore    County    Irr.    Co. 

(1893),    3    Idaho,   729,    35 

Pac.  171  542 

V.  Massini,  32  Cal.  590  518 

V.  Band,  60  N.  Y.  208       872,  908,  911 

Moreau  v.  Detchemendy,  41  Mo.  431  20, 

31,  477 
Morehead  v.  Halsell,  Stanton's  Code 

(Ky.),  96  910 
Morehouse  v.  Throckmorton  (1899), 

72  Conn.  449,  44  Atl.  747              15,  802 

Morenhaut  v.  Wilson,  52  Cal.  263  198, 

807 
Morey  v.  City  of  Duluth  (1897),  69 

Minn.  5,  71  N.  W.  694  666 

Morgan  v.  Booth,  13  Bush,  480  737 
V.  Hawkeye  Ins.  Co.,  37  Iowa, 

359  789 
V.  Hayes  (1898),  98  Wis.  313,  73 

N.  W.  786  864 
V.  Hudnell  (1895),  52  0.  St.  552, 

40N.  E.  716  196 
V.  King  (1900),  27  Colo.  539,  63 

Pac.  416  356 
V.  Morgan  (1894),  10  Wash.  99, 

38  Pac.  10.54                     639,  643 

V.  Morgan,  2  Wheat.  290  255 
V.  Eandolph,  etc.  Co.  (1900),  73 

Conn.  396,  47  Atl.  658     105,  106 

V.  Reid,  7  Abb.  Pr.  215  150 

V.  Smith,  7  Hun,  244               869,  908 

-   V.  Wattles,  69  Ind.  260  769 

V.  Wickliffe  (1901),  110  Ky.  215, 

61  S.  W.  13  686 


ARE  TO  TnE   PAGES.] 

Morgau  r.   Wickliffe   (1903),  — Ky, 

— ,  72  S.  W.  1122  330 

Morganthau  v.  King,  15  Colo.  413         877 
Morley  r.  xMorley,  25  Beav.  253  245 

iMornan  v.  Carroll,  35  Iowa,  22      177,  270 
Morning  c.  Long  (1899),  109  la.  288, 

80  N.  W.  390  817 

Morningstar    v.    Cunningham,    110 

Ind.  328  189 

Morrell    v.   Irving   F.  Ins.    Co.,  33 

N.  Y.  429  298,  801,  804 

Morret  v.  Westerne,  2  Vern.  663  333 

Morrill  v.  Little  Falls  Co.  (1893),  53 

Minn.  371,  55  N.  W.  547  678 

Morris  v.  Tuthill,  72  N.  Y.  575  88 

o.  Wheeler,  45  N.  Y.  708         325,  333 
Morrison    v.    City    of    Eau    Claire 
(1902),    115   Wis.    538,    92 
N.  W.  280  608 

V.   Herrington    (1894),   120  Mo. 

665,  25  S.  W.  568  32 

V.  Kramer,  58  Ind.  38  887,  908 

V.  Lovejoy,  6  Minn.  319    843,  852,  933 
V.  Morrison    (1898),    122  N.  C. 

598,  29  S.  E.  901  197 

V.  Rogers,  2  111.  317  649 

V.  Snow  (1903),  26  Utah,  247,  72 

Pac.  924  612 

Morrissey  v.  Board  of  Education 
(1895),  7  S.  D.  553,64N.  W. 
1126  615,624 

V.  Faucett  (1902),  28  Wash.  52, 

68  Pac.  352  642 

Morrow  v.  Bright,  20  Mo.  298        131,  134 

V.  Lawrence,  7  Wis.  574  348 

Morse  v.  Oilman,  16  Wis.  504       592,  597, 

696 

V.  Morse,  42  Ind.  365  347,  373 

V.  Sadler,  1  Cox,  352  254 

Mortimer  v.  Chambers,  63  Hun,  335     866, 

881 
Mortland  v.  Holton,  44  Mo.  -58  935 

Morton  v.  Coffin,  29  Iowa,  235  753 

V.  Dickson,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  905  51 

V.  Green,  2  Neb.  441  63 

V.  Morton,  10  Iowa,  58  725 

V.  Waring's  Heirs,  18  B.  Mon. 

72.  82  735 

V.  Weil,  11  Abb.  Pr.  421  342 

V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
(1902),  130  N.  C.  299,  41 
S.  E.  -184  216,  444,  452,  503 

Moser  v.  Cochrane,  l-'i  Dalv,  159  887 

r.  Cochrane,  107  N.  Y."35  911 

Moses  i-\  Kearney,  31  Ark.  261  119 

Mosher  r.  Bruhn  (1896),  15  Wash. 

332,  46  Pac.  397  593,  606 

Mosier  c.  Beale,  43  Fed.  Rep.  503 

Moss  V.  North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co. 
(1898),  122  N.  C.  880,  29 
S.  E.  410  623 

V.  Warner,  10  Cal.  296     316,  337,428 
Motes  V.  Gila  Valley  Ry.  Co.  (1902), 

Ariz.,  68  Pac.  532  640,  642,  819 

Motley  V.  Griffin,  104  N.  C.  112  782 


CXXVl 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  beferen'ces  ahe  to  the  pages.] 


Mott  r.  Bunieit,  2  E.  D.  Smith,  50 

V.  Mott.  8-J  Cal.  413 
Moultun  i:  C'liafee,  22  Fed.  Hep.  26 

V.  Cornish,  01  Hun,  438 

o.  Nortt)n,  5  Barb.  280 

r.  Thompson,  20  Minn.   120 


831 
','42 
358 
338 
302 
709, 
784 
821 
11,  15 


V.  Walsh,  30  Iowa,  301 
Mowry  r.  Hill.  11  Wis.  14G 

V.   McQueen    (11X)0),  80   Minn. 

385.  83  N.  W.  348  823 

r.  Wareliam   (lb97),  101  la.  28, 

09  N.  W.  1128  643 

Moyle  c.  Porter,  51  Cal.  639  887,  922 

Mozlev    r.   Reagan  (1899),  109  Ga. 

182,"  34  S.  E.  310  817 

Muiitrett  r.  Gager,  52  Me.  541        248,  251 
MiUileiibertc    r.   Tacoma   (1901),  25 

Wash.  30,  04  Pac.  925  421 

Muir  V.  Gibson,  8  Ind.  187     271,  273,  325, 

329,  348 


MulbergLT  V.  Koenig,  62  Wis.  558 


903, 
927 


Muldoon  r.  Brown  (1899),  21  Utah, 

121.  59  Pac.  720 
Mulliall  c.    Mulhall    (1895),  3  Okla. 
304.  41  Pac.  109 
V.  Mulliall  (1895),  3  Okla.  252,  41 
Pac.  577 

Mulholland  r.  Uapp,  50  Mo.  42      455,  458 
Mullallv    r.   Townscnd    (1897),    119 

Cal.  47,  50  Pac.  1060 
Mullen  1-.  Hewitt.  103  Mo.  639 

r.  McKim  (1890),  22  Colo.  468, 

45  Pac  416 
r.  Morris  (1895),  43  Neb.  596,  62 
N.  W.  74 
Mullendore  v.  Scott,  45  Ind.  113 
Mulock  r.   Wilson  (1893),  19  Colo. 
MiUlin's  Appeal,  40  Wis.  154 


90 


636 


802 


499 

463 

801 
727. 
932 
159 


296,  35  Pac.  532 
Munch  r.  Cockerell,  8  Sim.  219 


261, 


Muhford  >■  Koet  (1900),  154  Mo. 36, 

55  S    W.  271 
Muiiirer  -•.  Shannon,  61  X.  Y.  251 
.Munn  '■.  Marsii.  38  N.  J.  Eq.  410 
.Miiiuis  r.  Loveland  (1897),  15  Utah, 

•2VI.  49  Pac.  74;; 
Muiizesheimer  v.   Byrne,   19  S.  W. 

Kci».  320 
.Miirden  r.  Primenf,  1  Ililt.  75        842, 
M  unlock  '•.  Cox,  118  Ind.  260 
Murphy    i\    Branaman    (1900),    156 
In<l.  77.  59  N.  E.  274 
V.  Colton  (1896),  4  Okla.  181,44 

Pac.  208  876, 

V.  Ganey   (1901).  23  Utah.  633, 

66  Pac. 190 
>•.  Uussell  (1901),  Idaiio,67  Pac. 

427  832, 

>:  Wilson,  44  Mo.  313 
Murray  r.  Bardon  (1903).  132  N.  C. 
130,  43  S.  E.  600 


30 
348, 
352 

657 
713 
329 

780 

114 
920 
002 

543 

881 

642 

939 
301 

822 


326, 
173, 


Murray  v.  Biacklcdge,  71  N.  C.  492 
r.      Booker     (1900),     Ky.,     58 

S.  W.  788 
V.  Catlett,  4  Greene,  108 
V.  Ebright,  50  Ind.  362 
V.  Hay,  i  Barb.  Cii.  59 
V.   Live    Stock    Co.    (1895),    12 

Wasli.  259,  40  Pac.  942 
V.  Loushman  (189U),  47  Neb.  256, 

66  N.  W.  413 
?'.  McGarigle,  69  Wis.  483       177, 
I'.  N.  Y.  Life  Ins.  Co.    85  N.  Y. 

236  662, 

V.  Polglase  (1899),  23  Mont.  401, 

59  Pac.  439 
V.  Shoudy   (1896),  13  Wash.  33, 

42  Pac.  031 
V.  Tingley  (1897),  20  Mont.  200, 
50  Pac.  723 
Murrell  i:  Henry  (1902),  70  Ark.  161, 

66  S.  W.  647 
Musselman  v.  Cravens,  47  Ind.  4 

V.  Galligher,  32  Iowa,  383      231, 
882, 
Musser  r.  Crum,  48  Iowa,  52 

V.  King  (1894),  40  Neb.  892,  59 
N.  W.  744 
Muth  V.  Frost,  75  Wis.  166 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Presbyterian 
Church   (1900),   111   Ga.   677,   36 
S.  E.  880 
Muzzy  r.  Ledlie,  23  Wis.  445 
Myer  v.  Van  Collem,  28  Barb.  230 
Myers  v.  Bauahman  (1901),  01  Neb. 
818,  80  N.  W.  507  115 

r.  Berry  (1895),  3  Okla.  612,  41 

Pac.  580 
r.  Burns,  35  N.  Y.  269 
V.  Chicairo,  etc.  Rv.  Co.  (1897), 
09  Minn.  476,  72  N.  W.  694 
V.  Davis,  22  N.  Y.  489      122,  131, 
V.  Dougla.ss   (1896),  99  Kv.  207, 

35  S.  W.  917 
v.   First    Presbyterian    Church 
(1901),  11  Okla.,  544, 69  Pac. 
674 
V.  Longstaff  (1900),  14  S.  D.  98, 

84  N.  W.  233 
V.  Machado,  6  Abb.  Pr.  198 
V.  Stale,  47  Ind.  293 
[Src  Meyers.] 
Mygatt  V.  Wilcox,  1  Lans.  55 
Mynderse  r.  Snook,  1  Lans.  488 


157, 


874, 


64 

452 
327 
277 
262 

812 

638 
181 

753 

418 

678 

640 

599 
153 
313, 
875 
825 

688 
911 


641 
0(50 
403 

152 

680 
909 

677 
133 

669 


640 

806 
181 
295 

291 
878, 
879 


N. 


Naplee  >:  Minturn,  8  Cal.  540  936 

V.  Palmer,  7  Cal.  543  936 

Nalle  V.  Parks  (1903),  173  Mo.  616, 

73  S.  W.  596  32,  63 

V.   Thompson   (1903),   173   Mo. 

595,  73  S.  W.  599  32,  63 

Napa  V.  Ilowland,  87  Cal.  84  285 

Nash  V.  McCauley,  9  Abb.  Pr.  159        660 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


cxxvu 


[the   IlEFERENOES   ARE  TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Nash  V.  Mitchell,  71  N.  Y.  1',)<J  316 

,:  St.  Taul,  U  Minn.  174         7Go,  811 
Na.sliville,  etc.  li.  K.  Co.  o.  Carrico 

(1894),  i)5  Ky.  489,  20  S.  W.  177        757 
Nat.  Bank   v.    Harkalow  (18'J4),  53 

Kan.  08,  35  Tac.  I'M  780 

V.  Quinton  (1897),  57  Kan.  750, 

48  Tac.  20  802 

Nat.  Bank  of  Auburn   r.  Lewis,  81 

N.  Y.  15  908 

Nat.  Bank  of  Cham   v.  Grimm,  109 

N.  C.  93  872 

National  Bank  of  Deposit  v.  Rogers 
(1901),  106  N.  Y.  380,  59  N.  E.  922    376, 

045 
Nat.  Bank  of  Michigan  v.  Green,  33 

Iowa,  140  658,  826 

Nat.   Bank  of  Paris   v.  McKay,   21 

N.  Y.  191  779 

V.  Nickel  1,  34  Mo.  App.  295    858,  877 
National  Distilling  Co.  v.  Cream  City 
Importing  Co.  (1898),  86  Wis.  352, 
56  N.  W.  864  96,  71.3,  814 

National  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Eastern 
Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
(1902),  63  Neb.  698,88  N.  W. 
863  593 

v.  McKay,  21  N.  Y.  191  857,  858 

National  German-American  Bank  c. 
Lawrence  (1899),  77  Minn.  282,  79 
N.  W.  1016  352 

National    Life    Ins.    Co.    v.   Martin 

(1899),  .57  Neb.  350,  77  N.  W.  760     756 
Nat.  L.  Ins.  Co.  of  U.  S.  A.  v.  Robin- 
son, 8  Neb.  4.52  814 
Nat.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ashby  (1894), 

41  Neb.  292,  59  N.  W.  913  702 

Nat.  Pahquioque  Bk.  v    First  Nat. 

Bk.  of  Bethel,  36  Conn.  325  261 

Nat.  Park  Bank  v.  Goddard,  131  N.  Y. 

494  114 

National    Savings    Bank    v.   Cable 

(1900),  73  Conn.  568,  48  Atl.  428       413 
Nat.  State  Bank  v.  Nat.  Bank  (1895), 

141  Ind.  352,  40  N.  E.  799  678 

Nat.  Trust  Co.  v.  Gleason,  77  N.  Y. 

400  '  651 

Natoma  W.  &  M.  Co.  v.  Clarkin,  14 

Cal.  544  518 

Nat.  Wall  Paper  Co.  v.  McPherson 

(1897),  19  Mont.  355,  48  Pac.  550      744 
Nave  V.  lladley,  74  Ind.  155  279 

0.  KiuiT,  27  Ind.  .356  118 

Neal  i'.  Blecldey  (1897),  51  S.  C.  506, 

29  S.  E.  249  662 

V.  Lea,  64  N.  C.  678  878,  879 

V.  Wideman   (1894),  59  Ark.  5, 

26  S.  W.  16  48 

Nealis   v.    Am.    Tube    &    Iron    Co. 

(1896),  1.50  N.  Y.  42,  44  N.  E.  944    356 
Nebraska  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  r.  Kroener 

(1901),  63  Neb.  289,  88  N.  W.  499     680 
Neb.  Mortgage,  etc.  Co.  v.  Van  Klos- 
ter  (1894),  42  Neb.  740,  60  N.  W. 
1016  816 


Needliam  v.  Wright  (1894),  140  Ind. 

190,  3y  N.  E.  510  800 

Neftel  );.  Liglitstone,  77  N.  Y.  96     75,626 
Negley  v.  Cowell  (1894),  91   la.  250, 

59  N.  W.  48  675 

Neier  r.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  12  Mo. 

App.  35  658 

Nelson  i:  Brodhack,  44  Mo.  596     781,  831, 

833 
r.    Great     Nortliern     Ry.     Co. 
(1903),     28    Mont.   297,  72 
Pac.  642  543 

r.  Johnson,  18  Ind.  329  310 

V.  Hart,  8  Ind.  293  269,  309,  346 

V.   Merced   County   (1898),   122 

Cal.  644,  55  Cal.  421  712 

V.  Murray,  23  Cal.  338  753 

;;.  Nixon,  13  Abb.  Pr.  104  150 

Netcott  V.  Porter,  19  Kan.  131  702 

Netzer  v.  Crookston  City   (1894),  59 

Minn.  244,  61  N.  W.  21  819 

Neuberger  v.  Webb,  24  llun,  347  756 

Neudecker  v.  Kohlberg,  81  N.  Y.  296     75, 

310,  620,  629 

Nevada  Cy..  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Kidd, 

43  Cal.  180  456 

Nevada  Ditch  Co.  v.  Bennett  (1896), 

30  Ore.  .59,  45  Pac.  472  942 

Nevil  V.  Clifford,  55  Wis.  161  180 

Neville    v.  St.    Louis,    etc.   Rv.    Co. 

(1900).  158  Mo.  293,  59  S.  W.  123     625 
New    Bank    v.    Kleiner    (1901),   112 

Wis.  287,  87  N.  W.  1090  678 

New  Berlin,  First  Nat.  Bank  of,  .'. 

Church,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C.  10  718 

Newberry  v.  Garland,  31   Barb.  121     225 
Newcomi)  ?;.  Crews   (1895),  98  Ky. 

339,  .32  S.  W.  947  809 

r.  Dewev,  27  Iowa,  .381  326,  333 

V.  Horton,  18  Wis.  560    258,  264,  378, 

388 
Newcombe  ?'.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  8  N.  Y.  Suppl.  366 
Newell  V.  Mahaske  Cy.  Sav.  Bank, 
51  Iowa,  178 
I'.  Roberts,  54  N.  Y.  677 
V.  Salmons,  22  Barb.  647         810,  881 
New  England  Com'l  Bk.  v.  Newport 

Steam  Factory,  6  R.  I.  154 
New  England  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v. 
Browne   (1900),   157  Mo.  116,  57 
S.  W.  760 
Newhall  V.  Hatch  (1901),  134  Cal. 

269,  66  Pac.  266 
Newhall-IIouse  Stock  Co.  r.  Flint  & 

V.  M.  Ry.  Co..  47  Wis.  516 
New  Haven,  Bank  of,  v.  Perkins,  29 

N.  Y.  554 
New  Haven  &  N.  Co.  v.  Quintard,  6 

Abb.  Pr.  N.  s.  374 
New   Idea   Pattern   Co.  i:   Whelan 
(1903),  75  Conn.  445,  53  Atl.  953 

615,  864 
Newkirk  v.  Marshall,  .35  Kan.  77  51 


471 

637 
315 


321 


621 
816 
801 
93 
778 
543, 


V.  Neild,  19  Ind.  194 


931 


OXWIll 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references 

^i-wlaml  r.  Morris  (1902),  Uo  Wis. 

207,  '.•!  N.  W.  604  923 

New  London  i\  Brainard,  22  Conn. 

i>o2  118 

2sewniiin  c.  Buzard  (1901),  24  Wasli. 

22.J,  G4  Pac.  loy  639 

V.  liomu  Ins.  Co.,  20  Minn.  422      364 
V.  Newman  (1899),  152  Mo.  398, 

54  S.  W.  ly  350 

V.  Otto,  4  San.lf.  068  603 

V.  PtTiell,  73  111. I.  1.33  610 

r.  Spriimtield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co., 

17  -Minn.  12-i  110,  736 

Newport    c.  Coinnmnwealth   (1899), 

106  Ky   434,  50  S.  \V.  845  641 

Newport    Lijilit  Co.  r.  Newport,  19 

S.  \V.  Kep.  188  598 

Newton  r.  Allis.  12  Wis.  378  633 

r.  Eginont,  4  Sim.  574  337,363 

I-.  Keech,  9  Hun,  355  119 

r.  Lee  (1893),  13y  N.  Y.  332,  34 

N.  E.  905  868,  871 

Newton's  Executor  r.  Field  (1895), 

98  Ky.  186,  32  S.  W.  623  588 

New  Whatcom  v.  Beliingliam  Bay 
Imp.  Co.  a«96),  16  Wash.  138,  47 
I'ac.  1102  871 

New  York  Breweries  Corporation  v. 
Baker  ( 1896),  68  Conn.  337, 36  Atl. 
785  585 

New  York,  Mayor,  etc.  of,  v,  Mabie, 

13  N.  V.  151  842,  843 

r.  Parker  Vein  Stp.  Co.,  12  Abb. 

I'r.  300  852,  894,  916 

N.  Y.  &  N.  11.  R.  Co.  »•.  Schuyler,  17 

N.  Y.  592  276.  277,  342,  363,  480 

New  York,  etc.  B.  U.  Co.  v-  Ilunger- 
ford  (1902),  75  Conn.  76,  52  Atl. 
487  552 

N.  Y.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nat.  Protec- 
tion Ins.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  85         15,  17,  53 
N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  V.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co.,  23 

NY.  357  472,  497 

r.  Parker,  8  Bosw.  688  874 

N.  Y.  Milk   Pan  Co.  v.  Kemington 

Works,  25  Hun,  475  412 

New  York  News  Publishing  Co.  i\ 
Steamship  Co.  (1895),  148  N.  Y. 
39,  42  N.  E.  514  642,  619 

Nichol  r.  McCallister,  52  Ind.  586  725 

Niciiolaus  r.  Ciiicago,  etc.  Ky.  Co. 

(1894),  '.(0  la.  85,  57  N.  W.  694  817 

Nicholl  r.  Willianjs,  2  M.  &  W.  758      761 
Nicholls  r.  Hill  (1KH4),  42  S.  C.  28,  19 

S.  E.  1U17  849,  863 

Nichols  /•.    Hardwell    Lodge  (1898), 

105  Ky.  168,  4H  S.  W.  426       686 
V.  Boeruni,  6  Abb.  Pr.  290  910 

r.  Burton,  5  Bush,  320  290 

V.  Cliicau'o,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1895), 

94  la.  202,  62  N.  W.  769  703 

V.  Chicago,    etc.     Hy.    Co.,    36 

Minn.  452  103 

V.  Drew,  19  Hun,  490  499 

>'.  Michaels,  23  N.  Y.  264        286,  305 


ARE  TO  TBE  PAGES-] 

Nichols   V    Nichols  (1896),  134  Mo. 

187,  35  S.  W.  577  542,  557 

V.  Nichols  (1898),  147  :\Io.  407, 

4»  s.  W.  <J47  r:i2 

i:    Peck    (1898),  70  Conn.  439, 

3'.t  Atl.  803  .^02 

V.  Randall  (1902),  1-36  Cal.  420, 

(JU  Pac.  26  ,-,84 

r.  Randall,  5  Minn.  304   278,  325,  330 
V.  Scranton  Steel  Co.,  137  N.  Y. 

471  637 

V.  Stevens  (1894),  123   Mo.  96, 

25  S.  W.  578  7'.i0 

V.  Townscnd,  7  Hun,  375         908,  910 
Nichols  &  Sliei)ar(l   Co.  i\   Dedrick 
(1895),  61  Minn.  513,63  N. 
W.  1110  619 

V.  Hubert  (1899),  150  Mo.  620, 

51  S.  W.  1031  601 

V.  Minnesota  Thresher  Co. 
(1897),  70  Minn.  528,  73 
N.  W.  415  780 

r.  Wiedemann  (1898),  72  Minn. 

344,  75  N  W.  208  666 

Nicholson  ?•.  Louisville,  etc.  Ry.  Co., 

55  Ind.  504  273 

Nickell  v.    Pliceni.x  Ins.  Co.  (1898), 

144  Mo.  420,  46  S.  W.  435  689 

Nicklace  r.  Dickerson  (1898),  65  Ark. 

422,  40  S.  W.  945  646 

Nickum    v.    Bnrckbardt    (1897),   30 

Ore.  464,  47  Pac.  888  076 

Nicolai  r.    Krimbel  (1896),  29  Ore. 

76,  43  Pac.  865  593 

!-.  Lyon,  8  Oreg.  56  575 

Nightingale  v.  Scannell,  6  Cal.  506       204 
Nill  V.  Jenkinson,  15  Ind.  425  118 

Nimrock  v.  Scanlin,  87  N.  C.  119  336 

Nims  :Mfg.  Co.  r.  tilvthe  (1900),  127 

N.  C.  325,  37  S.  E"  455  640 

Ninde  r.  Oskaloosa,  55  Iowa,  207  756 

Ninman  v.  Suhr  (1895),  91  Wis.  392, 

64  N.  W,  1035  817 

Nippel  V.  Hammond,  4  Colo.  211  55 

Nipper  r.  Jones,  27  Mo.  App.  538         877 
Niver  r.  Nash  (1893),  7  Wash.  558, 

35  Pac.  380  929,  932 

Nix  V.  Gilmer  (1897),  5  Okla.  740,  50 

Pac.  131  752 

Noble  V.  Aasen  (1898),  8  N.  I).  77,76 

N.  W.  990  860 

v.  Atcheson,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1896),  4  Okla.  534,  46  Pac. 
483  626 

V.  Burton,  38  Ind.  206  584 

Nodine  r.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1902),  41 

Ore.  386,  68  Pac.  1109  668 

Noe  I'.  Christie,  51  N.  Y.  270  149 

Noel  V.  Kinney,  31  Alb.  L.  J.  328  226 

Noesen  c.  Port  Washington,  37  Wis. 

168  119 

Nolan  )'.  Ilazen,  44  Minn.  478  356 

Noland  v.  Great  Northern  Ry,  Co. 
(1903),  31  Wash.  430,  71 
Pac.  1098  626 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXXIX 


[the  refeeences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Noland?;.Hentig  (1903), 138  Cal.  281, 

71  Pac.  440  734 

P.  Turner,  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  179  '249 

Nolle  r.  Thompson,  3  Mete.  121     911,  927 
NoUman  v.  Evenson  (1895),  5  N.  D. 

344,  65  N.  W.  6«6  861 

Noonan  v.  Orton,  21  Wis.  283  32 

V.  Orton,  34  Wis.  259  518 

Norcross  r.  Bahlwin  (1897),  50  Neb. 

885,  70  N.  W.  511  688 

Norden  v.  Jones,  33  Wis.  GOO  650,911, 

936 
Nordliolt  V.  Nordholt,  87  Cal.  552  576 

Norfolk  Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  Hight 
(1898),56Neb.  162,  76N.W. 
566  593 

V.  Hight  (1899),  59  Neb.  100,  80 

N.  W.  276  642 

Normand    r.    Otoe    Cy.    Com'rs,    8 

Neb.  18  119 

Normile  v.  Oregon,  etc.  Co.  (1902), 

41  Ore.  177,  69  Pac.  928  619,  623 

Norris  v.  Amos,  15  Ind.  365     769,  791,  804 

V.  Glenn,  1  Idaho,  590  737 

Norris    Safe   &  Lock    Co.   r.    Clark 

(1902),  28  Wash.  268,  68  Pac.  718    639, 

642 
North  V.  Bloss,  30  N.  Y.  374  292 

0.  Bradway,  9  Minn.  183         342,  473 
North  Carolina  Land  Co.  v.  Beatty, 

69  N.  C.  329  497,  504 

Nortli  Hudson  Bldg.  &  Loan  Ass'n 
V.  Child  (1893),  86  Wis.  292,  56 
N.  W.  870  276 

North  Neb.  Fair,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Box 

(1899),  57  Neb.  302,  77  N.  W.  770     794 
North  Pacific  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lang 

(1895),  28  Ore.  246,  42  Pac.  799         410 
North  Point  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Canal 
Co.  (1900),  23  Utah  199,  63  Pac. 
812  674 

North  Powder  Mill  Co.  v.  Coughan- 

our  (1898),  34  Ore.  9,  54  Pac.  223     813 
North  St.  Louis  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Obert 

(1902),  169  Mo.  507,  69  S.  W.  1044     704 
North    Star    Boot    Co.    v.    Stebbins 

(1893),  3  S.  D.  540,  54  N.  W.  593     619 
Northampton,  First  Nat.  Bk.  of,  v. 

Crafts,  145  Mass.  444  251 

Northern  Assurance  Co.  v.  Hotch- 
kiss  (1895),  90  Wis.  415,  63  N.  W. 
1020  672 

Northern  Trust  Co.  r.  Healy  (1895), 

61  Minn.  230,  63  X.  W.  625     131 
V.  Hiltgen  (1895),  62  Minn.  361, 

64  N.  W.  909  835,  868,  872 

Northern  Kan.  T.  Co.  v.  Oswald,  18 

Kan.  336  562 

Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McCormick, 

55  Fed.  Rep.  601  781 

Northrup  v.  A.  G.  Willis  Lumber 
Co.  (1902),  65  Kan.  769, 
70  Pac.  879  180 

V.  Miss.  Valley  Ins.  Co.,  47  Mo. 

435  764,  792,  813 


North  W.  Cement,  etc.  Co.  v.  Norwe- 
gian-Dan. Ev.  L.  A.  Sem..  43 
Minn.  449  375 

North  W.  Conf.  of  U.  v.  Myers,  36 
Ind.  375  147 

North  W.  Union  Packet  Co.  v. 
Shaw,  37  Wis.  655  635,  637 

Northwestern,  etc.  Bank  v.  Ranch 
(1901),  Idaho,  66  Pac.  807  934 

Northwestern  Cordage  Co.  r.  Gal- 
braith  (1897),  9  S.  D.  634,  70 
N.  W.  1048  787 

Northwestern  Loan  Co.  v.  Muggli 
(1895),  8  S.  1).  160,  65  N.  W.  442     383 

Northwestern  Steamship  Co.  ;;.  Dex- 
ter Ilorton  &  Co.  (1902),  29  Wash. 
565,  70  Pac.  59  678 

Northwestern  Telephone  Co.  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  (1900),  9  N.  D.  339,  83 
N.  W. 215  413 

Norton  v.  Foster,  12  Kan.  44  131,  135 

V.  Scruggs  (1899),  108  Ga.  802, 

34  S.  E.  166  641 

Xorvell  V.  Mecke  (1900),  127  N.  C. 
401,  37  S.  E.  452  470 

Nosier  v.  Coos  Bay  R.  R.  Co. 
(1901),  39  Ore.  331,  64  Pac.  644        639 

Notre  Dame  Univ.  v.  Shanks,  40 
Wis.  352  609 

Nourse  v.  Weitz  (1903),  120  la.  708, 
95  N.  W.  251  565 

Nowlin  r.  State  ex  rel.  Board  of 
Commissioners  (1903),  —  Ind.—, 
66  N.  E.  54  712 

Noyes  v.  Longhead  (1894),  9  Wash. 

32.5,  37  Pac.  452  710 

r.  Sawyer,  3  Vt.  160  244 

Nudd  V.  Thompson,  34  Cal.  39  834 

Nugent  V.  Powell  (1893),  4  Wyo. 
173,  33  Pac.  23  735 

Nunn  r.  Jordan  (1903),  31  Wash. 
506,  72  Pac.  124  812 

Nutter  V.  Johnson,  80  Ky.  426  865 

Nye  v.  Bill  Nye  Min.  Co.  (1903),  42 
Ore.  560,  71  Pac.  1043  593 

Nys  V.  Biemeret,  45  Wis.  104  713 

Nystuen  c.  Hanson  (1902),  —  la. — , 
91  N.  W.  1071  >  608 


o. 


Oakes   v.   Ziemer   (1901),   62   Neb. 

603,  87  N.  W.  .350;  s.  c.  (1900),  61 

Neb.  6,  84  N.  W.  409  787,  832 

Oakley  r.  Valley  County  (1894),  40 

Neb.  900,  59  N.  W.  368  709 

Gates  V.  Gray,  66  N.  C.  442  544 

V.  Kendall, 67  N.C. 241  618,626,  636 
O'Banion    v.   Goodrich  (1901),  Ky., 

62  S.  W.  1015  782 

Oberlander  v.  Spiess,  45  N.  Y.  175  629 
O'Blenis  v.  Karing,  57  N.  Y.  649  869, 870 
O'Brien    v.    Fitzgerald    (1894),    143 

N.  Y.  377,  38  N.  E.  371  667 


cxxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES   CITED. 


[tde  beferences  are  to  the  pages.] 


O'Brien  v.  McCann,  58  N.  Y.  373  798 

r.  O'Connell,  7  Hun,  228  238 

f.  Smith,  42  Kan.  i'J  06 

r.  St.  Paul,  18  Minn.  176  622 
V.  Stambac'li  (1897),  101  la.  40, 

UON.  \V.  1133  818 

O'Callaghan  v.  Bode,  84  Cal.  689  181 
Ucean   Steamship   Co.   r.  Anderson 

(lltOO),  HJ  Ga.  b3-J,  oS  S.  E.  102  730 
Ockenden  c.  Uarnes,43Iowa,615     562,  575 

U'Counell  v.  Cotter,  44  Iowa,  48  637 
O'Conner  r.  City  of  Fond  du   Lac 

(1898),  101  Wis.  83,  76  N.  \V.  1110  072 
O'Connor  v.  Chicago  &   Nortliwest- 
ern      Rv.    Co.    (18%),    92 

Wis.  612,  66  N.  W.  795  639 

r.  Frasher,  53  Ind.  435  942 
V.  Irvine,  74  Cal.  435               201,  273 

V.  Koch,  56  Mo.  253  611 

Oconto  Cv.  Sup.  V.  Hall,  42  Wis.  59  155 
O'Day  f.Conn.  (1895),  131  Mo.  321, 

32  S.  W.  1109  32 
O'Donnell  v.  Sargent  &  Co.  (1897), 

69  Conn.  476,  38  Atl.  210  712 
O'Donohoe  v.  Polk  (1895),  45  Neb. 

510,  63  N.  W.  829  605 

Oechs  f.  Cook,  3  Duer,  161  663 
Oester  r.  Sitlington  (1893),  115  Mo. 

247,  21  S.  W.  820  579,  780 

Oevermann  r.  Loebertmann  (1897), 

68  Minn.  162,  70  \.  W.  1084      579,  821 

O'Fallon  v.  Clopton,  89  Mo.  284  273 
Offley  V.  Jennev,  3  Ch.  Hep.  92  253,  347 
Ogden  V.  Coddington,  2  E.  D.  Smith, 

317  855 
r.  Ogden  (1894),  60  Ark.  70,  28 

S.  W.  796  664 
V.  Prentice,  33  Barb.  160  131,  134 
Ogdensburgii  &  L.  C.  R.  Co.  r.  Ver- 
mont &  (an.  R.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  176  482 
Ogilvie  /•-  Lightstone,  1  Daly,  129  936 
Ogle  1-.  Cloiigh,  2  Diiv.  145  341 
Oglesby  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Rv.  Co.  (1899), 

150  Mo.  137,  37  S.  W.  829  612 

O'Gorman  v.  Lindeke,  26  Minn.  93  298 
V.  Sabin  (1895),  62  i\Iinn.  46,  64 

N.  W.  84  640 
O'Hara  c  Parker  (1895),  27  Ore.  156 

39  I'ac.  1004  566,  710 

Ohio  &  Mi.«s.  R.  Co.  v.  Collarn,  73 

Ind.  201  229,  598 

V.  Hemberger,  43  Ind.  462  748 

V.  Nickless,  71  Ind.  271  439 

V.  Tindall,  13  Ind.  360  229 

Ohweiler    r.    Lohnianii    (1894),    88 

Wis.  75,  59  N.  W.  f,7H  817 
Oil  Well  Supply  Co.  ,-.  Wolfe  (1894), 

127  Mo.  016,  30  S.  W.  145  816 

Olcolt  .•.  Carroll.  39  N.  Y.  436  591 

<  ildhum  r.  ( ■ollinR.  4  J.  J.  Marsli.  50  249 
f)lev  r.  .Miller  (1901),  74  Conn.  304, 

50  Atl.  741  659 

nliphint  V.  Manstfic-ld,  36  Ark.  191  190 
Oliver  r.   Dougherty  (1902),  Ariz., 

68  Pac.  553  024 


Oliver  v.  Keightley,  24  Ind.  514  118 

V.  La  Vaile,  36  Wis.  592  229 

i:  Piatt,  44  U.  S.  (3  How.)  333, 

412  509 

Olmstead  v.  Citv  of  Raleigh  (1902), 

130  N.  C.  243,  41  S.  E.  292      703 
V.  Henry  Cy.  Sup.,  24  Iowa,  33      118 
Olmsted  c  Keyes,  85  N.  Y.  593  117 

Olsen  c  Cloquet  Lumber  Co.  (1895), 

61  Minn.  17,  63  N.  W.  95  715 

Olson  I'.   City  of  Seattle  (1903),  30 

Wash.  687,  71  Pac.  201    619,  623 
V.  Phanix  Mfg.  Co.  (1899),  103 

Wis.  337,  79  N.  W.  409     599,  604 
V.  Snake  l\iver  Valley  R  R.Co. 
(1900),   22    Wash.    139,    60 
Pac.  156  ■    013,  621 

Omaha  w.    Redick    (1901),  61    Neb. 

103,  85  N.  W.  46  655 

Omaha  &  R.  V.  Co.  v.  Crow  (1898), 

54  Neb.  747,  74  N.  W.  1066    681, 
682 
V.  Moscliel   (1893),  38  Neb.  281, 

56  N.  W.  825  638 

V.  Wright  (1896),  49  Neb.  456, 
68  N.  W.  618  (overruling 
same  case,  47  Neb.  886,  66 
N.  W.  842)  681 

Omaha     Bottling    Co.     r.     Theiler 

(1899),  59  Neb.  257,  80  N.  W.  82       642 
Omaha  Coal,  Coke  &  Lime  Co.  i-.  Fay 

(1893),  37  Neb.  68,  55  N.  W.  211       675 
Omaha    Consolidated  Co.  i-.  Burns 
(1895),  44  Neb.  21,  62  N.  W.  301    614, 

621 
Omaha  Fire  Ins.  Co  r.  Berg  (1895), 

44  Neb.  523,  62  N.  W.  862       144 
1-.  Dierks  (1895),  43  Neb.  473,  61 

N.  W.  745  834 

Omaha   Nat.  Bank  r.  Kiper  (1900), 

60  Neb.  33,  82  N.  W.  102  593 

Omaha  S.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Bee  son  (1893), 

36  Neb.  361,  54  N.  W.  557  418 

Onson  V.  Cown.  22  Wis.  329  51 

Ontario  Bk.  i\  N.  J.  Steamboat  Co., 

59  N.  Y.  510  784 

Ord  V.  McKee,  5  Cal.  516  149 

Oregon  &  Cal.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson 
Countv  (1901),  38  Ore.  589,  64 
Pac.  307  595 

Oregon  Gold-Mining  Co.  v.  Schmidt 

(1901).  Ky.,  60  S.  W.  530  871 

Oregon  Ry.  &  Nav.  Co.  v.  Hertzberg 

(1894),  26  Ore.  216,  37  Pac.  1019       808 
Oren    ;•.    Board    of     Conmiissioners 

(1901),  157  Ind.  158.  00  N.  E.  1019     744 
Orgall  i:  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co. 

(1895),  46  Neb.  4.  (U  N.  W.  450         683 
Orient  Ins.  Co.  r.  Clark  (1900),  Kv., 

59  S.  W.  863  ■        703 

Ormond  r.  Sage    (1897),  69  Minn. 

523,  72  N.  W.  810  679 

Orinsby  >•.  Douglas,  5  Duer,  665  833 

Orn  Fitio.  etc.  Min.  Co.  v.  Cullen,  1 
Idaho  Ter.  113  412.  637 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


CXXXl 


[the  references   ABE  TO   THE  PAGES.] 


Oroville  &  Va.  R.  Co.  v.  Plumas  Cy. 

Sup..  37  Cal.  354  789 

Orr  V.  Rode,  101  Mo.  387  821 

Orr  W.   Ditch  Co.  v.  Larcombe,  14 

Nev.  53  576 

Ortley  c.  Mcssere,  7  Johns.  Ch.  139      102 
Orton  V.  Noonan.  19  Wis.  350  063 

O'Rourke  v.  Citv  of  Sioux  Falls 
(1893),  4  S.  D.  47,54  N.W. 
1044  712 

V.  Noonan,  25  Wis-  672  782,  821 

Osborn  v.  Bell,  5  Denio,  370  652 

V.  Ketchum  (1894),  25  Ore.  352, 

35  Pac.  972  685 

I'.  Logus  (1895),  28  Ore.  306,  42 

Pac.  997  178,  179,  .326,  334 

V.  Portsmouth  Nat.  Bank  (1899), 

61  O.  St.  427,  50  N.  E.  197      819 
Osborn  &  Co.  r   Evans  ( 1894),  91  la. 

13,58  N.  \V.920  810 

Osborne  v.  Endicott,  6  Cal.  149  783 

V.  Lindstrom  (1899),  9  N.  D.  1, 

81  N.  \V.  72  823 

V.  Metcalf  (1900),  112  la.  540, 

84  N.  W.  685  606 

V.  Stevens  (1896),  15  Wash.  478, 

46  Pac.  1027  687 

V.  Taylor,  12  Gratt.  117  254 

Osborne  &  Co.  r.  Hanlin  (1902),  158 

Ind.  325,  63  N.  E.  572  812 

Osbourn  v.  Fallows,  1  R.  &  M.  741      337, 

378 

Osgood  V.  De  Groot,  36  N.  Y.  348         139 

V.  Laytin,  5  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  1     213,  355, 

363 
V.  Maguire,  61  N.  Y.  524  265,  354 
V.  Ogden,  4  Keyes,  70  139 

Oskaloosa  St.  Rv.  Co.  r.  Oskaloosa 

(1896),  99  la.  490.  68  N.  W.  808        702 
Oslin  r.  Telford  (1899),  108  Ga.  803, 

34  S.  E.  168  673 

Osmun  V.   Winters    (1896),  30  Ore. 

177,  46  Pac.  780  6.38 

Osten  *;.  Winehill  (1894),  10  Wash. 

333,  38  Pac.  1123  703 

Osterhoudt   v.  Ulster  Cy.   Sup,,   98 

N.  Y.  239  273 

Ostrom  V.  Bixby,  9  How.  Pr.  57  833 

V.  Greene  (1900),  161  N.  Y.  353, 

55  N.  E.  919  157 

Otis  V.  Shants,  128  N.  Y.  45  874 

O'Toole    V.    Faulkner     (1902),     29 

Wash.  544,  70  Pac.  58  605 

V.  Garvin,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C.  118  812 

Otitcalt    r.    Collier    (1899),   8  Okla. 

473,  58  Pac.  642  289 

Over  V.  Siiannon,  75  Ind.  352  784 

Overstreet  i\  Citizens'  Bank  (1903), 

12  Okla.  383,  72  Pac.  379  G66 

Owen  V.  Cawley,  36  N.  Y.  000  315 

»;.  Cooper,  46  Ind.  524  662 

V.  Frink,  24  Cal.  171  255 

V.  Meade  (1894),  104  Cal.  179,  37 

Pac.  923  625 

V.  Owen.  22  Iowa,  270  232 


Owen  V.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1895), 

12  Wash.  313,  41  Pac.  44         042 
V.  State,  25  Ind.  107  1^95 

Owens  V.  Colgan  (1893),  97  Cal.  454, 

32  Pac.  519  417 

V.  R.    Hudnol'i;    Piiarmacy,   20 

Civ.  Pro.  \ivp   145  751 

Owensboro  &  Nasliville  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Barclay's  Adm'r  (1897),  102  Ky. 
10,  43  S.  W.  177  656 

Owsley  V.  Bank  of  Cumberland 
(1902),   Ky.,   06   S.    W.   33  877 


P. 


Packard  v.  Slack,  32  Vt.  9  476 

V.  Snell,  35  Iowa,  80  622 

Paddock  v.  Somes,  102  Mo.  226   20,  29,  37 


Paddon  v.  Williams,  2  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

Padley  v.  Neill  (1890),  134  Mo.  364, 

35  S.  W.  997 
Paducali  Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah  W. 

Supply  Co.,  89  Ky.  340 
Page  V.  Citizens  Banking  (,^o.  (1900), 
111  Ga.  73.  30  S.  E.  418 


91, 
115 

335 

112 

302, 
525 
872 
502 
748 
829 
815 
037 


V.  Ford,  12  Ind.  46 
V.  Kennan,  38  Wis.  320 
V.  Merwin,  54  Conn.  426 
V.  Mitchell,  37  .Minn.  368 
I'.  Smith,  13  Oreg.  410 
V.  Williams,  54  Cal.  502 
Pahquioque  Bk.  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.,  36 

Conn. 325  261 

Paige  V.  Fazackerly,  36  Barb.  392        155 

V.  Willett,  38  N.  Y.  31  663 

Paine  v.  Comstock,  57  Wis.  159  823 

V.  Foster  (1900),  9  Okla.  213,  53 

Pac.  109  320 

V.  Hunt,  40  Barb.  75  874 

Painter  v.   Painter  (1902),  138  Cal. 

23,  71  Pac.  90  358 

Palen  v.  Bushnell,  46  Barb.  24       486,  495 

V.  Lent,  5  Bosw.  713  501 

Palk  V.  Clinton,  12  Ves.  58     246,  247,  379, 

511 
Palmer  iJ.  Bank  of  Ulysses  (1899),  59 

Neb.  412,  81  N.  W.  303  718 

V.  Bank  of  Zumbrota  (1896),  65 

Minn.  90,  67  N.  W.  893    423,  662 
V.  Breed  (1890),  Ariz.,  43  Pac. 

219  001 

V.  Carlisle,  1  S.  &  S.  423         244,378 
V.  Cay  wood  (1902),  64  N^eb.  372, 

89  N.  W.  1034  606 

V.  Davis,  28  N.  Y.  242     177,  181,  186, 
190,  224 
V.  Fort  Plain,  etc.  Plk.  R.  Co.,  11 

N.  Y.  376  148, 155 

V.  Hartford  Dredging  Co.  (1900), 

73  Conn.  182,  47  Atl.  125         659 
V.  Lavigne  (1894),  104  Cal.  30, 

37  Pac.  775  543 


CXXXll 


TABLI-:    01'    CASES    CITED. 


[rat 

Palmer  v.  Mt.  Sterling  Nat.  Bk.,  18 
S.  W.  Kep.  234 
1-.  Palmer  (1894),  90  la.  17,  57 

N.  \V.  t345 
i;.  Stevens,  100  Mass.  461 
r.  Wad.lell.  "22  Kan.  352 
V.  Winona    Kv.    &    Light 
(1001),    b"3    Minn.    85, 
N.  W.  941 
r.  Yager,  20  Wis.  01 
Palmer  Oil  Co.  v.  Blodgett  (1899),  60 

Kan.  712,  57  I'ac  047 
Pancoast  r.  Hurneil,  32  Iowa,  394 
Parcliin  c.  Peck,  2  Mont.  567 
Pardee  <■.  Stewaid,  37  Hun,  259 

c.  Treat,  82  X.  Y.  385 
Paris  V.  Stronp,  51  Ind.  339 
Paris    Nat.   Bk.   c.   Nickell,  34  Mo. 

A  pp.  2!»5 
Parke  v-  Bonlware  (1901),  Idaho,  63 
Pac.  1045 
V.  Kiliiam.  8  Cal.  77 
Parker  v.  Beasley  (1895),  110  N.  C. 
1,  21  S.  E.  955 
V.  Berrv,  12  Kan.  351 
V.  Carolina  Bank  ( 1898),  53  S.  C. 

58;i,  31  S.  E.  673 
V.  Clayton,  72  Ind.  307 
V.  Cochran  (1895),  97  Ga.  249, 

22  S.  E.  961 
V.  Dacres,  1  Wash 
V.  Ues      Moines 
(1899),     108 
N.  \V.  826 
V.  Harden  (1898),  122  N 

28  S.  E.  962 
V.  Fuller,  1   Kuss.  &  My.  656 


95 


890,  922 
248,  251 
196 
Co. 
85 


179 
190     782,  815 
Life   Ass'n 
la.  117,  78 

790 

cm, 

640 
247, 
334 
V.  Jackson,  16  Barb.  33   276,  293,  299," 

400 


112 
26  Ore 


V.  Jacobs,  14  S.  C 
r.  Jefferv    (1894), 

37  Pac.  712 
r.Jewett   (1893),  52 

55  N.  W.  56 
V.  Laney.  58  X.  Y.  469 
V.   Minneapolis,  etc.    R. 

(19(X»),    79    Minn. 

X.  W.  673 
V.  Small,  .58  Ind.  349 


V.  Tavlor  (1902),  Neb.,  91  N.  W. 

537  102 

r.  Thomas,  19  Ind.  213  661 

Parmelee  t-.  Egan,  7  Paige,  610  260 
Parno  r.  Iowa.  etc.  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 

114  la.  1.32,  86  X.  W.  210  703 

Parrolt  r.  Hughes,  10  Iowa,  459    326,  333 

Parrv  r.  Kellev,  5'J  Cal.  334  316 
Parrv   Mfg.  Co.  >:  Tohin   (1900),  106 

Wis.  'iHij,  H2  X.  W.  154  911 

Parhhall  r.  Moodv,  24  Iowa,  314  353 

Parsley  >■.  XidioUon,  05  N.  C.  207  618 
Parson."*  r.  (Jrand  Lodge,  etc.  (1899), 

108  la.  6.  78  X.  W.  676  703 


REFERENCES   AEE   TO   THE    PAGES.] 

Parsons  v.  Neville,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  365      249 
V.  Sutton,  66  N.  Y.  92  933 

r.  Wright    (1897),  102  la.  473, 

71  X.  W.  351  734 

Partridge  c.  Blanchard,  23  Minn.  69     576 
Pass  V.  Pass  (1&96),  98  Ga.  791,  25 

S.  E.  752  819 

Patchin  r.  Peck,  38  X.  Y.  39  178 

674  Pate  r.  Allison  (1901),  114  Ga.  651, 
337        40  S.  E.  715  825 

Paterson  v.  Long,  5  Beav.  186  255 

816  Patnode  >■-  Westenhaver  (1902),  114 
231        Wis.  460,  90  N.  W.  467  470 

178    Paton  v.  Murray,  9  Paige,  474  326 

333  Patrick  Land  Co.  v.  Leavenworth 
111  (1894),  42  Neb.  715,  60  N.  W. 
769       954 

Patterson  v.  Clark,  20  Iowa,  429 
19  V.  Lynde,  112  111.  196 

V.  Patterson,  59  X.  Y.  574       874, 
735  V.  Patterson  ( 1902),  40  Ore.  560, 

195  67  Pac.  664 

Pattillo  r.  Jones  (1901),  113  Ga.  330, 
41        38  S.  E.  745 
821    Pattisoni-.  Richards,  22  Barb.  143 

855,  894, 
872    Patton  r.  Fox  (1902),  169  Mo.  97,  69 
610  S.  W.  287 

V.  Koval  Baking  Powder  Co., 
114  X.  Y.  1 
Paul  v.  Fulton,  25  Mo.  156 
Pavey  v.  Pavev,  30  Ohio  St.  300 
Paving  Co.  v.'  Botsford    (1896),   56 

Kan.  532,  44  Pac.  3 
Pavisich  v.  Pean,  48  Cal.  364         271, 
Paxton  V.  Learn  (1898),  55  Xeb.  459, 
75N.  W.  1(196 
V.  Wood,  77  X.  C.  11 
Payne  r.  Bovd  (1890),  125  N.  C.  499, 
34  S.  E.  631 
38  V.  Briggs,  8  Xeb  75 

Johnson's  Ex'ors   (1893),  95 
106  Kv.  175,24  S.  W.  238 

McCormick    Co.  .(1901),    11 
790  Okla.  318,  66  Pac.  287 

19,  30  r.  McKinlev,  54  Cal.  532 

R.  Co.  V.  Treadwcll,  16  Cal.  220 

•2-  82  Peabody  r.  Beach,  6  Duer,  53 

688  V.  Bloomer,  5  Duer,  678  870, 

193,  246  V.  Washington,  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  20 

Barb.  329 
Peacock  *•.  Monk,  1  Ves.  127 

r.  I'enson.  11  Beav.  355 
Peak  V.  Lemon,  1  Lans.  295  313, 

Peake  r.  Buell  (1895),  90  Wis.  508, 


186, 
Minn.  514, 


V.  Na»h,  8  How.  Pr.  454 


879,  880 


63  N.  W.  1053  565, 

V.  Ledger,  8  Hare,  313  252, 

Peaks  V.  Graves.  25  Xeb.  235 

('.  Lord    (1894),  42  Neb.  15,  60 
N.  W.  349 
Pearce  »•.  Ferris's  Ex.,  10  N.  Y.  280 

I'.  Hitchcock,  2  N.  Y.  388 

V.  Mason,  78  N.  C.  37 
Pearkes  v.  Freer,  9  Cal.  642 
Pearson  r.  Cummings,  28  Iowa,  344 


942 
780 
356 
930 

595 

673 
859, 
926 

764 

911 
350 
831 

790 

584 

688 
526 

669 
702 

344 

780 
562 
71 
880 
880 

177 
259 
255 
314 

566 
253 
215 

702 
2H4 
206 
665 
521 
99 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXXXlll 


[the  references  are  to  the  PACEa.] 


Pearson  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 

Iowa,  2o9  660 
V.  Neeves  (18'J5),  02  Wis.  319,  06 

N.  W.  357  787 
V.  Switzer  (1898),  98  Wis.  397, 

74  N.  W.  214  588 

Pease  v.  Hannah,  3  Oreg.  301  792 

V.  Rush,  2  Minn.  107  99 

V.  Smith,  61  N.  Y.  477  576 

Peatman  v.    Centervilk'    Light    Co. 

(1896),  100  la.  245,  69  N.  W.  541  708 
Peav   V.  Salt   Lake   City  (1894),  11 

Utah.  331,40  Pac.  206  626 
Peeha  v.  Kastl  (1902),  64  Neb.  380, 

89  N.  W.  1047  752 
Peck  I'.  Beloit  Sch.  Dist.  No.  4,  21 

Wis.  516  264 
r.  Easton   (1902),  74  Conn.  456, 

51  Atl.  134  710 

V.  Elder,  3  Sandf.  126  262 

V.  McLean,  36  Minn.  238  201 
V.  Newton,  46  Barb.  173  11,  19,  64 
V.  N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Ry.  Co.,  85  N.Y. 

246                                     618,  667 

V.  Parcliin,  52  Iowa,  46            417,  727 

V.  Root,  5  Hun,  547                  629,  630 

V.  Shick,  50  Iowa,  281  637 

V.  Snow,  47  Minn.  398  877 

V.  Ward,  3  Duer,  647  414 

Pecker  v.  Cannon,  11  Iowa,  20  293 

Peckham    v.    City    of    WatsonvilLe 

(1902),    138    Cal.    242,    71    Pac. 

169  678 

Peddicord  v.  Whittam,  9  Iowa,  471  300, 

403 
Peden  v.  Cavins  (1892),  134  Ind.  494, 

34N.  E.  7  704 

Peel  V.  Elliott,  7  Abb.  Pr.  433  156 
Peerless  Stone  Co.  r.  VVray  (1898), 

152  Ind.  27,  51  N.  E.  326  642 

Peet  V.  O'Brien,  5  Neb.  360  727 
Pekin  Plow   Co.  v.  Wilson  (1902),  — 

Neb.-, 92  N.  W.  176  641 

Pelly  V.  Bowyer,  7  Busli,  513         169,  219 
V.  Naylor  (1893),  139  N.  Y.  598, 

3oN.  E.  317  678 

Pelton  V.  Farmin,  IS  Wis.  222  337 
V.  Powell  (18U7),  96  Wis.  473,  71 

N.  W.  887  921 
Pemberton    i^.  Simmons,  100  N.  C. 

316  823 

Pence  v.  Aughe,  101  Ind.  317  181 

V.  Croar,  51  Ind.  329  575 

r.  Sweeney,  28  Pac.  Rep.  413  428 

Pender  v.  Mallett  (1898),  123  N.  C. 

57,  31  S.  E.  351                     314,  600,  601 
Pendergast   v.  Greenfield,  40  Hun, 

494  874 
Pendleton  v.  Beyer  (1896),  94  Wis. 

31,  68  N.  W.  415               888,  9-34 

V.  Dalton,  77  N.  C.  67  219 

Penfield  v.  Wheeler,  27  Minn.  358  412 

Pengra  v.  Munz,  29  Fed.  Rep.  830  517 

V.  Wheeler  (1893),  24  Ore.  532, 

34  Pac,  354  817 


Penn  Coal  Co.  i-.  Blake,  85  N.  Y.  226    713. 

75i 

V.  Del.  &  H.  Can.  Co.,  1  Keyes,  72  36 

V.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Con- 

oughv  (1898),  54  Neb.  128, 

74  N.  W.  422  .  586 

Pennie  v.  Hildreth,  81  Cal.  127  659 

Pennoyer  v.  Allen,  50  Wis.  308        46,  47, 

49,  885 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Holderman,  69 

Ind.  18  658 

V.  Sedgwick,  59  Ind.  336  598 

Penny  r.  Penny,  9  Hare,  39  352 

V.  Waits,  2  Phil.  149  240 

Penrose  v.  Winter  (1901),  135  Cal. 

289,  67  Pac.  772  565,  56G 

People  V.  Albany  &  Susq.  R.  Co.,  57 

N.  Y.  161  41,  119 

r.  Albany  &  Vt.  R.  Co.,  77  N.  Y. 

232  354,  406,  414,  417 

V.  Brandretli,  3  Abb.   Pr.  n.  s. 

224  -  869 

V.  Clark,  21  Barb.  214  152 

V.  Cram,  8  How.  Pr.  151  880 

V.  Crooks,  53  N.  Y.  648  181,  193 

V.  Curtis,  1  Idaho,  753  756 

V.  Denison,  84  N.  Y.  272  626, 

629,  894,  918 
V.  Edwards,  9  Cal.  286  399,  402 

f.  Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491  119 

V.  Ha  gar,  52  Cal.  171  728 

V.  Haggin,  57  Cal.  579  193 

f.  Ingersoll,  58  N.  Y.  1  119 

v.  Jenkins,  17  Cal.  500  293 

V.  Kendall,  25  Wend.  399  650 

V.  Laws,  3  Abb.  Pr.  450  152 

V.  Lothrop,  3  Call,  428  831 

V.  Love,  25  Cal.  520  402 

V.  Marlboro  H.  Coni'rs,  54  N.  Y. 

276  561,  663 

r.  Mayor,  32  Barb.  102  118 

V.  Norton,  9  N.  Y.  176  152 

V.  Ryder,  12  N.  Y.  433     25,  541,  544, 
559,  596 
V.  Sexton,  37  Cal.  532  428 

V.  Sherwin,  2  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  528     1 19 
i,'.  Slocum,  1  Idaho,  62  149 

V.  Sloper,  1  Idaho,  158  289,  609 

V.  Stevens,  51  IIow.  Pr.  235  711 

V.  Talmage,  6  Cal.  256  428 

I'.  Townsend,  37  Barb.  520  152 

V.  Tweed,  63  N.  Y.  194  470 

People  e.r  re/,  v.  District  Court  (1893), 

18  Colo.  293,  32  Pac.  819  185 

V.  Railway  Co.  (1900),  164  N.  Y. 

289,  58  N.  E.  138  305 

People's  Bank  v.  Mitchell,  73  N.  Y. 

406  38 

V.  Scalzo   (1894),  127  Mo.   164, 

29  S.  W.  1032  593 

People's  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geisthardt 
(1898),  55  Neb.  232,  75 
N.  W.  582  832 

V.  Myers  (1902),  65  Kan.  122,  69 

Pac.  164  615 


CXXXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  references 

Penria,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  i-.  Attica,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1899),  154  Iiul.  218,  56 
N.  E.  210  G87 

Pepper  r.  Donnelly,  87  Kv-  260  710 

Percifull  i:  Piatt,  36  Ark." 456  63 

Perego  c.  Dodge  (1893).  9  Utah,  1, 

33  Pac.  221  805 

Perkins  v.  Krnit-l,  2  Kan.  325  769 

v.  Lewis,  24  III.  208  119 

r.  Marrs.  15  Colo.  262  103 

v.  Perkins,  02  Barb.  531  226,  315 

V.  Port  Washington,  37  Wis.  177   886 
V.  RoKers,  35  Ind.  124  821 

c.  Stimmel,  114N.  Y.359  181 

Perkins  County  v.  Miller  (1898),  55 

Neb.  141,  75  N.  W.  577  288,  639 

Perkins  Windmill  &  Ax  Co.  i'.  Till- 
man (1898),  55  Neb.  652,  75  N.  W. 
1098  669 

Perry  v.  Chester,  12  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

131  872,  881 

V.  JeEferies  (1901),  61  S.  C.  292, 

.39  S.  E.  315  466 

V.  Knott,  4  Beav.  179  250,  252 

V.  Seitz,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)  122       309,  311 
V.  Turner,  55  Mo.  418  289,  311 

V.  Whitakcr,  71  N.  C.  477  388 

Person  r.  Merrick,  5  Wis.  231        247,  334 
c.  Warren,  14  Barb.  488  161,  162 

Peter  i:  Farrel,  etc.  Co.  (1895),  53 

Ohio  St.  534,  42  N.  E.  690  888,  941 

Peters  v.  Jones,  35  Iowa,  512         2-56,  360 
y.  McKay   (1902),  1-36   CaL  73, 

68  Pac.  478  818 

V.  St.  Louis,  etc.  II.  Co.,  24  Mo. 

586  99 

Petersen  v.  Chemical  Bank,  32  N.  Y. 

21  100 

Peterson  i-.  Bean  (1900),  22  Utah,  43, 

61  Pac.  213  734,  857 

V.  Hopewell  (1898),  55  Neb.  670, 

76  N.  W.  451  593 

V.  Manni.v  (1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  \V. 

210  679 

V.  Roach,  32  Ohio  St.  374  562 

r.  Seattle  Traction  Co.  (1900), 

23  Wash.  615,  63  Pac.  539       768 
Pete  V.  Hammond,  29  Beav.  91  326 

Petre  v.  Dimcombe,  7  Hire,  24  255 

Petrie  v.  Petrie,  7  Lans.  90     248,  249,  372 
Pettibone  r.  Edwards.  15  Wis.  95         245 
V.  Hamilton,  40  Wis.  402  262 

Pettit  r.  Hamlyn,  43  Wis.  314  570 

Petty  V.  Malier,  15  B.  Mon.  604  42,  51 
Peyton  r.  Hosie,  41  Mo.  257  20,  31,  477 
Pfaendi  r  r.   Winona,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 

{\:m ).  81  Minn.  224,  87  N.  W.  018    787 
I'fau  '•.  .State  <x  rel.  (1897),  148  Ind. 

639,  47  N.  E.  927  613 

Pfefiferkorn   v.  Haywood  (1896),  65 

Minn.  429.  68  N.  W.  G8  290 

Pfiffner  r.  Krapfel,  28  Iowa,  27  544,  546 
I'fiBter  /•.  Wade,  56  Cal.  43  412 

r.  Wi-llg  (IB'.Hi),  'J2  Wis.  171,  65 

N.  W.  1041  787 


ARE   TO   THK    PAGES] 

Pfohl  V.  Simpson,  74  N.  Y.  137      2.38,  248 
Phalen  c.  Dingee,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  379 

300,  402 
Pharis  v.  Carver,  13  B.  Mon.  230  517 

Phelps  V.  Skinner  (1901),  63  Kan. 

364,  65  Pac.  607  773 

V.  Wait,  30  N.  Y.  78  301,  306 

Phelps,  etc.  Co.  v.  Halsell  (1901),  11 

Okla.  1,  65  Pac.  340  24 

Phifer  c.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  (1898), 

123  N.  C.  410,  31  S.  E.  716  669 

Philip  f.  Durkee  (1895),  108  Cal.  300, 

41  Pac.  407  89 

Phillipi  V.  Thompson,  8  Oreg.  428         784 
Phillips  V.   Carver    (1898),  99  Wis. 

561,  75  N.  W.  432  593,  655 

r.  Dorris  (1898),  56  Neb.  293,  76 

N.  W.  555  365 

?•.  Gorham,  17   N.  Y.  270    15,  17,   3-3, 
34,  64,  473,  497 
r.  Hagart    (1896),  113  Cal.  552, 

45  Pac.  843  746 

V.  Jarvis,  19  Wis.  204  801 

V.  Phillips,  107  Mo.  369  283 

V.  Van  Schaick,  37  Iowa,  229   111,  622 

Phillipson  v.  Gatty,  6  ILire,  26  251 

Philomath  v.  Ingle   (1902),  41  Oreg. 

289,  68  Pac.  803  593 

Phipps   r.  Wilson  (1899),  125  N.  C 

106,  34  S.  E.  227  892,  922 

Phoenix  v.  Lamb,  29  Iowa,  352  718 

Phoenix  Bank  r.  Donnell,  40  N.  Y. 

410  181,  814 

Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bachelder  (1894), 

39  Neb.  95,  57  N.  W.  996        702 
V.  Carnahan    (1900),  03  O.  St. 

258.  58  N.  E.  805,  88,  208   684,  832 
V.   Omaha    Loan    &   Trust   Co. 
(1894),  41  Neb.  8-34,60  N.W. 
133  110 

Phoenix    Iron    Works    r.    McEvonv 

(1896),  47  Neb.  228,  6(5  N.  W.  290     679 
Phoenix  Miit.  L.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Walrath, 

53  Wis.  609  780 

Pickens  v.  Polk  (1894),  42  Neb.  267, 

60  N,  W.  566  375 

Pickering  i-.  Miss.  Val.  Nat.  Tel.  Co., 

47  Mo.  457  455, 458 

Pickersgill  v.  Lahens,  15  Wall.  140       293 
Pickett    V.   Fidelity   Co.   (1901,,   60 

S.  C.  477,  38  S.  E.  160  640,  818 

Pickle  Marble  &  Granite  Co.  r.  Mc- 
Clay  (189S),  54  Neb.  661,  74  N.  W. 
1062  106 

Pico  v.  Cuyas,  47  Cal.  174  66 

Piedmont  Bank  r.  Wilson  (1899),  124 

N.  C.  561,  32  S.  E.  889  836,  846 

Pier  V.  Finch,  29  Barb.  170  806 

V.  Fond  du  Lac,  38  Wis.  470    265,  283 

V.  Heinrichofifen,  52  Mo.  333  544, 

545,   621 

Pierce  v.  Carey,  37  Wis.  232  75,  62G, 

629,  630 
V.  Conners  (1894),  20  Colo.  178, 

37  Pac.  721  220 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED.. 


CXXXV 


[the  references  are  to  thk  pages.] 


Pierce  v.  Faunce,  47  Me.  507 


C64 


V.   Great    Falls,   etc.    llv.    Co. 
(1S99),   22    .Mont.    445,   50 
Pac.  8t57 
V.   Milwaukee    Coiistr.    Co.,  38 
Wis.  25;-S  200, 

Piercy  v.  Sabin,  10  Cal.  22 
Pierson  v.  Fuhrmaiui,  27  Pac.  1015 
V.  KobinsDii,  3  Swaiist.  13i)  u. 
V.   School    District    (1898),    lOG 
Iowa,  1)95,  77  N.  W.  494 
Pierstoff  r.  Jorires  (1898),   80   Wis. 

128,  50  N.  W.  735  077,  (iaO, 

Pietsch   V.  Krause  (1903),  110  Wis. 

344,  93  N.  W.  9 
Pike  V.  Kiiigr,  10  Iowa,  49 

V.  Sutton  (1895),  21  Colo.  84,  39 
Pac.  1084 
Pilger  V.  Harder  (1898),  55  Neb.  113, 

75  N.  W.  559 
Pillow  V.  Sentelle,  39  Ark.  01         329, 
Pinckney  v.  Keyler,  4  E.  D.  Smith, 

469 
Pine  Tree  Lumber  Co.  r.  McKinlev 
(1901),  83  Minn.  419,  86  N.  W.  414 

Pine  Valley  r.  Unity,  40  Wis.  682 

Pinkham  v.  Pinkham  (1901),  61  Neb. 

330,  85  N.  W.  285  782, 

Pinkum  v.  Eau  Claire,  81  Wis  301 
Pioneer  Fuel  Co.  a   Hager  (1894),  57 

Minn.  76,  58  N.  W.  828  584, 

Pioneer  Press  Co.  v.  Hutcliinson 
(1896),  03  Minn.  481,  05 
N.  W.  938  908, 

V.  McClay  (1898),  54  Neb.  003, 
74  N.  W.  1063 
Piper  V.  City  of  Spokane  (1900),  22 
Wash.  147,  60  L^ac.  138 
V.  Hoard,  107  X.  Y.  67 
V.  Woolman  (1895),  43  Neb.  280, 
01  N.  W.  588 
Pirsson  v.  Gillespie,  4  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

691 
Piser  V.  Stearns,  1  Hilt.  86 
Pitcher  v.  Hennessey,  48  N.  Y.  415 
Pitkin  V.  New  York  &  New  England 
R.  R.  Co.  (1894),  64  Conn.  482,  30 
Atl.  772  612, 

Pitman  v.  Ireland  (1902),  64  Neb.675, 

90  N.  W.  540 
Pitts  Agricultural   Works  v.   Baker 
(1898),    11    S.    I).    342,    77 
N.  W.  586 
V.  Young  (1895),  0  S.  D.  557,  62 
N.  W.  432 
I'ittsburah,   Cin.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  o. 
Keller,  49  Ind.  211 
V.  Moore,  33  Ohio  St.  384 
V.  Nelson,  51  Ind.  150 
V.  Theobald,  51  Ind.  239 
Pittsburgh,  etc.    Ry.    Co.    v.   Praze 
(1898),  150  Ind.  570,  50  N.E. 
576 


082 

354 

804 
277 
372 

600 

714 

443 
833 

830 

115 
942 

881 

943, 
946 
155, 
576 

822 
661 

585 


924 

106 

619 
823 

703 

273 

915 

49 

039 
421 

181 

780 

561 
562 
575 
570 


Pittsburgh   etc.    Ry.    Co.    v.  Moore 
(1898),    152    Ind.    345,   53 
N.  E.  290 
V.  Sullivan  (1894),  141  Ind.  83, 

40  N.  E.  138 
V.  Wilson  (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  06 
N.  E.  899 
Pitzer    1-.    Territory    of    Oklahoma 

(1890),  4  Okla.  86,  44  Pac.  210 
Pixley  r.  Van  Nostern,  100  Ind.  34 
I'lacke  V.   Union   Depot    R.    R.  Co. 
(1897),  140  Mo.  634,  41  S.  W.  915 
Plankinion  v.  llildebrand  (1895),  89 
Wis.  209,  61  N.  W.  839      277,  328,  443, 
444,  458,  474,  501,  511 
Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Daley   (1897),  6 

N.  D.  330,  70  N.  W.  277 
Plant  V.  Carpenter  (1898),  19  Wash. 

621,  53  Pac.  1107 
Plass  V.  Plass  (1898),  121  Cal.  131,53 

Pac.  448 
Plath  V.  Braunsdorff,  40  Wis.  107 
Piatt  I'.  Colvin  (1893),  50  O.  St.  703, 
36  N.  E.  735 
V.  Iron  E.xch.  Bk.,  53  N.  W.  Rep. 

737 
V.  Jante,  35  Wis.  629 
V.  Town   of  Milford  (1895),  06 
Conn.  320,  34  Atl.  82 
Pleasant  r.  Samuels  (1896),  114  Cal. 

34,  45  Pac.  998 
Plumb  V.  Curtis  ( 1895),  GO  Conn.  154, 
33  Atl.  998 
V.  GrifRn  (1901),  74  Conn.  132, 

60  Atl.  1  570,  689 

Plumer  v.  Clarke,  59  Wis.  048  637 

Plummer  v.  Mold,  22  Minn.  15  660 

Plummer,  Perry  &  Co.  v.  Rohman 

(1900),  61  Neb.  61,  84  N.  W.  600      703, 

822 
880 


712 

656 

682 

735 
189 

680 


780 

710 

736 
801 

384 

207 
283 

675 

584 

677 


Plver  V.  Parker,  10  S.  C.  464 
Plympton  v.  Hall  (1893),  55  Minn. 

22,  50  N.  W.  351 
Poehlman  v.  Kennedy,  48  Cal.  201 
Pollard  V.  Lathrop,  12  Colo.  171 
Pollock    V.    Association    (1896),   48 

S.  C.  05,  25  S.  E.  977       450,  478 
V.   Stanton   County    (1899),   57 

Neb.  399,  77  N.  W.  1081 
V.  Whipple  (1895),  45  Neb.  844, 
64  N.  W.  210 
Polster  ?•.  Rucker,  16  Kan.  115 
Poly  i:  Williams  (1894),  101  Cal.  648, 

36  Pac.  102 
Pomeroy  v.  Benton,  57  Mo.  531 


161 
428 
414 


688 


660 
609 


650 
596.  598. 
599 
Ponca  Mill  Co.  v.  Mikesell  (1898), 

55  Neb.  98,  75  N.  W.  46  455, 

456,  493 
V.  Nichols  (1899),  61  Kan.  230, 

59  Pac.  257  64 

Pond  V.  Davenport,  45  Cal.  225  813 

I--.  Waterloo  Agric.    Works,    50 

Iowa,  593  942 

Poole  V.  Gerrard.  6  Cal.  71  231 


ex  XXVI 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Poole  V.  Marsli,  8  Sim.  528  24.S 

Poore  V.  Clarke,  2  Atk.  515     243,511,  592 

Pope  v.  Cole,  55  X.  Y.  124  2'J3 

V.  Kan:-as  City  Cable  Rv.    Co., 

itl»  .Mo.  400  575 

V.  Meloiie.  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  239       248 
V.  Porter,  3«  Fed.  liep.  7  110 

Pope  Mfg.  Co.  r.  Cycle  Co.  (1899), 

55  S.  C.  528,  33  S.  E.  787  870 

Popp  r.  Swanke,  68  Wis.  364  783 

Port  c.  Kiissell,  30  Ind.  (JO  748 

Port  Huron,  etc.  K.  Co.  r.  Clements 
(1902),  113  Wis.  249,  89  N.  W. 
160  812 

Porter  v.  Allen  (1002),  —  Idaho  — , 

09  Pac.  105  542,  543 

c.  Blciler,  17  Barb.  149  195 

c.  Dunn,  131  N.  Y.  314  225 

V.  Fillebruwn    (1H07),  119   Cal. 

235,  51  Pac.  322  641 

V.  Fletcher,  25  Minn.  493        178,  205 
V.  Garrissoraio,  51  Cal.  559  428 

V.  International  Bridge  Co. 
(1900),  163  N.  Y.  79,  57 
N.  E.  174  494 

r.  Sherman  County  Banking  Co. 
(1893),  36  Neb.  271,  54 
N.  W.  424  452 

r.  Woo<ls  (1896),  138  Mo.  539, 39 

S.  W.  794  107 

Portland  r.  Baker,  8  Oreg.  356  576 

Post  r.  Campbell   (1901),  110  Wis. 

37^,  85  N.  W.  1032  642 

I'ost-Intelligencer  Co.  c.  Harris 
(1895),  11  Wash.  500,  39  Pac.  965    615, 

619 
Postlewaitc  i:  Howes,  3  Iowa,  365  341 
Potter  r.  Aiax  Min.   Co.  (1900),  22 

Utah.  27.S,  61  Pac.  999  817 

f.  Benge  (1902),  Ky.,  67  S.  W. 

1005  710 

V.  Earnest,  45  Ind.  416  558,  824 

V.  Ellice.  48  N.  Y.  321  271,  360 

V.  Neal,  62  How.  Pr.  158  199 

V.  Pliillips,  44  Iowa,  357  340,  373 

Pottgieser  -•.  Dorn.  18  .Minn.  204  737 

Potts  r.  Baldwin,  67  App.  Div.  434      293 
t:  Domice  (1903),  173  N.  Y.  335, 

m  N.  E.  4  293,  296 

Powder  t:   Bowdle,  54  X.  W.  Rep. 

404  861,  862,  923,  927 

I'owder  River  Live  Stock  Co.  v. 
Lamb  (1893),  38  Neb.  339,  56 
N.  W.  1019  686,  714 

Powell  f.  Banks  (1898),  146  Mo.  620, 

4H  .S.  W.  66 1  191 

1-.  Davton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13  Oreg. 

446  499 

r.  Finch,  5  Duer,  666  413,  414 

I'.  Flanary  (1900),  109  Ky.  342, 

59  S.  W.  5  810 

r.  Nolan  (1902),  27  "Wash.  318, 

07  Pac.  712  103,  934,  042 

V.  Powell,  48  Cal.  234      299,  396,  403 
V.  Ro88,  4  Cal.  197  325,  336 


Power  c.  Bowdle  (1893),  3  N.  D.  107, 

54  .\.  W.  404  642 

r.  Hambrick     (1903),     Ky.,    74 

S.  W.  660  95 

V.  Sla  (1900),  24  Mont.  243,  61 

Pac.  468  49,  818 

Powers  V.  Armstrong,  35  Ohio  St. 

357  784,  807 

i;.  Bumcratz,  12  Ohio  St.  273  177 

Powis  V.  Smith,  5  B.  &  A.  851 
Poynter  r.  Chipnian  (1893),  8  Utah, 

442,  32  Pac.  690  816 

Prader   v.  Nat.  Ace.   Ass'n   (1899), 

107  la.  431,  78  N.  W.  60  520 

Prall  V.  Peters,  32  Neb.  832  790,  814 

Pratt  V.  Collins,  20  Hun,  126  877 

V.  Hawes  (1903),  118  Wis.  603, 

95  N.  W.  965  816 

V.  Howard  (1899),  109  la.  504, 

80  N.  W.  546  815 

r.  Menkens,  18  Mo.  158  935 

r.  Radford,  52  Wis.  114  202 

Pratcliett  v.  .Marsh  (1895),  52  Ohio 

St.  494,  40  N.  E.  200  97 

Pray  v.  Life  Indemnity  Co.  (1897), 

104  la.,  114,  73  N.  W.  485  934 

Preferred  Accident  Ins.  Co.  i\  Stone 

(1899),  61  Kan.  48,  58  Pac.  986  443 

Prentice  c.  Janssen,  7  Hun,  86  470 

Prentiss  v.  Bowdeii  (1895),  145  N.  Y. 

342,  40  N.  E.  13  341 

Presb.  Soc.  >:  Beach,  8  Hun, 644     147, 149 

Prescott  V.  Grady,  91  Cal.  518  575 

President,  etc.  of  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parker 

(1902),  64  Neb.  411,  89  N.  W.  1040    913, 

924 
Preston  v.  Roberts,  12  Bush,  570  575,  787 
Prettyman  t'.  Tazewell  Cy.  Sup.,  19 

111.406  119 

Pretzfelder  v.  Merchants'   Ins.   Co. 

(1895),  116  N.  C.  491,  21  S.  E.  302    498 
Prcw*itt   V.    Missouri,   etc.   Ry.   Co. 

(1896).  134  Mo.  615,  36  S   W.  667      570 
Prey  v.  Stanley  (1895),  110  Cal.  423, 

42  Pac.  908  231 

Price  V.  Brown,  10  Abb.  N.  Cas.  67       519 
V.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18 

Ind.  137  786 

V.  Price  (1894),  91    la.    693,  60 

N.  W.  202  303 

r.  Price's  E.xecutor  (1897),  101 

Kv.  28,  39  S.  W.  429  588 

w.  Sanders.  60  Ind.  310  661 

V.  Scott   (1896),  13  Wash.    574, 

43  Pac.  634  639 

V.  Water  Co.    (1897),   58   Kan. 

551,  50  I'ac.  450  682 

Price  Baking  I'owder  Co.  r.  Rinear 

(1897),  17  Wasli.  95,  49  Pac.  223       639 
Prichard's  K.xecutri.x  i'.  Peace  (1895), 

98  Kv.  99.  32  S.  W.  296      179,  850,  863 
Prince  "r.  'lakash  (1903),  75  Conn. 

616.  54  Atl.  1003  666 

Prindle  ;;,  Aldrich,  13  How  Pr.  466       6-35 

V.  Caruthers,  15  N.  Y.  425  596 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


cxxxvn 


[the  references  are  to  tue  pages.] 


Printup  V.  Patton  (1893),  91  Ga.422, 

18  S.  E.  311 
Prior  r.  Madigan,  51  Cal.  178 
Pritohard    v.    Hicks,    1  Paige,    270 

Pritchett  v.  McGaiitfhey  (1898),  151 

Ind.  038,  52  N.  E.  397 
Privett   V.    Railroad  Co.  (1899),  54 

S.  C.  98,  32  S.  E.  75 
Proctor  y.  Baker,  15  Itid.  178         326, 
V.  Cole,  66  Ind.  57(5 
V.  Cole,  104  Ind.  373 
V.  Georgia  Ins.  Co.  (1899),  124 

N.  C.  265,  32  S.  E.  716 
V.  Irvin  (1899),  22  Mont.  547,  57 

Pac.  183 
V.  Rief,  52  Iowa,  592 
V.  Southern   Ry.  Co.  (1901),  61 
S.  C.  170,  39  S.  E.  351 
Prost  V.  More,  40  Cal.  347  755, 

Protection  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  6  Ohio 

St.  553 
Prouty  V.   Eaton,     41    Barb.    409 


V.  Lake   S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.,  85 

N.  Y.  272 
V.  Prouty,  4  Wash.  174 
V.  Swift,  61  N.  Y.  594 
Pruyn  v.  Black,  21  N.  Y.  300 
Pryor  v.  Brady  (1902),  115  Ga.  848, 
42  S.  E.  223 
V.  Kansas  City  (1899),  153  Mo. 
135,  54  S.  W.  499  466, 

Pugli  V.  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Ry.  Co. 
(1897),  101  Ky.  77,  39  S.  W. 
695 
V.  Currie,  5  Ala.  44G 
V.  Oregon  Imp.   Co.   (1896),  14 

Wash.  331,  44  Pac.  689 
V.  Ottenheinier,  6  Oreg.  231 
Pugmire  c.   Diamond  Coal  &  Coke 
Co.  (1903),  26  Utah,  115,  72   Pac. 
385 
Pugsley  V.  Aikin,  11  N.  Y.  494 
Pullen  u.  Heron   Min.  Co.,  71  N.  C. 
5(57 
i\  Wright,  34  Minn.  314 
PuUiam  v.  Burlingame,  81  Mo.  Ill 
PuUins'  Adm'r  v.  Smitli  (1899),  106 

Ky.  418,  50  S.  W.  833 
Pulver  V.  Skinner,  42  Hun,  322 
Punteney-Mitchell  Mfg.  Co  v.  North- 
wall   Co.    (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  91 
N.  W.  863  911, 

Purity  Ice  Works  v.  Rountree  (1898), 

104  Ga.  676,  30  S.  E.  885 
Purnell  v.  Vaughan,  80  N.  C.  46 
Putnam  v.  Ross,  55  Mo.  116 
V.  Tennyson,  50  Ind.  456 
V.  Wise,  1  Hill,  234  648, 

Putt  r.  Putt    (1897),  149  Ind.  30,  48 

N. E.  356 
Pyle  V.  Peyton  (1896),  146  Ind.  90, 

44  N.  E.  925 
Pyncent  v.  Pyncent,  3  Atk.  571 


305 
737 
249, 
347 

711 

643 
3;j3 
598 

881 

207 

740 
620 

089 
812 

150 
845, 

852 

412 
526 
631 
400 

661 

070 


302 

248 


815 


642 
470 

331 

737 
780 

817 
111 


913 

641 
940 
375 

727 
649 

947 

565 
255 


Q. 


Quaid  r.  Cornwall,  13  Bush,  601  665 
Quassaic  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Waddell,  3  N.  Y. 

S.  C.  680  315 
Quayle  (•.  Bayfield  Co.  (1902),  114 

Wis.  108,  89  N.  W.  892  711 
Quebec  Bk.  of  Toronto  v.  Weyand, 

30  Oliio  St.  126  47,  55,  852 
Queen  City  Printing  Co.  i'.  McAden 

(1902),  131  N.  C.  178,  42  S.  E.  575  605 

Q'ligley  r.  Merritt,  11  Iowa,  147  834 

Quillen  v.  Arnold,  12  Nev.  234     117,  515, 

Quilty  (;.  Battle,  01  Hun,  164  314 
Quin  V.  Havenor  (1903),  118  Wis.  53, 

94  N.  W.  642  680 

V.  Lloyd,  41  N.  Y.  349     769,  780,  802 

(iuinn  V.  Smith,  49  Cal.  163  930 
Quinney    v.    Stockbridge,    33    Wis. 

505  563 

(Juintard  v.  Newton,  5  Robt.  72  628 
Q.  W.  Loverin-Browne  Co.  v.  Bank 

(1898),  7  N.  D.  569,  75  N.  W.  923  638 


K. 


Rabb  p.  Albright  (1894),  98  la.  50, 

61  N.  W.  402  ■  6 

Rabe  v.  Sommerbeck  (1895),  94  la. 

656,  63  N.  W.  458  673 

Rabone  v.  Williams,  7  Durnf.  &  E. 

T.  R.  360  n.  877 

Racine  Cy.  Bank  v.  Keep,  13  Wis. 

209  911,  913 

Racouillat  v.  Rene,  32  Cal.  4.50     733,  736 
Radabaugh    v.    Silvers  (1893),    135 

Ind.  605,  35  X.  E.  694  181 

Radant  v.  Werheim  Mfg.  Co.  (1900), 

106  Wis.  600,  82  N.  W.  562        178,  179 
Radde  v.  Ruckgaber,  3  Duer,  684         748, 

783 
Radford  v.  Gaskill  (1897),  20  Mont. 

293.  50  Pac.  854  643 

V.    So.  Mut.  Life  Ins.    Co.,   12 

Bush,  434  666 

Ragan  v.  Simpson,  27  Wis.  355  633 

Ragsdale  v.  Railway  Co.  (1901),  60 

S.  C.  381,  38  S.  E."609  610 

Railroad  Co.  v.  Stark,  38  Mich.  714     676 
Railway  Co.  v.  State  (1894),  59  Ark. 

165,  26  S.  W.  824  569 

V.  Taylor  (1893).  57  Ark.  13(3, 

20  S.  W.  1083  117 

Railway  Officials,  etc.  Ass'u  v. 
Drummond  (1898),-  56  Neb.  235,' 
76  X.  W.  502  664,  672,  817 

Rain  r.  Roper,  15  Fla.  121  360 

Rainbolt  v.  Strang  (1894),  39  Neb. 

339,  58  N.  W.  96  809 

Rainey  v.  Sniizer,  28  Mo.  310       174,  204, 

209 
Rainsford  v.  Massengale   (1893),   5 
Wyo.  1,  35  Pac.  774  703 


CXXiVlU 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the   REFEBENCES   ABE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Ralphs   >:  Ilensler  (1896),  114  Cal. 

\M.  45  Pac.  1062  643 

Kalvu    r.    Atkins    (1901),   157    Ind. 

■■jh,  h\  N.  K.  126  730 

Kaming  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co. 
(1900),  157  Mo.  477,  57  S.  W.  268   613, 
623,  684 
Ramsdell  >:  Clark  (1897),  20  Mont. 

103,  49  Pat'.  591  466 

Ramsev  /•.  .Jolmson  (1897),  7  Wvo. 

392,  42  Pac.  10><4  058,  673 

Randall  v.  City  of  Hoquiam  (1902), 

30  Wash.  435,  70  Pac   1111     673 
V.  Persons  (1894),  42  Neb.  607, 

60  N.  W.  898  623 

V.  Reynolds,  20  J.  &  S.  145  140 

V.  Simmons  (1902),  40  Ore.  554. 

67  Pac.  513  787,  832 

Rankin  c.  Collins,  50  Ind.  158  452 

I'.  Major,  9  Iowa,  297       245,  325,  332 
V.  Newman  (1895),  107  Cal.  602, 

40  Pac.  1024  736 
V.  Railroad  Co.  (1900),  58  S.  C. 

532.  36  S.  E.  997  709 

Ransom  i'.  Stanherry,  22  Iowa,  334  622 
Ranson  r.  Anderson,  9  S.C.  438  713,  787 
Rasmussen  v.  Levin  (1901),  28  Colo. 

44S,  65  Pac.  94  819 

Rathbone  r.  Frost  (1894),  9  Wash. 

162,  37  Pac.  298  678 

V.  Hooney,  58  N.  Y.  463  333,  334 

r.  McConnell,  20  Barb.  311  806 

Rathbone,   etc.    Co.    v.    Wheelihan 

(1900),  82  Minn.  30,  84  N.  W.  638      674 
Raunia  v.  Bailey  (1900),  80  Minn. 

336.  83  N.  W.  191  675 

Ravicz   V.  Nickells  (1900),  9  N.  U. 

536.  84  N.  W.  353  866 

Rawley  r.  Woodruff,  2  Lans.  419  909 

Rawlings  v.  Fuller,  31  Ind.  255  146 

Rawson  t-.  Penu  R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Pr. 

.V.  s.  220  225 

Ravan  r.  Dav,  46  Iowa,  239  659 

Rayburn  v.  Ilurd,  20  Ore.  229  131 

Raymond  v.  Hanford,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

312  584,  587 

V.    Johnson   (1897),    17    Wash. 

232,  49  Pac.  492  757 

V.  Miller  (1897),  50  Neb.  506,  70 

N.  W.  22  688 

V.    Morrison    (1894),    9    Wash. 

156,  37  Pac.  318  285,  734 

V.  Pritchard,  24  Ind.  318  791,  814 

V.  Railway  Co.  (1897),  57  O.  St. 

271,  48  N.  E.  1093  642,643 

1-.  Richardson,  4  E.  D.  Smith, 

171  777 

V.  Watiifin  (1895),  142  Ind.  367, 

41  N.  E.  815  643,  601 
Rayner  r.  Julian,  Dickens,  677  345 
Ravnor    r.     Wilmington     Seacoast 

Ry.  Co.  (1901),  129  N.  C.  196,  39 

S.  E.  821  806 

Ro.     .>'e<' name  of  party. 

Kcab  r.  McAlister,  8  VVend.  109  842 


Read  v.  Beardslcy,  6  Neb.   493  637 

V.  Brown,  22 "q.  B.  Div.  128  463 

V.  Decker,  5  Hun,  646  784,  793,  908 
r.  Jeffries,  16  Kan.  534  299 

r.  Patterson,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  211  347 

V.  Sang,  21  Wis.  678        177,  227,  270 

Reading  Township  >:  Telfer  (1897), 

57  Kan.  798,  48  Pac.  134  673 
Ready  i-.  Smith  (1902),  170  Mo.  163, 

70  S.  W.  484  340 

r.  Sommer,  37  W^is.  265  713 

Real  V.  Honey  (1894),  39  Neb.  516, 

58  N.  W.  136  642 
Realty    Revenue,  etc.  Co.  i'.  Farm, 

etc    Co.  (1900),  79  Minn.  465,  82 
N.  W.  857  543,  658 

Redford    r.    Spokane    St.    Rv.    Co. 

(1894),  9  Wasli.  5'.,  36  Pac.  1085     683 
Redin  v.  Branhan,  43  Minn.  283  360 

Redman  v.  .Vlalvin,  23  Iowa,  296     875,  878 
Redmond    v.    Peterson    (1894),    102 

Cal.  595,  36  Pac.  923  353 

Red  River  Vallev  Investment  Co.  v. 
Cole     (1895),  "62  Minn.    457,    64 
N.  W.  1149 
Reed  v.  Chubb,  9  lowra,  178 

V.  Corrigau  (1901),  114  la.  638, 

87  N.  W.  676 
1-.  Equitable    Trust   Co.   (1902), 

115  Ga.  780,  42  S.  E.  102 
V.  Finton,  63  Ind.  288 
I'.  Garr,  59  Ind.  299 
V.  Harris,  7  Robt.  151 
V.  Howe,  28  Iowa,  250 
1-.  Lane   (1895).  90  la.   454,   65 

N.  W.  380 
r.  McConnell,  133  N.  Y.  425 
V.  McRill  (1894),  41   Neb.  206, 

59  N.  W.  775 
V.  Newton,  22  Minn.  541  55,  922 

V.  Pi.xley,  25  Minn.  482  609 

V.  Poindexter  (1895),  16  Mont. 

294.  40  Pac.  596  659 

V.  Reed,  93  N.  C.  462  831 

V.  Robertson,  45  Mo.  580  20,  61 

V.  Stryker,  12  Abb.  Pr.  47  342 

V.  Union  Central  Life  Ins.  Co. 
(1900),  21  Utah,  295,  61 
Pac.  21  796 

Reeder  v.  Savre,  70  N.  Y.  180       202,  637 


687 
936 

666 


543 
310 
310 
104,  154 
520 


6 
620 


687 


Reedy  v.  Smith,  42  Cal.  246 

Reeg  V.  Adams  (1902),  113  Wis.  175. 

87  N.  W.  1067 
Rees  V.  Cupp,  59  Ind.  566 

V.    Shepherdson    (1895),  95   la. 
431,  64  N.  W.  286 
Reeve  i-.  Fraker,  32  Wis.  243 
Reeves  v.  Kimball,  40  N.  Y.299 


472 


443 

598 


665 
573,  596 
122,  123, 
124 
Reeves   &   Co.    r.   Cress    (1900),  80 

Minn.  466,  83  N.  W.  443  638 

Register     Printing     Co.    v.     Willis 

(1894),  57  Minn.  9,3,  58  N.  W.  825     817 
Rcichert    r.    Lonsberg    (1894),    87 
Wis.  543,  58  N.  W.  1030  069 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


CXXXIX 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Eeichert  v.  Stilwell  (1902),  172  N.  Y. 

83,  64  N.  E.  790  474 

lleid  V.  Evergreens,  21  How.  Pr.  319    385, 

387 
I'.  Gifford,  Hopk.  416  262 

V.  Sprague,  72  N.  Y.  457  123 

Reilly  v.  Cullen  (1900),  159  Mo.  822, 

60  S.  W.  126  536,  642 

V.  Rucker,  Ki  Ind.  303  935 

V.  Sicilian  Asphalt  Paving:  Co. 
(1902),  170  N.  Y.  40,  62 
N.  E.  772  461,  468,  470 

Eeindl  v.  Heath  (1901),  109  Wis.  570, 

85  N.  W.  495  515 

Reinhardt  r.  Wendeck,  40  Mo.  577       369 
Reiser  v.  Gigrich  (1894),  69  IVlinn. 

368,  01  N.  W.  30  318,  347 

Reiss  r.  Argubright  (1902),  Neb.,  92 

N.  W.  988  730 

Reisz  V.  Supreme  Council  (1809),  103 

Wis.  427,  79  N.  W.  430  689 

Reizenstein  v.  Clark  (1897),  104  la. 

287,  73  N.  W.  588  303,  625 

Remillard  ;;.  Prescott,  8  Oreg.  37  815 

Remington    v.    Hudson    (1902),    64 

Kan.  43,  67  Pac.  636  655 

V.  King,  11  Abb.  Pr.  278  935 

Reray  i-.  Olds,  88  Cal.  537  457 

Renaker  r.  Smith   (1901),  109  Ky. 

643,  60  S.  W.  407  920 

Rennebaura  v.  Atkinson  (1898),  103 

Ky.  555,  45  S.  W.  874  922,  890 

Renner  Bros.   i\  Thornburg  (1900), 

111  la.  515,  82  N.  W.  950  641 

Rensberger  v.  Britton  (1903),  —  Col. 

-,  71  Pac.  379  924,925 

Renshaw  v.  Taylor,  7  Oreg.  315  329 

Reubens  v.  Joel,  13  N.  Y.  448  8,  9,  10 

Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  8  Cal.  66         316,  337 
Revelle  v.  Claxon,  12  Bush,  558  609 

Revere  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chamberlin,  66 

Iowa,  508  928 

Reynolds  v.  Craus,  16  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

792  787 

V.  Hosmer,  45  Cal.  616  199 

V.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1895),  143  Ind.  579, 40  N.E. 
410  91,  107 

V.  Lounsburv,  6  Hill,  534  719 

V.  Pascoe  (1901),  24  Utah,  219, 

66  Pac.  1064  816 

V.  Price  (1900),  Kv.,  56  S.  W.  502  567 
V.  Reynolds,  45  Mo.  App.  622  810 
V.  Robinson,  64  N.  Y.  589  225,  503 
V.  Roth  (1895),  61  Ark.  317,  33 

S.  W.  105  458 

V.  Smith,  28  Kan.  810  930 

Reynoldson  v.  Perkins,  Amb.  564  365 

Rhea  r.  Bagley  (1899),  06  Ark.  93, 

49  S.  W.  492  849 

Rhoades  v.  Higbee  (1895),  21  Colo. 

88,  39  Pac.  1099  754 

Rhoads  v.  Booth,  14  Iowa,  575  216 

Rhode  V.  Green,  26  Ind.  83  748,  784 

Rhodes  r.  Alameda  Co.,  52  Cal.  350      576 


Rhorer  v.  Midillesboro    Co.   (1898), 

103  Ky.  146,  44  S.  W.  448    354,  566, 685 
Ricard  v.  Sanderson,  41  N.  Y.  179      105, 

110 
Rice  V.  Ashland  County  (1902),  114 

Wis.  130,  80  N.  W.  908  815 

V.  Dorrian  (1893)  57  Ark.  541,  22 

S.  W.  213  421 

V.  Hall,  41  Wis.  453  370 

V.  O'Connor,  10  Abb.  Pr.  362         931 
V.  Savery,  22  Iowa,  470  105,  109, 

113,  149,212 
r.  Smith,  9  Iowa,  570  118 

Rich  v.  llobson  (1893),  112  N.  C.  79, 

16  S.  E.  931  G76 

Richards  v.  Am.  Desk  &  Seating  Co. 
(1894),87  Wis.  603,68N.W. 
787  849 

v.  Cooper,  5  Beav.  304  334 

V.  Darly,  34  Iowa,  427  135 

V.   Jefferson    (1898),  20   Wash. 

106,  54  Pac.  1123  802 

V.  Lake  View  Lan<l  Co.  (1897), 

1 15  Cal.  642,  47  Pac.  683         566 
r.  Union  Vil.,  48  Hun,  263  135 

Richardson  r.  Bates,  8  Ohio  St.  257         51 
V.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.  (1895), 

10  Wash.  648,  39  Pac.  95         455 
V.  Doty   (1895),  44  Neb.  73,  62 

N.  W.  254  754,  887 

V.  Hadsall,  106  111.  476  332 

r.  Hittle,  31  Ind.  119  790 

I'.  Hoole,  13  Nev.  4y2  609 

r.  Hulbert,  1  Aiist.  65  348 

V.  Mackay  (1896),  4  Okla.  328, 

46  Pac.  546  823 

V.  Means,  22  Mo.  495  11,  38 

V.  Moore  (1902),  SO  Wash.  406, 

71  Pac.  18  644 

V.  Opelt  (1900),  60  Neb.  180,  82 

N.  W.  377  470,  474,  680,  815 

V.  Penny  (1900),  10  Okla.  32,  61 

Pac.  584  907,  928 

V.  Steele,  9  Neb.  483  714 

Richardson's  Adm.  v.    Spencer,    18 

B.  Mon.  450  253 

Ricliey  -■.  Bly,  115  Ind.  2-32  936 

V.  Branson,  33  Mo.  App.  418  213 

Richmon.l  r.  Bloch  (1900),  38  Ore. 

317,  60  Pac.  388  934 

V.    Dubuque,    etc.   R.    Co.,    33 

luwa,  422  19,  42 

r.  Latiin,  04  Cal.  273  938 

V.  Post  (1897),  69  Minn.  467,  72 

N.  W'.  704  680 

V.  Voorhees  (1894),  10  Wash.  316, 

38  Pac.  1014  668 

Richmond  &  L.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 

7  Bush,  532  H,  71 

Richter  v.  Leibv  (1898),  99  Wis.  512, 

75  N.  W.  82  155 

r.  Poppenhansen,  42  N.  Y.  373       293 

Richtmeyer  v.  Remsen,  38  N.  Y.  206     807 

Richtmyer  c.  Richtmver,  50  Barb. 

55      '  ■  177,  249,  475 


cxl 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[IHE   BEFERESCES   ARE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 


Rich  wine    v.   Presbyterian    Church 

(l«y3|,  135  Ind.  bb,  34  N.  E.  737 
Rickard  i:  Kohl,  '22  Wis.  500 
Ricker  c  Pratt,  48  Ind.  7o 
Ricketson    r.    City    of    Milwaukee 
(1900),    105  Wis.    591,    81 
N.  W.  804 
c.  Richard.son.  19  Cai.  330 
Ricketts  r.  Hart  (18U9),  150  Mo.  64, 

51  S.  W.  825 
Ricks  V.  Pope  (1901),  129  N.  C.  52, 

39  S.  E.  038 
Riddell  v.  Priciiard  (1895),  12  Wash. 

GOl,  41  Pac.  905 
Riddick  v.  Walsh,  15  Mo.  538        326,  336 
Ridenour  v.  Mayo,  29  Ohio  St.  138       702 
r.  Vv'iierritt,  30  Ind.  485  350,  353 

Rider  Life  Raft  Co.  v.  Roacli,   97 

N.  Y.  378  289 

Ridgteway  v.  Herbert  (1899),  150  Mo. 

606,  51  S.  W.  1040  41,  47 


521 

931 

46 


800 
936 

G64 

197 

94 


Riemer  v.  Johnke,  37  Wis.  258 
Riggs  V.  Am.  Tract  Soc,  84  N.  Y. 
330 
V.  Home   Fire  Ass'n  (1901),  61 
S.  C.  448,  39  S.  E.  614 
Rigsbee  r.  Trees,  21  Ind.  227 
Riif  V.  Riibe  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94 

N.  W.  517 
Riley  v.  Corwin,  17  Hun,  597 
V.  Norman,  39  Ark.  158 
i".  Schawacker,  50  Ind.  592 
Rinard    r.    Omaiia,    etc.    Ry.    Co. 
(1901),  164  Mo.  270,  64  S.  W.  124 


455 

811 

713 
472 


820 
457 
310 

602, 

659 

68 


Rindge  v.  Baker,  55  N.  Y.  209 
Rinehart  c.  Rineiiart,  2  McCarter, 

44 
Riner  r.  New  Hampshire  Fire  Ins. 

Co.  (1899).  9  Wyo.  81,  60  Pac.  262 
Ring  V.  Ogden,  44  Wis.  303 
Rio    Grande    West.    R.    R.    Co.    v. 

Power  Co.  (1900),  23  Utah,  22,  63 

Pac.  995 
Rippstein  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  L.  Ins 

Co.,  57  Mo.  86 
Risdon  v.  Davenport  (1894),  4  S.  D. 

555,  57  N.  W.  482 
Riser  v.  Snoddy,  7  ind.  442 
Risk  V.  Hoffman,  69  Ind.  137 
Risiey  i-.  Wightman,  13  Hun,  163 
Rissler  v.    Ins.  Co.  (1899),   150  Mo. 

36<5,  51  S.  W.  755 
Ritchie  V.  Hay  ward,  71  Mo.  560    901,918 
Rittenhouse  v.  Clark  (1901),  110  Ky. 

147,01  S.  W.  33 
Rivers  v.  Blom  (1901),  163  Mo.  442, 

63  S.  W.  812 
Rizer  v.  Davis  Cy.  Com'rs,  48  Kan. 

389 
Roach  V.  Privett.  90  Ala.  391 
Roback  v.  Powell,  30  Ind.  515 
Robl.ins  V.  Clicek,  32  Ind.  328 

r.  Codnian,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  325 


253 

770 
918 


816 

829 

789 
786 
112 
178 

466 


I'.  Deverill,  20  Wis.  142 


179 

818 

499 
939 
723 
113 
663 
98,  146 


Robbins  r.  Dishon,  19  Ind.  204 
V.  Lincohi,  12  Wis.  1 
V.  Wells,  18  Abb.  Pr.  191 

Roberts  v.  Carter,  38  N.  Y.  107     131, 

r.  Chamberlain,  30  Kan.  677 
V.  Donovan,  70  Cal.  108 
V.  Evans,  43  Cal.  380  648, 

r.     Indianapolis     St.    Rv.    Co. 

(1902),  158  Ind.  634, 64  N.  E. 

217 
V.  Johannas,  41  Wis.  616         725, 
V.  Johnson,  58  N.  Y.  613  301, 

V.  Leak  (1899),  108  Ga.  806,  33 

S.  E.  995 
r.  Lovell,  38  Wis.  211 
V.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co. 

(1898),  155  N.Y.  31,49  N.E. 

262 
V.  Samson  (1897),  50  Neb.  745, 

70  N.  W.  384 
V.  Treadwell,  50  Cal.  520 
V.  Tunstall,  4  Hare,  257 
V.  Wood,  38  Wis.  60 
Robertson  v.  Burrell  (1895),  110  Cal. 

568,  42  Pac.  1086 
V.  Gr.  West.  R.  Co.,  10  Sim.  314 


113 

738 
159 
135. 
935 
304 
881 
649 


612 
734 
306 

587 
575 


V.  Robertson'(1900),  37  Ore.  339, 

02  Pac.  377  770, 

V.  Rockford,  21  111.  451 
V.  Soutiigate,  6  Hare,  536 
Robinson  v.  Allen,  37  Iowa,  27 

1-.  Berkey   (1896),  100   la.   136, 

69  N.  W.  433 
V.  Brown  (1901),  166  N.  Y.  59, 

159  N.  E.  775 
V.  Crescent  City  Mill,  etc.  Co., 

93  Cal.  316 
V.  Dickey  (1895),  143  Ind.  205, 

42  N.  E.  679 
V.  Eau   Claire    Stationery    Co. 

(1901),    110    Wis.   369,    85 

N.  W.  983 
V.  Ferguson  (1903),  — la.— ,  93 

N.  W.  350 
V.  Frost,  14  Barb.  536  769, 

V.  Gleason,  53  Cal.  38 
V.  Hill  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  623 


V.  Hintrager,  36  Fed.  Rep.  752 
V.  Howes,  20  N.  Y.  84  131, 

V.  Jennings,  7  Bush,  630 
V.  Kind  (1896),  23  Nev.  330,  47 

Pac.  1  350, 

V.  Rice,  20  Mo.  229 
v.  United   Trust  (1903),  — Ark. 

—  72  S.  W.  992 
V.  Wheeler,  25  N.  Y.  252 
V.  Willoughby,  67  N.  C.  84 
Robson  V.  Comstock,  8  Wis.  372 

596,  697, 
Roby  V.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  R.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1894),  142   N.  Y.   176,  36  N.  E. 
1053 


349 

592 
576 
352 
337 

203 
255, 
358 

803 
119 
258 
821 

565 

473 

428 

712 

642 

602 
779 
412 
832, 
834 
203 
136 
291 

413 
504 

640 
218 
636 
592, 
598 


285 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


cxli 


[the  references  are  to  tub  pages.] 


Roclie   I'.    Baldwin  (1902),  135  Cal. 

5-22,  05  Pac.  459  587 

V.  Spokane    County    (1900),  22 

Wash.  121,  60  Pac.  59  710 

Rochester  v.  Alfred  Bk.,  18  Wis.  432   118 
Rochester  City  Bk.   v.  Suydam,  5 

How.  Pr.  216  23,  541,  559 

Rock  r.  Collins  (1898),  99  Wis.  630, 

75  N.  W.  426  639 

V.  Wallace,  14  Iowa,  593  118 

Rockford    Watch    Co.    i\    Manifold 

(1893),  36  Neb.  801,  55  N.  W.  236     678 
Rockwell  V.  Geery,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

687  347 

V.  Holcomb,  31  Pac.  Rep.  144         150 
Rodenbarger  v.   Bramblett,  78  Ind. 

213  112 

Rodgers  v.  Association,  17  S.  C.  406    463, 

493 
V.  Baltimore,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1897), 

150  Ind.  397,  49  N.  E.  453       682 
i;.  Parker  (1902),  136  Cal.  313, 

68  Pac.  975  867 

V.  Rodgers,  11  Barb.  595  502 

Rodini  v.  Lytle  (1896),  17  Mont.  448, 

43  Pac.  501  398 

Roe  V.  Angevine,  7  Hun,  679         772,  793 
V.  Rogers,  8  How.  Pr.  356  832 

Roehring  v.  Huebschmann,  34  Wis. 

185  476 

Roemer  v.  Striker  (1894),  142  N.  Y. 

134,  36  N.  E.  808  778 

Rogers  v.  Castle,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  651       50 
v.  Duhart  (1893),  97  Cal.  500,  32 

Pac.  570  15,  218 

V.  Felton  (1895),  98  Kv.  148,  32 

S.  W.  405  '  741 

V.  Gallowav  (1898),  64  Ark.  627, 

44  S.  W.  454  117 

V.  Gosnell,  58  Mo.  589  105 

V.  Lafayette  Agr.  Works,  52  Ind. 

296  181,  265,  667 

V.  Levy  (1893),  36  Neb.  601,  54 

N.  W.  1080  180 

V.  Milwaukee,  13  Wis.  610      544.  567 
V.  Penniston,  16  Mo.  432  65 

V.  Scliulenburg  (1896),  111  Cal. 

281,  43  Pac.  899  662 

V.  Shannon,  52  Cal.  99  594 

V.  Smith,  17  Ind.  823        229,  458,  525 
i:   Truesdale    (1894),  57   Minn. 

126,  58  N.  W.  688  682 

V.  Wolfe,  104  Mo.  1  360 

Rogge  V.  Cassidy,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  716     99 
liohman  v.  Gaiser  (1898),  53   Neb. 

474.  73  N.  W.  923  106,  735 

Rohrer  v.  Turrill,  4  Minn.  407  95 

Rolleston  v.  Morton,  1  Dr.  &  W.  171    333 

Rollins  V.  Forbes,  10  Cal.  299  474 

V.  Humphrey  (1897),  98  Wis.  66, 

73  N.  W.  331  670 

I).  Rolliqs,  76  N,  C.  264  283 

Rome,  Bk.  of,  y.  Haselton,15Lea,216     389 

Romer  v.  Center  (1893),  53   Minn. 

171,  54  N.  W.  1052  609 


Romine  v.  Roniine,  59  Ind.  346 
Honnow  v.  Delmue  (1895),  23  Nev. 

2!t,  41  Pac.  1074. 
Rood  r.  Taft  (1890),  94  Wis.  380,  69 

N.  W.  183  8,  72,  864,  908,  913, 

Roosevelt  v.  Draper,  23  N.  Y.  318 
;;.  Ulmer  (1898),  98  Wis.  356,  74 
N.  W.  124 
Root  V.  Ciiilds  (1897),  68  Minn.  142, 
70  N.  W.  1078 
V.  Taylor,  20  Johns.  137 
V.  Wright,  84  N.  Y.  72 
Roots  V.  Merriwetlier,  8  Bush,  397 
Roper  V.  McFadden,  48  Cal.  346 
Rose  V.  Hurley,  39  Ind.  77 
l:  Madden,  1  Kan.  445 
1-.  Page,  2  Sim.  471  247, 

V.  Trcadway,  4  Nev.  455 
V.  Williams,  5  Kan.  483  290, 

Roseburg  Ky.  Co.  v.  Nosier  (1900), 

37  Ore.  299,  60  Pac.  904 
Rosecrans  v.  Asay  (1896),  49  Neb. 
512,  68  N.  W.  627 
V.  Elsworth,  52  Cal.  509 
Rosekrans  v.  White,  7  Lans.  486    342, 
Roselle  v.  P'armers' Bank  (1893),  119 

Mo.  84,  24  S.  W.  744 
Rosenau  v.  Syring   (1894),  25  Ore. 

386,  35  Pac.  845 
Rosenberg  v.  Staten  Island  Ry.  Co., 

14  N.  Y.  Suppl.  476 
Rosenberger  a.  Marsh  (1899),  108  la. 

47,  78  N.  W.  837  615, 

Rosenthal  v.  Sutton,  31  Ohio  St.  406 
Rosewater  v.  Horton  (1903),  —  Neb. 

— ,  93  N.  W.  681 
Ross  V.  Charleston,  etc.  Co.  (1894),  42 
S.  C.  447,  20  S.  E.  285 
V.  Cornell,  45  Cal.  133 
V.  Crary,  1  Paige,  416 
V.  Howard  (1901),  25  Wash.  1, 

64  Pac.  794 
i\  Johnson,  1  Handy,  388 
W.Jones  (1896),  47  S.  C.  211,  25 

S.  E.  59 
V.  Under,  12  S.  C.  592  178, 

V.  Mather,  51  N.  Y.  108    75,  626, 

i--.  Page  (1902),  11  N.  D.  458,  92 

N.  W.  822  179, 

V.  Purse,  17  Colo.  24 
V.  Ross,  25  Hun,  642 
V.  Wait  (1894),  4  S.  D.  584,  67 
N.  W.  497 
Rosser  v.    Georgia   Home   Ins   Co. 

(1897),  101  Ga.  710,  29  S.  E.  286 
Rossiter  v.  Loeber  (1890),  18  Mout. 

372,  45  Pac.  560 
Rost  V.  Harris,  12  Abb.  Pr.  446     748, 
Roth  V.  Palmer,  27  Barb.  652        562, 


Rothe  V.  Rothe,  31  Wis.  570 
Rothschild  v.  Mack,  42  Hun,  73 
r.  Whitman,  132  N.  Y.  472 
r.  Whitman,  57  Hun,  135 


626, 


.061 

262 

932 
118 

669 

671 
140 
111 
564 
807 
827 
299 
334 
792 
299 

593 


428 
370 

410 

676 

495 

638 
377 

642 

612 

66 

249 

703 
935 

457 
271 
630, 
631 

180 
667 
718 

452 

800 

730 
783 
651, 
652 
630 
133 
920 
920 


cxlii 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Rounow  f.  Delmue  (1895),  23  Nev. 

29.  41  Pac.  1074 
Houiitree  v.  lirinson,  98  N.  C.  107 
lioiisli  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1897J,  102 

Ga.  lO'J,  2'J  S.  E.  144 
Kow  c.  Row  ( 1«95),  53  0.  St.  249,  41 

N.  E.  239 
Kowe  i;.  Barnes  (J897),  101  la.  302, 
70  N.  W.  197 
V.  Beckett,  30  Ind.  154 
V.  Moon  ( 11»02),  115  Wis.  566,  92 

N.  W.  263 
v.  Parsons,  6  Hun,  338 
V.  Sniiili,  38  How.  Pr.  37 
Roweli  V.  Janvriii  (1896),  151  N.  Y 

60,  45  N.  E.  398 
Kowland  r.  Phalen,  1  Bosw.  43 
Kownd  V.  State  (1898),  152  Ind.  39 

51  X.  E.  914 
Roy  V.  Haviland,  12  Ind.  364 
Roys  V.  Vilas,  18  Wis.  169  101,  203 

Ruberg  r.   Brown   (1897),  50  S.  C. 

397,  27  S.  E.  873 
Rucker  c.  Hall  (1895),  105  Cal.  425, 
38  Pac.  962 
V.  Steelman,  73  Ind.  396 
Ruckman   v.  Pitcher,  20  N.  Y.  9 


196 
b09 

041 

IGl 

703 
63 

108 
111,  117 
314 

077 
149 

661 
373 


644 


659 
852 
116, 

148 


Rudd  V.  Fosseen  (1900),  82  Minn.  41, 

84  X.  W.  496  318 

Ruffatti    c.    Lexington    Mining   Co. 
(1894),  10  Utah,  386,  37  Pac.  591 

275,  276,  278,  397,  639 
Ruffing  V.  Tilton,  12  Ind.  259  260 

Ruggles  r.  Fond  du  Lac  Cy.,  63  Wis. 

205  823 

Rugland  r.  Thompson,  48  Minn.  539    910 
Rumbough    ;•.    Young    (1896),    119 

N.  C.  567,  26  S.  K.  143        849,  867,  872 
Rumsey  i-.  People's  Ry.  Co.  (1898), 

144  Mo    175,46  S.  W.  144       614 
r.  People's  Hy.  Co.  (1900),  154 

Mo.    215,   55   S.    W.   615      348, 
350 
Rank  >:  St.  John,  20  Barb.  585  153 

Runkle  '■.  Hartford  Ins.  Co.  (1896), 

99  la.  414,  68  X.  W.  712  703 

Rush  I'.  Cobbett,  2  Jolins.  Cas.  256       721 

V.  Thompson,  112  ind.  168  877 

Russell  f.  Allen,  13  N.  Y.  173  204 

i:  Amundson  (1894),  4  N.  D.  112, 

59  X.  W.  477  757 

r.  Bvn.n  &  Ford,  2  Cal.  86         38,  66 
V.  Cunwav,  11  Cal.  93  936 

V.  Easterbrook  (189«),  71  Conn. 


50,  40  A  tl.  905 

850 

V.  Grimes,  46  Mo.  410 

66 

1-.  Kooiice,  104  X.  C.  237 

930,  931 

V.  Lennon,  39  Wis.  570 

202 

V.  Loomis,  43  Wis.  545 

618 

V.  Mi.xcr.  42  Cal.  475 

596 

V.  State  liiB.  Co.,  55  Mo. 

585 

697 

Rust  r.  Goff,  94  Mo.  511 

284 

Rutenberg  >:  Main,  47  Cal.  213 

271,276. 

278 

Rutenic  v.  Ilamaker  (1902),  40  Ore. 

444,  67  Pac.  192  065 

Ruth  1-.  Smith  (1901),  29  Colo.  154, 

68  Pac.  278  686 

Rutherford   v.  Aiken,  3  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  60  89 

r.  Johnson   (1897),  49  S.  C  465, 

27  S.  E.  470  599 

r.  Williams,  42  Mo.  18  20,  31 

Rutledge  i-.  Corbin,  10  Ohio  St.  478    170, 

208 
r.  Vanmeter,  8  Bush,  354  635 

Ruyter  v.  Keid,  121  N.  Y.  498  332 

Ryan   r.   HoUiday    (1895),   110  Cal. 

335,  42  Pac.  891  565,  566 

V.  Jacques  (1894),  103  Cal.  280, 

37  Pac.  186  355 

V.  MiddIesl)orough   Co.    (1899), 

106  Ky.  181,  50  S.  W.  13  790 

V.  MuUin,  45  Iowa,  631  178 

v.  Riddle,  78  Mo.  521  209 

V.  Spieth  (1896),  18  Mont.  45,  44 

Pac.  403  687 

V.  Springfield  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co., 

46  Wis.  671  618 

r.  State  Bk  ,  10  Neb  524       277,  289 
Rychlicki  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (1893), 

115  Mo.  662,  22  S.  W.  908  624 

Ryder  r.  Thomas,  32  Iowa,  56  946 

Kverson  v.  Hendrie,  22  Iowa,  480       217, 

290,  299,  875 

V.  Ryerson,  55  Hun,  191  226 

Rylanderf.  Laursen  (1902),  113  Wis. 

461,  89  N.  W.  488  863 


Sabin  v.  Austin,  19  Wis.  421  658 

Sachleben  v.  Heintze  (1893),  117  Mo. 

520,  24  S.  W.  54  47 

Sachra  i-.  Town  of  Manilla  (1903), 

_  la.  _,  95  N.  W.  198  640 

Sackman  v.   Sackman   (1898),    143 

Mo.  576,  45  S.  W.  264  G07 

Sacramento  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wagner, 

67  Cal.  293  110 

Sacramento  Savings  Bank  v.  Hynes, 

50  Cal.  105  575 

Safely  v.  Caldwell  (1895),  17  Mont. 

184,  42  Pac   766  417 

Sage  V.  City  of  Plattsmoiith  (1890), 

4»  Neb.  553,  67  N.  W.  455      605 
V.  Culver  (1895),  147  X.  Y.  241, 

41  N.  E  513  592 

Sager  v.  Blaine,  44  N.  Y.  445         626,  631 
r.  Nichols,  1  Daly,  1  271,  287 

Sainstry  v.  Grammer,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr. 

1(J5  241 

St.  Anthony  Falls  Co.  f.  King  Bridge 

Co.,  23  Minn.  186  751 

St.  Anthony  Mill  Co.  v.  Vandall,  1 

Minn.  246  153 

St.  Clair  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Mo. 

App.  76  778 


TABLK    OF    CASES   CITED. 


cxliii 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 

St.  Clara  Female  Academy  r.  North- 
western Nat.  Ins.  Co.  (189"J),  101 
Wis.  464,  77  N.  W.  893 

St.  John  V.  Griffith,  2  Abb.  Pr.  198 


G39 
110, 
611 
415 
504 


V.  Ilardwick,  11  Ind.  251 
V.  Pierce,  22  Barb.  362 
St.    Joseph    Uuion     Depot    Co.    v. 
Chicago,  etc.   K3^  Co.  (1895),  131 
Mo.  291,  31  S.  W.  903 
St.  Louis  V.  Weitzel  (1895),  130  Mo. 

600,  31  S.  W.  1045 
St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hall  (1903), 
—  Ark.  — ,  74  S.  W.  293 
V.  Holladay  (1895),  131  Mo.  440, 

33  S.  W.  49 
V.  State  (1901),  68  Ark.  561,  00 

S.  W.  654 
V.  Sweet  (1897),  63  Ark.  563,  40 

S.  W.  463 
V.  Trigg  (1897),  63  Ark.  536,  40 
S.  W.  579 
St.  Louis  &  S.  E.  R.  Co.  v.  Mathias, 

50  Ind.  65 
St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ky.  Co.  v.  French 
(1896),  56  Kan.  584,  44  Pac. 
12 
I,-.  Ludlum  (1901),  63  Kan.  719, 

66  Pac.  1045 
V.  Snaveley,  47  Kan.  637 
St.  Louis  F.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Chenault, 

36  Kan.  51 
St.   Louis,  F.   S.   &  W.   R.   Co.   i'. 

Grove,  39  Kan.  731 
St.  Louis  Gas  L.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  86 

Mo.  495 
St.   Louis,   I.   M.    &   S.  Ry.  Co.  o. 
Brown,  49  Ark.  253 
V.  Camden  Bk.,  47  Ark.  541 
St.  Louis  Nat.   Bank  v.  Gay  (1894), 
101  Cal.  286,  35  Pac.  876      130,  134, 137, 
841,  846,  932 
St.    Louis   Trust  Co.   v.  Bambrick 
(1899),   149   Mo.   560,   51   S.   W. 
706  675 

St.  Mark's  Church  v.  Teed,  120  N.  Y. 

583  111, 112 

St.  Paul  &  Pac.   R.  Co.,  First  Div., 

v.  Rice,  25  Minn.  278  666 

St.    Paul,    etc.    Trust  Co.   v.   Leek 
(1894),  57  Minn.  87,58  N.  W.  826     131, 
133,  134,  930 
St.   Paul   Fire   Ins.    Co.    v.   Dakota 
Land  Co.  (1897),  10  S.  D.  191,  72 
N.  VV.  460 
Salazar  v.  Taylor   (1893),  18  Colo. 

538,  33  Pac.  369 
Sale  V.  Aurora,  etc.  Co.  (1896),  147 
Ind.   324,  46  N.   E.   669 

682 
V.  Bugher,  24  Kan.  432  873,  940 

V.  Crutchfield,  8  Bush,  636      42,  453, 

457 
Salem  Traction  Co.  v.  Anson  (1902), 
41  Ore.  562,  69  Pac.  675  676 


703 
455 
718 
354 
594 


594 


302 


602 

640 

598 

919 

801 

659 

820 
310 


741 
615 


67 


Saline  Co.  v.  Sappington,  64  Mo.  72    666 
Salinger  v.  Gunn  (1895),  61  Ark.  414, 

33  S.  W.  959  358 

r.  Lusk,  7  How.  Pr.  430  738 

Salladin  c.  Mitcliell  (1894),  42  Neb. 

859,  61  N.  W.  127  887 

Salmon  Falls  Bank  v.  Leyser  (1893), 

116  Mo.  51,  22  S.  W.  504  593 

Saloy  V.  Bloch,  130  U.  S.  338  243 

Salt  Lake  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Mills- 
paugh  (1898),  18  Utah,  283, 54  Pac. 
893  677 

Saltus  V.  Kip,  5  Ducr,  646  798 

Salvidge    V.   Ilvde,    5    Madd.     Cii. 
.  138  '  506 

Sample  v.  Griffith,  5  Iowa,  376  936 

(;.  Rowe,  24  Ind.  208  886 

Sampson  v.  Mitchell  (1894),  125  Mo. 

217,  28  S.  W.  768  32,  143 

V.  Stiaeffer,  3  Cal.  196  71 

Sams  r.  Derrick  (1898),  103  Ga.  678, 

30  S.  E.  668  525,  812 

r.  Price  (1897),   121  N.  C.  392, 

28  S.  E.  486  641 

Sams  Car  Coupler  Co.  v.  League 
(1898),  25  Colo.  129,  54  Pac.  042      191, 

666 
Samuels  v.  Blanchard,  25  Wis.  329       196, 

211,  633 
San  Benito  Cy.  i-.  Whitesides,  51  Cal. 

416  155 

Sanborn  v.  People's  Ice  Co.  (1900), 

82  Minn.  43,  84  N.  W.  641  241 

Sandberg    v.    Victor     Mining    Co. 

(1901),  24  Utah,  1,  66  Pac.  360  669 

Sanders  i?.  Chartrand  (1900),  158  Mo. 

352,  59  S.  W.  95  816 

V.   Clason,   13   Minn.  379       105,109, 

502 
V.  Sanders,  30  Ind.  207  727 

V.  Yonkers,  63  N.  Y.  489  373 

Sandford  r.  Jodrell,  2  Sm.  &  Giff. 

176  238 

V.  Travers,  40  N.  Y.  140  923 

Sandmeyer  v.  Dak.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co., 

50  N.  W.  Rep.  353  153 

Sands  v.  Gund  (1908),  —  Neb.  — ,  93 

N.  W.  990  462 

V.  St.  John,  36  Barb.  628         663,  820 
V.  Wood,  1  Iowa,  263  325,  330 

Sandwich   Mfg.  Co.  v.  Earl  (1894), 

56  Minn.  390,  57  N.  W.  938  815 

Sanford  v.  Jansen    (1806),  49  Neb. 

766,  69  N.  W.  108  674 

V.  Lichteriberu^er  (1901),  62  Neb. 

501,  87  X.  W.  .'.(ly  599 

V.  McCreedy,  28  Wis.  103  787 

V.  Wood,  49  Ind    165  439 

San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  r.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 9  Cal.  453  755 
Sanger  v.  French  (1898),  157  N.  Y. 

213,  51  N.  E.  979  818 

Sanguinett  v.  Webster  (1900),  153 

Mo.  343,  54  S.  W.  563  602,  644 

Sannoner  v.  Jacobsson,  47  Ark.  31        667 


cxliv 


TABLE    OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  BEFERBKCES  ABE  TO  THE   PAGES.] 


San  Te'lro  Lumber  Co.  r.  Rcvnolds 

(ISiUi).  Ill  Cal.  588,  44  Pac.  309  473 
Santa  Barbara  r.  Eldred  (1895),  108 

Cal.  ■2'M,  41  Pac.  410  591),  601 

Santa   Fe,  etc.   Ky.  Co.   r.   Hurley 

(1894),  Ariz.,  36  Pac.  210  594 

Sarber  v.  McConnell  (1897),  04  Ark. 

450,  43  S.  W.  395  639 

Sargent   r.   (^liio  >.<;  Miss.  R.  Co.,  1 

Handy,  52  118 

V.  Steuhenville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32 

Oliio  St.  449  713,791 

v.    Wilson,   5   Cal.   504         316,  337, 

428 
Satterlund  >:  Beal  (1903),  —  N.  D. 

— ,  95  N.  W.  518  646,  819 

Satterthwaite      v.      Beaufort      Cy. 

Com'rs,  76  N.  C.  153  321 

Sauer  v.  Steinbauer,  14  Wis.  70  474 

Sauerherins:  r.  Iron  Ridge  &  M.  R. 

Co.,  25  Wis.  447  118 

Saulsburv  i'.  Alexander,  50  Mo.  142     596, 

598,  604 
V.  Corwin,  40  Mo.  App.  373  97 

Sautnarez  v.  Saumarez,  4  M.  &  C. 

336  258 

Saunders  v.  Chamberlain,  13  Ilun, 

568  793 

I'.  Druce,  3  Drew.  140  241 

V.  United  States  Marble  Co. 
(1901),  25  Wash.  475,  65 
Pac.  782  656 

Savage  v.  Corn  Exch.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  4 

Bosw.  2  95,  814 

V.  Davis  (1902),  131  N.  C.  159, 

42  S.  E.  571  921 

V.  O'Neil,  44  N.  Y.  298  316 

V.  Savage  (1899).  36  Ore.  268,  59 

Pac.  461  656 

Savannah  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hardin  (1900), 

110  Ga.  433,  35  S.  E.  681  543 

Saville  V.  Tancred,  1  Ves.  Sen.  101       252 
Savings  Bank  v.   Burns  (1894),  104 

Cal.  473,  38  Pac.  102  543 

Sawtelle  v.  Ripley,  55  N.  W.  Rep. 

156  2.39 

Sawyer  v.  Baker,  66  Ala.  202  .360 

V.  Chambers,  11  Abb.  Pr.  110         414 
V.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  150 

Mo.  408,  57  X.  W.  108  669 

V.  Warner,  15  Barb.  282  733 

Saxton  r.  Seiberling,  48  Ohio  St.  554  181 

Sayles  r.  Bi-niis,  57  Wis.  315  470 

V.  FitzGerald  (1^99),  72  Conn. 

391.44  A tl.  733  757 

Saylor  v.  Coinnjonwealth  Banking 

Co.  (1000),  38  ( )re.  204. 02  Pac.  652  800 
Sayres  r.  I.inkart,  25  Iiid.  145  727,  935 
Scantlin  r.  Allison,  12  Kan.  85  149 

Scarborough    >:    Mvrick   (1896),  47 

Neb.  794.  60  X.  W.  807  680,  681 

Scarry  r.  Eldridge,  63  Ind.  44  328 

Schaake  r.  Eagle  Automatic  Can  Co. 

(1902),  i:;.j  Cal.  472,  03  Pac.  1025  038 
Schadt  i:  lleppe,  45  Cal.  4-»  326 


336 

738 
124 
887 


639 

772 


Schaefer  v.  Purviance  (1903),  —  Ind. 

— ,  66  N.  E.  154 
Schaetzel   '•.  Germantown,  etc.  Ins. 

Co.,  22  Wis.  412 
Schafer  v.  Reilly,  50  N.  Y.  67        123 

v.  Schafer,  68  Ind.  .374 
Schaller  v.  Chicago  &  Northwestern 

Ry.  Co.  ( 1897),  97  Wis.  31,  71  N.  W. 

1042 
Scharz  v.  Oppold,  74  N.  Y.  307 
Schaus  ?•.  Man.  Gas  Co.,  14  Abb.  Pr. 

N.  s.  371  769,  778 

Schawacker  v.    McLaughlin  (1897), 

139  Mo.  333,  40  S.  W.  935  644 

Schee  v.  McQuilken,  59  Ind.  269  852 

Scheer  v.  Keown,  34  Wis.  349      769,  783, 

806 
Scheffer  v.  Hines  (1897),  149  Ind.  413, 

49  N.  E.  348 
Schehan  v.  Malone,  71  N.  C.  440 
Scheldt  V.  Sturgis,  10  Bosw.  606 
Scheland  r.  Erpeldins,  6  ,Oreg.  258 
Schenck  v.  Putsch,  32  Ind.  .338 

V.  Ellingwood,  3  Edw.  Ch.  175 
V.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  71  Cal. 
28 
Schenectady  v.  Furman,  01  Hun,  171 


676 
728 
417 
942 
476 
251 


Scherar  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  (1902), 

63  Nell.  530,  88  N.  W.  687 
Schermerhorn  v.  Barhydt,  9  Paige, 
28 
V.  Van  Allen,  18  Barb.  29      709, 


065 
852, 
858 


638 

347 
772, 
777 

Scheunert  r.  Kaehler,  23  Wis.  523       633, 

896,918 

SchiefEelin  v.  Hawkins,  1  Daly,  286      935 

SchifEer  v.  Eau  Claire,  51  Wis.  385      173, 

177,  196,061 

Schiffman  v.  Schmidt  (1900),  154  Mo. 

204,  55  S.  W.  451  678,  670 

Schilling  r.  Mullen  (1893),  55  Minn. 

122,  56  N.  W.  686  104 

V.  Rominger,  4  Col.  100        18,  38,  39. 
562,  508 
Schirmer  v.  Drexler  (1901),  1.34  Cal. 

134, 66  Pac.  180  618 

Schlageck    v.    Widhahn    (1900),    59 

Neb.  541,  81  N.  W.  448  639 

Schlicker  v.  Hemenwav  (1895),  110 

Cal.  579,  42  Pac.  100.3  605 

Schmidt  v.  Coulter,  3  Minn.  492  933 

1-.  Mitchell  (1897),  101  Ky.  570, 

41  S.  W.  929  644 

v.  Oregon  Gold  Min.  Co.  (1895), 
28  Ore.  9,  40  Pac.  406, 
1014  615 

r.  Zahrndt  (1897),  148  Ind.  447, 

47  N.  E.  335  946 

Schmitt  v.  Hager  (1903),  88  Minn. 

41.3,  93  N.  W.  110  822 

r.  Schneider  (1899),  109  Ga.  628, 

35  S.  E.  145  666 

Schnaderbeck  v.  Worth,  8  Abb.  Pr. 
37  894, 920 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


cxlv 


[the  refeeen'ces  are  to  the  pages.] 


Schneider  v.  Schultz,  4  Sandf.  GG4 

V.  White,  12  Oreg.  503 
Schnier  v.  Fay,  12  Kan.  184 
Schnitzer  v.  Cohen,  7  Hun,  CG5     499, 
Sclioeilhaiuer  r.  Roinetsch  (181)4),  26 

Ore.  394,  38  Vac.  344 
Schoenleber  v.  Buvlchart  (1896),  94 

Wis.  575,  69  N.  W.  343 
Schoenrock  v.  Farlev,49  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  302 
Schoepflin  v.  Coffey  (1900),  162  N.Y. 

12,  56  N.  E.  502 
Scholefield  v.  Heafield,  7  Sim.  667 
Scholey    v.     Demattos     (18'.)8),    18 
Wash.    504,   52   Pac.   242 

L\  Halsey,  72  N.  Y.  578 
Schoraberg   v.    Walker  (1901),    132 

Cal.  224,  64  Pac.  290 
School  District  i'.  Flanigan  (1901), 
28  Colo.  431,  65  Pac.  24  605, 
V.  Holmes,  16  Neb.  486 
V.  Pratt,  17  Iowa,  16 
V.  Sheidley  (1897),  138  Mo.  672, 

40  S.  W.  656 
c.  Shoemaker,  5  Neb.  36 
School    District    ex    rel.    v.   Livers 
(1899),  147  Mo.  580,  49  S.  W.  507 
School  Dist.   No.  9  v.  School  Dist. 
No.  5    (1903),  118  Wis.  238,   59 
N.  W.  148 
School  Sec.  Trs.  v.  OdUn,  8  Ohio  St. 

293  541, 

Schoonover  v.   Hinckley,  46  Iowa, 
207 
v.  Quick,  17  Ind.  196 
Schouweiler    i-.    Hough    (1895),    7 

S.  D.  163,  63  N.  W.  776 
Schowalter  v.  Beard  (1900),  10  Okla. 

454,  63  Pac.  687 
Schrandt  v.  Young  (1901),  62  Neb. 

254,  86  N.  W.  1085 
Schreiner     i'.    Stanton     (1901),    26 
Wash.  563,  67  Pac.  219 

Rockford    Ins.    Co. 
Minn.  291,  79  N.  W. 


Schrepfer 
(1899),  77 
1005 

Schroeder    v. 
la.  — ,  m  N 

Schubart 


Schroeder    (1903),— 
W.  78 
Harteau,  34  Barb.  447 

877,  879, 
Schubert  v.  Richter  (1896),  92  Wis. 

199,  66  N.  W.  107 
Schuchman  v.  Heath,  38  Mo.  App. 

280 
Schular  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  38 

Barb.  653  769, 

Schulte  l:  Coulthurst  (1895),  94  la. 

418,  62  N.  W.  770 
Schuhz   V.    Griffith    (1897),  103    la. 
150,  72  N.  W.  445 
V.  Schultz,  27  Hun.  26 
V.  Winter,  7  Nev.  1-30  262^ 

Schumpert    v.    Southern    Ry.    Co. 
(1903),  — S.  C—  43S.  E.  813 


112 

89 

526 

678 

710 

779 

615 
372 

644, 

777 
293 

783 

606 

831 
270 

811 
769 

107 

684 

596 

611 
935 

433 

395 

781 
681 

672 

819 
855, 
9.32 

680 

833 

778 

703 

675 
226 
503 

689 


Schurick  v.  Kollman,  50  Ind.  336  576 

Schurmeier  v.  English,  46  Minn.  300  910 
Schurtz  V.  Colvin  (1896),  56  O.  St. 

274,  45  N.  W.  627  816 
Schuster  v.  Myers  (1899),  148  Mo. 

422,  50  S.  W.  103  680 

Schuttler  v.  King,  30  Pac.  Rep.  25  637 
Schutz  r.  Morette  (1895),  146  N.  Y. 

137,  40  N.  E.  780  668 
Schwartz  v.  Stock  (1901),  Nev.,  66 

Pac.  351                              641,  644 

V.  Wechler,  20  N.  Y.  Suppl.  861  273 
Schwartzschild,  etc.   Co.  r.   Weeks 

(1903),  66  Kan.  800,  72  Pac.  274  625 

Scliwarz  v.  Oppold,  74  N.  Y.  307  784 

Schweickhart  v.  Stuewe,  71  Wis.  1  911 
Scofield   V.   Clark    (1896),   48   Neb. 

711,  67N.  W.  754  735 

r.  Doscher,  72  N.  Y.  491  784 
V.     Eighth     School     Dist.,     27 

Conn.  499  118 

V.  State  Nat.  Bank,  9  Neb.  499  702 

V.  Whitelegge,  49  N.  Y.  269,  261  604 

605,  008,  665 

Scott  V.  B.  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.,  52  Iowa, 

18  562 

V.  Chickasaw  Cy.,  54  Iowa,  47  637 
V.     Cleveland,     etc.     Rv.     Co. 
(1895),   144   Ind.   125,   43 

N.  E.  133  657 

V.  Conway,  58  N.  Y.  619  292 

V.  Crawford,  12  Ind.  411  15 
V.  Flowers  (1900),  60  Neb.  675, 

84  N.  W.  81               302,  494,  519 

V.  Gill,  19  Iowa,  187  105 

V.  Guernsey,  60  Barb.  163       242,  371 
r.  llallock  (1897),  16  Wash.  439, 

47  Pac.  968  271 
V.  Indianap.  Wagon  Works,  48 

Ind.  75  340 

V.  McGraw,  3  Wash.  675  286 

i;.  Menasha.  64  N.  W.  Rep.  263  911 

V.  Morse,  64  Iowa,  732              769,  772 

V.  Norris,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  332  47 

r.  Robards,  67  Mo.  289     541,  546,  562, 

568,  658 
V.  Spencer  (1895),  44  Neb.  93, 

62  N.  W.  312  640 

V.  Timherlake,  83  N.  C.  382  869 
Scott-Force  Hat  Co.  v.  Hombs  (1894), 

127  Mo.  392,  30  S.  W.  183           410,  G69 
Scottish    Union    Ins.    Co.  v.  Strain 

(1902),  Kv.,  70  S.  W.  274  640 

Scribner  v.  Allen,  12  Minn.  148  118 
Scroggin    v.    Johnston    (1895),    45 

Neb.  714, 04  N.  \V.  236     640,  816 
v.  Nat.  Lumber  Co.   (1894),  41 

Neb.  196,  59  N.  W.  548  822 
Seaboard  Air  Line  Rv.  Co.  v.  Main 

(1903),  —  N.  C.  —  43  S.  E.  930  599 

Seager  v.  Burns,  4  Minn.  141         278,  359 
Seal  V.  Cameron   (1901),  24  Wash. 

62,  63  Pac.  1103  669 
Seals  V.  Augusta  Rv.    Co.  (1898), 

102  Ga.  817,  29  S."E.  116        20,  72,  666 


.; 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  beferknces  are  to  the  pages.] 


Seaman  c.  Goodnow,  20  Wis.  27  519 

1-.  Jolinson,  40  Mo.  Ill  G6 

1-.  Reeve,  15  Barb.  454  935 

V.  Slater,  18  Fed.  Hep.  485  293 

V.  Slater,  49  Fed.  Rep.  37        881,  911 
Searls  i-.  Knapp  (1894),  5  S.  D.  325, 

58  N.  W.  807  822 

Sears  v.  Ackerinan  (1903),  138  Cal. 

583,  72  Pac.  171  102 

V.  Hardv,  120  Mass.  524  387 

V.  Martin,  29  Pac.  Rep.  890  938 

i:  Tavlor,  4  Col.  38  576 

i".  Williams  (1894),  9  Wash.  428, 

37  Pac.  665  106 

Seaton  v.  Davis,   1  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

91  160 

r.  Grimm  (1899),  110  la.  145,  81 

N.  W.  225  825 

Seattle  v.  Pearson  (1896),  15  Wasli. 

575,  46  Pac.  1053  684 

Seattle  Nat.  Bank  r.  Carter  (1895), 

13  Wash.  281.  43  Pac.  331      832 
l:  Meerwaldt    (1894),  8   Wash. 

630,  36  Pac.  768  740,  756 

Sebbitt  V.  Stryker,  62  Ind.  41  598 

Sebree  Deposit    Bank  r.    Moreland 

(1894),  96  Ky.  150,  28  S.  W.  153        601 
Sebring  i*.  Mersereau,  Hopk.  501  367 

Seckinger   v.    Philibert   Co.  (1895), 

129  Mo.  590,  31  S.  W.  957  606 

Secor  c.  Keller,  4  Diier,  416  207 

V.  Lord,  3  Keyes,  525  105,  111 

V.  Sturgis,  16  N.  Y.  548  470 

Security    Co.    c.    Harper    County 

(1901),  63  Kan  351,  65  Pac.  060       567 
Security  Loan  ami  Trust  Co.  v.  Mat- 
tern  (1901),  131  Cal.  326,  63  Pac. 
482  474 

Security     Nat.     Bank    r.    Latimer 

(1897),  51  Neb.  498,  71  N.  W.  38       642 
Seeleman    >:    Hoagland    (1893),    19 

Col.  231,  34  Pac.  995  780 

Seeley  v.  Engell,  13  N.  Y.  542         52,  718 
Segelke   &    Kohlhaus   Mfg.   Co.   v. 
Hulberg  (1896),  94  Wis.  106,68 
N.  \V.  653  639 

Segelken  r.  Mever,  94  N.  Y.  473  219 

Seibert  r.  Blooilifield  (1901),  Ky.,  63 

S.  W.  584  816 

V.  Minneapolis,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1894),  58  Minn.  39,  59 
N.  W.  822  593 

Selby  r.  I'onifrt-t,  1  J.  &  H.  336  246 

Selden  i-.  I'ringle,  17  Barb.  458  100 

Sell  V.  .Mi>i!ii«sippi  River  I>ogging 
Co.  (1894).  88  Wis.  581,  60  N.  W. 
10(55  24 

Seliar  r.  Sage,  12  How.  Pr.  531  611 

Selleck  »•.  (iriswold.  49  Wis.  3'.t  865 

Sellers  r.  First  Presl)yterian  Church 

(1895),  91  Wis.  32H.64  N.  W.  1031     670 

Sellon  r.  Bra.len.  13  Iowa,  365       296,  299 

Sells  /•.  Hubbcll.  2. Johns.  Ch.  394         348 

Sellwood   c.    Ik-nnenian    (1!>00),    36 

Ure.  575,  60  Pac.  12  685 


12 


95 


Sclover  v.  Coe,  63  N.  Y.  438  308, 

Selp  V.  Tilghman,  23  Kan.  289 
Selz  V.  Tucker  (1894), -10  Utaii,  132, 

37  Pac.  249 
Semple  r.  Lee,  13  Iowa,  304  325, 

Sengfelder  v.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y., 

31  Pac.  Rep.  428 
Senn    c.  Southern  Ry.    Co.   (1894), 
124  Mo.  621,  28  S.  W.  66 
v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  135 
Mo.  512,  36  S.  W.  367 
Sentinel   Co.  v.  Thomson,  38  Wis. 

489 
Service  i-.  Bank  (1900),  62  Kan.  857, 

62  Pac.  670  96,  102, 

Settembre  v.  Putnam,  30  Cal.  490 

372, 
Seward    v.    Derrickson   (1895), 
Wash.  225,  40  Pac.  939 
V.  Huntington,  94  N.  Y.  116 
Sexton  V.  Rhames,  13  Wis.  99 
V.  Shriver  (1903),  —  Neb.  - 
N.  W.  594 
Seybold  r.  Bank  (1896),  5  N.  D.  460, 

67  N.  W.  682 
Seymore  v.  Rice  (1894),  94  Ga.  183, 

21  S.  E.  293 
Se3"mour  v.  Carpenter,  51  Wis.  413 
V.  Davis,  2  Sandf.  239 
V.  Dtiniiam,  24  Hun,  93 
V.  Pittsburg,  C,  &  St.  L.  Ry.  Co., 

44  Ohio  St.  12 
V.  Smith,  114  N.  Y.  481 
Shabata  v.  Johnston  (1897),  53  Neb. 

12,  73  N.  W.  278 
Shafer  v.  Bronenbcrg,  42  Ind.  89 
r.  Moriartv,  46  Ind.  9 
V.  State,  49  Ind.  400 
Shain  ;;.  Bclvin,  79  Cal.  262 
Shale  1-.  Schantz,  35  Hun,  622 
Shalter  i\  Caldwell,  27  Ind.  376 
Shambaugh  r.  Current   (1900),  111 

Iowa,  121.  82  N.  W.  497 
Shamp  r.  Meyer,  20  Neb.  223 
Shanahan  c.  Madison,  57  Wis.  276 
Shane  r.  Francis,  30  Ind.  92  88 

V.  Lowry,  48  Ind.  205  271 

Shank  v.  Pearson.  10  Iowa,  588 

r.  Teeple,  33  Iowa.  189 
Shannon   v.    (Jrindstaff    (1895),    11 
Wash.  536,  40  Pac.  123 
V.  Portland  (1900),  38  Ore.  382, 

62  Pac.  50 
V.  Wilson,  19  Ind.  112  931 

Sharon  v.  Sharon,  m  Cal.  29 
Sharp   V.  Johnson    (1895),   44    Neb. 
165,  62  N.  W.  466 
V.  Kinsman.  18  S.  C   108         906 
I'.  Miller.  54  Cal.  329 
Sharpe  r.  Larson   (IS'.I7).  70  Minn. 

209,  72  N.  W.  tOl 
Sharpless  v.  Giffen  (1896),  47  Neb. 

146,  06  N.  W.  285 
Shartle    v.    -Minneapolis,    17    Minn. 
308 


343 
202 

678 
327 

665 

220 

683 

455 

646 
357, 
414 

638 
111 
663 

702 

95 

656 
196 
843 
131 

820 
150 

931 
791 
289 
661 
942 
215 
65 

101 
112 
228 
,  104 
,311 
834 
592 

687 

566 

,  935 

811 


928 
658 

680 

812 

665 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


cxlvii 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Shaver  v.  Brainard,  29  Barb.  25     271 

340 
l:  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.,  57  N.  Y. 
459 
Shaw  V.  Iloadlev,  8  Blackf.  165 

V.  Jones  (I'iuO),  156  Iiid.  60,  59 

N.  E.  106 
V.  Merchants'  Bank,  60  Ind.  83 
V.  Tracy,  95  Mo.  531 
Shavvyer  v.  Chamberhiin  (1900),  113 

la.  742,  84  N.  W.  661 
Sheafe  v.  Hastie  (1897),  16  Wash. 

563,  48  Pac.  246 
Sheahan  v.  Shanahan,  5  Hun,  461 

Shearer  v.  Evans,  89  Ind.  400 

r.  Mills,  35  Iowa,  499 
Sheehan  r.  Hamilton,  2  Keyes,  304 

I'.  Pierce,  23  N.  Y.  Suppl.  1119 

Sheehan  &  L.  Transp.  Co.  v.  Sirams, 

28  Mo.  App.  64 
Sheeks  v.  Erwin,  130  Ind.  31 

V.  State  ( 1900),  156  Ind.  508,  60 
N.  E.  142 
Sheibley  v.  Dixon  County  (1901),  61 

Neb.  409,  85  N.  W.  399       896,  924, 
Shelby   Cy.  v.  Simnionds,  33  Iowa, 

345 
Sheldon  v.  Sabin,  12  Daly,  84 

('.  Stp.  Uncle  Sam,  18  Cal.  626 
Sheldon    Co.    v.    Mayers,    81    Wis. 

627 
Shell  V.  West  (1902),  130  N.  C.  171, 

41  S.  E.65 
Shelly  V.  Vanarsdoll,  23  Ind.  543 
Shelton  v.  Conant  (1894),  10  Wash. 
193,  38  Pac.  1013  929, 

V.  Wilson  (1902),  131  N.  C.  499, 
42  S.  E.  937  197, 

Siiepard  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  117 

N.  Y.  442  195, 196, 

Shepherd  v.  Evans,  9  Ind.  260 
Sheppard  v.  Green  (1896),  48  S.  C. 
165,  26  S.  E.  224      340,  341, 

V.  Starke,  3  Munf.  29 
V.  Stevens,  2  S.  W.  Rep.  548 
Sheridan  v.  Jackson,  72  N.  Y.  170 

V.  Mayor,  etc.,  68  N.  Y.  30         81 
V.  Nation  (1900),  159  Mo.  27,  59 
S.  W.  972 
Sherman  v.  Boehm,  13  Daly,  42 
V.  Hale,  76  Iowa,  383 
V.  Osborn,  8  Oreg.  66 
V.  Parish,  53  N.  Y.  483 
Sherod  v.  Ewell  (1897),  104  la.  253, 

73  N.  W.  493 
Sherrin  v.  Flinn  (1900),  155  Ind.  422, 
58  N.  E.  549  466 

Sherrit  v.  Birch,  3  Bra  C.  C.  229 
Sherwood  v.  Saxton,  63  Mo.  78 
Sliewalter    v.   Bergman,     123    Ind. 
155 


273, 
,413 

90 
326 

703 
598 
283 

811 

872 
627, 
628 
306 
821 
40 
895, 
920 

290 

598 

599 
927 

151 

756 
230 

910 

642 
920 

932 

781 

242 

160 

462, 
466 
249 
457 

562, 
609 

i,  97 

87 
758 
875 
756 
417 

816 

665 
249 

815 

821 


Shields  v.  Fuller,  4  Wis.  102  60 

V.  Jolinson  County  (1898),  144 

Mo.  76,  47  8.  W.  107  709 

Sliigley  i:  Snyder,  45  Ind.  541  576 

Shilling  i\  Rominger,  4  Col.  100  666 

Shipman  v.  Lansing,  25  Hun,  290  131 

r.  State,  43  Wis.  381  713 

Shippen  v.  Kimball,  47  Kan.  173  326 

Shipton  r.  Rawlins,  4  Hare,  019  3;'')2 

Shirks.  Mitchell  (1893),  137 Ind.  185, 

36  N.  E.  850  670 

V.  Neible  (1900),  156  Ind.  GG,  59 

N.  E.  281  812 

Shirley  v.  Jacobs,  7  C.  &  P.  3  761 

V.   Stephenson   (1898),   104  Ky. 

518,  47  S.  W.  581  567 

Shively    v.    Semi-Tropic    Land    Co. 

(1893),  99  Cal.  259,  33  Pac.  848  664 

Shockley  v.  Shockley,  20  Ind.  108        245 
Shoemaker  v.  Goode"(1902),  Neb.,  92 

N   W.  629  681 

V.  Smith,  74  Ind.  71  942 

Shore  v.  Smith,  15  Ohio  St.  173  519 

V.  Taylor,  46  Ind.  345  662 

Shorter  v.  Nelson,  4  Lans.  114  315 

Shortle  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  Ry.  Co., 

131  Ind.  338  727 

Shove  V.  Shove,  69  Wis.  425  310 

Showalter  v.  Rickert  (1902),  64  Kan. 

82,  67  Pac.  454  678 

Shrigley  v.  Black  ( 1898),  59  Kan.  487, 

53  Pac.  477  455 

Shroeder  v.  Webster  (1893),  88  la. 

627,  55  N.  W.  569  711 

Shropshire  v.  Conrad,  2  Mete.  (Ky.) 

143  936 

V.  Ryan  (1900),  111  la.  677,  82 

N.  W.  1035  656 

Shuler   v.   Millsap's  Ex.,  71   N.  C. 

297  231 

ShuII  V.  Arie  (1901),  113  la.  170,  84 

N.  W.  1031  668 

V.  Barton  (1898),  56  Neb.  718,  77 

N.  W.  132  216 

I'.  Barton  (1899),  58  Neb.  741,  79 

N.  W.  732  216 

V.  Caughman  (1898),  54  S.  C. 

203,  32  S.  E.  301  179,  271 

Shute  V.  Austin  (1897),  120  N.  C.  440, 

27  S.  E.  90  664 

Sibila  V.  Bahney,  34  Ohio  St.  399         618 
Sichler  v.  Look,  93  Cal.  600  333 

Sickels  V.  Pattison,  14  Wend.  257  842 

Sickman  i'.  Wollett  (1903),  —  Colo. 

— ,  71  Pac.  1107  452 

Sidney   Stevens    Implement   Co.  v. 
Improvement    Co.    (1899), 
20  Utah,  267,  58  Pac.  843        326, 
330 
V.  South  Ogden  Land  Co.  (1899), 

20  Utah,  267,  58  Pac.  843        245 
Sidway  v.  Missouri  Land,  etc.  Co. 
(1901),  163  Mo.  342,  63  S  W.  705    601, 

603 
Siedenboch  u.  Rilev,  111  N.  Y.  560       780 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


Siesel  r.  Town  of  Liberty  {1901),  111 

Wis.  470,  87  N.  W.  487  666 

Siever  r.  Union  Pac.  Kv.  Co.  (1903), 

—  Neb.  — .  93  N.  W."943  235,  320 

Sifton  I-.  Sifton  (189ii),  5  N.  D.  187, 

05  N.  \V.  670  787 

Sigel  Sell.  Dir.  v.  Coe,  40  Wis.  103      117, 

155 
Sigmund  ;•.  Bank  of  Minot  (1894), 

4  N.  D.  164,  59  N.  W.  966  756 

Siliiman  i'.  Tattle,  45  Barb.  171  115,  202 
Silsbee  r.  Smith,  60  Barb.  372  348,  374 
Silver  v.  Foster,  9  Kan.  56  290 

Silvers  v.  Junction  R.  Co.,  43  Ind. 

435  658,  661,  725 

Sim  V.  Hurst,  44  Ind.  579  189 

Simar  v.  Canady,  53  N.  Y.  298      187,  190, 

227,  228,  496,  879 

Simmons  c.  Eldridge,  29  How.  Pr. 

309  611 

V.  Law,  8  Bosw.  213  663 

V.  Sisson,  26  N.  Y.  264  720,  754 

v.  Spencer,  0  Fed.  Rep.  581     300,  304 
Simon  r.  Sabb  (1899),  56  S.  C 

o3  S.  E.  799  35,  329 

Simonds  v.  East  Windsor  Elec 


[tub  eefeeexces  aee  to  the  pages.] 

Skidmore  c.  Collier,  8  Hun,  50 


720, 
300, 
.  38, 

35, 
Rv. 

Co.  (1900),  73  Conn.  513,  48  Atl. 
210 
Simons  r.  Fagan  (1901),  62  Neb.  287, 

87  N.  W.  21 
Simonton  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.,  24  Minn. 

216 
Simpson  v.  McArthur,  16  Abb.  Pr. 
302  748, 

V.  Remington  (1899),  Idaho,  59 
Pac.  360 
Simpson    Cent.    Coll.    v.  Bryan,  50 

Iowa,  293 
Sims  V.  Bond,  5  B.  &  Ad.  389        116, 
f.  Clark  (18'.»2),  91  Ga.  302,  18 

S.  E.  158 
V.  Goettle,  83  N.  C.  268 
V.  McLure,  52  Ind.  267 
V.  Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1899), 
101  Wis.  586,  77  N.  W.  908 
Simson  r.  Brown,  68  N.  Y.  355 

V.  Satterlee,  64  N.  Y.  657         244, 
Sintrer  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Potts  (1894),  59 

Minn.  240,  61  N.  \V.  23 
Singleton  i:.  O'Blenis,  125  Ind.  151 


825 
656 
153 
783 


'•.  Scott,  11  Iowa,  589  544, 

Sinker  v.  Floyd,  104  Ind.  291 
Siou.x  City  Sch.  Dist.  Tp.  v.  Pratt, 

17  Iowa,  16 
Sii)perly  i-.  Troy  &,  B.  R.  Co.,  9  How. 

Pr.  83  505, 

Siskiyon     Lumber    Co.    i'.    Rostel 

(1898).  121  Cal.  511,  53  Pac.  1118 
Sisty  V.  Bebee,  4  Col.  52 
Siter  /;.  Jcwett.  33  Cal.  92  736, 

Sizer  v.  Millor,  9  Paige,  605 
Skaggs  r.  CJiven,  29  Mo.  App.  612 
Skcllv  V.  W.-.rren  (1903),—  S.  D.  — , 

94  X.  W.  408 


713 
153 

300 
417 
310 

703 
111 
326 

675 
104, 

576 
568 
104 

270 

,660 

594 
55 
834 
342 
930 

923 


104 

646 
596 

206 
862, 


343,  372, 

470 

Skiff  V.  Cross,  21  Iowa,  459  209 

Skinner  r.  Clute,  9  Nev.  342  662,  753 

c.  Skinner  (1894),  38  Neb.  756, 

57  N.  W.  534  12,  25 

Skobis  V.  Ferge  (1899),  102  Wis.  122. 

78  N.  W.  426 
Slater  v.  Estate  of  Cook  (1893),  93 

Wis.  104,  67  N.  W.  15 
Slatterv  i'.  Hall,  43  Cal.  191 
Slaughter  r.  Davenport  (1899),  151 

Mo.  26,  51  S.  W.  471 
Slayback  v.  Jones,  9  Ind.  470        843 

872,  881,  911,  9Iti 
Sleeman  r.  Hotchkiss,  13  N.  Y.  Suppl. 

98  637 

Sleeper  v.  Goodwin,  07  Wis.  577  356 

Sloan  V.  Hunter  (1899),  56S.C.  385, 

34  S.  E.  658  341 

1-.  McDowell,  71  N.  C.  356      878,  879 
V.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  Co.,  4  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  135  225 

r.  Railway  Co.  (1902),  64  S.  C. 

.389,  42  S.  E.  197  466,  712 

v.  Rose  (1899),  101  AVis.  523,  77 

N.  W.  895 
V.  Thomas  (1899),  58  Neb.  713, 
79  N.  W.  728 
Sloane   i-.    Southern    Cal.    Ry.    Co. 

(1896),  111  Cal.  668,  44  Pac.  320 
Slocum  V.  Barry,  .34  How.  Pr.  320 
Sloman  i:  Sclimidt,  8  Abb.  Pr.  5 
Slone  V.  Slone,  2  Met.  .339 
Slutts  V.  Chafee,  48  Wis.  617 
Sly  V.  Palo  Alto  Mining  Co.  (1902), 

28  Wa.-^h.  485,  68  Pac.  871 
Small  V.  Atwood,  1  Younge,  458    2.39,  512 
V.  Cohen  (1897),  102  Ga.248,  29 

S.  E.  430  822 

V.  Kennedy  (1893),  137  Ind.  299, 

.33  N.  E.  674  867 

i:  Lutz  (1899),  34  Ore.  131,  55 

Pac.  529  18 

V.  Robinson,  9  Hun,  418  212,  649 

V.  Sandall   (1896),  48  Neb.  318, 

67  N.  W.  156  680,  681 

Smart  v.  Bradstock,  7  Beav.  500  254 

Smead  v.  Chrisfiold,  1  Disney,  18   913,  935 
Sinelker  v.  Chicago  &  Northwestern 
R.   Co.  (lyOO),   106  Wis.  135,   81 
N.  W.  994 
Smctters  ;•.  Rainey,  14  Ohio  St.  247 
Smiley  t:  Dewcese,  1  Ind.  App.  211 


866 

332 

7.57 
153 
584 
921 
027 

714 


470 
270 
470, 
476 
315 


Smith  >:  Allen,  1  Lans.  101 

V.  Allen  (1901),  63  Neb.  74,  88 

N.  W.  1.55  731,  757,  942,  946 

V.  Atkinson  (1893),  18  Colo.  255, 

.32  Pac.  425  103 

V.  Barron  Cy.  Sup.,  45  Wis.  686     609 
r.  Bodine,  74  N.  Y.  .30  38 

V.  Bolden,  33  Beav.  262  253 

V.  Bowers  (1902),  Neb.,  89  N.  W. 

590  796 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


cxlix 


[the  refebences  are  to  the  pages.] 


Smith  r.  Bradstreet  (1902),  63  S.  C. 

525,  41  S.  E.  7G3  599 

V.   Brockett    (1897),    69    Conn. 

492,  38  Atl.  57  781 

V.  Building,   etc.   Ass'n  (1895), 

116  N.  C.  102,  21  S.  E.  33       614 
i;.  Building    Ass'n    (1896),    119 

N.  C.  257,  26  S.  E.  401     845,  908, 
920,  925 
V.  Buttner,  90  Cal.  95  575 

V.  Champion  (1897),  102  Ga.  92, 

29  S.  E.  160  757 

V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  K.  Co.,  23 

Wis.  267  102 

V.  Citv  of  St.   Paul  (1896),  65 

Minn.  295,  68  N.  W.  32  422 

V.  Citv  of  Sioux  City  (1903),  119 

la.  50,  03  N.  W.  81  638 

V.  Coe  (1902),  170  N.  Y.  162,  63 

N.  E.  57  735,  744,  863 

V.  Columbia  Jewelry  Co.  (1901), 

114  Ga.  698,  40S.  E.  735         641 
V.  Continental   Ins.    Co.  (1899), 

108  la.  382,  79  N.  W.  129        817 
V.  Countryman,  30  N.  Y.  655  611 

V.  Daw  ley  (1894),  92  la.  312,  60 

N.  W.  625  853,  871 

?;.  Day  (1901),  39  Ore.  531,  65 

Pac.  1055  303,  456,  498,  819,  820 
V.  Den  man,  48  Ind.  65  748 

V.  Dennett,  15  Minn.  81   596,  598,  599 
V.  Des  Moines  Nat.  Banlc  (1899), 

107  la.  620,  78  N.  W.  238        685 
V.  Diamond  (1893).  86  Wis.  359, 

56  N.  W.  922  870 

V.   Dickinson    (1898),   100    Wis. 

574,  76  X.  W.  766     259,  355,  887 
V.  Dohertv  (1901),  109  Ky.  616, 

60  S.  W.  380  832,  833 

V.  Douglass,  15  Abb.  Pr.  266  660 

V.  Dragert,  60  Wis.  139  823 

V.  Dunning,  61  N.  Y.  249         315,  316 
V.  Estey  Organ  Co.  (1897),  100 

Ga.  628,  28  S.  E.  392  790 

V.  Felton,  85  Ind.  223 
V.  Felton,  43  N.  Y.  419    102,  133,  869 
V.  Fife,  2  Neb.  10  916 

V.  Fox,  48  N.  Y.  674  132 

V.  Freeman,  71  Ind.  229  598 

V.  Gale,  12  Super.  Ct.  674       426,  428 
V.  Griswold  (1895),  95  la.  684, 

64  N.  W.  624  703 

V.  Hall,  67  N.  Y.  48         784,  806,  894, 

918 
V.  Holmes,  19  N.  Y.  271  815 

V.  Jones,  18  Neb.  421  254 

V.  Jones  (1902),  —  S.  D.  — ,  92 

N.  W.  1084  456 

V.  Kaufman  (1895),  3  Okla.  568, 

41  Pac.  722  565,  566 

V.  Kennett,  18  Mo.  154  99 

V.  Kibling  (1897),  97  Wis.  205, 

72  N,  W.  869  711,  713,  714 

V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  (1893),  95 

Kv.  11,  28  S.  W.  652  702 


Smith  V.  Lisher,  23  Ind.  .500  798 

y.  Long,  12  Abb.  N.  Cas.  113  120 

r.  Martin  (1901),  135  Cal.  247, 

67  Pac.  779 
V.  Mason  (1895),  44  Neb.  610,  63 

N.  W.  41 
V.  McCarthy,  39  Kan.  308 
f.  Meyers  (1898),  54  Neb.  1,  74 

N.  W.  277 
V.  Moberlv,  15  B.  Mon.  70 
I'.  Moim,  87  Cal.  489 
V.  Moore,  49  Ark.  100 
V.  Nelson,  62  N.  Y.  286 
V.  Orser,  43  Barb.  187 
v.  Peckham,  39  Wis.  414 
V.  Pedigo  (1896),  145  Ind 

33  N.  E.  777 
V.  Phelan   (1894),  40  Neb.  765, 

59  N.  W.  562 
V.  Pinnell  (1895),  143  Ind.  485, 

40  N.  E.  798 
V.  Portland,  30  Fed.  Rep.  734 
V.  Prior  (1894),  58   Minn.  247, 

59  N.  W.  1016 
V.  Putnam  (1900),  107  Wis.  155, 

82  N.  W.  1077 
V.  Rodecap,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  479 
V.  Rowe,  4  Cal.  6 
V.  Runnels  a896),  97  la.  55,  65 

N.  W.  1002 
V.  St.  Joseph,  55  Mo.  456        228,  229 
V.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1899), 

151  Mo.  391,  52  S.  W.  378 
V.  Schibel,  19  Mo.  140 
V.  Schulting,  14  Hun,  52 
V.  Security  Co.  (1899),  8  N.  D. 

451,  79  X.  W.  981  96, 

V.  Smith,  80  Cal.  323 
V.  Smith,  33  Mo.  557 
V.  Smith  (1897),  50  S.  C.  54,  27 

S.  E.  545  462,  559,  610 

V.  Snow,  3  Madd.  10         249,  250,  512 


819 


678 
936 


612 

42,  53 

576 

379 

575 

457,  495 

181,  801 

361, 

800 


615 

712 
253 

639 

452 

798 

11 

623 


354 

89 

260 

714 

782 
66 


V.  Spingler,  83  Mo.  408 

V.  Steinkamper,  16  Mo.  150 

V.  Summerfield,  108  N.  C.  284 

v.  Theot)nld,  86  Kv.  141 

V.  Usher  (189:);,  108  Ga.  2.31,  33 

S.  E.  876 
V.  Van  Osrrand,  64  N.  Y.  278 
V.  Waite  (1894),  103  Cal.  372,  37 

Pac.  232 
V.  Wall,  12  Colo.  363 
V.  Watson,  2  B.  &  C.  401 
V.  Weaee,  21  Wis.  440 
V.  Wells,  20  How.  Pr.  158 
V.  West's  Ex.,  5  Litt.  48 
V.  Wetmore  (1901),  167    N.   Y. 

234,  60  N.  E.  419 
I'.  Whitney,  22  Wis.  438 
V.  Wis.  Inv.  Co.  (1902),  114  Wis. 

151,  89  N.  W.  829 
V.  Young,  109  N.  C.  224 
Smith-McCord     Drv-Goods    Co.  '  v. 
Burke  (1901),  63  Kan.  740,  66  Pac. 
1036 


132 
935 
611 
783 

708 
219 

676 
911 
877 
415 
831 
245 

643 
636 

685 
936 


200 


cl 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  reperesces  are  to  the  pages.] 


Smithies  v.  Harrison,  1  Ld.  Raym. 

727  761 

Smock  V.  Carter  (1897),  6  Okla.  300, 

50  Tac.  -iG'i  642 

r.  Harrison,  74  Ind.  348  610 

Smvthe  i:  Brown,  lio  S.  C.  89  331 

'  r.  Scott,  100  Ind.  245  084 

Snapp  f.  Stanwood  (1898),  65  Ark. 

222,  45  S.  \V.  546  584,  585 

Snedager  c.  Kincaid  (1901),  Ky.,  60 

S.  W.  ry2-2  233 

Siiell  r.  Harrison  (1895),  131  Mo.  495, 

32  S.  W.  37  141 

Suidcr  r.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  77  Mo. 

533  149,  153 

1-.  Newell  (1903),  132  N.  C.  614, 

44  S.  E.  354  220,  086 

Snook  r.  Cit}'  of  Anaconda  (1901), 

20  Mont.  128,  60  Pac.  756  673 

Snow  ,.'.  Holmes,  71  Cal.  42  910 

*-.  Howard,  35  Barb.  55  298 

V.  Rich  (1900),  22  Utah,  123,  61 

Pac.  336  822 

Snowden  /•.    Waterman  (1897),  100 

Ga.  588,  28  S.  E.  121  625 

V.  Wilas,  19  Ind.  10  596,  718,  815 

Snyder  v.  Baber,  74  Ind.  47  598 

V.  Johnson  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95 

N.  \V.  692  703 

V.  Parker,  19  Wash.  276  (53  Pac. 

59,  67  Am.  St.  Rep.  726)  926 

V.  Pliillips,  m  Iowa,  481  103 

Societa  Italiana  r.  Snlzer  (1893),  138 

N.  Y.  468,  34  N.  E.  193  830 

Solder  v.  Williams,  1  Curtis,  479  255 

Solm  V.  Marion,  etc.  Co.,  73  Ind.  78       667 
Solomon  c.  Bates  (1896),  118  N.  C. 

311,  24  S.  E.  746  452,  493 

Solt  V.  Anilerson  (1901),  62  Neb.  153, 

86  N.  W.  1076  702 

>:  Anderson  (1902),  63  Neb.  734, 

89  N.  W.  306  614 

V.   Anderson    (1903), —  Neb. —, 

93  X.  W.  205  614 

Somerset  v.  Banking  Co.  (1900),  109 

Ky.  549,  60  S.  W.  5  934 

Sopris  r.  Truax.  1  Colo.  89  780,  805 

Sorensen  r.  Sorensen  (1903),—  Neb. 

— ,  94  N.  W.  540  744 

Sortore  v.  Scott,  fi  Eans.  271  201,  472 

Soule  V.  Mop!x,  35  Ilun.  79  202 

Sourse  v.  Marshall.  23  Ind.  194  392 

Southal  r.  Shields,  81  N.  C.  28      372,  412 
Southard  '•  Sutton,  68  Me.  575  246 

South    Bend   v.  Turner  (1900),  156 

Ind.  418,  60  N.  E.  271  603,  005 

South    Bend    Chilled    Plow    Co.    c 
Gr-orpe  C.  Cribh  Co.  (1900), 
105  Wis.  443,  81  N.  W.  675      15, 
461.  467,408.511 
r.  Geo.  C.  Cribb  Co.  (1897),  97 

Wis.  230,  72  X.  W.  749  592 

South  Varolina,  etc  R.  R.  Co.  r. 
Auunmta  R.  R.  Co.  (1900),  111  Ga. 
420,  :i6  S.  E.  593  30 


South  Milwaukee  Boulevard  Co.  v. 

Ilartc    (1897),   95    Wis.    592,   70 

N.  W.  821 

South    Milwaukee   Co.   v.   Murphy 

(1902),  112  Wis.  614.  88  N.  W.  583 

South    Omaha   r.   Cunningham,  31 

Neb.  316 
South  Portland  Land  Co.  v.  Munger 

(1900),  36  Ore.  457.  00  Pac.  5 
South  Side  Ass'n  v.  Cutler,  etc.  Co., 

04  Ind.  560 
Southern    Kan.    Farm,   etc.    Co.    r. 
Barnes   (1901),  63    Kan.  548,  66 
Pac.  638 
Southern  Kansas  Rv.  Co.  v.  Gritlith 

(1894),  54  Kan.  428,  38  Pac.  478 
Southern  Mut.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Turnley 

(1896),  100  Ga.  200,  27  S.  E.  975 
Southern    Pac.  R.   U.   Co.  c.  Pixley 
(1894),    103    Cal.    118,   37 
Pac.  194 
V.  Terry,  70  Cal.  484 
Southern  Rv.  Co.  i\  Covenia(1896), 
10(J  Ga.  40.  29  S.  E.  219 
V.  Dyson    (1899),   109  Ga.   103, 

34  S.  E.  997 
V.  Marshall  (1901),  111  Ky.  560, 

64  S.  W.  418 
V.  O'Brvan  (1900),  112  Ga.  127, 
37  S.  E.  161 
Southey  v.  Dowling  (1898),  70  Conn. 

153,  39  Atl.  113 
Southward    v.    Jamison    (1902),   66 

Ohio  St.  290,  64  N.  E.  135 
Southwick  V.    First   Nat.    Bank  of 

Memphis,  84  N.  Y.  420 
Sowards    V.   Moss    (1899),   58   Neb. 

119,  78  N.  W.  373 
Sowin  V.  Pease  (1895),  6  Wyo.  91, 

42  Pac.  750 
Spalir  r.  Nicklaus.  51  Ind.  221 
Spalding  r.  Alexander,  6  Bush,  160 
V.   AUred   (1901),  2:3  Utah,  354, 

64  Pac.  1100 
V.  Black,  22  Kan.  55 
f.  Murphv  (1901),  03  Nib.  401, 

88  N.  W.  489 
V.  St.    Joseph's   School    (1899), 
107  Ky.  .382,  54  S.  W.  200 
Spaiti    r.   Blunier  (1894),  56   Minn. 

523,  58  X.  W.  156 
Spanish    Fork    City   i'.  Hopper,  26 
Pac.  Rep.  293  196 

Spargur  v.  Romine  (1893),  38  Neb. 

736,  57  N.  W.  523 
Sparks  v.  Heritage,  45  Ind.  06      748, 

!•.  Nat.  Accident  Ass'n  (1896), 
100  la.  458,  69  N.  W.  678 

Sparling  i\  Conway,  75  Mo.  510 
Sparman  r.  Keim.  83  N.  Y.  245       75, 
Sparrow  v  Rlioadcs,  70  Cal.  208 
Spaulding  r.  C.  St.  P.  &  K.  G.  Rv. 
Co.  (1896),  98  la.  205,67  N.W.  227 


830 
543 
778 
43 
515 

787 
614 
543 

867 
51 

709 

684 

206 

683 

814 

943 

620 

686 

640 
517 

886 

789 
202 

422 

821 

337 

,823 

594 
779, 
780 

671, 
814 

783 
627 

782 

625 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


cil 


[the  references  are  to  tbe  paoes.] 


Spauldiiict  V,  Xorlli  Milwaukee  Town 
Site  Co.  (1900),  100  Wis.  481,  81 
N.  VV.  1064  302 

Spaur  V.  McBee,  19  Oreg.  76  820 

Spears  r.  Ward,  48  Ind.  541  659 

Specht  V.  Allen,  12  Oreg.  117  790 

Spect  V.  Spect,  88  Cal.  437  49 

Speer  v.  Bishop,  24  Ohio  St.  598  618 

V.  Crawter,  2  Meriv.  410  243 

Spence  v.  Hogg,  1  Coll.  225  256,  359 

V.  Spence,  17  Wis.  448  718 

Spencer  v.  Babcock,  22  Barb.  326         872 
V.  Johnston  (1899),  58  Neb.  44, 

78  N.  W.  482  815,  931,  934 

V.  Papach   (1897),   103  la.  513, 

70  N.  W.  748,  72  N.  W.  665     816 
I'.   Society   of    Shakers    (1901), 

Ky.,  64  S.  W.  468  833 

V.  Turney  (1897)    5  Okla.  683, 

49  Pac.  1012  741,  753 

Speyer  v.  Ihmels,  21  Cal.  280  428 

Speyers  i-.  Fisk,6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  197    293, 

299 
Spicer  v.  Hunter,  14  Abb.  Pr.  4  342,  343 
Spiers  v.  Duane,  54  Cal.  176  713 

Spink  V.  McCall,  52  Iowa,  432  637 

Spinners  v.  Brett,  38  Wis.  648       635,  637 
Spires   v.  South   Bound  R.  R.  Co. 

a896),  47  S.  C.  28,  24  S.  E.  992        600 
Sp'offord  V.  Rowan,  124  N.  Y.  108         878 
Spokane   &   Idaho   Lumber   Co.    v. 
Boyd    (1902),   28    Wash.    90,    68 
Pac.  337 
Spooner  v.  Keeler,  51  N.  Y.  527 

V.  Ross,  24  Mo.  App.  599 
Spousenberger  v.  Lemert,  23  Kan. 

55 
Spragg  V.  Binkes,  5  Ves.  587 
Sprague   v.    lioonev,    104    Mo.    360 

V.  Wells,  47  Minn.  504 
Sprigg  V.  Am.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  (1897), 

101  Ky.  185,  40  S.  W.  575 
Springer  v.  Cabell,  10  Mo.  640 
V.  Clay  Cy.,  35  Iowa,  241 
V.  Dwyer,  50  N.  Y.  19  831, 

V.  Kleinsorge,  83  Mo.  152 
V.  Vanderpool,  4  p:dw.  Ch.  362 
Springfield  n.    Weaver    (1896),   137 

Mo.  650,  37  S.  W.  509 
Springfield,  etc.    Co.     v.    Donovan 
(1899),  147  Mo.  622,  49  S.  W.  500 


Springs  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1902), 

130  N.  C.  186,  41  S.  E.  100 
Springsteed  v.  Lawson,  14  Abb.  Pr. 

328 
Spurlock  V.  Mo.  Pac.  Rv.  Co.  (1894), 

125  Mo.  404,  28  S.  W'.  634 
Squires  v.  Seward,  16  How.  Pr.  478 
Srader  v.  Srader  (1898),  151  Ind.  339 

51  N.  E.  479 
Stack  V.  Beach,  74  Ind.  571 
Stadler  v.  First  Nat.  Bank   (1899), 

22  Mont.  190,  56  Pac.  Ill  131, 

133, 


106 
797 
200 

915 
254 
811 
206 

734 
6(5 
821 
870 
783 
348 

102 

32, 
718 

674 

521 

643 

806 

675 
562 

132, 
134 


Stadler  v.  Parmelee,  10  Iowa,  23  936 

Stafibrd  v.  London,  1  P.  Wms.  428  242 
V.  Nutt,  51  Ind.  535          277,  769,  801 
Stalm  V.  Catawba  Mills  (1898),  53 

S.  C.  519,  31  S.  E.  498  602,  830 

Stair  V.  Cragin,  24  Ilun,  177  736 

Stalcup  V.  Garner,  26  Mo.  72  504 

Staley  v.  Ilousel,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  288  780 

V.  Ivory,  65  Mo.  74  791 
Stall  c.  Wilbur,  77  N.  Y.  158    199,  200,202 

Stanberry  v.  Smy the,  13  ( )hi<)  St.  495  935 

Stanbrough  v.  Daniels,  77  Iowa,  561  333 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Hoese  (1899),  57 

Neb.  665,  78  N.  W.  292  709 
Standard  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  v.  Henry 

(1894),  43  S.  C.  17,  20  S.  E.  790  785, 

788 

Standish  v.  Dow,  21  Iowa,  363      325,  334 

Stanford  v.  Davis,  54  Ind.  45  661 

V.  Stanford,  42  Ind.  485  309 

Stanley  v.  Foote  et  a/.  (1900),  9  Wyo. 

335,  63  Pac.  940  418 

V.  Mather,  31  Fed.  Rep.  860  329 

Stansfield  v.  Hobson,  16  Beav.  189  244 
Stanton  v.  Kenrick  (1893),  135  Ind. 

382,  35  N.  E.  19  684 
Stapleton  v.  Ewell  (1900),  Ky.,  55 

S.  W.  917  702 
Starbird  v.  Cranston  (1897),  24  Colo. 

20,  48  Pac.  650  108 

Starbuck  v.  Dunklee,  10  Minn.  173  728 

Stariha  v.  Greenwood,  28  Minn.  521  112 
Stark  V.  Publishers,  etc.  Co.  (1901), 

160  Mo.  529,  61  S.  W.  669  806 

V.  Wellman,  96  Cal.  400  522 

Starr  v.  Cragin,  24  Hun,  177  753 
Starr  Cash  Car  Co.  v.  Reinhardt,  20 

N.  Y.  Suppl.  872                          649,  936 

State  V.  Bailey,  7  Iowa,  390  118 
I'.  Bank  of  Commerce  (1900),  61 

Neb  22,  85  N.  W.  43  655 

V.  Bartlett,  68  Mo.  581  609 

V.  Beckner,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  553  806 

V.  Boone,  108  N.  C.  78  667 

V.  Cason,  11  S.  C.  392  609 
V.  Casper  (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  67 

N.  E.  185  378 

V.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co  ,  9  Nev.  79  792 

V.  Chamberlin,  54  Mo.  338  787 
V.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1893), 

4  S.  D.  261,  56  N.  W.  894  G74 

V.  Cy.  Judge,  7  Iowa,  186  118 
V.  Jacksonville  P.  &  M.  R.  Co  , 

15  Fla.  201                         279,  321 

V.  .Johnson,  52  Ind.  197              88,  104 
V.  Krause   (1897),  58  Kan.  651, 

50  Pac.  882                444,  498,  639 

V.  Kruttschnitt,  4  Nev.  178  502 
V.  Lorenz  (1900),  22  Wash.  289, 

60  Pac.  644  639 
V.   McDonald   (1805),   4  Idaho, 

343,  40  Pac.  312                298,  670 

V.  Mclntire,  58  Iowa,  572  820 
V.  Marshall  Cy.  Judge,  7  Iowa, 

186  118 


clii 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


[IHE   REFERENCES   ARE   TO   THE   PAGES.] 


State  V.  Meagher,  44  Mo.  356  55 

V.  Milwaukee   L.  S.  &  W.  Ry. 

Co.,  44  Wis.  579  659 

V.  Moore,  10  Mo.  369  151 

I'.  Moores  ( 1897),  52  Neb.  770,  73 

N.  W.  299  709 

V.  Newlin,  69  Ind.  108  713 

V.  Nortli.  Belle  Min.  Co.,  15  Neb. 

385  597 

V.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  (1897),  150  Ind. 

21,  49  N.  E.  809  180 

V.  Orwig,  34  Iowa,  112  283,  285 

r.  Owslev  (1895),  17  Mont.  94, 

42  Pac.  105  686 

V.  Pac.   Brewing  Co.  (1899),  21 

Wasli.  451,  58  Pac.  584  217 

V.  Porter  (lOOy),  —  Neb.  — ,  95 

N.  W.  769  709 

V.  Ramsey  (1897),  50  Neb.  166, 

69  N.  W.  758  565 

V.  Red  River,  etc.  Co.  (1897),  69 

Minn.  121,  72  N.  W.  60  354 

i>.  Russell,  5  Neb.  211  736 

V.  Satiingtun,  68  Mo.  454  178 

V.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1894), 

125    Mo.    596,    28    S.    W. 

1074  107 

V.  Stratton,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  803       203 
V.  Tittmann,  li>3  Mo.  553  455 

V.  True,  25  Mo.  App.  451  202 

V.  Williams,  48  Mo.  210  813 

V.  Y.  J.  S.  M.  Co.,  14  Nev.  220       658 
State    ex   inf.    v.    Firemen's    Fund 
Ins.  Co.   (1899),    152   Mo.    1,    52 
S.  W.  595  832 

State  ex  rd.  v.  Adams  (1901),  161 

Mo.  349,  61  S.  W.  894  730 

V.  Aloe  (1899),  152  Mo.  466,  54 

S.  W.  494  709 

i;.  Archibald  (1894),  52  0.  St.  1, 

38  N.  E.  314  709 

r.  Bradlev  (1901),  10  N.  D.  157, 

86  N."  W.  354  217 

V.  Butte   Water  Co.   (1896),  18 

Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966  730 

V.  City  of  Pierre  (1902),  15  S.  D. 

559,  90  N.  W.  1047  751 

f.  Coolev  (1894),  58  Minn.  514, 

60  N.  W.  338  602 

V.  Cornell  (1897),  52  Neb.  25,  71 

N.  W.  961  710 

V.  Dickerman  (1895),  16  Mont. 

278,  40  Pac.  698  013 

V.  Fleming  (1898),  147  Mo.  1,  44 

S.  W.  758  612 

V.  Fraker  (1901),  106  Mo.  130, 

05  S.  W.  720  217 

V.  Halter  (1897),  149  Ind.  292, 47 

N.  E.  605  710 

V.  Helms  (1898),  101  Wis.  280, 

77  N.  W.  194  8, 72 

V.  Hickman  (18tt9),  150  Mo.  626, 

51  S.  W.  680  343 

V.  Holmes  (1900),  60  Neb.  .39,82 

N.  W.  109  421 


State  ex  rel.  v.  Ilorton  Land  and 
Lumber  Co.  (1001),  161  Mo. 
664,  61  S.  W.  869  477,  665 

r.  Indemnity   Ass'n    (1898),    18 

Wash.  514,  52  Pac.  234  606 

V.  Jackson  (1895),  142  Ind.  259, 

41  N.  E.  534  645 
V.  Jeter  (1901),  59  S.  C.  483,  38 

S.  E.  124  599 

V.  King  (1894),  6  S.  D.  297,  60 

N.  W.  75  788 

V.  Mack  (1902),  20   Nev.  85,  69 

Pac.  862  421 

V.  Merchants'  Bank  (1901),  160 

Mo.  640,  61  S.  W.  676  602 

V.  Metschan  (1896),  32  Ore.  372, 

46  Pac.  791  271,  320 
V.  Moores  (1899),  58  Neb.  285,  78 

N.  W.  529  181,  605 

r.  Mount    (1808),   151  Ind.  679, 

51N.  E.  417  217 

V.  Osborn   (1895),  143  Ind.  071, 

42  N.  E.  921  744 
1-.  Osborn    (1900),  60  Neb.  415, 

83  N.  W.  357  565 

V.  Parsons  (1896),  147  Ind.  579, 

47  N.  E.  17  822 
V.  Peckham  (1893),  136  Ind.  198, 

36  N.  E.  28  521 

V.  Peterson  (1897),  142  Mo.  526, 

89  S.  W.  453  801,  802 

V.  Renshaw  (1902),  166  Mo.  682, 

66  S.  W.  953  593 

V.  Sandford  (1894),  127  Mo.  368, 

30  S.  W.  112  117 

V.  Stuht  (1808),  52  Neb.  209,  71 

N.  W.  941  709 

V.    Superior    Court    (1894),    9 

Wash.  366,  37  Pac.  454  638 

V.    Thompson    (1899),   149   Mo. 

441,  51  S.  W.  98  605 

V.  Thum   (1898),  Idaho,  55  Pac. 


V.  Tittmann  (1896),  134  Mo.  162, 

35  S.  W.  579 
V.  Tooker  (1806),  18  Mont.  540, 

46  Pac.  530 
V.  Withrow  (1000),  154  Mo.  397, 

55  S.  W.  400 
V.  Wood  (1900),  155  Mo.  425,  56 
S.  W.  474 
State  Bank  v.  Felt  (1896),  99  la.  532, 
68  N.  W.  818 
V.  Kellv    (1890),  109  la.  544,  80 

N.'W.  520 
V.  Showers   (1902),  —  Kan.  — , 
70  Pac.  332 
State  Nat.  Bank  v.  Smith  (1898),  55 

Neb.  54,  75  N.  W.  51 
Staten  Island,  etc.  Rv.  Co.  r.  Hinch- 
liffe  (1902),  170  N.'Y.  473,63  N.  E. 
545 
Stauback  v.  Rexford,  2  Mont.  Ty.  505 
Steadman  v.  Guthrie,  4  Met.  (Ky.) 
147 


663 
670 
665 
709 
566 
675 
804 
613 
312 


793 

784 

212 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED, 


cliii 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Stearns  r.  Martin,  4  Cal.  227  881 

Stebbins  v.  Goldtlnvaite,  31  Ind.  159     786 
V.  Lardner,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  847        831 
Stack  V.  a.  F.  &  I.  Co.  (1894),  142 

N.  Y.  236,  ;]7  X.  E.  1  840,  845 

Stedinan  v.  City  of  Berlin  (1897),  97 

Wis.  505,  73  N.  W.  57  708 

Steed  V.  Savage  (1902),  115  Ga.  97, 

41  S.  E.  272  39,  666,  667 

Steele  v.  Etlieridge,  15  Minn.  501  852 

Steele  Lumber  Co.  i'.  Laurens  Lum- 
ber Co.  (1896),  98  Ga.  329, 24  S.  E. 
755  356 

Steenerson  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.  (1890),  64  Minn.  216,  66 
N.  W.  723  712 

V.  Waterbury  (1893),  52  Minn. 

211,  53  N.  W.  1146  832,  833 

Steeple  v.  Downing,  60  Ind.  478     119,  784 
Steffes  V.  Lemke,  40  Minn.  27  402 

Stehman  v.  Crull,  26  Ind.  436  63 

Steidl  V.  State  (1902),  63  Neb.  695, 

88  N.  VV.  853  669 

Steinbach   v.    Prudential    Ins.    Co. 
(1902),  172  N.  Y.  471,  65  N.  E. 
281     271,  274,  318,  375,  413,  417,  473 
Steinhart  v.  Pitcher,  20  Minn.  102        915 
Steinmann  v.  Strimple,  29  Mo.  App. 

478  375 

Stelling   V.    Grabowski,    19    N.   Y. 

Suppl.  280  178 

Stembridge    v.    Southern    Ry.    Co. 

(1903),  — S.C.  — ,  43  S.  E.  968        689 
Stenberg  v.   State   (1896),  48  Neb. 

299,  67  N.  W.  190  888 

Stendal  v.  Boyd  (1897),  67    Minn. 

279,  69  N.  W.  899  682 

Stengel  v.  Boyce,  143  Ind.  642  690 

Stepank  v.  Kula,  36  Iowa,  563       216,  227 
Stephens  v.  Am.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1896), 

14  Utah,  265,  47  Pac.  83  543 

V.  Harding  (1896),  48  Neb.  659, 

C7  N.  W.  746  20,  179 

V.  Magor,  25  Wis.  533  475 

V.  Spokane  (1895),  11  Wash.  41, 

39  Pac.  266  567,  568 

V.  Union  Assurance  Co.  (1897), 

16  Utah,  22,  50  Pac.  626  689 

Stephenson  v.  Ballard,  50  Ind.  176       576, 

578,  581 
V.  Bankers'  Life  Ass'n   (1899), 

108  la.  637,  79  N.  W.  459       816 
V.  Southern  Pac.  Co.  (1894),  102 

Cal.  143,  36  Pac.  407         681,  682 
Sterling    v.  Smith    (1893),    97  Cal. 

343,  32  Pac.  320  702 

V.  Sterling  (1903),  43  Ore.  200, 

72  Pac.  741  685 

Stern  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (1901),  161 

Mo.  146,  61  S.  W.  594  625 

V.  Katz,  38  Wis.  136  576 

Stern  Auction,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mason,  16 

Mo.  App.  473  780,  805 

Sternberger  v.'  McGovern,  56  N.  Y. 
12  35,  36,  475 


Sterrett  ;•.  Barker  (1897),  119  Cal. 

492,  51  Pac.  695  353 

Stetler  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co., 

49  Wis.  609  609 

Stetson   V.  Briggs  (1896),   114  Cal. 

511,46  I'ac.  603  730 

Stevens  v.  Baker,  1  Wash.  315  66 

V.  Bosch,  54  N.  J.   Eq.  59,  33 

Atl.  293  509 

V.  Brooks,  23  Wis.  196    389,  391,  393, 

633 
V.  Campbell.  21  Ind.  471  326,  327 
V.  Chance,  47  Iowa,  602  520,  526 

r.  Cumin  (1903),  28  Mont.  366, 

72  Pac.  753  674 

V.  Flannagan,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  898     110 
V.  Home  Savings  Ass'n  (1897), 

Idaho,  51  Pac.  779  940 

V.  Mayor,  etc.,  84  N.  Y.  296       15,  29, 

og 

V.  South  Ogden  Land  Co.  (1896), 

14  Utah,  232,  47  Pac.  81  302 

r.  Thompson,  5  Kan.  305        801,  803 
Stevenson  v.  Flournov,  89  Ky.  561       756 
I'.    Matteson    (1893),    13   Mont. 

108,  32  Pac.  291  341 

V.  Polk,  71  Iowa.  278  364 

Stewart  v.  Am.  Ex.  Bank  (1898),  54 

Neb.  461,  74  N.  W.  865  735 

V.  Anderson  (1900),  111  la.  329, 

82  N.  W.  770  568 

V.  Beale,  7  Hun,  405  260 

V.  Beck,  90  Ind.  458  815 

V.  Bole  (1901),  61  Neb.  193,  85 

N.  W.  33  599 

V.  Brown,  37  N.  Y.  350  202 

V.  Carter,  4  Neb.  564  29,  470 

V.  Erie    &    W.   Transp.  Co.,  17 

Minn.  372  386,  388 

I'.  Gregory,  Carter  &  Co.  (1900), 

9  N.  D.  618,  84  N.  W.  553  152 
V.  Hoag,  12  ( )hio  St.  623  782,  807 
V.  Price  (1902),  64  Kan.  191,  67 

Pac.  553  91,  98 

V.  Rusengren  (1902),  — Neb. — , 

92  N.  W.  586  444,  498 

V.  Spaulding,  72  Cal.  264  103 

V.   Walterboro  Ry.  Co.   (1902), 

64  S.  C.  92,  41  S.  E.  827  642 

Stich  V.  Dickinson,  38  Cal.  608  425 

Stiles  V.  City  of  Guthrie  (1895),  3 
Okla.  2G,  41  Pac.  383         191,  263,  388, 

662 
Still  V.  Hall,  20  Wend.  51  842 

Stillings    V.    Van    AUstine    (1902), 

Neb.,  89  N.  W.  756  569 

Stillwcll  !K  Duncan  (1898),  103  Ky. 

59,  44  S.  W.  357  924 

Stillwell's  Adm'r  ;;.  Land  Co.  (1900), 

Ky.,  58  S.  W.  696  673 

Stilwell  u.  Chappell,  30  Ind.  72  935 

V.  Hurlbert,  18  N.  Y.  374  152 

V.  Kellogg,  14  Wis.  461  475 

V.  McNeely,  1  Green  Ch.  305         251 

Stitt  V.  Little,  63  N.  Y.  427  627,  629 


:liv 


TABLE -OF    CASCS    CITED. 


hitix  c.  Matthews,  63  Mo.  371 
Stock-ii  rowers'     Bank    r.    Newton 

(1889),  13  Colo.  245.  22  Pac.  444 
Stocker  i:  Green,  04  Mo.  280 
Stockett   1-.   Watkins,  2   Gill   &   J. 

o2t5 
Stockton  j\  Anderson,  40  N.  J.  Eq. 
426 
V.  Stockton,  73  Ind.  510 
Stockton,  Bk.  of,  v.  Howland,  42  Cal. 

129 
Stockton  Sav.  &  L.  Soc.  r.  Giddings, 

yG  Cal.  84 
Stockton,  etc.  Works  r.  Glens  Falls 
Ins.  Co.  (1898),  121  Cal.  167,  53 
I'ac.  565 
Stoddard  r.  Aiken  (1890),  57  S.  C. 
134,  35  iS.  E.  501 
r.  Treadwell,  26  Cal.  294        910,  913 
Stoddard  County  r.  Malone  (1803), 

115  Mo.  508,  22  S.  W.  469 
Stoddard  MtV-  Co.  v.  Mattice  (1897), 

10  S.  D.  253,  72  N.  W.  891 
Stoddert  1-.  Ward,  31  Md.  562 
Stokes  r.  Geddes,  46  Cal.  17 
r.  Scott  Cy.,  10  Iowa,  166 
v.  Sprague  (1899),   110  la.  89, 
81  N.  W.  195 
Stoll  r.  Sheldon,  13  Neb.  207 
Stolze  V.  Bank  of  Minnesota  (1807), 
67  Minn.  172,  69  N.  W.  172 


[the  refeeexces  are  to  the  pages.] 
5 


30 
781 

649 

352 
852 

293 

869 


659 

785 


821 

758 
118 
563 
118 

713 
150 


131, 
134 
V.  Torrison  (1903),  118  Wis.  315, 

95  N.  W.  114     856,  887,  897,  903, 

906,  921,  924 

Stone  v.  Buckner,  12  Sm.  &  M.  73    359 

r.  Fouse,  3  Cal.  292  38,  66 

r.  Hunt,  94  Mo.  475  778 

r.  Lewman,  28  Ind.  97 

v.  Mattinjrly,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  402 

Stone's  Adm'r  t".  Towell,  13  B.  Mon. 

342 
Stoner  v.  Keith  Countv   (1896),   48 

Neb.  279,  67  N.  W.  311 
Storer  i-.  Austin  (1902),  136  Cal.  588, 

69  Pac.  277 
Store V    i:    Kerr    (1902),   Neb.,    89 

N.  \V.  601 
Stork  r.  Supreme  Lodge  (1900),  113 

la.  724,  84  N.  W.  721 
Storm    V.    Davenport,  1  Sandf.   Ch. 

135 
Storts  V.  George  (1899),  150  Mo.  1, 

51  S.  W.  489 
Storv    &    Isliam    C.    Co.    v.    Story 
(1893),  100  Cal.  30,  34  Pac.  671 

903,  918 
Stotscnburg  v.  Fordice  (1895),  142 

Ind.  4!«).  41  N.  E.  313  840,  864 

Stout  v.  Notiman,  30  Iowa,  414  300 

V.   St.    Louis    Tribune    Co 

Mo.  342 

Stowell  V.  Eldred,  30  Wis.  614 


727 
65 

800 

403 


640 


40 


34 


48 


130 


491, 


■.  Otis.  71  N.  V.  .36 


52 
'  584,687 
620,  865, 
886 

784,  791 


Strahle  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1896), 

47  Neb.  319,  66  N.  W.  415  688 

Stratton    v.    Wood   (1895),  45   Neb. 

629,  63  N.  W.  917  640 

Strause  i-.  Ins.  Co.  (1001),  128  N.  C. 

64,  38  S.  E.  256  703 

Strauss    v.    Bendheim    (1000),    162 

N.  Y.  469,  56  N.  E.  1007  158 

Straut's  Est.,  lie,  126  N.  Y.  201  253 

Stra whacker   v.  Ives  (1901),  114  la. 

661,  87  N.  W.  669  712 

Street  v.  Beal,  16  Iowa,  68    326.  333,  338, 

370 
r.  Bryan,  65  N.  C.   610  915 

V.  Morgan   (1902),  64  Kan.  85, 

67  Pac.  448  780 

V.   Town   of   Alden    (1895),  62 

Minn.  160,  64  N.  W.  157  263 

Street  Ry.  Co.  i-.  Stone  (1894),   54 

Kan.  83,  37  Pac.  1012  303,  599,  600 

Streeter  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  40 

Wis.  294  609 

r.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44  Wis. 

383  620 

Strickland  v.  Strickland,  12  Sim.  463     347 
Striker  r.  Mott,  2  Paige,  387  243 

Stringer  v.  Stringer  ( 1894),  93  Ga. 

320,  20  S.  E.  242  822 

Stringfellow    v.   Alderson,  12  Kan. 

112  718 

Striiigfield  v.  Graff,  22  Iowa,  4-38  246 

Strobel  f.  Kerr  Salt  Co.  (I'JOO),  164 

N.  Y.  303,  58  N.  E.  142  196,  262 

Stroebe  v.  Fehl,  22  Wis.  347  633 

Strohn  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.   Co.,  37 

Wis.  625  150 

Stronach  v.  Stronacli,  20  Wis.  129        241 
Strong    V.   Downing,   34   Ind.    300     271, 

311 
r.  Hoos,  41  Wis.  659  502 

V.  Weir  (1896),  47  S.  C.  307,  25 

S.  E.  157  592 

Stroup  r.  State,  70  Ind.  405  614,  618 

1-.  Stroup  (1894),  140  Ind.  179,  30 

N.  E.  864  678 

Strucknieyer    i:   Lamb    (1896),    64 

Minn.  57,  65  N.  AV.  930  94,  154 

Strunian  v.  Robb,  37  Iowa,  311  53 

Strunk  v.  Smith,  36  Wis.  631  442 

Stuart  r.  Bank  of  Staplehurst  (1899), 

57  Neb.  569,  78  N.  W.  298  304 

Stubblefifld  v.  Gadd  (1901),  112  la. 

6Sl,  81  N.  W.  917  665 

Stubbs  V.  Motz  (1893),  113  N.  C.  458, 

18  S.  E.  387  702 

Stuber  1-.  Gannon  (1896),  98  la.  228, 

67  N.  W. 105  673 

r.    McKntce    (1894),  142  N.  Y. 

200,  36  N.  E.  878  740 

Stucker  v.  Stucker,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  301     244 
Stuckey  v.  Eritsche,  77  Wis.  329  89 

Studebaker  Bros.  Mfg.  Co.  i'.  Lang- 
son  (1895),  89  Wis.  200,  61 
N.  W.  773  638 

V.  McCargur,  20  Neb.  500  332 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


clv 


[the  references  are  to  tue  pages.] 


Stuht  V.  Sweesy  (1896),  48  Neb.  767, 

67  N.  W.  748 
Sturges  ('.  Burton,  8  Ohio  St.  215 
Sturgis  V.  Baker  (1903),  43  Ore.  236, 

72  Pac.  744 
Sturm  r.  Atlantic  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  63 

N.  Y.  77 
Sturman  v.  Stone,  31  Iowa,  115 
Sturtevant  v.  Brewer,  9  Abb.  Pr.  414 

Styer  v.  Sprague  (1896),  63  Minn. 

414.  65  N.  W.  659 
Styers  r.  Alspaiigli  (1896),  118  N.C. 

631,  24  S.  E.  4-i2 
Styles  (,'.  Fuller,  101  N.  Y.  622 
Suber  r.  Allen,  13  S.  C.  317 

V.  Richards  (1901),  61  S.  C.  393, 

89  S.  E.  540 

Suckstorf  V.   Butterfield   (1898),  54 

Neb.  757,  74  N.  W.  1076 
Suiter  v.  Turner,  10  Iowa,  517       325, 
Sukforth  V.  Lord,  87  Cal.  399 
Sullivan  r.  Byrne,  10  S.  C.  122 

V.  Collins  (1900),  107  Wis.  291, 

83  N.  W.  310  639, 

V.  Davis,  4  Cal.  291 
V.  Field  (1896),  118  N.  C.  358,  24 

N.  E.  735 
V.  N.  Y.,  N.  Haven,  &  H.  K.  Co., 

19  Blatchf.  388 
V.  Nicoulin  (1901),  113  la.  76,  84 

N.  W.  978  868, 

V.  Sherrv  (1901),  111  Wis.  476, 

87  N.  W.  471 
r.  Sullivan,  4  Hun,  198 
V.  Sullivan  Co.,  14  S.  C.  494 
V.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  169 
N.  Y.  21.S,  62  N  E.  146 
Sully  V.  Goldsmith,  49  Iowa,  690 
Summers  v.  Farish,  10  Cal.  347 

V.  Heard  (1899),  66  Ark.  550,  50 

S.  W.  78 
V.  Hoover,  42  Ind.  153 
V.  Hutson,  48  Ind.  228  419, 

V.  Vaughan,  35  Ind.  323 
Sumner  v.  Coleman,  20  Ind.  486     325, 
Sundback  v.  (iilbert  (1896),  8  S.  D. 

359,  66  N.  W.  941 
Sunman  v.  Brewin,  52  Ind.  140 
Supervisors  of  Douglas  County,  etc. 
See    Douglas    County,    Franklin, 
Kewaunee,    La    Pointe,    Mercer, 
Oconto,  Saratoga,  etc. 
Surginer  v.  Paddock,  31  Ark.  528 

562, 
Susong  V.  Vaiden,  10  Rich.  L.  247 
Sussdorf  V.  Schmidt,  55  N.  Y.  319 

Sutherland  v.  Carr,  85  N.  Y.  105 
V.  HoUiday  (1902),  —  Neb.  — , 

90  N.  W.  937 

Sutton  ".  Casseleggi,  77  Mo.  397 
V.  Clark  (1901),  59  S.  C.  440,  .38 

S.  E.  150 
V.  Stone,  2  Atk.  101 


612 
660 

91 

150 
575 
412, 
413 

362 

331 
816 
526 

686 


332 

598 
865 

643 
516 

191 

457 

870 

200 
242 
515 

702 
787 
114 

202 
784 
425 
727 
327 

686 
314 


439, 

597 
295 
587, 
617 
155 

278 

283 

822 
365 


Sutton   V.   Sutton   (1900),  60   Neb. 

400,  83  N.  W.  200  49 

Suydam  r.  Moore,  8  Barb.  358  .396 

Svanburg  r.  Fosseen  (1899),  75  Minn. 

350,  78  N.  W.  4  180,  191 

Swales   V.  Grubbs,    33  N.  p].  Kep. 

1124  216 

Swan  L.  &  Cat.  Co.  v.  Frank,  39  Fed. 

Kep.  456  356 

Swank  v.  Barnum  (1896),  63  Minn. 

447,  05  X.  W.  722  641 

v.  St.  Paul  City  My.  Co.  (1895), 
61  Minn.  423,  63  N.  W. 
1088  816 

V.  Swank  (1900),  37  Ore.  489,  61 

Pac.  846  624 

Swanson  v.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co. 
(1898),  73  Minn.  103,  75  N.  W. 
1033  710 

Swarthout  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

49  Wis.  625  202 

Swasev  ;•.  Adair,  88  Cal.  179  52 

S watts  V.  Bowen  (1894),  141  Ind.  322, 

40  N.  E.  1057  676,  821 

Swearingen  v.  Lahner  (1894),  93  la. 

147,  61  N.  W.  431  819 

Swedish  Am.  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dickin- 
son Co.  (1896),  6  N.  D.  222,  69 
N.  W.  455  432 

Sweeney  v  Bailey  (1895),7  S.D.404, 

64  N.  W.  188  877,  881,  934 

V.  Schlessinger  (1896),  18  Mont. 

326,  45  Pac.  213  787 

Sweet  r.  Davis  (1895),  90  Wis.  409, 

m  N.  W.  1047  757 

V.  Desha  Lumber,  etc.  Co.,  20 

S.  W.  Rep.  514  598 

V.  Ervin,  54  la.  101  714 

V.  Ingerson,  12  How.  Pr.  331         481, 
483,  497,  521 
V.  Mitchell,  15  Wis.  641  633 

V.  Tuttle,  14  N.  Y.  465  800,  829 

Sweetman    v.    llamsev    (1899),    22 

Mont.  323,  56  Pac.  361  787 

Sweetser  v.  People's  Bank    (1897), 

69  Minn.  196,  71  N.  W.  934  930 
Sweezey  v.  Collins,  36  Iowa,  589  617 
Swenney  v.  Hill  (1902),  65  Kan.  826, 

70  Pac.  868  .338 
Swenson  v.  Cresop,  28  Ohio  St.  668    793, 

939 

V.  Moline  Plow  Co.,  14  Kan.  387     244 

Swift  V.  Ellsworth,  10  Ind.  205       95,  113, 

156,  814 
V.  Fletcher,  6  Minn.  550  872 

V.  Kingsley,  24  Barb.  541  663 

V.   Pacific   Mail  S.   8.  Co.    106 

N.  Y.  20()  149 

V.  State  Lumber  Co.,  71   Wis. 

476  378 

V.  Swift,  46  Cal.  266  153 

Swihart  r.  Harless  (1896),  93  Wis. 

211,67  N.  W.  413  443 

Swinsr  V.  White  River  Lumber  Co. 
(1895),  91  Wis.  517,  65  N.  W.  174     180 


clvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES   CITED. 


[the  beferences  are  to  the  pages.] 


428 


642 


852 


Switz  V.  Black,  45  Iowa.  507 

Swon    r.   Stevens    (1897),    143   Mo. 

384,  45  S.  W.  270 
Swope  r.  Burnham,  etc.  Co.  (1898), 

C  Ukla.  736.  52  Pac.  924 
Svdner  I'ump  Co.  v.  Kocky  Mount 
'ice  Co.  (1899),   125  N.  C.  80,  34 

S.  E.  198 
Sykes   r.  First  Nat.  Bk.,  49  N.  W. 

Kep.  1058  15,  310 


T. 


Tabler  i-.  Wiseman,  2  Ohio  St.  207       369 
Tabor  v.  Mackee,  58  Ind.  290         887,  940 


286 


15 


Tabue  i-.  McAdams,  8  Bush,  74 
Tacoma  v.    Tower   Co.  (1896), 

Wash.  515,  46  Pac.  1043 
Taggart  v.  Risley,  3  Ore.  306 
Taintor  i'.  Prendergast,  3  Hill,  72 
Tait  r.  Culbertson,  57  Barb.  9 
Talbert  v.  Singleton,  42  Cal.  390 
Talbot  V.  Garretson  (1897),  31  Ore. 
256,  49  Pac.  978 
V.  Roe  (1903),  171  Mo.  421,  71 

S.  W.  682 
V.  Wilkins,  31  Ark.  411 
Talbott  V.  Padgett,  30  S.  C.  107 
Taliaferro  i-.  Smiley  (1900),  112  Ga. 

62, 37  S.  E.  106 
Tallnian  v.  Barnes,  54  Wis.  181 
f.  HoUister,  9  How.  Pr.  508 
Talmage    v.    Bierhause,    102    Ind. 

270 
Talty  V.  Torling    (1900),    79  Minn. 

386,  82  \.  W.  632 
Tanderup  ;•.  Hansen  (1894),  5  S.  D. 

104,  58  N.  W.  578  651,  655 

Tanguav  r.  Feltliouser,  44  Wis.  30       637 
Tannebaum   v.   Marsellus,  22  N.  Y. 

.suppl.  928 
Tanner  v.  Niles,  1  Barb.  560 
Tarbox  v.  Adams  Cy.  Sup.,  34  Wis. 

558 
Tarpey  v.  Deseret  Salt  Co.,  5  Utah, 

205 
Tarwater  *•.  Han.  &  St.  Jos.  R.  Co., 

42  Mo.  193 
Tasker  i-.  Small,  3  My.  &  Cr.  632   55, 256, 

358 
Tassell  r.  Smith,  2  DeG.  &  J.  713 
Tate  V.    Douglas  (1893),  ;il3  N.  C 
190,  18  S.  E.  202 
i:  Ohio  &.  Miss.  R.  Co.,  10  Ind. 

174  113,173,262 

Tatum  t'.  Roberts  (1894),  59  Minn. 

52,  60  N.  W.  848 
Taylor  v.  Adair,  22  Iowa,  279 
V.  Collins.  51  Wis.  123 
V.  Fickas,  64  Ind.  167 
1-.  Matteson  (1893),  86  Wis.  113, 

56  N.  W.  829  710,  868,  871 

r.  Mayor,  20  Hun,  292  131 

V.  Mayor,  8li  N.  Y.  10  930 


815 
723 
116 
313 
52 

636 

327 
112 
891 

686 
924 
418 


866 


368 


821 

63 
920 


246 


191 


341 
424 

178 
219 


Taylor  v.  Metrop.  El.  Ry.  Co.,  52 

N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  299 
V.  Patton  (li)03),  —  Ind.  — ,  66 

N.  E.  91 
V.  Pullen  (1899),  152  Mo.  434,  53 

S.  W.  1086 
V.  Purcell  ( 18941,  60  Ark.  606,  31 

S.  W.  567  754,  812, 

V.  Root,  4  Keyes,  335  876, 

V.  Stowell,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  175 

V.  Tavlor  (1900),  110  la.  207,  81 

N.  W.  472 
V.  Thompson,  42  111.  9 
r.  Webb,  54  Miss.  36 
Teachout  v.  Des  Moines  B.  G.  S.  Ry. 

Co.,  75  Iowa,  722 
Teague  v.  Fowler,  56  Ind.  569       887, 
Teal  V.  Woodworth,  3  Paige,  470 
Teall  V.  Syracuse,  32  Hun,  332 
Teasley  v.  Bradley  (1900),  110  Ga. 

497,  35  S.  E.  782 
Tecuniseh    Nat.    Bank    v.    McGee 
(1901),  61  Neb.  709,  85  N.  W.  949 
Tecumseh    State    Bank  v.  Maddox 

(1896),  4  Okla.  583,  46  Pac.  563 
Tell  V.  Beyer,  38  N.  Y.  161  663, 

V.  Gibson,  66  Cal.  247  228, 

Telle    V.    Rapid    Transit    Ry.    Co. 
(1893),  50  Kan.  455,  31  Pac.  1076 
Templeton  v.  Sharp,  9  S.  W.  Rep. 

507 
Ten  Broeck  v.  Orchard,  74  N.  C.  409 

Tendesen  v.  Marshall,  3  Cal.  440 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Casad,  15  Iowa,  524    326, 

I).  Mayor,  15  Iowa,  486 
Tennant  v.  Pfister,  51  Cal.  511      178, 
Tenney  v.  State  Bank,  20  Wis.  152 

Terhune  v.  Terhune,  40  How.  Pr.  258 
Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Pierce,  95 

Ind.  496 

Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Corkle  (1894),  140  Ind.  613, 
40  N.  E.  62 
I'.  Sheeks  (1900),  155  Ind.  74,  56 
N.  E.  434 
Terre  Haute  &  L.   R.  Co.  v.  Sher- 
wood, 132  Ind.  129 
Terrell  v.  Walker,  66  N.  C.  244 
Terrett  v.  Sharon,  34  Conn.  105 
Territory  v.  Cox,  3  Mont.  197 

V.  Hildehrand,  2  Mont.  426 
Terry  i-.  .Munger,  121  N.  Y.  161 

V.  Musser,  68  Mo.  477 
Terwilliger  r.  Wheeler,  35  Barb.  620 
Tew  V.  Wolfsohn  (1903),  174  N.  Y. 

272,  66  N.  E.  934 
Tewsbury  v.  Bronson,  48  Wis.  581 

V.  Schulenbcrg,  41  Wis.  584 
Texas,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Humble  (1899), 

97  Fed.  (C.  C.  A.  Ark.)  837 
Texier  v.  Gouin,  5  Duer,  389  769 


495 

816 

312 

824 
934 
933, 
936 

642 
118 
340 

428 
895 
368 
522 

715 

158 

638 
805 
503 

682 

823 
47, 
49 
517 
333 
118 
193 
37, 
633 
890 

920 


656 

625 

661 
843 
118 
117 
277 
649, 
804 
568 
114 

501 
637 
667 

230 
,801 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


clvii 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Thalheimer  v.  Crow,  13  Colo.  397       G18, 

8t)9 
Thames  v.  Jones,  97  N.  C.  121  196,  471 
Thatcher   v.   Candee,  33   How.  Fr. 

145  242, 251 

V.  Cannon,  6  Bush,  541  <»36 

I'.  Haun,  12  Iowa,  303  377 

V.  Heisey,  21  Ohio  St.  608  022 

TheUn  v.  Stewart  (1803),  100  Cal. 

372,  34  Pac.  861  444,517,711,712 

Tlieusen  i-.Eryan  (1901),  113  la.  496, 

85  N.  W.  802 
Thigpen  v.  Staton,  104  X.  C.  40 
Thomas  v.  Bennett,  56  Barb.  197 
V.  Carson  (1896),  46  Neb.  765,  65 

N.  W.  899 
V.   Chamberlain,    39    Ohio   St. 

112 
V.  Churchill  (1896),  48  Neb.  266, 

67  N.  W.  182 
V.  Cooksey  (1902),  130  N.  C.  148, 

41  S.  E.  2 
V.  Dunning,  5  De  G.  &  S.  618 
V.  Exchange  Bank  (1896),  99  la. 

202,  68  N.  W.  780 
V.  Franklin  (1894),  42  Neb.  310, 

60  N.  W.  568 
V.  Glendinning  (1896),  13  Utah, 

47,  44  Pac.  652 
V.  Goodwine,  88  Ind.  458 
V.  Irwin,  90  Ind.  557 
V.  Kennedy,  24  Iowa,  397 
V.  Markmann  ( 1895),43Neb.  823, 

62  N.  W.  206 
V.  Nelson,  69  N.  Y.  118 
V.  Utica  &  B.  li.  Co.,  97  N.  Y. 

245 
V.  Walker  (1902),  115  Ga.  11,  41 

S.  E.  269 
V.  Werremeyer,  34  Mo.  App.  665 
V.  Wood,  61  Ind.  132 
Thomas's  Adm'r  v.  Maysville  Gas  Co. 
(1900),  108  Ky.  224,  50  S.  W.  153 
Thompkins  v.  White,  8  How.  Pr.  520    576 
Thompson  v.  Brazile  (1898),  65  Ark. 
495,  47  S.  W.  299 
V.  Brown  (1898),  106  la.  367,  76 

N.  W.  819 
V.    Caledonian    Fire    Ins.    Co. 
(1896),    92    Wis.    664,    6G 
N.  W.  801 
V.  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.  (1898), 
152  Ind.  461,  53  N.  E.  462 


655 
618 
166 

681 

823 

818 

314 
245 

930 

607 

822 
714 
206 
364 

566 
618 

522 

41 

806 
178 

656 


606 
640 


639 


614, 
623 
V.  Cohen  (1894),  127  Mo.  215,  28 

S.  W.  984  816 

V.  Ellenz  (1894),  58  Minn.  301, 

59  N.  W.  1023  608 

V.  Erie  R.  R.,  45  N.  Y.  468  788 

V.  Fall,  64  Wis.  384  47,  49 

V.  Fargo,  63  N.  Y.  479  149 

V.  Fenn  (1896),  100  Ga.  234,  28 

S.  E.  39  625 

V.  Frakes  (1900),  112  la.  585,  84 

N.  W.  703  783 


Thompson  v.  Graham,  1  Paige,  384 
V.    Great    Northern      Ky.    Co. 

(1897),   70    Minn.   219,   72 

N.  W.  962 
V.  Greenwood,  28  Ind.  327      801, 
V.  Halbert,  109  N.  Y.  329 
V.  Harris  (1902),  64  Kan.  124,  67 

Pac.  456 
V.  Iluffaker,  19  Nev.  291 
V.  Huron  Lumber  Co.,  4  Wash. 

600 
V.   Kessel,   30  N.   Y.    383    900, 

V.  Killian,  25  Minn.  Ill  592, 

V.  Lake,  19  Nev.  103 

i'.  Mallorv  Bros.  (1898),  104  Ga. 

684,  30  S.  E.  887 
V.  Perkins  (1896),  97  la.  607,  66 

N.  W.  874 
r.  Recht  (1902),  158  Ind.  302,  63 

N.  E. 569 
V.  Rush  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92 

N.  W.  1060 
V.  Sanders  (1901),  113  Ga.  1024, 

39  S.  E.  419 
V.  Sickles,  46  Barb.  49 
V.  Skeen  (1896),  14  Utah,  209,  46 

Pac.  1103 
V.  Sweetser,  43  Ind.  312  779, 

V.  Thompson,  52  Cal.  154 
V.  Toland,  48  Cal.  99 
V.  Tookey,  71  Ind.  296 
V.  Town  of   Elton   (1901),   109 

Wis.  589,  85  N.  W.  425 
V.  Wertz  (1894),  41  Neb.  31,  50 

N.  W.  518  614, 

r.  Whitney  (1899),  20  Utah,  1, 

57  Pac.  429 
V.  Wolfe,  6  Oreg.  308 
V.  Young,  51  Ind.  599 
Thompson  &  Sons  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Nich- 
olls  (1897),  52  Neb.  312,  72  N.  W. 
217 
Thompson-Houston     Elec.    Co.     v. 
Palmer  (1893),  52  Minn.  174,  53 
N.  W.  1137  677, 

Thomson  I'.  Baskerville,  3  Ch.  Rep. 
215 
V.  Sanders,  118  N.  Y.  252 
V.  Smith,  63  N.  Y.  301     244,  360, 
V.   Town    of    Eton    (1901),    109 
Wis.  589,  85  N.  W.  425 
Thorn  j;.  Sweeney,  12  Nev.  251 
Thornton  v.  Crowther,  24  Mo.  164 
V.  Knox's  Ex.,  6  B.  Mon.  74 
V.  Pigg,  24  Mo.  249  325, 

Thorp  V.  Keokuk  Coal  Co.,  48  N.  Y. 
253 
I'.  Philbin,  15  Dalv,  155 
Thorpe  v.  Dickey,  51  Iowa,  676    499, 
i:     Union     Pacific     Coal     Co. 
(1902),   24    Utah,  475,    68 
Pac.  145 
Thorson  v.  Baker  (1898),  107  la.  49, 
77  N.  W.  510 


253 

673 

829 
727 

466 
392 

428 
922, 
927 
609 
355 

641 

625 

543 

179 

197 

872 

757 
780 
736 
154 

852 

584 

625 

672 
576 
221 


804 

247 
911 
376 

586 
576 
99 
245 
336 

110 
916 
520 


221 
830 


clviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  beferemces  ake  to  tbe  pages.] 


Threadgill  i\  Commissioners  (1895), 

11(5  N.  C.  010,  21  S.  E.  425         643,  831 
Threait   v.   Mining  Co.    (1896),  49 

S.  C.  95,  -lO  S.  E.  970  402,  466,  468 

Throckmorton  i-.  Pence  (1893),  121 

Mo.  50,  25  S.  W.  843  366,  816 

TliurnionJ  i-.  Cedur  Spring  Baptist 

Church   (1900),   110  Ga.   810,  36 

S.  E.   221 
Thurston    r.    Thurston    (1894), 

Minn.  279,  59  N.  \V.  1017 
Tibbetis  f.  Blood.  21  Barb.  650 
Turnginst,   85   N. 


58 


291 

271 
157 


Tieineyer 

516 
Tiernev  i- 


816 

329 


503 
118 


818 


Spiva,  97  Mo.  98 
Tiffin  Glass  Co.  v.  Stoelir  (1896),  54 

().  St.  157,43  N.  E.  279 
Tift  V.  Buffalo,  1  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  150 
I'.     Wight     &    Wesloskv     Co. 
(1901),113Ga.  681,39S.E. 
503 

Tillamook  Dairy  Ass'n  i;.  Schermer- 
horn  (1897),  31  Ore.  308,  51  Pac. 
438  639, 642 

Tillerv  v.  Candler  (1896),  118  N.  C. 

888,'  24  S.  E.  709  642 

Times    Publishing   Co.    v.   Everett 

(1894),  9  AYash.  518,  37  Pac.  695       459 
Tinkler  r.  Swaynie,  71  Ind.  562     113,  205 
Tinkuni  v.  O'Xeale,  5  Nev.  93       269,  289 
Tinsley  v.  Tinslev,  15  B.  Mon.  454       881, 
899,911,916,927 
Tippecanoe  Cy.  Cora'rs    v.    Lafay- 
ette, etc.  R.  Co.,  50  Ind.  85        265 
Tipton  Light,  etc.  Co.  v.  Newcomer 
(1900),  156  Ind.  348,  58  N.  E.  842 
Tisdale  v.  Moore,  8  Hun,  19 
Titus  r.  Lewis,  33  Ohio  St.  304 
Tobias  v.  Tobias  (1894).  51  O.   St. 

519,  38  N.  E.  317 
Tobin  V.  Galvin,  49  Cal.  34  234,  316 

V.  Portland  Mills  Co.  (1902),  41 

Ore.  269,  68   Pac.  743     235,  379, 
381,  383,  385.  386,  390 
Tobv  V.  Oregon  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1893), 

98  Cal.  490,  33  I'ac.  550  94,  97 

Todd  c.  Cromer  (1893),  30  Neb.  430,    • 
54  N.  W.  674 
V.  Crutsinger,  30  Mo.  App.  145 


942 

602 
470 
702 

354 


332 
103, 
930 
254 
112 


V.  Sterrett,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  432 
'•.  \Veber,  95  N.  Y.  181  111 

Tolbert    r.     Caledonian     Ins.     Co. 

(1897).  101  (ia.  741,  28  8.  E.  991 
Toledo  \V.  &  \V.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Harris, 

49  Ind.  119 
'I'olman  c  .Johnson,  43  Iowa,  127 
Tomlinson  i-.  .Monroe,  41  Cal.  94 
Tompkins  r.  Wadley,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

424  798,  810 

V.  White.  8  How.  Pr.  520  516 

Toner  v.   Wagner  (1901),  158  Ind. 

447.  r,:j  N.  K.  H,yj 
TonrK-Uc-  r.  Hiill.  3  Abb.  Pr.  205 
Toombs  c.  Ilornbuckle,  1  Mont.  286 


678 

575 
930 
605 


071 
309 
739 


Tootle  1-.  Berkley  (1896),  57   Kan. 

Ill,  45  Pac.  77  713 

Tojicka  Capital    Co.  ;•.  Remington 
(1900),  01  Kan.  6,  59  Pac.  1062        668, 

734 
Topping  1-.  Clay  (1895),  62  Minn.  3, 

63  N.  W.  1038  688 

v.  Clay   (1896),  65  Minn.  346. 

68  N.  W.  34  676 

V.  Parish   (1897),  98  Wis.  378, 

71  N.  W.  367  20,665 

Tormev  r.  Pierce,  49  Cal.  306  637 

Touchard  v.  Crow,  20  Cal.  150  196 

V.  Keyes,  21  Cal.  202  199 

To  well  V.  Pence,  47  Ind.  304  725 

Towle  V.  Pierce,  12  Mete.  329  248 

Town  i:  Bringolf,  47  Iowa,  133     852,  930 
Town  of.     See  name  of  town. 
Towne  i:  Sparks,  23  Neb.  142       780,  815 
Towner  v.  Tooley,  38  Barb.  598  309, 

384,  387 
Towns  !-.   Matliews   (1893),  91  Ga. 

546,  17  S.  E.  955  198 

To%vnsend   v.  Bissell,  5  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  583  218 

V.  Rackham  (1894),  143  N.   Y. 

516,  38  N.  E.  731  107 

Townsend     v.     Champernowne,    9 

Price,  130  360 

Township  of.    See  name  of  township. 
Tov  V.  McHugh  (1901), 62  Neb.  820, 

87  N.  W.  1059  615,  665 

Trabue  v.  Bogert,  126  N.  Y.  370  455 

V.  McAdams,  8  Bush,  74  298 

Tracy  v.  Ames,  4  Lans.  500  622 

V.  Craig,  55  Cal.  01  662 

r.  Grezaud  (1903),  — Neb.— ,  93 

N.  W.  214  605 

V.  Harmon  (1895),  17  Mont.  465, 

43  Pac.  500  676 

V.  Kelly,  52  Ind.  535  784 

v.  Tracy,  59  Hun,  1  576 

Traders'     Deposit     Bank    v.     Day 

(1899),  105  Ky.  219,  48  S.  W.  983     641 
Tradesman's    Bk.    r.    McFeely,   61 

Barb.  522  505,  524 

Trapnali  v.  Hill,  31  Ark.  345         662,  734, 

942 
Traster  v.  Snelson's  Adm.,  29   Ind. 

96  727 

Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  r.  Cal.  Ins.  Co., 

1  N.  Dak.  151  207 

V.  Walker  (1899),  77  Minn.  438, 

80  N.  W.  018  782 

Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  Ry.  Co.  (1901), 

25  Wash.  225,  65  Pac.  284  681,  682 

Travis  f.  Barger,  24  Barb.  614  798 

Trayser  Piano  Co.  v.  Kerschner,  73 

N.  Y.  183  598 

Treadway  v.  Wilder,  8  Nev.  91  604 

Trccothick  v.  Austin.  4  Mason,  41         357 
Trenor  v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Cal. 

222  179 

Tre.scott   v.  Sniytii,  1  ^McCord    Ch. 
301  377 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


clix 


Tresterr.  Oitv  of  Sheboygan  (18'J4), 

87  Wis.  49(3,  58  N.  W.  747         853,  887, 

941 
Trevaskis  v.  Peard   (1896),  111  Cal. 

599,  44  Pac.  24(3 
Treweek  r.  Howard  (1895),  105  Cal. 

434,  39  Pao.  20 
Trezona   r.   Cliicago,    etc.    Ry.    Co. 

(1898 J,  107  la.  22,  77  N.  W.  486 
Tribune     Printing    Co.    v.     Barnes 

(1898),  7  N.  D.  591,  75  N.  W.  904 
Trigg  V.  Ray  (1897),  G4  Ark.  150,  41 

S.  VV.  55 
Trimmer  v.  Thomson,  10   Rich.  L. 

1(54 
Tripp  V.  Riley,  15  Barb.  333 
Trogden   r.  Deckard,  45  Ind 


709 

830 

295 
199,  204 
572      748, 
783 
Trompen    v.    Yates    (1902),  — Neb. 

— ,  92  N.  W.  647  173,  202 

Tron  V.  Yohn  (1896),  145  Ind.  272, 

43  N.  E.  437  849,  864 

Tronson  v.  Union    Lumber  Co.,  38 

Wis.  202  562 

Troost  V.  Davis,  31  Ind.  34  LJ,  17 

Trotter  c.  Mutual  Reserve  Life  Ass'n 

(1897),  9  S.  D.  596,  70  N.  W.  843      669 
Trowbridge  v.  Forepaugli,  14  Minn. 

133  303,  305 

V.  Spinning  (1000),  23  Wash.  48. 

62  Pac.  125  680 

V.  True,  52  Conn.  190  470 

Troxel  v.  Thomas  (1900),  155  Ind. 

519,  58  N.  E.  725  258,  712 

Troy  &  Rut.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  17  Barb. 

581  663 

u.  Tibbits,  11  How.  Pr.  168  635 

Truesdell  v.  Bourke  (1895),  145  N.  Y. 

612,  40  N.  E.  83  656 

V.  Rhodes,  26  Wis.  215   270,  276,  278, 

457 

Truitt  V.  Baird,  12  Kan.  420  824 

Trull  V.  Granger,  8  N.  Y.  115  650 

Trustees  v.  Forrest,  15  B.  Mon.  168       42 

V.  Gleason,  15  Fla.  384  350 

V.  Kellogg,  16  N.  Y.  83  344 

V.  Nesbitt  (1896),  65  Minn.  17, 

67  N.  W.  652  756 

V.  Odlin,  8  Oliio  St.  293  541,  596 

Tryon  v.  Baker,  7  Lans.  511  648,  649, 

650 
V.  Lovejoy,  73  Wis.  66  820 

Tucker  v  McCoy,  3  Colo.  284  55,  942 

V.  Northern  Terminal  Co. 
(1902),  41  Ore.  82,  68  Pac. 
426  673 

V.  Shiner,  24  Iowa,  334  300,  403 

V.  Silver,  9  Iowa,  261  348 

Tuells  V.  Torras  (1901),  113  Ga.  691, 

39  S.  E.  455  816 

Tuers  v.  Tuers,  100  N.  Y.  190  470 

Tuffree    v.    Stearns    Ranchos    Co. 

(1899),  124  Cal.  306,  57  Pac.  69  102 

Tupper  V.  Thompson,  26  INIinn.  385      805 
Turk  r.  Ridge,  41  N.  Y.  201  111 


[tUE   REFEKENCES   are  to   the   P.'kGES.] 

Turner  v.  Althaus,  6  Neb.  54 

V.  Butler  (1894),  126   Mo.   131, 

28  S.  W.  77 
7.-.  Campbell,  59  Ind.  279 
V.  Duehman,  23  Wis.  500         520, 
V.  First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Keokuk,  26 

Iowa,  262  261,271, 

V.  Gregory  (1899),  151  Mo.  100, 

52  S.  W.  234  680, 

V.  Hitchcock,  20  Iowa,  310    301 


734 
658 
703 


V.    Interstate    Ass'n    (1897),   51 

S.  C.  33,  27  S.  E.  947 
V.  Pierce,  34  Wis.  658         29,  37, 
V.  Shuffler,  108  N.  C  642 
r.  Simpson,  12  Ind.  413  866, 

Turpi n  v.  Eagle  Creek,  etc.  Co.,  48 

Ind.  45 
Tustin  Fruit  Ass'n  v.  Earl  Fruit  Co. 

(1898),  Cal,  53  Pac.  693 
Tutwiler  v.  Dunlap,  71  Ala.  126 
Tweeddale  v.  Tweeddale  (1903),— 

Wis.  — ,  93  N.  W.  440 
Twine  V.  Kilgore  (1895),  3  Okla.  640, 

39  Pac.  3«» 
Tyler  r.  Freeman,  3  Cush.  261 
i".  Granger,  48  Cal.  259 
V.  Kent,  52  Ind.  583 
('.  Tualatin  Acad.,  14  Oreg.  485 
V.  Willis,  33  Barb.  327 
Tvnon  v.  Despain   (1896),  22  Colo. 

"240,  43  Pac.  1039  714, 

Tyson   v.   Applegate,  40  N.   J.  Eq. 
305 
V.  Blake,  22  N.  Y.  558 


29 

704 
131 
527 

520 

681 
307, 
313 

710 

475 
823 
935 

119 

152 
327 

108 

680 
116 
154 
439 
402 
872 

818 

239 
219 


u. 

Ueland  v.  Haugan  (1897),  70  Minn. 

349,  73  N.  W.  169  354 

Uhl  V.  Uhl,  52  Cal.  250  525 

Ullrich  V.   Cleveland,   etc.   Ry.   Co. 

(1898),  151  Ind.  3-58,  51  N.  E.  95       689 
Ulrich   V.  McConaughev   (1901),  63 

Neb.  10,  88  N.  W.  150"  781 

Umsted  v.  Buskirk,  17  Ohio  St.  113     179, 
180,  266,  355 
Undeland  i-.  Stanfield  (1897),  53  Neb. 

120,  73  N.  W.  459  640 

Underwood  v.  Tew  (1893),  7  Wash. 

297,  34  Pac.  1100  687 

Unglish  ('.  Marvin,  128  N.  Y.  380  816 

Union  Bank  v.  Bell,  14  Ohio  St.  200     270, 

325 
V.  Hutton  (1903),  —Neb.  — ,  95 

N.  W.  1061  816 

V.  Mott,  27  N.  Y.  633  301,  651 

Union  Casualty  &  Surety  Co.  v.  Bragg 

( 1901 ),  63  Kan.  291,  65  Pac.  272  703 

Union  Coll.  v.  Wheeler,  61  N.  Y.  88       123 
Union    Guaranty    Co.   v.  Craddock 

(1894),  59  Ark.  693,  28  S.  W.  424    830 
Union  India  Rub.  Co.  v.  Tomlinson, 

1  E.  1).  Smith,  364  142 


clx 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Union  Lumber  Co.  v.  Chippewa  Cy. 

8up.,  47  Wis.  245 
Union     rklercantile    Co.    i-.    Jacobs 

(IbltT),  -20  Mont.  270,  50  Pac.  793 

Union  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Carr,  49  Iowa,  259 
V.  Roberts,  44  Wis.  373 
V.  Cross  (1898),  100  Wis.  174,  75 

N.  W.  992 
V.  Hill  (1899),  148  Mo.  380,  49 
S.  W.  1012 
Union    Pac.    Kv.   Co.   r.    Davidson 
(1895)," 21  Colo.  93,  39  Pac. 
1095 
V.  Roeser  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95 

N.  W.  68 
V.  Smith  (1898),  59  Kan.  80,  52 

Pac.  102 
r.  Vincent  (1899),  58  Neb.  171, 
78  N    W.  457  162, 

Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co.  v.  Olson  ( 1901), 

82  Minn.  187,  81  N.  W.  756 
Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Conoyer 
(1893),  38  Neb.  488,56  N.  W.  1081 
Union  Stockyards  Nat.  Bank  v.  Has- 
kell (1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  W.  233 
Union   Storage    Co.    v.    McDermott 
(1893),  53  Minn.  407,  55  N.  W.  606 
Union  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 

(1903),  42  Ore.  606,  72  Pac.  586 
United  Coal  Co.  v.  Canon  City  Coal 
Co.   (1897),  24  Colo.  116,  48  Pac. 
1045  20,  40,  243, 

United  States  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  R. 

Co.,  98  U.  S.  509,  604 
Unitod  States  ex  rel.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(1895),  3  Okla.  404,  41  Pac.  729 
U.  S.  Express  Co.  v.  Keefer,  59  Ind. 

263 
U.  S.  L.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Jordan,  21  Abb. 

N.  Cas.  330 
United  States  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Clure  (1902),  42  Ore.  190,  70  Pac. 
543 
United  States  Saving  Co.  v.  Harris 
(1895),  142  Ind.  220,  40  N.  E.  1072 

U.  S.  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Roche, 

116  N.  Y.  120  333, 

U.  S.  T.  Co.  /'.  Stanton  (1893),  139 

N.  Y.  631,  34  N.  E.  1098 
Universalists,    N.   W.    Conf.   of,   v. 

Myers,  36  Ind.  375 
University   Notre  Dame  du  Lac  v. 

Shanks,  40  Wis.  352 
Upchurch  /•.   Robertson  (1900),  127 

N.  C.  127,  37  S.  E.  157 
Upington  v.  Oviatt,  24  Ohio  St.  232 

Uppfalt  '•.  Woermann,  30  Neb.  189 

Upton  I'.  Kennedy  (1803),  36  Neb.  66, 
ry.i  N.  W.  1042  787, 

V.  Railroad  Co.  (1901),  128  N.  C. 
173,  38  S.  E.  736 


758 

849, 
864 
865 
618 

604 

117 

375 
683 
177 
214 
543 
817 
802 
107 
703 

320 
509 
117 
598 
471 

819 

592, 
726 

373 

853 

147 

609 

806 
263, 

265 
932, 

939 

788 
831 


Ure  V.  Bunu  (1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  W. 

904  643 
Urlan  v.  Weeth  (1902),  —  Neb.  — , 

89  N.  W.  427  418 

Urton  r.  State,  37  Ind.  339  748 

Usher  v.  Heatt,  18  Kan.  195  576 

Usparicha  r.  Noble,  13  East,  232  116 
Utassy  v.  Giedinghagen  (1895),  132 

-Mo.  53,  33  S.  W.  444  687 
Utlev  r.  Foy,  70  N.  C.  303  89,  881 
Utterback  v.     Meeker  (1896),  16 

Wash.  185,  47  Pac.  428   '  263 


V. 

Vail  V.  Jones,  31  Ind.  467      831,  886,  917, 

923 
Valentine's  Will  (1696),  93  Wis.  45, 

67  N.  W.  12  308 

Vallev    Bank   v.   Wolf   (1897),   101 

Iowa,  51,  69  N.  W^  1131  423 

Valz  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1895),  96 

Kv.  543,  29  S.  W.  329  823 

Van  Aken  v.  Clarke,  82  Iowa,  256        358 
Vanalstine   v.    Whelan    (1901),    135 

Cal.  232,  67  Pac.  125  664 

Van    Alstvne     v.    Van   Slyck,    10 

Barb.  383 
Van  Arsdale  v.  Drake,  2  Barb.  599       368 
Vanarsdall  v.  State,  65  Ind.  176  155 

Van  Bibher  v.  Fields  (1894),  25  Ore. 

527,  36  Pac.  o26  703 

V.  Hilton,  84  Cal.  585  942 

Van  Brunt  v.  Day.  81  N.  Y.  251  930 

V.  Mather.  48  Iowa,  503  660 

Van  Brunt  &  Co.  v.  Harrigan  (1895), 

8  S.  D.  96,  65  N.  W.  421  684 

Vance  v.  Anderson  (1896),  113  Cal. 

532,  45  Pac.  816  664,  665 

Vancleave  v.  Beam,  2  Dana,  155  257 

Vanderbcek    v.   Francis    (1903),    75 

Conn.  467,  53  Atl.  1015  584,  587 

Vandermulen  v.   Vandermulen,   108 

N.  Y.  195  206,211 

Vander})oel  r.  Van  Valkenburgh,  0 

N.  Y.  190  257,  340,  343 

Van    de  Sande   v.    Hall,  13    How. 

Pr.  458  872 

Van  Deusen  r.  Young,  29  Barb.  9         196 

Vandcvoort  v.  Gould,  36  N.  Y.  639       516 

Van   Doren  i-.  Relfe,  20  Mo.  455    89,  104 

I)..  Robinson,  16  N.   J.  Eq.  256 

251,  351 
Vanduyn  i-.  Hepner,  45  Ind.  589  781 

Van    Dyke   v.    Doherty     (1896),   6 

N.  D.  263,  69  N.  W.  200     712, 

735,  757 

V.  Maguire,  57  N.  Y.  429         734,  777 

Van  Epps  v.  Harrison,  5  Hill,  03  842 

Van    Etten    v.    Kosters    (1896),   48 

Neb.   152,  66  N.  W.   1106 


V.    Medland  (1898),  53  Neb.  569, 
74  N.  W.  33 


735, 
876 

G03 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


clxi 


[the  references  are  to  tub  paqes.] 


Van    Gicson     r.    Van    Gieson,    10 

N.  Y.  316  769 

Van  Gorden  v.  Ormsby.  65  Iowa,  657  428 
Van  Home  v.  Everson,  13  Barb.  526  175 
Van    Housen    v.   Broehl    (18'J'J),  59 

Neb.  48,  80  N.  W.  260  96,  816 

Van  Lehn  r.  Morse  (1897),  16  Wash. 

672,  48  Pac.  404  639 

Van  Lien  v.  Byrnes,  1  Hilt.  133  152 

Van  Liew  v.  Johnson,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

648  504 

Van  Loben   Sels  r.  Bunnell  (1901), 

131  Cal.  489,  63  Pac.  773  334 

Vanmeter    v.     Fidelity    Trust    Co. 

(1899),  107  Kv.  108,  53  S.  W.  10       409 
Van  Metre  v.  Wolf,  27  Iowa,  34  814 

Vanneman  u.  Powers,  56  N.  Y.  39  314 
Van  Nest  v.  Latson,  19  Barb.  604  326 
Vanover  v.  Justices,  27  Ga.  354  118 

Van  Pelt  v.  Gardner  (1898),  54  Neb. 

701,  75  N.  W.  874  259,  355,  356 

Van  Schaack  v.  Saunders,  32  Hun, 

515  329 

Van    Schaick    v.   Farrow,   25   Ind. 

310  544,  568 

V.    Third  Av.  R.  Co.,  38  X.  Y. 

346  105,  110 

Van  Sickle  v.  Keith  (1893),  88  la.  9, 

55  N.  W.  42  607 

Van  Skike  v.  Potter  (1897),  53  Neb. 

28,  73  N.  W.  295  773 

Vanstream  v.  Liljengren,  37  Minn. 

191  94 

Vansyoc    v.    Freewater    Cemetery 

Ass'n    (1901),   63    Neb.     143,   88 

N.  W.  162  681 

Van  Trott  v.  Wiesse,  36  Wis.  439         791 
Van  Valen  v.  Lapham,  5  Duer,  689      931 
V.  Russell,  13  Barb.  590  877 

Van  Wagenen  v.  Kemp,  7  Hun,  328    301, 
303,  305,  478 
Van  Wart  v.  Price,  14  Abb.  Pr.  4  190 

Van   Werden   v.   Equitable    Assur- 
ance Society    (1896),  99   la.  621, 

68  N.  W.  892  710 

Van  Wy  v.  Clark,  50  Ind.  259  791 

Varick  v.  Smith,  5  Paige,  160  345 

Vary  v.  B.  C.  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  42  Iowa, 
246  301 

Vass  V.   Brewer  (1898),   122  N.    C. 

226,  29  S.  E.  352  787 

Vassar  v.  Thompson,  46  Wis.  345  609 
Vassear    v.    Livingston,    13   N.  Y. 

248  663,  856,  872 

Vaughn  v.  Gushing,  23  Ind.  184  376 

V.  Georgia  Land  Co.  (1896).  98 

Ga.  288,  25  S.  E.  441  29 

Vaule  V.   Miller   (1897),    69   Minn. 

440,  72  N.  W.  452  887,  925 

V.  Steenerson   (1895),  63  Minn. 

110,  65  N.  W.  257  656,  709 

Veach  v.  Schaup,  3  Iowa,  194  326,  333 
Veasey  c.    Humphreys    (1895),   27 

Ore.  515,  41  Pac.  8  832 

Veeder  v.  Lima,  19  Wis.  280  118 


Venable  v.  Dutch,  37  Kan.  515      850,  873 

Venice  v.  Breed,  65  Barb.  597     374,  788, 

834,  882,  924 

Venlin  v.  Slocum,  9  Hun,  150        325,  .•!50 

Vernieule  v.  Beck,  15  How.  Pr.  333      499 

Vermont  Loan  &  Trust  Co  v.  Cardin 

(1898),    19    Wash.  304,   53 

Pac.  164 

V.    McGregor   (1897),   5   Idaho, 

320,  51  Pac.  102  465, 

Vernon  y.  Union  Life  Ins.  C'o.  (1899), 

58  Neb.  494.  78  N.  W.  929 
Vetterk'in  ?;.  Barnes,  124  U.  S.  169 
Via  11  V.  Mott,  37  Barb.  208 
Viburt  V.  Frost,  3  Abb.  Pr.  120 
Victorian  Number  Two   (1894),   26 

Ore.  194,41  Pac.  1103 
Vidger    v.  Nolin   (1901),    10  N.   I  J. 

353,  87  N.  W.  593 
Vieley  v.  Thompson,  44  111.  9 
Vierling   v.    Binder    (1901),   113  la. 

337,  85  N.  W.  621  796, 

Vilas  V.  Mason,  25  Wis.  310         633, 

V.  Page,  106  N.  Y.  439 
Viles  V.  Bangs,  36  Wis.  131  188, 

V.  Green  (1895),  91  Wis.  217,  64 
N.  W.  856 
Village  of.     See  name  of  village. 
Vilmar  v.  Schall,  61  N.  Y.  564 
Vimont  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

64  Iowa,  513  97, 

Vincent  v.  Starks,  45  Wis.  458 
Vine  V.  Casmey  (1902),  86  Minn.  74, 

90  N.  W.  158 
Vint  V.  Pad  get,  2  DeG.  &  J.  611 
Virden  v.  Ellsworth,  15  Ind.  144     .300, 
Virgin  v.  Brubaker,  4  Nev.  31 
Virginia    Chemical    Co.    i'.    Moore 

(1901),  61  S.  C.  166,  39  S.  E,  346 
Vliet  V.  Sherwood,  38  Wis.  159     611, 

Voechting  v.  Grau,  55  Wis.  312 
Vogelgesang   v.    City  of   St.   Louis 

(1897),  139  Mo.  127,  40  S.  W.  653 
Voight  V.  Brooks  (1897),  19  Mont. 

374,-48  Pac.  549 
Von   Fragstein   v.   Windier,  2   Mo. 

App.  598 
Von  Schmidt  v.  Huntington,  1  Cal. 

55 
Voorhcos  V.  Fisher  (1893),  9  Utah, 

303,  34  Pac.  64  666, 

Voorhis  v.  Baxter,  1  Abb.  Pr.  43 


202 

472 

833 
350 
497 
181 

498 

606 
118 

810 
897, 
927 
111 
204 

711 

627 

102 
160 

675 
246 
402 
103 

933 
635, 
637 
866 

592 

579 


V.  Child's  Ex.,  17  N.  Y.  354 


175 


V.  Kelly,  31  Hun,  293 
Voris  V.  State,  47  Ind.  345 
Vose  V.  Galpen,  18  Abb.  Pr.  96 

V.  Philbrook,  3  Story,  335       248, 
Voss  V.  Lewis,  126  Ind.  155 
Vrooman  v.  Jackson,  6  Hun,  326   614 

V.  Turner,  69  N.  Y.  280 


790 
177. 
293 
i,  86, 
293 
120 
295 
927 
251 
213 
,620 
111 


clxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


w. 


Wabasli,  St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Cen- 
tral Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  22  Fed. 
Kcp. 138  334 

Wabaska  Electric  Co.  v.  City  of 
Wvniore  (1900),  60  Neb.  199,  82 
N."\V.  62G  378,  56.5,  680 

Wa  Ching  v.  Constantine,  1  Idaho 

Ter.  2m  29,  45 

Wachter  i:  Queiizer,  20  N.  Y.  547         797 

Waddell  V.  Darlinp,  51  N.  Y.  327     859, 934 

r.  Waddell,  99  Mo.  338  490 

"Wade  r.  City  Railway   Co.   (1900), 

36  Ore.  311,  59  Pac.  875  639 

V.  Gould  (1899),  8  Okla.  690,  59 

Pac.  11  433 

V.  Rusher,  4  Bosw.  537  372 

V.  State,  37  Ind.  180  814 

V.  Strever  (1901),  166  X.  Y.  251, 

59  N.  E.  825  702 

"Wadley  v.  Davis,  63  Barb.  500    900,  916, 

927 
"Wadsworth   v.   Wadsworth,  81  Cal. 

182  942 

Wagener  v.  Boyce  (1898),  Ariz.,  52 

Pac.  1122  711,  819 

V.  Kirven  (1899),  56  S.  C.  126, 

34  S.  E.  18  668 

Wager  i:  Link   (1896),  150  N.  Y. 

549,  44  N.  E.  1103  624 

AVaggoner  v.  Liston,  37  Ind.  357  745 

Waggv  V.  Scott  (1896),  29  Ore.  386, 

45  Pac.  774  592 

"Wagner  v.  Ewing,  44  Ind.  441  814 

V.  Sanders  (1901),  62  S.  C.  73, 

39  S.  E.  950  818 

"Wait  V.  "Whecder  &  Wilson  Man.  Co., 

31  Pac.  Kcp.  661  895 

"Waite  c.  Willis  (1902),  42  Ore.  288, 

70  Pac.  1034  580 

"Wakeman  v.   Everett,  41   Hun,  278     874 
V.  Grover,  4  Paige,  23  334 

V.  Norton  (1897),  24  Colo.  192, 

49  I'ac.  283,  814 

Walburn  i'.  Chenault,  43  Kan.  352  97 

"Walcott   V.    Hand    (1894),  122  Mo. 

621,  27  S.  W.  331  198 

"Waldo  r.  Thweatt  (1897),  64  Ark. 

126,  40  S.  W.  782  717 

Waldron  v.  Home  Mutual  Ins.  Co. 
(1894),  9  Wash.  534,  38  Pac. 
136  624 

Walker    r.    Bamberger    (1898),    17 

Utah,  2;59,  54  Pac.  108  410 

V.   Chester   County    (1893),   40 

S.  C.  342,  18  S.  E.  9.36  677 

V.  Edraundson  (1900),  111  Ga. 

454,  .36  S.  E.  800  686 

V.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  143  N.  Y.  167, 

38  N.  E.  106         850,  803 
V.   Irwin  (1895),  94  la.  448,  62 

N.  W.  785  588 

V.  Johnson  (1881),  28  Minn.  147, 

'J  N.  W.  632  866,  878 


Walker  r.  Kynett,  32  Iowa,  524  63 

V.  Lanev,  27  S.  C.  150  828 

V.  Mauro,  18  Mo.  564  90 
r.  McCaull  (1900),  13  S.  D.  512, 

83  X.  W.  578  682 

V.   McKay,   2   Mete.   294      131,  134, 

135 
t'.  McNeill  (1897),  17  Wash.  582, 

50  Pac.  518  673 

V.  Mitchell.  18  B.  Mon.  541  516 
V.  O'Connell  (1898),  59  Kan.  306, 

52  Pac.  894  643 
V.  Paul,  Stanton's  Code  (Ky.), 

37                                         •  251 

r.  Sedgwick.  8  Cal.  398       29,  30,  475 

V.  Steele,  9  Colo.  388  89 

i'.  Symonds,  3  Swanst.  75  352 
V.  Walker  (1895),  93  la.  643,  61 

N.  W.  960  864 
r.  Walker  (1897),  150  Ind.  317, 

50  N.  E.  68  824 

V.  Wilson,  13  Wis.  522  937 
Walker's  Adm.  v.  Walker,  25  Mo. 

367  20,  31,  69 

Walkup  V.  Zehring,  13  Iowa,  306  472 
Wall  V.  Buffalo  Water  Co.,  18  N.  Y. 

119  742 

V.  Fairley,  77  N.  C.  105  343 
'v.  McMillan  (1895),  44  S.  C.  402, 

22  S.  E.  424  330 
I'.  Mines  (1900),  1.30  Cal.  27,  62 

Pac.  386  427 
r.  Muster's  Ex'rs  (1901),  Ky.,  63 

S.  W.  432  817 

V.  Whisler,  14  Ind.  228  415 

Wallace  i\  Eaton,  5  How.  Pr.  99  340 
V.   E.xch.   Bk.  of  Spencer,  126 

Ind.  265  748 

V.  Lark,  12  S.  C.  576  791 

t'.  Morss,  5  Hill,  391  660 

V.  Robb,  37  Iowa,  192  780 
V.  Ryan   (1894),  93  la.  115,  61 

N.  W.  395  672 
Wallber  v.  Williams  (1003),  —  Wis. 

— ,  93  N.  W.  47  822 
Wallenstein   v.    Selizman,   7   Bush, 

175  878 

Waller  v.  Bowling,  108  N.  C.  289  200 
V.  Deranlciui  (1003),  —  Neb.  —  , 

94  N.  W.  1038  849,  863,  982 

v.  Hamer  (1902),  65  Kan.  168,  69 

Pac.  185  855 

Walley  v.  Walley,  1  Vern.  487  248 

Walrod  r.  Bennett,  6  M;irb.  144  806 
Walser  v.  Wear  (1897),  141  Mo.  443, 

42  S.  W.  928  718,  906,  928 

Walsh  V.  Hall,  66  N.  C.  233           891.  920, 

922,  927 

V.  Mehrback,  5  Iliin,  448  751 
V.  Wash.  Mar.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Robt. 

202  150 

Walsworth  >:  Johnson,  41  Cal.  61  815 

Walter  v.  Bennett,  16  N.  Y.  250     626,  630, 

631,  633 

V.  Fowler,  85  N.  Y.  621  598 


TABLE   OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references   ABE  TO  THE   PAGES.] 


Walters  c.  Cont.  Ins.  Co.,  5  Hun,  343    470 
V.  Eaves  (1898),  105  Ga.  584,  32 

S.  E.  609  543,  930 

V.  Walters,  132  III.  467  360 

Walton  ;;.  Washburn  (1901),  Ky.,  64 

S.  W.  634  180 

Walton    Plow  Co.   v.   Campbell,  52 

N.  W.  Hep.  883 
Waltz  ('.  Waltz,  84  Ind.  403 
Wandell  v.  Edwards,  25  Hun,  498 


779 
112 

784, 
799 
495 
662 


Wandle  v.  Turney,  5  Duer,  661 
Wands  v.  School  Dist.,  19  Kan.  204 
Wanser  v.  Lucas  (1895),  44  Neb.  759, 

62  N.  W.  1108 
Wapello  Cy.  v.  Bigham,  10  Iowa,  39 
Warburton  v.  Ralph  (1894),  9  Wash. 

537,  38  Pac.  140 
Ward  V.  HUckwood,  48  Ark.  396 
i:  Cowdrey,  5  N.  Y.  Suppl.  282 
V.  Edge  (1897),  100  Ky.  757,  39 

S.  W.440 
V.  Guyer,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C.  58 
V.  Petrie  (1898),  157  N.  Y.  301, 51 

N.  E.  1002 
V.  Rvba  (1897),  58  Kan.  741,  51 

Pac;  223  116,  149 

V.  Waterman,  85  Cal.  488  350 

i'.  Waters,  63  Wis.  39  821 

Warden   v.  Fond  du   Lac   Sup.,  14 

Wis.  618 
Warder  v.  Cuthbert   (1896),  99  la. 
681.  68  N.  W.  917 
V.  Seitz  (1900),  157  Mo.  140,  57 

S.  W.  537  579,  584 

Ware  v.  Long  (1902),  Kv.,  69  S.  W. 

797 
Waring  v.  Gaskill  (1895),  95  Ga.  731, 
22  S.  E.  659  ■ 
V.  Indem.  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  45  N.  Y. 

606 

V.  Waring,  3  Abb.  Pr.  246 

Warner  v.  Hess  (1899),  66  Ark.  11-3, 

49  S.  W.  489 

V.  Myrick,  16  Minn.  91  779,  810 

V.  Stp.  Uncle  Sam,  9  Cal.  697         230 

V.  Turner,  18  B.  Mon.  758  103 

V.  Warren,  46  N.  Y.  228  314,  315 

Warren  v.  Boyd  (1897),  120  N.  C.  56, 

26  S.  E.  700  818 

V.  Burton,  9  S.  C.  196  334 

V.  Chandler  ( 1896),  98  la.  237, 67 

N.  W.  242  866 

V.  Hall  (1895),   20  Col.  508,  38 

Pac.  767  854,  919 

V.  Howard,  99  N.  C.  190  254 

V.  Van  Pelt.  4  E.  D.  Smith,  202     910 

Warrenton  v.  Arrington,  101  N.  C. 

109 
Warshawkv     i\    Anchor    Ins.    Co. 
(18'.)0),  98  la.  221,  67  N.  W.  237  ^ 
Wiu-th  V.  Kadile,  18  Abb.  Pr.  396 


49 
293 

757 
920 
113 

756 
661 

180 


118 


816 


664 

914 

150 
419 


605 


190 


Warthen  v.  Himstreet  (1900),  112  la. 
605,  84  N.  W.  702 


830 
388, 
525 


603 


Washburn  &  M.  Man.  Co.  v.  Chicago 

G.  W.  F.  Co.,  109  111.  71  358 

Washington  ;;.  Love,  34  Ark.  93  286 

i:  Spokane  St.  Ky.  Co.  (1895),  13 

Wash.  9,  42  Pac.  628  083 

Washington  Nat.  Bank  ?■.  Saunders 
(1901),  24  Wash.  321,  61 
Pac.  546  '  867 

v.  Woodrum  (1898),  60  Kan.  34, 

55  Pac  330  466 

Washington  Sav.  Bank  y.  Butchers', 
etc.  Bank  (1895),  130  Mo.  155,  31 
S.  W.  761  ,     ■  872 

Washington  Tp.  v.  Bonney,  45  Ind. 

77  147,  725 

Water  Supply,  etc.  Co.  v.  Larimer, 
etc.  Co.  (1898),  25  Col.  87,  53  Col. 
386  665 

Water  Supply  Co.  v.  Hoot  (1895),  50 

Kan.  187,  42  ]\ac.  715  359 

Waterbury  v.   Westervelt,  9   N.  Y. 

5!)8  302 

Waterhouse  v.  Schlitz  Brewing  Co. 
(1900),  12  S.  D.  397,  81  M.  W. 
725  305 

Waterman  r.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 

61  Wis.  464  149 

V.  Frank,  21  Mo.  108  89 

V.  Waterman,  81  Wis.  17  515 

Waterville    Man.  Co.   v.  Bryan,   14 

Barb.  182  785 

Watkinds  v.  So.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Fed. 

Rep.  711  778 

Watkins  v.  Brvant,  91  Cal.  492  350 

V.  Jones,  28  Ind.  12  769,  808 

V.  Milwaukee,  52  Wis.  98  878 

V.  Wilco.x,  4  Hun,  220  354,  373 

Watson  V.  Conwell,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  5    310 
V.  Gabby,  18  B.  Mon.  658  101 

V.  Glover  (1899),  21  Wash.  677, 

59  Pac.  516  17 

V.  Hazzard,  3  Code  R.  218  519 

V.  Lemen,  9  Colo.  200  753 

V.  Railway  Co.    (1894),  8  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  144,  27  S.  W.  924    469 
V.   Richardson    (1900),    110   la. 

698,  80  N.  W.  416  815 

V.  Rushmore,  15  Abb.  Pr.  51  635 

V.  San  Francisco  &  H.  B.  R.  Co., 

50  Cal.  523  455,  456 

V.  St.  Paul  Citv  Ry.  Co.  (1899), 

76  Minn.  358,  79  N.  W.  308     710 
Watt  V.  Alvord,  25  Ind.  533  325,  336 

;.'.  Mayor.  1  Sandf.  23  131,  133 

Wattels   r.   Minchen  (1895),  93  la. 

517,  61  N.  W.  915  002,710 

Watts  r.  Co.ven,  52  Ind.  155  748 

V.  Creighton,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  12      327 

V.  Gallagher,  31  Pac.  Rep.  626        316 

V.  Gantt  (1899),  42  Neb.  869,  61 

N.  W.  104         896,  903,  906,  928 

V.  Julian,  122  Ind.  124  327 

V.  McAllister,  33  Ind.  204        626,  631 

v:  Svmes,  1  DeG.  M.  &  G.  240        246 

Waugh  V.  Blumenthal,  28  Mo.  462       369 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  references 

Waughenheim   r.  Graham,  39  Cal. 

IG'J  Oil,  927 

Waukon  &  Miss.  R.  Co.  r.  Dwyer,  49 

Iowa,  I'Jl  576 

Wausau  Boom  Co.  v.  Plumer,  49  "Wis. 

11-  195 

Way  V.  Bragaw,  1  C.  E.  Green,  213      260 
1-.  Colyer  ( 1893),  54  Minn.  14,  55 

N.  \V.  744  132 

Wavland  v.  Tysen,  45  N.  Y.  281  787 

Waviiure   -•.   Wavmirc    (1895),   144 

Iml.  329,  43  X.E.  :i67  822 

Weaver   r.  Apple'  (1896),   147  Ind. 

304,  46  N.  E.  642  645 

V.   Braden,  49  N.   Y.  286      765,  779, 

812 
V.  Cressman,  21  Neb.  675  340 

V.  Wabasli,  L-tc.  Can.  Trs.,  28  Ind. 

112  145,  149 

Webb   v.   Bidwell,    15   Minn.    479     563, 

665 
V.  Hayden  (1901),  166  Mo.  39,  65 

S.  W.  760  160 

r.  Ilelion,  3  Kobt.  625  372 

Webber    r.  Ward     (1896),    94    Wis. 

605,  69  N.  W.  349  815 

Weber  i-.  Dillon  (1898),  7  Okla.  568, 

54  Pac  894  177 

V.  Marshall,  19  Cal.  447  52 

Webster  i-.  Bebintier,  70  Ind.  9  784 

1-.  Bond,  9  Hun,  437  45,  47,  411 

i:  Drinkwater,  5  Greenl.  322  652 

V.  Ilarwinton,  32  Conn.  131  118 

V.  Long  (1901),  63  Kan.  876,  66 

Pac.  1032  780 

V.  Tibbits,  19  Wis.  438    256,  278, 662. 

725 
Wedgewood  r.  Parr  (1900).  112  la. 

514,  84  N.  W.  528  453 

Weed  V.  Case,  55  Barb.  534  629 

Weeks  v.  Love,  50  N.  Y.  568  213 

i-.McPhail  (1901),  128  N.  C.  134, 

38  S.  E.  292  452 

V.  O'Brien  (1891),  141  N.  Y.  199, 

36  N   E.  185  671,  672 

V.  Pryor,  27  Barb.  70  872 

r.  Smith.  18  Kan.  508  784 

Weese  v.  Barker,  7  Colo.  178  197 

Weetjen  v.  Vibbard,  5  Hun,  266  238 

Wehle  V.  Butler,  01  X.  Y.  245  301 

Wi-limhoff  r.  Rutherford  (1895),  98 

Ky.  91,  .32  S.  W.  288  600,  659 

Welch  1-.  Milliken  (1898),  57  Neb.  86, 

77  N.  W.  363  639 

Weil  >:  Howard,  4  Nev.  384  474 

r.  Jones,  70  Mo.  560  870,  880 

r.  Lankins,  3  Neb.  384  260 

Wciidand  v.  ('(jchran.  9  Neb.  480  29 

Weir  r.  Groat,  0  N.  Y.  S.  C.  444  315 

V.  Itathbun  (1895),  12  Wash.  84, 

40  Pac.  625  327 

Weirich  v.  Dodge  (1899),  101   Wis. 

621,  77  N.  W.  906  181 

Wei«e  r.  fieriu-r.  42  Mo.  527  104 

Welborn  v.  Eckcy,  25  Neb.  193  428 


ARE  TO  THE  PAGES.] 

Welch  V.  City  of  Astoria  (1894),  26 

Ore.  89,  37  Pac.  G6  687 

r.  Hazelton,  14  I  low.  Pr.  97  939 

V.  Piatt,  32  Hun,  194  471 

?•.  Sackett,  12  Wis.  243  202 

Weld    f.    The    Jolinson    Mfg.    Co. 

( 1893),  86  Wis.  549,  57  N.  W.  378       47 
Welier  v.  Goble,  66  Iowa,  113  112 

Welles  r.  Yaies,  44  N.  Y.  525  29,  30 

Wells  V.  Cone,  55  Barb.  585  178,  202 

V.  Green  Bay,  etc.  Canal  Co. 
(1895),  90  Wis.  442,  64 
N.  W.  99  355 

V.  Henshaw,  3  Bosw.  625  934 

V.  Jewett,  11  How.  Pr.  242  502 

r.  McPike,  21  Cal   215  753 

V.  Monihan.  129  N.  Y.  161  815 

V.  Mutual  Benefit  Ass'n  (1894), 

126  Mo.  630,  29  S.  W.  607       605 
V.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  35  Mo.  164  578 

V.  Sinmionds,  8  Hun,  189  310 

V.  Stewart,  3  Barb.  40  131,  133 

V.  Strange,  5  Ga.  22  248 

V.  Wells  (1898),  144  Mo.  198,  45 

S.  W.  1095  308 

V.  Western  Paving  &  Supply  Co. 
(1897),  96  Wis.  116, 70  N.W. 
1071  606 

Well«,  Fargo,  &  Co.  v.  Coleman,  53 

Cal.  416  576 

Welsh  i:  Burr  (1898),  56  Neb.  361, 

76  N.  W.  905  604 

V.  Darragh,  52  N.  Y.  590  627 

Welsher  v.  Libby,  McNeil  &  Libbv 
(1900),  107  Wis.  47,  82  N.  W. 
693  934 

Wendover  v.  Baker  (1893),  121  Mo. 

273,  25  S.  W.  918  47 

Wenk  V.  City  of  New  York  (1902), 

171  N.  Y.  607,  64  N.  E.  509  592 

Wenning  v.  Teeple  (1895),  144  Ind. 

189,  41  N.  E.  600  678 

Werner  r.  Ascher  (1893),  86  Wis. 

349,  56  N.  W.  869  593 

Wernli  r.  Collins,  54  N.  W.  365  620 

Wertf.  Crawfordsville&  A.  Tump. 

Co.,  19  Ind.  242  785 

West  V.  Bisho])  (1900),  110  la.  410, 

81  N.  W.  696  818 

V.  Eley  (1901),  39  Ore.  461,  65 

Pac.  798  587 

V.  Miller,  125  Ind.  70  327 

v.  Moody,  33  Iowa,  137  931,  935 

I'.  Norwich  Union  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  (1894),  10  Utah,  442,  37 
Pac.  685  689 

V.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181         249,  251 
V.  West  (lh98),  114  Mo.  119,  46 

S.  W.  13!»  704 

West  Midland   Rv.  Co.  v.  Nixon,  1 

Hem.  &  M.  176'  256 

West  Point  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Ditch 

Co.  (1900),  21  Utah,  229,61  Pac.  16  320 
West  Point  Water,  etc.  Co.  v.  State 
(1896),  49  Neb.  223,  68  N.  W.  607      709 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


clxv 


[the  references 

West   Seattle   Land   Co.   v.    Ilerren 

(1897),  16  Wash.  G65,  48  Pac.  341     639 
Wostcott  V.  Ainsworth,  ;)  Ilun,  53     627, 

()2'J 
r.  Brown,  13  Ind.  83  748,  784 

r.  Fargo,  61  N.  Y.  542  354 

Western  Assurance  Co.  v.  Dry 
Goods  Co.  (1808),  54  Nob.  241, 
74  N.  W.  592  639 

Western  Assurance  Co.  v.  Towie,  65 

Wis.  247  651 

Western  Bank  v.  Sherwood,  29  Barb. 

383  122 

Western  Carolina  Bank  v.  Atkinson 

(1893),  113  N.  C.  478,  18  S.  E.  703     787 
Western  Compound  Co.  See  Great 

Western,  etc. 
Western    Cornice,    etc.    AVorks    i\ 
Mever    (1898),    55  Neb.  440,   76 
N.  W.  23  640 

Western  Dev.  Co.f.Emery,  61  Cal.611     112 
Western    Mattress    Co.     v.    Potter 

(1903),  —  Neb.  -,  95  N.  W.  841  752 

Western  11.  Co.  r.  Nolan,  48  N.  Y. 

513  104,  238,  251,  253 

Western   Union   Tel.  Co.  v.  Fenton, 

52  Ind  1  713 

V.  Henley  (1901),  157  Ind.  90,60 

N.  E.  682  669 

V.  Meek,  49  Ind.  53  748 

V.  Mullins  (1895),  44  Neb.  732, 

62  N.  W.  880  714 

V.  Parsons  (1903),  Ky.,  72  S.  W. 

800  665 

V.  State  (18^6),  146  Ind.  54,  44 

N.  E.  793  643 

Westervelt  v.  Acklev,  62  N.  Y.  505    930, 

940 
Westfall  i:  Dungan,  14  Iowa  St.  276  874 
Westfelt  0.  Adams  (1902),  131  N.  C. 

379,  42  S.  E.  823  64 

WestiPixliouse  Co.  v.   Tilden  (1898), 

56  Neb.  129,  76  N.  W.  416  626 

Westlake  v.  Farrow,  34  S.  C.  270  470 

Weston  V.  Brown  (1899),  158  N.  Y. 

360,  53  N.  E.  36  26 

V.  Estey  (1896),  22  Colo.  334, 

45  Pac.  367  825 

V.  Keighlev,  Finch,  82  242 

V.  Lumley,'33  Ind.  486  831 

V.  McMuUin,  42  Wis.  567  637 

V.  Meyers  (1895),  45  Neb.  95,  63 

N.  W.  117  566 

V.   Turver,    17   N.  Y.  St.  Hep. 

502  915 

Wetherell  v.  Collins,  3  Mad.  255  378 

Wetmore  v.  Crouch  (1899),  150  Mo. 

671,  51  S.  W.  738  565,  579 

Wetzstein  v.  Boston  &  M.  Min.  Co. 
(1903),  28  Mont.  451,  583, 
72  Pac.  865  714 

V.  Hegeman,  88  N.  Y.  69  147 

Wetmore  v.  San  Francisco,  44  Cal 

294  91,  97,  766,  778,  779,  803 

Wi-y mouth  V.  Boyer,  1  V€s.  416  250 


ARE  TO  THE   PAOES.] 

Whalen  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Light  Co. 
(1896),   151   N.    Y.  70,  45   N.   E. 
363  673 

Whaley  v.  Dawson,  2  Sch.  &  Lef.  370 

506 
V.  Lawton  (1898),  53  S.  C.  580, 

31  8.  E.  660  604 

V.  Lawton  (1900),  57  S.  C.  256, 

35  S.  ¥..  558  644 

Whalon  i-.  Aldricli,  8  Minn.  346  852, 

911,  913 
Whatling  v.  Nash,  41    Hun,  579  471 

Wiieat  r.  Kice,  97  N.  Y.  296  ]  1 1 

Wheatley  r.  Strobe,  12  Cal.  92  'JO 

Wlieaton  v.  Briggs,  35  Minn.  470         758 
Whedbee  r.  Leggett,  92  N.  C.    469    940 
V.  Keddick,  79  N.  C.  521,        887,  895, 
Wheeler  v.    Barker  (1897),  51  Neb. 

846,  71  N.  W.  750  711 

V.  Billings,  38  N.  Y.  263  751,  762,  764 
V.  Floral  Mill  Co.,  9  Nev.  254  563 

V.   Lack    (1900),   37   Ore.    238, 

61  Pac.  849  413 

Wheeler,  etc.  Co.  v.  Worrall,  80  Ind 

297  684 

Wheeler,  etc.  MfL^  Co.    r.    Bjelland 

(1896),  97    la.  637,  66  N.  W.  885     942 
Wheeler  Savings   Bank    r.    Trace}' 
(1897),  141  Mo.  252,  42  S.  W.  946    466, 

470 
Wheelock  v.  Lee,  64  N.  Y.  242  29,  42 

V.  Pacific  Pn.  Gas  Co.,  51  Cal. 

223  1)30,  933 

Whcreatt  >:  Worth  (1900),  108  Wis. 

291,  84  N.  W.  441  639,  643,  820 

Whetstone  v.   Beloit   S.  B.  Co.,  45 

N.  W.  Kep.  535  471 

In  re,  Whetton,  Estate  of  (1893),  98 

Cal.  203,  32  Pac.  970  308 

Whippernian  r.  Dunn,  124  Ind.  349       180 
Whipple  V.  Fowler  (18:!4),  41'  Neb. 

675,  60  N.  W.  15  645 

Whitaki'i'  r.  Whitaker,  52  N.  Y.  368     316 
Whitbeck  v.  Sees  (1898),  10  S.  D. 

417,  73  N.  W.  915  593 

r.  Skir.iier,  7  Hill,  53  843 

Whitcomb  ;.•   Hardy  (1897),  68  Minn. 

265,  71  N.  W.  263  725,  804 

White  V.  Allatt,  87  Cal.  245  147 

r.  Allen,  3  Ore.  103  792 

r.  Blitch  (1900),  112  Ga.  775,  38 

S.  E.  80  849 

V.  Costisjan  (1903),  138  Cal.  564, 

72  Pac.  178  735 

r.  Cox,  46  Cal.  169  456 

f.  Johnson  (1895),  27  Ore.  282, 

40  Pac.  511  413 

V.  Joy,  13  N.  Y.  83  541 

V.  Lvons,  42  Cal.  279     15,  37,  544,  559 
V.  M'iller,  7  Hun,  427  310,  801 

V.  Moses,  11  Cal.  69  814 

V.  Parker,  8  Barb.  48  160 

r.  Phelps,  14  Minn.  27  99 

V.  San   Rafael,  etc.   R.   Co.,   54 

Cal.  176  713 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


[the  befere-nces  are  to  the  pages.] 


!■; 


769,  803 

570 

719,  791 


Wliite  V.  Scott,  26  Kan.  476 
V.  Smith.  46  X.  Y.  418 
i:  Soto,  82  Cal.  654 
i:  Spencer,  14  N.  Y.  247 
c.  Wliite's  Bk.  of  Buffalo  r.  Far- 
thing. 101  N.  Y.  344         260,  414 
Whitehead  r.  Sweet  (1899),  126  Cal. 

67.  58  Pac.  376  15,  466,  511,  606 

WJiiteiiill  V.  Shickle,  43  Mo.  537  66 

Whitelegee  v.    De  Witt,  12  Daly, 

319       '  911 

Whitelev  i:  Southern  Rv.  Co.  (1896), 

119N:C.  724.  25  S.  E.  1018  664 

White  C)ak   Dist.  Tp.  r.  Oskaloosa 
Dist.  Tp.,  44  Iowa,  512      181,  190,  277, 

279 
Wliite  Sulphur  Springs  Co.  v.  Holly, 

4  \V.  Va.  597 
Whiting  i:  Doob  (1898),  152  Ind.  157, 
52  N.  E.  759 
V.  Koepke  (1898),  71  Conn.  77, 

40  Atl.  1053 

V.  Root,  52  Iowa,  292  18,  34,  37 

Whitlock  r.  Redford.  82  Ky.  390  922 

v.  Uhle  (1903),  75  Conn.  423,  53 

Atl.  891 

Whitman  r.  Keith,  18  Ohio  St.  134 


118 


643 


615 


603 
100, 
120 
592 


( .  Wairy.  44  W^is.  491 
Whitman  McXaniara  Tobacco  Co.  v. 

Wurm  (1902),  Kv-,  66  S.  W.  609       302 
Wiiiimire  r.  Boyd  (1898),  53  S   C. 

315.  31  S.  E.  .306  040 

Whitner  v.  Perhacs,  25  Abb.  N.  Casi 

130  471 

Whitney  v.  Allaire.  1  X.  Y.  305  843 

i:  Chicago  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  27 

Wis.  327  060 

c.  McKinney,  7  Johns.  Ch.  144     357, 

378 
V.  Priest  (1901),  26  Wash.  48,  66 

Pac.  108  703 

r.  Whitnev  (1902),  171  N.  Y.  176, 

03  X.'E.  834  762 

Whitsett  V.  Keishow,  4  Colo.  419  343 

Whittfd  V.  Xasli,  60  X.  C.  590  413 

Wiiittenhall  v.  Korber,  12  Kan.  618      290 
Whitty  v.  City  of  Oshkosh   (1900), 

106  Wis.  87,  81  N.  W.  992  673 

Whitworth  V.  Davis,  1  Ves.  &  B.  550     612 
Wickersham   v.   Comerford    (1894), 

104  Cal.  494,  38  Pac.  101  757 

V.  Crittenden.  93  Cal.  17  356,  471 

Wickhatn  v.  Weil,  17  X.  Y.  Suppl. 

518  933 

Wickwire  v.  Angola,  30  X.  E.  Rep. 

917  748 

Widener  .;.  State,  45  Ind.  244  748 

Wict)hold  V.  Hermann,  2  Mont.  609      676 
Wiedenian  r.  Hedges  (1901),  03  Neb. 

103.  88  X.  W.  170  768 

Wieiienfeid  r.  Byrd,  17  S.  C.  106  295 

Wiesner  v.  Young,  52  X.  W.  Rep. 

390  190 

Wigand  i;.  Sickel,  3  Keyes,  120  651 


Wiggins  I'.  McDonald,  18  Cal.  126 

104,  105, 
Wigmore  r.  Buell  (1897),  116  Cal. 

94,  47  Pac.  927  835, 

Wigton  r.  Smith  (1895),  46  Xeb.  461, 

04  X.  W.  1080 
Wilbour  r.  Hill.  72  X.  Y.  .36 
Wilcke  V.  Wilcke  (1897),  102  la.  173, 
71N.  W.  201  703, 

Wilco.x  r.  Hausch,  57  Cal.  139 
r.  McCoy,  21  Ohio  St.  655 
Wilcox    Lumlier  Co.    v.    Rittenian 
(1902),  88  Minn.  18,  92  X.  W.  472 
Wild  V.  Columbia  Cy.  Sup.,  9  How. 

I'r.  315 
Wildbahn  r.  Robidoux,  11  Mo.  659 
Wilde  r.  Ilaycraft,  2  Duval,  309 
Wilder  v.  Bovnton,  63  Barb.  547 

911, 
Wildman    v.   Wildman    (1898),    70 

Conn.  700,  41  Atl.  1     400.  46U,  462, 
Wiles  i:  Lambert,  66  Ind.  492       598, 
V.  Suydam,  6  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  292 
455,  458,  482,  505. 
Wilev  V.  Starbnck.  44  Ind.  177 
Wilhelm  r.  Byles,  60  Mich.  561 
Wilhoit    V.    (i)unnin<,'liam,    87    Cal. 

453 
Wilken    V.   Exterkamp  (1897),   102 

Ky.  143,  42  S.  W.  1140 
Wilkerson  v.  Farnliam,  82  Mo.  672 

r.  Hast,  57  Ind.  172 
Wilkes  V.  Morehead,  Stanton's  Code, 

31  n. 
Wiikeson,  etc.  Co.  r.  Driver  (1894), 

9  Wash.  177,  37  Pac.  307 
Wilkins  r.  Batterman,  4  Barb.  47 

r.  Erv,  1  Meriv.  262         236,  254, 
r.  Lee  (1894),  42  S.  C.  31,  19 

S.  E.  1016 
r.  Moore,  20  Kan.  538 
V.  Stidger,  22  Cal.  231 
r.  Suttles  (1894),  114  X.  C.  650, 
19  S.  E.  606 
Wilkinson  r.  Bertock  (1900),  HI  Ga. 
187,  36  S.  E.  623  870, 

r.  Fowkes,  9  Hare,  193 
V.  Henderson,  1  My.  &  K.  682 
r.  Parish,  3  Paige,  053 
V.  Pritchard  (1895),  93  la.  308, 
61  X.  W.  965 
Willard  v.  Carrigan  (1902),  Ariz.,  68 
Pac.  538  584, 

V.  Giles,  24  Wis.  319 
V.  Reas,  26  Wis.  540       177,  180, 
270,  278, 
Wilier  r.  Bergenthal,  50  Wis.  474 

;•.  Mai)hy,51  Ind.  169 
Willett  '•.  I'oVter.  42  Ind.  250 

V.  Willett,  3  Watts,  277 
Willey  I'.  Xichols  (1898),  18  Wash. 

528,  52  Pac.  237  450, 

Williams  >:  Allen,  29  Beav.  292 
V.  Bankhead.  19  Wall.  563 
V.  Boyd,  75  Ind.  286 


15, 
109 

023 

703 
797 

924 
592 
476 

616 

165 

783 
399 
865, 
913 

467 
665 

621 
147 
261 

181 

806 
982 
661 

104 


137 
611 

413 

692 
684 

923 

872 
.321 
294 
368 


659 
780 
193, 
457 
618 
784 
273 
649 

478 
352 
321 
942 


TABLE    OF   CASES   CITED. 


clxv: 


433 
702 
343 

785 

680 

641 

25 

891 

334 
526 
725 


[the  refebences 

Williams  v.   Brown,  2   Keyes,   486      91, 

131,  135,  935 

V.  Browulee,  101  Mo.  309  333 

V.  Casebcer  (1899).  126  Cal.  77, 

58  Pac.  380  228,  231 

f.  Eikenbarv    (189.!),    36    Neb. 

478,  54  N.  \V.  852 
V.  Evans,  6  Neb.  216 
V.  Ewing,  31  Ark.  229 
V.  Franklin     Pp.  Acad.  Ass.,  26 

Ind.  310 
u.  Fuller   (1903), —  Neb. —,  94 

N.  \V.  118 
V.  Hall  (1898),  103   Ga.  796,  30 

S.  E.  660 
V.  Hayes,  5  How.  Pr.  470 
V.  Irby,  15  S.  C.  458 
V.  Kerr  (1893),  113  N.  C.  306,  18 

S.  E.  501 
17.  Lowe,  4  Neb.  382 
I'.  McGrade,  13  Minn.  46 
V.  Meeker,  29  Iowa,  292  326,  327 

V.  Meloy  (1897),  97  Wis.  561,  73 

N.  W.  40  387 

i;.  Ninemire    (1901),    23    Wash. 

393.  63  Pac.  534  703 

V.  Norton,  3  Kan.  295  89,  97 

V.  Oresfon  Short  Line  K.  TJ.  Co. 

(1898),    18    Utah,   210,    54 

Pac.  991 
V.  Peabody,  8  Hun,  271 
V.  Peinny,  25  Iowa,  436 
V.  Rogers,  14  Bush,  776 
V.  Scott's  Adm.,  11  Iowa,  475  293 
^•.  Slote,  70  N.  Y.  601  15,  34,  37,  38 
V.  Smitli,  49  Me.  564  378,  379 

V.  Smith,  22  Wis.  594  262 

V.   Southern     Pac.     R.   R.    Co. 

(1895),  110  Cal.  457,42  Pac. 

974 
V.  Thorn,  11  Paige,  459 
V.  Van  Tuvl,  2  Ohio  St.  336 
V.    Weiting,    3  N.   Y.   Sup.    Ct. 

439 
r.  Williams  (1902),  115   la.  520, 

88  N.  W.  1057  639,  640 

I'.  Williains   (1894),  20  Colo.  51, 

37  Pac.  614 
V.  Williams  ( 1899),  102  Wis.  246, 

78  N.  W.  419 
I'.  Williams  (1903),  117  Wis.  125, 

94  N.  W.  24 
Williams  -  Havward     Shoe     Co.    v. 
Brooks    (1900),    9   Wyo.    424,  64 
Pac.  342 
Williams  Mower,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith,  33 

Wis.  530 
Williamson  v.  Brown,  15  N.  Y.  354 
V.  Dodge,  5  Hun,  497 
V.  Michigan  Fire  &  Marine  Ins. 

Co.  (1893),  86  Wis.  393,  57 

N.  W.  46 
V.  Selden  (1898),  53  Minn.  73,  54 

N.  W.  1055 
Willie  c.  Lugg,  2  Edm.  78 


679 

470,  519 

118 

290 


207 
123 
369 


932 


230 


618 


675 


783 

785 
137 
316 


110 

340 

247 


ARE  TO   THK   PAGES.] 

Willis  u.  Barron  (1898),  143  Mo.  450, 

45  S.  VV. 289  210,  887 

i:  City  of  Perry  (1894),  92  la. 

297,  60  N.  VV.  727  817 

V.  DeWiti,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  1090      286 
V.  Tozer  (1894),  44  S.  C.  1,  21 

S.  K. 617  671 

Willitsr.  Walter  (1898),  32  Ore.  411, 

52  Pac.  24  680 

Wills  V.  Simmon.ls,  8  Hun,  189  217 

V.  Siade,  6  Ves.  498  242 

V.  Wills,  84  Ind.  106         544,  546,  579 

Willson  V.  Cieaveland,  30  Cal.  192     831, 

833 
V.  Manhattan  liy.  Co.,  20  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  852  806 

Wilson  V.  Aberdeen  (1901),  25 Wash. 

614,  66  Pac.  95  716 

V.  Atlanta,  etc.  Kv.  Co.  (1902), 

115  Ga.  171,41  S.  E.  699         815 
V.  Bell,  17  Minn.  61  338 

V.  Burhans  (1897),  96  Wis.  550, 

71  N.  W.  879  787 

V.  Castro,  31  Cal.  420      269,  505,  508 
i:  City   Nat.    Bank    (1897),    51 

Neb.  87,  70  N.  W.  501  688 

V.  Clark,  20  Minn.  367  97,  564 

V.  Commercial    Union   Ins.  Co. 

(1902),   15    S.   D.   322,  89 

N.  W.  649  756 

f.  Fuller  (1894),  58  Minn.  149, 

59  N.  W.  988  626 

V.  Garagtv,  70  Mo.  617  284 

V.  Henrv,'40  Wis.  594  283 

V.  Houston,  76  N.  C.  375         160,  205 
V.  Hughes,  94  N.  C.  182  891,  922 

V.    Kiesel  (1894),  9   Utah,  397, 

35  Pac.  488  96,  102,  646 

v.  Lowry  (1898),  Ariz.,  52  Pac. 

777  710 

V.  Madison,  55  Cal.  5  942 

V.  Mineral  Point,  39  Wis.  160         378 
r.  .Moore,  1  My.  &  K.  126  241 

V.  Neu     (1901)",  —  Neb.  — ,   95 

N.  W.  502  756 

V.  Noonan,  35  Wis.  321  799 

V.  Railwav  Co.  (1897),  51  S.  C. 

79,  28  S.  E.  91  773,  778,  818 

V.  Root,  48  Ind.  486  748 

V.  Runkel.  38  Wis.  526  870,  930 

V.  Smith,  61  Cal.  209  515 

V.  Sullivan  (1898),  17  Utah,  341, 

53  Pac.  994  790 

V.  Thompson,    Stanton's    Code 

(Kv.),  60  467,  523 

V.  Wilson  (1894),  26  Ore.  251,  38 

Pac.  185  159 

V.   Wilson  (1902),  41  Ore.  459, 

69  Pac.  923  714 

V.  AVilson  (1895),  117  N.  C  351, 

23  S.  E.  272  809 

V.  Wilson's  Guardianship  (1902), 

40  .Ore.  353,  68  Pac.  393  353 

Wilt  I'.  Buchtel,  2  Wash.  Ter.  417        820 
Wiltman  ;•.  Watrv,  37  AVis.  238  756 


TABLE    OF    CASES   CITED. 


[the  references  are  to  the  pages.] 


Wiltsic  c.  Nortliam,  3  Bosw.  1G2  872 

Winimcr  v.  Simon  (1894),  9  Utah,  378, 

35  Pac.  507  018 

Wiliborne    c.    Lumber   Co.    (1902), 

130  N   C.  32,  40  S.  E.  825  197 

WiiiLiirn     r.    Fidelity,    etc.     Ass'n 

( litOO),  110  la.  374.'81  X.  W.  682       069 
Wimliester  r.  Joslyn  (1903),  —  Colo. 

— ,  72  Pac.  1079  624,  790 

"Wiliclicster,   Bp.  of,  v.  Mid   Hants 

Ky.  Co..  L.  K.  5  Kq.  17  255 

AVinchester  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Wick- 

liffe's  Adm'r  (1897),  100  Ky.  531, 

38  S.  W.  866  823 

Windsor   v.  Miner  (1899),  124  Cal. 

492.  57  Pac.  386  664 

Winemiller  v.    Laughlin  (1894),   51 

(),  Si.  421,  38  X.  E.  Ill  677 

AViner  v.  Mast  (1896),  146  Ind.  177, 

45  X.  E.  66  814 

Wines  r.  Rio  Grande  Ry.  Co.  (1893), 

9  Utah.  228,  33  Pac.  1042  96 

Wing  r.  Davis,  7  Greenl.  31  244 

V.  Dusjan,  8  Bush,  583  758 

AVingard  c.  Banning,  .39  Cal.  543  376 

A\inkler  v.  Racine  AVagon,  etc.  Co. 

(1898),  99  Wis.  184,  74  N.  W.  973     593 
Winne  v.   Xiagara  F.   Ins.  Co.,  91 

X.  Y.  185  207,  217 

AVinninaham    v.   Trueblood    (1899), 

149  .Aio  572,  51  S.  AA^  399  819 

AA'inona   &    St.  Peter  R.  Co.  v.  St. 

Paul  &  S.   C.   R.   Co.,    23   Minn. 

359  117 

AVinslow  r.  Clark,  47  X.  Y.  261  338,  379 
V.  Dousman,  18  \A''is.  456  342,  473 
i:  Minn.  &  Pac.  R.  Co.,  4  Minn. 

313  3.50 

V.  Urquhart,  .39  Wis.  260  376 

V.  Winsiow,  52  Ind.  8         47,  886,  942 
AVinston's  Adm'r  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R. 

Co.  ( 1901 ),  Kv.,  65  S.  AV.  13  302 

AVinter  ,:  McMillan,  87  Cal.  256  942 

t:  Winter,  8  Xev.  129  596 

Winterburg    v.    AVinterburg    (1893), 

52  Kan.  406,  34  Pac.  971  623 

AVinterfield  v.  Cream  City  Brewing 

Co.  (1897),  96  AVis.  239,  71  N.  AV. 

101  758 

Wintermute  >:  Cooke,  73  X.  Y.  107        38 
AA'inters    r.  Means    (1897),   50  Neb. 

209,  69  X.  AV.  753  684,  822 

/■.  Rush,  34  Cal.  1.36  149 

Wintringham  v.   Hayes  (1894),  144 

X.  Y.  1,  38  N.  E.  999  913 

AVintrode  r.  Uenbarger  (1898),  150 

Ind.  .056,  50  X.  E.  570  716 

AVirt  r.  Dinan,  44  .Mo.  App.  583  314 

AVisconsin  Cent.  Bk.    r.    Knowlton, 

12  Wis.  024  785 

AVisconsin  Lakes  Ice  Co.  r.  Ice  Co. 

(1902),  115  AVis.  377,  91  X.  AV. 

988  604 

AVise  V.  Rose  (1895),  110  Cal.  159,  42 

Cal.  669  740 


Wiseman  v.  Thompson  (1895),  94  la. 

607,63  N.  W.  346  714,818 

AViser  r.  Blachly,  1  Johns.  Ch.  437      321, 

347,  412 
AVisner  v.  Ocumpaugh,  71  X".  Y.  113 

42,45 
Wiswell  v.  Tefft,  5  Kan.  263  783 

AVitherington  r.  Huntsman    (1897), 

64  Ark.  551,  44  S.  AV.  74  877 

AVitkowski  V.  Hern,  82  Cal.  604  637 

Witte  r.  Eoote  (1895),  90  AVis.  235, 

62  N.  AV.  1044  815 

.     V.  Wolfe,  16  S.  C.  256  515 

AVittenbrock  v.  I'arker  (1894),  102 

Cal.  93,  36  Pac.  374  946 

Witter  r.  Little,  66  Iowa,  431  153 

AAMttraan  i:  AVatry,  37  AVis.  228  787 

AA''ohhvend  r.  Case  Threshing  Mach. 

Co.,  42  Minn.  500 
AA'olcott  i\  Ensign,  53  Ind.  70 
AVolf  V.  Banning,  3  Minn.  202      317 


428 
804 
325, 
335 

V.  H.,  13  How.  Pr.  84  855,  872 

V.  Hemrich  Bros.  Co.  (1902),  28 
AA'ash.  187,  68  Pac.  440 


V.  Schofield,  38  Ind.  175 


626 
576,  584, 
748 


V.  Shelton  (1902),  159  Ind.  531, 
65  X.  E.  582 
Wolfe  V.  Mo.  Pac.  Rv.  Co.,  97  Mo. 

473 
Wolff  r.  Lamann    (1900),  108  Kv., 
.343,  50  S.  AV.  408 
V.  Stoddard,  25  AVis.  503 
r.  Ward,  104  Mo.  127 
Womble  v.  Fraps,  77  X.  C.  198 

V.  Leach,  83  X.  C.  84 
Women's  Christian  Ass'n  r.  Kansas 
City  (1898),  147  Mo.  103.  48  S.  AV. 
960 
Wood  V.  Anthony,  9  How.  Pr.  78 
V.  Bangs,  1  Dakota,  179 
V.  Bewick  Lumber  Co.  (1897), 

103  Ga.  235,  29  S.  E.  820 
V.  Brown  (1897),  104  la.  124,  73 

X.  AV.  608 
V.  Brown,  34  X.  Y.  337 
r.  Brush,  72  Cal.  224 
V.  Carter  (1903),  —  Xeb.  — ,  93 

X.  AV.  15S 
V.  Cullen,  13  Minn.  394 
r.  Denver  City  Water  Co.  (1894), 

20  Colo.  253,  38  Pac.  739 
V.  Dummer,  3  Mason,  315 

V.  Fisk,  63  X.  Y.  245 

V.  Holland  (1893),  57  Ark.  198, 

21  S.  AV.  223 

V.  Luscomb,  23  AVis.  287 

1-.  Mayor,  etc.  73  X.  Y.  656 

V.    Oakland,    etc.    Transit    Co. 

(1895),  107  Cal.  500,  40  Pac. 

806 
V.  Olney,  7  Xev.  109       278 
V.  Orford,  52  Cal.  412 


132 

149 

677 
573 
239 
713 
576 


350 
455 
118 

641 

645 
344 
878 

89 
66 

421 
385 
293 

378 
301 
119 


375 
662 
316 


V.  Ostram,  29  Ind.  177 


764,  815 


TABLE    OF   CASES    CITED. 


clxi.K 


[toe  eeferences  are  to  the  pages.] 
"Wood  V.  Perry,  1  Barb.  114  122  |  Wotten  v.  Copeland, 


Steina  (1896),  9  8.  D.  110,  08 
N.  W.  160  200 

V.  White,  4  My.  &  Cr.  470     255,  256,  I 

358; 
V.  Williams,  4  Mad.  186  239  | 

V.  Wood,  83  N.  Y.  575  225  i 

Woodbridge  v.  De  AVitt  (1897),  51 

Neb.  98,  70  N.  W.  506  685 

v.   Sellwood    (1896),   65   Minn. 

135,  67  N.  W.  799  811 

Woodbury  c.  Delap,  1  N.  Y.  Sup. 

20  496, 497 

Woodbury  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Charter  Oak 

Ins.  Co.,  29  Conn.  374  111 

Woodcock    V.    Bostic    (1901),    128 

N.  C.  243,  38  S.  E.  881  756 

Wooden  v.  Waffle,  6  How.  Pr.  145         23, 

541,  559 
Woodford  v.  Leavenworth,  14  Ind. 

311 
Woodhouse  i-.  Duncan,  106  N.  Y.  527 
Wooding  V.  Blanton  (1900),  112  Ga. 

509,  37  S.  E.  720 
Woodrick  v.  Woodrick   (1894),  141 

N.  Y.  457,  36  N.  E.  395 
Woodruff  V.  Garner,  27  Ind.  4      862,  886, 

898,  923 
V.  No.  Bloomfield  Gr.  Min.  Co., 
8  Sawy.  628 
Woods  V.  Colony  Bank  (1901),  114 
Ga.  G83,  40  S.  E.  720 
V.  Sheldon(1896),  9  S.  D.  392,  69 
N.  W.  602 
Woodward  v.  Conder,33  Mo.  App.  147 
v.  Lavertv,  14  Iowa,  381 
V.  State  ("1899),  58  Neb.  598,  79 

N.  W.  164  565 

V.  Wood,  19  Ala.  213  244,  251 

Woodwortli  V.  Campbell,  5  Paige, 

518  243 

V.  Knowlton,  22  Cal.  164         739,  780 

V.  Sweet,  44  Barb.  268  315 

Woody  V.  Jordan,  69  N.  C.  189      728,  932 

Wool  V.  Edenton  (1893),  113  N.  C. 

33,  18  S.  E.  76  191 

Woolsey  v.  Brown,  74  N.  Y.  82  316 

V.  EUenviUe  V.  Trs.,  23  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  411  620 

V.  Williams,  34  Iowa,  413        564,  621 
Wooster    c.    Chamberlin,   28   Barb. 

602  273,  289 

Work  V.  Tibbits,  133  N.  Y.  574  637 

Woronicki  v.  Pariskiego  (1901),  74 

Conn.  224,  50  Atl.  562  732 

Worrall  v.  Munn,  38  N.  Y.  137  517 

Worth  V.  Fayetteville,  1  Wins.  70         118 
V.    Stewart    (1898),    122    N.   C. 

263,  29  S.  E.   413  678 

V.   Wliartou   (1898),   122  N.  C. 

376,  29  S.  E.  370  676 

Wortliam  v.  Sinclair  (1896),  98  Ga. 

173,  25  S.  E.  414  600,  802 

Worthlev's  Adm.  v.  Hammond,  13 
Bush,  510  665 


Johns.   Ch. 
140  "  243,  368 

Wrigglesworth  v.  Wriggleswortli,  45 

Wis.  255  37 

Wright  V.  Bacheller,  16  Kan.  259         831, 

942 
V.  Bundy,  11  Ind.  398 
V.  Cormer,  34  Iowa,  240 
V.  Delafield,  25  N.  Y.  266 
V.  Hooker,  10  N.  Y.  51 
V.  Howcdl,  35  Iowa,  288 
V.  Johnson,  50  Ind.  454 
V,  McCorniick,  67  N.  C.  27 
V.  Schmidt,  47  Iowa,  233 
V.  Storrs,  32  N.  Y.  691 
V.  Tinsley,  30  Mo.  G89 
V.  Wilcox,  19  Wend.  343 
V.  Wright,  54  N.  Y.  437 


11 

292 

196 

800 


242 

715 

714 

895 
936 


247,  334 
456 

865,  889 
633 
333 
618 
594 
748 
178 
149 
306 
15,  225,  316, 
814 

Wright,  Barrett,  etc  Co.  v.  Robin- 
son (1900),  79  Minn.  272,82  N.  W. 
632  655 

Wright's  Adm.  v.  Wright,  72    Ind. 

149  159 

Wunderlich  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
R.  R.  Co.  (1896),  93  Wis.  132,  66 
N.  W.  1144  191,  215 


Wurlitzer  v.  Suppe,  38  Kan.  31 
Wyandotte  v.  Agan,  37  Kan.  528 


515 
225, 
231 


Wyandotte,  etc.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Wy- 
andotte, 10  Kan.  .326 
Wyatt  V.  Wvatt  (1897),  31  Ore.  531, 

49  Pac.  855 
Wygand  v.  Sichel,  3  Keyes,  120 
Wvland  r.  Griffith  (1895),  96  la.  24, 

64  N.  W.  678 
Wylly    c.  Grigsbv  (1899),  11  S.  D. 

491,  78  N.  W.  957 
Wyman  v.  Herard  (1899),  9  Okla.  35, 

59  Pac.  1009  179,  271 

V.  Remond,  18  How.  Pr.  272  636 

V.  Robbins  (1894),  51  0.  St.  98, 

37  N.  E.  264  132 

Wynn  v.  Cory,  43  Mo.  301         20,  30,  477 
Wynne  v.  Heck,  92  N.  C.  414  153 


265 

593 
562 

608 

606 


X. 


Xenia  Branch  Bk. 
372 


Lee,  7  Abb.  Pr. 

902,  927 


Yale  r.  Dederer,  18  N.  Y.  265  315 

Yancey  v.  Greenlee,  90  N.  C  317  196,  424 


Yaucy  v.  Teter,  39  Ind.  305  727 

Yardfcy  v.  Clothier,  51  Fed.  Rep.  508  132 
Yarwood  v.  Johnson  (1902),  29  Wash. 

643,  70  Pac.  123  665 

Yates  V.  Compton,  2  P.  Wms.  308  253 

V.  Hoffman,  5  Hun,  113  293 

V.  State,  58  Ind.  299  189 


clxx 


TABLE   OF    CASES    CITED. 


[the  references   4RE  TO  THE   PAGES.] 


Yeatcs  v.  Walker,  1  Duv.  84  189,  453 

Yotzer  c.  Young,  52  N.  \V.  Kep.  1054     426, 

428 
York  r.  Chicago.  B.  &  Q.  U.  R.  Co. 
{ie9H),    5G    Neb.  572,    76 
N.  \V.  1005  679 

V.  Rockwood,  132  Ind.  358  576 

I',  fciteward  (1898),  21  Mont.  515, 

55  Pac.  29  639 

!•.  Wallace,  48  Iowa,  305  620 

York   Park  Bldg.  Ass'n    v.   Barnes 

( 1894 1,  39  Neb.  8:34, 58  N.  W.  440       686 
Yorn   '•.  Bracken    (1899),    153   Ind. 

492,  55  N.  H.  257  656 

Yost  V.  Coin'l  Bk.  of  Santa  Ana.  94 

Cai.  494  658 

Young  V.  Borzone  (1901),  26  Wash.  4, 

66  Pac.  135  913 

V.  Catlett,  6  Duer,  437  738 

V.  Coleman,  43  Mo.  179  458 

V.  Drake,  »  Hun,  (51  265,  470 

V.  Franklin  Cy.  Com'rs,  25  Ind. 

295  209 

V.  Garlington,  31  S.  C.  290  413 

V.  Gaut  (1901),  69  Ark.  114,  61 

S.  W.  372  8!;6 

V.  Glascock,  79  Mo.  574  780,  805 

r.  Gormlev  (1903),  119   la.  540, 

93N.'W.565  625 

J,-.  Gormley  (1903),  120  la.  372, 

94  N.  W.  922  675 

V.  Greenlee,  82  N.  C.  346  283 

V.  Hudson,  99  Mo.  102  94,  97 

1-.  Marshall,  8  P>ing.  43  652 

V.  N.  Y.&  Liv.  Stp.  Co.,  10  Abb. 

Pr.  229  278,  355 

V.  Pickens.  49  Ind.  23  791 

V.  Schofield  (1895),  132  Mo.  650, 

34  S.  W.  497  679,  752 

V.  Severy  (1897),  5  Okla.  630, 49 

Pac.  1024  603 

V.  Shickle  H.  &  H.  Iron  Co.,  103 

Mo.  324  575 

r.  Young,  81  N.  C.  91        29,  470,  496 
Youngblood  v.  Railroad  Co.  (1901), 

60  S.  C.  9,  38  S.  E.  232  679 

Young  Men's  Chr.  Ass.  v.  Dubach, 

82  Mo.  475  830 

Youngs  I'.  Kent,  46  N.  Y.  672  751 

Youngson   v.  Bond   (1902),  64  Neb. 
615,  90  N.  \V.  556  254 


Youngstown  v.  Moore,  30  Ohio  St. 

133  609 

Younkin     v.    Milwaukee,  etc.    Co. 

(1901),  112  Wis.  15,  87  N.W.  861    196, 

263 
Yuba  V.  Adams,  7  Cal.  35  428 


Zabriskie   r.  Smith,  13  N.  Y.  322      178, 

215 
Zalesky  i-.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (1897),  102 

la.  613,  71  N.  W.  566  432 

Zander  f.  Valentine  Blatz  Brewing 

Co.  (1897),  95  Wis.  162,  70  N.  W. 

164  651 

Zarrs  i\  Keck   (1894),  40  Neb.  456, 

58  N.  W.  933  947 

Zeidler  v.  Johnson,  35  Wis.  335  791 

Zeller   v.   Martin,   54    N.    W.   Rep. 

330  306 

Ziglcr  V.  McClellan,  15  Ore.  499  911 

Zimmerman  v.  Erhard,  58  How.  Pr. 

11  226 

V.  Makepeace  (1899),  152  Ind. 

199.  52  N.  E.  992  239 

V.  Schoenfeldt,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

142  373 

Zinc  Carbonate  Co.  v.  The  First  Na- 
tional Bank  of  Shull.'sburg  (1899), 

103  Wis.  125,  79  N.  W.  229        468,  493 
Zinn  V.  Baxter  (1901),  65  Ohio  St. 

341.  62  N.  E.  327  181 

Zion  Church    v.  Parker  (1901),  114 

la.  1,  8G  N.  W.  60  603,  864 

Zion    Co-operative    Ass'n    v.    Mayo 

(1898),  22  Mont.  100.  55  Pac.  915      672 
Zitske  V.  Goldberg,  38  Wis.  216  576 

Zoller  V.  Kellogg,  66  Hun,  194  637 

Zorger  i-.  Rapids  Tp.,  36  Iowa,  175       119 
r.  Ruster,  51  Wis.  32  329 

Zorn  r.  Zorn,  38  Hun,  67  525 

Zuelly  1-.  Casper  (1903),  —  Ind.  — , 

67  N.  E.  103  118 

Zug  V.  Forgan  (1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  W. 

1129  593 

Zundelowitz  v.   Webster  (1896),  96 

la.  587,  65  N.  W.  835  606 

Zurrtuh   1-.  Smith   (1902),  135  Cal. 

644,  67  Pac.  1089  16 


CIVIL     REMEDIES, 


INTRODUCTION. 

§  1.  *  1.  Necessity  of  Remedial  Law.  By  far  the  greater 
portion  of  any  actual  system  of  jurisprudence  consists  of  com- 
mands tlmt  create  and  define  those  rights  and  corresponding 
duties  which  control  the  normal  relations  of  individuals  with  each 
other  and  with  the  body  politic  of  which  they  are  members.^ 
Some  of  these  rights  and  their  corresponding  duties  govern  the 
relations  alone  of  the  state  with  individuals,  and  are  properly 
termed  public;  the  others  are  confined  to  the  relations  of  in- 
dividuals with  each  other,  and  are  called  private.  As  these 
rights  and  duties  form  the  very  substratum  of  the  whole  law,  as 
the  law  and  all  the  machinery  of  administration  exist  solely  to 
declare  and  enforce  them,  as  they  are  in  fact  the  very  end  and 
object  of  legislation  and  government,  they  may  be  and  are  by 
most  juridical  writers  appropriately  styled  primary  rights  and 
duties.  If  mankind  were  absolutely  perfect  so  that  disobedience 
would  be  impossible,  if  it  were  certain  that  every  command 
uttered  by  the  Supreme  Power  would  be  voluntarily  obeyed  by 
those  to  whom  it  was  addressed,  the  law  would  contain  nothing 
else  than  an  enumeration  of  these  primary  rights  and  duties. 
Since,  however,  disobedience  is  possible,  and  these  primary  rights 
may  be  broken  and  duties  unperformed,  a  supplemental  branch 
of  the  law  becomes  a  matter  of  necessity,  by  which  obedience 
may  be  enforced.  This  secondary  and  supplementary  department 
is  by  some  writers  called  the  "  sanctioning,"  because  it  deals  with 

1  [|For  a  discussion  of  the  question,  "What  is  Law?  "  see  vol.  25,  Reports  Am. 
Bar  Ass'u,  1902,  p.  445  et  s"-/.] 

1 


2  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

the  sanctions  which  give  their  compulsive  efficacy  to  the  com- 
mands of  the  supreme  power.  I  shall,  however,  use  the  term 
remedial  as  descriptive  of  this  department,  since  it  more  nearly 
accords  with  the  nomenclature  customary  among  lawyers  in 
England  and  in  America. 

§  2.  *  2.  Remedies  and  Remedial  Rights  and  Duties.  Definitions 
and  Illustrations.  This  secondary  and  supplementary  or  remedial 
department  of  jm"isprudence  has  to  do  with  remedies  and  with 
remedial  rights  and  duties.  Remedies^  in  their  widest  sense,  are 
either  the  final  means  by  which  to  maintain  and  defend  primaiy 
rights  and  enforce  primary  duties,  or  they  are  the  final  equiva- 
lents given  to  an  injured  person  in  the  place  of  his  original  pri- 
mary rights  which  have  been  broken,  and  of  the  original  primary 
duties  towards  him  which  have  been  unperformed.  Remedial 
rights,  or  rights  of  reined?/,  are  rights  which  an  injured  person 
has  to  avail  himself  of  some  one  or  more  of  these  final  means,  or 
to  obtain  some  one  or  more  of  these  final  equivalents.  Remedial 
duties  are  secondary  duties,  devolving  upon  the  party  who  has 
infringed  upon  the  primary  rights  of  another,  and  failed  to  per- 
form his  own  primary  duties  towards  that  other,  to  make  the 
reparation  provided  by  some  one  or  more  of  these  final  means,  or 
furnished  in  some  one  or  more  of  these  equivalents.  One  or  two 
familiar  and  simple  examples  will  illustrate  and  explain  these 
abstract  definitions.  A.  and  B.  have  entered  into  a  contract  by 
which  the  latter  has  agreed  to  sell  and  deliver  to  the  former  a 
quantity  of  merchandise :  analyze  the  results  of  this  relation. 
A.  has  the  right  that  B.  should  transfer  and  deliver  to  him  the 
goods  referred  to,  and  a  corresponding  duty  rests  upon  B.  to 
make  the  transfer  and  delivery.  This  right  and  this  duty  are 
primary.  B.  fails  to  perform,  and  thereupon  a  new  secondary 
right  in  A.  arises,  and  a  new  secondary  duty  of  B.  A.'s  new 
right  is  to  have  the  remedy  which  tlie  law  permits  in  such  a  case, 
and  B.'s  new  duty  is  to  grant  this  remedy ;  this  new  right  and 
this  new  duty  are  remedial.  The  remedy  given  under  such  cir- 
cumsttinces  is  a  pecuniary  compensation,  a  sum  of  money  in  the 
place  of  the  goods,  which  in  our  legal  nomenclature  is  termed 
damages.  In  this  instance  the  remedy  is  plainly  an  equivalent. 
A.'s  primary  riglit  was  to  acquire  the  ownership  and  the  posses- 
sion of  the  corpus  of  the  goods;  B.'s  primary  duty  was  to  trans- 
fer the  ownership  and  possession  of  that  corpus.     The  remedy, 


INTllODUCTION. 


however,  is  not  the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  merchan- 
dise, but  the  ownership  and  possession  of  a  sum  of  money  instead 
thereof.  It  is  a  moral  and  indirect  means  of  enforcing  the  pri- 
mary right,  because  it  may  induce  B.  to  perform  his  primary  duty 
and  deliver  the  goods ;  but,  if  it  does  not  produce  that  effect,  it 
is  an  equivalent  for  the  ownership  and  possession  of  the  articles 
themselves.  In  this  instance  we  have  a  given  primary  right  and 
duty,  a  breacli  thereof  b}^  non- performance,  a  new  remedial  right 
and  duty  in  the  place  of  the  primary  ones,  and  a  remedy  differ- 
ent from,  but  equivalent  to,  those  originals.  This  familiar  ex- 
ample illustrates  every  case  of  remedy  by  a  pecuniary  compensation 
in  the  place  of  the  primary  right  and  duty  which  have  been 
broken.  Another  example  will  be  sufificient.  A.  and  B.  have 
entered  into  a  contract  by  which  the  latter  has  -agreed  to  convey 
a  certain  farm,  and  to  execute  and  deliver  a  deed  thereof  to  the 
former.  Here  A.'s  primarj'-  right  is  to  have  B.  convey  the  farm, 
which  is  done  by  executing  and  delivering  the  deed  and  by  sur- 
rendering possession  of  the  land.  B.'s  corresponding  primary 
duty  is  to  perform  these  acts.  Upon  B.'s  refusal,  A.  is  at  once 
clothed  with  a  new  and  remedial  right,  and  B.  is  subjected  to  a 
new  and  remedial  duty.  Under  these  circumstances  the  law  gives 
a  remedy  which  is  the  same  as  the  end  which  was  to  be  attained 
by  the  primary  right  and  duty  themselves ;  that  is,  the  convey- 
ance of  the  land.  In  other  words,  the  law  will  compel  B.  to  do 
just  what  he  in  terms  contracted  to  do, — execute  and  deliver 
the  deed  and  surrender  the  possession.  Here  the  secondary 
remedial  right  and  duty  are  the  same  as  the  original  primary 
right  and  duty ;  and  the  remedy  itself  is  not  an  equivalent  to, 
but  is  identical  with,  the  result  to  be  reached  by  such  primary 
right  and  duty.  The  remedy,  however,  is  plainly  a  means  by 
which  A.  maintains  his  primary  right,  and  enforces  the  primary 
duty  which  B.  owes  to  him,  for  by  it  the  self-same  right  is 
upheld,  and  the  self-same  duty  is  performed. 

§  3.  *  3.  Distinction  bet'ween  Public  and  Private  Remedies. 
When  the  primary  rights  and  duties  are  public,  that  is,  Avhen 
they  govern  the  relations  alone  of  the  State  with  individuals, 
the  remedies  for  the  violation  thereof  are  public,  and  the  larger 
portion  of  them  are  criminal.  Wlien  tlie  primary  rights  and 
duties  are  private,  that  is,  when  they  are  confined  to  relations 
of  individuals  with  each  other,  the  remedies  are  also  private,  or, 


4  CIVIL    REMKDIES. 

as  they  are  frequently  termed,  civil.  This  treatise  will  deal 
with  the  latter  class  alone.  The  vast  majority  of  public  remedies 
are  designed  to  preserve  the  good  order  of  society,  and  to  enforce 
those  duties  of  individuals  towards  the  State  whose  violations  are 
called  crimes,  and  the  remedies  themselves  are  criminal:  but 
there  are  other  public  remedies  which  are  not  in  any  respect 
criminal.  The  remedies  to  which  I  now  refer  may,  at  first 
blush,  appear  to  be  private,  and  to  be  used  to  enforce  some 
rights  that  belong  to  an  individual  rather  than  to  the  body 
politic ;  yet,  on  closer  examination  of  their  elements  and  objects, 
it  Avill  be  plainly  seen  that  they  are  strictly  public,  and  serve  to 
uphold  rights  which  inhere  in  the  Commonwealth.  The  sub- 
division which  I  am  thus  describing  includes  those  judicial  pro- 
ceedings by  which  the  regular  organization  and  structure  of  the 
government  are  preserved  by  determining  the  conflicting  claims 
of  litigant  parties  to  occupy  and  hold  the  powers  and  functions 
of  some  particular  public  office.  The  individual  who  is,  or  who 
claims  to  be,  a  portion  of  the  governmental  organism,  by  virtue 
of  an  official  position  which  he  seeks  to  estaljlish,  may  be  an 
actor  in  the  judicial  proceeding ;  but  the  proceeding  is  not  insti- 
tuted, nor  is  the  determination  made,  on  his  own  personal  ac- 
count, nor  for  his  own  private  benefit;  the  State  is  in  theory  and 
in  practice  the  party  primarily  interested,  and  the  rights  of  the 
State  are  maintained  and  established  by  the  judicial  decision. 
On  the  other  hand,  certain  remedies  which  have  the  outward 
appearance  of  being  public,  which  are  required  by  some  ancient 
and  arbitrary  rule  of  form  to  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the 
Commonwealth  or  of  the  people,  are  actuall}-  private  and  civil. 
The  interj)osition  of  the  State  as  a  nominal  actor  is  merel}' 
formal,  and  the  rights  to  l)e  upheld  belong  to  individuals  in  their 
private  cliaracters  and  ca[)acities.  Remedies  and  remedial  rights 
of  this  last  class,  being  strictly  private  and  civil,  fall  within  the 
scope  of  the  present  work,  while  those  of  the  preceding  class  are 
not  embraced  within  its  design. 


CHAPTER   FIRST. 

ABOLITION  OF  THE  DISTINCTIONS  BETWEEN  ACTIONS  AT 
LAW  AND  SUITS  IN  EQUITY,  AND  OF  ALL  THE  COMMON- 
LAW   FORMS   OF   ACTION. 

§  4.  *  44.  statutory  Provision.  The  following  is  the  form  of 
the  simple  but  most  comprehensive  provision  found  in  the  codes 
of  procedure  and  practice  acts,  embodying  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciple which  is  the  subject-matter  of  the  present  chapter,  and 
which  is  the  single  source  from  which  all  the  other  portions  of 
the  system  flow  as  necessary  consequences :  "  The  distinction 
between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  and  the  forms  of  all 
such  actions  and  suits  heretofore  existing,  are  abolished;  and 
there  shall  be  in  this  State  hereafter  but  one  form  of  action  for 
the  enforcement  or  protection  of  private  rights  and  the  redress 
of  private  wrongs,  which  shall  be  denominated  a  civil  action."^ 
In  a  very  few  of  the  States  the  change  from  the  former  modes  is 


1  N.  Y.  §  69  (3.339)  ;  Cal.  §  307  ;  S.  C. 
§  92;  Nev.  §  1  ;  Nebr.  §  2;  Kans.  §  10; 
Ohio,  §  3  ;  Ind.  §  1  ;  N.  C.  §  12  ;  [Con- 
necticut, Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  607  ;  Minnesota, 
Gen.  St.,  1894,  §  5131  ;  Mi.ssouri,  Kev.  St., 
1899,  §  539;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2600; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901.  §  3112; 
Montana,  §  460 ;  North  Dakota,  Rev. 
Codes,  1899,  §  5181  ;  Wyoming,  Kev.  St., 
1899,  §3443;  Colorado,  §  1;  Utah,  Rev. 
St.,  1898,  §2852;  South  Dakota,  Ann. 
St.,  1901,  §  6030;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893, 
§  3882  ;  ^Vashing•ton.  Bal.  Code,  §  4793. 

In  the  citations  of  New  York  statutes, 
the  section  numbers  first  given  refer  to 
tlie  old  Code  of  Procedure,  while  the 
numbers  a])pearing  in  parentheses  refer 
to  the  new  code  of  Civil  Procedure.]  The 
provision  in  the  California  Code  is  as 
follows:  "§307  (§  1).  There  is  in  this 
State  but  one  form  of  civil  action  for  the 
enforcement  or  protection  of  ])rivate 
rights,  and  the  redress  or  prevention  of 
private  wrongs." 

£The  provision  of  the  New  York  code. 


quoted  in  the  text,  has  been  changed  to 
read  as  follows :  "  There  is  only  one  form 
of  civil  action.  The  distinction  between 
actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  and  the 
forms  of  those  actions  and  suits,  have  been 
abolished."  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  3339.  The 
various  codes  differ  somewhat  among 
themselves  in  the  wording  of  this  pro- 
vision, but  in  a  general  way  they  follow 
either  the  New  York  or  California  form. 
The  New  York  form  is  found  in  Indiana, 
Kansas,  Nebraska,  Minnesota,  Wisconsin, 
Nortli  Dakota,  Wyoming,  Colorado.  South 
Dakota,  and  Oklahoma,  while  the  Califor- 
nia form  is  found  in  Missouri,  Ohio,  Con- 
necticut, South  Carolina,  Nevada,  Idaho, 
Montana,  Utah,  and  Washington. 

Georgia,  wliich  in  many  respects  has 
followed  the  Code  procedure,  has  adopted 
statutes  as  follows :  "  Bills  in  equity  and 
all  distinctions  of  actions  into  real,  per- 
sonal, and  mixed,  are  abolished."  "  A 
civil  action  is  one  founded  on  private 
rights,  arising  eitlier  from  contract  or 
tort."     Code,   1895,  §§4931,  4932.] 


6  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

not  SO  complete,  and  a  slight  distinction  is  preserved  between 
suits  brought  to  obtain  legal  and  those  brought  to  obtain  equi- 
table relief.  All  the  common-law  forms  of  action  are  abolished, 
and  one  civil  action  is  established  for  all  remedial  purposes:  the 
proceedings  in  this  civil  action,  however,  may  be  either  (1) 
ordinary  or  (2)  equitable.  The  plaintiff  may  prosecute  his 
action  by  equitable  proceedings  in  all  cases  where  courts  of 
chancery,  before  the  adoption  of  the  code,  had  jurisdiction,  and 
must  so  proceed  in  all  cases  where  such  jurisdiction  was  exclu- 
sive. In  all  other  cases  the  plaintiff  must  prosecute  his  action  by 
ordinary  proceedings.  The  plaintiff  indicates  by  the  formula, 
"In  ordinary  proceedings,"  or  "In  equitable  proceedings,"  at 
the  commencement  of  his  petition  or  complaint,  to  which  class 
the  action  belongs.  The  provisions  of  the  code  regulating  the 
prosecution  of  actions  apply  to  both  kinds  of  proceedings  unless 
the  contrary  expressly  appears.  In  fact,  the  only  real  distinction 
between  them  is  that  they  are  to  be  placed  upon  different  dockets 
of  the  court,  so  that  the  suits  of  the  one  class  will  be  tried  by  a 
jury,  while  those  of  the  other  class  will  be  tried  by  the  judge 
without  a  jury,  and  the  evidence  in  equitable  proceedings  may 
be  taken  by  deposition  instead  of  b}^  oral  examination  in  open 
court.  ^  It  is  evident  that  in  these  States  the  difference  kept  up 
between  legal  and  equitable  actions  is  more  nominal  than  real, 
and  that  the  principle  of  absolute  unity  prevails  as  truly  in  their 
codes  as  in  those  of  the  other  commonwealths. ^ 


1  Ky.  §§  1-1.3  ;  Iowa,  §§  2507,  2508, 
251.3,  2514,  2520;  Oregon,  §§  1,  376; 
[[Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §§  5607- 
5610,  5616-5622.] 

'^  [[The  question  cannot  be  raised  by 
demurrer,  but  by  motion  to  transfer  from 
one  docket  to  the  other.  McClure  v.  Dee 
(1902),  115  la.  546,  88  N.  W.  1093;  Mc- 
Cormick,  etc.  Co.  v.  Markert  (1899),  107 
la.  .340,  78  N.  W.  33.  See  also  the  follow- 
ing cases  in  whicii  tliis  distinction  is  di.s- 
cu88ed:  Hodowal  v.  Yearous  (1897),  103 
la.  32,  72  N.  VV.  294  ;  Kassiug  i,-.  Ordway 


(1897),  100  la.  611,  69  N.  W.  1013;  Gatch 
V.  Garretson  (1896),  100  la.  252,  69  N.  W. 
550;  Evans  v.  McConnell  (1896),  99  la. 
326,  68  N.  W.  790  ;  Leach  v.  Kundsou 
(1896),  97  la.  643,  66  N.  W.  913  ;  Hawley 
V.  Exchange  Bank  (189F),  97  la.  187.  6C. 
N.  W.  152;  Reed  v.  Lane  (1895),  96  la. 
4.54,  65  N.  \V.  380 ;  Wilkinson  v.  Pritciiard 
(1895).  93  la.  308.  61  N.  W.  965  ;  Rabb  r. 
Albright  (1894),  93  la.  50,  61  N.  W.  402; 
Mechan  v.  Watson  (1898),  65  Ark.  216,47 
S.  W.  109-3 


GENERAL   NATURE   OF   Till':   CIVIL    ACTION. 


SECTION    FIKST. 

THE  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  AS  TO  A  UNION  OF  LEGAL  AND  EQUI- 
TABLE METHODS  WHICH  HAVE  BEEN  ADOPTED  BY  THE  COURTS. 

§  5.  *  65.  Purpose  of  Section  One,  Chapter  One.  General  Prin- 
ciples of  Construction.  It  is  not  my  purpose  in  the  present  sec- 
tion to  discuss  in  order  the  particuhir  practical  questions  that 
have  arisen  in  the  construction  of  those  provisions  of  the  State 
codes  of  procedure  and  practice  acts  wliich  abolish  the  distinction 
between  legal  and  equitable  actions;  namely,  the  combining  of 
legal  and  equitable  causes  of  action  and  defence  in  the  same  suit, 
the  interposing  of  equitable  defences  to  legal  causes  of  action, 
the  granting  of  legal  remedies  where  the  pleadings  had  con- 
templated equitable  ones,  or  of  equitable  remedies  where  the 
pleadings  had  contemplated  legal  ones,  and  the  like.  I  intend 
rather  to  ascertain,  if  possible,  and  state  the  general  principles 
of  construction  which  the  courts  have  finally  adopted  and  applied 
in  the  settlement  of  these  and  all  other  similar  questions  which 
have  arisen  from  this  most  distinctive  and  important  feature 
of  the  reformed  procedure.  These  principles  are  fundamental; 
they  underlie  the  whole  process  of  judicial  interpretation ;  they 
shape  the  entire  action  of  the  courts  in  building  up  a  system  of 
practical  rules  out  of  the  broad  and  somewhat  vague  enactments 
of  the  statute.  A  knowledge  of  these  controlling  motives  and 
opinions  which  have  guided  the  judges  in  their  work  of  con- 
struction is  of  the  highest  importance;  with  it  we  may  attain  a 
systematic  and  harmonious  result;  without  it  we  shall  certainly 
be  left  in  a  chaos  of  conflicting  decisions. 

§  6.  *  Q6.  Narro-wr  Interpretation  by  Some  Judges.  This  Inter- 
pretation Overruled.  The  adoption  of  the  Code  of  Procedure  by 
the  Legislature  of  New  York  in  1848  was  undoubtedly  a  shock 
to  the  opinions  and  prejudices  of  lawyers  who  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  regard  the  former  system  as  perfect  in  principle,  and 
while  it  met  with  a  strenuous  opposition  from  many  members  of 
the  bar,  it  is  not  surprising  that  some  of  the  judges  also  for  a 
time  found  it  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  yield  obedience  to  the 
letter  even  of  the  statutory  requirement,  much  less  to  accept  its 
spirit  with  zealous  approval.     Opinions  are  to  be  found,  deliv- 


8  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

ered  at  an  early  day  by  very  eminent  and  able  judges,  sometimes 
sitting  in  the  court  of  last  resort,  which,  if  taken  as  correct 
expositions  of  the  statute,  would  have  reduced  the  great  reform 
to  the  empty  change  in  a  few  words;  the  ancient  names  would 
have  been  abolished,  but  all  the  substance,  all  that  Avas  repre- 
sented by  those  names,  would  have  remained  in  full  force  and 
effect.  According  to  this  view  there  had  been  no  union  of 
methods  into  one  common  mode  of  proceeding,  no  abolition  of 
any  real  distinctions  between  legal  and  equitable  actions,  because 
such  a  result  is  simply  impossible  of  attainment.^  Since  the 
New  York  Constitution  provides  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  that 
State  shall  have  general  jurisdiction  in  law  and  equity,  and 
speaks  in  one  or  two  other  places  of  "equity,"  it  has  been  said 
from  the  bench  that  a  statute  abolishing  the  distinctive  features 
of  equity  would  be  unconstitutional,  and  that  the  New  York 
code,  so  far  as  it  purports  to  produce  that  effect,  is  void.^  The 
system  which  this  school  of  judges  has  constructed  out  of  the 
reformatory  legislation  is  the  following. ^  The  distinctions  be- 
tween law  and  equity  inhere  in  tlie  very  nature  of  the  subject, 
and  cannot  be  abolished.  The  legislature  may,  unless  restrained 
by  the  constitution,  abrogate  the  law  or  equity,  but  cannot 
destroy  the  distinctions  between  them.  The  language  of  the 
statute,  however,  is  not  broad  enough  to  effect  such  a  change; 

^  See  Reubens  r.  .Joel,  13  N.  Y.  488,  in  which  it  is  held  error  to  permit  the  jury 

493,  and  Voorhis  7-.  Child's  Ex.,  17  N.  Y.  to  find  a  cause  of  action  ex  contractu  under 

354,  357-362,  per  S.  L.  Seldeu  J.  pleadin^js  showing  that  the  cause  of  action 

2  Selden   J.,    in    Reubens   v.   Joel,    13  was  founded  in  tort.    See  also  to  the  same 

N.  Y.  494,  495.  effect  State  ex  rel.   v.  Helms  (1898),  101 

8  Selden  J.,  in  Reul)ens   v.   Joel   and  Wis.  280,   77    N.    W.    194.     See   further 

Voorhis  v.  Child's  Ex.,  uhi  supra.  Joseph  Dessert  Lumber  Co.  v.   Wadleigh 

QSee  Anderson  i-.Chilson  (1895),  8  S.D.  (1899),  103  Wis.  318,  79  N.  W.  237,  affirm- 

64,  where  it  is  stated  in  the  syllabus  that  ing  Kewaunee  Cy.  Sup.  r.  Decker,  30  Wis. 

"  AltiioHKli  the  common  law  forms  have  624,  and  in  which  it  is  said  :  "  It  is  just  as 

been  abolished,  an  e(|uitable  action  under  necessary   to-day  as  it   ever   was   that   a 

the  code  system  is  clearly  distingui.shable  suitor  should  so  state  his  cause  of  action 

from  one  at  law,"  quoting  from  Dalton  v.  that  the  court  may  determine  whether  it 

Vanderveer  (Sup.),  29  N.  Y.   Su])p.  .342,  be  ex  contractu  or  ex  delicto."     In  Fran- 

that  a  "  distinction  between  equitable  and  Cisco  v.  Hatch  (1903),   117  Wis.  242,  93 

legal  actions  still  exists,  tliough  tiic  forms  N.    W.    1118,   the   court   said:    "Having 

have    been    abolished."     In    Ca.sgrain    v.  brought   this  action  in    tort,  neither   the 

Hamilton  (1890),  92  Wis.  179,  60  N.  W.  plaintiff   nor  the   court  could   change  it 

1 18,  it  is  shown  that  whether  the  action  is  into   an   action    upon   contract  upon   the 

one  in  tort  or  in  contract  is  still  a  practical  trial   against    the   defendants'   objections. 

question  under  the  code.      See  also  Rood  This    principle    is    well    settled    in    this. 

V.  Taft  (1890),  94  Wis.  380,  09  N.  W.  183,  State."J 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF   THE   CIVIL    ACTION.  9 

it  is  confined  to  external  acts  and  forms,  to  tlie  metliods  of  ob- 
taining remedies,  to  the  incidents  of  actions,  and  not  to  their 
substance.  Even  when  thus  restrained,  tliere  are  necessary 
elements  in  tlie  subject-matter  which  cannot  be  affected  l)y 
legislation,  and  which  limit,  therefore,  the  general  phrases  of 
the  code.  Assuming  that  primary  legal  and  equitable  rights 
and  duties  remain  unaltered,  essential  differences  must  exist  in 
the  actions  brought  to  enforce  the  legal  and  the  equitable  classes 
of  rights,  and  also  the  various  species  of  legal  rights.  For  this 
reason  the  substantial  features  and  characteristics  of  the  various 
actions  at  law  must  and  do  subsist,  and  the  rules  which  are 
based  upon  these  facts  must  and  do  continue  in  operation.  The 
names  "covenant,"  "debt,"  "trespass,"  "assumpsit,"  "bill  in 
equity,"  and  the  like,  have  been  abandoned,  but  all  the  things 
which  these  names  represented  are  left  in  their  essentials  exactly 
as  before  the  attempted  reforms.  This  theory  of  interpretation 
reduces  the  Code  of  Procedure  from  its  position  as  the  embodi- 
ment of  a  new  system  for  the  administration  of  justice  to  the 
level  of  a  mere  amendatory  act  regulating  the  minor  details  of 
practice.  The  explanation  here  made  of  it  is  now  useful  only  as 
a  matter  of  history;^  it  never  became  controlling;  the  opinions 

^  ^See,  however,  the  case  of  Draper  r.  between  actions  at  law  and  in  equity,  to 
Brown,  decided  in  1902  by  the  Supreme  abolish  which  is  beyond  the  power  of 
Court  of  Wisconsin,  115  Wis.  361,  91  legislative  enactment.  The  legislature 
N.  W.  1001,  from  which  we  quote  as  fol-  may  abolish  the  old  forms  of  action  and 
lows  :  "  It  iH.ay  seem  somewhat  anomalous  has  done  so ;  but  the  essential  principle* 
that,  under  a  Code,  any  distinction  should  of  equitable  actions  and  equitable  relief, 
exist  between  legal  and  equitable  actions,  as  distinguished  from  legal  actions  and 
That  such  distinction  does  exist  is  recog-  remedies,  are  as  vital  now,  and  as  clearly 
nized  in  almost  every  Code  State.  It  is  a  marked  and  defined,  as  before  the  en- 
distinction  inherent  in  the  very  nature  of  actment  of  the  Code.  They  are  inde- 
things,  and  must  be  recognized  .so  long  as  structible  elements  in  our  system  of 
both  legal  and  equitable  remedies  are  jurisprudence,  and  the  courts  are  con- 
permitted.  A  ra.nn  has  both  legal  and  stantly  required  to  recognize  and  apply 
equitalde  rights.  In  the  vindication  of  them.'  The  courts  of  New  York  an- 
his  legal  rights  he  can  call  upon  the  in-  nounced  the  same  doctrine  early  in  the 
dividual  or  individuals  who  have  invaded  history  of  the  Code.  Reubens  v.  Joel,  13 
such  rights  for  reparation  In  the  en-  N.  Y.  488  ;  Goulet  f.  As.seler,  22  N.  Y.  225  ; 
forcement  of  his  equitable  rights  he  has  the  Gould  ?'.  Rank,  86  N.  Y.  75-83.  So  pro- 
power,  and  it  is  Ids  duty,  to  call  in  every  nounced  and  well  preserved  is  this  distiuc- 
person  necessary  to  a  complete  determina-  tion  that  this  court  sustained  a  demurrer 
tion  or  settlement  of  the  question  involved,  to  a  complaint  in  an  equitable  action, 
Such  is  the  statute.  Section  2603,  Ilev.  St.  notwithstanding  it  contained  allegations 
1898.  In  treating  this  question,  Mr.  Jus-  which,  if  standing  by  themselves,  would 
tice  Lvon,  in  Bonesteel  r.  Bonesteel,  28  constitute  an  action  at  law.  Denner  v. 
Wis.  245.  wrote  as  follows:  'There  are  Railroad  Co.,  57  Wis.  218,  15  N.  W. 
certain  essential  and  inherent  distinctions  158."] 


10  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

which  it  represents  were  tliosc  of  individual  judges  rather  than 
of  courts,  and  they  have  been  repeatedly  and  completely  over- 
ruled by  tribunals  of  the  highest  authority.  ^ 

^  7.  *  Cn  .  How^  Interpreted  in  Most  of  the  States.  Criticism  of 
Interpretation  in  these  States.  This  protest  against  the  changes 
in  the  time-honored  modes  of  judicial  procedure,  this  antagonism 
to  the  principle  of  the  new  system,  which  was  at  the  outset  con- 
fined to  a  small  though  very  able  portion  of  the  bench,  was  long 
since  abandoned;^  and  the  courts  have  in  most  of  the  States  not 
only  conformed  to  the  letter  of  the  reformatory  legislation,  but 
have  to  a  considerable  extent,  but  not,  as  I  think,  to  the  full 
extent,  accepted  and  carried  out  its  evident  spirit  and  meaning. 
I  speak  advisedly  in  this  statement.  While  the  courts  on  the 
whole,  and  in  all  the  States,  do  not  show  a  disposition  to  defeat 
the  reform  by  a  hostile  construction,  but  rather  seem  desirous  of 
promoting  it,  and  establishing  it  upon  a  secure  basis,  there  are 
yet  marked  differences  in  this  respect  among  the  States,  and  also 
strange  inconsistencies  in  the  application  of  general  principles  to 
particular  instances.  The  acceptance  of  the  reformed  procedure 
is  much  more  constrained  and  reluctant  in  certain  of  the  States 
than  in  the  remaining  and  by  far  the  larger  portion  of  them. 
Again,  a  lack  of  uniformity  will  be  discovered  in  applying  the 
most  general  and  comprehensive  principles  of  interpretation  to 
the  various  elements  and  features  of  judicial  procedure.  All 
these  inconsistencies,  when  they  exist,  have  arisen  from  the 
incapacity  of  the  judicial  mind  to  apprehend  the  fact  that  legal 
actions  and  equitable  actions  have  been  abolished,  and  a  "civil 
action "  has  been  substituted  in  their  place.  Conceding  this 
truth  in  general,  courts  have  sometimes  failed  to  act  upon  it  in 
reference  to  some  subordinate  particulars;  the  result  has  been, 
not  a  perfect  harmonious  structure  built  up  by  judicial  labor,  but 
a  structure,  although  following  on  the  whole  a  comprehensive  and 
symmetrical  plan,  yet  marred  by  many  breaks  and  unfinished 
parts  and  misshapen  additions.  In  short,  the  true  fundamental 
principles  of  construction  have  been  generally  adopted  as  guides, 
the  true  spirit  and  design  of  the  reform  system  have  been  gener- 

'  Sec  the  comments  upon  Mr.  Justice  ^  See,  however,  cases  cited  in  note  1, 

Selden'H  o[)inion  in  I{euben.s  v.  Joel,  made     p.  9. 
by  Com.stock  J.,  in  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  W. 
Ins.  Co.,  2.3  N.  Y.  330,  360. 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF    THE    CIVIL    ACTION.  11 

ally  apprehended;  but  in  descending  to  the  details,  and  in  pre- 
scribing the  practical  rules  of  procedure,  this  principle  and  this 
spirit  have  been  sometimes  forgotten  or  intentionally  disregarded. 
§8.  *  68.  No  Change  in  Rights,  Duties,  or  Liabilities.  It  has 
been  abundantly  settled,  in  perfect  accordance  with  the  theory 
developed  in  the  preceding  section,  and  in  strict  conformity  with 
the  language  and  design  of  all  the  State  codes  and  practice  acts, 
that  the  new  system  has  not  produced,  and  was  not  intended  to 
produce,  any  alteration  of,  nor  direct  effect  upon,  the  primary 
rights,  duties,  and  liabilities  of  persons  created  by  either  depart- 
ment of  the  municipal  law.^  Whatever  may  have  been  the 
nature  or  extent  of  these  primary  rights  and  duties,  from  what- 
ever causes,  facts,  acts,  or  omissions  they  took  their  rise,  whether 
they  were  denominated  legal  or  equitable,  they  remain  exactly 
the  same  as  before.  The  codes  do  not  assume  to  abolish  the 
distinctions  between  "  law  "  and  "  equity, "  regarded  as  two  com- 
plementary departments  of  the  municipal  law ;  not  a  clause  is  to 
be  found  which  suggests  such  a  revolution  in  the  essential  nature 
of  the  jurisprudence  which  we  have  inherited  from  England. 
The  principles  by  which  the  courts  determine  the  primary  rights 
and  duties  of  litigant  parties  remain  unaltered;  upon  the  acts  or 

1  Peck  V.  Newton,  46  Barb.  173,  174,  104,  73  N.  W.  776,  where  the  court  says: 
per  Parker  J. ;  Cole  v.  Reynolds,  18  N.  Y.  "  The  framers  of  the  code  clearly  intende<l 
74,  76,  per  Harris  J. ;  Lattin  v.  McCarty,  to  abolish  all  distinctions  between  actions 
41  N.  Y.  107,  110,  per  Hunt  C.J. ;  Meyers  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  to  abolish  the 
V.  Field,  37  Mo.  434,  441,  per  Holmes  J. ;  forms  of  all  .such  actions,  and  to  provide 
Richardson  v.  Means,  22  Mo.  495,  498,  per  that  in  this  State  there  .shall  be  but  one 
Leonard  J. ;  Maguire  i'.  Vice,  20  Mo.  429  ;  form  of  action  for  the  enforcement  or  pro- 
Matlock  V.  Todd,  2.5  Ind.  128,  130,  per  tection  of  private  rights  and  the  redress  or 
Elliot  J. ;  Woodford  v.  Leavenworth,  14  prevention  of  private  wrongs,  which  is  de- 
Ind.  311,  314,  per  Worden  J.;  Emmons  nominated  a  civil  action."  See  especially 
V.  Kiger,  23  Ind.  483,  487;  De  Witt  r-  Draper  r.  Brown  (1902),  11.5  Wis.  361,  91 
Hays,  2  Cal.  463,  468,  per  Murray  C.  J. ;  N.  W.  1001,  citing  and  quoting  from  Hone- 
Grain  t'.  Aldrich,  38  Cal.  514;  Cropsey  r.  steel  v.  Bouesteel,  supra.  Hopkins  v. 
Sweeney,  27  Barb.  310;  Klonne  v.  Brad-  Washington  County  (1898),  56  Neb.  596, 
street,  7  Ohio  St.  322,  325,  per  Bowen,  J. ;  77  N.  W.  53  :  "  The  distinction  between 
Garret  v.  Gault,  13  B.  Mon.  378,  380,  per  law  and  equity  is  not  abolished  in  this 
Hise  J. ;  Bonesteel  v.  Bonesteel,  28  Wis.  State.  Section  2  of  the  Code  of  Civil 
245,  250,  per  Lyon  J. ;  Dickson  r.  Cole,  Procedure,  however,  provides  that  there 
.34  Wis.  621,  625  ;  Martin  v.  Mobile  &  O.  shall  be  but  one  form  of  action,  called  a 
R.  R.,  7  Bush,  116,  124;  Richmond  &  L.  '  civil  action,' in  which  rules  of  law  or  doc- 
Turnp.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  7  Bush,  .532,  535 ;  trines  of  equity  may,  under  proper  plead- 
Lanison  i\  Pfaff,  1  Handy,  449,  452  ;  ing  and  proper  states  of  facts,  either  or 
Clau.ssen  v.  La  Frenz,  4  Greene  (la.),  224;  both  be  enforced.'']  See  Mowry  t'.  Hill, 
Smith  -•.  Rowe,  4  Cal.  6.  11  Wis.  146,  149. 

[^See  Kollock  v.  Scribuer  (1897),  98  Wis. 


12  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

omissions  which  were  fhe  occasion  of  a  right  called  equitable  the 
same  right  is  still  based,  and  is  still  properly  termed  equitable; 
from  the  acts  or  omissions  which  were  the  occasions  of  a  right 
called  legal  the  same  right  still  arises,  and  is  still  with  propriety 
termed  legal.  ^  I  remark,  in  passing,  that  much  of  the  confusion 
and  uncertainty  which  now  exists  would  at  once  disappear,  if  the 
bar  and  the  bench  should  adopt  a  nomenclature  in  conformity 
with  the  settled  principle  of  interpretation,  and  should  speak  of 
legal  and  equitable  rights,  legal  and  equitable  remedies,  but  not 
of  legal  and  equitable  actions.  To  term  an  action  "legal"  or 
"  equitable  "  is  a  misnomer,  and  one  which  involves  a  wrong 
conception  and  a  false  doctrine,  since  the  statute  has  removed 
all  distinction  between  legal  and  equitable  actions,  and  has  su"b- 
stituted  in  place  of  both  a  single  "  civil  action ;  "  and  the  courts 
have  decided  that  the  legislature  intended  exactly  what  it  has 
said. 2  But  as  the  legislature  did  not  say,  nor  mean  to  say,  that 
the  distinctions  between  legal  and  equitable  rights  or  remedies 
are  abolished,  those  terms  may  be  used  with  propriety  and  cor- 
rectness.^ The  reformed  American  system,  in  short,  has  given 
no  new  causes  of  action.  Primary  rights  and  duties  are  un- 
changed ;  the  delicts  or  wrongs  which  are  the  violations  of  these 
rights  and  duties  are  still  committed  in  the  same  manner  as 
before ;  and  as  these  primary  rights  and  duties,  and  the  wrongs 
which  violate  them,  constitute  the  causes  of  action  over  which 
the  courts  exercise  their  remedial  jurisdiction,  it  is  plain  that  no 
statute  relating  solely  to  procedure  can  increase,  diminish,  or 
modify  the  causes  of  action  which  exist  independently  of  pro- 
cedure. In  some  instances  particular  parties  are  permitted  to 
maintain  an  action  who  could  not  have  maintained  it  under  the 
old  practice;  but  in  no  instance  can  this  now  be  done  where 
upon  the  same  facts  and  circumstances  a  similar  action  could  not 
have  been  maintained  by  some  person.  A  familiar  illustration  of 
this  statement  is  found  in  the  change  made  in  the  common-law 

'  QAnderson   v.  War  Eagle  Min.  Co.  reference  to  the  form  of  action.     Skinner 

(1903),  Idaho,  72   I'ac.  671,  quoting  the  i-.  Sliinner  (1894),  38  Neb.  756,  57  N.  W. 

text.]  534.      But  see   Draper  r.    Brown   (1902), 

'^  Qlt  is  not  material  by  what  name,  or  115  Wis.  361,  91  N.  W.  1001. 3 
whetlier  by  any,  an  action  under  the  code  ^  [^Anderson  v.   War  Eagle  Min.  Co. 

JH  designated.     The  pleader  .sliould  state  (1903),   Idaho,  72   Pac.  671,  quoting  the 

the  facts,  and  if  they  constitute  a  cause  of  text.] 
action,  the  law  affords  the  remedy  without 


GENEUAL    NATURE    OF   THE    CIVIL    ACTION.  13 

rule  prohibiting  an  action  by  the  assignee  of  a  non-negotiable 
thing  in  action,  and  requiring  the  suit  to  be  prosecuted  in  the 
name  of  the  assignor,  although  for  the  benefit,  and,  as  it  was 
finally  settled,  under  the  complete  control,  of  the  assignee.  The 
codes  have  abrogated  this  technical  dogma,  and  thus  permit  an 
action  to  be  brought  by  a  party  who  formerly  had  no  such  power; 
but  this  does  not  create  nor  constitute  any  new  cause  of  action. 
The  assignee  now  sues  where  the  assignor  sued ;  the  same  facts 
must  be  proved,  the  same  rights  asserted,  and  the  same  relief 
given ;  the  only  change  is  in  permitting  the  assignee  to  accom- 
plish directl}^  and  in  his  own  name,  what  he  before  accomplished 
indirectly  and  by  the  use  of  another's  name. 

§  9.  *69.  No  Change  in  Remedies  or  Remedial  Rights.  The 
doctrine  thus  uniformly  established  in  reference  to  the  effect  of 
the  reform  legislation  upon  primary  rights  and  duties,  and  causes 
of  action,  is  also  as  clearly  settled  in  reference  to  its  effect  upon 
remedies  and  remedial  rights,  when  the  term  is  used  —  as  it 
properly  should  be  —  to  denote  the  reliefs  which  are  conferred 
upon  parties,  and  not  tlie  means  of  procuring  these  reliefs.  The 
word  "remedies"  is  sometimes  used  in  two  different  technical 
senses,  and  from  this  dual  meaning  there  arises  —  as  in  all  such 
cases  —  doubt  and  confusion.  The  secondary  and  in  strictness 
improper  signification  renders  the  word  equivalent  to  the  mere 
judicial  instruments  and  their  incidents,  the  actions  at  law,  suits 
in  equity,  special  proceedings,  and  the  like,  — the  various  steps 
in  a  forensic  controversy  which  fall  within  the  proper  domain  of 
practice.  The  primary  and  strictly  accurate  signification  makes 
it  synonymous  with  the  judgments  which  are  pronounced  by  the 
court,  and  which  established  the  remedial  rights  and  prescribe 
the  manner  in  which  and  the  means  by  which  they  are  to  be 
satisfied.  Or  "remedies  "  may  denote  those  judgments  executed 
and  performed  by  which  the  party  has  received  the  very  benefit 
to  which  he  was  entitled,  —  the  sum  of  money,  the  possession  of 
the  land  or  of  the  chattels,  the  execution  and  delivery  of  the 
deed,  the  cancellation  of  the  agreement,  the  removal  of  the  ob- 
struction, or  whatever  else  was  ordered  to  be  done  by  the  opposite 
party.  In  either  of  these  two  latter  senses,  the  remedies  which 
were  in  use  under  the  former  system,  and  which  were  awarded 
by  the  courts  upon  proper  occasions,  are  absolutely  unaffected 
in   any  of   their   essential   features  by  the  reformatory  legislu- 


14  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

tion.^  The  general  and  sweeping  language  so  often  quoted  abol- 
ishes the  distinction  between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity  ;  and 
other  provisions  and  clauses  recognize  all  the  forms  of  judgment 
known  to  the  common-law  courts,  namely,  for  payment  of  money, 
for  the  possession  of  land  and  of  chattels,  and  also  the  specific 
kinds  of  relief  which  courts  of  equity  embodied  in  their  decrees. 
Strictly  speaking,  the  remedy  given  is  no  part  of  the  action,  but 
is  the  result  thereof;  it  is  the  object  for  which  the  action  is 
prosecuted,  the  end  at  wdiich  all  the  litigation  is  directed.  A 
modification  of  the  action,  a  change  in  its  forms,  incidents, 
names,  modes  of  procedure,  including  the  process,  the  pleadings, 
the  parties,  the  manner  of  trial,  and  all  other  steps  preparatory 
to  the  judgment,  does  not  involve  any  alteration  in  this  result; 
the  general  language  of  the  codes  does  not,  therefore,  include 
and  apply  to  the  substance  of  the  judgments,  that  is,  of  the 
remedies.  Without,  however,  relying  exclusively  upon  an 
interpretation  which  may  seem  to  be  too  refined  and  verbal,  the 
practical  construction  given  by  the  courts,  and  as  illustrated  by 
the  citations  contained  in  the  preceding  foot-note,  fully  sustains 
the  conclusions  which  are  reached  by  an  analysis  of  the  language. 
Abolition  of  the  distinction  between  legal  and  equitable  actions, 
and  of  the  forms  of  legal  actions,  does  not  abolish  the  distinc- 
tions between  remedies.  If  from  the  nature  of  the  primary  right, 
and  of  the  wrong  by  which  it  is  invaded,  the  injured  party  would 
under  the  old  system  have  been  entitled  to  an  equitable  remedy, 
he  is  still  entitled  to  the  same  relief,  and  it  may  well  be  teimed 
equitable;  if  from  the  like  causes  he  would  have  been  entitled  to 
a  legal  remedy,  he  is  still  entitled  to  the  same  relief,  and  it  may 
properly  be  described  as  legal. 

§  10.  *  70.  The  Differences  that  have  been  Abolished.  What  is 
Established?  It  having  been  thus  determined  that  no  effect  has 
been  wrought  upon  the  primary  lights  and  duties  which  consti- 

'  See  ca.<es  last  citeil  under  §  8  ;  also,  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  yet  the 

Carrico  I'.  Toinlinson,  17  Mo.  499  ;  Butler  legislature  has   not    intended   tliereby   to 

r.  Lee,  .33  How.  I'r.  K.  251  (Ct.  of  App.).  change  the  nature  of  the  remedies  wliieh 

[[See  Uord  c.  Bradbury  (1900),  156  Ind.  generally   obtain    in    those    jurisdictions 

30,  S;*  N.  IC.  31,    where   the   court   says:  where   courts  of   law   and   chancery   are 

"  .Judgments  at  law  and  decrees  inequity  separate,   nor    could  they   do  so  if   they 

are    all    'judgments'    under    the   code."  wished,  as  it  would  be  in  most  instances 

Olson  c.  Thompson  (1897),  6  Okla.  74,  48  impos.sible  to  obtain  relief  in  an  action  at 

Pac.   184:   "  Notwitlistanding  the  legisla-  law  wiiere  such  relief  must  come  through 

turc  hat  abolisiied  the  distinction  between  the  equitable  powers  of  the  court. "J 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF   THE    CIVIL    ACTION. 


15 


tute  the  great  body  of  the  municipal  hiw,  nor  upon  tlie  final 
remedies  granted  to  the  litigant  parties,  the  courts  have,  with 
general  though  not  with  absolute  unanimity,  agreed  upon  the 
interpretation  to  be  given  to  the  pi'ovision  under  consideration. 
The  broad  principle  of  construction  may  be  regarded  as  estab- 
lished in  most  if  not  all  the  States,  that  the  clauses  of  the  stat- 
utes abolishing  the  distinction  between  actions  at  law  and  suits 
in  equity  were  intended  to  mean  exactly  what  they  say,  without 
reservation  or  equivocation.  All  the  differences  which  belonged 
to  the  external  machinery  by  which  a  judicial  controversy  was 
conducted  up  to  the  judgment  itself,  all  the  rules  respecting 
forms  of  action,  all  the  peculiar  characteristics  of  a  legal  or  of  an 
equitable  action,  or  of  the  various  kinds  of  legal  actions,  except 
the  constitutional  requirement  as  to  the  jury  trial,  have  been 
swept  away.  One  action,  governed  in  all  instances  by  the  same 
principles  as  to  form  and  methods,  suffices  for  the  maintaining 
of  all  classes  of  primary  riglits,  and  for  the  pursuit  of  all  kinds 
of  civil  remedies.^  1  say,  governed  by  the  same  pynnciples  us  to 
form  and  method;    but  this  does  not  assume  that  exactly  the 


1  Dobson  u.  Pearce,  12  N.  Y.  156,  165; 
Crary  v.  Goodman,  12  N.  Y.  266,  268; 
N.  Y.  Ceut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nat.  Protection 
Ins.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  85,  90;  Cole  v.  Reynolds, 
18  N.  Y.  74,  76  ;  Bidwell  r.  Astor  In.s.  Co., 

16  N.  Y.  263,  267  ;  Phillips  r.  Gorham,  17 
N.  Y.  270,  273,  275  ;  Laub  v.  Buckniiller, 

17  N.  Y.  620,  626 ;  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  W. 
Ins.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  357,  359  ;  Brown  v. 
1-irown,  4  Robt.  688,  701  ;  Grinnell  v. 
Buchanan,  1  Daly,  538  ;  Crosier  v.  Mc- 
r>aughlin,  1  Nevada,  348 ;  Rogers  v.  Pen- 
niston,  16  Mo.  432;  Troost  v.  Davis,  31 
Ind.  34,  39;  Scott  v.  Crawford,  12  Lid. 
411  ;  Kramer  v.  Rebman,  9  Iowa,  114; 
De  Witt  V.  Hays,  2  Cal.  463  ;  Wiggins  r. 
McDonald,  18  Cal.  126  ;  Bowen  v.  Aubrey. 
22  Cal.  566,  569  ;  Ireland  v.  Nichols,  1 
Sweeney,  208;  Garret  v.  Gault,  13  B. 
Mon.  378,  380 ;  Wright  v.  Wright,  54 
N.  Y.  437,  442  ;  White  v.  Lyons,  42  Cal. 
279 ;  Giles  v.  Lyon,  4  N.  Y.  600 ;  Getty 
V.  Hudson  River  R.  R.,  6  How.  Pr.  269  ; 
Mowry  v.  Hill,  11  Wis.  146,  149;  Chiiin 
V.  Trustees,  32  Ohio  St.  236  ;  Gress  v. 
Evans,  1  Dak.  387  ;  Williams  v.  Slote,  70 
N.  Y.  601  ;  Stevens  v.  The  Mayor,  etc, 84 
N.  Y.  296,  304,  305;  Anderson  v.  Hunn, 


5  Hun,  79 ;  McPlierson  i-.  Weston,  64 
Cal.  275 ;  Sykes  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.  (S.  D.), 
49  N.  W.  1058. 

[South  Bend  Chilled  Plow  Co.  v.  Geo. 
C.  Cribb  Co  (1900),  105  Wis.  443,  81 
N.  W.  675  ;  Dickerson  v.  Spokane  (1901), 
26  Wash.  292,  66  Pac.  381  :  "  Under  the 
system  of  code  procedure  whereby  the 
distinction  between  actions  at  law  and 
suits  in  equity  is  abolislied,  an  action  at 
law  is  maintainable  upon  an  ecjuitable  as- 
signment." Morehouse  v.  Throckmorton 
(1899),  72  Conn.  449,  44  Atl.  747  ;  Hahl  v. 
Sugu  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  109,  62  N.  E.  135. 
In  Rogers  v.  Duhart  (1893),  97  Cal.  500, 
32  Pac.  570,  it  is  said :  "  With  us,  mere 
forms  of  action  are  cast  aside.  Every 
action  is  now,  in  effect,  a  special  action  on 
the  case."  Merriman  i\  Walton  (1895), 
105  Cal.  403,  38  Pac.  1108;  Whitehead  v. 
Sweet  (1899),  126  Cal.  67,  58  Pac.  376  : 
"  Under  our  code  there  is  but  one  form 
of  action,  and  if  the  complaint  states  facts 
.wljic'h  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  relief  either 
legal  or  equitable,  it  is  not  demurrable 
upon  the  ground  that  it  does  not  state 
facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of 
action."J 


16  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

same  form  or  method  is  to  be  or  can  be  used  in  all  actions  for 
whatever  purposes  brought.  The  common  principle  as  to  form 
and  method  is  not  that  all  actions  shall  assume  absolutely  the 
same  form,  nor  is  it  that  they  shall  be  governed  by  any  technical 
rules  which  separate  them  into  arbitrary  classes ;  it  is  that  they 
shall  all  conform  to  and  follow  the  facts  and  circumstances  which 
constitute  the  cause  of  action,  and  entitle  the  parties  to  relief. 
It  is  established,  therefore,  that  a  single  judicial  action,  based 
upon  and  conforming  to  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  par- 
ticular case,  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  primary  right  which 
they  create,  must  be  used  for  the  pursuit  of  all  remedies,  legal 
or  equitable.^  The  authorities  referred  to  in  the  notes  show  that 
this  doctrine  is  now  adopted  in  all  the  States  where  the  reformed 
procedure  prevails,  and  that  there  is  little  variation  in  the  lan- 
guage by  which  it  is  expressed.  When,  however,  we  shall 
pass  from  this  statement  of  the  doctrine  in  the  abstract  to  the 
application  of  it  in  particular  instances,  —  as,  for  example,  in 
questions  as  to  parties,  pleading,  judgments,  —  the  perfect  uni- 
formity of  jq,dicial  opinion  and  action  disappears ;  but  still  in 
the  great  majority  of  the  States  the  courts  have  fairly  followed 
the  true  intent  of  the  legislation  and  the  correct  principle  of 
interpretation. 

§11.    *71.    Rule  Settled  herein.      Familiar  Rule   in    Old   System. 
Thus  it  may  be  regarded  as   a  settled  rule,  resulting  from  the 

'  []See  cases  cited  in  last  preceding  note,  ferred  to,   clearly   evince   the   legislative 

Zurfluh  V.  Smith  (1902),  135  Cal.  644,  67  intent  to  strip  our  modern  procedure  of 

Pac.    1089.     This  was  an  action    for  ac-  the  cumbrous  forms  and  distinctions  which 

counting  against  the  administrator  of  a  made  tlie  jiractice  under  the  common  law 

deceased  guardian  and  for  judgment  fur  and  tiie  earlier  statutes  so  burdensome  iu 

the  amount  found  due  against  the  sureties  its  details  and  so  uncertain  in  its  results. 

on  the  guardian's   bond.     Appellants,  tlie  I'pon  exaniiiiiiig  that  portion  of  the  Code 

sureties,  claimed  that  an  equitaljlc  action  which  deals  with  actions  to  recover  real 

must   first   be   brought   to  ascertain   the  property  (Ch.  14,  tit.  1,  art.  1)  we  find  that 

amount  due  and  then  a  second  action  to  the  old    term    'ejectment'   has   been   dis- 

obtiiin  a  judgment  against  tlie  sureties  for  carded  in  the  title  and  it  is  now  eutitled 

that  amount.    But  the  court  held  it  proper  '  Actions  to  recover  real  property.'      This 

to  bring  one  action  to  decide  the  entire  change  of  name  was  obviously  a  part  of 

controversy,  saying  that  it  mattered  not  the  plan  of   the  codifiers  to  reduce   our 

that  part  of  the  relief  was  eiiuitable  and  practice  to  a  simple  and  composite  scheme 

part  legal.]  under  which  all  of  the  rights  of  litigants, 

Qln  Hahl  u.  Sugo  (1901),  169  X.  Y.  109,  both  legal  and  e()uitable,  so  far  as  they 

62  .N.  E.  135,  the  court,  referring  to  sec-  are  consistent  with  each  otlier  and  affect 

tions  3339,481,  and  others  of  the  code,  the  same  ])arties,  can  he  tried  in  one  actioa 

said:  "These  sections  of  the  Code,  and  and  be  merged  iu  one juiiguieut."] 
others,  which   ueed  not  Ije  sjiecifically  re- 


GENERAL   NATURE    OF   THE    CIVIL   ACTION. 


17 


statutory  provision  in  question,  that  if  a  plaintiff  lias  set  forth 
facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action,  and  entitling  him  to  some 
relief,  either  legal  or  equitable,  his  action  shall  not  be  dismissed 
because  he  has  misconceived  the  nature  of  his  remedial  right,  and 
has  asked  for  a  legal  remedy  when  it  should  have  been  equitable, 
or  for  an   equitable  remedy  when  it   should  have   been   legal. ^ 


1  [[Damou  v.  Leque  (1896),  14  Wash. 
253,  44  Pac.  261,  quotiug  the  text;  Wat- 
son !'.  Glover  (1899),  21  Wash.  677,  59 
Pac.  516;  Dreyer  v.  Hart  (1896),  147  lud. 
€04,  47  N.  E.  174;  Gartuer  v.  Corwine 
(1897),  57  O.  St.  246,  48  N.  E.  945  ;  Auder- 
son  V.  War  Eas^le  Miu.  Co.  (1903),  Idaho, 
72  Pac.  671,  quoting  the  te.xt] ;  Crary 
V.  Goodraau,  12  N.  Y.  266,  268;  N.  Y. 
Cent.  Ins.  Co.  v.  National  Protec.  Ins.  Co., 
14  N.  Y.  85,  90  ;  Emery  v.  Pease,  20  N.  Y. 
€2,  64  ;  Bidwell  v.  Astor  Ins.  Co.,  16  N.  Y. 
263,  267;  Phillips  i'.  Gorham,  17  N.  Y. 
270,  273,  275;  Laub  v.  Buckniiller,  17 
N.  Y.  620,  626  ;  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  W. 
Ins.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  357,  359  ;  Farlow  v. 
Scott,  24  N.  Y.  40,  45  ;  Marquat  v.  Mar- 
quat,  12  N.  Y.  336  ;  Troost  v.  Davis,  31 
lud.  .34,  39  ;  Grain  v.  Aldrich,  38  Cal.  514, 
520  ;  Leonard  v.  Rogau,  20  Wis.  540,  542. 
In  Emery  v.  Pease,  20  N.  Y.  62,  the  com- 
plaint set  out  facts  entitling  the  plaintiff 
to  an  accounting,  but  did  not  ask  one ;  it 
did  not  aver  any  settlement,  nor  ascer- 
tained balauce  due,  and  demanded  judg- 
ment for  a  sum  certain.  On  the  trial  the 
complaint  was  dismissed,  on  the  ground 
that  it  did  not  set  forth  facts  sufficient  to 
constitute  a  cause  of  action.  Comstock  J., 
after  stating  the  old  rule  by  which  the 
action  would  liave  been  properly  dis- 
missed, proceeds  (p.  64):  "In  determin- 
ing whether  an  action  will  lie,  the  courts 
are  to  liave  no  regard  to  the  old  distinc- 
tions between  legal  and  equitable  reme- 
dies. Those  distinctions  are  c.\])ressly 
abolished.  A  suit  does  not,  as  formerly, 
fail  because  the  plaintiff  has  made  a  mis- 
take as  to  the  form  of  the  remedy.  If  the 
case  which  he  states  entitles  him  to  any 
remedy,  either  legal  or  equitable,  his  com- 
plaint is  not  to  be  dismissed  because  he 
has  prayed  for  a  judgment  to  which  he  is 
not  entitled."  Bidwell  v.  Astor  Ins.  Co., 
16  N.  Y.  263,  was  an  action  on  a  policy  of 
insurance.  The  complaint  asked  thiit  tlie 
policy  be  reformed,  and  that  the  defendant 


pay  $7,000  as  the  sum  insured  by  the  re- 
formed policy.  Without  a  reformation 
the  plaintiif  was  not  entitled  to  a  judg- 
ment for  any  amount.  On  the  trial  a 
mistake  in  the  instrument  was  prqved, 
and  the  court  directed  a  judgment  for 
$7,000.  The  defendant  insisted  that  a 
judgment  for  damages,  instead  of  one  for 
a  reformation,  was  imj)roper.  The  court 
say  :  "  There  was  nothing  in  the  objection 
that  the  court  should  have  stopped  with 
reforming  tlie  policy,  and  turned  the  plain- 
tiff over  to  a  new  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages." The  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Ins. 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  357,  is  an  important  and 
suggestive  case.  The  action  was  on  an 
insurance  policy.  The  plaintiff  claimed  a 
money  judgment  for  a  loss,  and  also  a 
reformation  of  the  policy  which,  if  made, 
would  entitle  him  to  a  furtlier  recovery  of 
money.  He  failed  to  make  out  a  case  for 
a  reformation  ;  whereupon  the  trial  court 
dismissed  the  action,  holding  that  tlie  other 
issue  could  not  be  tried.  Comstock  J.  said 
(p.  359)  :  "  I  am  of  opinion  that  it  was 
erroneous  to  turn  the  plaintiff  out  of  court 
on  the  mere  ground  that  he  had  not  en- 
titled himself  to  the  equitable  relief 
granted,  if  there  was  enough  left  of  his 
case  to  entitle  him  to  recover  the  sum  in 
which  he  was  insured.  No  suggestion  was 
made  that  the  complaint  did  not  show  a 
good  cause  of  action  for  this  money,  even 
after  striking  out  all  tlie  allegations  and 
the  prayer  on  the  subject  of  the  equitable 
relief."  The  same  doctrine  is  again  ap- 
plied in  Barlow  v.  Scott,  24  N.  Y.  40,  45, 
Lott  J.  saying :  "  Under  our  present 
arrangement,  the  same  court  lias  botli  legal 
and  equitable  jurisdiction  ;  and  if  tiie  facts 
stated  by  a  party  in  his  complaint  are 
sufficient  to  entitle  liim  to  any  of  the 
relief  asked,  and  an  answer  is  put  in 
putting  these  facts  in  issue,  it  would  be 
erroneous  to  dismiss  the  complaint  on  the 
ti-ial  merely  because  improper  relief  is 
primarily  demanded."    The  true  principle 


18  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

Nothing  was  a  more  familiar  rule  in  the  old  system  than  the  one 
which  turned  a  plaintiff  out  of  court  if  he  had  misconceived  tlie 
nature  or  form  of  his  action.  If  he  brought  an  action  at  law, 
and  on  the  trial  proved  a  case  for  equitable  relief,  or  if  he  filed  a 
bill  in  equity,  and  at  the  hearing  showed  himself  entitled  to  a 
judgment  at  law,  he  must  absolutely  fail  in  that  proceeding.  It 
is  very  plain  that  this  arbitrary  and  most  unjust  rule  rested 
wholly  upon  the  ancient  notions  as  to  distinctions  between  legal 
and  equitiible  actions,  and  did  not  rest  upon  any  notions  as  to  the 
jirimary  rights  which  the  litigant  parties  sought  to  maintain. 
Wherever,  therefore,  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  reformed  system 
are  followed  by  the  courts,  this  harsh  rule  is  swept  away.  A 
suit  does  not  now  fail  because  the  plaintiff  has  erred  as  to  the 
form  or  kind  or  extent  of  the  remedy  he  demands.^  A  party 
cannot  be  sent  out  of  court  merely  because  the  facts  alleged  do 
not  entitle  him  to  relief  at  law,  or  merely  because  they  do  not 
entitle  him  to  relief  in  equity.  If  the  case  which  he  states  shows 
him  entitled  to  any  relief,  either  legal  or  equitable,  his  complaint 
is  not  to  be  dismissed  because  he  has  prayed  for  a  judgment  that  is 
not  embraced  by  the  facts.  The  only  inconvenience  which  a 
plaintiff  can  suffer  from  such  an  error  is,  that  the  trial  may,  per- 
haps, be  suspended,  and  the  cause  sent  to  another  brancli  of  tlie 
court,  or,  as  in  Kentucky,  Iowa,  and  Oregon,  to  another  docket.^ 
If  a  plaintiff  had  brought  his  action  on  the  theory  that  it  M'as 
based  upon  an  equitable  right,  and  sought  an  equitable  relief, 
and  it  turns  out  to  be  in  effect  legal,  so  that  the  defendant  is 
entitled  to  a  jury  trial,  the  trial  must  be  had  before  a  jury,  and 

was  tersely  and  most  accurately  stated  by  ^  McCrory  v.   Parks,  18    Ohio   St.    1; 

Sanderson  J.  in  Grain  r.  Aldrich,  38  Cal.  Ellithorpe  r.  Buck,  17  Ohio  St.  72.     See 

.014,  520 :  "  Legal  and  equitable  relief  are  Dickson  v.  Cole,  34  Wis.  621,  62.5. 

adnninistered  in   the  same  forum  and  ac-  ^See  p.  6,  note  1.     Ming  Yue  i'.  Coos 

cording  to  the  same  general  plan.    A  party  Bay  U.  R.  Co   (1893),  24  Ore.  392,  33  Pac. 

cannot  be  sent  out  of  court  merely  because  641:    "The    distinction    between   actions 

liis  facts  do  not  entitle  him  to  relief  at  and   suits  is  not  al)olished  by  our  code, 

law,  or  merely  because  he  is  not  entitled  .  .  .  When,  therefore,  the  }ilaintiffs,  being 

to  relief  in   equity,  as  the  case  may  be.  in  equity,  failed  to  statu  in  their  complaint 

He  can  be  sent  out  of  court  only  when  a  cause  of  suit,  notwithstanding  they  may 

upon  his  facts  he  is  entitled  to  no  relief  have  stated  a  cause  of  action,  the  court 

either  at  law  or  in   eciuity."     Hamill   v  bad  no  jurisdiction  to  retain  and  try  such 

Thompson,  3  Colo.  518,  523  ;  Schilling  v.  action,  but  was  bound  to  dismi.'^s  the  suit, 

Kominger,  4  Colo.  100;  Whiting  i'    Hoot,  and  leave  the  ])laintiffs  to  prosecute  their 

52  Iowa,  292  ;  Herring  r.  Neely,  43  Iowa,  action,    if   they    have   one  .at   law."     See 

157.  also  Small  v.  Lutz  (1899),  34  Ore.  131,  55 

»  See  notes  2  and  3,  p.  005.  Pac.  529.] 


GENERAL    MATUKE    OF   THE    CIVIL    ACTION.  19 

not  before  a  single  judge  sitting  us  a  chancellor  ;  and,  when  the 
trial  had  taken  place   before  the    wrong  tribunal,  the  judgment 
would  be  reversed,  and  the  cause  sent  for  a  new  trial  in  the 
■proper  place.^ 

§  12.  *  72.  Struggle  in  Establishing  Rule.  Missouri  Doctrine. 
The  rule  discussed  in  the  foregoing  paragraph  as  to  the  relation 
between  the  facts  alleged  and  the  relief  asketl  and  granted  was 
not  established  without  a  struggle,  and  has  not  at  all  times, 
and  in  all  the  States,  prevailed  without  exception,  and  perhaps  is 
not  even  now  universally  accepted.  Many  early  cases  in  New 
York  were  decided  under  the  influence  of  the  former  practice 
and  the  ancient  notions ;  and  although  the  Court  of  Appeals 
has  completely  repudiated  the  doctrine  of  those  adjudications, 
yet  the  principles  announced  by  it  have  not  always  been  fol- 
lowed by  the  inferior  tribunals  of  the  same  State.^  In  one  or 
two  of  the  States,  and  especially  in  Missouri,  the  ancient  rules 
and  doctrines  in  reference  to  this  subject-matter  have  been  re- 
peatedly asserted,  and,  until  a  very  recent  period,  prevailed  in 
the  courts,  notwithstanding  the  adoption  of  the  reformed  proce- 
dure. In  Missouri,  the  judiciary,  standing  alone  in  this  respect, 
preserved  for  a  long  time  the  real  distinctions  between  legal  and 
equitable  actions  as  strongly  marked  as  under  the  former  system, 
and,  in  fact,  insisted  upon  a  rule  more  strict  than  that  enforced 
by  the  English  Court  of  Chancery.^  The  following  examples 
will  illustrate  this  peculiar  interpretation  of  their  code  by  the 
Missouri  courts.  In  those  cases  where  the  plaintiff  holds  the 
equitable  title  to  land,  while  the  legal  title  is  in  the  defendant  by 

1  Davis  V.  Morris,  36  N.  Y.  569,  571,  jury  cause.     Parker  v.   Laney,  58   N.  Y. 

5"2,  per  Grover  J.     In  this  case  the  New  469 ;  Richmoud  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co., 

York   Court  of  Appeals  laid  down,  in  a  33  Iowa,  422,  489-491. 
formal  manner,  the  rule  as  to  the  trial  of  2  gee  Peck  v.  Newton,  46  Barb.   173, 

legal  and  e(|uitable  issues.     If  the  plead-  174. 

iugs    present    both    legal    and    equitable  '*  fSoe  also  Draper  v.  Brown  (1902), 

issues,  the  parties  are  entitled  to  a  jury,  115  Wis.  361,  91  N.  W.  1001,  in  which  the 

and  all  the  issues  must  be  tried  together  ;  court,  in  speaking  of    the  distinction   be- 

tliat   is,   there   should    not    be    a   partial  tween  legal   and  eqnital)le  actions,  said  : 

trial  before  a  jury  and  the  residue  before  "  So    pronounced  and    well  preserved    is 

another  tribunal.     If,  however,  the  plain-  this  distinction  that  this  court  sustained 

tiff  insists  upon  a  trial  before  the  court,  and  a  demurrer  to  a  complaint  in  an  equitable 

his  claim  is  acceded  to,  upon  the  discov-  action,  notwithstanding  it  contained  alle- 

ery  that  the  action  presents  issues  which  gations  which,  if  standing  by  themselves, 

must  be  decided  by  a  jury,  the  complaint  would  constitute  an  action  at  law.  Deuuer 

should  not  be  dismissed,   but   the   cause  v.  Railroad  Co.,  57  Wis.  218,  15  N.  W. 

should  be  seut  to  the  circuit  for  trial  ai  a  158. "3 


20 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


mciius  of  a  fraudulent  conveyance,  it  has  been  frequently  held 
tluit  the  former  must  first  obtain  a  decree  in  equity,  cancelling 
the  outstanding  deed,  and  must  then  resort  to  a  separate  action 
of  ejectment  to  recover  possession  of  the  land.  A  vendee  of 
land  has  also  been  required  to  proceed  in  two  distinct  actions,  — 
the  first  equitable,  to  compel  a  specific  performance,  and  the 
second  legal,  to  obtain  possession.  The  plaintiff  was  turned 
over  to  a  second  legal  action  in  order  to  complete  his  remedy, 
because,  as  the  court  repeatedly  insisted,  possession  of  land  can 
never  be  awarded  by  a  decree  in  equity.^  The  Missouri  court  ha.s 
recently  receded,  in  part  at  least,  from  tliis  extreme  position,  and 
is  plainly  tending  towards  a  complete  harmony  with  the  doctrines 
which  are  accepted  in  other  Stfites.^  A  simple  criterion  has  been 
suggested  by  which  to  determine  the  nature  of  the  action.  If 
the  facts  alleged  in  the  complaint  or  petition  would  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  both  legal  and  equitable  relief,  the  prayer  for  judg- 
ment—  that  is,  the  nature  of  the  remedy  demanded  —  might 
be  a  certain  test  by  which  the  character  of  the  suit  should  be 
known.'^  This  suggestion  has  not,  however,  been  followed  in 
other  cases. 


1  Meyers  v.  Field,  37  Mo.  434,  441 ; 
Maguire  c.  Vice,  20  Mo.  429;  Curd  v 
Lackland,  43  Mo.  199;  Wyuu  i-.  Cory, 
43  Mo.  301 ;  Gray  i:  Payne,  43  Mo.  203 ; 
Bobb  1-.  Woodward,  42  Mo.  482,  487 ; 
Peyton  i:  Rose,  41  Mo.  257,  262  ;  Gott  v. 
Powell,  41  Mo.  416  ;  Moreau  v.  Detche- 
mendy,  41  Mo.  431;  Walker's  Adm.  /•. 
Walker,  2.')  Mo.  367  ;  Reed  v.  Robert.son, 
4.T  Mo.  580  ;  Rutherford  v.  Williams,  42 
Mo.  18,  23;  Fithiau  v.  Monks,  43  Mo. 
502,  517  ;  Magwire  v.  Tyler,  47  Mo.  115, 
127. 

2  Henderson  f.  Dickey,  .50  Mo.  161, 
165,  per  Wagner  J.  Followed  in  numer- 
ous recent  ca-ses;  see  Paddock  v.  Somes, 
102  Mo.  226. 

QSee  Holli.ster  t-.  Bell  (1900),  107  Wis. 
198,  83  N.  W.  297,  in  which  it  is  said: 
"The  idea  that  a  plain  action  at  law,  as 
to  whicii  there  is  an  entire  failure  of  proof, 
can  be  turned  into  an  action  in  equity  and 
a  recovery  be  had  such  as  that  jurisdiction 
in  any  event  can  aff(jrd  on  the  facts,  does 
not  find  supjjort  in  the  decisions  of  this 
court.  If  an  nction  be  brought  an<l  tried 
*n  an  action  at  law,  such  relief  only  is  ob- 


tainable as  is  afforded  on  the  facts  in  that 
form  of  action."  Seals  v.  Augusta  Ry.  Co. 
(1898),  102  Ga.  817,29  S.  E.  116;  Ham- 
ilton V.  Mandle  (1898),  103  Ga.  788,  30 
S.  E.  658  ;  Field  v.  Brown  (1896),  146 
Ind.  293,  45  N.  E.  464  :  "  There  may  prop- 
erly be  joined  causes  or  defences,  one  of 
which  is  triable  by  the  court  and  the  other 
by  a  jury. "J 

3  Giliett  V.  Treganza,  13  Wis.  472,  475, 
per  Dixon  C.  J.  Followed  in  Lowber  v. 
Connil,  36  Wis.  176;  liarrall  i'.  Gray,  10 
Neb.  186. 

[[Topping  t'.  Parish  (1897),  96  Wis.  378, 
71  N.  W.  367.  But  in  Stephens  v.  Hard- 
ing (1896),  48  Neb.  6.^)9,  67  N.  W.  746, 
the  court  said :  "  Under  our  system  of 
pleading  the  nature  of  an  action  is  deter- 
mined not  alone  by  the  j>rayer  for  relief, 
but  also  from  the  character  of  the  facts 
alleged."  So,  also,  Lett  v.  Hammond 
(1899),  59  Neb.  339,  80  N.  W.  1042  ;  Irwin 
V.  Richard.son  (1894),  88  Wis.  429,  60 
N.  W.  786 ;  United  Coal  Co.  i-.  Canon 
City  Coal  Co.  (1897),  24  Colo  116,  48  Vnv. 
1045;  Imperial  Siiale  Brick  Co.  >•  .Tewett 
(1901),  169  N.  Y.  143,  62  N.  E.  167.3 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF   THE    CIVIL    ACTION.  21 

§  13.  *  73.  Summary  of  Foregoing  Discussion.  Fundamental 
Principle  Stated.  To  recapitulate  the  results  ol'  the  foregoing 
(Uscussion:  The  courts  have,  with  few  exceptions,  accepted  the 
language  of  the  code  in  its  simplicity,  and  have  given  to  it  a 
reasonable  meaning;  they  have  acknowledged  that  the  legislature 
intended  to  abolish,  and  has  abolished,  all  the  features  which 
distinguish  legal  and  equitable  actions  from  each  other,  and  has 
established  a  single  action  for  the  pursuit  of  all  remedies;  they 
have  settled  the  doctrine  that  by  the  use  of  this  single  action 
neither  the  primary  rights  nor  the  remedial  rights  of  litigant 
parties  are  affected  or  in  any  manner  modified,  since  they  do 
not  depend  upon  matters  connected  with  the  form  or  external 
features  of  the  action,  and  that  among  the  matters  which  are 
thus  connected  with  the  form  are  the  setting  forth  or  statement 
of  the  cause  of  action  or  defence  in  the  pleadings,  and  the 
demand  of  relief  or  prayer  for  judgment.  A  mistake  or  mis- 
conception in  respect  to  the  action  being  called  legal  or  equitable 
does  not  defeat  the  plaintiff,  but  at  most  may  require  a  trial 
before  a  properly  constituted  court.  One  fundamental  principle 
controls  the  administration  of  justice  by  means  of  this  common 
civil  action,  and  this  principle  may  be  formulated  in  the  follow- 
ing manner:  The  object  of  every  action  is  to  obtain  a  judgment 
of  the  court  sustaining  or  protecting  some  primary  right  or 
enforcing  some  primary  duty;  every  such  primary  right  and 
duty  results  from  the  operation  of  the  law  upon  certain  facts, 
in  the  experience  of  the  person  holding  the  right  or  subjected  to 
the  duty ;  every  wrong  or  violation  of  this  primary  right  or  duty 
consists  in  certain  facts,  either  acts  or  omissions  of  the  person 
committing  the  wrong.  A  statement,  therefore,  of  the  facts 
from  which  the  primary  right  or  duty  arises,  and  also  of  the 
facts  which  constitute  the  wrong  or  violation  of  such  primary 
right  or  duty,  shows,  and  must  of  necessity  show,  at  once  a 
complete  cause  of  action;  that  is,  the  court  before  which  this 
statement  is  made  can  perceive  from  it  the  entire  cause  of  action, 
the  remedial  right  flowing  therefrom,  and  the  remedy  or  reme- 
dies which  should  be  awarded  to  the  injured  party.  All  actions 
can  be  and  should  be  constructed  in  the  manner  thus  described ; 
and,  if  so,  they  would  conform  to  the  single  and  common  prin- 
ciple announced  by  the  reformed  method  of  procedure.  Whether 
the  rights  and  duties  are  legal  or  equitable,  whether  the  remedies 


22  CIVIL  remp:dies. 

appropriate  are  legal  or  equitable,  whether  the  facts  are  simple 
and  few  or  complex  and  numerous,  does  not  in  the  sliglitest 
degree  affect  the  application  and  universality  of  this  principle; 
it  is  the  central  conception  of  the  new  system,  the  corner-stone 
upon  which  the  whole  structure  is  erected. 

§  14.  *  74.  Pleading  at  Common  Law  and  in  Equity.  It  is  not 
my  purpose  in  the  present  section  to  follow  this  general  principle 
in  its  application  to  the  various  features  and  phases  of  an  action; 
to  do  so  would  be  to  anticipate  the  matter  contained  in  several 
subsequent  chapters.  A  brief  allusion  must  be  made,  however, 
to  one  of  these  topics,  or  else  the  theory  of  construction  finally 
accepted  by  the  courts  will  be  but  partially  explained,  —  I  refer 
to  the  subject  of  pleading.  No  single  element  of  difference 
more  sharply  marked  the  contrast  between  the  action  at  law  and 
the  suit  in  equity  under  the  former  system  than  the  manner  in 
which  the  litigant  parties  in  each  stated  their  causes  of  action 
and  their  defences.  Although  it  was  said  that  in  each  kind  of 
judicial  proceeding  the /ac^s  constituting  the  cause  of  action  or 
defence  should  alone  be  alleged,  this  rule  was  not  followed  in 
actual  practice.  In  a  common-law  action  the  "issuable  facts" 
only  were  spread  upon  the  record.  The  plaintiff  never  narrated 
the  exact  transaction  between  himself  and  the  defendant  from 
which  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  parties  arose ;  he  stated  what 
he  coiiceivid  to  he  the  legal  effect  of  these  facts.  Thus,  if  the  trans- 
action was  a  simple  arrangement  respecting  the  sale  and  purchase 
of  goods,  instead  of  disclosing  exactly  what  the  parties  had 
actually  done,  the  pleader  used  certain  formulas  expressing  the 
supposed  legal  effect  of  what  had  been  done,  as  that  he  had  "sold 
and  delivered  "  or  had  "  bargained  and  sold  "  tlie  chattels ;  and, 
if  a  mistake  was  made  in  properly  conceiving  of  this  legal  effect, 
—  that  is,  if  the  real  facts  of  the  transaction,  as  disclosed  by  the 
evidence,  did  not  correspond  with  this  conception  of  their  legal 
effect  taken  by  the  pleader,  — the  plaintiff  might  be,  and,  unless 
permitted  to  amend,  would  be,  turned  out  of  court.  On  the 
equity  side  the  facts  as  they  occurred,  rather  than  the  legal 
aspect  of  or  conclusions  from  these  facts,  were  set  forth,  accord- 
ing to  the  original  theory  of  equitable  pleading.  In  practice  this 
narrative  was  always  accompanied  b}^  a  detail  of  mere  evidentiary 
matter,  which  was  inserted,  not  because  it  was  necessary  to  the 
statement  of  the  cause  of  action,  but  because  it  was  a  means  of 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF   THE   CIVIL   ACTION.  23 

obtaining  admissions  from  the  defendant,  and  of  thus  making 
him  a  witness  in  the  cause  against  himself.  A  l)ill  in  equity 
had,  therefore,  two  entirely  distinct  uses  and  olTices;  it  was  a 
narrative  of  the  facts  from  which  the  plaintiff's  rights  to  relief 
arose,  and  it  was  an  instrument  for  obtaining  evidence  from  the 
opposite  party.  This  latter  purpose,  which  was  known  as  "dis- 
covery," the  codes  have  expressly  abolished,  and  have  substituted 
in  its  stead  the  more  direct  method  of  an  oral  examination  of  one 
party  by  the  other,  if  desired,  either  on  the  trial  or  preliminary 
thereto. 

§  15.  *  75.  Tw^o  Schools  of  Interpretation  respecting  Modes  of 
Pleading  under  the  Code.  Upon  the  adoption  of  the  reformed 
system  in  New  York  there  arose  at  once  in  that  State,  and  sub- 
sequently in  other  commonwealths,  two  schools  of  interpretation 
in  reference  to  the  modes  of  pleading  prescribed  by  the  new 
procedure.  One  school  maintained  that  all  the  distinctive  fea- 
tures and  elements  of  the  common  law  and  of  the  equity  modes 
of  pleading  remained  in  full  force,  and  that  the  legislature  had 
simply  abolished  certain  names  and  certain  technical  rules  of 
mere  form.  This  particular  theory  was  a  necessary  and  evident 
corollary  of  the  broader  principle  advocated  by  the  same  school, 
and  already  explained  in  the  present  section,  that  the  division  of 
actions  into  legal  and  equitable  still  existed,  in  all  that  pertained 
to  their  substantial  nature ;  if  actions  were  now,  as  before,  legal 
or  equitable,  the  most  characteristic  features  of  the  two  classes, 
that  which  marked  their  difference  in  the  most  emphatic  manner, 
—  the  peculiar  modes  of  pleading  appropriate  to  each,  —  were  of 
course  preserved.  In  a  common-law  cause  the  pleader  was  to 
follow  the  common-law  rules  of  pleading,  and  in  an  equity  suit 
the  equity  rules.  This  doctrine  was  asserted  and  was  sustained 
with  great  ability  and  earnestness  by  several  judges  in  the  in- 
fancy of  the  system.  It  would  be  useless  to  cite  all  the  reported 
decisions  in  which  it  was  advocated ;  and  I  shall  only  refer  to  a 
few  which  have  always  been  regarded  as  leading.^     The  other 

1  Rochester    City    Bank    v.    Suydam,     "Tlie  rules  of  pleading  at  common  law 

5  How.    Pr.    216;     Wooden    r.    Waffle,     have  not  heen  abrogated.     The  essential 

6  How.  Pr.  145.  principles  still  remain,  and  have  only  been 
I^But  see  the  following  cases:  Lassiter     inoiiified  as  to  technicalities  and  matters 

V.  Roper  (1894),  114  N.  C.  17,  18  S.  E.  of  form."  Kilpatrick-Kocli  Dry-Goods  Co. 
946;  quoting  with  approval  Parsley  v.  r.  Box  (1896),  13  Utah,  494,  4.5  Pac.  629 : 
Nicholson,  65  N.  C.  210,  the  court  said:     "  Section  3219,  Comp.  Laws  of  Utah,  1'<SS, 


24  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

school  asserted  that  all  the  distinctions  between  the  common-law 
and  the  equity  modes  of  pleading  had  been  embraced  within  the 
sweeping  language  of  the  statute,  and  had  been  discarded ;  that 
one  general  principle  of  pleading  was  applicable  to  the  civil 
action  in  all  cases,  whatever  might  be  the  nature  of  tlie  primary 
right  it  sought  to  maintain,  or  of  the  remedy  it  sought  to  pro- 
cure. This  principle,  which  was  stated  in  a  preceding  para- 
graph, is  simple,  universal,  and  natural.  It  is  merely  that  the 
pleader  must  narrate  in  a  plain  and  concise  manner  the  actual 
facts  from  which  the  right  and  duties  of  the  parties  arise,  and 
not  his  conception  of  their  legal  effect,  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  mere  detail  of  evidence  which  substantiates  the  existence  of 
those  facts.  This  comprehensive  principle  applies  to  all  kinds  of 
actions,  to  one  founded  upon  a  legal  right  and  seeking  a  legal 
remedy,  and  to  one  founded  on  an  equitable  right  and  seeking 
an  equitable  remedy;  and  it  avoids  all  questions  and  difficulties 
as  to  the  "  issuableness  "  of  the  matters  alleged.  Undoubtedly, 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  primary  rights  invaded  and  of  the 
remedies  demanded,  the  narrative  of  facts  will  generally  be  much 
more  minute,  detailed,  and  circumstantial  in  actions  brought  to 

declares  the  rule  for  stating  the  cause  of  and  must  remain  the  same,  whether  under 

action  as   follows:    'The  complaint  must  code  or  at  common  law;  that  is  to  say,  a 

contain  ...  a  statement  of  the  facts  con-  pleading  must  be  so  drawn  as  to  tender  a 

stituting  the  cause  of  action,  in  ordinary  definite  issue  or  issues,  and  not  leave  the 

and  concise  language.'     The  al)Ove  is,  in  adversary  to  grope  in  the  dark  as  to  what 

substance,  the  common-law  rule.      '  Plead-  the  meaning  of  the  pleading  is ;  '  this  is 

ing  is  the  statement  in  a  logical  and  legal  no  more  allowable  now  than  formerly.'  " 

form   of  the   facts    which  constitute  the  Citizens'   Bank   v.   Tiger   Tail    Mill    Co. 

plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  or  the  defend-  (1899),  152  Mo.  14.5,  53  S.  W.  902  :  "  While 

ant's  ground  of  defence.    .  .   .  Facts  only  the  use  of  formal  aud  technical  averments, 

are   to   be   stated,  and  not  arguments  or  which  were  necessary  at  common  law  to 

inferences,  or  matters  of  law.'     1   Chitty  the  statement  of  a  cause  of  action,  have 

PI.  pp.  21.3,  214."     Casey  i'.  Mason  (1899),  been  dispensed  with  by  our  code  aud  are 

8  Okla.  665,  59  Pac.  252  :    "  The  statute  no  longer  necessary,  the   same   material 

did  not  abolish  common-law  causes  of  ac-  allegations  are   necessary    under   it   that 

tion  —  it  only  abolished  their  forms  and  were  necessary  at  common  law;  and  it  is 

grouped  them  under  one  head  —  aud  there  clear,  we  think,  that  at  common  law,  in 

is  no  difference  between  trespass  at  com-  order  to  state  a  cause  of  action  in  trover, 

mon  law  and  under  the  .statutes.     A  plain-  the  petition  should  .«tate  that  the  plaintiff 

tiff,    under  the  statute,  must  allege  and  liad  possession,  or  the  right  to  the  po.sses- 

prove  every  fact  that  he  was  required  to  sion,  of  the  property  sued  for  at  the  time 

allege  and  prove  at  common  law  "    Phelps,  of  the  conversion."     Merriman  i\  McCor- 

etc.  Co.  V.   Halsell  (1901),  11   Okla.  1,  65  mick  Harve.sting  M.  Co.  (1893),  86  Wi.s. 

Pac.340;  Huston  y.  Tyler  (1897),  140  Mo.  142,    56    N.  AV.   743 ;    Sell  i-.   Missi.ssippi 

252,  36    S.  W.  654:    "The   above   cases  River  Logging  Co.   (1894),  88  Wis.  581, 

recognize  the  doctrine   that   the   'funda-  60  N.  W.  1065.3 
mental  requirements '  of  good  pleading  are 


GENERAL    NATURE    OF   TIIH   CIVIL    ACTION 


25 


maintain  equitable  rights  and  to  recover  equitable  relief  than  in 
those  based  upon  legal  rights  and  pursuing  legal  relief,  but  this 
incident  does  not  alter  or  affect  the  j)rinciple  which  governs  all 
cases;  the  pleader  in  both  cases  sets  out  the  facts  which  entitle 
him  to  the  remedy  asked,  and  no  niore;^  it  simply  liappens  that 
legal  remedies  usually  depend  upon  a  few  positive  facts,  while 
equitable  remedies  often  arise  from  a  multitude  of  circumstances, 
events,  and  acts,  neitlier  of  which,  taken  by  itself,  would  have 
created  any  right  or  imposed  any  duty.  It  would  be  useless  to 
incumber  the  page  by  a  reference  to  all  the  reported  cases  in 
which  this  doctrine  has  been  approved;  and  I  shall  merely  cite 
one  or  two  which  are  leading  in  point  of  time,  and  which  may  be 
regarded  as  examples  of  the  class, ^  Without  entering  upon  any 
discussion  of  these  two  theories,  it  is  enough  to  say  that  the 
latter  one  has  been  accepted  as  expressing  the  true  intent  and 


[^^  "  The  spirit  of  our  civil  code  is  that 
a  party  shall  state  in  his  pleadings  the 
real  facts  of  iiis  case  and  not  falsehoods 
or  fictions ;  and  when  each  party  states 
what  he  believes  to  be  true  and  the  real 
facts  of  his  case,  the  court  may  know  pre- 
cisely where  the  parties  differ : "  Ken- 
nett  I'.  Peters  (1894),  54  Ken.  123,  37  Pac. 
999.  "  Under  the  reformed  procedure  it 
is  unnecessary,  in  a  pleading,  to  state  legal 
fictions.  The  pleader  should  state  the 
facts  which  constitute  his  cause  of  action 
in  ordinary  and  concise  hmguage  " :  Ball 
V.  Beaumont  (1900),  59  Neb.  631,  81  N.  W. 
858.] 

2  Millikin  V.  Gary,  5  How.  Pr.  272; 
Williams  v.  Hayes,  5  How.  Pr.  470; 
People  !;.  Ryder,  12  N.  Y.  433,  437.  The 
doctrine  of  the  text  was  very  clearly  and 
accurately  stated  by  Crocker  J.  in  Bowen 
V.  Aubrey,  22  Cal.  566,  569. 

[See  also  Botsford  v.  Wallace  (1899), 
72  Conn.  195,  44  Atl.  10,  where  the  court 
says:  "Aiming  at  simplicity,  the  Practice 
Act  has  discarded  the  technical  formali- 
ties of  common-law  pleading,  and  has  fol- 
lowed in  the  main  the  practice  in  equity." 
Also  Dun nett  v.  Thornton  (1900),  73  Conn. 
1,  46  Atl.  158;  Cone  v.  Ivinson  (1893),  4 
Wyo.  226,  33  Pac.  31  ;  Skinner  (•.  Skinner 
(1894),  38  Neb.  756,  57  N.  W.  534;  Moore 
V.  Spurrier  (1899),  55  S.  C.  292,  33  S.  E. 
352;  Hawkins  v.  Overstreet  (1898),  7  Okla. 
277,  54  Pac.  472:  "We  have  no  action 
of   trover.  .  .  .  The   distinction    between 


actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  and  the 
forms  of  all  such  actions  and  suits  hereto- 
fore existing,  are  abolished.  ...  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  facts  should  be  stated 
in  such  manner  as  would  iiave  entitled 
the  plaintiff  to  a  recovery  under  any  par- 
ticular form  of  action.  It  is  sufficient  if 
facts  are  alleged  which  show  a  right  to 
recovery  by  the  plaintiff  against  the  de- 
fendant under  the  general  principles  of 
law  determining  the  rights  of  parties,  and 
without  regartl  to  what  may  or  may  not 
liave  been  the  rules  of  pleading  or  stating 
a  cause  of  action  before  the  adoption  of 
our  code."] 

See  contra,  the  remarks  of  Holmes  J.  in 
Meyers  r.  Field,  37  Mo.  434,  441.  It  will 
be  seen  in  the  sequel  that  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri  stands  quite  alone  —  or 
at  least  did  so  until  a  very  recent  day  — 
in  its  theory  of  interpretation,  and  retains 
the  distinctions  between  legal  and  equita- 
ble forms,  in  as  marked  a  manner  as 
thou<;h  no  change  had  been  made  by  the 
statutes. 

[See  Faulkner  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1900), 
130  Cal.  258,  62  Pac.  463,  in  which  it  is 
said  :  "  While  we  have  no  forms  of  action 
here,  yet  when  the  averments  of  facts  in  a 
complaint  show  the  case  to  be  one  for 
which  a  particular  action  would  have  been 
a  proper  one  at  common  law,  then  the 
general  principles  of  pleading  and  practice 
apply  to  it  which  apply  to  the  special  form 
of  common-law  action."] 


26  CIVIL    KEMEDIKS. 

spirit  of  the  new  procedure,  and  the  former  has  left  scarcely  any 
traces    in    the    practical  administration  of  justice  in  the  great 
majority  of  the  States.     The  forms  contained  in  the  most  popular 
and  approved  text-books  upon  practice  and  pleading  furnish  a 
sure  test;  and,  without  exception,  these  are  all  based  upon  the 
method  of  interpreting  the  codes  last  described.     And  yet  with 
great  inconsistency,  as  it  seems  to  me,  the  courts  have  generally 
held  that  the  ancient  forms  of  common-law  pleading  in  assumpsit 
viay  be  used  in  actions  upon  contract,  especially  where  the  con- 
tract is  implied ;  that  they  sufficiently  meet  the  requirements  of 
the  codes,  although  they  do  not  set  out  the  actual  facts  of  the 
transaction  from  which  the  legal  right  arises.     Thus,  it  has  been 
decided  that  the  count  in  indebitatus  assumpsit  for  goods  sold 
and  delivered  is  a  sufficient  complaint  or  petition  in  an  action 
to  recover  the  price. ^     The  difference  between  this  ruling  of  the 
courts  and  the  theory  first  above  stated  is,  that  according  to  the 
latter  theory  the  common-law  mode  of  stating  a  legal  cause  of 
action  or  defence  must  be  followed  in  substance,   while  by  the 
decisions  referred  to  it  may  be  followed  in  the  particular  classes 
of  actions  described.     But  even  this  ruling,  although,  as  I  think, 
a  plain  departure  from  the  essential  spirit  of  the  new  system,  is 
of  little  practical  importance ;  the  bar  have,  with  almost  absolute 
unanimity,    adopted    the  method    of   stating   the  facts   as    they 
occurred,   and  do  not   attempt  to  aver  in  their  stead    the  legal 
fictions  of  promises  which  are  never  made,  or  conclusions  of  law 
which  are  in  no  sense  of  the  term  actual  facts.     There  are  other 
important  features  of  an  action  —  the  parties,  the  union  of  dif- 
ferent causes  of  action  or  defence,  affirmative  relief  to  the  de- 
fendant, the  form  of  the  judgments,  and  the  like  —  which  have 
been    greatly  affected  by  the    general   provision  of   the   statute 
abolishing  the  distinctions  between  legal  and  equitable  methods, 
and  the  judicial  interpretation  given  thereto;  but  it  is  impossible 
to  discuss  them  in  any  general  manner,  and  their  particular  treat- 
ment is  reserved  for  subsequent  chapters. 

1  Allen  V.  Patterson,  7  N.  Y.  476,  478.  or  ])etitions  being  sanctioned   which  are 

Some  of  the  State  legislatures  have  by  a  identical  with  the  ancient  common  counts, 

statutory   enactment  set    forth    forms   of  and  therefore  allege  fiction  instead  of  facts, 

pleading  under  the  code,  and  tlius  made  See,    for   example,    statutes   of    Indiana, 

them  regular  and  valid.     It  is  strange  that  ^Weston  v.  Brown  (1899),  158  N.  Y.  360, 

in  some  of  these  the  spirit  of  the  code  53  N.  E.  36.3 
is  dii'ectly   violated,  forms  of  complaints 


UNION    OF    LEGAL    AND    KQL'ITABLE    REMEDIES.  27 


SECTION   SECOND. 

THE  COMBINATION  BY  THE  PLAINTIFF  OF  LEGAL  AND  EQUITABLE 
PRIMARY  RIGHTS  AND  OF  LEGAL  AND  EQUITABLE  RKMEDIES 
IN   ONE   ACTION. 

§  16.  *  76.  Principles  of  Unity  Applied  to  Particular  Cases.  The 
general  principles  of  unity  developed  in  the  preceding  section 
will  now  be  applied  to  the  several  cases  which  are  constantly 
arising  in  the  practical  administration  of  justice,  for  the  purpose 
of  ascertaining  how  far  the  abolition  of  all  distinctions  between 
actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity  has  affected  the  process  of 
stating  causes  of  action,  and  praying  for  and  obtaining  remedies 
by  the  plaintiff.  It  was  in  this  very  feature  of  the  judicial  process 
—  the  stating  of  causes  of  action,  and  the  obtaining  of  relief 
thereon  —  that  the  distinction  spoken  of  was  exhibited  in  the 
most  marked  manner  ;  and  it  is  in  this  feature,  therefore,  that  the 
change  must  be  the  most  sweeping  and  radical,  if  the  distinction 
has  in  truth  been  abolished.  Under  the  former  system  a  legal 
primary  right,  when  invaded,  could  only  be  redressed  by  an 
action  at  law,  and  a  legal  judgment  alone  was  possible  ;  while 
an  equitable  primary  right  must  be  redressed  or  protected  in  an 
equity  suit  and  by  an  equitable  remedy.  A  union  or  combina- 
tion of  the  two  classes,  either  wholly  or  partially,  in  one  action 
was  unknown,  unless  permitted  by  some  express  statute,  and  was 
utterly  opposed  to  the  theory  whicli  separated  the  two  depart- 
ments of  the  municipal  law.  The  new  system  not  only  permits 
but  encourages  —  and  in  its  spirit,  I  believe,  requires  —  such  a 
union  and  combination;  for  one  of  its  elementary  notions  is  that 
all  the  possible  disputes  or  controversies  arising  out  of,  or  con- 
nected with,  the  same  subject-matter  or  transaction  should  be 
settled  in  a  single  judicial  action.^ 

1  The  code  does  not  require  legal  and  a  jireviou.s  recovery  of  legal  relief  bars 
equitable  causes  of  action  and  reliefs  to  tlie  subsequent  recovery  of  equitable  relief 
be  united  in  the  same  action,  even  when  based  on  the  same  cause  of  action.  In 
growing  out  of  the  same  transaction  or  tiiis  case  the  facts  were  as  follows  :  Plain- 
subject-matter ;  a  previous  decree  award-  tiffs  and  defendant  were  the  respective 
ing  equitable  relief  does  not,  it  is  held,  bar  owners  of  adjoining  lots  in  the  city  of 
the  subsequent  recovery  of  legal  relief.  Buffalo.  Defendant  in  erecting  a  brick 
Bruce  v.  Kelly,  5  Hun,  229,  232.  house  on  her  lot  encroached  on  plaintiff.-;' 

[See  Hahl  r.   Sugo  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  lot.     In  1896  plaintiffs  brouglit  an  action 

109,  62  N.  E.  135,  in  which  it  is  held  that  to  recover  the  land  thus  encroached  upon. 


28 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  17.  *78.  Both  Equitable  and  Legal  Relief  Awarded.  Illustra- 
tious.  When  the  plaintiff  is  ch)thed  with  primary  rights,  both 
legal  and  equitable,  growing  out  of  the  same  cause  of  action  or 
the  same  transaction,  and  is  entitled  to  an  equitable  remedy,  and 
also  to  a  further  legal  remedy,  based  upon  the  supposition  that 
the  equitable  relief  is  granted,  and  he  sets  forth  in  his  complaint 
or  petition  the  facts  which  support  each  class  of  rights,  and  which 
show  that  he  is  entitled  to  each  kind  of  remedy,  and  demands  a 
judgment  awarding  both  species  of  relief,  the  action  will  be  sus- 


Plaintiffs  recovered  in  this  action  and 
upon  a  second  trial  recovered  again,  and 
in  1898  judgment  was  entered  in  their 
favor  establishing  their  title  in  fee  to  the 
land  in  dispute.  The  execution  issued  on 
the  judgment  was  returned  "  by  the  sheriff 
with  an  endorsement  thereon  .stating  in 
substance  that  the  strip  of  land  described 
therein  was  occupied  by  a  portion  of  the 
stone  foundation  and  brick  wall  of  defend- 
ant's house,  and  that  it  was  impracticable 
for  him  to  remove  the  same."  A  motion 
by  plaintiffs  at  "a  Special  Term  for  an 
order  directing  the  defendant  to  remove 
that  portion  of  the  wall  of  her  house 
which  encroaches  upon  the  plaintiffs' 
land  "  having  been  denied,  plaintiffs  there- 
upon brought  an  "  action  in  equity  to 
compel  the  defendant  to  remove  said  en- 
croaching wall  from  their  land."  The 
judgment  recovered  by  plaintiffs  in  the 
former  action  was  pleaded  in  bar.  The 
Supreme  Court  sustained  the  action  and 
granted  the  relief  prayed  for,  and  this 
judgment  "  was  unanimously  affirmed  by 
the  Appellate  Division."  The  Court  of 
Appeals,  in  its  opinion  reversing  the  judg- 
ment, among  other  things,  said  :  "  Let  us 
now  see  whether  the  plaintiffs  have  more 
than  one  cause  of  action  arising  out  of 
the  wrong  of  the  defendant,  and  if  not, 
what  that  cause  of  action  is.  The  plain- 
tiffs are  the  owners  of  a  strip  of  land 
upon  which  the  defendant  has  wrongfully 
entered  and  erected  a  wall  which  is  a 
portion  of  her  house.  The  facts  alleged 
show  one  y)rimary  right  of  the  plaintiffs 
and  one  wrong  done  by  the  defendant 
which  involves  that  right.  Therefore  the 
plaintiffs  have  stated  but  a  single  cause  of 
action,  no  matter  how  many  forms  and 
kinds  of  relief  they  may  be  entitled  to.  .  .  . 
The  plaintiffs'  right  is  to  recover  pousession 


of  their  land.  The  defendant's  wrong 
consists  in  the  entry  upon  and  use  of  the 
land  without  the  plaintiffs'  consent.  The 
particular  nature  of  that  wrong  may  re- 
quire the  application  of  different  remedies 
for  the  enforcement  of  the  right.  But 
that  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the 
cause  of  action,  nor  entitle  the  plaintiffs 
to  split  it  into  several  causes  of  action. 
The  complaint  in  the  first  action  stated 
tlie  facts  upon  which  the  plaintiffs  based 
their  claim  of  title  and  right  to  possession. 
Under  its  allegations  tlie  title  as  well  as 
the  right  to  possession  could  be  tested. 
(Cagger  v.  Lansing,  64  N.  Y.  417.)  The 
right  to  possession  involved  the  removal 
of  the  encroaching  wall,  for  without  such 
removal  there  could  be  no  real  transfer  of 
possession.  This  in  turn  required  equi- 
table relief,  which,  under  proper  pleadings 
and  an  appropriate  method  of  trial,  could 
have  been  granted  in  the  same  action  in 
which  the  title  and  right  to  po.ssession 
were  adjudicated.  (Corning  v.  Troy  Iron 
&  N'ail  Factory,  40  N.  Y.  191  ;  Broie.stedt 
V.  S.  S.  R.  R.  Co.,  55  id.  220.)  The  fact 
that  jjhiintifts'  com))laint  lacked  the  aver- 
ments wiiich  wouhl  have  apprised  the 
court  of  their  right  to  equitable  relief,  and 
that  the  course  of  the  trial  furnisiied  no 
indication  that  they  intended  to  claim 
such  relief,  is  no  excuse  for  the  com- 
•mencement  of  a  separate  and  independent 
action  upon  the  siuirle  cause  involved  in 
the  prior  action.  It  would  be  novel  prac- 
tice, indeed,  to  permit  the  correction  of 
errors  in  that  summary  and  extra-judicial 
manner."  I'ringle  v.  Hall  (1899),  Ariz  , 
56  Pac.  740:  An  action  for  the  refor- 
mation of  a  contract  may  be  joined  with 
an  action  on  the  contract.  Text,  §  *76, 
quoted  at  length.] 


UNION    OF    LEGAL    AND    EQUITABLE    REMEDIES. 


29 


tained  to  its  full  extent  in  the  form  thus  adopted.  He  may,  on 
the  trial,  prove  all  the  facts  averred,  and  the  court  will  in  its 
judgment  formally  grant  both  the  equitable  and  the  legal  relief.^ 
It  will  be  noticed  that  this  proposition  embraces  only  those  cases 
in  which  the  legal  relief  demanded  rests  upon  and  flows  as  a 
consequence  from  the  prior  equitable  relief,  but  the  principle  of 
the  rule  is  not  confined  to  such  cases ;  it  extends  also  to  those  in 
which  the  two  remedies,  although  connected  witli  the  same  trans- 
action or  subject-matter,  are  not  connected  as  cause  and  effect.^ 
This  is  the  most  complete  union  of  legal  and  equitable  primary 
rights  and  remedies  in  one  action  which  can  be  made  ;  but  it  is 
limited  and  restricted  to  those  cases  in  which  these  rights  and 
remedies  arise  from  the  same  transaction  or  subject.-matter.  It  is 
not  generally  possible  to  join  one  legal  cause  of  action  with 
another  entirely  independent  equitable  cause  of  action,  there 
being  no  antecedent  connection  between  the  two.  In  the  cases 
described  above,  where  the  union  is  permitted,  there  is,  in  fact, 
no  joinder  of  different  causes  of  action ;  ^  there  is  only  the  union 


1  Laub  V.  Buckmiller,  17  N.  Y.  620, 
€26  ;  Lattin  v.  McCartv,  41  N.  Y.  107,  109, 
110;  Davis  v.  Lamberton,  56  Barb.  480, 
483  ;  Brown  v.  Brown,  4  Robt.  688,  700, 
701  ;  Walker  v.  Sedgwick,  8  Cal.  398 ; 
Welles  r.  Yates,  44  N.  Y.  52.5 ;  Henderson 
r.  Dickey,  50  Mo.  161,165;  Guernsey  u. 
Am.  Ins.  Co.,  17  Minn.  104,  108;  Mont- 
gomery V.  McEwen,  7  Minn.  351.  See, 
however,  Hudson  i\  Caryl,  44  N.  Y.  553, 
which  holds  that,  in  an  action  brought  to 
remove  a  nuisance,  damages  can  only  be 
awarded  by  the  verdict  of  a  jury,  sed  qn. 
See  also  Kewaunee  Cy.  Sup.  v.  Decker, 
30  Wis.  624,  626-630,  per  Dixon  C.  J.,  for 
a  very  elaborate  opinion  in  opposition  to 
the  doctrine  of  the  text  and  of  the  cases 
cited  above  in  this  note.  Further  illustra- 
tions of  the  text  are  Stewart  v.  Carter, 
4  Neb.  564 ;  Turner  v.  Althaus,  6  Nel>. 
.54;  Weinland  v.  Cochran,  9  Neb.  480; 
Wa  Ching  ?•.  Constantine,  1  Idaho,  266  ; 
Young  r.  Young,  81  N.  C.  91  ;  Kahn  v. 
Kahn,  15  Fla.  400;  Leidersdorf  v.  Flint, 
50  Wis.  401  ;  Anderson  r.  Hunn,  5  Hun, 
79  ;  Stevens  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  84  N.  Y. 
296,  305 ;  Wheelock  v.  Lee,  74  N.  Y.  495, 
500 ;  Margraf  v.  Muir,  57  N.  Y.  159  ;  Hale 
V.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  626 ;  Madi- 


son Av.  Bap.  Ch.  V.  Oliver  St.  Bap.  Ch. 
73  N.  Y.  83  ;  Cone  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins. 
Co.,  60  N.  Y.  619. 

[;Hahl  V.  Sugo  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  109,  62 
N.  E.  135;  Vaughn  v.  Georgia  Land  Co. 
(1896),  98  Ga.  288,  25  S.  E.  441  ;  Harp  i-. 
Abbeville  Investment  Co.  (1899),  108  Ga. 
168,  33  S.  E.  998;  Brown  v.  Latham 
(1893),  92  Ga.  280,  18  S.  E.  421.]  Butler 
1-.  Barnes,  61  Conn.  399  ;  Bowen  v.  State, 
121  Ind.  235;  Jaseph  v.  People's  Sav.  Bk. 
(Ind.  Sup.  1889),  22  N.  E.  980;  Jennings 
V.  Reeves,  101  N.  C.  447 ;  Paddock  v. 
Somes,  102  Mo.  226.  But  see  La  we  v. 
Hvde,  39  Wis.  345. 

'  2  See  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co., 
23  N.  Y.  357,  359;  Cahoon  v.  Bank  of 
Utica,  7  N.  Y.  486 ;  Broiestedt  i-.  South 
Side  R.  Co.,  55  N.  Y.  220,  222 ;  Turner  v. 
Pierce,  34  Wis.  658,  665,  ])er  Dixon  C.  J.  ; 
Linden  v.  Hepburn,  3  Sandf.  668,  671  ; 
Gray  v.  Dougherty,  25  Cal.  266.  The 
legal  and  equitable  causes  of  action  should 
be  separately  stated.  Gates  v.  Kieff,  7 
Cal.  124;  Magwire  i-.  Tyler,  47  Mo.  115, 
127. 

3  [^The  following  cases  support  the  doc- 
trine of  the  text,  but  they  all  assume  that 
there  are  two  distinct  causes   of   action, 


30  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

of  remedial  rights  flowing  from  one  cause  of  action,  as  -wall  be 
seen  from  the  judgments  of  the  court  in  several  of  the  cases  cited 
in  the  note,  and  as  will  be  more  fully  shown  in  a  subsequent 
/-€hapter.  This  rule,  which  has  been  lirraly  established  by  the  ^ 
/  court  of  last  resort  in  New  York,  and  which  is  adopted  in  all  the 
States  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  has  been  applied  in  the  follow- 
ing cases  among  others :  ^  in  an  action  by  the  holder  of  the  legal 
title  to  correct  his  title  deed,  to  recover  possession  of  the  land 
according  to  the  correction  thus  made,  and  to  recover  damages 
for  withholding  such  possession  ;  -  in  an  action  by  one  holding  the 
equitable  title  to  procure  defendant's  deed  to  be  cancelled,  and  a 
conveyance  by  defendant  to  himself,  to  recover  possession  and 
damages,  and  to  restrain  defendant  from  conveying  away  the 
land  ;  3  in  an  action  by  the  grantor  of  land  to  correct  his  deed  by 
the  insertion  of  an  exception  of  the  growing  timber,  and  to  recover 
damages  for  trees  embraced  in*  the  exception,  wrongfully  cut  by 
the  grantee ;  *  in  an  action  to  abate  a  nuisance,  to  restrain  its 
further  commission,  and  to  recover  damages  therefor ;  ^  in  an 
action  by  a  widow  to  establish  her  right  of  dower,  to  procure  it 
to  be  assigned,  to  recover  possession  and  damages ;  ^  and  in  an 
action  by  the  vendor  of  land  to  recover  a  money  judgment  on 
notes  given  him  for  the  price,  and  to  foreclose  his  lien  on  the 
land  itself." 

§  18.  *  79.  Doctrine  in  Missouri  and  "Wisconsin.  In  Missouri, 
however,  the  judiciary  for  a  long  time  denied  the  correctness  of 
this  rule,  and  rejected  it  under  all  circumstances  in  which  it 
could  possibly  be  applied.  The  doctrine  was  asserted  and  main- 
tained in  a  long  series  of  adjudications  that  the  holder  of  an 
equitable  title,  or  the  possessor  of  an  equitable  primary  right, 
can  obtain  none  but  an  equitable  remedy  prosecuted  in  an  equi- 
table form  of  action.     The  Supreme  Court  of  that  State   even 

one  legal  and  the  other  equitable.    Brown  recover  thereon,  as  reformed,  against  joint 

V.Wilson    (1895),   21    Colo.   309,   40   Pac.  iusurersj 

fi88;   Mulock  r.   Wilson   (1893),   19  Colo.  "  Lattin    v.   McCarty,   41   N.   Y.   107; 

296.  3.T   Pac.   532;    Stock-Growers'  Bank  Henderson  r.  Dickey,  50  Mo.  161. 

!•.  Newton   (1889),  13  Colo.  245,  22   Pac.  *  Welles  i-.  Yates,  44  N.  Y.  525. 

444.]  ^  Davis  c.   Laniberton,   5'6  Barb.  4S0. 

'  For    additional    instances,    see    jiost,  But  see  Hudson  r.  Caryl,  44  N.  Y.  553, 

§§  *452-*462.  that  a  jury  trial  is  necessary  to  the  re- 

^  Laub  V.   Buckmiller,    17   N.  Y.   620.  covery  of  daniage>.     Parker  r.  Laney,  58 

(^Imperial  Shale  Brick  Co.  r.  Jewett  (1901),  N.  Y.  469. 

169  N.  v.  143,  62   N.    E.   167,  in  an  aition  o  Brown  v.  Brown,  4  Kobt.  688. 

to  reform  a  contract  of  insurance  and  to  ''  Walker  v.  Sedgwick,  8  Cal.  398. 


UNION   OF    LEGAL   AND    EQUITABLE    REMEDIES.  31 

went  SO  far  as  to  reject  the  familiar  principle  of  equity  jurispru- 
dence, which  permitted  the  Court  of  Cliancery,  liaviiiy  ac(iuired 
jurisdiction  by  means  of  some  equitable  rig] it,  to  go  on  and 
administer  full  legal  relief  in  order  that  the  party  should  not  be 
put  to  the  trouble  and  expense  of  a  second  action  at  law.  In 
accordance  with  this  narrow  view  of  equity  and  this  narrow 
construction  of  the  reformed  legislation,  it  was  settled  that  ths 
holder  of  an  equitable  title  who  seeks  to  enforce  his  right  and  to 
acquire  a  legal  title  by  means  of  a  specific  performance,  a  can- 
cellation, or  a  reformation  of  deeds,  must,  after  obtaining  that 
relief,  bring  a  second  action  at  law  to  recover  the  possession.  If 
he  unite  his  equitable  cltiim  for  cancellation  and  the  like  with 
the  legal  claim  for  possession,  he  was  actually  to  be  turned  out 
of  court.  This  remarkable  interpretation  pvit  upon  the  language 
of  the  statute,  and  so  completely  defeating  its  plain  intent,  was 
resorted  to  in  the  following,  among  other  instances,  which  are 
selected  as  illustrations  merely:  in  actions  brought  to  set  aside 
and  cancel  deeds  of  conveyance  made  to  the  defendant,  alleged 
to  be  fraudulent,  and  to  vest  the  legal  title  in  the  plaintiff,  and 
to  recover  possession  of  the  premises  in  question;  ^  in  an  acticm 
of  partition,  where  defendant  was  in  possession  of  the  whole 
land,  claiming  title  therein,  it  being  held  that  the  plaintiff  must 
first  establish  his  legal  right  by  ejectment,  and  then  bring  an 
equity  action  of  partition.^  The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri 
has,  however,  in  a  very  recent  decision,  receded  from  this  very 
extreme  position,  and  has  partly,  at  least,  overruled  the  authorit}' 
of  the  cases  referred  to  in  this  and  the  subsequent  paragraph. 
Although  the  single  judgment  does  not  in  its  reasoning  and 
conclusions  accept  the  liberal  views  of  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals  in  their  full  scope  and  extent,  yet  it  plainly  tends  in 
that  direction,  conferring  the  reliefs  of  reformation  or  correction 
of  a  deed  of  conveyance  and  recovery  of  possession  of  the  land 
included  in  such  deed  as  corj^ected.^     The  judiciary  of  Wiscon- 


1  Curd  i'.  Lackland,  43  Mo.  139  ;  Wynn  ^  Gott  r.  Powell,  41  Mo.  416  ;   Moreau 

V.  Cory,  43  Mo.  301  ;    Gray    v.  Payne,  43  v.  Detchemendy,  41  Mo.  431. 

Mo.   203;    Bobb   v.    Woodward,   42    Mo.  *  Henderson    v.   Dickey,  50   Mo.    161, 

482  ;  Peyton  !,\  Hose,  41  Mo.  257  ;  Walker's  16.5,  per   Wagner  J.     The  judgment    in 

Adm'r  v.  Walker,  2.5   Mo.  367  ;  Magwire  this  case  comments  on  and  condemns  the 

?'.  Tvler,  47  Mo.   115,  127;  Rutherford  v.  leading  decisions  referred  to  in  the   two 

Williams,    42    Mo.    18,    23;    Fithian     v.  preceding  notes;  and,  although   it  deals 

Monks,  43  Mo.  502,  517.  too  leniently  with  the  gross  mistakes  int» 


32 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


sin  seem  now  alone,  among  the  tribunals  of  the  several  States, 
to  reject  this  liberal  theory  of  interpretation,  and  to  require 
separate  actions  for  the  assertion  of  legal  and  equitable  rights, 
and  the  procurement  of  legal  and  equitable  remedies.  The 
principle  of  unity  approved  and  adopted  b}-  the  highest  tribunal 
of  New  York  has  been  deliberately  rejected  after  a  most  thor- 
ough examination,  and  the  opposite  principle,  which  distin- 
guishes between  the  two  classes  of  action,  and  retains  their 
separate  use,  and  prohibits  the  recovery  of  legal  and  equitable 
remedies  in  one  suit,  is  avowedly  accepted  as  being  the  correct 
construction  of  the  legislative  provisions.^ 


which  Holmes  J.  had  fallen  in  announcing 
the  doctrine  of  those  prior  cases,  yet  it 
squarely  overrules  their  central  principle, 
and  destroys  their  authority.  Henderson 
V.  Dickey  has  been  followed  in  numerous 
cases  in  Missouri.  See  Paddock  v.  Somes, 
102  Mo.  226. 

[^The  view  now  entertained  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Missouri  respecting  some 
of  the  matters  referred  to  in  the  te.xt  is 
shown  by  the  following  recent  cases  :  Nalle 
V.  Thompson  (1903),  173  Mo.  595,  73  S.  W. 
599;  Nalle  i;.  Parks  (1903),  173- Mo.  GI6, 
73  S.  W.  596 ;  Martin  v.  Turnbaugh 
(1899),  153  Mo.  172,  54  S.  W.  515  ;  Lewis 
V.  Rhodes  (1899),  150  Mo.  498,  52  S.  W. 
11  ;  Dunn  v.  McCoy  (1899),  150  Mo.  548, 
52  S.  W.  21  ;  Springfield,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Donovan  (1899),  147  Mo.  G22,  49  S.  W. 
500;  Kingman  i'.  Sievers  (1898),  143  Mo. 
519,  45  S.  W.  266;  O'Day  v.  Conn  (1895), 
131  Mo.  321,  32  S.  W.  1109;  Kerstner  v. 
Vorweg  (1895),  130  Mo.  196,  32  S.  W. 
298;  Sampson  v.  Mitchell  (1894),  125  Mo. 
217,  28  S.  \V.  768  ;  Crawford  v.  Whitmore 
(1803),  120  Mo.  144,  25  S.  W.  365  ;  Morri- 
son V.  Ilerrington  (1894),  120  Mo.  665,  25 
S.  W.  568.  In  these  cases  a  greater  de- 
gree of  liberality  is  shown  than  the  author 
ascribes  to  the  court.  In  Martin  c  Turn- 
baugh it  is  said  that  "  every  one  admits 
that  it  is  elementary  law  that  when  a  court 
of  efjuity  obtains  jurisdiction  of  a  cause  it 
has  power  to  retain  jurisdiction  until  it 
does  complete  justice  between  the  parties," 
and  further  that  "the  petition  may  now 
have  a  count  at  law  and  a  count  iu  ecpiity, 
.  .  .  the  answer  may  contain  a  legal 
defence,    an    eijuitable    defence,    and   an 


equital)le  cross  bill  or  counterclaim,  .  .  . 
and  the  reply  may  set  up  legal  or  equitable 
defences  to  the  new  matter  set  up  in  the 
answer.  .  .  .  The  object  of  all  of  which  is 
to  simplify  proceedings,  and  to  settle  the 
whole  controversy  between  the  parties  in 
one  action.] 

[|In  Morrison  v.  Herrington,  an  action 
of  ejectment,  the  court  said  :  "  Here  the 
causes  of  action,  one  legal  and  the  other 
equitable,  arose  out  of  transactions  con- 
nected with  the  same  subject  of  action. 
The  parties  being  the  same  also,  there  was 
no  misjoinder.  Though  the  court  could 
have  granted  full  and  complete  relief  on 
the  equity  cause  of  action,  euen  to  awarding 
a  ivrit  of  possession,  still  it  is  quite  common 
practice  to  join  an  ejectment  count  with 
an  eciuity  cause  of  action  in  sucli  cases. "3 

Qlt  is  held  in  Lewis  i;  Rhodes,  Dunn  v. 
McCoy,  Martin  i\  Turnbaugh,  and  O'Day 
r.  Conn,  that  "  where  the  answer  admits 
the  facts  constituting  the  plaintiff's  legal 
cause  of  action  and  sets  up  other  facts  of 
an  equitable  cliaracter  in  avoidance,  the 
whole  case  is  converted  into  a  suit  in 
equity  triable  by  the  court."  Likewise  if 
the  answer  .seeks  affirmative  equitable 
relief.  See,  however,  Kersten  i\  Vorweg, 
in  which  it  is  said  :  "  This  is  an  action  at 
law.  The  fact  that  the  answer  contained 
an  equitable  dofence  did  not  change  the 
character  of  the  action  and  convert  it  into 
a  case  in  equity."] 

1  Noonan  r.  Orton,  21  Wis.  283  ;  Ke- 
waunee Cy.  Sup.  r.  Decker,  30  Wis.  624, 
626,  per  Di.xon  C.  .J. ;  Horn  v.  Luddington, 
32  Wis.  73.  The  first  of  these  cases  was 
an  action  brought  to  compel  the  specific 


UNION    OF    LEGAL    AND    EQUITABLK    KK.MKDIES.  33 

§  19.  *  80.  Legal  Relief  only  actually  Awarded.  lUustratioas. 
The  next  case  to  be  considered  is  tlie  same  in  principle,  and 
nearly  so  in  all  its  features,  with  the  one  just  discussed.  Tiie 
plaintiff,  as  in  the  last  instance,  possesses  primary  rights,  both 
legal  and  equitable,  arising  from  the  same  subject-matter  or 
transaction,  and  is  entitled  to  some  equitable  relief,  reformation, 
cancellation,  specific  performance,  and  the  like,  and  to  legal  relief 
based  upon  the  assumption  that  the  former  relief  is  awarded ;  he 
avers  all  the  necessary  facts  in  his  pleading,  and  demands  both 
the  remedies  to  which  he  is  entitled.  The  court,  instead  of 
formally  conferring  the  special  equitable  remedy  and  then  pro- 
ceeding to  grant  the  ultimate  legal  remedy,  may  treat  the  former 
as  though  accomplished,  and  render  a  simple  common-law  judg- 
ment embracing  the  final  legal  relief  which  was  the  real  object 
of  the  action.^  This  proceeding  is  plainly  the  same  in  princi[)le 
with  the  one  stated  in  the  foregoing  paragraph;  but  it  is  a  more 
complete  amalgamation  of  remedies,  a  more  decided  departure 
from  the  notions  which  prevailed  under  the  former  system.  By 
the  omission  of  the  intermediate  step,  the  actual  result  is  reached 
of  a  legal  remedy  based  upon  an  equitable  primary  right  or  title. 
No  doubt  this  omission  of  the  intermediate  step  is  often  as 
advantageous  to  the  plaintiff  as  though  it  had  been  taken  in  the 
most  formal  manner;  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  will  sometimes 
happen  that  the  formal  change  of  his  equitable  title  into  a  legal 
one  by  a  decree  of  cancellation,  or  of  specific  performance  or 
reformation,  will  be  necessary  to  secure  and  protect  his  rights  in 
the  future.  As  a  matter  of  safety  and  prudence,  the  particular 
form  of  judgment  just  described  should  only  be  used  in  actions 

performauce  of  an  agreement  to  give  a  tions  wliicli  are  in  direct  conflict  with  tlio 

lease.    The  complaint  also  alleged  a  breach  letter  as  well  as  the  spirit  of  tiic  codes, 

of  a  covenant  which   was  to   liave   been  See  also  Lawe    v.    Hyde,    39    Wis.    345 ; 

contained  in  the  lease,  and  demanded  a  Williams  v.  Lowe,  4  Neb.  382 ;  Paxton  r. 

judgment  for  the  damages  arising  tliere-  Wood,  77  N.  C.  11  ;  Mattair  v.  Payne,  15 

from  as  well  as  for  the  specific  perform-  Fla.  682. 

ance.     Held,   that  the  two  could   not  be  [[But  see  Draper  r.   Brown  (1902),  115 

combined;    that    the    plaintiff    must  first  Wis.  361,   91   N.   W.   1001,  in  which    the 

obtain  the  lease,  and  then  bring  his  action  Wisconsin  court  cites  the  New  York  cases 

for  a  breach  of  tlie  covenant  in  it.     The  of  Keubens  c  Joel,  (ioulet  v.  A.sseler,  and 

judgment  of  Dixon  C.  .J.  in  Supervisors?-.  Gould  v.  Bank,  to  sustain  it  in  the  distinc- 

Becker  is  an  exhaustive  discussion  of  this  tion  whicli    it  makes  between  legal  and 

subject,    with   a   review   of    the    leading  equitable  actions.] 

authorities.     Although  there  is   much  in  i  Bidwell   v.   Astor  In.s.   Co.,  16  N.  Y. 

his  opinion  that  is  correct  and  admirable,  263,   2G7  ;   riiillijjs  v.   Gorham,    17   N.  Y. 

he  reaches,  as  his  main  conclusions,  posi-  270  ;  Caswell  v.  West,  3  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  3S3. 

3 


34  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

upon  executory  contracts  where  a  pecuniary  payment  exhausts 
their  efficiency;  in  actions  involving  titles  to  land,  the  full  judg- 
ment—  embracing  the  equitable  relief  as  well  as  the  legal  remedy 
of  possession  —  would  generally  be  far  preferable.  The  rule 
permitting  such  a  single  legal  remedy  has  been  applied  in  the 
following  among  other  instances:  in  an  action  upon  an  insurance 
policy  which  by  mistake  was  so  drawn  that  the  plaintiff  —  the 
assured  —  had  no  claim  for  damages,  he  demanded  judgment  (1) 
reforming  the  instrument,  (2)  recovering  $7,000  for  a  loss  em- 
braced within  its  terms  as  thus  reformed,  and  the  court  ordered 
a  judgment  merely  for  the  amount  of  the  loss  as  claimed;^  in  an 
action  to  recover  lands  of  which  the  plaintiff  had  the  equitable 
title  only,  the  legal  title  being  in  the  defendant  by  means  of  a 
deed  of  conveyance  from  the  plaintiff"'s  ancestor,  the  former 
owner,  regular  on  its  face,  but  alleged  to  have  been  obtained  by 
fraudulent  representations,  instead  of  directing  a  cancellation  of 
this  deed  and  a  reconveyance  to  the  plaintiff,  the  court  granted 
a  judgment  for  the  recovery  of  possession  directly ;  ^  in  an  action 
upon  a  contract  for  the  building  of  a  house  according  to  certain 
specifications,  the  complaint  alleging  a  mistake  in  the  specifica- 
tions as  set  out  in  the  written  instrument,  and  averring  a  per- 
formance according  to  the  specifications  actually  agreed  on  by  the 
parties,  and  demanding  judgment  for  the  amount  due  for  such 
services  without  praying  for  any  reformation  of  the  contract,  the 
action  in  this  form  was  sustained,  and  it  was  expressly  held  that 
no  prayer  for  a  correction  was  necessary.^  The  rule  here  stated, 
and  the  decisions  which  sustain  it,  are  plainly  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  doctrine  which  originally  prevailed  in  the  Missouri  courts, 
and  which  still  receives  the  approval  of  the  Wisconsin  judges. 

§  20.  *  81.  Legal  Relief  A'warded,  but  Equitable  Relief  Denied. 
Illustrations.  Another  case,  varying  in  souh^  of  its  cii'cumstanees 
from  the  two  which  have  been  described,  and  yet  depending 
upon  the  same  principle,  remains  to  be  considered.  If  the 
plaintiff  possesses,  or  supposes  liimself  to  possess,  primary  rights, 
Ijoth  legal  and  equitable,  arising  from  the  same  subject-matter  or 
transaction,  and  avers  the  necessary  facts  in  his  pleading,  and 

1  Bidwell  V.  Astor  Ins.  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  Williams  v.  Slote,  70  N.  Y.  681  ;  Whiting 

263.     See  also  Cone  v.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  v.  Root,  .52  Iowa,  292. 
Co.,  60  N.  Y.  619,  3  T.  &  C.  33;  Maher  2  phJUips  v.  (iorham,  17  N.Y.  270. 

t'.   Ilibeniia  Ins.  Co.,  67  N.Y.  283,  291;  «  Caswell  u.  West,  3  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  383. 


UNION    OF   LEGAL   AND    EQUITABLE   REMEDIES. 


35 


prays  for  both  the  remedies  corresponding  to  the  two  different 
rights,  but  on  the  trial  fails  to  establisli  his  e(|uitable  cause  of 
action  and  his  consequent  right  to  the  equitable  remedy,  his 
action  should  not  be  therefore  dismissed ;  he  should  recover  the 
legal  judgment  which  the  legal  cause  of  action  demands. ^ 
Thus,  in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  insurance,  all  the  necessary 
facts  being  alleged,  the  complaint  demanded  a  money  judgment 
on  account  of  a  loss,  and  also  that  the  instrument  should  be 
reformed  by  reason  of  an  alleged  mistake,  which  reformation,  if 
made,  would  increase  the  sum  insured,  and  enable  the  plaintiff 
to  recover  a  larger  amount.  On  the  trial  he  failed  to  prove  the 
averments  respecting  the  mistake,  and  was  not,  therefore,  en- 
titled to  any  equitable  relief.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals 
held  that  judgment  should  have  been  recovered  on  the  legal 
cause  of   action  for  the    sum  which  was    actually  insured,   and 


1  McNeady  v.  Hyde,  47  Cal.  481, 483,— 
action  to  recover  possession  of  laud,  and 
for  an  injunction;  Sternberger  v.  Mc- 
Govern,  56  N.  Y.  12,  21,  15  Abb.  Pr. 
N.  s.  257,  271,  —  specific  performance  and 
damages. 

[^Micliener  y.  Springfield,  etc.  Co.  (1895), 
142  lud.  130,  40  N.  E.  679:  "Not  only 
does  the  same  judge  under  [our  reformed] 
system  exercise  both  law  and  ecjuity  pow- 
ers, but  he  exercises  botli  legal  and  equita- 
ble jurisdiction  aud  administers  both  legal 
and  equitable  relief  in  each  case,  when 
the  facts  pleaded  and  proved  warrant  it. 
How,  then,  can  the  cause  be  dismissed 
for  want  of  jurisdiction  merely  because  the 
plaintiff  asks  for  equitable  relief  wliile 
the  facts  show  that  he  is  entitled  to  legal 
relief?  Tiie  court  being  clothed  by  the 
code  with  power  and  jurisdiction  to  ad- 
minister botli,  or  either  legal  or  equitable 
relief  in  the  same  case,  its  jurisdiction  is 
not  and  cannot  be  defeated  by  it  appearing 
from  the  facts  stated  that  tlie  eijuitable 
relief  sought  cannot  be  awarded  because 
such  facts  show  that  the  only  relief  the 
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  is  purely  legal  re- 
lief, or  vice  versa ;  nor  is  the  jurisdiction 
defeated  because  the  facts  stated  in  the 
complaint  are  not  sufficient  to  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  either  legal  or  equitable  relief. 
The  remedy  in  such  a  case  is  a  demurrer 
for  want  of  sufficient  facts."     Latham  v. 


Harby  (1897),  50  S.  C.  428,  27  R.  E.  862: 
Where  a  complaint  filed  as  a  bill  in  equity 
does  not  entitle  plaintiff  to  equitable  re- 
lief, but  does  show  a  legal  cause  of  action, 
it  is  error  to  dismiss  it.  Tlie  cause  should 
be  transferred  to  the  law  calendar.  Mor- 
decai  i:  Seignious  (1898),  53  S.  C.  95,  30 
S.  E.  717:  When  a  complaint  states  a 
good  cause  of  action,  either  at  law  or  in 
equity,  it  should  not  be  dismissed.  Simon 
V.  Sabb  (1899),  56  S.  C.  38,  33  S.  E.  799: 
A  complaint  entitling  plaintiff  to  relief 
either  on  the  law  or  equity  side  of  the  court 
is  not  subject  to  demurrer  on  the  ground 
that  it  does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  con- 
stitute a  cause  of  action.  Ferst's  Sons  v. 
Powers  (1902),  64  S.  C.  221,  41  S.  E.  974; 
Gillis  I'.  Hilton  &  Dodge  Co.  (1901),  113 
Ga  622,  38  S.  E.  940 :  Where  a  legal  and 
an  equitable  cause  of  action  is  alleged,  aud 
evidence  establishes  only  the  legal  cause 
of  action,  judgment  sliould  be  given  on 
tliat.  Alter  r.  P.ank  of  Stockham  (1897), 
53  Neb.  223,  73  N.  W.  667  :  "  To  maintain 
a  civil  action  under  our  code,  it  is  not 
essential  that  the  action  be  denominated 
either  an  action  at  law  or  in  equity,  nor 
that  it  be  given  any  particular  name.  If 
the  litigant  pleads  the  facts,  and  they  con- 
stitute a  cause  of  action  or  defence,  the 
courts  are  bound  to  award  the  relief  due." 
Meyers  n.  Smith  (1899),  59  Neb.  30,  80 
N.  W.  273.] 


36  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

reversed  the  ruling  below  which  had  dismissed  the  action.^  As 
another  illustration:  in  an  action  by  the  grantor  of  land  against 
the  grantee  to  set  aside  the  deed  of  conveyance  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  procured  by  false  and  fraudulent  representations, 
after  setting  out  all  the  facts  which  constituted  the  transaction, 
the  complaint  prayed  for  two  remedies  in  the  alternative,  —  (1) 
damages  for  the  deceit,  (2)  cancellation  and  a  reconveyance.  A 
reconveyance  was  found  to  be  impossible  on  the  trial,  because 
the  defendant  had  conveyed  the  premises  to  hona  fide  purchasers. 
A  simple  legal  judgment  for  the  damages  caused  by  the  deceit 
was  granted,  and  was  held  to  be  proper  by  the  general  term  of 
the  New  York  Supreme  Court. ^  This  rule  is  now  established, 
except  in  the  one  or  two  States  which  retain  the  distinctions 
between  legal  and  equitable  actions ;  but  there  are  some  earlier 
dicta,  and  even  decisions  opposed  to  it,^  which,  however,  must 
be  considered  as  overruled.* 

§  21.  *  82.  Where  Equitable  Remedy  only  is  demanded  and 
Legal  Remedy  only  is  granted.  Doctrine  in  Missouri  and  "Wiscon- 
sin. In  each  of  the  foregoing  instances  the  complaint  has  suited 
all  the  necessary  facts  constituting  both  grounds  for  relief,  and 
has  actually  demanded  both  remedies  in  the  prayer  for  judgment. 
Another  case  presents  itself  with  a  change  of  features.  The 
averments  of  fact  are  the  same,  but  the  plaintiff  demands  only 
the  special  equitable  remedy  to  which  he  deems  himself  entitled. 
On  tlie  trial  he  fails  to  prove  the  alleged  grounds  for  equitable 
relief,  bat  does  establish  a  case  for  the  legal  relief  which  was  not 
demanded  in  the  prayer  for  judgment,  although  all  the  necessary 
facts,  from  which  the  remedial  right  arose,  were  averred.  It  is 
now,  after  some  hesitation,  settled  that  even  in  this  case  the 
plaintiff  is  not  to  be  dismissed  from  court,  but  should  be  per- 
mitted to  recover  the  legal  remedy  supported  by  the  allegations 
of  fact  contained  in  the  complaint  or  petition.^     There  are  dicta 

1  N.  V.  Ice  Co.  V.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co.,  23  even  this  dirium  is  not  so  broad  as  the 
N.  Y.  357,  359.  head-note. 

2  Graves  v.  Spier,  58  Barb.  349,  383,  *  See  Davis  v.  Morris,  36  N.  Y.  569. 
384;  and  sec  Sternberger  r.  McGovern,  15  ^  QSouth   Carolina,  etc.    R.   R.  Co.  v. 
Abb.  Pr.  N.  8.  257,  271,  .56  N.  Y.  12.  Aujrusta  R.  R.  Co.  (1900).  Ill  Ga.  420,36 

*  See  Penn.  Coal  Co.  v.  Del.  &  Hudson  S.  E.  593  :   A  petition  mainly  in  the  form 

Canal  Co.,  1    Keyes,  72.     The  reporter's  of  an  equitable  petition  is  maintainable  as 

head-note  is  not  sustained  by  the  decision  an  action  at  law  if  it  sets  forth  a   letral 

of  this  case.     A  dictum  of  Mr.  J.  Emott,  cause  of  action. 3     Marquat  i-.  Marquat,  12 

at  p.  76,  is  the  sole  ground  for  it ;   and  N.  Y.  336 ;   Barlow  i-.  Scott,  24  N.  Y.  40, 


UNION    OF    LEGAL   AND    EQUITABLE   REMEDIES.  37 

in  opposition  to  this  rule,^  but  they  are  all  overruled  oy  the 
subsequent  and  more  authoritative  decisions  in  the  same  States. 
In  Missouri  this  liberal  doctrine  lias  not  been  adopted,  since,  as 
has  been  already  seen,  the  principle  of  uniting  legal  and  equitable 
causes  of  action  and  remedies  in  one  suit  has  been  rejected  in  all 
its  phases.  The  moditication  of  its  earlier  notions,  which  the 
Supreme  Court  of  that  State  has  made  in  its  latest  decisions, 
does  not  necessarily  extend  to  the  case  under  consideration. ^ 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  seems,  also,  to  have  aban- 
doned the  position  which  it  originally  occupied  in  reference  to 
the  particular  subject  in  question,  and  now  refuses  to  award  a 
legal  remedy  to  a  plaintiff  who  has  only  demanded  equitable 
relief.^ 

§  22.  *  83.  Where  Allegations  and  Proof  entitle  to  Equitable 
Relief  only,  but  only  Legal  Relief  is  prayed  for,  Equitable  Relief  ■will 
be  awarded.  Rule  in  Missouri.  The  phases  and  combinations 
to  which  the  liberal  principle  has  thus  far  been  applied  have 
resembled  each  other  in  this,  that  in  all  of  them  the  plaintiff 
was  clothed  with  a  double  remedial  right  and  both  a  legal  and 
an  equitable  cause  of  action;  in  those  which  are  now  to  be 
examined,  the  plaintiff  claims  but  one  remedial  right,  and  sets 
up  but  one  cause  of  action.     When  the    complaint  or  petition 

45;  Cuff  y.  Dorlaucl,55  Barb.  481  ;  Graves  Henderson   v.  Dickey,  .50  Mo.   161;  (fol- 

i'.  Spier,  58  Barb.  .349;    Tenney  v.  State  lowed    in    numerous    subsequent    cases; 

Bank,  20  Wis.  152  ;  Foster  v.  \Vatson,  16  Paildock  v.  Somes,  102  Mo.  226.) 
B.  Mon.  377,  387  ;  Leonard  ;;.  Rojian,  20  ^  Horn  v.  Luddington,  32  Wis.  73.    The 

Wis.  540 ;    White  v.  Lyons,  42  Cal.  279.  complaint  alleged  moneys  advanced  and 

In  Leonard  v.  Rogan,  Dixon   C    J.  said  services  rendered  by  plaintiff  to  defendant 

(p.  .542):  "If  the  plaintiff  demands  relief  under  an  oral  agreement  that  the  latter 

in  equity  when  upon  the  facts  stated  he  is  would  convey  certain  lauds,  and  demanded 

only  entitled  to  a  judgment  at  law,  or  vice  judgment  for  a  specific  performance.     De- 

versa,  liis  action  does  not  as  formerly  fail  ciding  that  no  case  was  made  out  for  a 

because   of  the   mistake.      He  may   still  specific  performance,  the  court  also  held 

have  the  judgment  appropriate  to  the  case  that  tlic  jdaintiff  could  not  recover  for  the 

made  by  the  complaint."     See  also  Hamill  moneys   advanced    and   the   services  ren- 

V.  Thompson,  3  Colo.  518,  523;  Harrall  r.  dered ;  and  that  in  such  an  equitable  ac- 

Gray,  10  Neb.  186  ;  Herrington  v.  Robert-  tion  a  legal  remedy  could  not  be  obtained, 

son,  71  N.  Y.  280;  7  Hun,  368;  Williams  relying  upon  the  authority  of  Kewaunee 

r.   Slote,  70  N.  Y.  601  ;  Lewis  -v.  Soule,  Cy.  Sup.  )'.  Decker,  30  Wis.  624,  626.    The 

52  Iowa,  11;  Whiting  v.  Root,  52  Iowa,  conflict  between  this  ruling  and  that  of  the 

292.  same  court  in  Leonard  v.  Rogan,  20  Wis. 

1  See,  for  example,  Mann  v.  Fairchild,  .540,  542,  is  direct.  T  make  no  attempt  to 
2  Keyes,  106,  111;  Heywood  i-.  Buffalo,  reconcile  them.  See  Dickson  r.  Cole,  34  id. 
14  N."  Y.  534,  .540.  621 ,  625  ;  Turner  r.  Pierce.  34  id.  658.  665  ; 

2  Myers  v.  Field,  37  Mo.  434.  As  to  Deery  r.  McPlintock.  31  id.  195;  Wrig- 
the  extent  of  the  recent  modification,  see  glcsworth  r.  Wii^rglesworth,  45  id.  255. 


38  CIVIL   REMEDIES." 

alleges  a  case  which  entitles  the  plaintiff  to  equitable  relief,  but 
no  basis  for  legal  relief  is  stated,  and  prays  a  common-law  judg- 
ment, but  no  equitable  remedy  of  any  kind,  if  the  case  as  alleged 
is  proved  upon  the  trial  the  equitable  remedy  which  is  appro- 
priate to  it  should  be  awarded.  Disregarding  tlie  prayer  or 
demand  of  judgment,  the  court  will  rely  upon  the  facts  alleged 
and  proved  as  the  basis  of  its  remedial  action.  This  application 
of  the  general  principle  has  been  made  in  a  case  wliere  the 
complaint  or  petition  stated  facts  entitling  the  plaintiff  to  an 
accounting  as  against  the  defendant  in  respect  of  a  joint  under- 
taking, but  not  to  a  judgment  for  a  sum  certain.  The  prayer, 
however,  was  for  the  ordinary  money  judgment.  The  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  held  that  this  action  should  not  have  been  dis- 
missed, but  that  a  judgment  for  an  accounting  should  have  been 
granted.^  The  rule  in  Missouri  seems  to  have  been  settled  in  an 
entirely  different  sense." 

§  23.  *  84.  'Where  Allegations  entitle  to  Equitable  Relief  and 
not  to  Legal  Relief,  and  Equitable  Relief  alone  is  asked,  and  Proof 
fails  to  establish  Case  Alleged,  but  does  establish  Legal  Cause  of 
Action,  Suit  must  be  dismissed.  Converse  of  this  Rule.  Principle 
herein.  If,  however,  the  complaint  or  petition  contains  a  case 
entirely  for  equitable  relief,  stating  no  facts  upon  which  a  legal 
remedial  right  arises,  and  prays  a  judgment  awarding  the  equi- 
table relief  alone,  but  on  the  trial  the  plaintiff  fails  to  prove  the 
case  as  thus  alleged,  but  does  establish  a  legal  cause  of  action 
not  averred  in  his  pleading,  his  suit  must  be  dismissed;  he 
cannot  recover  the  legal  remedy  appropriate  to  the  facts  which 
he  succeeds  in  proving.^     There  is  no  conflict  between  this  and 

1  Emery  y.  Pease,  20  N.Y.  62,  64.    See,  Aucr,   8  Ilun,   180;    Hurlbutt  i:    N.    W. 

however,  Russell  i;.  Ford,  2  Cal.  86  ;  Biuk-  Spaiildiiig  Saw  Co.,  93  Cal.  55,  rule  stated 

ley  V.  Carlisle,  2  Cal.  420  ;  Stone  i-.  Fouse,  in  the  text  followed. 

3  Cal.  292;  Barnstead  y.  Empire  Miu.  Co.,  -  Maguire  r.  Vice,  20  Mo.  429;    Rich- 

5  Cal.  299.     In  all  these  cases,  the  court,  ardson  r.  Means,  22  Mo.  495  ;    Mevers  r. 

while  lioldini;  tl'at  the  plaintiff  could  not  Field,  37  Mo.  434. 

recover  a  judgment  for  a  certain  sum,  did  '  Bradley  '-•.  Aldrich,40  X.  Y.  504.  This 

no/ give  judgment  for  au  accounting.     The  case   is   Important,   as  it   lays   down   the 

question,  however,  was  not  raised.     Blood  proper  limitations  upon   tlie   doctrine  of 

V.  Fairbanks,  48  id.    171,   174.     See  also  some  prior  decisions  which  I  liave  cited. 

Schilling  I'.  Rominger,  4  Colo.  100;  Ilamill  See  al.^o  Stevens  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  84 

f.  Thomp.son,  3  id.  518,  523;    Harrall  v.  N.  V.  296,  305;   Arnold  r.  Angdl,  62  id. 

Gray,  10  Neb.  186;  Parker  v.  Jacobs,  14  .508;  People's  Bank  i-.  Mitchell,  73  iil  406, 

S.  C.  112  ;  Smith  i;.  Bodine.  74  N.  Y.  30;  415  ;  Bokes  /'.  Lansing,  74  id.  437  ;  Win- 

WiUiams  i;.  Slote,  70  id.  601  ;  Mackey  v.  termute   v.  Cooke,  73  id.   107;   Smith  v. 


UNION   OF   LEGAL   AND    EQUITABLE    REMEDIES. 


39 


any  of  the  preceding  propositions;  in  fact,  the  one  principle 
governs  them  all.  This  principle  is  that  the  court  looks  to  the 
faicts  alleged  and  proved,  and  not  to  the  prayer  for  relief.'  If 
the  facts  •entitling  a  party  to  a  remedy,  legal  or  equitable,  are 
averred  and  proved,  he  shall  o])tain  that  remedy,  notwithstanding 
his  omission  to  ask  for  it  in  his  demand  of  judgment;  and,  if  the 
facts  were  not  averred,  he  shall  not  obtain  the  remedy,  although 
he  demanded  it  in  the  most  formal  manner.  The  reform  legisla- 
tion has  not  dispensed  with  the  allegations  of  fact  constituting  a 
cause  of  action;  on  the  contrary,  it  has  made  them,  if  possible, 
more  necessary  than  under  the  old  system.  The  converse  of  the 
rule  above  stated  is  also  true.  If  the  plaintiff  sets  forth  a  case 
entirely  for  legal  relief,  and  prays  a  legal  judgment  alone,  and 
at  the  trial  fails  to  prove  the  averments  actually  made,  he  cannot 
establish  an  equitable  cause  of  action  not  pleaded,  and  recover 
an  equitable  remedy  thereon. ^ 

§  24.  *  85.  May  invoke  Equitable  Right  in  Aid  of  Legal  Action. 
The  principle  may  be  applied  in  still  another  form  or  combination 
of  circumstances.     In  a  purely  legal  action,  or,   to  speak  more 


Bodiiie,  74  id.  30  ;  Lawe  v.  Hyde,  39  Wis. 
34.5  ;  Meyer  v.  Dubuque  County,  43  Iowa, 
592;  Schilling  v.  Rominger,  4  Colo.  100; 
Hamill  v.  Thompson,  3  id.  518,  523.  [[See 
to  the  same  effect  Ander.son  v.  Chilson 
(1895),  8  S.  D.  64,  65  N.  W.  435,  where 
the  court  said  :  ''  When  a  complaint  is 
framed  for  equitable  relief,  and  it  appears 
upon  the  trial  that  the  pleader  is  not  en- 
titled thereto,  judgment  at  law  inconsis- 
tent with  the  allegations  of  the  complaint, 
for  damages  upon  a  breach  of  contract  to 
pay  a  stipulated  amount  of  money,  cannot 
be  entered,  and  the  complaint  must  be 
dismissed."] 

1  [[Metropolis  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Lynch  (1896), 
€8  Conn.  459,  36  Atl.  832.  But  see  Steed 
V.  Savage  (1902),  115  Ga.  97,  41  S.  E. 
272,  where  it  seems  to  be  held  that 
"  whether  a  petition  is  based  upon  an 
equitable  or  a  legal  cause  of  action  de- 
pends upon  the  character  of  the  relief 
sought,  as  shown  by  the  prayers,  which 
indicate  whether  the  alleged  cause  of  ac- 
tion is  intended  by  the  pleader  as  founded 
upon  legal  or  equitable  principles ;  and 
upon  general  demurrer  it  will  be  deter- 
mined whether  the  averments  of  the  peti- 
tion are  such  as  to  authorize   the   relief 


called  for  by  the  prayers.  When  a  peti- 
tion contains  some  averments  which  are 
appropriate  to  a  legal  cause  of  action  and 
the  prayers  of  the  same  call  for  equitable 
relief  only,  the  court  upon  general  de- 
murrer will  decide  whether  the  j)etition  as 
a  whole  authorizes  the  equitable  relief 
prayed  for ;  and  if  it  does  not,  the  de- 
murrer will  be  sustained,  notwithstanding 
there  may  be  averments  in  the  petition 
which  as  against  a  general  demurrer 
might  constitute  a  legal  cause  of  action."] 
2  Drew  V.  Person,  22  Wis.  651.  This 
case  resembles  Emery  v.  Pease,  20  N.  Y.  62, 
and  might  be  confounded  with  it.  The 
distinction,  however,  is  plain  upon  exami- 
nation, and  at  once  removes  any  appear- 
ance of  conflict.  In  Emmery  v.  Pease,  the 
complaint  stated  facts  showing  that  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  an  accounting, 
although  it  prayed  for  a  money  judgment. 
In  Drew  v.  Ferson,  the  pleading  set  out 
simi>ly  a  case  to  recover  money  laid  out 
and  expended  ;  it  did  not  contain  any  alle- 
gation upon  which  to  base  a  judgment  for 
accounting.  In  the  former  case,  there- 
fore, it  was  proper  to  grant  the  equitable 
remedy,  and  in  the  latter  it  was  proper 
to  dismiss  the  suit :  there  is  no  conflict. 


40 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


correctly,  in  an  action  where  the  plaintiif  sets  forth  and  mainly 
relies  upon  a  legal  primary  right  or  title,  and  asks  a  remedy 
which  is  purely  legal,  he  may  still  invoke  the  aid  of  an  equitable 
right  or  title  which  he  holds,  or  of  which  he  may  avail  himself,  in 
order  to  maintain  his  contention,  and  obtain  the  legal  relief  which 
he  seeks.  This  is  a  more  indirect  union  of  legal  and  equitable 
rights  and  causes  of  action  tlian  exists  in  any  of  the  instances 
heretofore  discussed;    but  it  is  none  the  less  such  a  union, ^ 

§  25.  *86.  Mode  of  Trial  when  both  Legal  and  Equitable  Causes 
of  Action  are  alleged,  Ho-wr  w^aive  Right  to  Jury  Trial.  As  tO 
the  mode  of  trial  when  the  complaint  or  petition  sets  forth  an 
equitable  and  a  legal  cause  of  action,  there  is  some  diversity  in 
the  practice  of  the  several  States.''^    The  constitutions  protecting 


'  Sheehan  v.  Ilamiltou,  2  Keyes,  304 ; 
3  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  197.  This  was  an  action 
to  recover  possession  of  laud.  Living- 
ston, the  original  owner,  had  demi.sed  tlie 
land  to  one  Tavlor  by  a  perpetual  lease, 
reserving  a  rent-charge  with  a  clause  of 
re-entry.  L.  assi^rned  this  rent-charge  and 
all  his  rights  to  Dr.  Clarke,  who  died 
in  18-16,  and  the  plaintiff  is  his  heir-at- 
law.  The  action  is  brought  to  recover 
the  land  on  account  of  failure  to  pay  the 
rent.  The  defence  was  as  follows :  Tay- 
lor had  given  a  mortgage  on  the  land 
whicli  had  been  foreclosed,  and  the  land 
was  bought  by  Dr.  Clarke  in  1831,  and 
was  by  him  conveyed  to  one  Risley  and 
from  him  by  mesne  conve3"ances  to  the 
defendant.  The  defendant's  contention 
was  that  Dr.  Clarke  in  1831  being  owner 
both  of  the  land  and  of  the  rent-charge, 
the  latter  merged  and  was  extinguished. 
In  reply,  the  plaintiff  ])roved  that  Dr. 
Clarke  did  not  intend  that  the  rent-charge 
should  merge,  but  that  it  should  be  kept 
alive.  The  General  Term  of  the  Supreme 
Court  held  that  this  doctrine  of  non- 
merger  was  purely  equitable,  and  could 
not  be  invoked  by  the  plaintiff  in  this 
legal  action,  and  that  the  plaintiff  should 
have  first  established  the  rent-charge  in 
an  e(|uitabh'  action,  and  then  brought  this 
action  of  ejectment.  The  Court  of  Ap- 
peals reversed  this  decision,  and  laid 
down  the  doctrine  of  the  text.  See,  al.'JO, 
Arthur  r.  Homestead  Ins.  Co.,  78  N.  Y. 
462,  467.  [Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Railroad 
Co.  (1893),  I'J  Colo.  4G,  34  Pac.  281.] 


2  ^United  Coal  Co.  t".  Canon  City  Coal 
Co.  (1897),  24  Colo.  116,  48  Pac.'lO-l5: 
"  The  question  whether  an  issue  of  fact 
can  be  tried  by  a  jury  or  by  the  court  is 
not  to  be  determined  from  the  nature  of 
the  issue,  but  from  the  character  of  the 
action  in  which  such  issue  is  joined." 
Kuhl  r.  Pierce  County  (1895),  44  Neb. 
584,  62  N.  W.  1066;"  Angus  v.  Craven 
(1901),  132  Cal.  691,  64  Pac.  1091:  Per 
Henshaw  J.  (concurring).  "  Under  onr 
system,  equitable  and  legal  rights  are 
determined  in  the  same  forum.  It  is 
within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  con- 
trol the  order  of  proof  upon  the  issues 
joined.  In  the  natural  order,  before  de- 
fendant was  entitled  to  a  hearing  upon  the 
legal  issues  tendered,  she  nmst  defeat 
plaintiffs  upon  the  equitable  issues  pre- 
sented by  them.  This  was  the  view  of  the 
trial  court,  and  in  pursuance  of  it,  it  took 
to  itself,  as  was  proper,  the  determination 
of  tlie.se  e(juital)le  matters.  The  result 
was  that  it  found  defendant's  deeds  to 
have  been  forgeries.  Had  it  reached  the 
opposite  conclusion,  then  defendant  might 
with  right  have  insisted  that  the  remain- 
ing issues  of  law  be  tried  before  a  jury. 
But  that  time  never  arrived,  and  I  do  not 
concede  the  riglit  of  a  litigant  to  oust  a 
court  of  e(|uitable  jurisdiction  in  an  action 
of  purely  etjuitable  cognizance,  merely  by 
tendering  additional  issues  whicli  are  tria- 
ble at  law  before  a  jury.  It  is  sufficient  if 
a  jury  be  lia<l  when  those  issues  come  to 
trial."  'I'his  was  an  action  to  quiet  title 
brought  by  a  plaintiff  in  possession,  and 


UNION    OF    LEGAL    AND    EQUITABLE    KKMEDIES.  41 

the  jury  trial  in  common-law  cases  in  which  it  had  been  custom- 
arily used,  the  defendant  may,  of  course,  insist  that  the  legal 
issues  shall  be  passed  upon  by  a  jury.  He  may  waive  this  right 
by  a  stipulation  in  writing,  by  an  oral  stipulation  made  in  open 
court,  by  failing  to  appear  on  the  trial,  and  perhaps  by  permitting 
the  trial  to  be  actually  entered  upon  without  objection.  If  tlie 
litigant  parties,  or  either  of  them,  assert  their  rights  as  thus 
stated,  it  is  settled  in  New  York  that  the  legal  issues  must  be 
tried  at  a  circuit  court,  or  at  a  trial  term  of  the  court  in  which 
the  action  is  pending;  ^  and  it  seems  that  all  the  issues,  legal  and 
equitable,  must  thereupon  be  tried  together  in  the  same  manner, 
for  it  is  said  that  "no  provision  is  made  for  two  trials  of  the 
issues  joined  in  the  same  action."  If  a  cause  is  brought  on  to 
trial  before  the  court  sitting  without  a  jury  —  in  New  York,  the 
special  term  —  as  an  equity  cause,  and  the  trial  is  commenced 
under  that  supposition,  the  defendant  not  waiving  his  right  by 
acquiescence,  and  the  court,  in  the  course  of  the  investigation, 
discovers  that  it  involves  separate  legal  issues,  the  complaint 
should  not  be  dismissed  on  that  account;  the  trial  should  be 
suspended,  and  the  case  sent  to  the  Circuit  or  other  court  pos- 
sessing a  jury. 2       The   same  rule  prevails   generally  in    other 

defendant  answered  by  a  cross  complaint  out   recourse  to  a  court  of  equity.     But 

in    the    nature    of    ejectment.     See    also  where  defendant  lias  performed  liis  part 

Hidgeway  y.  Herbert  (1899),  150  Mo.  606,  of   the   contract   of   release  pleaded,  and 

51   S.  W.  1040,  quoted  at  length  in  note  interposed  it  as  a  bar  to  the  action,  and 

2,    p.  47,    and    other   cases  cited   in  the  plaintiffs   admit   its    execution,    knowing 

same   note.     Thomas   i\    Wallver  (1902),  at  the  time  thereof  its  legal  effect,  they 

115  Ga.  11,41  S.  E.  269:  "It  has  always  cannot  escape  the  legal  bar  created  tliereby. 

been   the    practice,   especially   since    the  To  get  rid  of  such  an  instrument  resort 

passage   of    tlie   procedure   act   of   1887,  must  be  had  to  a  court  of  equity.     Han- 

when  both  legal  and  equitable  rights  are  cock  v.  Blackwell  (1897).  1.'39  Mo.  440,41 

united  in  one  petition,  for  tlie  court  to  S.  W.  205  :  Defendant  was  charged  with 

apply  legal  principles  to  the  legal  rights  having  uttered  slanderous  words  res])ect- 

and  equitable  principles  to  the  equitable  iiig  plaintiff.     For  a  valuable  considera- 

rights."     Ford    v.    Holloway   (1900),   112  tion   plaintiff  executed  to  defendant  her 

Ga.  851,  38  S.  E.  373.]  release  in  full  satisfaction   of   all  claims 

1  Davis  w.  Morris,  36  N.  Y.  569;  Peojjle  against  defendant.  Subsequently  the  con- 
V.  Albany,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  161,  174.  sideration    was    tendered    back   and   the 

2  [^Hahl  ('.  Sugo  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  109,  jire.<cnt  action  was  brought  for  the  same 
62  N.  E.  135.  Homuth  v.  Metropolitan  slander,  and  defendant  pleaded  the  release 
St.  Ry.  Co  (1895),  129  Mo.  629,  31  S.  W.  in  bar.  Plaintiff  replied  alleging  fraud  in 
903 :  It  is  the  general  rule  in  this  State  procuring  the  release.  Held  that  the  re- 
and  elsewhere  that  the  issues  raised  by  a  lease  must  first  lie  set  aside  by  an  action 
reply  impeaching  the  integrity  of  a  re-  in  e(]uity  or  jtlaintiff  must  a:ld  a  count  to 
lease  pleaded  by  way  of  answer  in  an  her  petition  to  have  the  release  set  aside, 
action  at  law,  may  be  tried  at  law  with-  Parker  v.  Beasley  (1895),  116  N.  C.  1,  21 


42  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

States.  A  mistake  in  bringing  on  the  cause  for  trial  is  to  be 
corrected  by  simply  sending  it  to  the  proper  court  or  placing  it 
upon  tlie  proper  docket.^  In  some  of  the  States  provision  is 
made  for  the  trial  of  the  issues  separately  and  at  different  times. 
The  equitable  issues  may  be  tried  first  and  the  legal  issues  after- 
wards, or  the  order  may  be  reversed  as  the  nature  of  the  case  and 
the  relations  of  the  issues  seem  to  require.^ 

SECTION   THIRD. 

EQUITABLE  DEFENCES  TO  ACTIONS  BROUGHT  TO  ENFORCE  LEGAL 
RIGHTS   AND   TO   OBTAIN   LEGAL   REMEDIES. 

S  26.  *  87.  Former  System.  Illustration.  Criticism.  Subject 
Matter  of  Section  Third.  Another  practical  effect  of  removing  the 
distinction  between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity  is  shown  in 
the  emplo\inent  of  equitable  defences  to  actions  bi-ought  to  en- 
force legal  rights  and  to  obtain  legal  remedies.  The  ancient 
system  knew  of  no  such  union,  and  a  thorough-paced  lawyer 
of  the  old  school  would  have  deemed  it  incestuous.  Legal 
rights  set  up  by  the  plaintiff  must  be  met  in  the  same  action 
by  legal  rights  set  up  by  the  defendant.  If  the  defendant, 
when  prosecuted  in    an   action  at  law,  had  an  equity  which,  if 

S.  E.  9.5.5  :  "  The  moment  either  party  by  ^  Massie  v.  Stradford,  17  Ohio  St.  .596  ; 
his  pleadings  sets  out  and  asks  equitable  Petty  v.  Malier,  15  B.  Mon.  591,  604; 
relief,  the  court  of  equity  acquires  juris-  Smith  i'.  Moberly,  15  B.  Mon.  70,  7-3  ;  Ben- 
diction,  cleaM  the  deck,  and  adjusts  all  nett  v.  Titherington,  6  Bush,  192.  Sec 
equities  between  the  parties."]  Guernsey  v.  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  17  Minn.  104, 
^  I^banon  Trs.  r.  t'orrest,  15  B.  Mon.  108;  Harrison  i\  Juneau  Bank,  17  Wis. 
168;  Foster  >:  Watson,  16  B.  Mon.  .377,  340;  Du  Pont  r.  Davis,  .35  Wis.  631,  639  ; 
387  ;  Sale  v.  Crutchfield,  8  Bush,  636,  644.  and  see  Richmond  r.  Dubuque,  etc.  R. 
If  an  action  is  wrongly  transferred  to  the  Co.,  33  Iowa,  422,  489-491.  [|See  p.  6, 
equity  docket  when  no  valid  equitable  note  1.]  On  the  mode  of  trial,  .see  also 
issues  are  presented  by  the  pleadings,  McPherson  v.  Featherstoiie,  37  Wis.  632 
this  is  error  which  requires  a  new  trial,  (equitalde  issue  may  be  tried  by  the  court 
Creager  i'.  Walker,  7  Bush,  1,  3.  QCarder  "J^i'r  the  legal  i.ssue  is  determined  in  favor 
V.  Weisenburgh  (1893),  95  Ky.  135,  23  of  the  plaintiff  by  the  jury)  ;  Lewis  r. 
S.  W.  964:  "If  the  equitalde  right  de-  Sonic,  52  Iowa,  11;  Davison  r.  Associates 
pends  upon  the  decision  of  legal  issues,  of  the  Jersey  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  333  ;  Wheelock 
concerning  which  the  party  is  entitled  to  a  r.  Lee,  74  id.  495,  500,  and  cases  cited  ; 
jury  trial,  the  case,  on  motion,  should  be  Hughes  v.  Dunlap.  91  Cal  385  ;  Donahue 
tran.sferred  as  matter  of  right  to  the  com-  v.  Meister,  88  Cal.  121;  Downing  i:  Le 
mon  law  docket  to  be  tried  by  jury."  Du,  82  C,a.l.  471.  An  equitalde  defence 
Where  an  equitable  defence  is  interposed,  set  up  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the 
the  cau.se  is  transferreil  to  the  ecpiity  action.  Wisner  v.  Ocumpaugh,  71  N.  Y. 
docket:  Peel  v.  January,  35  Ark.  331;  113,117. 
Sandel  &  Hill  Dig.  §  5804.3 


NATURE    OF    EQUITABLE    DEFENCES.  43 

worked  out,  would  defeat  the  recovery,  his  only  mode  ot  redress 
was  to  commence  an  independent  suit  in  chancery  by  which  he 
might  enforce  his  equitable  right,  and  in  the  mean  time  en- 
join his  adversary  from  the  furtlier  prosecution  of  the  action 
at  law.     A  single  familiar  example  Avill  illustrate  the  situation. 

A.  has  entered  into  a  contract  with  B.  to  convey  to  the  latter  a 
farm  on  payment  of  the  price,  and  lets  him  into  possession.  The 
price  is  paid  in  full, 'so  that  the  vendee  is  fully  entitled  to  liis 
deed.  A.,  in  this  position  of  affairs,  commences  an  action  of 
ejectment  to  recover  possession  of  the  land.  By  tiie  common-law 
system  B.  would  have  no  defence  whatever  to  that  action ;  tiie 
legal  title  is  in  the  plaintiff,  and  his  own  title  and  right  to  a  deed, 
being  equitable,  were  not  recognized  by  courts  of  law  as  any 
defence.  Of  course  a  municipal  law  which  did  not  furnish  some 
means  of  enforcing  B.'s  right  and  defeating  A.'s  action  would  be 
incomplete,  and  unfitted  for  a  civilized  people.  The  common  law 
provided  a  means,  but  it  was  cumbrous,  dilatory,  and  expensive. 

B.  commences  a  suit  in  the  Court  of  Chancery,  sets  forth  the 
agreement  to  convey  and  all  the  other  facts  from  which  his 
equitable  title  arises,  alleges  the  pending  ejectment  brought  by 
the  vendor,  and  prays  for  the  proper  relief.  It  is  important  to 
notice  the  extent  and  nature  of  this  relief,  because  it  throws 
light  upon  questions  which  now  arise  concerning  the  doctrine 
of  equitable  defences.  The  vendee  might  content  liimself  witli 
asking  and  obtaining  an  injunction  which  would  stay  the  pend- 
ing ejectment,  and  leave  him  in  possession  undisturbed  by 
that  action,  but  would  plainly  not  be  a  perfect  and  lasting  pro- 
tection in  the  future.  To  end  the  matter  and  to  secure  himself 
absolutely,  he  must  ask  and  obtain  the  affirmative  remed}'  of  a 
specific  performance  and  a  conveyance  from  A.  to  himself.  This 
being  done,  he  is  armed  with  the  legal  title,  and  can  defend  any 
legal  action  brought  against  him  by  the  vendor  or  his  heirs  or 
grantees.  Nothing  could  be  devised  more  cumbrous  than  this 
double  litigation  to  enforce  one  right  and  to  end  one  controversy.' 

1  [[South  Portland  Land  Co.  i'.  Munger  equity.     Each  action,  that  at  law  and  that 

(1900),  36   Ore.   457,  60  Pac.    5  :    In  an  in   ecjuity,  was  a  distinct  proceeding  l)c- 

actiou  of  ejectment  defendant  filed  a  cross-  longing    to   a    different .  forum,   and   th(> 

bill  in  equity,  and  it  was  held  that  plain-  jirupcr  practice  w.as  to  try  out  the  action 

tiff  was  entitled  to  have  the  bill  stricken  at  law  and  tlien  institute  a  se])arate  suit 

out  on  motion,  since   the  action  at   law  in  wjuity  to  obtain  the  relief  sought  in  the 

should  be  tried  out  before  the  cross  suit  in  cross-bill.] 


44  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

NothinfT  could  be  more  simple,  natural,  and  necessarj'  than  the 
reforni  which  permits  the  equitable  right  to  be  pleaded  and 
proved  in  the  action  at  law ;  and  yet,  when  the  change  was  made 
by  the  legislature,  experienced  and  learned  lawyers  and  judges 
denounced  it,  and  strove  to  render  it  merely  nominal.  Even  at 
the  present  day,  and  in  States  Avhere  the  liberal  doctrine  has  been 
accepted  and  has  received  the  sanction  of  the  highest  tribunals, 
individual  members  of  the  bench  wdll  occasionally  raise  their 
voices  in  strenuous  opposition ;  and  in  one  or  two  of  the  States 
an  interpretation  has  been  placed  upon  the  statute  which  confines 
its  beneficial  operation  within  the  narrowest  limits.  The  subject- 
matter  of  the  present  section  naturally  separates  itself  into  three 
divisions,  and  the  discussion  will  follow  that  order  :  (1)  What  is 
an  equitable  defence?  (2)  When  may  an  equitable  defence  be 
interposed  in  an  action  purely  legal,  which  will  include  the 
joinder  of  equitable  and  legal  defences  in  the  same  suit?  and 
(3)  When  can  affirmative  relief  against  the  plaintiff  be  granted 
to  the  defendant  upon  the  equitable  defence  which  he  sets  up  ? 

§  27.  *  88,  Meaning  of  the  Terms  "  Equitable  "  and  ''  Defence." 
Restriction  Imposed  by  some  Courts  herein.  What  is  an  equitable 
defence?  It  is  to  be  observed  that  this  term  contains  two  distinct 
words,  and  that  the  separate  meaning  of  each  is  essential  to  the 
complete  and  accurate  conception  of  the  whole,  —  "  equitable  " 
and  "  defence."  Equitable  is  used  in  its  technical  sense  as  con- 
trasted with  legal ;  that  is,  the  right  which  gives  it  its  efficacy  is 
an  equitable  right,  —  a  right  formerly  recognized  and  enforced 
only  in  courts  of  equity,  and  not  in  courts  of  law.  The  notion 
involved  in  the  word  "  defence  "  is,  however,  the  most  important 
to  observe.  In  its  judicial  signification,  a  defence  is  sometliing 
which  simply  prevents  or  defeats  the  recovery  of  a  remedy  in  an 
action  or  suit,  and  not  something  by  means  of  which  the  party 
who  interposes  it  can  obtain  relief  for  himself.  If  the  codes  had 
merely  in  express  language  authorized  the  defendant  to  set  up 
equitable  defences,  but  had  not  enacted  any  further  provisions  in 
reference  to  the  subject-matter,  the  granting  of  affirmative  equi- 
table remedies  to  the  defendant  could  not  have  been  inferred 
from  such  permission.  A  "defence"  is  essentially  negative,  and 
not  afllirmative.  The  facts  from  which  the  defensive  right  arises, 
may  [)erhaps,  in  a  proper  occasion  and  when  employed  for  that 
pur{)Ose,  be  made    the  basis  of  aifinnative  relief;  but,  when  so 


NATURE    OF    EQUITABLE    DEFENCES.  45 

employed,  they  would  not  be  a  defence.  In  sliort,  a  defence  is 
not  to  be  conceived  of  as  the  means  of  acquiring  positive  relief 
or  any  remedy,  legal  or  equitable.  When,  therefore,  the  statute 
permits  an  equitable  defence  to  be  interposed  in  a  legal  action,  it 
merely  contemplates  the  fact  that  the  equitable  right  averred 
shall  prevent  the  plaintiff  from  recovering  the  legal  remedy  he  is 
pursuing  by  his  action.  If  to  this  negative  effect  is  added  the 
privilege  of  obtaining  an  affirmative  judgment  against  the 
plaintiff,  based  upon  the  same  equitable  right,  the  latter  so  far 
ceases  to  be  a  "defence,"  and  becomes  in  turn  a  cause  of  action. 
The  action  itself  thus  assumes  a  double  aspect;  each  litigant 
party  in  this  respect  becomes  an  actor,  and  each  a  defendant. 
This  analysis  may  appear  to  be,  and  certainly  is,  elementary  and 
familiar ;  but  it  is  needed  to  clear  up  some  confusion  and  dif- 
ficulties into  which  certain  courts  have  fallen  in  reference  to  the 
subject  under  consideration.  Tliese  courts,  as  will  be  seen  in  the 
sequel,  would  restrict  the  operation  of  the  reform  to  those  cases 
in  which  the  defendant  asks  and  obtains  some  specific  aifirmative 
equitable  relief  against  the  plaintiff ;  in  other  words,  to  those 
cases  in  which  the  equitable  right  relied  upon  by  the  defendant 
is  not  used  as  a  defence  at  all^  but  is  averred  as  a  true  cause  of 
action.  This  construction  is,  as  it  seems  to  me,  a  palpable  error, 
and  it  deprives  the  legislative  provision  of  half  its  efficacy. 

§  28.  *  90.  Meaning  of  Equitable  Defence.  Definition  by  Ne-vr 
York  Court  of  Appeals.  A  defence  is  a  right  possessed  by  the 
defendant,  arising  from  the  facts  alleged  in  his  pleadings  A\hich 
defeats  the  plaintiff's  claim  for  the  remedy  which  he  demands  by 
his  action.  An  equitable  defence  is  such  a  right  wliich  was 
originally  recognized  by  courts  of  equity  alone.  A  concise  and 
accurate  definition  was  given  by  one  of  the  members  of  the  New 
York  Court  of  Appeals  in  an  early  case.  "  Under  the  head  of 
equitable  defences  are  included  all  matters  which  would  before 
have  authorized  an  application  to  the  Court  of  Chancery  for 
relief  against  a  legal  liability,  but  which  at  law  could  not  be 
pleaded  at  bar.  The  facts  alleged  by  way  of  defence  in  this  action 
would  have  been  good  cause  for  relief  against  the  judgment  in  a 
court  of  chancery,  and  under  our  present  system  are,  therefore, 
proper  matters  of  defence.'*  ^     Another  judge  said  in  the  same 

1  Dobson  V.  Pearce,  12  N.  Y.  15('),  166,  IIuii,  437  ;  Wisiier  r.  Ocuinpaugh,  71  N.  Y. 
per   Allen   J.     See   Webster  v.   Bond,  9      113,    117;  Wa   Cliuug   v.  Constautiue,    I 


46  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

case :  "  An  equitable  defence  to  a  civil  action  is  now  as  available 
as  a  legal  defence.  The  question  now  is,  Ought  the  plaintiff 
to  recover?  and  anything  which  shows  that  he  ought  not  is 
available  to  the  defendant,  whether  it  was  formerly  of  equitable 
or  of  legal  cognizance."'  ^  I  nee^  not  pursue  this  analysis  fur- 
ther ;  the  instances  in  which  equitable  defences  have  been  sus- 
tained, as  given  in  the  cases  hereafter  cited,  will  explain  and 
illustrate  their  nature  more  clearly  than  any  abstract  definition  or 
description. 

§  29.  *  91.  Cases  holding  that  Facts  entitling  to  Equitable  Re- 
lief against  Legal  Cause  of  Action  can  be  interposed  only  upon  the 
Condition  that  AfiBrmative  Relief  is  demanded.  Criticism.  Express 
as  is  the  language  of  the  statutes,  and  well  established  as  is  the 
juridical  nature  of  "  defence '' in  general,  the  doctrine  has  been 
strenuously  maintained,  and  is  supported  by  the  decisions  of 
respectable  courts,  that  a  defendant  cannot  avail  himself,  as  a 
defence,  of  facts  entitling  him  to  equitable  relief  against  the 
plaintiff's  legal  cause  of  action,  unless  he  does  it  by  demanding 
and  obtaining  that  specific  remedy  which,  when  granted,  destroys 
the  cause  of  action ;  in  other  words,  he  cannot  invoke  the  right 
as  long  as  he  treats  it  and  relies  upon  it  as  a  defence.  If  he  does 
not  institute  a  separate  action  based  upon  his  equitable  right,  and 
recover  the  specific  relief  therein,  and  restrain  the  pending  action 
at  law,  he  must,  at  least,  in  the  answer  pleaded  to  that  action  at 
law,  affirmatively  demand  the  equitable  remedy,  and  this  remedy 
must  be  conferred  upon  him.  If  he  simply  avers  the  facts  as  a 
negative  defence,  he  will  not  be  j)ermitted  to  rely  upon  them  and 
to  defeat  the  plaintiff's  recovery  by  that  means.  Certain  of  the 
cases  which  announce  this  doctrine,  will  be  found  in  the  foot- 
note.^    The  error  of  this  doctrine  has  already  been  demonstrated. 

Idaho,  266;  rennover  c.  Allen,  51  Wis.  -  Follett  !•.  Heath,  15  Wis.  GOl  ;  Conger 
360;  50  Wis.  308;"  Holland  v.  Johnson,  r.  Parker,  29  Ind.  380;  Hicks  v.  Shep- 
51  Ind.  346.  As  to  whether  an  equitable  pard,  4  Lans.  335,  337  ;  Cramer  r.  Ben- 
defence  must  or  only  mm/  he  .set  up,  see  ton,  60  Barb.  216.  See  also  Keuyou  i'. 
Erie  II.  Co.  r.  Uamsay,  45  N.  Y.  637,  per  Quinn.41  Cal.  325  ;  Lombard/;.  Cowham, 
FolgerJ. ;  Giles  i>.  Austin,  62  id.  486  (such  34  Wis.  486,  492;  Dewey  ;-.  Hoag,  15 
defence  need  not  be  set  up  when  tiie  de-  Barb.  365;  Cadiz  r.  Majors,  33  Cal.  288; 
fondant's  ripht  is  not  absolute,  and  when  Clark  >:  Lockwood,  21  Cal.  220;  Bruck  y. 
it  rests  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  Tucker,  42  Cal.  352 ;  Miller  v.  Fulton,  47 
grant  the  relief  or  not) ;  Ricker  v.  Pratt,  Cal.  146.  Kent  v.  Agard,  24  Wis.  378, 
48  Ind.  73.  does  not  conflict  with  this  doctrine.  See 
'  Dubson  ?'.  Pcarce,  12  N.  Y.  150,  168,  Du  Pont  v.  Davis,  35  Wis.  634,  639;  Hills 
per  Johnson  J.  v.  Sherwood,  48  Cal.  386,  392  ;  McClane  v. 


NATURE    OF   EQUITABLE   DEFENCES.  47 

A  defence  is  a  negative  resistance,  an  obstacle,  a  something  which 
prevents  a  recovery,  whether  it  be  equitable  or  legal.  If  every 
equitable  defence,  in  order  to  be  available,  must  consist  in  an 
affirmative  recovery  of  specific  relief  against  the  plaintiff,  or  at' 
least  in  the  right  to  recover  such  relief  if  the  defendant  choose 
to  enforce  it,  for  exactly  the  same  reasons,  and  with  exactly  the 
same  force,  it  might  be  said  that  every  legal  defence,  in  order 
to  be  available,  must  consist  of  an  off-set  or  counter-claim.  In 
fact,  the  codes,  without  exception  recognize  the  correctness  of 
the  rule  stated  in  the  text.  The  sections  which  prescribe  the 
form  and  contents  of  the  answer  enumerate  "  defences,"  legal  and 
equitable,  and  counter-claims.  A  recovery  of  equitable  relief  by 
defendant  is  as  truly  a  counter-claim  as  the  recovery  of  pecuniary 
damages ;  ^  and  the  statute  thus  expressly  distinguishes  between 
equitable  defences  as  such  and  the  recoveries  of  affirmative  equi- 
table relief.  The  cases  which  will  be  referred  to  in  subsequent 
paragraphs  show  that  the  overwhelming  weight  of  authority  sus- 
tains the  doctrine  which  I  have  stated  as  the  correct  construction 
of  the  codes. 

§  30.  *  92.  Correct  Construction.  Limitation  upon  the  Interposi- 
tion of  Equitable  Defences  to  Legal  Causes  of  Action.  1  now  pasS 
to  the  consideration  of  the  cases  in  which  equitable  defences  have 
been  admitted. ^     It  will  be  impossible  to  state  any  exhaustive 

White,  5  Minn.  178,  190.  See  Webster  in  the  same  forum,  a  party  who  is  brought 
V.  Eoud,  9  Hun,  437 ;  Ten  Broeck  v.  into  court  to  respond  to  a  promise  con- 
Orchard,  74  N.  C.  409 ;  Quebec  Bank  v.  tained  in  a  note  may  defend  successfully 
Weyand,  30  Ohio  St.  126  ;  Hatcher  v.  by  showing  that  its  consideration  has 
Briggs,  6  Ore.  31;  Fennoyer  v.  Allen,  failed  because  of  facts  creating  the  equita- 
51  Wis.  360;  50  id.  308;  Lawe  i'.  Hyde,  ble  barrier  to  its  enforcement  just  stated." 
39  id.  345  ;  Henkle  v.  Margerum,  50  Ind.  The  liarrier  stated  was  misrepresentation. 
240;  Winslow  v.  Winslow,  52  id.  8;  Wendover  n.  Baker  (1893),  121  Mo.  273, 
Thompson  I'.  Fall,  64  id.  382;  Kentfield  25  S.  W.  918:  An  answer  setting  up  e(|ui- 
V.  Hayes,  57  Cal.  409  ;  Scott  v.  Norris  table  defences  and  praying  for  affirmative 
(Ind.  App.  1892),  32  N.  E.  332;  Mason  v.  ecjuitable  relief,  converts  the  case  into  a 
Mason,  102  Ind.  38.  [|Weld  v.  Tlie  John-  proceeding  in  ecjuity  to  be  governed  by 
son  Mfg.  Co.  (1893),  86  Wis.  549,  57  N.  W.  prmciples  and  rules  of  procedure  applicar 
378.3  ble  to  such  cases.     Swon  y.  Stevens  (1897), 

1  Affirmative  relief  will  of   course  be  143   .Mo.  384,  45   S.   W.  270;  Kostuba  i-. 

given  in  proper  cases.     As  an  illustration.  Miller  (1896),  137  Mo.  161,  38  S.  W.  946  : 

see  Blake  v.  Buffalo  Creek  R.  B.,  56  N.  Y.  An  equitable  defence  will  not  convert  an 

485,  493,  494 ;  Bailey  v.  Bergen,  4  N.  Y.  action  at  law  into  one  in  eciuity  where  no 

Sup.  Ct.  642.  afhrmative  relief  is  asked.     Kidgeway  v. 

'  [^Sachleben   v.  Heintze    (1893),    117  Herbert   (1899),   150  Mo.  606,   51   S.  W. 

Mo.  520,  24  S.  W.  54  :  "  Under  our  i^ystem  1040:  "When    an  answer  in  a  law  suit 

of  law,  in  which  legal  and  equitable  rights  admits  the  j)laintiffs  cause  of  action,  and 

and  remedies  are  recognized  an  !  ai)plied  sets  up  purely  an  e(iuitable  defence,  it  con- 


48  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

rule  derived  from  the  decisions  thus  far  made  by  the  courts ;  for 
it  cannot  be  supposed  that  they  have  exhausted  the  instances  in 
Avliich  this  species  of  defence  is  proper.  There  does  not  seem 
to  be  any  limit  to  the  use  of  such  defences  other  than  is  found 
in  the  very  nature  of  equity  jurisprudence  itself.  Whenever 
equity  confei-s  a  right,  and  the  right  avails  to  defeat  a  legal  cause 
of  action,  —  that  is,  shows  that  the  pkintiff  ought  not  to  recover 
in  his  legal  action,  —  then  the  facts  from  which  such  right  arises 
may  be  set  up  as  an  equitable  defence  in  bar.  There  can  be  no 
other  limitation,  unless  we  would  defeat  the  plain  intent  of  the 
statute,  and  return  to  the  old  method  of  granting  to  the  defendant 
a  decree  in  equity  from  which  a  le(jal  defence  may  arise.  The 
following  cases  are  intended  as  illustrations  and  examples  rather 
than  as  a  full  enumeration  of  the  possible  instances  in  which  the 
defence  may  be  interposed. 

§  31.  *  93.  Illustrations  and  Examples.  In  an  action  brought 
to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of  covenants  contained  in  a 
deed  of  conveyance,  the  defendant  may  set  up,  as  an  equitable 
defence,  a  mistake  in  the  instrument  which  should  be  corrected ; 
as,  for  example,  in  such  an  action  on  a  covenant  against  incum- 
brances, the  alleged  breach  being  an  outstanding  mortgage,  the 
defendant  may  show  the  original  agreement  to  except  such  mort- 
gage from  the  operation  of  the  covenant,  and  that  by  mistake  the 
exception  was  omitted.^  In  an  action  upon  a  judgment  recovered 
against  the  defendant,  the  latter  pleaded  that  the  judgment  was 

verts  the  whole  case  into  a  suit  in  equity  tory  substitute  for  the  relief  formerly 
triable  by  the  chancellor.  A  plaintiff  is  afforded  l)y  courts  of  law  and  courts  of 
not  thereby  deprived  of  his  rigiit  of  trial  equity  collectively."  Hainill  v.  Bank  of 
by  jury,  because  the  defendant  by  his  Clear  Creek  County  (1896),  22  Colo.  384, 
answer  concedes  the  plaintiff'.s  right  to  re-  45  Pac.  411:  In  an  action  of  forcible 
cover  unless  the  equity  defence  prevails."  detainer,  equitable  defences  may  be  inter- 
But  where  in  such  an  action  defendant  posed  which  show  that,  while  the  title  to 
presents  two  defences,  one  legal  ami  the  the  property  is  in  the  plaintiff,  the  de- 
other  equitable,  the  legal  issues  are  triable  fendant  has  a  better  right  to  possessiou. 
by  a  jury  and  the  equitable  issues  are  for  Neal  r.  Widcman  (1894),  59  Ark.  5,  26 
the  chancellor.  Martin  v.  Turnbaugii  S.  W.  16:  Defendant  in  an  action  to  recover 
(1899),  153  Mo.  172,  54  S.  W.  515:  "If  possession  of  land  was  allowed  to  take 
the  action  is  one  at  law,  and  the  answer  advantage  of  fraud  by  answer  and  cross- 
seeks  atlirmative  e(|uitable  relief  or  pleads  complaint.] 

a   legal  defence  and  the  reply   rai.scs  an  ^  llaire  v.  Baker,  5   N.  Y.  357.     The 

equitable  defence  to  the  affirmative  legal  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  in  this 

defence  set  up  in  the  answer,  the  equitable  case  that  the  defendant  could  set  up  this 

claim  or   defence  must    be   tried    by  the  matter  as  a  de/lnce,  but  could  not  hare  any 

court,  sitting  in  equity,  before  the  actiou  atfirmative  relief.     This  latter  po.sition  has 

at  law  can  be  tried  ;  and  this  is  the  statu-  been  since  abandoned  by  the  court. 


NATURE    OF   EQUITABLE    DEFENCES.  49 

originally  obtained  by  fraud,  and  that  he  had  instituted  a  suit  in 
equity  against  the  judgment  creditor  in  the  State  of  Connecticut, 
in  which  the  judgment  had  been  decreed  to  be  void,  and  its  en- 
forcement had  been  enjoined.  These  facts  constituted  a  perfect 
equitable  defence  and  complete  bar  to  the  action.^  In  an  action 
to  recover  damages  for  the  non-performance  of  an  executory  con- 
tract to  run  a  steamboat  on  a  certain  route  for  the  plaintiff,  the 
answer  alleged  a  mistake  in  drawing  the  contract  by  which  a 
proviso  was  omitted  that  would  have  excused  the  defendant's 
failure  to  perform,  and  prayed  a  reformation.  The  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  sustained  the  defence,  saying:  "The  court 
below  clearly  erred  in  holding  that  the  equitable  defence  could 
not  be  tried  in  this  action.  That  it  could  be  is  too  thoroughly 
settled  to  admit  of  further  dispute."  ^  The  defence  may  arise 
from  facts  occurring  subsequent  to  tlie  joinder  of  issue,  and 
require  to  be  interposed  in  a  supplemental  answer.  On  the  day 
of  trial  of  an  action  for  work  and  labor,  the  parties  met,  had  a 
negotiation,  and  settled  the  controversy,  by  the  terms  of  which 
settlement  the  suit  was  to  be  abandoned.  The  plaintiff  after- 
wards repudiating  the  compromise  and  proceeding  with  the  trial 
■of  the  cause,  the  defendant,  after  tendering  performance,  was 
permitted  to  set  up  the  facts  in  a  supplemental  answer ;  and  it 
"was  held  that  they  constituted  a  perfect  equitable  bar.^ 

§  32.  *  94.  In  Actions  to  recover  Land.  Three  Classes  of  Cases. 
Illustrations.  The  action  to  recover  possession  of  land  — analogous 
to  ejectment  —  is  the  one  in  which  the  equitable  defence  is  the 
most  frequent;  and  here,  of  course,  it  assumes  a  great  variety  of 
shapes.*     Those,  however,  which  are  the  most   common  are  the 

1  Dobson  V.  Pearce,  12  N.  Y.  156,  165  ;  60  N.  Y.  430  ;  Rpect  v.  Spect,  88  Cal. 
Pennoyer  v.  Allen,  51    Wis.  360;  50  id.     437. 

308.  ^The  following  cases  hold  that  an  equi- 

2  Pitcher  v.  Hennessey,  48  N.  Y.  415,  table  defence  may  be  interposed  in  an 
422.  In  this  case  the  defendant  asked  action  of  ejectment :  Wanser  v.  Lucas 
and  obtained  the  reformation.  (1895),  44  Neb.  759,  62  N.  W.  1108;   Sut- 

3  Kelly  V.   Dee,  2  N.  Y.  vSup.  Ct.  286.  ton    v.   Sutton    (1900),   60   Neb.    400,    83 

4  Harrin<rtoni'.Fortner,58Mo.468,474;  N.  W.  200;  Davis  v.  Holbrook  (1898),  25 
Hubble  V.  Vaughau,  42  Mo.  138;  Max-  Colo.  493,  55  Pac.  730;  Cheney  f.  Crandell 
-well  V.  Campbell,  45  Ind.  360,  363  ;  Ham-  (1901),  28  Colo.  383,  65  Pac.  56  ;  Power  v. 
mond  V.  Perry,  38  Iowa,  217.  See  also  Sla  (1900),  24  Mont.  243,  61  Pac.  468; 
Collins  V.  Rogers,  63  Mo.  515;  Ten  Goldberg  w.  Kidd  (1894),  5  S.  1).  169,  58 
Broeck  v.  Orchard,  74  N.  C.  409  ;  Heer-  N.  W.  574;  Freeman  r.  Brewster  (1897),  70 
mans  v.  Robertson,  64  N.  Y.  .332;  Mc-  Minn.  203,  72  N.  W.  1068.  In  Freeman  f. 
Manus  v.  Smith,  53  Ind.  211  ;  Thomp.son  Brewster  the  court  holds  that  in  such  ca.se 
V.  Fall,  64  id.  382 ;  Hoppough  v.  Struble,  the  defendant  must  set  up  and  allege  his 

4 


50  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

right  to  a  connection  of  either  the  plaintiff's  or  the  defendant's 
muniments  of  title  because  of  mistakes  therein ;  the  riglit  to  a 
specific  performance  by  the  plaintiff  of  his  contract  to  convey  the 
land;  and  tlie  right  to  a  cancellation  of  a  conveyance  on  the 
ground  of  fmud.  These  three  classes  of  defences  are  found  in 
numerous  forms  according  to  the  different  circumstances  wliich 
may  arise  in  the  transactions  of  life  and  the  affairs  of  business ; 
but  they  may  all  be  reduced  to  the  same  general  principle.  In 
i  some  instances  the  equitable  rights  have  been  admitted  in  a 
purely  defensive  character,  and  in  others  the  judgment  has 
awarded  affirmative  relief  to  the  defendant.  In  one  case,  the 
plaintiff  having  proved  title  in  himself  by  means  of  a  deed  from 
the  conceded  original  owner,  the  defendant,  by  way  of  an  equi- 
table bar,  alleged  that,  prior  to  the  plaintiff's  conveyance,  he  had 
purchased  of  the  said  owner  several  parcels  of  land,  including 
the  one  in  question,  that  the  deed  from  such  original  owner 
should  have  contained  a  description  of  the  premises  claimed  by 
the  plaintiff,  but  by  mistake  it  was  omitted.  This  defence  was 
sustained  as  an  equitable  bar  without  an  actual  reformation  of 
defendant's  deed ;  ^  and  in  the  same  manner  a  mistake  in  a  deed 
from  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant,  by  which  the  land  in  suit  was 
omitted,  may  be  made  the  basis  of  an  equitable  defence  without 
any  actual  reformation  asked  or  granted.^  The  title  of  the  plain- 
tiff in  another  similar  action  being  claimed  under  a  sheriff's  deed 
given  in  pursuance  of  a  sale  on  execution  against  the  original 
owner,  the  defence  was  that  at  the  sale  the  sheriff  expressly  ex- 
cepted the  parcel  of  hmd  in  question  therefrom,  that  his  certificate 
and  deed  omitted  such  exception  and  included  a  description  of 
the  premises  by  mistake,  and  that  the  owner  subsequently  con- 
veyed to  the  defendant.  The  court,  on  the  defendant's  demand, 
reformed  the  plaintiff's  deed,  and  admitted  the  defence.^     In  a 

equities  in  his  answer  so  fully  and  com-  Griffith  (1894),  9  Utah,  469,  35  Pac.  512, 

j)letely  that  a  court  of  equity  would,  under  it  is  held  that  the  defendant  in  ejectment 

the  old   yiractice,  have  granted  him  ade-  may  set  up  iu  his  answer  and  prove  any 

quale  relief  and  have  confirmed  his  right  facts  constituting  an  equitable  estoppel.] 
of  possessiou  aa  against  the  holder  of  the  ^  Crary  v.  Goodman,  12  N.  Y.  266,268. 

adverse  title,  citing  Williams  v.  Murphy,  See  also  Guedici   v.   Boots,  42  Cal.  452, 

21    Minn.    .5.34.     In  the  Montana  case   it  456. 

is   said :     "  In    such   cases,    however,    the  -  Iloppough   v.   Struble,  2  N.  Y.  Sup. 

answer  is  in  the  nature  of  an  original  hill  Ct.  604,  60  N.  Y.  430  ;  Glacken  t\  Brown, 

in  equity,  and  must  contain  all  the  allcga-  39    Hun,    294;    Rogers   v.  Castle   (Minu. 

tions  necessary  to  constitute  the  defence  or  1892),  53  N.  W.  651. 
warrant  the   relief   sought.     In   Duke  v.  •'  Bartlett  v.  Judd,  21  N.  Y.  200,  203. 


NATURE    OF    EQUITABLE    DEFENCES.  51 

similar  action,  where  the  plaintiff's  title  was  through  a  sheriff's 
deed,  executed  to  him  as  purchaser  at  an  execution  sale  against 
the  person  who  was  the  admitted  source  of  title,  the  defendant 
pleaded,  as  an  equitable  defence,  an  equitable  mortgage  arising 
prior  to  the  inception  of  tlie  judgment  lien,  and  liis  own  posses- 
sion under  the  same.  These  facts  were  held  to  constitute  a  jrood 
defence  without  affirmative  relief  asked  or  ffranted.^ 

§  33.  *  95.  In  Actions  by  Vendors  against  Vendees  to  recover 
Possession  of  Lands.  Illustrations,  Equitable  defences  are  very 
frequent  in  actions  brought  to  recover  possession  of  lands  by  the 
vendors  against  the  vendees,  when  an  agreement  to  convey 
the  land  in  question  has  been  entered  into.^  As  illustrations, 
the  following  have  been  upheld :  when  the  complaint  alleged  the 
non-payment  of  the  purchase  price  at  the  stipulated  time,  and  a 
consequent  forfeiture,  the  defence  that  the  time  of  payment  had 
been  extended  by  an  oral  agreement,  and  that  a  tender  had  been 
duly  made  in  compliance  with  such  agreement;^  in  an  action  in 
all  respects  the  same  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  defence  that 
a  tender  had  been  made  and  kept  good,  the  court  expressly  refus- 
ing to  grant  the  affirmative  relief  of  specific  performance  to  the 
defendant.^  The  vendee's  right  to  possession  under  a  contract  to 
convey  is  a  very  familiar  species  of  equitable  defence  to  actions 
brought  to  recover  the  land  by  the  vendor.^     In  an  action  by  the 

1  Chase  v.  Peck,  21  N.  Y.  581.  The  may  set  up,  as  an  equitable  defence,  the 
court  having  first  decided  that  the  facts  same  equitable  rights  which  he  could  have 
alleged  constituted  the  defendant  an  equi-  enforced  had  he  brought  an  action  for  a 
table  mortgagee,  so  that  his  possession  specific  performance.  Duffy  i'.  O'Donovan, 
under  it  would  be  a  good  e(iuitable  defence,  46  N.  Y.  227  ;  Leaird  r.  Smith,  44  id.  619  ; 
stated  the  rule  in  a  very  accurate  and  con-  Hubbell  v.  Von  Schoening,  49  id.  330,  331  ; 
densed  manner,  per  Denio  J.  (p.  586)  :  Giles  v.  Austin,  62  id.  486;  Ingles  v.  I'at- 
"  But,  since  the  blending  of  legal  and  terson,  36  Wis.  373  ;  Morton  v.  Dickson, 
equitable  remedies,  a  different  rule  must  (Ky.  1890),  14  S.  W.  905  ;  Hyde  r.  Man- 
be  applied.  The  defendant  can  defeat  the  gan,  88  Cal.  319  ;  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  r. 
action  upon  equitable  principles ;    and  if,  Terry,  70  Cal.  484. 

upon  the  application  of  these  principles,  ^  Cythe  t-.    La  Fontain,  51   Barb.  186, 

the  plaintiff  ought  not  to  be  put  into  posfies-  188. 

sion  of  the  premises,  he  cannot  recover  in  the  *  Harris  v.  Vinyard,  42  Mo.  568. 

action."     The  principle  so  concisely  and  »  Petty   v.    Malier,   15   B.    Mon.  604; 

clearly  enunciated  is  a  complete  answer  Onson  v.  Cown,  22  Wis.  329 ;   Creager  v. 

to  the  reasoning  of  Mr.  Justice  Talcott,  Walker,  7  Bn.sh,  1,3.     Possession  of  de- 

in  Cramer  r.  Benton,  cited  supra,  note  2,  fendant  under  an  oral  contract  to  convey 

p.  46.     See   McClane  v.  White.   5   Minn,  by  plaintiff   or    his  vendor:  Chandler    v. 

178;  Ptichardson  r.  Bates,  8  Ohio  St.  257,  Neil.  46  Kan.  67  ;    Newkirk  c.  Marshall. 

264.  35  Kan.  77  ;  Ingles  v.  Patterson,  36  Wis. 

-  In  Cavalli  ?;.  Allen,  57  N.  Y.  508,  514,  373;    Kenyon    v.    Youlen,   53   Hun.  591; 

it  was  held  that  the  vendee  in  possession  Ford  v.  Steele,  31  Neb.  521  (parol  gift). 


52  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

grantee  of  the  vendor,  who  took  with  constructive  notice  of  the 
defendant's  interest,  the  right  of  the  vendee's  assignee  to  pos- 
session and  to  a  deed  of  conveyance  is  a  good  equitable  defence 
in  bar.^  To  an  action  for  the  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  executed 
by  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff's  assignor,  the  answer  alleged  a 
mistake  in  the  instrument  in  relation  to  the  terms  and  times  of 
payment,  claiming  that,  when  corrected,  nothing  would  be  due, 
and  demanded  the  affirmative  relief  of  a  reformation.  This 
remedy  was  granted  by  the  court,  although  the  mortgagee  was 
not  a  party  to  the  action. ^  In  pleading  an  equitable  defence,  all 
the  facts  should  be  averred  which  are  necessary  to  the  existence 
of  the  equitable  right.  In  many  instances  this  right  is,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  a  right  to  affirmative  remedy;  and,  whether 
this  remedy  is  demanded  or  not,  the  answer  should  contain  all 
the  substantial  facts  that  would  be  found  in  a  cross-bill  in 
chancery. 3 

§34.  *96.  Other  Actions  to  -which  such  Defences  are  Appli- 
cable. Tliese  defences  are  not,  however,  confined  to  actions 
involving  the  title  to  lands,  or  those  brought  upon  contracts 
relating  to  land;  they  are  proper  in  actions  based  upon  mercan- 
tile agreements,  and  in  all  others  where  an  equity  may  arise  and 
affect  the  rights  of  the  parties.  The  complaint  in  an  action 
upon  a  promissory  note  demanded  judgment  for  a  certain  balance 
unpaid.  A  defence  that  the  note  was  given  upon  a  settlement, 
and  that  by  mistake  the  amount  was  made  too  large  by  a  certain 
sum  which  was  more  than  the  unpaid  balance  claimed  by  the 
plaintiff,  was  held  a  good  equitable  bar  to  the  action,  without 
any  specific  relief  demanded  or  awarded ;  ^  and  in  an  action  upon 
a  policy  of  reinsurance  the  recovery  was  defeated  by  the  fact,  set 
up  in  defence,  that  the  same  person  acted  as  agent  for  both  the 
parties  in  procuring  the  policy  to  be  issued,  and  that  his  agency 

1  Talbcrt  I-.  Singleton,  42  Cal.  390,395,  Arguello  r.  E(linp:pr,  10  Cal.  150;  Clark 
396  ;  Cavalli  v.  Allen,  57  N.  Y.  508.  ?\  Huher,  25  Cal.  593,  597.     See  also  Hiii- 

2  Andrews  (•.  Gillespie,  47  N.  Y.  487,  ton  r.  Pritchanl,  102  N.  C.  94;  Dorris  v. 
490;  Cox  V.  Ratcliffe,  105  Ind.  374;  Sullivan,  90  Cal.  279  ;  Swasey  r.  Adair,  88 
Dobbs  v.  Kellogg.  53   Wis.  448.  Cal.  179;  Dale  r.  Hunnenian,  12  Neb.  221. 

8  See    Hruck    c.   Tucker,  42  Cal.  346,  *  Seeley  i-.  Engell,    13  N.  Y.  542,  re- 

352;    Kstrada   v.    Murphy,   19   Cal.   272;  versing  s.  c.  17   Barb.   530.     See  Becker 

Leatrado  v.  iJarth,  19  Cal.  660;   Weber  v.  r.  Sandusky  City  Bk.,  1  Minn.  311.     Also 

Marshall,  19  Cal.  447  ;  Ilium  v.  Kobinson,  in  actions  on  notes,  see  Holland  tv  John- 

24  Cal.    127;    Downer  v.  Smith,  24  Cal.  son,  51    lud.  346;    Ueukle  v.  Margerum, 

114.     See   Hughes  r.  Davis.  40  Cal.  117;  50  id.  240. 


NATURE    OF   EQUITABLE    DEFENCES.  53 

for  the  plaintiff  was  unknown  to  the  defendant  at  tiie  tinio.^ 
Here,  also,  no  affirmative  relief  was  granted;  nor  could  any  have 
been  given  except  cancellation  of  the  policy,  which  would  cer- 
tainly have  been  entirely  useless.  The  assignee  of  a  leiise 
bringing  an  action  for  the  rent,  the  defendant  averred  that  ihe 
assignment  to  the  plaintiff,  although  absolute  in  form,  was  in 
fact  given  as  collateral  security  for  the  payment  of  a  note,  that 
the  note  had  been  paid,  and  that  the  interest  of  the  plaintiff  had 
thereby  ended.  This  defence  was  sustained,  and  here,  also,  no 
affirmative  relief  could  have  been  essential  to  the  defendant's 
security  or  protection  under  any  circumstances;  the  judgment 
in  his  favor  was  a  bar  to  all  possible  further  action  on  the  lease 
by  the  plaintiff  or  his  assigns. ^  In  all  the  foregoing  instances 
the  single  equitable  defence  has  been  spoken  of  as  though  it 
stood  alone,  unconnected  with  any  others.  An  equitable  de- 
fence, however,  may  be  joined  with  any  other  defences,  legal  or 
equitable,  which  may  possibly  arise  in  the  action.  In  many  of 
the  cases  referred  to  in  the  text  and  cited  in  the  notes,  other 
defences  were  spread  upon  the  record.  Thus,  in  the  action  upon 
a  policy  of  insurance,  any  of  the  customary  legal  defences  of 
misrepresentations,  breach  of  warranties,  non-compliance  with 
provisions  of  the  policy  in  regard  to  proofs,  and  the  like,  might 
have  been  pleaded  and  proved  in  connection  with  the  equitable 
defence  which  was  interposed.^ 

§  35.  *  97.  Affirmative  Relief  upon  Facts  Alleged  in  Answer. 
C^-oss-Complaints.  Different  Positions  Contrasted.  Tlie  remain- 
ing question  to  be  considered  is.  When  will  affirmative  equitable 
relief  be  granted  to  the  defendant  upon  the  facts  which  he 
alleges  in  his  answer  as  constituting  an  equitable  bar  to  the 
plaintiff's  recovery?  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  in  an 
early  case,  expressly  held  that  in  an  action  upon  a  covenant 
against  incumbrances  in  a  deed  of  lands,  brought  to  recover 
damages  for  a  breach  thereof  by  means  of  an  outstanding  mort- 
gage, the  defendant  may  show,  by  way  of  equitable  defence  in 
bar,  a  mistake  in  the  deed  by  which  an  exception  of  that  very 

^  N.  Y.  Central  Ins.  Co.  v.  Nat.  Pro-  to  an  equitable  cause  of  action :  Ilanna  r. 

tection  Ins.  Co.,  UN.  Y.  85  ;  20  Barb.  468.  Keeves  (1900),  22   Wash.  6,  60  Pac.  62] 

'^  Despard  v.  Walbridge,  15  N.  Y.  .374,  See    Bennett    r.    Titherington,    6    Bush, 

378;  Struman  17.  Robb,  37  Iowa,  311,313;  192;  Dorsey  v.   Reese,  14  B.   Mon.  157; 

Hablitzel  i'.  Latham,  35  id.  550.  Smith   v.   Moberly,    15  B.   Mon.   70,  73  ; 

^  C^  legal  defence  may  be  interposed  Bosley  v.  Mattingly,  14  B.  Mon.  89,  91. 


54  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

mortofasfe  was  omitted  from  the  covenant,,  but  that  he  could  not 
have,  in  that  action  and  upon  an  answer  setting  up  all  these 
facts,  the  affirmative  relief  of  reformation.  The  case  was  de- 
cided, and  the  judgment  sustained,  expressly  upon  this  distinc- 
tion.^ This  decision,  however,  cannot  be  regarded  as  correct  in 
the  light  of  other  subsequent  adjudications  made  b}'  the  same 
court  and  referred  to  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs.  Affirmative 
relief  may  certainly  be  given  to  the  defendant  upon  his  answer 
in  all  cases  where,  from  the  nature  of  the  subject-matter  and 
from  the  relations  of  the  parties,  a  specific  remedy  in  his  favor  is 
possible  according  to  the  doctrines  of  equity  jurisprudence,  cer- 
tainly iu  all  cases  where  the  answer  can  be  considered  as  setting 
up  a  counter-claim.  There  are  undoubtedly  instances  in  which 
no  such  relief  is  possible.^  Where,  however,  the  nature  of  the 
subject-matter  and  of  the  relations  between  himself  and  the 
plaintiff  are  such  that  he  could  have  maintained  an  independent 
suit  in  equity  against  the  plaintiff  and  procured  specific  relief 
thereby,  or  could  have  filed  a  cross-bill  under  the  old  practice, 
he  may  now  obtain  the  same  remedy  upon  his  answer,  at  all 
events,  as  was  before  remarked,  if  the  demand  alleged  in  the 
answer  constitutes  a  valid  counter-claim.  This  is  undoubtedly 
the  general  rule.  In  a  very  few  States,  however,  cross-com- 
plaints or  petitions  are  expressly  recognized  by  the  codes  in 
addition  to  counter-claims;^  and  the  rule  in  those  States  may  be 
that,  if  the  demand  for  equitable  relief  do  not  constitute  a  proper 
counter-claim,  it  must  be  made  in  a  cross-complaint  or  cross- 
petition,  and  not  in  an  answer.  Subsequently  to  the  decision  of 
Haire  v.  Baker,*  in  New  York,  the  Court  of  Appeals  held,  by 
way  of  dictum  in  Dobson  v.  Pearce,^  that  the  defendant  miiij 
obtain  affirmative  relief  upon  the  answer  which  he  pleads  to  the 

J  Haire  v.  Baker,  5  N.  Y.  357  (1851).  3  [^Crosby  v.  Clark  (1001),  132  Cal.  1, 

2  The  case  of    Despard  v.  Walbridge,  63  Tac.   1022:  In  an  action  of  ejectment 

cited    supra,   seems    to    be    such    a   one.  for  land  purchased  by  plaintiff,  the  defen- 

The  defendant  had  a  rigiit  to  prevent  a  dant  in  po-ssession  may  by  cross-complaint 

recovery  against   himself  by  one  whri  had  enforce  a  trn.st  ajjain.^t  the   plaintiff,  fur 

DO  interest  in  the  lease;   but  he  certainly  fraud    in    j)rocurinp;   the   title.    Board   of 

could  not  have  enforced  a  rea.s.signment  of  School   Commissioners   t\    Center   Town- 

the  lea.se  from  the  plaintiff  to  his  a.ssignor,  ship  (1895),  143  Iiid.  391,  42  N.  E.  808  ; 

nor  a  cancellation  of  that  a.«signment,  be-  Cocke  v.  Clausen  (1900),  67  Ark.  455,  55 

cause  he  had  no  interest  in  or  povk-er  over  S.  W.  846.  See  also  §682  et  seq.] 
the    instrument   in    question  ;    much    less  *  Haire  v.  Baker,  5  N.  Y.  357. 

could  he  have  obtained  any  relief  against  ^  Dobson  i;.  Pearce,  12  N.  Y.  156,  105. 

the  lease.     Ilia  right  was  purely  defensive,  per  Allen  J. 


THE    ACTION    OF    EJECTMENT.  0.> 

plaintiff's  cause  of  action.  Finally,  the  doctrine  was  expressly 
established  as  the  basis  of  the  decision.  In  an  action  to  recover 
possession  of  land,  where  the  plaintiff  held  his  title  by  a  sheriff's 
deed  given  upon  a  sale  under  execution  against  the  original 
owner,  the  defendant  not  only  defeated  the  recovery  by  proving 
a  mistake  in  the  sheriff's  deed,  but  obtained  a  judgment  reform- 
ing that  deed  by  correcting  the  mistake.^  While  in  some  States 
the  answer  may  be  turned  into  a  cross-petition,  and  affirmative 
relief  obtained,^  yet  this  proceeding  does  not  seem  to  be  neces- 
sary, even  in  those  States  where  the  practice  provides  for  such 
cross-petition  or  cross-complaint;  the  defendant  may  have  the 
proper  affirmative  relief  to  which  he  is  entitled  upon  his  answer.-^ 
In  Missouri,  however,  it  would  seem  that  affirmative  equitable 
relief  can  never  be  granted  to  the  defendant  upon  his  mere 
answer.*  In  extreme  contrast  with  this  position  is  the  doctrine, 
already  discussed,  which  refuses  to  the  defendant  the  benefit  of 
an  equitable  defence  as  a  bar  to  a  legal  cause  of  action,  unless 
the  facts  relied  upon  are  such  that  he  would  be  awarded  an 
affirmative  remedy  if  he  elected  to  demand  a  judgment  confer- 
ring it.^  The  general  subject  of  affirmative  relief  to  defendants 
will  be  treated  more  at  large  in  the  subsequent  sections  upon 
"Counter-claim  "  and  "Union  of  Defences  in  One  Answer." 

SECTION   FOURTH. 

A  LEGAL   REMEDY    OBTAINED   UPON   AN    EQUITABLE   OWNERSHIP 
OR  EQUITABLE   PRIMARY   RIGHT. 

§  36.  *  98.  Statement  of  Question  Discussed  herein.  Ejectment 
at  Common  Law.  A  special  case,  arising  from  the  general  union 
of   legal    and   equitable   forms   produced    by   the    new   system, 

1  Bartlett  v.  Judd,  21  N.  Y.  200,  203.  Nippel  v.    Hammond,  4  id.  211  ;   Reed   r. 

2  Massie  v.  Stradford,  17  Ohio  .St.  .596;  Newton,  22  Minn.  541  ;  Quebec  Bank  v. 
Hablitzel  L'.  Latham,  35  Iowa,  550 ;  Ham-  Weyand,  30  Ohio  St.  126;  I)o.ugIas  v. 
mond  r.  Perry,  38  id.  217.  Haberstro,  25  Hun,  262.    Relief  on  a  cro.=9- 

3  Klonne  v.  Bradstreet,  7  Ohio  St.  .322.  complaint  or  cross  petition.  Marre  Lewi.s, 
Defendant  can  have  no  alBrmative  relief  31  Ark.  203  ;  Abbott  r.  Monti,  3  Colo.  561  : 
upon  an  answer  by  way  of  defence  merely;  Hatcher  ;■.  Briggs,  1  Ore.  31  ;  Kellogg  v. 
it  must  be  demanded  by  a  cross-complaint,  Aherin,  48  Iowa,  299.  QSee  discussion  of 
or  by  a  counter-claim'.   Earle's   Adni.   v.  cross-complaints,  §§  *806-*808.] 

Hale,  31   Ark.  473;  Tucker  v.  McCoy,  3  *  Harris  v.  Vinyard,  42  Mo.  568.  See 

Colo.  284 ;  Abbott  v.    Monti,  3    id.    561  ;  State   v.    Meagher,   44   Mo.   356. 
Monti  V.  Bishop,  3  id.  605  ;  Sisty  v.  Bebee,  ^  See  supra,  §  29. 

4  id.  52;  Mills  v.  Buttrick,  4  id.  53,  123  ; 


56  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

requires  a  particular  examination.  It  may  be  properly  presented 
under  the  form  of  the  question  whether  the  holder  or  possessor 
of  a  purely  equitable  primary  right,  or  the  owner  of  a  purely 
equitable  estate  or  interest,  can  maintain  an  action  to  recover  a 
remedy  which,  before  the  change  in  procedure,  was  purely  legal; 
or,  to  express  the  same  thought  in  terms  not  entirely  accurate, 
but  which  are,  nevertheless,  in  constant  use,  whether  STich 
holder  of  a  purely  equitable  primary  right,  or  owner  of  a  purely 
equitable  estate  or  interest,  can  maintain  upon  it  an  action  at 
law  to  recover  an  ordinary  legal  judgment,  either  for  possession 
or  for  damages ;  to  put  the  same  question  in  a  concrete  form  by 
limiting  it  to  a  particular  class  of  rights  and  remedies,  whether 
the  owner  of  an  equitable  estate  in  land  can  maintain  an  action 
analogous  to  ejectment  ?  The  action  of  ejectment  was  originally 
invented  to  enable  a  tenant  for  years  to  recover  possession  of  the 
demised  premises  during  the  term,  the  ancient  real  action  being 
confined  to  freehold  estates.  It  was,  during  its  existence  and 
use  as  a  strict  common-law  instrument,  a  possessory  action ;  and 
a  judgment  rendered  in  it  never  determined  the  question  of  title. 
Its  use  in  trying  titles  was  wholly  a  matter  of  convenience :  no 
rule  of  the  common  law  made  it  a  means  of  settling  a  disputed 
controversy  as  to  title.  Nothing  but  the  voluntary  acquiescence 
of  the  defeated  party  enabled  it  to  produce  even  the  semblance 
of  such  a  result.  Action  after  action  might  be  brought,  and  the 
common  law  placed  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  such  a  succession  of 
attacks.  Equity  alone  devised  the  cumbrous  method  of  an  injunc- 
tion suit  to  restrain  the  further  prosecution,  and  to  quiet  the  title 
of  the  party  who  had  succeeded  in  several  trials  at  law.  Since 
the  common  law  paid  the  most  rigid  adherence  to  external  forms, 
it  is  true  that  the  action  of  ejectment,  until  changed  by  statute, 
was  never  used  except  for  the  recovery  of  demised  premises;  and 
this  form  was  preserved  in  the  absurd  fiction  of  making  John 
Doe,  as  tenant  of  the  real  claimant,  the  plaintiff  on  the  record. 
As  the  estate  for  years,  to  protect  which  the  action  was  origi- 
nally invented,  was  a  legal  estate,  the  rule  grew  up,  and  was 
followed  witliout  exception,  and  from  the  very  necessities  of 
its  form,  that  the  action  of  ejectment  could  only  be  employed 
as  a  means  of  recovering  possession  of  a  legal  estate.  The 
common  law  undoubtedly  knew  no  such  thing  as  ejectment 
by  the  owner  of  an  equitable  estat(.',  or  tlie  holder  of  an  equi- 


THE   ACTION    OF   EJPXTMENT.  57 

table  title;  such  estate  or  title  could  only  be  protected  by  a  court 
of  equity. 

§  37.  *  99.  Arbitrary  and  Technical  Character  of  Old  Rule.  Dis- 
tinction Abolished  by  Code.  View  still  Entertained  by  some  Courts. 
Criticism.  This  rule,  however,  was  always  a  matter  of  mere 
external  form;  it  was  one  of  the  formal  incidents  of  the  action, 
as  arbitrary  and  technical  as  the  fiction  of  the  plaintiff  being  a 
lessee.  When  the  statute  abolished  all  the  distinctions  between 
actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity  and  between  the  forms  of  such 
actions,  one  might  naturally  have  supposed  that  the  formal  rule 
thus  described  would  have  been  at  once  abandoned.  On  the 
contrary,  the  courts  of  certain  States,  in  which  the  new  pro- 
cedure has  been  adopted,  continue  to  speak  of  actions  of  eject- 
ment as  though  they  were  existing  and  fully  recognized  judicial 
instruments,  with  all  their  ancient  and  arbitrary  incidents  and 
requirements ;  as  though,  in  fact,  there  had  been  no  great  change 
sweeping  away  the  very  foundations  of  the  ancient  system.  It 
is  true,  this  reform  legislation  has  not  altered  any  primary  rights 
nor  final  remedies;  an  equitable  right  or  estate  is  not  turned  into 
a  legal  right  or  estate ;  and  the  remedies  of  pecuniary  compensa- 
tion and  of  possession  of  lands  or  chattels  whicli  were  called 
legal  because  they  could  only  be  obtained  by  actions  at  law,  and  the 
other  specific  kinds  of  relief  which  were  called  equitable  because 
they  could  only  be  obtained  by  suits  in  equity,  are  left  unaffected. 
One  great  change,  however,  has  taken  place  which  some  courts 
seem  at  times  to  have  forgotten;  all  these  remedies  are  now  to  be 
obtained  by  a  single  civil  action,  which  it  is  neither  appropriate 
to  call  legal  nor  equitable,  because  the  distinctions  between  legal 
and  equitable  actions  have  been  destroyed.  It  may  be  well 
enough,  in  order  to  avoid  circumlocution,  to  describe  one  class 
of  remedies  as  legal  and  another  as  equitable,  if  it  be  constantly 
remembered  that  this  nomenclature  no  longer  depends  upon  the 
kind  of  action  used  in  the  pursuit  of  these  remedies,  and  that 
they  are  all  pursued  and  obtained  by  means  of  one  action  which 
has  no  distinctive  and  peculiar  features  depending  upon  the 
species  of  remedy  granted  through  its  instrumentality. 

§38.  *100.  Question  Stated  in  Paragraph  Thirty-six  Answered 
upon  Principle.  Argument.  Assuming  these  elementary  doctrines 
of  the  new  systerri  of  procedure,  I  am  enabled,  by  applying  them, 
to  answer  tha  proposed  question  upon  principle ;  I  shall  then  com- 


58  CIVIL    REMKDIES. 

pare  the  results  thus  obtained  with  the  rules  laid  down  by  judicial 
decision.  It  must  be  conceded  at  the  outset  that  every  primary 
right,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  when  invaded,  should  have  a 
remedy  or  remedies  appropriate  to  its  nature  and  extent.  When 
the  right  is  possessory,  there  should  be  a  remedy  which  restores 
possession ;  when  the  right  involves  the  ownership  or  title,  there 
should  be  a  remedy  which  establishes  the  ownership  or  title,  or 
which  restores  the  owner  to  his  full  dominion  by  removing 
obstructions  to  or  clouds  upon  his  title.  The  law  gives  these 
classes  of  remedies;  and  the  confusion  into  which  some  of  the 
courts  have  fallen  in  reference  to  this  subject  results  from  a 
failure  to  distinguish  between  these  two  kinds  of  primary  rights, 
and  the  two  corresponding  kinds  of  remedies;  from  an  utter 
confounding  of  possessory  rights  with  rights  of  ownership,  and 
possessory  remedies  with  remedies  going  to  the  ownership. 
Now,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  where  the  question  is  concerning 
ownership,  where  the  primary  right  invaded  is  one  of  ownership 
or  title,  and  the  remedy  sought  is  correlative  thereto,  the  equi- 
table right  must  have  an  equitable  remedy.  If  a  person  is  clothed 
with  an  equitable  title  or  ownership,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case  his  remedy  must  be  equitable,  because  the  positive  relief 
which  he  needs  in  almost  all  cases  is  the  conversion  of  this 
equitable  ownership  or  title  into  a  legal  one,  which  can  only  be 
done  by  a  remedy  within  the  competency  of  equity  tribunals,  — 
by  a  specific  performance,  a  reformation,  a  re-execution,  a  can- 
cellation, and  the  like.  The  only  exception  to  the  kind  of  relief 
described  —  the  turning  the  equitable  title  into  a  legal  one  —  is 
the  remedy  of  injunction,  which  is  often  necessary,  and  which 
does  not  change  the  nature  of  the  title,  but  leaves  it  as  it  was. 
When,  therefore,  the  object  of  the  action  and  of  the  remedy 
demanded  relates  to  ownership  or  title,  unquestionably  the  equi- 
table title  must  be  judiciall}'  protected  and  aided  by  a  remedy 
that  is  purely  equitable,  and  cannot  be  thus  protected  and  aided 
by  a  remedy  which  is  in  form  legal. 

§39.  *101.  Conclusion.  This,  liowever,  is  not  true  when 
the  right  is  possessory,  and  the  remedy  demanded  is  a  mere 
transfer  or  restoration  of  possession.  There  are  equitable  pri- 
mary rights,  titles,  and  ownerships  which  entitle  the  holder 
thereof  to  the  undisturbed  possession  of  the  land  which  is  the 
subject-matter  of  the  right  or  title.     This  proposition  cannot  be 


THE    ACTION    OF    EJKCTMKNT.  50 

denied.  A  large  part  of  the  remedies  once  given  by  the  Court 
of  Chancery  alone,  and  the  whole  range  of  equitable  defences 
now  allowed  in  legal  actions,  are  based  upon  the  conception  that 
the  equitable  owner  is  entitled  to  possession  as  a  part  of  his 
right.  To  deny  this  is  to  turn  many  of  the  familiar  rules  of  the 
law  into  absurdity,  and  to  render  much  of  the  relief  given  by 
the  courts  self-contradictory.  When  the  vendor  under  a  land 
contract  sues  the  vendee  in  possession  to  recover  the  premises, 
and  the  latter  interposes  his  equitable  right  as  a  defence,  and 
succeeds  in  defeating  the  action  brought  against  him,  that  suc- 
cess is  entirely  due  to  the  fact  that  he  is  entitled  to  the  possession 
by  virtue  of  his  equitable  title.  Now,  what  the  law  permits  to 
be  done  defensively^  for  the  same  reason,  and  by  the  application 
of  the  same  principle,  it  should  permit  to  be  done  affi.rmatively . 
There  is  no  distinction  in  principle  between  the  two  cases.  It 
is  simply  absurd  to  say  that  a  person  in  possession  under  an 
equitable  title  may  defend  and  be  kept  in  his  possession  by 
exhibiting  that  title  in  a  legal  action,  but  that,  if  he  is  out  of 
possession,  he  shall  not  be  allowed  to  recover  his  rightful  pos- 
session by  exhibiting  his  title  in  the  same  kind  of  action.  In 
fact,  when  the  courts,  with  almost  perfect  unanimity,  decided 
that  the  equitable  owner  may  rely  on  his  title  as  an  absolute  l)ar 
—  a  merely  negative  defence  —  to  the  so-called  action  of  eject- 
ment brought  against  him,  they  decided  in  principle  that  he  may 
obtain  possession  in  the  like  action.  Whenever,  therefore,  a 
person  clothed  with  an  equitable  title  or  ownership  Avhich  by  its 
nature  entitles  him  to  the  immediate  possession  of  the  land  as 
against  the  party  actually  in  possession,  and  he  desires  simply 
to  obtain  the  possession,  there  is  nothing  in  principle  which  can 
forbid  him  to  maintain  an  action  for  that  purpose,  and  recover 
the  possession.  To  call  such  an  action  "legal  "  is  no  answer;  for 
the  rule  which  forbade  an  equitable  right  or  title  to  be  enforced 
or  even  recognized  in  a  court  of  law  was  a  mere  arbitrary  matter 
of  form,  and  has  been  expressly  abolished.  To  call  the  action 
"ejectment"  is  no  answer,  because  there  is  no  such  action,  and 
all  the  technical  rules  which  prevailed  in  respect  to  it  at  the 
common  law  have  been  swept  away  by  the  legislative  command. 
The  courts  which  now  speak  of  "ejectment"  as  an  existing 
species  of  action,  and  which  apply  its  rules  to  an  action  now 
brought  to  recover  possession  of  land,  are  so  far  disregarding  the 


60  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

express  terms  of  the  statute  and  thwarting  its  plainest  design. 
It  is  true  that  all  equitable  ownerships  and  titles  do  not  carry 
with  them  the  right  of  immediate  possession  of  the  land,  and 
this  argument  is  carefully  limited  to  those  which  do  involve  this 
element  in  their  proper  nature.  It  might  seldom  happen  that 
the  equitable  owner  would  be  satisfied  with  a  mere  possessory 
remedy,  but  there  are  circumstances  and  situations  in  which,  and 
parties  .against  whom,  such  remedy  may  be  very  important,  and 
may  perhaps  be  the  only  one  practicable.  To  illustrate  by  the 
most  familiar  and  plain  example,  that  of  a  vendee  under  a  con- 
tract to  convey  land.  Assume  such  an  agreement  completely 
fulfilled  by  the  vendee.  He  is  the  equitable  owner,  and  entitled 
to  possession  as  against  the  vendor,  and  therefore  as  against  all 
the  world.  Beyond  a  doubt  as  against  the  vendor,  this  equi- 
table owner  would  prefer  to  bring  an  action  to  obtain  a  specific 
performance,  and  thus  at  one  blow  to  consummate  his  title  and 
remove  all  obstacles  to  the  full  enjoyment  of  his  ownership;  but 
if  he  chooses  to  ask  for  a  part  iiistead  of  the  whole,  upon  what 
grounds  of  principle,  upon  what  reasons  of  policy,  shall  the 
courts  refuse  to  award  him  the  possession  by  compelling  the 
vendor,  who  wrongfully  withholds,  to  surrender  it  up?  To  say 
that  the  vendor  has  the  legal  title  is  no  answer,  and  is  a  mere 
arguing  in  a  circle,  because  the  action  and  the  remedy  do  not 
concern  the  title,  and  by  the  conceded  rules  of  the  law  his  legal 
title  does  not  enable  the  vendor  to  retain  possession  from  the 
vendee.  If,  however,  a  third  person  without  color  of  right,  and 
not  the  vendor,  withholds  the  possession,  the  reasons  in  favor 
of  the  vendee's  maintaining  the  action  are  still  stronger.  Is  it 
answered  that  in  ejectment  the  defendant  may  succeed  by  prov- 
ing legal  title  out  of  the  plaintiff,  because  the  plaintiff  must 
recover  upon  the  strength  of  his  own  title,  and  not  upon  the 
weakness  of  the  defendant's  ?  This,  again,  is  a  mere  formula  of 
words  without  any  real  meaning.  There  is  no  action  of  eject- 
ment. The  action  supposed  to  have  been  brought  is  simply  one 
to  recover  the  possession  to  which  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  from  a 
defendant  who  has  no  right  or  color  thereof;  and  at  best  the  rule 
invoked  is  the  arbitrary  result  of  external  and  technical  forms 
clustered  about  the  common-law  action,  all  of  which  have  been 
swept  out  of  existence  with  the  action  itself.  Unless,  therefore, 
it   is   established    that  the    common-law    form    of   action    called 


ACTION    FOR    POSSESSION    ]?Y    AN    EQUITARLI';   OWNER.  01 

"ejectment,"  with  all  of  its  incidents,  still  remains  in  full  force 
and  effect,  notwithstanding  the  peremptoiy  provisions  of  the 
statute  which  have  in  terms  abrogated  them,  I  have  demonstrated 
that  there  is  no  reason  or  ground  in  principle  for  refusing  to 
permit  the  owner  of  an  equitable  estate,  which  entitles  him 
to  immediate  possession,  to  maintain  an  action  for  the  purpose 
of  recovering  that  possession.  We  maj'  call  the  action  legal  or 
equitable,  and  it  makes  no  difference.  The  sum  of  the  whole 
matter  is,  a  person  is  clothed  with  a  right  over  land  which  by 
its  essential  nature  confers  upon  him  the  right  of  immediate 
possession;  he  should  be,  and  6n  principle  is,  permitted  to  en- 
force that  right  and  obtain  possession,  if  that  remedy  is  all  he 
demands,  even  though  he  might,  if  he  chose,  avail  himself  of  a 
higher  and  more  efficient  remedy.  The  same  course  of  argument 
applies  with  equal  force  to  rights  over  chattels  as  well  as  over 
lands,  wherever  there  can  be  an  equitable  ownership  of  chattels. 

§  40.  *  102.  Result  of  Discussion  upon  Principle  Compared  •writh 
Doctrine  of  Decisions.  Concession  by  Author.  Rule  in  Missouri, 
"Wisconsin,  Indiana,  California,  and  Iowa.  I  have  now  to  compare 
the  result  of  a  discussion  of  the  question  upon  principle  with  the 
doctrine  which  is  established  upon  the  authority  of  decisions  thus 
far  made ;  and  I  concede  at  the  outset  that  in  numbers  the  judi- 
cial decisions  are  decidedly  opposed  to  my  conclusions.  In  ac- 
cordance with  its  general  theory,  that  a  distinction  between  legal 
and  equitable  actions  is  still  preserved,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Missouri  has  held,  in  a  long  series  of  cases,  that  the  owner  of  an 
equitable  title  can  under  no  circumstances  obtain  legal  relief,  but 
shall  be  driven  to  two  actions,  —  the  first  to  turn  the  equitable 
into  a  legal  estate,  and  the  second   to  obtain  possession.^     The 

1  Reed  v.  Robertson,  45  Mo.  580,  and  [[See  Martin  v.  Turnbaugh  (1899),  l.").-} 

cases  cited  in  the  notes  to  §  *79.    See,  how-  Mo.   172,   54   S.   W.    515.      This  was   an 

ever,   Henderson  v.  Dickey,  50  Mo    161.  action   of   ejectment,   the   petition    being 

In  Reed  v.  Robertson  the  defendant  was  in    the   u.sual   form.      The  answer  was  a 

a  trnstee,  and  held  the  legal  title  in  trust  general  denial,  and  an  equitable  defence 

to  convey  the  same  to  the  plaintiff.     It  and  cross  action.    The  reply  raised  equi- 

was  adjudged  that  the  plaintiff  could  not  table  defences  to  the  claim  for  equitable 

maintain  a  simple  action  for  possession, —  relief  asked   by  defendant  in    his  answer, 

called  by  the  court  ejectment,  —  but  must  The  court  below  heard  defendant's  equi- 

resort  to  a  suit  in  equity  to  compel  a  per-  table   defence,   but    held    that    the    equi- 

formance  of  his  trust  by  the  defendant,  table  reply  thereto  of  the  plaintiff  could 

The  other  case  cited  shows  that  the  court  of  not   be   heard    in    this   action,    and    that 

Mis.souri  has  modified  its  views  in  relation  plaintiffs  "must  he  reverted  to  a  separate 

to  relief  of  possession  accompanying  other  bill  in  equity."     In  reversing  the  case  the 

specific  equitable  relief ,  but  goes  no  farther.  Supreme    Court    said:    "This   case   is   a 


62 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


same  doctrine  lias  been  estoblished  in  Wisconsin,  and  has  been 
extended  to  waste,  on  the  ground  that  the  actions  of  ejectment 


strong  illustration  of  the  difference  be- 
tween ptoceedings  at  common  la\\'  and 
under  our  code.  It  is  a  plain  suit  in 
ejectment.  When  it  was  begun,  the  title 
was  in  the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendant 
was  in  possession,  without  any  right  of 
record.  But  by  his  answer  the  defendant 
asks  the  court,  on  its  chancery  side,  to 
raise  up  or  restore  an  equitable  right  to 
the  possession,  by  cancelling  the  entry  of 
satisfaction  of  the  deeds  of  trust,  and  re- 
instating them.  Unless  and  until  the 
court  does  so,  which  it  can  only  do  after  a 
trial,  the  defendant  has  shown  no  defence 
to  the  plaintiffs'  right  to  the  possession  of 
the  lanil.  At  common  law  the  defendant 
could  not  have  interposed  such  a  defence 
or  asked  such  relief  in  the  ejectment 
suit.  The  defendant  would  have  been 
compelled  to  ask  the  aid  of  a  court  of 
equity,  and  the  proceedings  in  the  eject- 
ment suit  would  have  been  stayed  until 
the  determination  of  the  equity  suit. 
When  the  defendant  went  into  a  court 
of  equity  and  asked  to  have  the  entry  of 
satisfaction  annulled  and  tlie  deeds  of 
trust  reinstated,  tlie  plaintiff  could  have 
defended  on  the  grounds  stated  in  his 
reply ;  that  is,  that  the  defendant  had 
lost  his  right  to  have  the  relief  asked  be- 
cause of  his  fraud,  by  virtue  of  the  merger 
or  by  reason  of  the  payment  of  the  debt 
secured  by  the  deeds  of  trust.  If  the 
plaintiffs  herein  (who  would,  of  course,  be 
the  defendants  in  such  a  suit  in  equity) 
establislied  any  of  these  defences,  the  de- 
fendant herein  (the  plaintiff  in  such  an 
equity  suit)  would  be  denied  the  relief 
sought,  the  equity  suit  would  be  ended, 
and  the  defendant  W(juld  have  no  further 
defence  in  the  ejectment  suit,  and  lience 
the  judgment  would  be  for  tlie  plaintiffs. 

"  No  one  denies  that  in  such  a  suit  in 
equity  the  plaintiffs  could  interi)use  the 
defences  named.  No  one  will  contend 
that  if  this  defendant  had  commenced  a 
suit  in  eijuity  to  have  liis  entry  of  satis- 
faction annulled  and  his  deeds  of  trust 
reinstated,  as  soon  as  the  warranty  deed 
from  Wells  to  him  was  set  aside,  that  the 
plaintiffs  herein  (wlio  would  be  tlie  neces- 
sary defendants  in  such  an  action)  could 
plead  the  defences  here  set  up  or  could 


ask  for  an  accounting  and  for  leave  to  re- 
deem. Every  one  admits  that  it  is  ele- 
mentary law  tliat  wlien  a  court  of  equity- 
obtains  jurisdiction  of  a  cause  it  has  the 
power  to  retain  jurisdiction  until  it  does 
complete  justice  between  the  parties. 

"  It  was  the  very  purpose  of  the  code, 
when  the  common  law  and  ecjuity  powers 
were  centred  in  the  same  court,  to  abolish 
this  circumlocution,  and  hence  the  petition 
may  now  have  a  count  at  law  and  a  count 
in  equity  { R.  S.  1889,  sec.  2040),  the  answer 
may  contain  a  legal  defence,  an  equitable 
defence,  and  an  equitable  cross  bill  or 
counter-claim  (R.  S.  1889,  sec.  2050),  and 
the  reply  may  set  up  legal  or  equitable 
defences  to  the  new  matter  set  up  in  the 
answer  (R.  S.  1889,  sec.  2052).  The  ob- 
ject of  all  which  is  to  simplify  proceed- 
ings, and  to  settle  the  whole  controversy 
between  the  parties  in  the  one  action.  If 
the  action  is  one  at  law,  and  the  answer 
seeks  affirmative  equitable  relief  or  pleads 
a  legal  defence,  and  the  reply  raises  an 
equitable  defence  to  the  afrirmative  legal 
defence  set  up  in  the  answer,  tlie  equitable 
claim  or  defence  must  be  tried  by  the 
court,  sitting  in  equity,  before  the  action 
at  law  can  be  tried  ;  and  this  is  the  statu- 
tory substitute  for  the  relief  formerly 
afforded  by  courts  of  law  and  courts 
of  equity  collectively.  In  this  case  the 
court  has  stayed  the  plaintiffs'  suit  at  law 
while  it  heard  defendant's  cross  action  in 
equity ;  but  it  has  refused  to  hear  the 
plaintiffs'  defence  to  the  defendant's  (?ross 
action  in  equity,  and  thus  it  has  granted 
defendant  the  c(|uitable  relief  he  asked, 
and  denied  the  plaintiffs  the  right  to  de- 
fend in  equity  against  the  defendant's 
equitable  claim,  and  also  denied  the  plain- 
tiffs the  relief  at  law  they  asked. 

"Tlie  conditions  thus  presented  in  this 
case  are  that  when  tliis  ejectment  suit  was 
begun  the  defendant  had  no  defence  at 
law  and  the  plaintiffs  were  entitled  to  a 
judgment.  But  by  his  answer  the  defend- 
ant stayed  tlie  suit  at  law  until  bis  claims 
for  eijuitable  relief  were  heard.  The 
court,  silting  in  ecjuity,  heard  defendant's 
claim  and  refused  to  hear  the  plaintiffs' 
equitable  defences  thereto;  awarded  the 
defendant  the  equitable  relief  he  asked. 


ACTION    FOR    POSSESSION    BY    AN    KQUITABLE    OWNER. 


G3 


and  waste  must  be  brought  by  one  having  the  legal  ownership, 
and  that  he  must  recover  on  the  strength  of  his  own  title. ^  It 
would  seem  th;it  the  same  rule  has  been  adopted  in  Indiana, 
although  tliis  is  by  no  means  certain.  A  series  of  cases  have  held 
that  a  plaintiff,  alleijing  a  legal  ownership  and  right  of  possession, 
cannot  recover  upon  proof  of  an  equitable  ownership ;  that  an 
action  to  recover  possession  of  lands,  where  the  pleading  contiuns 
such  averments,  is  analogous  to  the  connnon-law  ejectment,  and 
the  plaintiff  "  must  recover  on  a  legal  title,  and  not  on  an  equita- 
ble title."  ^  In  California,  the  doctrine  is  established  in  the  most 
general  form,  that  the  holder  of  an  equitable  title  cannot  maintain 
an  action  to  recover  the  possession,  because,  in  the  language  of 
the  courts,  "  in  ejectment  the  legal  title  must  prevail ; "  ^  and  a 
like  rule  seems  to  prevail  in  Iowa."* 

§  41.  *  103.  Conflict  in  New  York.  Phillips  v.  Gorham.  Rule 
in  Kansas.  In  New  York  there  is  a  conflict  of  opinion,  as  slunvn 
by  the  reported  cases.  The  Supreme  Court  has  held,  in  accord- 
ance with  the   doctrine   laid   down    in   Missouri,  Wisconsin,  and 


and  denied  the  plaintiff  any  kind  of  relief 
either  legal  or  equitable.  Thus  a  suit  at 
law  is  converted  into  a  suit  in  equity  so 
far  as  the  defendant  is  concerned,  but  the 
plaintiffs  are  reverted  to  another  proceed- 
ing in  equity  to  undo  what  the  court  sit- 
ting in  equity  has  done  in  this  case;  and 
if  they  succeed,  then  they  must  come 
again  into  a  court  of  law. 

"  The  error  of  the  trial  court  was  in 
not  dealing  with  the  whole  controversy 
when  it  tried  the  case  as  one  in  equity. 
If  it  was  a  case  in  equity  so  far  as  the  de- 
fendant was  concerned,  it  was  the  duty  of 
the  court,  in  trying  defendant's  claim  in 
equity,  to  hear  and  determine  all  the 
equitable  defences  which  a  court  of  equity 
would  or  could  hear  if  it  had  been  an 
original  proceeding  by  Estes  to  have  his 
entry  of  satisfaction  annulled  and  his 
deeds  of  trust  reinstated.  In  other  words, 
the  court  did  equity  for  Estes,  but  refused 
to  do  it  for  Martin,  and  told  iiini  to  go 
into  a  court  of  equity  to  get  relief,  not- 
withstanding he  was  already  in  a  court  of 
equity.  This  is  more  circumlocution  than 
existed  before  the  code.  For  this  error 
the  judgment  cannot  stand." 

It  is  stiU  the  rule  in  Missouri  that 
"to  support  an  action  of  ejectment  the 


plaintiff  must  be  vested  with  the  legal 
title  to  the  land  in  question  at  the  time 
of  the  commencement  of  the  action,  and 
that  he  cannot  recover  uptm  a  merely 
equitable  title."  See  Nalle  v.  Thompson 
(1902),  173  Mo.  595,  73  S.  W.  599  ;  Xalle  r. 
Parks  (1902),  173  Mo.  616,  73  S.  W.  596; 
Kingman  v.  Sievers  (1898),  143  Mo.  519, 
45  S.  W.  266;  Clay  i'.  Mayr  (1898),  144 
Mo.  376,  46  S.  W.  157  ;  Crawford  i-.  Whit- 
more  (1893),  120  Mo.  144,  25  S.  W.  365. 
A  similar  rule  prevails  in  Kentucky.  See 
Howard  v.  Singleton  (1893),  94  Ky.  336, 
22  S.  W.  337.] 

1  Eaton  V.  Smith,  19  Wis.  537;  Gillett 
v.  Treganza,  13  Wis.  472,475;  Hammer 
V.  Hammer,  39  Wis.  182. 

2  Groves  v.  Maiks,  32  Ind.  319;  Kowe 
V.  Beckett,  30  Ind.  154;  Stehman  i-.  Crull, 
26  Ind.  436. 

3  Emeric  ?;.  Pennima-i,  26  Cal.  119,  124  : 
Clark  V.  Lockwood,  21  Cal.  222.  See  Hart- 
ley r.  Brown,  46  Cal.  201  ;  Buhne  v.  Chism, 
48  Cal.  467,  472  ;  also  Morton  v.  Green,  2 
Neb.  441  ;  Percifull  v.  Piatt,  36  Ark.  456; 
Tarpey  v.  Deseret  Salt  Co.,  5  Utah.  20.t. 

*  Walker  v.  Kynett,  32  Iowa,  524,  526. 
But  see  Brown  v.  Freed,  43  Ind.  253',  254- 
257. 


64  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

California,  that  the  holder  of  an  equitable  title  cannot  recover 
possession,  even  against  a  mere  intruder,  but  that  he  must  first 
procure  liis  equitable  to  be  changed  into  a  legal  ownership  by  the 
judgment  rendered  in  an  equity  action,  and  thus  put  himself  in  a 
condition  to  maintain  ejectment.^  The  Court  of  Appeals  in  New- 
York  has  reached  a  conclusion  directly  the  contrary  in  a  case 
where  the  facts  and  the  form  of  the  proceeding  made  the  decision 
necessary  and  final.  The  ruling  was,  therefore,  not  a  dictum^  but 
was  the  very  ratio  decidendi,  and  involved  a  principle  which  fully 
sustains  the  reasoning  and  doctrine  of  the  text,  although  the  case 
did  not  in  form  present  the  naked  question  under  discussion.  A 
plaintiff  who  had  only  an  equitable  title  was  permitted  to  recover 
a  judgment  for  possession,  based  upon  a  verdict,  where  no  other 
relief  was  granted,  against  a  defendant  who  held  the  legal  title 
under  a  deed  regular  on  its  face.  This  decision  goes  to  the  full 
length  of  the  doctrine  which  I  have  advocated  ;  for,  although  the 
complaint  demanded  the  specific  equitable  reUef  of  cancellation 
and  reconveyance  as  well  as  possession,  yet  on  the  trial,  which 
was  had  before  a  jury,  and  was  conducted  in  all  respects  like  the 
trial  of  a  legal  action,  these  demands  for  relief  were  entii-ely 
ignored ;  the  single  question  of  the  plaintiff's  right  to  possession 
was  submitted  to  the  jury,  and  upon  their  verdict  a  judgment  for 
possession  was  rendered,  which  was  affirmed  by  the  tribunal  of 
last  resort.2  In  Kansas,  under  an  express  provision  of  the  code, 
the  holder  of  an  equitable  title  may  maintain  an  action  to  recover 
possession  of  the  land.^ 

§  42.  *  104.  Another  Class  of  Actions  herein.  Partner  ageiinst 
Copartner.  Familiar  Rule  herein.  Holding  in  Indiana.  In  Missouri. 
In  Most  of  the  States.  Case  herein  Referred  to  Contrasted  with  one 
previously  Discussed.  Argument.  Conclusion  Reached.  There  is 
another  class  of  actions  which  have  been  admitted  by  some  courts 
as  a  consequence  of  the  reform  legislation,  which  could  not  have 

1  Peck  (;.  Newton,  46  Barb.  173.  table  title  was  .sufficient  to  maintain  eject- 

2  Phillips  V.  Gorham,  17  N.  Y.  270.  nient.  In  WestfeJt  v.  Adams  (1902),  131 
Also,  Murray  v.  Blackledge,  71  N.  C.  492.     N.   C.  379,  42  S.   E.  823,  it  is  said:  "It 

*  Kanssis    Pac.    K.    v.    McBratuey,    12  seems   to   be   settled  by  the  decisions  of 

Kan.  9.  our  court  that  a  jilaintiff  may  recover  in 

p'<jpe  I'.  Nichols  (1899),  61   Kan.   230,  ejectment  upon  an  »'i|uitalile  title."    Citing 

59    I'ac.   2.")7.      The    Kansas   statute   was  Taylor  v.  Katman,  92  N.  C.  601  ;  Condry 

adopted    in  Oklahoma,  and  under  it   the  v.  Cheshire,  88  N.  C.  375;  Geer  v.  Geer, 

court  held,  In   Laughlin  v.  Fariss  (1897),  109  N.  C.  679.] 
7    Okla.    1,    50   Pac.    254,    that    an    equi- 


ACTION    BETWEEN    rAltTNEUS.  65 

been  maintained  prior  to  the  change.  It  was  a  faniihar  doc- 
trine that  one  partner  could  not  maintain  an  action  at  law 
against  a  copartner  to  recover  any  sum  which  was  a  portion  of 
the  firm  assets,  or  to  recover  any  sum  claimed  to  be  due  by  virtue 
of  their  common  partnership  dealing  or  joint  undertakings,  unless 
there  had  been  prior  to  the  suit  an  account  stated  and  a  balance 
agreed  upon  between  them,  or  unless  the  defendant  had  expressly 
promised  to  pay  the  sum  sought  to  be  recovered.  In  other  words, 
the  plaintiff  in  his  declaration  was  obliged  to  aver  either  the 
accounting  together  and  the  balance  struck,  or  the  express 
promise.  If  he  did  not,  he  would  be  either  nonsuited  at  the 
trial  or  his  pleading  would  be  held  insuificient  on  demurrer.  If 
there  had  been  no  such  account  stated  or  express  promise,  his 
only  remedy  was  by  an  action  in  equity  for  an  accounting ;  and, 
having  obtained  jurisdiction  of  the  matter,  the  Court  of  Chancery 
would  decree  pajanent  of  the  amount  due.  This  doctrine  is  too 
familiar  to  require  the  citation  of  authorities  in  its  support.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  has  held  that  this  rule  is  abrogated  by 
the  code  of  procedure,  and  that  a  partner  may  maintain  an  action 
to  recover  a  sum  due  from  his  copartner,  by  reason  of  their  joint 
business,  without  averring  or  proving  any  settlement  or  express 
promise.^  The  same  doctrine  has  been  applied  in  Missouri  to 
owners  in  common  generally  who  are  not  partners.^  The  old  rule 
is  retained,  however,  in  most  of  the  States ;  and  an  action  by  a  part- 
ner to  recover  a  sum  of  money  from  his  copartner,  alleged  to  have 
become  due  by  reason  of  their  joint  undertakings,  is  not  permitted, 
unless  based  upon  a  mutual  settlement  or  an  express  promise.^ 

1  Heavilon  v.  Heavilon,  29  Ind.  509;  ^  QFor  a  thorough  discussion  of  this 
Shalter  f.  Caldwell,  27  Iiid.  376  ;  Duck  r.  principle,  see  Miller  v.  Freeman  (1900), 
Abbott,  24  Ind.  349.  See  also  Jamison  y.  Ill  Ga.  6.')4,  36  S.  E.  961:  It  is  a  well 
Walsh,  30  Ind.  167.  But,  per  contra,  "recognized  rule  that  one  partner  cannot, 
Briggs  V.  Daughertv,  48  Ind.  247,  249,  before  a  final  winding  up  of  the  partner- 
seems  to  abandon  this  position.  See  also  ship,  maintain  against  his  copartner  an 
Crossley  v.  Taylor,  83  Ind.  337  ;  Lang  v.  action  at  law  based  upon  partnership 
Oppenheimer,  96  Ind.  47;  both  cases  con-  transactions."  To  this  rule  there  is  the 
forming  to  the  general  rule.  exception  thus  stated    by  Judge   Story  : 

■^  Rogers  I'.  Pennistou,  16  Mo.  432,  43.").  "  V/hencver  there  is  an  express  stipula- 

QBut  see  Bambrick  v.  Simms  (1895),  132  tion  in  the  partnership  articles  which   is 

Mo.  48,  33  S.   W.   445,  where  the  court  violated  i)y  any  partner,  an  action  at  law, 

said:  "It  is  well  settled  that  one  partner  either  assumpsit  or  covenant  as  the  case 

may  sue  another  in  an  action  at  law  where  may  require,  will  ordinarily  lie  to  recover 

the  transaction  relates  to  but  one  single  damages  for   the  breach   thereof.  ...  A 

unadju.sted   matter   growing   out   of    the  careful  consideration  of  the  statement  and 

partnership  transactions."]  of  the  authorities  cited  to  sustain  it  will 

5 


66 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


It  is  SO  held  in  California, ^  and  in  New  York,^  and  in  other 
States ;  ^  and  this  is  beyond  doubt  the  correct  interpretation  of 
the  codes.  The  contrast  between  this  case  and  the  one  previ- 
ously discussed  is  plain ;  and  an  analysis  of  these  contrasting 
features  will  do  much  toward  elucidating  the  general  principles 
which  regulate  the  union  of  legal  and  equitable  actions  and 
remedies.  When  a  person  has  an  equitable  ownership  of  land  of 
a  kind  which  entitles  him  to  immediate  possession,  his  remedial 
right  to  possession  is  in  exact  conformity  with  his  primary  right 
of  ownership.  The  denial  of  this  remedy  of  simple  possession 
under  the  former  system  was  based  solely  upon  technical  and 
arbitrary  notions  incidental  to  the  mere  external  forms  of  actions 
and  modes  of  adjudication  which  prevailed  in  the  two  classes  of 
courts ;  and  when  these  external  forms,  with  their  incidents,  were 
removed,  a  way  was  opened  for  redressing  the  primary  equitable 
right  in  a  manner  exactly  conforming  with  its  own  nature  and 
extent;  that  is,  a  primary  equitable  right  or  interest  calling  for 

sell  V.  Grimes,  46Mo.  410;  Buckner  v.  Ries, 
34  Mo.  357  ;  Jepsen  v.  Beck,  78  Cal   540. 

I^The  rule  iu  Ohio  is  stated  in  Kuiineke 
V.  Mapel  (1899),  60  O.  St.  1,  53  N.  E.  259. 
It  was  here  held  that  it  was  a  "  well  estab- 
lishe<l  rule  that  one  partner  cannot,  in  the 
absence  of  a  showing  that,  by  some  special 
agreement,  the  particular  matter  has  been 
withdrawn  from  the  partnership  account, 
maintain  an  action  at  law  against  another 
to  recover  an  amount  claimed  by  him  by 
reason  of  partnership  transactions,  until 
there  has  been  a  final  settlement  of  the 
business  of  the  partnership." 

Nebraska,  also,  follows  the  general  rule. 
Lord  V.  Peaks  (1894).  41  Neb.  891,  60 
N.  W.  353.  But  a  partner  may  sue  his 
copartner  where  the  cause  of  action  is  not 
connected  with  the  partnership  accounts : 
Ilalleck  V.  Streeter  (1897).  52  Neb.  827, 
73  N.  W.  219.  And  in  Glade  v.  White 
(1894),  42  Neb.  336,  60  N.  W.  556,  it  was 
said  that  "  where  a  partnership  has  been 
dissolved  and  in  tlie  settlement  of  the 
])artnprship  affairs  one  partner  lias  become 
owner  of  the  accounts  and  debts  payable 
to  the  partnership,  such  partner  may 
maintain  an  action  at  law  against  the 
other  for  money  collected  on  such  ac- 
count by  such  other  partner  and  with- 
held by  him  without  the  knowledge  of 
the  plaintiff."] 


show  that  the  cases  falling  within  this 
exception  are  of  three  classes:  (1)  those 
in  which  the  partnership  is  inchoate  and 
has  never  been  launched ;  (2)  those  in 
which  the  partnership  is  at  an  end ,  and 
(3)  tho.se  in  which  the  stipulation  whicli 
is  violated,  and  for  the  breach  of  which 
the  action  is  brought,  i.s  one  between  the' 
partners  individually  and  '  the  damages 
from  which  belong  exclusively  to  the 
other  partner  and  can  be  assessed  without 
an  accounting.'  "J 

1  Russell  V.  Byron,  2  Cal.  86  ;  Buckley 
V.  Carlisle,  2  Cal.  420 ;  Stone  v.  Fouse,  3 
Cal.  292 ;  Barnstead  v.  Empire  Mining 
Co.,  5  Cal.  299  ;  Ross  v.  Cornell,  45  Cal. 
133;  Pico  V.  Cuyas,  47  Cal.  174,  179; 
Fisher  v.  Sweet,  67  Cal.  228. 

2  Emery  v.  Pease,  20  N.  Y.  62. 

3  Wood  i\  CuUen.  13  Minn.  394,  397  ; 
Lower  v.  Denton,  9  Wis.  268  ;  Shields  f. 
Fuller,  4  Wis.  102  ;  Smith  r.  SmiHi,  33 
Mo.  557  ;  M'Knight  v.  M'Cutchen,  27  M<i. 
436  ;  Springer  v.  Cat)ell,  1 0  Mo.  640 ;  Bean 
r.  Gregg.  7  Colo.  490  ;  Bishop  c.  Bisliop. 
54  Conn.  232  ;  O'Brien  r.  Smith.  42  Kan. 
49,  Stone  v.  Mattinjrlv  (Kv.  1892),  19 
S.  W.  402  ;  McDonald  v  Holmes,  22  Or. 
212;  Stevens  »■  Baker,  1  Wash.  315.  But 
xee.  for  examples  where  an  action  may  be 
inaintained.  Wliitehill  v.  Shickle,  43  Mo. 
637  ;  Seaman  -•  Johnson,  46  Mo.  Ill  ;  Ru.s- 


ACTION    BETWEEN    PARTNERS.  07 

possession  can  be  redressed  by  granting  possession.  In  other 
words,  the  ancient  rule  denying  to  an  ecpii table  owner  tlie  remedy 
of  bare  possession  in  the  cases  described  was  one  of  the  "distinc- 
tions "  and  "  forms  "  in  express  terras  abolished  by  the  legislature 
in  enacting  tlie  new  procedure.  Courts  which  continue  the  denial 
because  "ejectment  could  not  be  brought  by  a  holder  of  an  equi- 
tiible  title,"  or  because  "  the  legal  title  must  prevail,"  overlook  the 
real  nature  botli  of  the  right  to  be  redressed  and  of  the  remedy  to 
be  conferred,  and  pay  a  regard  only  to  the  technical  notions  of 
form  which  hampered  the  common-law  courts  in  all  their  move- 
ments, and  which  became  at  last  so  grievous  a  restraint  upon  the 
administration  of  justice  that  the  legislature  was  compelled  to 
intervene.  In  the  other  case,  however,  the  reasons  of  the  rule 
were  very  different,  and  were  founded  upon  the  nature  of  the 
primary  right  itself,  and  not  upon  any  formal  incidents  of 
the  judicial  proceeding  by  which  it  was  redressed.  A  partner 
is  not  suffered  to  maintain  the  action  in  question  because  his 
primary  right,  flowing  from  the  fact  of  partnership,  is  not  of  such 
a  nature  as  to  call  for  a  remedy  of  that  kind ;  that  is,  a  judgment 
for  the  payment  of  a  certain  sum.  The  right  to  the  recovery  of 
a  certain  sura  of  money,  unless  arising  from  tort,  must,  according 
to  the  common-law,  be  based  upon  a  promise  express  or  implied. 
It  does  not  affect  this  principle  to  say  that  the  common-law  doc- 
trine of  implied  promises  was  itself  largely  founded  upon  a  fiction. 
Granting  this  to  be  true,  as  it  undoubtedly  was,  still  the  theory 
was  firmly  established  that  the  liability  spoken  of  arose  either 
from  an  express  promise  or  from  acts,  events,  or  relations  which 
created  a  duty  to  pay,  and  which  duty  the  law  conceived  of  as 
springing  from  an  implied  promise.  If  we  discard  the  notion  of 
an  implied  promise,  therefore,  as  fictitious,  there  must  still  be  a 
relation  existing  between  the  parties,  from  which  the  duty  takes 
its  origin  ;  and  without  tlie  existence  of  such  a  relation  there  was 
no  duty  on  the  one  side,  and  no  primary  right  on  the  other.  Now, 
it  was  an  elementary  doctrine  of  tlie  law  pertaining  to  partnership 
that,  resulting  from  their  mutual  dealings  with  their  joint  assets, 
no  promise  is  ever  implied  that  one  partner  shall  pay  to  the  other 
any  definite  sum  as  the  amount  due  from  the  proceeds  of  the 
undertaking,  or  as  his  share  of  the  joint  assets.  No  promise  is 
ever  implied  from  the  existence  of  this  relation,  from  the  mere 
fact  of  there  being  a  joint  business,  joint  profits,  or  joint  property. 


68  CIVIL    KKMEDIES. 

Or,  to  express  the  same  doctrine  -without  the  use  of  fictitious 
terms,  from  the  relation  of  partnership  and  the  joint  undertakings 
and  assets  thereof,  the  law  imposed  no  duty  upon  one  partner  to 
pay  to  tlie  other  any  definite  sum  in  respect  of  his  share  therein, 
and  gave  no  corresponding  primary  right  to  that  other  to  demand 
such  payment.  If,  however,  there  has  been  an  accounting,  so 
that  a  balance  in  favor  of  one  is  ascertained,  a  promise  is  implied 
on  the  part  of  the  other  —  or  a  duty  arises  on  his  part  —  to  pay 
that  sum.  The  right  to  maintain  the  action  by  one  partner 
against  another,  and  to  recover  a  definite  sum,  depended  therefore, 
and  still  depends,  not  upon  anything  connected  with  the  form  of 
the  action,  or  upon  the  distinctions  between  legal  and  equitable 
actions,  but  upon  the  very  nature  of  the  primary  right.  Those 
courts  which  have  held  that,  under  the  new  procedure,  a  partner 
may  recover  a  definite  sum  from  a  copartner  without  an  account- 
ing and  without  an  express  promise,  have  in  effect  decided  that 
the  new  procedure  has  materially  changerl  the  primary  rights  of 
parties,  has,  in  this  instance,  created  a  primary  right  which  did 
not  before  exist  at  all,  which  is  a  conclusion  in  direct  antagonism 
with  the  plainest  and  best-settled  principles  of  interpretation.  In 
fact,  this  primary  right  of  a  partner  against  his  fellow  has  not  been 
modified  by  the  reform  in  the  modes  of  procedure  ;  and  under  the 
new  system,  as  under  the  old,  there  should  be  no  recovery  of  a 
definite  sum  in  any  action,  unless  the  facts  which  create  the 
primary  right  have  occurred,  —  unless  there  has  been  or  is  an  ac- 
counting and  balance  ascertaine  1,  or  an  express  promise  to  pay  the 
sum.  It  is  not  the  case  of  an  equitable  })rimary  right  being  sup- 
ported by  a  legal  remedy,  because  the  equitable  primary  right  of 
the  partner  does  not  involve  the  payment  of  a  certain  sum ;  its 
only  remedy  is  an  accounting,  and  this  is  preserved  in  full  force 
and  effect.  The  analysis  above  given  may  not  be  very  important 
in  itself ;  but  it  will  aid  in  distinguishing  primary  from  remedial 
rights,  and  the  substances  of  rights  which  have  not  been  changed 
from  the  foniial  incidents  which  have  been  abolished ;  it  will 
enable  us  to  determine  the  exact  limits  of  the  modifications  made 
by  the  reform  legislation. 

§43.    *105.    Additional  Instances.     A    few    instances    of    other 
actions  will  bring  this   inquiry   to  an  end.^     It  has  been  held  in 

*  Tli.1t  an  action  brought  to  recover  a     and  ha.seil   upon  purely  equitable  rights, 
money  judgment  alone  may  be  equitable     see  Hindge  c.  Baker,  .57  N.  Y.  209,  219. 


ACTION    BETWEEN    PARTNERS.  69 

Nevada  that  a  person  claiming  to  be  tenant  in  common  with  others 
of  land  may  maintain  an  action  for  partition,  whether  his  title  be 
legal  or  equitable.^  On  the  other  hand,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Missouri  has  decided  tliat  the  owner  of  chattels  by  an  equitable 
title  cannot  recover  damages  for  their  conversion  in  an  action 
analogous  to   trover.^ 

§  44.  *  lOG.  Importance  of  Subject-Matter  Dwelt  upon  in  Sec- 
tion Fifth.  Final  Object  of  Reformed  System.  Author's  Predic- 
tion. I  have  thus  dwelt  at  length  upon  the  particular  case  of 
combining  legal  and  equitable  rights  and  remedies  which  forms 
the  subject  of  the  present  section,  because  more  than  any  other 
it  involves  and  expresses  the  true  intent  and  design  of  the  new 
system ;  it  is  the  crucial  test  of  the  manner  in  which  the  spirit  of 
the  reform'  is  accepted  by  the  courts.  Probably  nothing  con- 
nected with  the  practical  administration  of  justice  could  be  more 
startling  to  the  lawyer  of  the  old  school  than  the  suggestion  that 
the  owner  of  a  purely  equitable  estate  in  lands  should  be  able  to 
bring  an  action  of  ejectment  to  recover  possession  of  the  premises  ; 
it  would  be  opposed  to  all  his  conceptions  of  law  and  of  equity 
and  of  the  uses  of  actions  and  courts.  And  yet  these  conceptions 
were  plainly  artificial  and  arbitrary,  and  the  familiar  rules  as  to 
the  employment  of  actions  as  plainly  had  no  foundation  in  the 
nature  of  things,  but  rested  upon  words  alone.  The  final  object 
of  the  reformed  American  system  was  to  sweep  away  all  of  these 
technicalities,  and  to  allow  every  primary  right  to  be  maintained 
and  every  remedial  right  enforced  in  the  same  manner  and  by  a 
single  judicial  instrument,  untrammelled  by  the  restrictions  and 
limitations  which  made  the  practical  administration  of  justice  in 
England  and  in  the  United  States  seem  so  absurd  to  the  culti- 
vated jurists  of  Europe.  That  the  numerical  weight  of  authority 
is  at  present  opposed  to  my  views  in  relation  to  the  particular 
matter  in  question,  I  fully  concede.  1  believe,  however,  that  in 
time  the  influence  of  an  education  in  the  technicalities  of  the 
common-law  system  will  cease  to  be  felt  on  the  bench  and  among 
the  members  of  the  bar,  and  that  the  practical  rules  of  procedure 
in  all  the  States  will  be  brought  into  a  perfect  harmony  with  the 
letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  reformatory  legislation. 

1  Crosier  i'.  McLauc^hlin,  1  Nev.  .348.        .367;    S.  P.  .Jolianuesson  v.  Borschenius, 

2  Walker's   Adm.  v.  Walker,   25    Mo.     35  Wis.  131,  134. 


70  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


SECTION   FIFTH. 

THE  NATURE  OF   CIVIL  ACTIONS  AND  THE   ESSENTIAL 
DIFFERENCES   BETWEEN   THEM. 

§  45.  *  107.  Features  of  Civil  Actions  that  are  really  Different 
and  which  the  New  System  does  not  change.  iSotwithstanding 
the  sweeping  language  of  the  codes  and  practice  acts,  which 
abolishes  all  distinctions  between  the  forms  of  actions  heretofore 
existing,  many  judges,  in  construing  the  provisions,  have  declared 
in  most  emphatic  terms  that  the  change  is  confined  to  the  external 
forms  alone  of  actions  at  law,  and  that  in  their  essential  features 
certain  distinctions  and  peculiar  elements  remain  which  cannot 
be  removed  by  legislation.  This  statement  is  to  a  certain  extent 
true,  if  It  be  con  lined  to  what  is  really  the  substance  of  each 
action,  and  is  not  extended  so  as  to  include  many  incidents  which, 
although  appearing  to  be  substantial,  are  really  the  results  of 
arbitrary  conceptions  relating  to  the  form ;  for  example,  the  old 
rule  discussed  in  the  preceding  section,  which  confined  the  action 
of  ejectment  to  the  recovery  of  possession  of  lands  in  which  the 
plaintiff  had  a  legal  estate.  If  this  doctrine,  however,  is  carefully 
examined,  and  the  examples  and  authorities  in  its  support  are 
closely  analyzed,  it  will  be  found  that  all  the  unchangeable  feat- 
ures and  elements  which  are  said  to  inhere  in  different  actions, 
and  which  cannot  be  reduced  to  an  identity,  pertain  to  the  primary 
rights  sought  to  be  maintained  by  their  means,  to  the  delicts  or 
wrongs  by  wiiich  these  rights  are  invaded,  to  the  remedial  rights 
which  thereupon  accrue  to  the  injured  party,  and  to  the  remedies 
themselves  which  are  the  final  objects  of  the  judicial  proceeding. 
These  features  and  elements  in  actions  are  indeed  different,  and 
the  difference  between  them  the  new  system  does  not  propose  t(. 
abolish  nor  change.  The  doctrine  itself  is,  therefore,  no  more 
than  the  statement  in  another  form  of  the  conceded  fact  that  the 
reformed  procedure  has  not  affected  the  primary  rights  or  the 
remedies  which  the  municipal  law  creates  and  confers. 

§  46.  *  108.  Actions  still  differ  in  Substance.  Statement  of  this 
Doctrine  by  the  Courts.  As  all  actions  are  l)iought  to  maintain 
some  primary  right  invaded  by  a  wrong,  and  as  they  result  in 
some  one  of  the  many  kinds  of  remedies  prescribed  by  the  law,  and 


ESSENTIAL    DIFFERENCES    BETWEEN    ACTIONS.  71 

as  in  each  action  the  facts  from  wliich  the  primary  riglit  arises, 
and  the  facts  which  constitute  the  wrong,  must  be  stated,  and  as 
the  plaintiff  must  demand  and  seek  to  obtain  some  remedy  appro- 
priate to  the  right  and  the  delict,  it  follows,  as  a  necessary  conse- 
quence, that  the  actions,  although  constructed  and  carried  on 
according  to  the  one  uniform  principle  of  alleging  the  facts  as 
they  actually  are  and  praying  for  the  relief  legally  proper,  must 
differ  in  their  substance,  because  the  rights,  the  delicts,  and  the 
remedies  differ.  This  necessary  feature  of  civil  actions  under  the 
codes  has  been  dwelt  upon  and  explained  in  numerous  cases, 
some  of  which  are  cited  in  the  note.^  This  doctrine  was  very 
clearly  stated  in  a  recent  case  as  follows :  "  Although  all  forms 
of  action  were  abolished  by  the  code,  the  principles  by  which  the 
different  forms  of  action  were  governed  still  remain,  and  now,  as 
much  as  formerly,  control  in  determining  the  rights  of  the  parties. 
In  pleading,  a  party  is  now  to  state  the  facts  on  w^liich  he  relies 
to  sustain  a  recovery ;  and,  if  issue  l)e  tak^^n  thereon,  lie  will  be 
entitled  to  just  such  a  judgment  as  the  facts  established  will  by, 
the  rules  of  the  law  warrant,  without  regard  to  the  name  or  the 
form  of  his  action."  ^  This  judge  would,  however,  have  ex- 
pressed his  meaning  more  accurately  if  he  had  said,  "  The  princi- 
ples by  which  the  different  actions  were  governed  still  control," 
instead  of  "  The  principles  by  whi(;h  the  different  forms  of  action 
were  governed  still  control."  The  true  effect  of  the  reform  w^as 
well  stated  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  of  Kentucky  in  the  follow- 
ing extract :  "  The  code  makes  no  change  in  the  law  w^iich  deter- 
mines what  facts  constitute  a  cause  of  action,  except  that,  by 
reducing  all  forms  of  action  to  the  single  one  by  petition,  it 
changes  the  question  whether  the  plaintiff's  statement  of  his 
cause  shows  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action  in  '  trespass,'  or 
*  assumpsit,'  or  other  particular  form,  into  the  more  general 
question  whether  it  shows  facts  which  constitute  a  cause  of  action 
at  all ;  that  is,  whether  the  facts  stated  are  sufficient  to  show  a 

1  Goulet  V.  Asseler,  22  N.  Y.  225,  227,  Cortes,  17    Cal.  487,  497,  per   Cope  J. ; 

228,  per  Selden  J.,    Eldridge  v.  Adams,  Sampson  ?'.  Shaeffer,  3  Cal.  196,  205,  per 

54  Barb.  417,  419,  per  James  J.;  Herd  v.  Wells  J.;  Miller  v.  Van  Tassel,  24  Cal. 

Chandler,  13  B.  Mon.  403  ;  Hill  v.  Barrett,  458,  4f>3,  per  Rhodes  .J. ;    Richnioud  &  L. 

14  B.  Men.  83,  85,  per  Marshall  J.;  Payne  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  7  Bush,  532.  535; 

V.  Treadwell,  16  Cal.  220,  243,  per  Field  Ilowland  v.  Needham,  10  Wis.  495. 
C.  J.;   Liibert  v.  Chauviteau,  3  Cal.  458,  -  Eldridge  v.  Adams, 54  Barb. 417, 419, 

462,  per   Wells   J. ;    Jones  v.  Steamship  per  James  J. 


72  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

right  in  the  plaintiff,  an  injury  to  that  right  by  the  defendant, 
and  consequent  damage.  What  facts  do  in  this  sense  estabhsh  a 
cause  of  action  is  determined  by  the  general  rules  or  principles 
of  law  respecting  rights  and  wrongs,  and  by  a  long  course  of 
adjudication  and  practice  applying  these  rules  to  particular  actions 
under  the  long-established  rule  of  pleading,  that  the  declaration 
must  state  the  facts  which  constitute  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action.  .  .  .  The  code  does  not  authorize  a  recovery  upon  a 
statement  of  facts  which  did  not  constitute  a  cause  of  action  in 
some  form  before  the  code  was  adopted.  And  therefore  the 
former  precedents  and  rules  and  adjudications  may  now  be  re- 
sorted to  as  authoritative,  except  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  dis- 
tinctions between  the  different  forms  of  action,  or  to  merely 
formal  or  technical  allegations."  ^  To  this  clear  and  accurate 
exposition  I  can  add  nothing  which  will  increase  its  efficacy  as 
the  enunciation  of  the  general  principle.  The  final  effect  pro- 
duced by  the  reform  legislation  in  abolishing  all  distinctions 
between  actions  may  be  expressed  in  the  following  manner:  No 
inquiry  is  now  to  be  made  whether  the  action  is  "  trespass,"  or 
"  trover,"  or  "  assumpsit,"  or  any  other  of  the  ancient  common- 
law  forms,  nor,  except  for  the  single  purpose  of  determining  the 
proper  tribunal  for  its  trial,  whether  it  is  legal  or  equitable ;  all 
these  forms  and  classes  are  utterly  abrogated.^  For  this  reason, 
the  various  rules  which  pertain  to  each  of  these  common-law 
forms  of  action,  which  distinguished  one  from  the  other,  which 
determined  the  peculiar  nature  and  object  of  each,  and  which 
regulated  the  proceedings  in  each,  are  no  longer  to  be  invoked. 

1  Hill  (-•.  Barrett,  U  B.  Mon.  83,  85.  tained.  See  also  Bates  v.  Drake  (1902), 
See  Johaniiessuii  v.  Borschenius,  35  Wis.  28  Wash.  447,  68  Pac.  961.  in  which  tlie 
131,  135  ;  Haughton  v.  Newberry,  69  N.  C.  court  refers  to  tlie  "  form  "  of  the  action 
456,  459-461.  in  a  different  sense  than  that  suggesteil  in 

2  QIntheca.se  of  Draper  r.  Brown  (1902),  the  text.  Seals  r.  Augusta  By.  Co.  (1897), 
115  Wis.  361,91  N.  W.  1001,  whether  a  102  Ga.  817,  29  S.  E.  116;  Hamilton  r. 
demurrer  should  he  sustained  was  held  to  Handle  (1898),  103  Ga.  788,  30  S.  E.  658. 
depenil  up(Jii  the  answer  to  the  inr|uiry  But  see  Casgrain  r.  Hamilton  (1896),  92 
whether  the  action  was  legal  or  equitable.  Wis.  179,66  N.  W.  118;  Hood  v.  Taft 
The  ground  urged  for  sustaining  the  de-  (1896),  94  Wis.  380,  69  N.  W.  183;  State, 
murrer  in  this  case  was  that  "two  or  more  e.r  rel.  v.  Helms  (1898),  101  Wis.  280,  77 
causes  of  action  have  been  improperly  N.  W.  194;  .Joseith  Dessert  Lumber  Co. 
united  in  the  complaint."  It  was  overruled  v.  Wadleigh  (1899),  103  Wis.  318,  79  N.  W. 
by  the  court  l)elov/,  and  this  was  affirmed  237;  Francisco  v.  Hatch  (1903),  117  Wis. 
by  the  Supreme  Court;  but  the  r)pini()n  242,  93  N.  W.  1118.  See  also  note  1, 
showH  thai  if  the  action  had  been  a  legal  ji.  9,  sn/ira.'J 

one,  the  demurrer  would   have  been  sus- 


ESSENTIAL    DIFFERENCES    BETWEEN    ACTIONS.  73 

It  is  simply  an  abuse  of  language  to  say  that  the  ancient  forms 
of  action  liave  been  abolished,  and  tliat  any  of  the  rules  which 
were  based  upon  the  existence  of  these  forms,  and  had  no  rele- 
vancy except  in  connection  therewith,  are  retained.  The  only 
question  is,  Would  the  facts  stated  have  enabled  the  plaintiff  to 
maintahi  any  of  the  common-law  actions  or  a  suit  in  equity? 
This  is,  however,  identical  with  the  rule  already  given,  that  the 
primary  rights  created  by  the  law,  and  the  wrongs  committed 
against  them,  and  the  remedial  rights  resulting  from  such  wi-ongs, 
are  unaffected  by  the  legislation  which  only  aims  at  a  reform  in 
the  procedure. 

§  47.  *109.  Illustrative  Examples  of  Doctrine  Reached.  Differ- 
ence in  Form  of  Discussion  under  the  Old  System  and  the  New. 
Danger  herein.  The  general  doctrine  thus  reached  may  be  prop- 
erly illustrated  by  one  or  two  examples  which  will  serve  to  fix  its 
exact  meaning  and  application.  Under  the  former  system,  the 
person  who  had  the  actual  possession,  or  the  immediate  right  to 
the  possession,  of  a  chattel  which  had  been  taken  and  carried 
away  or  destroyed  by  the  wrong-doer,  might  recover  his  compen- 
satory damages  in  the  action  of  "  trespass."  To  maintain  it,  the 
possession  or  immediate  right  thereof  was  an  essential  element, 
and  the  plaintiff  recovered  the  value  of  the  article  as  the  measure 
of  his  damages.  If,  however,  the  plaintiff  had  merely  a  contin- 
gent or  prospective  interest,  without  right  of  immediate  posses- 
sion, in  a  chattel  which  was  at  the  time  the  general  property  of 
another.  Ids  appropriate  action  for  the  taking,  destruction,  or  con- 
version of  the  chattel  by  a  wrong-doer,  was  "  case,"  and  his  dam- 
ages were  a  compensation  for  the  pecuniary  loss  actually  sustained. 
The  distinctions  between  these  two  actions  have  been  abolished ; 
but  the  distinctions  between  the  primary  rights  and  the  wrongs 
which  constitute  the  two  causes  of  action  cannot  be  removed. 
Now,  as  before,  if  the  owner  in  possession  sues  for  the  taking 
or  destruction  of  his  chattel,  he  will  recover  its  value  as  his 
damages,  while  if  the  holder  of  a  contingent  future  interest, 
unaccompanied  "by  possession,  sues  for  the  taking  or  destruction, 
he  will  recover  the  value  of  his  interest.  In  the  one  case  the 
plaintiff  must  establish  his  possessory  right  if  he  seeks  to  obtain 
the  value  of  the  chattel  as  his  compensation  ;  in  the  other  case 
the  value  of  liis  contingent  interest  will  be  proved  and  fixed 
by  the  jury.     These  elements  and  features,  however,  do  not  belong 


74  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

to  the  action  as  a  judicial  instrument  for  establishing  a  right;  they 
belong  to  the  primary  and  remedial  rights  themselves,  which  are 
unchanged  by  the  codes.  In  the  former  system  of  procedure,  in 
the  works  of  text-writers,  and  in  the  judgments  of  courts,  the 
discussion  and  determination  of  these  unchangeable  primar5'  and 
remedial  rights  was  always  intimately  connected  with,  and  made 
an  essential  part  of,  the  discussion  and  determination  of  the  rules 
as  to  external  form  in  the  action  itself,  so  that  it  was  difficult,  if 
not  impossible,  to  distinguish  them.  From  the  very  nature  of  the 
common-law  system  of  procedure,  as  well  as  from  tlie  judicial 
habit  of  mind  wliich  it  produced,  the  courts  seldom,  if  ever,  p;ussed 
upon  the  existence  of  the  primary  or  the  remedial  right  in  the 
abstract ;  they  decided  rather  whether  tlie  action  was  of  the 
proper  form,  or  the  averments  of  tlie  pleadings  were  of  the  proper 
nature,  to  maintain  the  primary  riglit  asserted,  and  to  enforce  the 
remedial  right  claimed  to  have  arisen.  The  result  was  that,  in  the 
standard  treatises  and  digests,  primary  and  remedial  rights  were 
classified  and  arranged  under  the  various  forms  of  action  known 
to  the  common-law  procedure.  These  forms,  with  all  their  inci- 
dents, have  been  swept  away ;  but  there  is  danger  lest  the  tecli- 
nical  rules  which  have  been  abrogated  should  be  confounded 
with  the  principles  relating  to  rights  and  remedies  which  remain 
unaffected  b}'  the  reform. • 

§  48.  *110.  Distinction  between  Actions  ex  contractu  and  those 
ex  delicto  Preserved.  Election.  This  Distinction  relates  to  Cause 
of  Action.  A  particular  feature  of  distinction  between  actions  — 
or  rather  between  the  rights  upon  which  actions  are  based  — which 
existed  under  the  common-law  s^'stem  has  been  preserved  under 
the  new  procedure.  The  general  classification  being  made  of 
actions  ex  contractu  and  those  ex  delicto,  there  were  many  cases  in 
wliicli  a  party  who  had  suffered  a  wrong  by  the  conversion  or  the 
taking  and  carrying  away  of  his  chattels  might  waive  the  tort, 
and  bring  an  action  of  assumpsit  upon  the  wrong-doer's  implied 
promise  to  pay  the  price  of  the  articles  taken.  The  same  elec- 
tion still  exists.  Wherever  the  plaintiff  who  could  sue  in  "tres- 
pass" or  "trover"  might,  if  he  chose,  bring  "assumpsit,"  he  may 
now  waive  the  tort,  and  nraintain  an  action  upon  an  implied  prom- 
ise and  recover  the  price  of  the  goods  as  though  there  had  been 
a  sale.     This  choice,  however,  does  not  relate  to  the  external  form 

'  See  Clark  v  Bates,  1  Dak.  42;  Frout  i-.  Hardin,  56  lud.  165. 


ESSENTIAL   DIFFEllENCES    BETWEEN   ACTIONS.  75 

of  an  action ;  it  relates  to  the  very  cause  of  action  itself,  —  to  the 
unchangeable  rights  which  are  to  be  protected  and  enforced  by 
the  judicial  proceeding.  In  one  instance,  the  plaintiff  is  permitted 
to  view  the  transaction  as  an  injury  to  his  property  by  which  he 
has  sustained  damages  which  amount  to  the  entire  value  of  that 
property.  In  the  other,  he  views  the  transaction  as  a  sale,  by 
which  the  title  to  the  property  has  passed  to  the  defendant,  and  a 
duty  to  pay  the  price  rests  upon  him.  For  reasons  of  public 
policy,  the  law  allows  the  injured  party  to  make  his  choice  be- 
tween these  two  quite  different  versions  of  the  same  transaction ; 
and,  although  one  of  them  may  be  a  fictitious  view,  substantial 
justice  is  done  thereby.  It  is  plain,  however,  that  this  rule  has 
no  connection  with  the  external  forms  of  action  ;  it  has  reference 
only  to  the  rights  and  delicts  which  lie  back  of  all  actions.^ 

§  49.  *111.  Conclusion.  Criticism  of  the  Author.  Difference 
in  the  Two  Systems  of  Procedure.  In  conclusion,  as  the  distinc- 
tions between  the  common-law  forms  of  action  are  abolished,  the 
practice  since  the  codes,  sometimes  indulged  in  even  by  courts  in 
their  solemn  judgments,  of  retaining  the  ancient  nomenclature, 
and  of  describing  a  given  cause  as  "trespass,"  "  trover,"  "assump- 
sit," and  the  like,  is  productive  of  confusion,  and  of  confusion 
alone.  No  practical  rules  or  doctrines  in  the  administration  of 
justice  according  to  the  reformed  system  of  procedure  result  from 
these  old  forms ;  no  practical  aid  in  the  decision  of  a  cause  is 
to  be  obtained  from  regarding  it  as  "trespass,"  or  "trover,"  or 
"  assumpsit,"  or  from  the  giving  it  any  other  name  ;  no  difficul- 
ties are  removed  nor  doubts  cleared  up  by  a  resort  to  this  method 
of  description.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  constant  tendency 
to  associate  with  these  names  the  rules  and  doctrines  which  were 
once  inseparable  from  them,  but  which  have  been  in  the  most 
positive  manner  abrogated  by  the  legislature ;  in  fact,  much  of 
the  doubt  and  confusion  which  even  yet  accompany  the  adminis- 
tration of  justice  in  those  States  which  iiave  adopted  the  reformed 

1  As  to  actions  ex  contractu  aud  ax  de-  Sparman  v   Keim,  83  id.  245,  249 ;  Lock- 

Ucto,  see  Goss  v.  Board  of  Commissioners,  wood    i\   Quackenbush,  83    id.    607  ;    Co- 

4  Colo.  468,  Pierce  v.  Carey,  37  Wis.  232  ;  naughty  c   Nichols,  42  id.  83  ;  Ledwich  v. 

Front  V.  Hardin,  56  Ind.  165:  Greeutree  c  McKini,  53  id.  307.  316;  Ross  v.  Mather, 

Kosenstock,  61  N.  Y.  583,  588-590,  Fields  51  id    108;  Matthews  v.  Gady,  61   id.  G51  ; 

I'.  Bland,  81   id.  239  ;  Neudecker  v.  Kohl-  Graves  v.  Waite,  59  id.  156;  Lataillade  '•. 

berg,  81   id.  296;  Neftel  v.  Lightstone,  77  Oreua,  91    Cal.    565;  and  post,  §§  *554- 

id.  96;   Harrington  i-.  Bruce,  84  id.  103;  *564,  *567-*573. 


76  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

system  of  procedure,  is  due  to  a  retention  of  these  names  by  the 
bench  and  the  bar ;  and  1  beheve  that  the  reform  itself  will  never 
produce  its  full  results  in  simplicity  and  scientific  accuracy  until 
the  ancient  nomenclature  is  utterly  forgotten  or  banished  from 
the  courts.  The  two  systems  of  procedure  are  so  entirely  differ- 
ent, they  are  based  upon  notions  so  absolutely  unlike,  that  any 
intermingling  of  their  elements  is  impossible  ;  the  one  which  has 
been  introduced  by  the  legislative  will  must  be  left  to  be  de- 
veloped according  to  its  own  distinctive  principles,  without  any 
interference  from  that  which  has  been  abandoned  and  discarded. 


STATUTORY    PROVISIONS    IN    RELATION    TO    PARTIES.  77 


CHAPTER   SECOND. 
THE  PARTIES  TO  THE  CIVIL   ACTION. 

SECTION   FIRST. 
THE   STATUTORY  PROVISIONS  AND  THEIR   GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 

§  50.  *  112.  Introductory.  Fundamental  Difference  between  Legal 
and  Equitable  Actions  in  respect  to  Parties.  Intention  Shown  in 
the  Codes  to  adopt  Equitable  Theory.  The  second  of  the  distinc- 
tive features  which  belong  to  and  characterize  the  single  civil 
action  of  the  American  system  consists  of  the  principles  and  rules 
adopted  in  respect  of  the  parties  thereto.  Under  the  old  procedure 
the  rules  which  governed  the  parties  to  actions  at  law,  and  those 
which  regulated  the  parties  to  suits  in  equity,  stood  in  marked 
contrast  with  each  other ;  in  fact,  the  fundamental  conception  of 
these  two  judicial  instruments  w^as  radically  unlike.  It  will  be 
sufficient  to  mention  one  of  these  essential  differences.  In  an 
action  at  law  the  plaintiff  must  be  a  person  in  whom  is  vested 
the  whole  legal  right  or  title ;  and,  if  there  were  more  than 
one,  they  must  all  be  equally  entitled  to  the  recovery.  So  far  as 
the  mere  recovery  is  concerned,  the  right  must  dwell  in  them  all 
as  a  unit,  and  the  judgment  must  be  in  their  favor  equall3\  The 
defendants,  on  the  other  hand,  must  be  equally  subject  to  the 
common  liability,  so  that,  even  if  it  were  possible  for  the  jury  to 
find  a  separate  verdict  against  each,  the  same  and  single  judgment 
must  be  rendered  against  them  all  in  a  body.  In  other  words, 
whatever  might  be  the  nature  of  the  antecedent  right  or  liability, 
whatever  antecedent  power  there  might  be  of  electing  to  sue  by 
one  or  all  and  against  one  or  all,  after  the  election  is  made  to 
sue  by  or  against  all,  the  recovery  is  necessarily  joint,  and  the 
burden  of  the  remedy  is  necessarily  joint.  The  suit  in  equity 
was  hampered  by  no  such  arbitrary  requirements.  Two  general 
and  natural  principles  controlled  its  form  :  first,  that  it  should  be 
prosecuted  by  the  party  really  in  interest,  although  with  him 
might  be  joined  all  others  who  had  an  interest  in  the  subject- 


78  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

matter  and  in  obtaining  the  relief  demanded  ;  and,  secondly,  that 
all  persons  \vhose  presence  is  necessary  to  a  complete  determi- 
nation and  settlement  of  the  questions  involved  shall  be  made 
parties,  so  that  in  one  decree  their  various  rights,  claims,  interests, 
and  liabilities,  however  varying  in  importance  and  extent,  may  be 
detei-mined  and  adjudicated  upon  by  the  court.  As  the  methods 
adopted  by  the  chancellor  did  not  require  him  to  pronounce  a 
judgment  in  favor  of  all  the  plaintiffs,  nor  indeed  in  favor  of 
plaintiffs  alone,  and  against  all  the  defendants,  nor  indeed  against 
defendants  alone,  it  was  not  a  matter  of  vital  importance  whether 
a  particular  person  wlio  was  made  a  party  should  be  a  plaintiff 
or  a  defendant.  It  was  possible  to  give  relief  to  defendants  as 
against  each  other  or  against  plaintiffs.  It  must  not  be  under- 
stood that  no  order  or  method  was  observed  in  the  disposition  of 
parties ;  but,  without  discussing  the  various  rules  in  detail,  it  is 
sufficient  for  my  present  purpose  to  point  out  this  fundamental 
difference  in  conception  between  legal  and  equitable  actions.  The 
intention  plainly  shown  in  the  various  State  codes  of  procedure 
is  to  adopt  the  general  equity  theory  of  parties,  rather  than  the 
legal  theory,  and  to  apply  it  to  the  single  civil  action  in  all  cases, 
whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  primary  riglit  to  be  protected  or 
of  the  remedy  to  be  obtained.  How  far  this  intention  has  been 
expressed,  how  comj^letely  it  has  been  carried  out  in  the  legisla- 
tion of  the  several  States,  will  be  seen  from  the  provisions  them- 
selves to  be  immediately  quoted.  After  making  these  extracts 
and  grouping  them  properly,  I  shall  very  briefly  point  out  their 
general  similarity  and  their  special  divergencies  from  the  common 
type,  and  shall  then  proceed  in  the  succeeding  sections  of  the 
present  chapter  ^vith  a  careful  discussion  of  each  separate  provi- 
sion. It  will  be  seen  that  there  is  an  almost  complete  identity 
in  many  of  these  statutory  rules  as  they  are  expressed  in  the  va- 
rious codes,  although  in  some  of  them  the  equitable  theory  has 
been  more  fully  carried  out  in  detail. 

§51.  *113.  General  Code  Provisions.  "  Every  action  must  be 
prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest  except  as 
otherwise  provided  .  .  .  .,  but  this  section  shall  not  be  deemed  to 
autliori/.e  the  assignment  of  a  thing  in  action  not  arising  out  of 
contract."  ^     The  same  appears  slightly  varied  in  a  few  States, 

'  [Iii.liana,  Burns' St.,  1901,  §251.]  §4;  [Kentucky,  §  18  ;  Washington,  Bal. 
Kansas,  §  20  ;  (Jregou,  §§  27, 37'J  ;  Nevada,     Code,  §  4824  ;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3898 ; 


STATUTORY    PKOVJSIONS    IN    RELATION   TO    PARTIES.  79 

as  follows:  "  Every  action  must  be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of 
the  real  party  in  interest,  except  as  is  otherwise  provided  by 
law."'  In  some  codes  the  form  is  that  first  given  above,  but 
to  it  is  added  the  following  clause :  "  But  an  action  may 
be  maintained  by  the  grantee  of  land  in  the  name  of  the 
grantor,  or  his  or  her  heirs  or  legal  representatives,  when  the 
grant  or  grants  are  void  by  reason  of  the  actual  possession  of  a 
person  claiming  under  a  title  adverse  to  that  of  the  grantor  at  the 
time  of  the  delivery  of  the  grant,  and  the  plaintiff  shall  be  allowed 
to  prove  the  facts  to  bring  the  case  within  this  provision."  ^  In 
Nebraska  the  following  provision  is  added  :  "  The  assignee  of  a 
thing  in  action  may  maintain  an  action  thereon  in  his  own  name 
and  behalf  without  the  name  of  the  assisfnor."  ^ 

§  52.  *114.  Same  Subject.  "In  the  case  of  an  assignment  of 
a  thing  in  action,  the  action  by  the  assignee  is  without  preju- 
dice to  any  set-off  or  other  defence  existing  at  the  time  of  or 
before  notice  of  the  assignment ;  but  this  section  does  not  apply 
to  a  negotiable  promissory  note  or  bill  of  exchange  transferred 
in  good  faith  and  upon  good  consideration  before  maturity."  * 
"  When  the  action  is  brought  by  the  assignee  of  a  claim  arising 
out  of  contract  not  assigned  by  indorsement  in  writing,  the 
assignor  shall  be  made  a  defendant  to  answer  as  to  the  assign- 
Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §2605;  Minnesota,  but  he  sliall,  in  his  complaint,  allege  that 
•St.,  1894,  §  5156  ;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  lie  is  the  actual,  bo»a  Jide  owner  thereof, 
§  540.]  and  set  forth  when  and   how  he  acquired 

1  Ohio,  §  25  ;  Cal.  §  367  ;  Iowa,  §  2543  ;  title  thereto."] 
I^Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2902;  North  *  New  York,  §  112  (502,  1909,  1910); 
Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §5221;  Mon-  Ohio,  §  26;  Kansas,  §  27;  California, 
tana,  §  570;  Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  368;  South  Carolina,  §  135;  Oregon, 
§4824;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Fro.,  1901,  §3155;  §§  28,382;  Nevada,  §  5;  Iowa,  §  2546, 
Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3467;  Col-  somewhat  different  in  form  from  the  text ; 
orado,  §  3  ;  Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill 's  Dig.,  N.  C.  §  55  ;  [^Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2903  ; 
§  5623;  Nebraska,  §  29;  New  York,  Code  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5222; 
Civ.  Tro.,  §  449,  but  see  provisions  cited  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6071; 
in  following  note.  Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1301  ;  Okla- 
§  1299.  homa,  St.,  1893,  §  3899  ;  Washington,  Bal. 

•■^  New  York,  §  111  (1501,  449,  1909,  Code,  §  4835;  Montana,  §  571;  Idaho, 
1910)  ;  South  Carolina,  §  134;  N.  C.  §  55.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3156;  Wyoming, 
[South  Dakota,  Ann.  St,  1901,  §6070.]      Rev.    St.,    1899,    §   3467;  Colorado,  §  4; 

3  [Nebraska,  §30;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  650.  in  a 
1902,  §  631,  where  the  following  is  the  form  somewhat  different  from  that  given 
entire  statute  on  the  subject,  without  tiie  in  the  te.\t;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901, 
jirovision  as  to  the  real  party  in  interest ;  §  277;  Nebraska,  §  31;  Wisconsin,  St., 
"  Tlie  assignee  and  equitable  and  bona  Jide  1 898,  §  2606  ;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5157  ; 
owner  of  any  chose  in  action,  not  nego-  Kentucky,  §  19.] 
tiable,  may  sue  thereon  in  his  own  name  ; 


80  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

raent  or  his  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action  ;  "  and  this  is 
followed  by  the  provision  in  reference  to  set-off  or  other  defences 
contained  in  the  last  citation.^ 

§  53.  *  115.  Same  Subject.  "  An  executor,  an  administrator, 
a  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  or  a  person  expressly  authorized  by 
statute,  may  sue  without  joining  with  him  the  person  for  whose 
benefit  the  action  is  prosecuted.  A  trustee  of  an  express  trust 
within  the  meaning  of  this  section  shall  be  construed  to  include  a 
person  with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is  made  for  the 
benefit  of  another."  '^  The  same  as  slightly  varied  :  "  An  ex- 
ecutor, administrator,  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  a  person  with 
whom  or  in  whose  name  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of 
another,  or  a  person  expressly  authorized  by  statute,  may  bring 
an  action  without  joining  with  him  the  person  for  whose  benefit 
it  is  prosecuted.  Officers  may  sue  and  be  sued  in  such  name  as 
is  authorized  by  law,  and  official  bonds  may  be  sued  upon  in  the 
same  way.'"  ^ 

§54.  *116.  Same  Subject.  "All  persons  having  an  interest 
in  the  subject  of  the  action,  and  in  obtaining  the  relief  demanded, 
may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs,  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this 
title." ^  "Any  person  may  be  made  a  defendant  who  has  or 
claims  an  interest  in  the  controversy,  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  or 
who  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  complete  determination  or  settle- 
ment of  the  questions  involved  therein."^     In  a  few  codes  the 

1  [Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  277.]  *  New    York.  §  117  (446)  ;  Ohio,  §  34 

2  New  York,  §  113  (449);  California,  Kansas,  §  35;  California,  §§  378,  381 
§369;  South  Carolina,  §  136,  Oregon,  Iowa,  §  2545;  South  Carolina,  §  140 
§  29 ;  Nevada,  §  6 ;  North  Carolina,  §  57  ;  Oregon,  §  380,  but  limited  to  equitable 
CUtah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2902  ,  North  Da  actions;  Nevada,  §  12;  N.  C.  §  60;  [[Utah, 
kota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5223;  South  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2913;  North  Dakota, 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6072;  Arizona.  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5229  ;  South  Dakota. 
Rev.  St.,  1901,  §§  1299,  1300;  Washing-  Ann.  St.,  1901.  §  6077;  Oklahoma.  St., 
ton.  Bal.  Code,  §  4825;  Montana,  §  570  .  1893.  §  3907;  Washington,  Bal.  Code, 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3157  ;  Colo-  §  4833,  in  somewhat  different  form  ;  Mon- 
rado,  §  5;  Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Mill's  Dig.,  tana,  §  580  ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ  Pro.,  1901, 
§  5626  ;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  620,  §  3166  ,  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3479  ; 
where  only  the  first  sentence  quoted  in  Colorado,  §  10;  Arkau.sas.  Sand.  &  Hill's 
the  text  appears;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  Dig  .§  5629 ;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902, 
§  2607;  Missouri.  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §541;  §  617;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §263; 
Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5158,  Indiana,  Nebraska.  §  40;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898, 
Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  252.]  §  2602;  Mis,souri,   Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  542; 

*  Ohio,    §    27;     Kansas,    §    28;    Iowa,  Kentucky,  §  22  ] 

§    2544,   [Oklahoma,   St.,    1893,  §  3900;  *  Ohio,    §    35;     Kansas,    §    3fi  ;     Iowa. 

Wyoming,  Rev.  .St.,    1899,   §  3469;   Ken-  §   2547;    Nebraska,   §  3S  ;    Nevada,  §   13; 

turky.  §  21,  in  a  somewhat  different  form  ;  Oregon,  §  .iSO.   limited    to  equitable  ac- 

^'ebraska,  §  32  ]  tions ;    QOklahunia,    St.,    1893,    §    3908; 


J 


STATUTOllY    PROVISIONS    IN    RKLATION    TO    PARTIES. 


81 


same  provision  appears,  but  added  to  it  is  the  following  clause: 
"  And  in  an  action  to  recover  possession  of  real  estate  the  land- 
lord and  tenant  thereof  may  be  joined  as  defendants ;  and  any 
person  claiming  title  or  a  right  of  possession  to  real  estate  may 
be  made  a  party  plaintiff  or  defendant  as  the  case  may  require  to 
any  such  action."  ^ 

§55.  *117.  Same  Subject.  "Of  the  parties  to  the  action 
those  who  are  united  in  interest  must  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  or 
■defendants;  but,  if  the  consent  of  any  one  who  should  have  l^een 
joined  as  plaintiff  cannot  be  obtained,  he  may  be  made  a  defend- 
a,nt,  the  reason  thereof  being  stated  in  the  complaint. 

"  When  the  question  is  one  of  a  common  or  general  in- 
terest of  many  persons,  or  when  the  parties  are  very  numerous, 
and  it  may  be  impracticable  to  bring  them  all  before  the  court, 
one  or  more  may  sue  or  defend  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole.  "^ 

§  56.  *118.  Same  Subject.  "Persons  severally  liable  upon 
the  same  obligation  or  instrument,  including  the  parties  to  bills 
of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,  may  all  or  any  of  them  be 
included  in  the  same  action  at  the  option  of  the  plaintiff.  "^     The 


Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4833,  in  some- 
■what  different  form  ;  Wyoming,  Rev.  St., 
1899,  §  3480;  Colorado,  §  11  ;  Arkansas, 
Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5630  ;  Connecticut, 
Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  618  ;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898, 
§  2603  ;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  269  ; 
Kentucky,  §  23.] 

1  New  York,  §  118  (447,  1503,  1598); 
California,  §§  379,  380;  South  Carolina, 
§  141  ;  N.  C.  §  61  ;  QUtah,  Rev.  St.,  1898, 
§  2914;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
§  5230;  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901, 
§  6078  ;  Moutana,  §  581 ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ. 
Pro.,  1901,  §  3167;  Missouri,  Rev.  St., 
1899,  §  .543.] 

'•i  This  provision  is  thus  given  in  one 
section  in  New  York,  §  119  (448);  Cali- 
fornia, §  382;  S.  C.  §  142;  N.  C.  §  62  ; 
Oregon,  §381, limited  to ecjuitahle  actions; 
Nevada,  §  14,  adding,  however,  to  the 
section  as  given  in  the  text  the  following 
clause  :  "  Tenants  iu  common,  joint  ten- 
ants, and  copartners,  or  any  number  less 
than  all,  may  jointly  or  severally  bring,  or 
defend,  or  continue,  the  prosecution  or 
defence  of  any  action  for  the  enforcement 
of  the  rights  of  such  person  or  per- 
sons."   The  same  provision  is  found  in  the 


California  code,  §  384,  except  that  "  copar- 
ceners "  is  substituted  in  place  of  "  co- 
partners." QUtah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2917  ; 
North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §5232; 
South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6079; 
Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1313  ;  Moutana, 
§584,  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3170; 
Colorado,  §  12;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901, 
§  270,  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2604.]  In 
the  following  States  it  is  separated  into 
two  sections  corresponding  to  the  two  para- 
graphs of  the  text :  Ohio,  §§  36,  37  ;  Kan- 
sas, §§  37,  38;  Iowa,  §S  2548,  2549; 
([Kentucky, §§  24,  25;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893, 
§§  3909,  3910;  Washington,  Bal.  Code, 
§§  4833,  4834,  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§§3481.  3482,  Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's 
Dig.,  §§  .'■)631,  56.32  ;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St., 
1902,  §§  617,  619,  with  a  .separate  pro- 
vision, §  589,  allowing  several  actions  by 
joint  tenants  and  tenants  in  common  ; 
Nebraska,  §§  42,  43.  In  Missouri,  the  first 
paragraph  only  is  enacted,  anil  is  Rev.  St., 
1899,  §  544  3 

»  New  York,  §  120  (454)  ;  Kansas,  §39; 
Ohio,  §  38;  California,  §  383,  adding, 
"and  sureties  on  the  same  or  separate  in- 
strument," after  the  words  "  promissory 


82  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

corresponding  provision  in  some  of  the  States  is  much  more  full, 
and  more  explicitly  alters  the  common  law  rules  in  respect  to 
joint  debtors.  "  Persons  severally  liable  on  the  same  contract, 
including  the  parties  to  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes, 
common  orders  and  checks,  and  sureties  on  the  same  or  separate 
instruments,  may  all  or  any  of  them,  or  the  representatives  of 
such  as  may  have  died,  be  sued  in  the  same  action  at  the  plain- 
tiff's option.''^  "Every  person  who  shall  have  a  cause  of  action 
against  several  parties,  including  parties  to  bills  of  exchange  and 
promissory  notes,  and  be  entitled  by  law  to  a  satisfaction  there- 
for, may  bring  suit  thereon  jointly  against  all,  or  as  many  of  the 
persons  liable  as  he  may  think  proper;  [and  he  may,  at  his 
option,  join  any  executor  or  administrator  or  other  person  liable 
in  a  representative  character,  with  others  originally  liable.  "J^ 
"When  two  or  more  persons  are  bound  by  contract  or  by  judg- 
ment, decree,  or  statute,  whether  jointly  only,  or  jointly  and 
severally,  or  severally  only,  including  the  parties  to  negotiable 
paper,  common  orders  or  checks,  and  sureties  on  the  same  or 
separate  instruments,  or  by  any  liability  growing  out  of  the 
same,  the  action  thereon  may  at  the  plaintiff's  option  be  brought 
against  all  or  any  of  them.  When  any  of  those  so  bound  are 
dead,  the  action  may  be  brought  against  any  or  all  of  the  sur- 
vivors, with  any  or  all  of  the  representatives  of  the  decedents 
or  against  any  or  all  of  such  representatives.  An  action  or  judg- 
ment against  any  one  or  more  of  several  persons  jointly  bound 
shall  not  be  a  bar  to  proceedings  against  the  others."^ 

notes;"  S.  C.  §  143;  N.  C.  §  63;  Oregon,  »  Qlowa,    Code,    1897,    §   3465;    Ken- 

§  36,  382  ;  Nevada,  §  15;  [^Minnesota,  St.,  tucky,  §  27,  in  slightly  different  form  ;  Ar- 

1894,  §  5166,  "and  sureties  on  the  same  kausas.  Sand.  &  Ilill's  Dig.,  §  5034,  same 

instrument ;"  Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2918  ;  as  Kentucky.]     In  Kansas  all  ioiut  cou- 

North  Dakota,  Kev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5223,  in  tracts  are  declared  to  he  joint  and  several  ; 

somewhat  different  form;   South  Dakota,  on  the  death  of  one  or  more  of  the  joint 

Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6080,  same   form   as  in  promisors  or  obligors,  the  right  of  action 

North  Dakota;    Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  exists  against  the  representatives  of  the 

§   1306,     in    somewhat     different    form  ;  deceased  and  against  the  survivors  ;  when 

Oklalioma,  St.,  1893,  §  3911  ;  Washington,  all  die  the  right  of  action  e.xists  against 

IJal.  Code,  §  4836  ;  .Montana,  §  585;  Idaho,  the    representatives   of   nil   the   decea.sed 

Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3171  ;  Wyoming,  debtors     in  all  cases  of  joint  obligations 

Rev.  St.,  1899,   §  3483;    Colorado,   §13;  or   joint  "  ;i.«sumptions  "   of   partners   or 

Indiana.  Hums' St .  1901,  §  271 ;  Nebraska,  others,    the   action    may     be    prosecuted 

§44;   Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2609.3  against   any  one   or   more  of  those  who 

1  [Kentucky,  §  26;  Arkansa-s  Sand.  &  are  so  liable.     [Gen.  St.,  1901,  §§  1190- 
Ilill's  Dig  ,  5;  .0633.]  11 94  J 

2  [.Miss>,uri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §515] 


STATUTOKY    ri;OVISIf)NS    IX    RELATION    TO    I-AUTIES.  83 

§57.  *119.  Same  Subject.  "(1)  The  court  nmy  determine 
any  controversy  between  the  parties  before  it,  when  it  can  be 
done  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  others,  or  by  saving  their 
rights;  but  when  a  complete  determination  of  the  controversy 
cannot  be  liad  without  the  presence  of  other  parties,  the  court 
must  cause  them  to  be  brougiit  in. 

"  (2)  Wlien,  in  an  action  for  tlie  recovery  of  real  or  personal 
property,  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  action,  but  having  an  inter- 
est in  the  subject  thereof,  makes  application  to  the  court  to  be 
made  a  party,  it  may  order  him  to  be  brought  in  by  the  proper 
amendment. 

"  (3)  A  defendant  against  whom  an  action  is  pending  upon  a 
contract,  or  for  specific  real  or  personal  property,  may  at  any 
time  before  answer  upon  affidavit  that  a  person  not  a  party  to 
the  action,  and  without  collusion  with  him,  makes  against  him  a 
demand  for  the  same  debt  or  property,  upon  due  notice  to  such 
person  and  the  adverse  party,  apply  to  the  court  for  an  order  to 
.substitute  such  person  in  his  place  and  discharge  him  from  lia- 
bility to  either  party,  on  his  depositing  in  court  the  amount  of 
the  debt,  or  delivering  the  property  or  its  value  to  such  person 
as  the  court  may  direct,  and  the  court  may  in  its  discretion  make 
the  order."! 

§58.  *120.  Special  Code  Provisions.  The  following  special 
provisions,  found  in  several  of  the  States,  are  quoted,  not  because 
they  are  necessarily  involved  in  the  general  theory  of  the  re- 

'  In  the  followinjr  States  these  provi-  first  and  third  subdivisions  of  tlie  text, 
sions  form  a  single  section,  as  in  the  text :  QSo  in  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
South  Carolina,  §  145,  N.  C,  §65;  Ne-  §§  5238,  5240;  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St., 
vada,  §  17  ;  [Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §2610.3  '^01,  §§  6085,  6087;  Washington.  Bal. 
In  these  others  they  are  separated  into  Code,  §§  4840,  4842.^  In  the  others  there 
three  sections,  corresponding  to  the  three  is  but  one  section  identical  with  the  first 
subdivisions  of  the  text :  (^hio,  §§  40,  41,  subdivision  of  the  text:  Oregon,  §§  40, 
42:  Kansas,  §§41,  42,  4.S  ;  ^Oklahoma,  .382;  Iowa,  §  2551.  [^Missouri,  Kev.  St., 
St.,  189.3,  §§391.3-3915;  Wyoming,  Hev.  1899,  §  0^19  In  Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901. 
St.,  1899,  §§  3487,  3488,  3490;  Arkansas,  §  1308,  the  provision  is  :  "  Additional  par- 
Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §§  5635-5637  ,  Ne-  ties  may  be  brought  in  l>y  proper  process 
liraska,  §§  46-48.]  In  others  still  they  either  by  plaintiff  or  ilefendant  upon  such 
form  two  sections,  embracing  respectively  terms  as  the  court  may  prescribe;  Con- 
tbe  first  and  second  subdivisions  and  the  necticut.  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  621  ;  Minnesota, 
third  (^Kentucky,  §§  28,  29;  Utah.  Rev.  Gen.  St..  1894,  §  5178,  in  different  form.] 
St.,  1898,  §§  2921,  2926  ;  Montana,  §§  588,  The  provisions  of  the  Iowa  and  California 
591  ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §§3175,  codes  in  relation  to  "  intervening,"  which 
3178;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §§  273,  are  very  special  and  unlike  that  in  the 
274,  New  York,  §§452,  820.]  In  Cali-  text,  are  quoted  in  a  subsequent  section  of 
fornia,    §§   389,   386,  correspond    to   the  this  chajiter. 


84  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

formed  system,  but  because  they  will  serve  to  explain  a  number 
of  cases  which  will  be  cited  hereafter,  and  because  they  show 
the  tendency  of  the  modern  legislation  away  from  the  arbitrary 
notions  of  the  common  law  in  respect  of  parties.  "  A  father,  or, 
in  case  of  his  death  or  desertion  of  his  family,  the  mother,  may 
prosecute  as  plaintiff  for  tlie  seduction  of  the  daughter,  and  the 
guardian  for  the  seduction  of  the  ward,  though  the  daughter  or 
ward  is  not  living  wnth  or  in  the  service  of  the  plaintiff  at  the 
time  of  the  seduction  or  afterwards,  and  there  is  no  loss  of  ser- 
vice.''^ "When  a  husband  has  deserted  his  family  the  wife  may 
prosecute  or  defend  in  his  name  any  action  that  he  might  have 
prosecuted  or  defended,  and  shall  have  the  same  powers  and 
rights  therein  as  he  might  have  had."^  "A  father,  or,  in  case 
of  his  death  or  desertion  of  his  family,  the  mother,  may  main- 
tain an  action  for  the  injury  of  the  child  and  the  guardian  for 
the  injury,  of  the  ward."  ^  "An  unmarried  female  may  prose- 
cute as  plaintiff  an  action  for  her  own  seduction,  and  recover 
such  damages  as  may  be  found  in  her  favor."* 

§  59.  *  121.  Same  Subject.  In  several  of  the  States  a  part- 
nership may  sue  or  be  sued  by  its  firm-name  alone,  the  judgment 
being  enforceable  against  the  property  of  the  firm  and  of  such 
members  as  are  personally  served,  provision  being  made  for 
extending  its  effect  to  the  other  members  by  some  subsequent 
proceeding.  The  following  is  the  type  of  these  provisions,  and 
they  are  all  substantially  the  same:'  "An  action  may  be  brought 
by  or  against  a  partnership,  as  such,  or  against  all  or  either  of 
the  individual  members  thereof;  and  a  judgment  against  the 
firm,  as  such,  may  be  enforced  against  the  partnership  property, 
or  that  of  such  members  as  have  appeared  or  been  served  with 
notice.     And  a  new  action  may  be  brought  against    the    other 


'  ^Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5163]  ;  Call-  clause,  as  to  tlie  guarfiian  and  ward,  is  not 

fornia,  §  375  ;  Orep^on,  §  34  ;  Qldaho,  Code  found   in  the  Iowa  code:    Oregon,  §  33; 

Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3163;   Montana,  §  577;  [Idaho,    Code    Civ.    Pro.,    1901,   §   3164; 

Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2910;  Washington,  Montana,  §    578;    Colorado,  §    9;    Utah, 

Bal.  Code.  §  4830;     Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  Hev.  St.,  1898,  §  2911  ;  Arizona,  Kev.  St., 

1901,  §265.]  1901,   §    1305;    Wa.shington,   Bal.    Code, 

•■'  [Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5165] ;  Iowa,  §  4829  ;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  267]. 

§  2564  ;    QArkansaB,  Sand.  &    Hill's  Dig.,  ♦  Iowa,  §  2555  ;  California,  §  374;  Ore- 

§    .5643;    I'tah,    Rev.    St.,    1898,   §    2906;  gon,  §  35  ;    [Idaho.  Code  Civ.  Pro..    1901, 

Indiana.  Burns'  St.  1901.  §  266.]  §  3162;   Montana.  §  576  ;  Utah.  liev.  St., 

'  [Minne.sota,  St..  1894.  §  5164]  ;  Cali-  1898.    §2909;     Wasliington.    Bal.    Code, 

fornia.  §  376  ;   I.«wa,  §  2.')56       But  the  last  §  4S31  :   Indiana,  Biirn.s'  St.,  1901,  §  264.] 


STATUTORY  TROVISIONS  IN  RELATION  TO  PARTIES.      85 

members  on  tlie  original  cause  of  action."  ^  Certain  other  special 
provisions  in  relation  to  parties  will  be  quoted  in  substMjuent 
sections,  and  especially  the  legislation  of  the  various  States  con- 
cerning suits  by  and  against  married  women.  This  legislation  in 
several  instances  does  not  form  a  part  of  the  codes  of  procedure, 
but  is  contained  in  separate  statutes  having  particular  reference 
to  the  status  of  marriage. 

§60.  *122.  Statutory  Provisions.  Interpretation.  Two  Vie'ws. 
The  foregoing  are  all  the  provisions  relative  to  parties  in  general. 
It  is  plain,  upon  the  most  cursory  reading,  that  the  language  of 
these  sections  is  so  comprehensive,  and  without  exception  or 
limitation,  that  it  appears  to  include  all  actions,  legal  and  equi- 
table, and  to  apply  the  equitable  doctrines  alike  to  both  classes. 
It  should  be  observed,  however,  in  this  connection,  that  in  a  vast 
number  of  actions  strictly  legal  the  equitable  theory  of  parties, 
as  stated  in  these  clauses,  would  determine  the  proper  parties 
thereto  in  exactly  the  same  manner  as  the  common-law  theorj% 
and  there  could  arise,  then,  no  conflict.  The  possible  conflict 
which  could  arise  in  other  cases  would  result  either  (1)  from  the 
old  notion  that  in  a  common-law  action  all  the  plaintiffs  must  be 
equally  interested  in  the  recovery,  and  all  the  defendants  equally 
liable  to  the  judgment,  so  that  no  person  could  be  a  plaintiff  who 
did  not  allege  for  himself  this  community  of  interest,  or  be  made 
a  defendant  against  whom  this  community  of  liability  was  not 
charged,  or  (2)  from  the  com.mon-law  doctrine  of  joint,  joint 
and  several,  or  several  rights  and  liabilities  which  control  to 
a  very  great  extent  the  rules  as  to  parties  in  legal  actions. 
One  school  of  judges,  applying  to  this  particular  topic  the 
theory  of  interpretation  described  in  the  preceding  chapter,  have 
been  unable  to  concede  that  the  general  statutory  provisions 
quoted  above  did  repeal  and  abrogate  these  long  and  firmly 
established  rules  and  doctrines  of  the  common  law,  and  have 
therefore  wished  to  confine  their  operation  and  effect  to  equitable 

1  Iowa,  §  2553  ;  ^Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  known  ;  and  in  such  case  it  shall  not  be 
§  51772;  California,  §  388;  Nebraska,  necessary  to  allege  or  prove  the  uames 
§§  24,  27.  Qn  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  of  the  individual  members  thereof  "  The 
§  3485,  the  provision  is  as  follows;  "A  Colorado  statute,  §  14,  is  similar  in  sub- 
partnership  formed  for  the  purpose  of  stance,  but  differs  in  form.  So  in  Utah, 
carrying  on  trade  or  business  in  this  state.  Rev  St..  1898,  §  2927  ;  Connecticut,  Geu. 
or  holding  property  therein,  may  .sue  or  St.,  1902,  §  588;  Ohio,  R.  S.,  1900, 
be  sued  by  the  usual  or  ordinary  name  §  5011/] 
which   it  has  assumed,  or  by  which  it  ie 


86  CIVIL    RKMEDIES. 

actions.'  Another  school  of  judges,  regarding  the  codes  as 
highl}'  remedial  statutes,  have  been  inclined  to  follow  out  their 
spirit,  and  to  give  their  language  the  fullest  meaning  of  wliich 
it  is  capable,  even  to  the  extent  of  liolding  that  its  general 
expressions  abolished  and  swept  away  the  legal  distinctions 
between  joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several  rights  and  liabili- 
ties. The  influence  and  effect  of  these  different  systems  of 
interpretation  will  be  shown  in  the  succeeding  sections  of  this 
chapter. 

§  61.  *128.  More  Radical  Statutes  in  a  Few  States.  Outline 
of  Treatment  of  Parties.  In  a  few  of  the  States  the  legislation  has 
left  no  room  for  any  such  conflict  of  opinion,  and  has  pushed  the 
equitable  theory  to  its  final  results  by  express  enactments  which 
leave  nothing  to  implication.  The  codes  of  these  States  provide 
for  bringing  in  parties  to  certain  legal  actions  under  some  cir- 
cumstances merely  because  they  have  an  interest  in  the  event  of 
the  suit,  although  they  have  no  share  in  the  relief,  and  bear  no 
part  of  the  liability;  and  they  utterly  abrogate  the  common-law 
rules  relative  to  joint,  joint  and  several,  or  several  liabilities. 
In  these  States,  therefore,  there  can  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  con- 
struction which  should  be  put  upon  the  general  statutory  provi- 
sions quoted;  and  they  are  treated  as  establishing  the  equity 
doctrine  and  applying  it  to  actions  of  all  kinds.  In  the  suc- 
ceeding sections  of  this  chapter  I  shall  pursue  the  order  of  the 
legislation  whicli  is  the  same  in  all  the  States,  and  shall  sepa- 
rately discuss  the  following  subjects:  The  Real  Party  in  In- 
terest to  be  made  Plaintiff;  The  Effect  of  an  Assignment  of 
a  Thing  in  Action  upon  the  Defences  to  it;  A  Trustee  of 
an  Express  Trust,  etc.,  to  sue  alone;  Who  maybe  joined  as 
Plaintiffs ;  Who  may  be  joined  as  Defendants ;  When  One  or 
More  may  sue  or  be  sued  for  All;  Parties  severally  liable  on 
the  same  Instrument;  Bringing  in  New  Parties;  Intervening; 
and  Interpleader. 

>  As  an  illustration  of  these  views,  see  the  opinion  of  S.  L.  Selden  J.  in  Voorhis 
V.  Child's  Ex.,  17  N.  Y.  354. 


THE    UKAL    TAKTY    IX    INTEREST    TO    BE    THE    I'L.VlNTII  I'.  87 

SECTION   SECOND. 

THE   REAL   TARTY   IN   INTEREST   TD   BE    MADE   PLAINTIFF. 

§  62.  *124.  Statutory  Provision  as  to  Real  Party  in  Interest. 
*'  Every  action  must  be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party 
in  interest/  except  when  otherwise  provided  .  .  .,"  is  the  sen- 
sible and  comprehensive  form  used  in  Ohio,  California,  Iowa, 
Nebraska,  Wyoming,  Idaho. ^  To  this  is  added:  "But  this  sec- 
tion shall  not  be  deemed  to  authorize  the  assignment  of  a  thing 
in  action  not  arising  out  of  contract,"  in  Indiana,  Kansas,  Mis- 
souri, Wisconsin,  South  Carolina,  Kentucky,  Oregon,  Nevada, 
North  Carolina,  Washington. ^  It  was  sometimes  said  that  at 
the  common  law  a  thing  in  action,  not  negotiable,  could  not  be 
assigned;  but  the  true  meaning  of  the  rule  was  merely  this,  that 
the  assignee  could  not  bring  an  action  upon  it  in  his  own  name. 
Courts  of  law  had  long  recognized  the  essential  validity  of  such 
assignment  in  a  large  class  of  cases,  by  permitting  the  assignee, 
who  sued  in  the  name  of  his  assignor,  to  have  entire  control  of 
the  action,  and  by  treating  him  as  the  only  person  immediately 
interested  in  the  recovery.  Indeed,  the  assignment  gave  to  the 
assignee  every  element  and  right  of  property  in  the  demand  trans- 
ferred, except  the  single  one  of  suing  upon  it  in  his  own  name ; 
it  was  regarded  as  assets  in  his  hands  and  in  those  of  his  personal 
representatives ;  his  rights  were  completely  protected  against  the 
interference  of  the  assignor  with  an  action  brought  in  the  latter's 
name.  It  is  true,  the  property  derived  from  the  assignment  was 
said  to  be  equitable,  and  not  legal ;  but  this  distinction  did  not 
lessen  the  intrinsic,  essential  nature  of  the  ownership.  It  would 
seem  that  the  property  of  the  assignee  is  now  strictly  legale 
although  the  question  does  not  require  any  solution  in  this  work. 

1  [^Sheridan  v.  Nation  (1900),  159  Mo.  under  section  29  of  tlie  code  of  Civil  Tro- 

27,  59  S.  W.  972  :    The  code  requirement  cedure,  is  the  person  entitled  to  the  avails 

that  the  suit  be  brought  in  the  name  of  of   the  suit  :  "    Kinsella  v.    Sharp  (1896i. 

the  real  party  in  interest  does  not  mean  47  Neb.  664,  66  N.  W.  634.] 
that  it  must  be  brouglit  in  the  real  name  ^  QAlso   in    New    York,    Utali,    Nortli 

of  the  party  in  interest.     A  party  may  do  Dakota,  Montana,  Washington,  Colorado, 

business  in  any  name  he  wishes,  and  suit  and  Arkansas.] 
may  be  brought  in  that  name.  ^  [|Also  in  Soutli  Dakota  and  Arizona.] 

Definition  :  "  The  real  party  in  interest 


88  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  63.  *  125.  Principal  Effect  of  Statutory  Provision.  One  effect 
—  and  perhaps  the  principal  effect  of  this  statutory  provision  — 
is,  that  all  assignees  of  things  iti  action  which  are  assignable  may 
sue  upon  them  in  their  own  names,  and  are  no  longer  obliged  to 
sue  in  the  names  of  the  original  assignors.^  It  is  not  strictly 
correct  to  say  that  the  provision  itself  renders  any  thing  in  action 
assignable,  that  it  creates  any  attribute  of  assignability ;  but,  for 
the  purpose  of  defeating  such  possible  interpretation,  the  second 
clause  was  added  in  many  of  the  codes.  This  limiting  clause, 
however,  is  only  negative  in  its  form  and  meaning.  It  merely 
forbids  a  certain  construction  to  be  placed  upon  the  preceding 
language.  It  does  not  say  that  no  thing  in  action  is  assignable 
unless  it  arises  out  of  contract.  The  rules  governing  this  quality 
of  things  in  action  are  found  in  other  provisions  of  the  law,  and 
not  in  this  section. 

§  64.  *126.  Legal  Assignment.  Action  in  Name  of  Assignee, 
niustratious.  The  immediate  and  in  some  respects  the  most 
important  consequence  of  the  rule  that  "every  action  must  be 
prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest,"  is  this: 
wherever  a  thing  in  action  is  assignable,  the  assignee  thereof 
must  sue  upon  it  in  his  own  name.^  I  shall  therefore,  in  the 
first  place,  discuss  this  result,  and  ascertain  the  extent  to  which 
it  has  been  carried,  and  the  cases  to  which  it  has  been  applied. 
It  is  abundantly  settled  that  when  a  thing  in  action,  transferable 
by  the  law,  is  absolutely  assigned,  so  that  the  entire  ow^nership 


1  This  provision  only  applies  to  "  ac-  542;  Carpenter  r.  Tatro,  3C  id.  297;  Har- 
tious  "  as  defined  in  the  code,  and  not  to  din  v.  Hilton,  .50  Ind.  319  ;  State  v.  John- 
special  proceedings.  The  proceeding  to  son,  ,52  Ind.  197;  Mitchell  v.  Dickson,  53 
enforce  a  mechanic's  lien,  in  pursuance  of  Ind.  110;  Shane  v.  Francis,  30  Ind.  92; 
certain  special  statutes  in  New  York,  is  Gallagher  v.  Nichols,  GO  N.  Y.  438,  448. 
not  an  action  ;  and  the  original  liulder  of  -  [^I'hcEiiix  Ins.  Co.  w.  Carualian  (1900), 
the  lien  who  had  assigned  it  is  the  proper  63  0.  St.  258,  58  N.  E.  805 :  Where  the 
party  to  institute  the  proceeding  for  tlie  owners  of  a  chose  in  action  assign  the 
henefit  of  his  assignee.  Hallahan  v.  Her-  same  ahsolutely  to  a  third  party,  the  as- 
hert,  57  N.  Y.  409.  As  to  actions  by  the  signee  muM  sue  on  it,  even  though  the 
assignee,  see  Devlin  »;.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  contract  of  assignment  contains  the  further 
63  N.  Y.  8,  14-20;  Sheridan  i'.  The  provision  that  the  assignors  are  to  pro- 
Mayor,  etc.,  68  id.  30 ;  Fitch  v.  Rathhun,  ceed  to  collect  the  moneys  due  on  said 
61  id.  579  ;  Morris  c.  Tuthill,  72  id.  575 ;  chose  in  action  in  their  own  names  and 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  Union  II.  &  T.  Co.,  69  pay  over  the  same  to  the  assignee.  The 
id.  373,  380;  Green  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.,  6  code  is  imperative  that  the  action  must  he 
Hun,  128;  Jackson  v.  Daggett,  24  Hun,  brought  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in 
204;  lirowning  i^  Marvin,  22  Hun,  547;  interest.] 
Archibald  i;.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  38  Wis. 


THE    REAL    PARTY    IN"    INTEREST    TO    BE    THE    I'LAIXTIFF 


89 


passes  to  the  assignee  witliout  condition  or  reservation,  and  the 
legal  title  is  fully  vested  in  him,  he  is  the  real  party  in  interest, 
and  may  sue  upon  it  in  his  own  name,  and  is,  in  fact,  the  onl}-- 
proper  party  to  bring  the  action,'  —  as  in  the  case  of  a  claim  for 
the  use  and  occupation  of  land  thus  assigned  ;2  a  partnership 
demand  transferred  by  the  other  partners  to  one  member  of  the 
firm;^  a  delivery  bond  taken  by  a  constable  for  the  delivering  up 
of  property  which  he  had  seized  on  execution  and  transferred  to 
the  plaintiff:'  in  the  action ;  *  the  right  of  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  a'  breach  of  a  covenant  of  seisin  in  a  deed  of  conveyance 
assigned  by  the  grantee;^  a  claim  for  borrowed  money. ^  It  was 
held  in  Missouri  that  the  assignee  of  a  thing  in  action  arising 
out  of  contract  must  sue  in  his  own  name,  although  there  was 
DO  specific  statutory  provision  in  that  State  permitting  such  a 
demand  to  be  assigned,  and  the  statutory  provision  to  that  effect 
formerly  existing  had  been  omitted  from  the  revision  of  the  laws 
then  in  force.  The  clause  of  the  Practice  Act  was  enough  to 
authorize  the  action  because  he  was  the  real  jjart}-  in  interest.' 

§65.  *127.  Equitable  Assignment.  Same  Rule.  Illustrations. 
Not  only  does  the  rule  prevail  when  the  assignment  is  absolute 
and  complete,  and  the  assignee  is  the  legal  owner  of  the  demand ; 


1  CCrum  i\  Stanley  (1898),  55  Neb.  351, 
75  N.  W.  851  :  The  assignee  of  a  chose  in 
action  is  the  proper  and  only  party  who 
can  maintain  an  action  thereon.  Wood 
V.  Carter  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W. 
158  ;  Gunderson  v.  Thomas  (1894),  87  Wis. 
406,  58  N.  W.  750 :  The  assignor  of  a 
chose  in  action  is  not  a  necessary  party. 
But,  as  was  held  in  Philip  v.  Durkce 
(1895),  108  Cal.  300,  41  Pac.  407,  the 
averment  that  the  plaintiff,  who  is  an 
assignee  of  a  contract,  was  damaged  in  a 
certain  sum  by  its  breach,  is  immaterial 
and  cainiot  aid  a  failure  to  aver  how  much 
the  assignors  were  damaged  thereby.] 

2  Mills  V.  Murry,  1  Neb.  327,  and  a 
claim  of  damages  for  waste  against  a 
tenant  or  subtenant  in  favor  of  the  rever- 
sioner, and  by  him  assigned  to  the  plain- 
tiff. Rutherford  v.  Aiken,  3  N.  Y.  Sup. 
Ct.  60. 

3  Canefox  v.  Anderson,  22  Mo.  347  ; 
Stuckey  v.  Fritsche,  77  Wis.  329  ;  Walker 
V.  Steele,  9  Colo.  388.  A  non-negotiable 
note  payable  in  work,  Schnier  v.  Fay,  12 


Kan.  184;  Williams  v.  Norton,  3  Kan. 
295.  [jBaxter  v.  Hart  (1894).  104  Cal. 
344,  37  Pac.  941  :  Where  two  partners 
jointly  entered  into  a  contract  with  defend- 
ant, and  then,  by  an  agreement  between 
themselves,  .stipulated  that  plaintiff  should 
be  the  recijiieut  of  the  entire  benefit 
thereof,  this  constitutes  plaintiff  the  real 
party  in  interest  and  he  is  the  proper  and 
only  party  plaintiff.  All  the  facts  show- 
ing it,  however,  should  be  alleged. ] 

*  Waterman  v.  Frank,  21  Mo.  108; 
and  see  Moorman  v.  Collier,  32  Iowa,  138. 
Where  a  bond  is  taken  in  an  action  by  an 
officer  for  the  security  of  any  particular 
person,  that  person  is  the  real  party  in 
interest. 

5  Van  Doren  v.  Relfe,  20  Mo.  455  ; 
Utley  r.  Foy,  70  N.  C.  303  (a  land 
contract).  See  also  Bartholomew  Cy. 
Comni'rs  r.  Jameson,  86  Ind.  154. 

«  Smith  V.  Schibel,  19  Mo.  140;  Knad- 
ler  V.  Sharp,  36  Iowa,  232,  235  (an  open 
account). 

■7  Lbng  !-.  Heinrich,  46  Mo.  603. 


90 


CIVIL    KEMHDIKS. 


it  prevails  with  equal  force  in  cases  where  the  assignment  is 
simply  equitable  in  its  character,  and  the  assignee's  title  would 
not  have  been  recognized  in  any  form  by  a  court  of  law  under 
the  old  system,  but  would  have  been  purely  equitable.  Such 
assignee,  being  the  real  party  in  interest,  must  bring  an  action 
in  his  own  name;  for,  in  respect  to  this  provision  of  the  statute, 
the  equit}^  doctrine  which  it  embodies  is,  beyond  a  question,  to 
be  applied  to  all  actions.^  As  illustrations:  the  person  to  whom 
an  order  is  given  by  a  creditor  upon  his  debtor  for  the  whole 
amount  of  the  demand,  although  the  debtor  has  not  accepted  nor 
promised  to  pay,  is  an  equitable  assignee,  and  nnist  sue  in  his 
own  name ;  ^  also,  where  a  creditor  assigns  part  of  his  claim  to 
the  plaintiff,  of  which  the  debtor  has  notice ;  ^  and  when  a  bond 
was  verbally  assigned,  and  was  delivered  by  the  obligee  to  the 
plaintiff;*  and  when  the  assignment,  though  absolute  on  the 
face,  was,  in  fact,  partial,  the  assignee  agreeing  to  account  for 
the  remaining  portion  to  the  assignor.  In  this  case  the  assignor 
might  be  brought  in  to  protect  his  own  interests,  and,  in  some 
States,   would   be  an  indispensable    party. ^     The   rule    deduced 


1  See  Cottle  v.  Cole,  20  Iowa,  481,  485  ; 
Lytle  V.  Lytle,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  127.  In  the 
fi-f-st  of  these  cases  Mr.  Justice  Dillon 
said :  "  The  course  of  decision  in  this 
State  establishes  this  rule  ;  viz.,  that  the 
party  hoMing  tlie  le()a/  title  of  a  note  or 
instrument  may  sue  upon  it,  though  he  be 
a-i  agent  or  trustee,  and  be  liable  to  ac- 
count to  another  for  the  proceeds  of  the 
recovery ;  but  he  is  open  in  such  case 
to  any  defence  which  exists  again-st  the 
party  beneficially  interested.  Or  the 
party  beneficially  interested,  though  he 
may  not  have  the  legal  title,  may  sue  in 
his  own  name.  This  may  not  j)rccisely 
accord  with  the  line  of  decisions  under 
other  codes,  but  we  think  it  liberal  and 
right,  and  conducive  to  the  practical  at- 
tainment of  justice."  [^Hartzell  v.  Mc- 
Chirg  (1898),  .54  Neb.  .316,  74  N.  W.  r,2fi  : 
"  The  equitable  owner  of  a  negotiable 
promissory  note  in  his  po.ssession  may 
maintain  an  action  there(jn  in  liis  own 
name. "3 

-  VVheatley  v.  Strobe,  12  Cal.  92.  98; 
Walker  v.  Mauro,  18  Mo.  564.  Upon 
facts  as  stated  in  the  text.  Gamble  J.  says 
in  the  last  case :  "  The  effect  of  our  new 


code  of  practice,  in  abolishing  the  distinc- 
tions between  law  and  ecjnity,  is  to  allow 
the  assignee  of  a  chose  in  action  to  bring 
a  suit  in  his  own  name  in  ca.scs  where,  by 
the  common  law,  no  assignment  would  be 
recognized.  In  this  respect,  the  rules  of 
equity  are  to  prevail,  and  the  assignee 
may  sue  in  his  own  name."  He  goes  on 
to  show  that  this  is  an  equitable  though 
not  a  legal  assignment. 

3  Grain  v.  Ahlrich,,38  Cal.  514  ;  Childs 
V.  Alexander,  22  S.  C.  169.  vSee  Shaver 
V.  West.  Un.  Tel.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  459,  464. 

*  Conyngham  v.  Smith,  16  Iowa,  471, 
475 ;  Barthol  v.  Blakin,  34  Iowa,  452, 
and  Moore  v.  Lowry,  25  Iowa,  336.  Same 
decision  in  case  of  mortgages  vcrl)ally 
a.ssigned.  S.  P.  Green  v.  Marble,  37  Iowa, 
95;  Andrews  r.  Mc Daniel,  68  N.  C.  385 
(an   unindorsed  note). 

5  Gradwohl  v.  Harris,  29  Cal.  150. 
The  action  was  brought  by  ydaintiff  as 
assignee  of  W.  &  B.  of  a  contract  for  the 
payment  of  money.  W.  &  R.  iiilervenexi, 
alleging  that,  though  the  assignment  was 
absolute  on  its  face,  it  was  actually  for  one- 
fourth  only  of  the  demand,  and  they 
(W.  &  B.)  were  entitled  to  three-fourtha 


THE    KK.VL    I'AUTY    IN    IXTERKST    TO    I5K    TIIK    PLAINTITF. 


01 


from  these  iiutliorities  is  plain  and  imperative:  The  assigntH; 
need  not  he  the  legal  owner  of  the  tiling  in  action;  if  the  legal 
owner,  he  must  of  course  bring  the  action;  hut,  if  the  assignee's 
right  or  ownership  is  for  any  reason  or  in  any  manner  equitaVile, 
he  is  still  the  proper  plaintiff,  in  most  of  tlie  States  the  only 
plaintiff,  although,  in  a  few,  the  assignor  should  be  joined  as  a 
plaintiff  or  as  a  defendant.^  The  plain  intent  of  the  statute  is  to 
extend  the  equity  doctrine  and  rule  to  all  cases. '-^ 

§  66.  *  128.  Effect  of  Statute  in  Case  of  Negotiable  Instruments. 
Conflict  in  Opinion.  As  the  Statutory  provision  declares  that 
"every  action  must  be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party 
in  interest,"  the  defence  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  such  real  party 
in  interest  is,  in  general,  a  bar  to  the  suit.^  This  is  certainly  so 
when  the  plaintiff  is  the  assignee  of  anything  in  action  not 
negotiable,  and  the  issue  raised  by  an  answer  setting  up  such 
defence  would  be  simply  whether  the  plaintiff  was,  upon  the 
proof,  the  real  party  in  interest.     If,  however,  the  thing  in  action 


of  the  recovery.  The  court  held  that  the 
action  was  properly  brought,  but  also  that 
the  interveutiou  was  proper,  and  gave  a 
judgnieut  that  the  plaintiff  recover  one- 
fourth  and  W.  &  B.  three-fourths  of  the 
demand.  Such  au  intervention  and  judg- 
ment would  doubtless  shock  a  lawyer  bred 
iu  the  old  school ;  but  it  is  convenient, 
sensible,  and  every  way  worthy  of  univer- 
sal adoption.  The  common-law  objection 
that  a  divided  judgment  is  impossible  is 
simply  absurd;  the  thing  is  done,  and  is 
therefore  possible.  See  also  Allen  v. 
Brown,  44  N.  Y.  228,  2.31 ;  Uurgin  v.  Ire- 
land, 14  N.  Y.  322;  Williams  v.  Brown, 
2  Keyes,  486 ;  Paddon  v.  Williams,  1 
Robt.  340  ;  Meeker  v.  Claghorn,  44  N.  Y. 
349,  353  ;  Wetmore  r.  San  Francisco,  44 
Cal.  294,  300 ;  Lapping  i-.  Duffy,  47  Ind. 
51;  Boyle  v.  Bobbins,  71  N.  C.  130; 
Bartholomew  Cy.  Comm'rs  i'.  Jameson, 
8<)  Ind.  154  (where  A  receives  money  of 
B,  and  in  consideration  tliereof  agrees  to 
assign  to  B  any  judgment  lie,  A,  may  re- 
cover on  a  claim  held  by  him  against  C, 
there  is  an  equitable  a.ssignment  of  the 
claim,  and  C  alone  can  sue  thereon); 
Childs  V.  Alexander,  22  S.  C.  169. 

1  ^Reynolds  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1895),  143  Ind.  579,  40  N.  E.  410,  quoting 
the  text.] 


2  McDonald  v.  Knecland,  5  Minn.  352, 
365. 

*  [^lowa  and  Cal.  Land  Co.  v.  Iloag 
(1901),  132  Cal.  627,64  Pac.  1073:  "As 
was  said  by  this  court  in  Philbrook  v. 
Superior  Court,  111  Cal.  31,  a  defendant's 
right  is  to  have  a  cause  of  action  prose- 
cuted against  him  by  the  real  party  in  in- 
terest, but,  as  has  been  elsewhere  pointed 
out  (Giselmau  v.  Starr,  106  Cal.  651),  liis 
concern  ends  when  a  judgment  for  or 
again.st  the  nominal  plaintiff  would  protect 
him  from  any  action  upon  the  same  de- 
mand by  another,  and  when,  as  against  the 
nominal  plaintiff,  he  may  assert  all  de- 
fences and  counterclaims  available  to 
him,  were  the  claim  prosecuted  by  the  real 
owner." 

So  in  Sturgis  v.  Baker  (1903),  —  Ore. 
— ,  72  Piiiv  744,  and  Lodge  v.  Lewis 
(1903),  32  Wash.  191,  72  Pac.  1009,  it 
was  held  that  a  defendant  could  not  raise 
the  question  whether  or  not  the  plaintiff 
was  the  real  party  in  interest,  unless 
some  right  of  setoff  or  counterclaim  was 
affected. 

But  see  also  Stewart  v.  Price  (1902), 
64  Kan.  191,  67  Pac.  553,  and  Brown 
V.  Ginu  (1902),  66  Ohio  St.  316,  64  N.  E. 
123,  set  out  at  some  length  in  note  1, 
p.  98.J 


92  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

is  an  instrument  negotiable  in  its  nature,  the  subject  is  compli- 
cated by  the  special  doctrines  and  rules  of  the  law  which  relate 
to  the  quality  of  negotiability.  It  is  elementary  that  possession 
of  negotiable  paper,  payable  to  bearer,  is  at  least  prima  facie 
evidence  of  ownership;  and  it  is  also  settled  that  when  such 
paper,  payable  to  order,  is  indorsed  and  delivered  to  the  in- 
dorsee, the  legal  title  passes  to  him,  and  he  may  maintain  an 
action  thereon;  while  the  maker,  acceptor,  or  indorsers  cannot 
question  his  title,  at  least  in  any  manner  short  of  impeaching  its 
good  faith.  This  legal  title  carried  with  it  the  right  to  sue,  no 
matter  what  arrangements  might  be  made  between  him  and  his 
immediate  indorser  concerning  the  use  of  the  proceeds.  The 
question  then  arises.  Has  the  rule  introduced  by  the  code  changed 
these  established  doctrines  ?  Does  the  apparent  and  formal  legal 
ownership  resulting  from  the  possession  of  a  negotiable  instru- 
ment payable  to  bearer,  or  from  the  indorsement  and  possession 
of  similar  paper  payable  to  order,  constitute  the  plaintiff  the  real 
party  in  interest  within  the  meaning  of  the  code  ?  Or  ma}^  the 
defendant  go  behind  this  formal  title,  and  show  that  some  other 
person  is  the  real  party  in  interest,  and  thus  defeat  the  action? 
If  the  latter  query  must  be  answered  affirmatively,  it  is  evident 
that  the  statutory  provision  under  consideration  has  made  an 
important  change  in  the  law  of  negotiable  paper.  The  question 
thus  proposed  has  given  rise  to  some  conflict  in  opinion,  and  is 
not  entirely  free  from  doubt.  On  the  one  side  it  has  been  urged 
that  the  language  of  the  section  in  all  the  State  codes  is  most 
general  and  comprehensive,  containing  no  exception  in  terms  nor 
by  implication,  and  that  it  is,  in  its  highest  degree  imperative, 
''''must  be  prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest," 
except  in  the  single  case  of  "the  trustee  of  an  express  trust," 
and  that  the  real  party  in  interest  is  the  person  for  whose  immedi- 
ate benefit  the  action  is  prosecuted,  who  controls  the  recovery, 
and  not  the  person  in  whom  the  mere  naked  apparent  legal  title 
is  vested.  On  the  other  side  it  is  urged  that  the  rule  permitting 
such  a  holder  or  indorsee  to  prosecute  the  action  is  one  of  the 
elementary  doctrines  of  the  law  relating  to  negotiable  paper,  —  a 
rule  not  of  practice  or  procedure,  but  of  the  mercantile  and  com- 
mercial law,  — and  that  the  legislature  cannot  liave  intended,  by 
such  a  general  clause  of  a  statute  concerning  procedure,  to  abro- 
gate well-settled  principles  of  the  law  merchant.     I  will  examine 


THE    REAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST   TO    BE    THE    PLAINTIFF.  93 

and  compare  some  of  the  cases  in  which  the  question  has  been 
discussed. 

§  67.  *129.  New  York  Decisions.  In  Edwards  V.  Camp- 
bell,^ which  WHS  an  action  upon  a  note  payable  to  bearer,  the 
plaintiff  had  the  note  in  his  passession ;  but  a  judgment  in  his 
favor  was  reversed  on  the  ground  tliat  he  was  not  the  real  party 
in  interest.  Killmore  v.  Culver  ^  was  an  action  upon  a  promis- 
sory note  payable  to  Tanner  or  bearer.  The  answer  denied  the 
plaintiff's  ownership,  and  alleged  that  Tanner  was  the  real 
owner.  It  was  sufficiently  established  by  the  evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  was  acting  simply  as  agent  for  Tanner,  and  would  be 
immediately  accountable  to  the  latter  for  all  the  money  recov- 
ered. These  facts  were  held  to  constitute  a  complete  defence  on 
the  ground  that  Tanner  was  the  real  party  in  interest,  and  should 
have  been  the  plaintiff.  In  James  v.  Chalmers,-'^  it  was  said  by 
one  of  the  judges  of  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  in  refer- 
ence to  actions  upon  negotiable  paper:  "Under  the  code  of 
procedure,  if  it  appears  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  real  party 
in  interest,  it  is  a  bar  to  the  action,  and  no  further  defence  is 
necessary."  The  question  was  very  elaborately  discussed  by  the 
courts  of  New  York  in  Eaton  v.  Alger,'*  which  was  an  action  by 
the  indorsee  of  a  note.  The  Supreme  Court  held  that  the  de- 
fendants! might  prove  that  the  plaintiff  had  no  interest  in  the 
note,  but  was  a  mere  agent  of  the  payee,  and  was  bound  to 
account  to  him,  on  demand,  for  the  proceeds,  and  that  these  facts 
would  constitute  a  complete  defence  to  the  action. 

§  68.  *  130.  The  Rule  in  New  York.  Cases  of  higher  au- 
thority, because  decided  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals, 
have  established  the  other  rule  for  that  State.  In  City  Bank  of 
New  Haven  v.  Perkins,^  the  rule  which  prevailed  prior  to  the 
code  was  reaffirmed  and  applied  to  the  facts  before  the  court, 

^  Edwards  v.  Campbell,  23  Barb.  423.  bills  in  question,  or  their  proceeds,  from 

"^  Killmore  v.  Culver,  24  Barb.  6.50,  6.57.  tlie  plaintiff."     The  doctrine  of  City  Bank 

'  James  v.  Chalmers,  6  N.  Y.  209,215,  v.  Perivius  is  declared   to  be  the   settled 

per  Welles  J.  general  rule,  but  its  operation  explained 

•     *  Eaton  V.  Alger,  57  Barb.  179,  189.  and  limited  in  Hays  v.  Hathorne,  74  N.  Y. 

*  City  Bank  of  New  Haven  v.  Perkins,  486.     As  sustaining  the  general  rule,  see 

29  N.  Y.  554,  568,  per  Johnson  J.     The  also  Devol  v.  Barnes,  7  Hun,  342  ;   Green 

learned  judge  also  said:  "  It  will  be  time  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co.,  6  Hun,  128;  Davis  i'. 

enough  to  determine  whether  any  other  Rowlands,  5  Hun,  651.     But  see  Iselin  v. 

person  has  a  better  title  when  such  person  Reynolds,  30  Hun,  488. 

shall  come  before  the  court  to  claim  the 


94  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

although  no  allusion  was  made  in  its  opinion  to  the  provisions 
of  §  111  (1501,  -149,  1909,  1910).  The  doctrine  was  stated  as 
follows :  "  Nothing  short  of  inahi  fides  or  notice  thereof  will 
enable  a  maker  or  indorser  of  such  paper  to  defeat  an  action 
brought  upon  it  by  one  who  is  apparently  a  regular  indorsee  or 
holder,  especially  when  there  is  no  defence  to  the  indebtedness. 
As  to  anything  beyond  the  bona  fides  of  the  holder,  the  defend- 
ant, who  owes  the  debt,  has  no  interest."  The  same  rule  was 
repeated  in  Brown  v.  Penfield;^  but  in  this  case  also  there  was 
no  reference  made  to  the  provision  of  the  code  relating  to  the  real 
party  in  interest.  It  might  be  considered  doubtful  whether  the 
question  had  been  put  to  rest  by  these  two  decisions,  but  all 
doubt  has  been  removed.  The  case  of  Eaton  v.  Alger  was 
carried  to  the  Court  of  Appeals;  the  opinion  of  the  Supreme 
Court  was  overruled ;  and  the  original  rule  of  the  law  in  refer- 
ence to  suits  upon  negotiable  paper  was  expressly  held  not  to 
have  been  changed  by  the  code.'-^  In  this  conflict  among  the. 
decisions,  the  judgment  of  the  court  of  last  resort  of  course  pre- 
vails; and  the  question  is  thus  settled  in  New  York  by  the  force 
of  authority,  whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  comparative  weight 
of  the  argument  in  support  of  either  rule. 

§69.  *131.  Rule  in  Other  states.  The  doctrine  which  prevails 
in  Iowa  seems  to  be  the  same  as  that  now  established  in  New 
York.'^  The  same  doctrine  appears  to  be  established  in  Min- 
nesota ;  *  in  Missouri ;  ^  in  Nebraska ;  ^  in  Washington ; "  in 
California.^     The  construction  given  to  the  statutory  provision 

1  Brown  r.  Peiifiel(l,36  N.  Y.  473.  The  Ileipler  (Minn.),  52  N.  AV.  33;  Elraquist 
remarks  of  Davies  C.  J.,  in  which  this  doc-  r.  Markoe,  4,5  Minn.  305;  Van.streani  v. 
trine  was  reasserted,  were,  however,  mere  Liljengren,  37  Minn.  191  ;  QStruckmeyer 
vbiter  dicta.  c.  Lam))  (1896),  64  Minn.  57,  65  N.W.  930.3 

2  Eaton  (•.  Alger,  47  N.  Y.  345;  s.  c.  '^  Young  v.  Iluilson,  99  Mo.  102. 

2  Keyes,  41.  '•  Ilerron  r.  Cole,25  Neb.  692;  [^Meeker 

8  Cottle  r.  Cole,  20  Iowa,  481,  485,  per  v.  Waldron  (1901),  62  Neh.  689,  87  N.  W. 

Dillon  J.  followed  in   Abell  Note,  etc.  Co.  539  :    Commercial  State  Bank  r.  Rowley 

r.    Hurd    (Iowa,    1892),    52    N.    W.    488 :  (1902),  Neh.,  89  N.  W.  765.] 

"  The   course   of    decision    in    tliis   State  ^  McDaniel  v.  Pressler,  3  Wasli.  636  ; 

establishes  this  rule;  viz.,  that  the  party  Davis  r.  Erickson,  3  Wash.  654;  QKidilell 

holding  the  legal  title  of  a  note  or  instru-  ;•.  Trichard  (1895),  12  Wash.  601,41   Pac. 

ment    may   sue   on    it,  though  he  he  an  905.] 

agent  or  trustee,  and  liable  to  account  to  *  McPherson   v.  We.ston,  64  (^al.  275  ; 

another  for  the  proceeds  of  the  recovery;  Curtis  ?•.  Sprague,  51   Cal.  239;   ^Oortel- 

but  he  is  oj)en  in  sucli  case  to  any  defence  you  r.  .lones  (1901),  132  Cal.  131,  64  I'ac. 

wliich  may  exist  ajjainst  the  person  bene-  119;  Toby  v.  r)regon  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1893), 

ficially  interested."  98  Cal.  490,  33  Pac.  550. 

*  Minnesota  Thresher   Manuf.   Co.    p.  Tlie  same  doctrine  prevails   in   North 


THE   REAL    rA^rrY    Ix\    INrEHL;8T    TO    BE    THE    PLAINTIFF.  95 

by  the  court  of  Indiana  is  entirely  different,  as  it  is  held  to 
include  the  indorsee  and  holder  of  negotiable  paper  as  well  as 
the  assignee  of  any  other  thing  in  action.  Such  indorsee  or 
holder,  although  possessed  of  the  naked  legal  title,  is  not  the  real 
party  in  interest,  and  is  not  authorized  to  sue,  if  the  beneficial 
interest  and  the  whole  right  to  the  proceeds  of  the  recovery  are 
in  another  party.  ^  It  is,  however,  a  settled  rule  of  pleading  in 
Indiana,  that  an  answer  merely  averring  that  the  plaintiff  is  not 
the  real  party  in  interest,  but  that  some  other  person  named  is 
the  real  party,  without  alleging  any  facts  from  which  these  con- 
clusions would  arise,  presents  no  issue. ^  In  Kentucky,  also,  the 
defence  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  real  party  in  interest  may  be 
set  up  in  an  action  upon  a  promissory  note  or  other  negotiable 
instrument,  brought  by  the  person  who  is  the  apparent  holder,  or 
who  has  the  naked  legal  title,  although  in  that  State,  by  virtue 
of  an  express  provision  of  the  code,  the  person  having  the  legal 
title  must  also  be  made  a  party,  either  plaintiff  or  defendant.^ 
In  an  action  by  the  assignee  of  a  note  against  the  maker  thereof, 
it  is  no  defence  to  show  that  the  assignment  was  made  with 
intent  to  defraud  certain  creditors  of  the  assignor.  This  does 
not  make  the  plaintiff  any  the  less  the  real  party  in  interest.  As 
the  assignor  participates  in  the  fraud,  he  could  not  repudiate  his 
transfer,  and  has  parted  with  all  possible  interest  in  the  note.* 
Whenever  the  defence  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  real  party  in 
interest  is  allowable,  it  must  be  pleaded  in  the  answer;  if  not,  it 
will  be  regarded  as  waived.^ 

Dakota.     Seybokl  v.  Bank  (1896),  5  N.  D.  Bank    (Ky.   1892),   18  S.  W.  234.     [^See 

460,  67  N.  W.  682;  Commercial  Bank  v.  Power  i\  Hambrick  (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W. 

Red  River  Bank  (1899),  8  N.  D.  382,  79  660,  where  it  was  held  that  the  assignee  of 

N.  W.  859.     Also  in  Montana.     Meadow-  a  note  may  sue  upon  it  in  his  own  name, 

craft  V.  Walsh  (189.5),  15  Mont.  544,  39  whether  the  assignment  was  absolute  or 

Pac.  914.]  merely  as  collateral  security.] 

1  Swift  V.  Ellsworth,  10  Ind.  205.     See  *  Rohrer  v.  Turrill,  4  Minn.  407. 

also  Gillispie  y.  Fort  Wayne  &  So.  R.  Co.,  ^  Savage   v.   Corn    Exch.  Ins.    Co.,   4 

12  Ind.  398  ;   Deuel  v.  Newlin  (Ind.  Sup.  Bosw.  2;  Giraldin  i\  Howard,  103  Mo.  40  ; 

1892),  30  N.  E.  795;    Bartholomew  Cy.  see  also  ;ws^  §  *711,  and  cases  cited  in  note. 

Comm'rs  f.  Jameson,  86  Ind.  154.  [^Lesh   r.   Meyer   (1901),  63  Kan.  524,  66 

'■'  Lamson  v.   Enlls,  6   Ind.   309 ;    Me-  Pac.  245 ;    Bank   of    Stockhara    v.   Alter 

wherter  v.  Price,  11  Ind.  199  ;  Garrison  v.  (1901),  61  Neb.  359,  85  N.  W.  300.     An 

Clark,  11    Ind.  369;    Swift  v.  Ellsworth,  averment  in  an  answer  that  the  plaintiff 

10  Ind.  205 ;  Hereth  v.  Smith,  33  Ind.  514,  is  not  the  real  party  in  intere.st  i.s  a  mere 

and   cases   cited;    Hardin    v.    Helt(jn,  50  conclusion  of  law,  and  insufficient:  Esch 

Ind.  319.  V.  White  (1901),  82  Minn.  462,  85  N.  W. 

^  Carpenter  v.  Miles,  17  B.  Mon.  598,  238,  718.     But  an  allegation  that  prior  to 

602.     See   Palmer   v.    Mt.    Sterling   Nat.  tlie  commencement  of  tlie  suit  the  plaintiff 


96  CIVIL   REMEDIES.  ; 

jj  70.  *lo2.  Absolute  Assignment  made  Conditional  or  Partiad 
by  Contemporaneous  and  Collateral  Agreement.  Analogous  to 
the  subject  discussed  in  the  preceding  paragraph  is  the  question 
whether  an  assignee,  to  whom  a  thing  in  action  has  been  trans- 
ferred by  an  assignment  which  is  absolute  in  its  terms,  so  as  to 
vest  in  him  the  entire  legal  title,  but  which,  by  means  of  a 
contemporaneous  and  collateral  agreement,  is,  in  fact,  rendered 
conditional  or  partial,  is  the  real  party  in  interest.  It  is  now 
settled  by  a  great  preponderance  of  authorit}',  although  there  is 
some  conflict,  that  if  the  assignment,  whether  written  or  verbal, 
of  an3-thing  in  action  is  absolute  in  its  terms,  so  that  by  virtue 
thereof  the  entire  apparent  legal  title  vests  in  the  assignee,  any 
contemporaneous  collateral  agreement  by  virtue  of  which  he  is 
to  receive  a  part  onh'  of  the  proceeds,  "  and  is  to  account  to  the 
assignor  or  other  person  for  the  residue,  or  even  is  to  thus  account 
for  the  whole  proceeds,  or  by  virtue  of  which  the  absolute  trans- 
fer is  made  conditional  upon  the  fact  of  recovery,  or  by  which  his 
title  is  in  any  other  similar  manner  partial  or  conditional,"  does 
not  render  him  any  the  less  the  real  party  in  interest:^  he  is 
entitled  to  sue  in  his  own  name,  whatever  collateral  arrangements 
have  been  made  between  him  and  the  assignor  respecting  the  pro- 
ceeds.^  The  debtor  is  completely  protected  by  the  assignment, 
and  cannot  be  exposed  to  a  second  action  brought  by  any  of  the 


sold  the  note  sued  on,  is  a  good  defence :  owner,  has   no   interest   in   the   property 

Van  Hoasen  v.  Broehl  (1899),  59  Neb.  48,  injured,  may  be  allowed:    Kansas  City  f. 

80  N.  W.  260.     See  also  National  Distil-  Kin<,'   (1902).   6,5   Kan.  64,68    Pac.    1093. 

ling    Co.    L".    Cream    City   Importing  Co.  I5ut  see  Service  v.  Baniv  (1900),  62  Kan. 

(1893),  86  Wis.  3.i2,  .56  N.  W.  864.]  857,  62  Pac.  670,  and  Hudson  v.  Barratt 

QThe  defence  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  (1901),  62  Kan.  137,  61   Pac.  737,  where 

the  real  party  in  interest  may  be  raised  sucli  amendments  were  allowed, 
by  answer  or  demurrer:  Meyer  r.  Barth  Bowser  c.  Mattler  (1893),  137  Ind.  649, 

(1897),  97   Wis.  .•?52,  72  N.   W.  748;  J.  I.  35   N.   E.  701  :   A  question  as  to  the  real 

Case  Threshing  Co.  r.  Pedersou  (1894),  6  party  in  interest,  and  as  to  the  consecpient 

S-  1)  140,  60  N.  W.  747.  right  to  sue,  cannot  be  r.aised  for  the  first 

Where  the  defect  appears  on  tlie  face  time  in  the  Supreme  Court,  but  such   a 

of    the    complaint,    a    general    demurrer  defence  must  be  specially  pleaded  in  bar.] 
properly  raises   the   objection:    Smith   r.  ^  QBohart  >'.   Buckingham   (1901),  62 

Security  Co.  (1899),  8  N.  D.451,  79  N.  W.  Kan.  658,  64  Pac.  627,  quoting  the  text.] 
981.      See   also   note,    p.   714,    on    Issues  -^  [[Wines  c.  Hio  (Jrande  Ily.  Co.  (1893), 

Raised  by  Demurrers.  9  Utah,  228,  .33   P.ac.    1042,  (juoting  the 

An    amcnilment  substituting  the  real  text;    Anderfson  r.  Yoscmite  Mining  Co. 

j>arty  in  interest  is  not  iillowal)le:  Wilson  (189+),  9  Utah,  420.35  Pac.  502  ;  Guerney 

«•.  Kiesel  (1894).  9  Utah.  397.  35  Pac.  488.  r.   Moore  (1895),    131    Mo.  650,  32  S.   W. 

Hut  an  amendniont  alleging  that  one  of  1 132,  (luoting  the  text.] 
the  plaintifTs,  originally  alleged  to  be  an 


THE    UKAL    VXliTY    IN    INTEUEST    TO    UK    THE    PLAINTIF!' 


97 


parties,  either  the  assignor  or  other,  to  whom  the  assignee  is 
bound  to  account.  This  is  the  settled  doctrine  in  most  of  the 
States.^  Notwithstanding  the  general  unanimity  of  the  court« 
in  sustaining  this  doctrine,  there  are  still  some  indications  of  a 
different  opinion,  although  it  can  hardly  be  said  that  this  differ- 
ence has  been  embodied  in  an  adjudication  as  the  ratio  decidendi. 
The  opinion  to  which  I  refer  will  be  found  at  large  in  the  note. 


1  Allen  1-.  Brown,  44  N.  Y.  228,  231 
•(assignmeut  without  consideration,  and 
assignee  to  be  accountable  to  the  assignor 
for  all  the  proceeds)  ;  Meeker  y.  Claghorn, 
44  N.  Y.  349,  353  (facts  similar  to  the 
last) ;  Wetmore  v.  San  Francisco,  44  Cal. 
294  (assignment  made  as  collateral  secu- 
rity) ;  Durgin  v.  Ireland,  14  N.  Y.  322 
{assignment  in  writing  absolute,  but  by  a 
contemporaneous  agreement  the  assignors 
were  to  have  one  half  the  proceeds)  ; 
Castner  i".  Sumner,  2  Minn.  44;  Williams 
V.  Norton,  3  Kans.  295  ;  Cottle  v.  Cole,  20 
Iowa,  481  ;  Curtis  v.  Mohr,  18  Wis.  615; 
Hilton  V.  Waring,  7  Wis.  492  (assignment 
as  collateral  security)  ;  Wilson  ),-.  Clark, 
11  Ind.  385;  Gradwohl  v.  Harris,  29  Cal. 
150  ;  Saulsbury  v.  Corwiu,  40  Mo.  App. 
373  (assignment  of  note  for  collection)  ; 
Jackson  i'.  Hamm,  14  Colo.  58  ;  Brumbaek 
V.  Oldliain,  1  Idaiio,  709  (assignment  of 
account  for  collection)  ;  Young  v.  Hudson, 
99  Mo.  102  (assignment  of  account  for 
collection) ;  Haysler  v.  Dawson,  28  Mo. 
App.  5.31  (same);  Sheridan  r.  The  Mayor, 
etc.,  68  N.  Y.  30  ;  Gates  v.  No.  Pac.  R.  Co., 
64  Wis.  64  (assignee  to  pay  certain  debts 
of  the  assignor  from  the  proceeds  of  the 
suit,  and  account  to  the  assignor  for  the 
remainder) ;  Vimont  i'.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
R.  Co.,  64  Iowa,  513;  Ginocchio  v.  Ama- 
dor Canal  &  Min.  Co.,  67  Cal.  493;  Ervin 
V.  Oregon  Ry.  &  N.  Co.,  35  Hun,  544; 
Walburn  v.  Chenault,  43  Kan.  352.  In 
Castner  v.  Sumner  the  notes  m  suit,  wliicli 
were  for  $3,100,  were  assigned  as  security 
for  $1,500,  owing  by  the  payee  to  the 
plaintiff,  the  latter  giving  ])ack  a  bond  to 
pay  over  the  balance  after  satisfying  his 
own  demand.  Upon  these  facts  the  court, 
per  Atwater  J.,  said :  "  There  may  be  a 
question  as  to  whether  the  assignment  of 
the  notes  was  absolute,  or  whether  a  con- 
tingent interest  remained  in  tlie  assignor. 
But  in  either  case  tlie  action  is  properly 


brought  in  the  name  of  the  plaintiff."  .  .  . 
In  Williams  v.  Norton  a  note  payable  to 
the  order  of  the  payee  had  been  verbally 
transferred  and  delivered  to  the  jjlaintiff 
without  endorsement.  The  action  by  such 
assignee  was  held  to  be  properly  brought, 
even  though  he  may  not  be  entitled  to 
apply  to  his  own  use  the  whole  proceeds. 
"  A  delivery  bj-  the  payee  to  his  surety  or 
indemnitor,  with  authority  to  receive  the 
money  and  pay  the  principal  debt,  will 
enable  the  surety  to  sue  in  his  own  name. 
He  will,  within  the  meaning  of  the  code, 
be  the  real  party  in  interest." 

[]In  Laurence  v.  Congregational  Church 
(1900),  164  N.  Y.  115,  58  N.  E.  24,  it  was 
held  that  "  the  assignee  of  a  claim  under  a 
written  assignment  which  vests  the  legal 
title  in  him,  though  as  security  for  a  debt, 
is  not  bound,  in  an  action  against  the 
debtor,  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  debt 
from  the  assignor  to  himself,  as  the  state 
of  the  accounts  between  the  assignor  and 
assignee  does  not  concern  the  defendant, 
or,  if  it  does,  the  burden  is  upon  \\\m  to 
prove  such  a  state  of  facts  as  would  render 
the  assignment  inoperative  or  reinvest  the 
assignor  in  equity  with  the  beneficial 
ownersliip  of  the  claim  "  (Syllabus).  lu 
Falconio  v.  Larsen  (1897),  31  Ore.  137,  48 
Pac.  703,  it  was  held  that  the  assignee  of 
a  claim  for  wages,  assigned  for  collection 
only,  could  sue  in  his  own  name.  In 
Toby  V.  Oregon  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1893),  98 
Cal.  490,  33  Pac.  550,  the  court  said :  "  A 
trustee  to  whom  a  chose  in  action  has 
been  transferred  for  collection  is,  in  con- 
templation of  law,  so  far  the  owner  that 
he  may  sue  on  it  in  his  own  name."  Re- 
affirmed in  Cortelyou  v.  Jones  (1901),  132 
Cal.  131,  64  Pac.  il9.  See  also  Pratchett 
V.  Marsh  (1895),  52  Ohio  St.  494,  40  N.  E. 
200;  McBrayer  v.  Dean  (1897),  100  Ky. 
398,  38  S.  W.  508.3 


98 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


as  it  is  an  able  argument  upon  that  side  of  the  question. ^     Em- 
braced within  the  same  principle,  and  governed  by  the  same  rule, 


1  Robbins  v.  Deverill,  20  Wis.  142. 
The  plaintiff  sues  an  assignee  of  Peet 
&  Williams.  Dixon  C.  J.  gave  the  fol- 
lowing opinion  (p.  148)  :  "  The  statute  is 
imperative  that  every  action  must  be 
prosecuted  in  the  name  of  the  real  party 
in  interest,  except  as  therein  otherwise 
provided.  The  proof  is  that  the  plaintiff 
is  not  the  owner  of  the  demand  sued  upon. 
It  belongs  to  the  firm  of  R.  &  L.,  com- 
posed of  the  plaintiff,  his  brother,  and  one 
Lewis.  The  demand  was  transferred  to 
the  plaintiff  alone  by  words  of  absolute 
assignment,  no  trust  being  expressed,  but, 
as  the  plaintiff  himself  testifies,  he  holds 
it  nevertheless  in  trust  for  his  firm.  It 
was  received  on  account  of  a  debt  due  the 
firm  of  R.  &  L.  from  P.  &,  W.  Upon  these 
facts  it  seems  to  me  the  plaintiff  cannot 
maintain  the  action.  He  is  not  the  real 
party  in  interest,  nor  the  trustee  of  an 
express  trust  within  the  meaning  of  the 
statute.  His  brotlier  and  Lewis  should 
have  been  joined  as  plaintiffs." 

pn  Crowns  !■.  Forest  Land  Co.  (1898), 
99  Wis.  10.3,  74  N.  W.  546,  the  court 
seems  to  have  departed  somewhat  from 
the  doctrine  of  Robbins  v.  Deverill.  This 
was  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  and 
the  defendant  attempted  to  defend  on  the 
ground  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  real 
party  in  interest.  The  court  said  :  "  That 
portion  of  tlie  answer  which  alleges  that 
respondent  gave  no  consideration  for  the 
note  and  mortgage  presents  no  issuable 
fact.  It  tends  in  no  way  to  defeat  the 
action.  It  is  a  matter  of  no  moment  to 
appellant  whether  any  consideration  was 
paid  for  the  note  and  mortgage  or  not. 
Under  subsequent  allegations  in  the  an- 
swer it  appears  that  respondent  became 
vested  with  and  held  the  legal  owncrsliip 
of  the  demand  sued  upon.  The  appellant 
had  no  legal  interest  to  inquire  whether 
the  respondent's  interest  was  actual  or 
colorable,  or  whether  consideration  was 
paid  therefor  or  not."  And  in  Chase  v. 
Dodge  (1901),  111  Wis.  70,  86  N.  W.  548, 
which  was  an  action  by  the  assignees  of  a 
bill  of  merchandise,  the  court  said  :  "  The 
assignee  of  a  claim,  holding  the  legal  title 
by  a  transfer  valirl  as  against  his  assignor, 


is  the  '  real  party  in  interest,'  and  th* 
proper  party  to  sue  thereon  .  .  .  ;  and  the 
fact  that  such  transfer  is  colorable  only  is 
immaterial  unless  the  rights  of  creditors 
are  involved  or  the  right  to  interpose  some 
defence  or  counterclaim  supposed  to  be 
cut  off  by  the  assignment."  See  also  An- 
derson V.  Johnson  (1900),  106  Wis.  218,82 
N.  W.  177;  Brossard  v.  Williams  (1902), 
114   Wis.  89,   89  N.  W.   832-3 

See  also  cases  cited  ante,  under  §  *130; 
and  Bostwick  v.  Bryant,  113  Ind.  448 
(assignee  for  collection  merely  of  a  note 
cannot  sue  thereon  in  his  own  name)  ; 
Hoagland  v.  Van  Etten,  22  Neb.  681  ; 
s.  c.  23  Neb.  462  (where  the  proceeds  of 
the  suit  are  to  be  paid  to  the  assignor, 
and  the  assignee  has  no  beneficial  interest 
in  them,  the  latter  cannot  sue  on  the 
assigned  claim). 

Qln  Kansas  the  sujireme  court  has 
wavered  in  its  decisions.  In  the  case  of 
Stewart  c.  Price  (1902),  64  Kan.  191,  67 
Pac.  553,  in  a  carefully  rea.soued  opinion, 
a  divided  court  expressly  overruled  the 
case  of  Knapp  v.  Eldridge,  33  Kan.  106, 
and  held  that  "  one  holding  by  written 
assignment  a  verified  itemized  account  is 
not  the  real  party  in  interest,  and  cannot 
maintain  an  action  thereon  in  his  own 
name  where  it  is  showu  tliat,  by  a  con- 
temporaneous oral  agreement,  he  has 
agreed  to  pay  the  full  amount  thereof, 
when  collected,  to  his  assignor ;  and  this 
is  true  notwithstanding  the  iis.^ignor  testi- 
fies that  the  defendant  in  the  action  does 
not  owe  her  anything,  that  the  whole 
amount  is  due  her  from  the  plaintiff,  and 
that  he  is  to  pay  her  provided  he  re- 
covers in  the  action."  But  only  two  years 
later,  Stewart  v.  Price  was  itself  expressly 
overruled  by  the  case  of  Manley  i'. 
Park  (1904),  —  Kan.  — ,  75  Pac.  557, 
the  court  unanimously  approving  the  doc- 
trine of  the  minority  opinion  in  Stewart 
V.  Price. 

The  same  rule  obtains  in  Ohio.  Brown  v. 
Ginn  (1902),  66  Ohio  St.  316,  64  N.  E.  123. 
In  this  case  the  court  said  :  "  We  are  aware 
that  the  tendency  of  some  courts  ha.s  been 
to  uphold  actions  brought  upon  negotiable 
instruments,    transferred     for     collection 


THE    REAL   PARTY    IN    INTEREST   TO    BE   THE    PLAINTIFF.  99 

is  the  case  of  an  assignee  of  a  thing  in  action,  who,  by  the  terms 
of  the  transfer,  is  not  bound  to  pay  the  consideration  thereof 
until  the  debt  has  been  collected ;  he  is  the  real  party  in  interest, 
and  is  fully  authorized  to  sue  in  his  own  name.^ 

§  71.  *  133.  Instances  of  Action  by  Assignee  as  Real  Party  in 
Interest.  The  following  are  particular  cases  in  which  the  as- 
signee was  held  by  the  courts  to  be  the  real  party  in  interest 
within  the  meaning  of  the  codes,  and  entitled  as  such  to  sue  in 
his  own  name:  Where  a  bond  or  a  mortgage  was  assigned 
verbally;^  the  assignment  of  a  receipt  and  delivery  order,  which 
was  in  the  following  words:  "1,000  bushels  of  com.  Received 
in  store,  on  account  of  S.  F.  A.,  1,000  bushels  of  corn,  to  be 
delivered  to  his  order  at,  etc.,  etc.  (signed)  W.  H.  H.;"^ 
assignment  of  a  promissory  note  payable  to  order  without  any 
indorsement;*  the  assignment  of  a  debt  evidenced  by  a  lost 
note ;  ^  where  the  assignment  of  a  bond  or  note  was  by  means  of 
a  separate  instrument  in  writing;*^  the  assignment  of  a  claim 
arising  from  an  agreement  to  pay  the  defendant  in  a  certain 
pending  suit  a  stipulated  sum  of  money  if  he  would  withdraw 
his  defence;'  the  assignment  of  a  claim  for  damages  resulting 
from  the  wrongful  conversions  of  chattels ;  ^  the  assignment  by  a 
widow  of  her  right  of  dower  after  the  death  of  her  husband,  but 
before  the  dower  had  been  set  apart  to  her.^     The  mere  parting 

only,  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff  is  3  Merchants  &  Mech.  Bank  v.  Hewitt, 

the  real  party  in  interest,  and  that  there  3  Iowa,  93. 

are  some  authorities  which  point  to  that  4  Carpenter  v.  Miles,  17  B.  Mon.  598  ; 

conclusion.     Indeed  it    may    lie  admitted  White  v.   Phelps,  14  Minu.  27;  Pease  v. 

that  the  trend  in  some  of  the  Code  States  Rush,  2  Minn.  107  ;  Pearson  v.  Cummings, 

is  in  that  direction.     But  we  have  found  no  28  Iowa,  344  ;  Hancock  v.  Ritchie,  11  Ind. 

case  which  goes  to  the  extent  of  holding  48  ;  Rogge  v.  Cassidy  (Ky.  1890),  1.3  S.  W. 

that  an   assignment   of  an    open    account  716;  Caldwell   v.   Meshew,  44  Ark.  564; 

for  the   mere   purpose  of  collection,   one  Heartman  v.  Franks,  36  Ark.  501  ;  Kiff  v. 

which   gives   the   assignee    a    contingent  Weaver,  94  N.  C.  274. 

interest    only,    constitutes    him   the   real  6  Long  r  Constant,  19  Mo.  320. 

party  in  interest  within  the  meaning  of  6  Thornton  v.  Crowther,  24  Mo.  164; 

the  statute."  Peters  v.  St.  Louis,  &c.  R.  R.,  24  Mo.  586. 

See  cases  cited  in  note  3,   p.  91,  and  "  Gray  v.  Garrison,  9  Cal.  325. 

note  1,  p.  87.  8  Smith  v.  Kennett,  18  Mo.  154;  Laz- 

1  Cummings  v.  Morris,  25  N.  Y.  625  ;  ard  v.  Wheeler,  22  Cal.  139.      lu  this  la.«t 
s.  c.  3  Bosw.  560.  case  an  action  by  the  assignee  to  recover 

2  Conyngham  v.  Smith,  16  Iowa,  471  ;  possession  of  tlie  chattels  was  sustained. 
Barthol  v.  Blakin,  34  Iowa,  452;  Green  9  Strong  c.  Clem,  12  Ind.  37  ;  ([Dobber- 
V.    Marble,    37    Iowa,    95;     Andrews   v.  stein  v.  Murphy  (1896),  64  Minn.  127,  66 
McDaniel,  68  X.  C.  385;  Kiff  v.  Weaver,  N.  W.  204-3 

94  N.  C.  274. 


100  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

with  the  possession  of  a  note  does  not,  however,  constitute  an 
assignment  thereof,  and  the  owner  is  the  proper  party  to  sue, 
although  the  instrument  is  in  the  hands  of  another  person  with 
whom  it  has  been  deposited.^  The  assignee  of  a  foreign  executor 
or  administrator  may  maintain  an  action  in  his  own  name  to 
recover  a  debt  due  to  the  estate  from  a  person  residing  within 
the  State  in  which  the  suit  is  brought.^  Upon  the  same  prin- 
ciple, when  a  demand  not  arising  within  the  State,  in  favor  of 
one  foreign  corporation  against  another  foreign  corporation,  is 
assigned  to  a  resident  of  the  State,  such  assignee  may  maintain 
an  action  upon  it  against  the  debtor  corporation,  although  the 
original  creditor  is  expressly  forbidden  by  statute  to  sue  under 
such  circumstances.  The  prohibition  of  an  action  between  the 
foreign  corporations  does  not  affect  the  assignability  of  the 
claim.  ^ 

§  72.  *  134.  Same  Subject.  The  assignee  of  a  judgment  re- 
covered by  the  defendant  in  an  action  brought  to  recover  the 
possession  of  chattels  may  sue  in  his  own  name  upon  a  bond 
given  by  the  plaintiff  upon  the  requisition  made  for  a  delivery 
of  tlie  goods  to  him.  The  assignment  of  the  judgment  carries 
with  it  all  demands  arising  upon  this  bond  or  undertaking,  and 
the  assignee  is  the  real  party  in  interest.*  In  like  manner,  the 
assignee  of  a  judgment  recovered  against  a  sheriff  for  official 
misconduct  in  seizing  the  plaintiff's  property  may  bring  an  action 
in  his  own  name  upon  the  sherift''s  bond."  The  principle  may  be 
stated  more  broadly.  The  assignee  of  any  claim  or  demand  may, 
in  general,  sue  in  his  own  name  upon  any  incidental  or  collateral 
security  connected  with  the  demand,  and  l)y  means  of  which  its 
payment  or  satisfaction  can  be  enforced.  Thus,  the  assignee  of 
a  judgment  obtained  in  a  garnishee  process  may  maintain  an 
action  in  his  own  name  against  the  garnishees;^  the  assignee  of 
the  cause  of  action  in  a  pending  litigation  may  sue  on  an  appeal 
bond  given  to  the  j)laintiff,   the  assignor,   in  the  course  of  the 

'  Seidell    r.     Prin;^le,    17    Barb.    4')8  :  revive  a  judfrinent  hy  the  assignee  thereof ; 

[^Bohart  >■.   Buckingham  (1901),  62  Kan  Gerner  v.  Cliurch  (1895),  43  Nel>.  690,  G 2 

658,  64  Pac.  627,  f)u<jliiig  the  text.]  N.  W.  51  (assignee  of  subscription).] 

2  Petersen   r.  Cliemical  Bank,  32  N.  Y.  *  Bowdoin  v.  Coleman,  3  Al.b.  Pr.  431. 

21.  6  Charles  r.  Haakins,  11  Iowa,  329. 

=>  .McBridf;  /•    FiirintTs'  Bank,  26  N.  Y.  «  Whitman  r.  Keith,  18  Ohio  St.    134. 

450.  457.  In  tliis  case,  Mr.  .Justice  Scott  give.s  a  very 

(^Further    instances:    Haupt  r   Biirtun  full  ami  clear  exposition  of  the  statutory 

(1898),  21   Mont.  572,  55  I'ac.  110  (suit  to  provision  under  consideration. 


THE    REAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST    TO    BE    THE    PLAINTIFF,         101 

proceedings.^  The  assignee  of  a  reversion  and  also  of  the  cove- 
nants contained  in  the  lease  is  the  proper  party  to  bring  an  action 
to  recover  damages  arising  from  a  breach  of  such  covenants. ^ 
When  a  surviving  partner  assigns  things  in  action  which  belonged 
to  the  firm,  the  assignee  succeeds  to  his  rights,  and  must  sue  in 
his  own  name  to  collect  the  same."* 

§  73.  *  185.  Joinder  of  Assignor  in  Some  States.  In  Ken- 
tucky, if  the  assignment  is  equitable,  which  is  defined  to  be 
an  assignment  not  expressly  authorized  by  statute  to  be  made, 
although  the  assignee  must  sue  in  his  own  name,  the  assignor 
must  also  be  joined  as  a  party  plaintiff  or  defendant;*  as,  for 
example,  when  an  execution  is  assigned,^  or  a  lease. ^  In  certain 
States,  where  the  thing  in  action  is  not  negotiable,  or  assignable 
by  indorsement,  the  assignor  may  be  joined  as  a  defendant  to 
answer  to  his  interest  and  to  the  assignment."  In  other  States, 
however,  where  similar  provisions  are  not  found  in  the  codes  or 
practice  acts,  the  rule  is  entirely  different,  and  the  assignor  is 
not  a  proper  party  either  plaintiff  or  defendant.  Thus,  in  Ohio, 
an  assignor  having  been  made  a  defendant  under  the  general 
provisions  of  the  code  relating  to  the  joinder  of  parties  plaintiff 
and  defendant,  it  was  held  that  he  neither  had  an  interest  in  the 
controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  nor  was  he  a  necessary  party 
to  a  complete  determination  or  settlement  of  the  questions  in- 
volved therein,  and  therefore  he  had  been  improperly  made  a 
defendant.^  This  is  undoubtedly  the  rule  in  all  the  States 
whose  codes  do  not  contain  the  special  provision  permitting  or 
requiring  the  joinder  of  assignors  in  order  to  answer  to  the  as- 
signment. And  even  though  he  may  retain  some  residuary, 
contingent,  or  equitable  interest,  the  assignor  is  not  the  proper 
party  to  sue;  the  legal  title  is  not  only  in  the  assignee,  but  he  is 

1  Bennett  v.  McGrade,  15   Minn.  1.32.  R.  S.  ch.  22,  §  C,  "all  bonds,  Itills,  or  notes 

Same   as   to  assignment    of    a  conti-act,  for  money  or  property  shall  he  assignable 

Gallagher  v.  Nichols,  60  N.  Y.  438,  448,  so  as   to  vest  the  right  of  action  in  the 

449;   liolen  r.  Crosby,  49  id.  183.  assignee." 

•^  Masury   v.    Southworth,   9  Ohio   St.  "^  ^Indiana,  Burns' St.,  1901,  §  277.] 

340.  s   Allen    v.    Miller,    11    Ohio    St.    374. 

3  Roys  V.  Vilas,  18  Wis   169.  [^Held  in  Shambaugh  v.  Current  (1900), 

*  Dean  v.  English,  18  B.  Men.  132;  111  Iowa,  121,82  N.  W.  497,  that  the  de- 
Gill  V.  Johnson's  Adni.,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  fendant  cannot  require  the  assignor  to  be 
649;  Lytle  v.  Lytle,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  127.  made  a  party,  since  any  defence  as  against 

^  Watson   r.   Gabby,   18  B.  Mon.  658,  the  assignor  could  be  made  against  the 

665.  assignee.] 

**  Hicks   V.  Dotv,  4   Bush,   420.     Bv  1 


102 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


entitled  to  receive  all  the  proceeds  of  the  recovery,  and  whatever 
possibilities  the  assignor  may  have,  he  is  not  the  real  party  in 
interest.^ 

^  74.  *  IfSG.  Assignment  Pendente  Lite.  Substitution  of  As- 
signee. The  thing  in  action  may  even  be  assigned  while  a 
snit  upon  it  is  pending,  and,  by  the  express  provisions  of  the 
statute,  the  assignee  may  either  be  substituted  as  plaintiff,  or 
the  suit  may  be  carried  on  to  its  termination  in  the  name  of  the 
original  party. ^  Such  substitution,  when  made,  is  not  the  bring- 
ing of  a  new  action,  and  does  not  require  a  supplemental  coni- 


1  Smith  V.  Cliicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  2.3 
Wis.  267,  where  it  apjjeared  that  in  pro- 
ceedings supplementary  to  execution,  be- 
fore instituted  against  the  plaintiff  in 
another  State,  the  demand  in  suit  had 
heen  assigned  to  a  receiver  ;  tiiis  was  held 
a  complete  defence.  See  also  Gates  i'. 
No.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  64  Wis.  64  ;  Vimont  v. 
Chicago  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  64  Iowa,  513  ; 
Smith  r.  Felton,  85  Ind.  223  (note  assigned 
as  collateral  security);  Michael  v  St.  Louis 
Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  17  Mo.  App.  23  (the 
assignor  of  an  insurance  policy  should  not 
be  joined  as  plaintiff  with  the  assignee,  to 
wiiom  the  whole  policy  has  been  trans- 
ferred as  collateral  security)  ;  Cable  v.  St. 
Louis  Marine  Ry.  Co.,  21  Mo.  133;  and 
see  insurance  cases,  post,  §  *226,  note. 

2  QMcCuUough  V.  Dovey  (1901),  61 
Neb.  675,  85  N.  W.  893  ;  Parker  v.  Taylor 
(1902),  Neb.,  91  N  W.  537;  City'  of 
Springfield  v.  Weaver  (1896),  137  Mo. 
650,  37  S.  W.  509 ;  TufPree  v.  Stearns 
Ranches  Co.  (1899),  124  Cal.  306,  57  Pac. 
69. 

Whethci  the  assignee  siiall  be  sub.sti- 
tuted  or  the  action  shall  proceed  in  the 
name  of  the  original  party,  is  a  matter 
within  the  discretion  of  the  court :  Brown 
V.  Kohout  (1895).  61  Minn  113,  63  N  W. 
248;  Fay  "  Steubenrauch  (1903),  138 
Cal.  656,  72  Pac.  156  ,  Sears  ».  Ackerman 
(1903).  138  Cal.  583,  72  Pac.  171. 

But  in  Wilson  v.  Kiesel  (1894),  9  Utah 
397,  35  Pac.  488,  it  was  held  that  where 
an  action  is  prosecuterj  to  judgment  in  the 
name  of  the  assignor,  after  an  assignment 
pmdpulf  lite,  no  action  can  thereaftor  be 
brought  on  such  judgment  in  the  name  of 
tlie  assignor  ;  and  where  an  action  is  Desun 
Ml    hw    name    it   must    be   dismissed,   an 


amendment  substituting  the  real  party  in 
interest  not  being  allowable.  See,  how- 
ever, Service  ;;.  Bank  (1900),  62  Kan.  857, 
62  Pac.  670,  and  Hudson  v.  Barratt  (1901), 
62  Kan.  137,  61  Pac.  737,  where  such 
amendments  were  allowed. 

The  statute  furnishes  no  authority  for 
the  continuation  of  the  action  by  the 
plaintiff  where  his  assignee  has  settled 
the  claim  and  demands  that  the  action 
be  discontinued.  Hirsheld  v.  Fitzgerald 
(1898),  157  N.Y.  166,  51  N.  E.  997, 

In  McKiiiglit  V.  Bertram  Heating,  etc. 
Co.  (1902),  65  Kan.  859,  70  Pac.  345,  a 
part  of  the  claim  was  assigned  pending 
the  action,  and  it  was  held  that  the  plain- 
tiff, who  sued  on  a  quantum  meruit,  could 
recover  in  his  own  name  the  amount 
assigned 

In  Matthews  v.  Cantey  (1896),  48  S.  C. 
588,  26  S.  E  894,  defendant  executed 
three  promissory  notes  to  A.  A  assigned 
them  to  B,  and  B  pledged  them  to  plain- 
tiffs as  collateral  security  for  a  debt  which 
B  owed  plaintiffs.  Said  debt  not  being 
paid  when  due,  plaintiffs  brought  this 
action  on  the  notes,  and  it  was  conceded 
by  all  parties  that  plaintiffs  had  a  good 
cause  of  actioii  at  that  time.  But  after 
the  commencement  of  this  suit,  B  paid 
plaintiffs  the  debt  in  full,  and  assigned 
the  notes  to  C,  such  assignment  by  B. 
divesting  plaintiffs  of  all  interest  in  the 
notes,  and  ])utting  the  legal  and  beneficial 
title  in  C.  C  did  not  move  to  be  made  a 
party,  and  the  circuit  court  dismissed  the 
action  on  the  ground  that  the  suit  was  not 
being  prosecuted  in  tlic  name  of  the  real 
party  in  interest.  This  order  was  afllrmed. 
Section  142  of  the  code  jjrovides  that  "no 
action  shall  ai)ate  by  the  death,  marriage 


THE    KEAL    PARTY    IX    INTEREST   TO    BK   THE    PLAINTIFF. 


103 


pliiint.^  If  an  assignee  carries  on  a  suit  in,  the  name  of  tlie 
assignor,  he  must  show  affirmatively  that  the  transfer  was  made 
■pendente  lite.'^ 

^  75.  *  137.  Assignment  of  Part  of  Demand.  Action  by  Grantee 
on  Covenants.  It  has  been  decided  in  some  cases  that  the 
assignment  of  part  of  an  entire  claim  does  not  enable  the  as- 
signee to  sue  in  his  own  name,  but  that  the  assignor  must  still 
sue  for  the  whole  demand.^  This  rule  is  based  upon  the  old 
doctrine  of  the  indivisibility  in  law  of  an  entire  thing  in  action. 
Other  cases  hold  that  such  an  assignment  conveys  an  equitable 
interest,  and  makes  the  assignee  an  equitable  owner,  so  that  he 
may  sustain  an  action  brought  in  his  own  name,   although  the 


or  other  disability  of  a  party,  or  by  the 
transfer  of  any  interest  therein,  if  the 
cause  of  action  survive  or  continue.  In 
case  of  death,  marriage  or  other  disability 
of  a  party,  the  court,  on  motion,  at  any 
time  within  one  year  tliereafter,  or  after- 
wards on  a  supplemental  complaint,  may 
allow  the  action  to  be  continued  by  or 
against  his  representative  or  successor  in 
interest.  In  case  of  any  other  transfer  of 
interest,  the  action  sliall  be  continued  in 
the  name  of  the  original  party,  or  the 
Court  may  allow  the  person  to  whom 
the  transfer  is  made  to  be  substituted  in 
the  action."  The  court  held  that  the  words 
"  any  other  transfer  of  interest,"  under 
which  it  was  sought  to  defeat  the  abate- 
ment of  the  action,  meant  "  such  a  transfer 
of  interest  in  the  action  as  would  enable 
the  transferee  to  claim  under  the  original 
parly."  And  .since  in  the  case  at  bar  the 
transferee  claimed  not  under  the  original 
party,  the  plaintiffs,  but  under  B.,  this 
statute  did  not  save  the  action,  and  it 
must  abate  under  the  provision  of  sec- 
tion 1.32,  requiring  all  actions  to  be 
prosecuted  in  tlie  name  of  the  real  party 
in  interest.] 

'  [Fish  V.  Smith  (1900),  7.3  Conn.  .377, 
47  Atl.  711  :  "An  assignment  of  a  claim 
pending  suit  thereon  calls  for  no  altera- 
tion or  amendment  in  the  complaint,  but 
only  for  an  application  for  a  change  of 
parties."  And  in  Campbell  r.  Irvine 
(1895),  17  Mont.  476,  43  Pac.  626,  it  was 
held  that  the  substituted  plaintiff  might 
prove  the  assignment  by  which  he  became 
entitled  to  the  subject  of  the  suit,  although 


the  assignment  was  not   pleaded    in   the 
complaint. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Washington, 
however,  has  held,  in  Powell  v.  Nolan 
(1902),  27  Wash.  318,  67  Pac.  712,  that  a 
supplemental  complaint  must  be  filed,  and 
that  a  judgment  obtained  witiiout  the 
filing  of  such  supplemental  complaint  is 
invalid,  where  the  defendant  was  not 
present  or  represented  in  court  at  the 
time  the  substitution  was  made.] 

2  St.  Anthony  Mill  Co.  v.  Vandall, 
1  Minn.  246 ;  Virgin  v.  Brubaker,  4  Nev. 
31;  Warner  I'.  Turner,  18  B.  Mon.  758. 
See  also  McGean  v.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ky. 
Co.,  133  N.  Y.  9 ;  Asher  v.  St.  Louis,  &c. 
K.  Co.,  89  Mo.  116;  Lowell  v.  Parkinson, 
4  Utah,  64  ;  Todd  v.  Crutsinger,  30  Mo. 
App.  145 ;  Hamilton  v.  Lamphear,  54 
Conn.  237 ;  Stewart  v.  Spaulding,  72  Cal. 
264 ;  Nichols  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  36 
Minn.  452  ;  Snyder  v.  Phillips,  66  la.  481 ; 
Perkins  v.  Marrs,  1 5  Colo.  262. 

3  Cable  V.  St.  Louis  Marine  Railway 
Co.,  21  Mo.  133;  Leese  v.  Sherwood,  21 
Cal.  151  ;  Burnett  v.  Crandall,  63  Mo. 
410;  Beardslee  v.  Morgner,  73  Mo.  22; 
Loomis  V.  Robin.son,  76  Mo.  488.  But 
this  rule  does  not  prevent  one  of  two 
joint  payees  from  transferring  the  whole 
of  his  interest,  so  that  his  assignee  (in  this 
case  the  other  payee)  may  sue  in  his  own 
name;  McLeod  y.  Snyder  (Mo.  1892),  19 
S.  W.  494.  See  Lapping  v.  Duffy,  47  Ind. 
51;  Boyle  v.  Robbins,  71  N.  "  C.  130; 
[^Smith  r.  Atkin.son  (1893),  18  Colo.  255, 
32  Pac.  425,  holding  that  the  common-law 
rule  has  not  been  changed.] 


104  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

assignors  may,  upon  their  own  application,  be  allowed  to  inter- 
vene, in  order  to  protect  their  interests.^  The  grantee  of  land 
cannot  sue  in  his  own  name  to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of 
covenants  in  the  deed  to  liis  grantor  which  do  not  run  with  the 
land,  unless  the  covenants  themselves  have  also  been  assigned, 
but  the  grantor  is  the  proper  party ;  as,  for  example,  the  grantee 
cannot  sue  upon  a  covenant  of  seisin  in  the  deed  to  his  grantor, 
in  those  States  where  that  covenant  is  regarded  as  broken  immedi- 
ately, if  at  all,  upon  the  execution  of  the  deed,  and  as  not  running 
with  the  land. 2 

§  76.  *  138.  Suing  "  to  the  Use  of"'  Another.  Beneficiaries 
under  Express  Trusts.  It  is  no  longer,  consistently  with  the 
provisions  of  the  codes,  possible  for  one  person  to  sue  "to  the 
use  of  "  another,  as  was  common  in  some  States.  The  parties 
beneficially  interested  must  themselves  bring  the  action.^  There 
are  cases  which  hold  that  when  there  is  a  trustee  of  an  express, 
trust,  he  must  bring  the  action,  and  that  the  beneficiary  can  in 
no  such  case  sue  in  his  own  name,  at  least  alone.*  The  correct- 
ness of  this  ruling  may  well  be  doubted.  The  section  relative 
to  the  real  party  in  interest  is,   in  all  the  codes,   imperative; 

1  Grain  r.  Aldrich,  38  Cal.  514;  Wig-  Relfe,  20  Mo.  45.5;  Wilkes  v.  Morehead, 
gins  V.  McDonald,  18  Cal.  126.  See,  also,  Stanton's  Code  (Ky.),  p.  31  (n  ) ;  Lytle  v. 
Childs  (,■.  Alexander,  22  S.  C.  169;  Sin-  Lytic,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  127,  128.  '  Also, 
gleton  y.  O'Blenis,  125  Ind.  151  (partial  State  v.  Johnson,  52  Ind.  197;  Shane  c. 
assignee  and  a.<siguor  may  join).  Qlt  was  Francis,  30  id.  92.  j^HoUister  v.  Hubbard 
held  in  Schilling  r.  Mullen  (1893),  55  (1899),  11  S.  D.  461,  78  N.  W.  949.  An 
Minn.  122,  56  N.  W.  .')86,  and  in  Dean  v.  action  for  breach  of  a  sheriff's  bond,  pay- 
St.  Paul,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1893),  .53  Minn.  504,  able  to  the  county,  must  be  brought  in  the 
55  N.  W.  628,  that  an  action  to  recover  a  name  of  the  party  in  interest,  and  not  in 
duly  assigned  portion  of  a  demand  cannot  the  name  of  the  county  for  the  use  of  such 
be  maintained  by  the  assignee  where  the  ))arty.  To  the  same  effect  is  Guernsey  v. 
a.<signor  is  not  made  a  party,  the  debtor  Tuthill  (1900),  12  S.  D.  584,  82  N.  W. 
refusing  to  recognize  the  assignment.  190.  See.  however.  City  of  Bethany  v. 
And  in  Cook  v.  City  of  Menasha  (1899).  Howard  (1899),  149  Mo.  504,  51  S.  W.  94, 
103  Wis.  6,  79  N.  W.  26,  it  was  held  that  where  the  contrary  is  held  in  respect  to  a 
the   plaintiff   was   not   aggrieved    by   an  contractor's  bond.j 

order  of  the  court  making  the  a.ssignor  a  *  Reed  v.  Harris,  7  Robt.  151.  A  Spe- 
party.  The  same  court  held,  in  Skobis  r.  cial  Term  deci.«ion,  and  not  entitled  to  much 
Ferge  (1899).  102  Wis.  122,  78  N.  W.  426,  weight.  See  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Nolan,  48 
that  the  assignment  by  a  creditor  of  a  N.  Y.  513;  Davis  v.  Erickson,  3  Wash, 
portion  of  a  claim  is  not  binding  on  the  654  ;  Kelley  v.  Thuey.  102  Mo.  522  ;  Hen- 
debtor  uidcss  he  consents  thereto.]  ricus  ;•.   Englert  (N.    Y.    App.    1893),   33 

2  Elall  V.  Plaine,  14  Ohio  St.  417;  N.  E.  5.50  (obligees  on  a  bond,  who  signed 
Sinker  r.  Floy.l,  104  Ind.  291.  as  "agents  "  of  others,  are  the  onlv  proper 

3  Weise  v.  (ierner,  42  Mo.  527  :  Hutch-  plaintiffs  to  a  suit  on  the  bond,  though  a 
ingB  V.  Weems.  35  Mo.  285;  Brady  v.  different  rnle  would  applv  had  the  instru- 
Ciiandler,    31     Mo.   28;    Van    Doren    i'.  ment  not  been  under  seal). 


THE   UEAL   PARTY    IN    INTEREST   TO    BE   THE    PLAINTIFF.         105 

while    that   in   rehition    to   the   trustee    of   an  express   trust   is 
permissive. 

§  77.  *  139.  Actions  by  Third  Persons  for  whose  Benefit  Con- 
tracts have  been  made.  The  cases  thus  far  considered  in  this 
section  are  all  connected  with  the  assignment  of  a  thing  in  action 
by  the  original  creditor,  and  they  involve  the  question,  When 
may  the  assignee,  under  such  circumstances,  be  the  party  plain- 
tiff in  an  action  to  enforce  the  assigned  demand?  The  rule  of 
the  statute,  that  every  action  must  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the 
real  party  in  interest,  applies  also  to  numerous  cases  which  have 
no  connection  whatever  with  assignments  and  assignees;  and  I 
propose,  in  the  remainder  of  this  section,  to  review  and  examine 
these  other  illustrations  of  the  principle.  It  is  now  the  settled 
doctrine  in  so  many  of  the  States,  that  it  may  be  called  the 
American  doctrine,^  —  although  the  contrary  rule  has  been  estab- 
lished in  England  and  in  some  States,  and  notably  in  Massachu- 
setts,^ where  it  has  been  very  recently  reaffirmed  with  emphasis, 
—  that,  where  an  express  promise  was  made  by  A.  to  B.,  upon  a 
consideration  moving  from  B.,  whereby  the  promisor  engages  to 
do  something  for  the  benefit  of  C,  as,  for  example,  to  pay  him 
a  sum  of  money,  although  C.  is  both  a  stranger  to  the  considera- 
tion and  not  an  immediate  party  to  the  contract,  yet  he  may 
maintain  an  action  upon  the  promise  in  his  own  name  against 
the  promisor,  without  in  any  manner  joining  as  a  party  the  one 
to  whom  the  promise  was  directly  made.^  This  rule  was  origi- 
nally adopted  prior  to  the  reformed  procedure,  and  was  based 
partly  upon  considerations  of  convenience,  and  partly  upon  a 
liberal  construction  of  the  nature  of  the  contract.     [The  provision 

1  Ileiulrick  v.  Lindsay,  93  U.  S.  143.  Iowa,  187;  Allen  r.  Thomas,  3  Mete.  (Ky.) 
For  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  ra-  198;  Wiggins  i\  McDonald,  18  Cal.  126; 
tionale.  of  the  doctrine,  see  an  article  by  Miller  v.  Florer,  15  Ohio  St.  148,  1.51,  per 
Henry  O.  Taylor,  15  Amer.  Law  Rev.  White  J.  ;  Rogers  i'.  Gosnell,  58  Mo.  589, 
231.  '                ■  590  ;    51    Mo.    466  ;    Coster    v.    Mayor  of 

2  l^The  same  doctrine  prevails  in  Con-  Albany,  43  N.  Y.  399,  411  ;  Van  Schaick 
necticut.  See  Baxter  v.  Camp  (1898),  71  v.  Tiiird  Avenue  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  346^ 
Conn.  245,  41  Atl.  803,  and  Morgan  v.  Ricard  i;.  Sanderson,  41  N.  Y.  179 ;  Barker 
Randolph,  etc.  Co.  (1900),  73  Conn.  396,  ,-.  Bradley,  42  N.  Y.  316,319;  Secor  v. 
47  Atl.  658.]  Lord,  3  Keyes,  525;  Claflin  v.  O-strom,  54 

3  Kimball  V.  Noyes,  17  Wis.  695;  San-  N.  Y.  581,  584;  Cooley  v.  Howe  Machine 
ders  V.  Clason,  13  "Minn.  379;  Meyer  v.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  620  ;  Glen  y.  Hope  Mnt.  Life 
Lowell,  44  Mo.  328:  Cross  r.  Truesdale,  Ins.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  379,  381;  Barlow  v. 
28  Ind.  44;  Devol  v.  McInto.sh,  23  Ind.  Meyers,  6  X.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  183;  Johnson 
529;  Day  r.  Patterson,  18  Ind.  114  :  Rice  v.  Knapp,  36  Iowa,  616;  Jordan  v.  White, 
V.  Savery,  22  Iowa,  470;  Scott  v.  Gill,  19  20  Minn.  91. 


106 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


of  the  codes  under  review  does  not  place  the  matter  beyond  all 
doubt ;  although  the  person  for  whose  benetit  the  promise  is  thus 
made  is  certainly  the  real  party  in  interest.]^     The  following  are 


1  po  late  :i.s  1903,  tlie  Supreme  Court 
of  Wisconsin,  in  the  case  of  Tweeddale  v. 
Tweeildale,  inj'ni,  declared  that  '"  there  is 
as  raucii  confusion,  prohahly,  in  the  judi- 
cial holdings  in  respect  to  the  matter,  as 
on  any  question  of  law  that  can  be  men- 
tioned." 

The  conflict  centres  about  tlie  two  req- 
uisites laid  down  in  tiie  leading  case  of 
Vrooman  v.  Turner,  69  N.  V.  280.  These 
are  as  follows :  there  must  be,  in  order  to 
allow  suit  by  a  third  person  on  such  a 
contract,  ( 1 )  an  intention  on  the  part  of 
the  promisee  to  secure  some  benefit  to  the. 
third  party,  (2)  some  privity  l)etweeu  the 
promisee  and  the  party  to  be  benefited, 
and  some  duty  or  obligation  owing  from 
the  promisee  to  the  third  person  which 
would  give  the  latter  a  legal  or  equita'.)le 
claim  to  the  benefit  of  the  promise.  Most 
of  the  cases  turn  on  one  or  the  other  of 
these  points,  and  they  may  l)e  grouped 
accordingly. 

In  Morgan  u.  Randolph,  etc.  Co.  (1900), 
73  Conn.  396,  47  Atl.  6.58,  the  defendant 
purchased  the  property  of  a  ])artnership, 
and  in  part  consideration  agreed  to  pay 
the  partnersiiip  deltts.  Held  tiiat  the 
intention  was  primarily  to  secure  a  benefit 
to  the  partnersiiip  and  not  to  the  creditors, 
hence  the  latter  could  not  recover  on  the 
agreement.  This  is  an  extreme  case,  and 
the  court  itself  admits  that  it  is  out  of 
accord  with  the  current  of  American 
authority. 

There  are  numerous  cases  of  actions 
by  materialmen  and  laborers  upon  con- 
tractors' bonds,  which  have  usually  turned 
upon  the  question  of  intention.  Such  a 
case  was  Parker  v.  Jeffery  (1894),  26  Ore. 
186,  37  Pac.  712,  where  the  court  held 
that  to  entitle  a  third  person  to  recover 
upon  a  contract  made  Initween  other 
persona,  tiiere  must  not  only  be  an  intent 
to  secure  some  benefit  to  such  third  person, 
but  the  contract  must  have  been  made  and 
entered  into  directly  and  primarily  for 
his  l>enefit.  The  same  rule  was  adopted 
in  Montgomery  v.  Uief  (1897),  15  Utali 
495,  50  I'ac.  623;  Brower  Lumber  Co.  i-. 
Mill.;r  (1896),  28  Ore.   565,  43  Pac.  659; 


Howsmon  i-.  Trenton  Water  Co.  (1893), 
119  Mo.  304,  24  S.  W.  784,  Jefferson  v. 
Asch  (1893),  53  Minn.  446,  55  N.  VV.  604. 

The  construction  of  tliese  contractors' 
bonds,  as  indicative  of  intention,  has  niveii 
rise  to  some  ditticulty.  In  Pickle  Marble 
&  Granite  Co.  v.  McClay  (1898),  54  Neb. 
661,  74  N.  W.  1062,  the  bond  provided 
that  the  contractor  should  provide  ail  the 
labor  and  materials  necessary  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  building,  and  that  tiiere 
should  not  be  any  lawful  claims  against 
him  for  labor  and  materials.  Tliis  w;is 
held  to  be  a  bond  for  tiie  benefit  of  the 
materialmen  and  lal)orers.  The  same 
l)ond  was  similarly  construed  in  Korsmeyer 
etc.  Co.  V.  McClay  (1895),  43  Neb.  649,  62 
N.  W.  50,  and  in  Pioneer,  etc.  Co.  v.  McClay 
(1898),  54  Neb.  663,  74  N.  W.  1063. 
Similar  bonds  were  construed  in  Doll  v. 
Crume  (1894),  41  Neb.  655.  59  N.  W.  806; 
Kaufmann  c.  Cooper  (1896),  46  Neb.  644. 
65  N.  W.  796;  Hohman  i\  Gniser  (1898), 
53  Neb.  474,  73  N.  W.  923  ;  and  Spokane 
&  Idaho  Lumber  Co.  v.  Boyd  (1902),  28 
Wash.  90,  68  Pac.  337,  and  in  each  case 
held  to  have  been  executed  for  the  bene- 
fit of  materialmen  and  laborers.  In 
McDonald  ;;.  Davey  (1900),  22  Wash.  366, 
60  Pac.  1116,  a  bond  conditioned  that  the 
lessee  of  a  mine  should  pay  all  debts  con- 
tracted for  labor  and  materials  used  in 
and  about  the  mine,  was  hehl  to  be  a 
bond  for  the  benefit  of  the  laborers,  over- 
ruling the  case  of  Sears)'.  Williams  (1894), 
9  Wash.  428,  37  Pac.  665,  in  which  the 
court  had  criticised  the  Nebraska  cases. 
Even  a  covenant  that  the  contractor  would 
file  with  the  board  of  public  works  receipts 
of  claims  from  all  parties  furnishing  ma- 
terials and  labor,  was  held  to  be  a  cove- 
nant for  the  benefit  of  materialmen,  in 
Lyman  !•.  City  of  Lincoln  (1894),  38  Neb. 
794,  57  N.  W".  531. 

On  the  other  hand,  in  Greenfield  Lum- 
ber Co.  V.  Parker  (1902),  1.59  Ind.  571, 
65  N.  E.  747,  where  one  contracted  with 
a  township  to  build  a  school  house  and 
gave  a  bond  conditioned  that  he  woiihi 
provide  the  labor  and  material  at  his  own 
cost,  and  that  the  township  should  not  be 


THE    KEAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST    TO    BE    THE    I'LAINTIFF. 


107 


some  examples  and    illustrations   of   this   rule:    Where  a  part- 
nership  assigns    its   assets,    and,    in   consideration    thereof,   the 


answerable  therefor,  it  was  held  that  this 
was  not  a  covenant  for  tlie  benefit  of  the 
luaterialmeu.  See  also  Reynolds  v.  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  H.  Co.  (1895),  143  Ind.  579, 
40  N.  E.  410.  So  in  Parker  v.  Jeffery 
(supra)  a  coveaaut  by  the  contractor  to 
pay  all  sums  of  money  due  for  material 
and  labor,  was  held  not  to  be  a  covenant 
for  the  benefit  of  the  laborers  and  material- 
men. Same  holding  in  Brcjwer  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Miller  {sujun),  and  in  Jefferson  v. 
Asch  {snpra).  See  also  Fidelity  &  Deposit 
Co.  V.  Parkinson  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94 
N.  W.  120. 

In  State  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1894), 
125  Mo.  596,  28  S.  W.  1074,  it  was  held 
that  where  a  railroad  company  covenants 
to  pay  the  debts  of  another  company,  the 
creditors  of  the  latter  may  sue  on  the 
covenant,  but  where  the  agreement  is 
merely  to  "  save  harmless  "  another  against 
the  claims  of  third  persons,  the  latter  can- 
not sue  on  the  agreement,  as  it  is  not 
made  for  their  benefit. 

The  Iowa  cases  on  this  point  are  based 
upon  a  statute,  and  hence  are  not  of  gen- 
eral authority.  See  (jreeu  Bay  Lumber 
Co.  V.  School  Dist.  (1902),  —  la.  — ,; 
90  N  W.  504,  citing  the  earlier  Iowa 
decisions. 

Upon  the  question  whether  privity  be- 
tween the  promisee  and  a  third  person,  or 
some  duty  or  obligation  owing  from  the 
former  to  the  latter,  is  necessary  to  support 
an  action  by  such  third  person,  there  is 
wide  divergence  of  judicial  opinion.  The 
New  York  cases  have  continued  to  adhere 
to  Vrooman  r.  Turner.  See  Townsend  v. 
Rackham  (1894),  143  N.  Y.  516,  38  N.  E. 
731.  In  the  more  recent  case  of  Bu- 
chanan V.  Tilden  (1899),  158  N.  Y.  109,  52 
N.  E.  724,  the  duty  owing  from  the  prom- 
isee to  the  third  person  was  largely  a 
moral  one,  but  was  held  sufficient.  The 
promise  was  made  to  a  husband  by  another 
for  the  benefit  of  his  wife,  and  this  rela- 
tion, taken  in  connection  with  the  peculiar 
equities  of  the  case,  was  held  to  he  a  suf- 
ficient consideration  to  support  a  promise 
in  favor  of  his  wife.  The  court  is  careful 
to  state  that  the  case  is  decided  upon  its 
peculiar  facts.  i 


The  New  York  doctrine  is  followed  in 
Jefferson  v.  Asch  (1893),  53  Minn.  446,55 
N.  VV.  604;  Union  Storage  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Dermott  (1893),  .53  Minn.  407,  55  N.  W. 
606 ;  School  District  ex  rel.  v.  Livers 
(1899),  147  Mo.  580,49  S.  W.  507;  Mc- 
Donald V.  American  Nat.  Bank  (1901),  25 
Mont.  456,  65  Pac.  896.  In  Howsmon  v. 
Trenton  Water  Co.  (1893),  119   Mo.  304, 

24  S.  W.  784,  and  Kansas  City  Sewer 
Pipe  Co.  y.Thomp.son  (1893),  120  Mo.  218, 

25  S.  W.  522,  the  court  held  that  inasmuch 
as  there  was  no  liability  of  the  promisee 
to  the  third  person,  no  recovery  could  be 
had  against  the  promisor. 

In  the  following  cases  the  promisee 
was  under  contractual  obligation  to  the 
third  party,  and  the  promisor,  for  a  con- 
sideration, assumed  the  debt.  In  each 
case  a  recovery  was  allowed.  Barnett  v. 
Pratt  (1893),  37  Neb.  349,  55  N.  W.  1050  ; 
Lovejoy  v.  Howe  (1893),  55  Minn.  353,  57 
N.  W.  57;  Meyer  v.  Shamp  (1897),  51 
Neb.  424,  71  N.  W.  57  ;  Porter  v.  Woods 
(1896),  138  Mo.  .539,  39  S.  W.  794  ;  Maxcy 
V.  New   Hampshire  Fire  Ins.  Co.   (1893), 

54  Minn.  272,  55  N.  W.  1130;  Barnes  v. 
Hekla  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1893),  56  Minn  38, 
57  N.  W.  314;  Dickinson  Co.  v.  Fitter- 
ling  (1898),  72  Minn.  483,  75  N.  W.  731  ; 
Feidman  v.  McGuire  (1899),  34   Ore.  309, 

55  Pac.  872;  Hawley  v.  Bank  (1896),  97 
la.  187.  66  N.  W:  152. 

In  a  number  of  States,  however,  the 
limitations  of  the  New  York  doctrine  have 
been  abandoned,  and  neither  privity  nor 
duty,  as  between  the  promisee  and  the 
third  person  is  required  to  support  a  suit 
by  the  latter.  Thus  in  Ferris  v.  Am. 
Brewing  Co.  (1900),  155  Ind.  539,  58 
N.  E.  701,  a  lease  was  executed  by  a  lessee 
whereby  he  covenanted  to  sell  no  beer 
upon  the  leased  premises  except  that 
manufactured  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the 
plaintiff  was  allowed  to  enforce  this  cove- 
nant by  injunction  against  the  lessee. 

As  stated  in  the  text,  one  of  the  most 
striking  instances  of  the  application  of 
this  liberal  view  appears  in  the  case  of  the 
assumption,  on  the  part  of  a  grantee  of 
land,  of  a  mortgage  debt.  It  is  held  in  a 
number  of  States  that  an  action  will  lie 


108 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


purchaser   agrees  with  the  members   to  pay  all  the  firm  debts, 
any  creditor  of  the  partnership  may  sue  him  upon  this  under- 


under  such  circumstances  liy  the  mort- 
gagee against  the  grautee,  even  though 
the  in)niediate  grantor  is  not  personally 
liable  therefor.  Hare  v.  Murphy  (1895), 
45  Neb.  809,  64  N.  W.  211  ;  McKay  i\ 
Ward  (1899),  20  Utah,  149,  57  Pac.  1024; 
Euos  V.  Sanger  (1897),  96  Wis.  150,  70 
N.  W.  1069.  In  Hicks  v.  Hamilton  (1898), 
144  Mo.  495,  46  S.  W.  432,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri  held  that  such  an  action 
could  not  be  maintained  by  the  mortgagee, 
in  the  absence  of  a  liability  on  the  part  of 
the  immediate  grantor.  But  two  years 
later,  in  Crone  v.  Stinde  (1900),  156  Mo. 
262,  55  S.  W.  863,  the  Hicks  case  was  ex- 
pressly overruled,  and  it  was  held  that  the 
liability  of  the  grantor  for  the  debt  was 
not  a  condition  precedent  to  the  right  of 
the  mortgagee  to  sue  the  grantee.  In 
Starbird  v.  Cranston  (1897),  24  Colo.  20, 
48  Pac.  650,  the  mortgagee  was  allowed 
to  sue  the  grantee,  but  it  does  not  appear 
whether  or  not  the  grantor  was  liable  for 
the  debt.  i)u  the  contrary,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Minnesota,  in  Brown  v.  Stillman, 
43  .Minn.  126,  45  N.  W.  2,  has  refused  to 
allow  such  an  action  except  where  tlie 
grantor  was  liable. 

An  action  by  the  mortgagee  against 
the  grantee,  at  least  under  the  rule  of 
Brown  v.  Stillmau  {supra),  is  expressly 
provided  for  by  statute  in  Connecticut. 
Gen.  St.  1902,  §  587. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin 
seems  to  have  gone  to  the  extreme  limit 
of  liberality  in  permitting  third  parties  to 
sue,  as  appears  in  two  very  recent  cases. 
In  Ktsclieid  v.  liaker  (1901),  112  Wis.  129, 
83  N.  W.  52,  the  parents  of  defendant's 
wife  conveyed  a  farm  to  iiim  for  a  recited 
consideration  of  -$5,000,  and  lie  gave  back 
a  mortgage  securing  a  bond  running  to 
them  in  tliat  amount,  conditioned  on  his 
paying  to  them  .§4,000,  in  designateil  in- 
stalments, and  the  remaining  Si, 000  to 
their  daughter  fdefendant's  sister-in-law) 
within  on«*  year  after  the  decease  of  both 
of  the  obligees.  Tiie  daughter's  adminis- 
tratijf  brougiit  an  action  on  the  b(jnd  more 
than  a  year  after  the  decea.se  of  both  the 
parents,  and  was  allowed  to  recover,  al- 
tbougii    the   last    surviving    obligee    had 


executed  a  receipt  in  full  satisfaction  of 
the  mortgage  and  l>ond,  and  had  dis- 
charged the  mortgage  of  record,  the 
court  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  daughter  had  known  of  the  provision 
of  the  bond  and  liad  assented  thereto.  lu 
Tweeddale  v.  Tweeddale  (1903),  —  Wi.s. 
— ,  93  N.  W.  440,  the  court  went  still 
farther.  The  facts  in  this  case,  so  far  as 
they  concern  tliis  question,  were  almost 
identical  with  those  in  Etscheid  r.  Baker, 
except  that  the  beneficiary,  who  was  the 
brother  of  the  defendant,  knew  nothing 
about  the  provision  for  his  benefit  until 
after  the  discharge  of  the  mortgage  by 
his  mother,  who  was  the  mortgagee  and 
obligee  of  the  bond.  But  the  court  held 
that  this  made  no  difference,  and  said : 
"  Without  further  discussion  of  the  matter 
we  adhere  to  the  doctrine  that  where  one 
person,  for  a  consideration  moving  to  him 
from  another,  promises  to  pay  to  a  third 
person  a  sum  of  money,  the  law  immedi- 
ately operates  upon  the  acts  of  the  parties, 
establishing  the  essential  of  privity  be- 
tween the  promisor  and  the  third  person 
requisite  to  binding  contractual  relations 
between  them,  resulting  in  the  immediate 
establishment  of  a  new  relation  of  debtor 
and  creditor,  regardless  of  the  relations  of 
the  third  person  to  the  immediate  prom- 
isee in  the  transaction  ;  that  the  liability 
is  as  binding  between  the  promisor  and  the 
third  person  as  it  would  be  if  the  considera- 
tion for  the  promise  moved  from  the  latter 
to  the  former,  and  such  promisor  made 
the  promise  directly  to  the  third  person, 
regardless  of  whether  the  latter  has  any 
knowledge  of  the  transaction  at  tiie  time 
of  its  occurrence ;  that  the  liability  being 
once  created  by  the  acts  of  the  immediate 
parties  to  the  transaction  and  the  opera- 
tion of  the  law  thereon,  neither  one  nor 
both  of  sucli  parties  can  thereafter  change 
the  situation  as  reg.ards  tiie  third  person 
without  his  consent." 

It  is  true  that  three  months  prior  to 
the  decision  in  the  Tweeddale  case,  the 
same  court,  in  Rowe  v.  Moon  (1902),  115 
Wis.  566,  92  N.  W.  263,  in  refusing  to 
accept  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  New  York 
case  of  V'rooman  r.  Turner,  stated  that,  to 


THE    REAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST    TO    BE   THE    PLAINTIFF. 


109 


taking,  and  recover  the  amount  of  the  indebtedness  due  to  the 
phiintiff  thus  suing, ^  and  may  even  sue  him  and  the  sureties  wlio 
united  with  him  in  his  undertaking  to  the  assigning  parties  ;2 
and  where  man}'  subscribers  contributed  different  sums  of  money 
to  the  defendant  for  a  specified  purpose,  and  he  entered  into 
a  written  contract  with  three  persons,  whereby,  among  other 
things,  he  promised  to  repay  the  sums  so  loaned,  it  was  held 
that  any  subscriber  might  sue  on  the  agreement  to  recover  the 
amount  which  he  advanced,^  and  where  B.  placed  a  sum  of 
money  in  the  hands  of  A.,  which  the  latter  promised  to  pay  over 
to  C,  C.  may  prosecute  an  action  against  A.  on  his  promise.^ 
Where  the  defendant  was  indebted  to  B.,  who  was  in  turn 
indebted  to  C.  in  a  less  amount,  and  the  two  former  parties 
agreed  that  defendant  should  pay  to  C.  the  amount  of  the  latter's 
demand,  which  should  be  2Jro  tanto  a  payment  on  his  own  debt  to 
B.,  C  was  permitted  to  recover  on  this  promise.^  If  in  a  policy 
of  insurance  it  is  stipulated  that  the  loss,  if  any,  shall  be  paid  to 


«nable  a  third  person  to  enforce  a  con- 
tract, there  must  be  both  "an  intent  on 
the  part  of  the  promisor  [should  read 
promisee]  to  benefit  him,  and  some  duty 
or  obligation  to  carry  out  such  promise." 
If  tliis  means  an  obligation  other  than 
that  arising  from  the  promise  itself,  it  is 
inconsistent  with  the  later  case  of  Tweed- 
dale  V.  Tweeddale,  and  must  be  deemed 
overruled  by  the  latter. 

Utah,  also,  seems  committed  to  this 
liberal  doctrine.  In  Brown  v.  Markland 
(1898),  16  Utah,  360,  52  Pac.  597,  the 
■court  said ;  "  Where  a  promise  or  con- 
tract has  been  made  between  two  parties 
for  the  benefit  of  a  third,  an  action  will 
lie  thereon  at  the  instance  and  in  the 
name  of  the  party  to  be  benefited,  although 
the  promise  or  contract  was  made  without 
his  knowledge,  and  without  any  considera- 
tion moving  from  him." 

Kentucky,  also,  has  approved  a  liberal 
interpretation  of  the  statute.  In  Blakeley 
V.  Adams  (1902),  —  Ky.  — ,  68  S.  W.  39.3, 
it  was  held  that  a  deed  conveying  land, 
which  provides  that  a  certain  surety  of  the 
grantee  shall  have  a  lien  on  the  land  to 
indemnify  him,  creates  a  lien  in  favor  of 
the  surety,  which  may  be  enforced  by 
him,  though  he  is  a  stranger  to  the  deed. 
This  is  a  curious  case,  and  it  does  not 


clearly  appear  how  the  doctrine  of  an 
action  by  a  third  party  applies.  But  tlie 
court  considered  it  and  decided  it  on  that 
basis,  and  in  the  course  of  the  opinion 
said:  "The  generally  recognized  doctrine 
in  American  courts  is  that  a  tliird  party, 
for  whose  benefit  a  contract  was  made 
between  others,  may  maintain  an  action 
on  the  contract  against  the  promisor. 
And  in  no  State  has  this  doctrine  been 
carried  farther  than  in   Kentucky." 

The  rule  stated  in  the  Tweeddale  ca.se 
{supra),  is  provided  against  by  statute  in 
some  States.  See  McArthur  v.  Drydea 
(1897),  6  N.  D.  438,  71  N.  W.  125,  w'hich 
construes  the  statute  of  that  State,  Kev. 
Codes,  §  3840,  declaring  that  "  a  contract 
made  expressly  for  the  l)enefit  of  a  third 
person  may  be  enforced  liy  him  at  any  time 
before  the  parties  thereto  rescind  it.''] 

'  Sanders  v.  Clason,  13  Minn.  379 ; 
Meyer  v.  Lowell,  44  Mo.  328,  and  cases 
cited;  Barlow  i;.  Myers,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
183;  64  N    Y.  41. 

-  Kimball  v.  Noyes,  17  Wis.  695  ;  Devol 
V.  Mcintosh,  23  Ind.  525  ;  Claflin  v.  Os- 
trom,  54  N.  Y.  581,  584. 

■^  Kice  V.  Savery,  22  Iowa,  470,  477. 
Dillon  J.  speaks  of  the  rule  as  well  settled. 

^   Allen  r.  Thomas,  3  Mete.  (Ky  )  198. 

s  Wiggins  V.  McDonald,  18  Cal.  126. 


110  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

a  person  named,  not  the  assured,  such  person  may  sue  in  his  own 
name  on  the  policy.^  B.  sold  and  delivered  goods  to  A.,  and  in 
consideration  thereof  A.  promised  to  pay  a  certain  sum  to  C, 
which  was,  in  fact,  the  amount  of  a  debt  due  from  B.  to  C. ;  it 
was  lield  that  C.  could  recover  upon  the  promise  so  made  by  A. 
in  his  behalf. 2  Perhaps  the  most  striking  illustration  of  this 
doctrine,  and  of  the  extent  to  which  it  has  been  carried,  is  found 
in  a  class  of  cases  where,  upon  a  conveyance  of  land,  the  grantee 
assumes  and  promises  to  pay  a  debt  which  is  secured  by  mortgage 
on  the  land  so  conveyed.  If  the  grantee  of  land  encumbered  by 
a  mortgage  assumes  the  mortgage  debt  by  a  clause  in  his  deed, 
and  promises  to  pay  the  same,  the  creditor-mortgagee  may  main- 
tain an  action  against  this  grantee  upon  the  bond  or  other  evi- 
dence of  the  indebtedness,  and  recover  the  amount  thereof,  and 
is  not  restricted  to  the  remedy  by  foreclosure  of  the  mortgage ;  ^ 
and  the  creditor  may  thus  sue  the  grantee  upon  the  bond,  even 
though  that  instrument  had  expressly  provided  that  the  mort- 
gagee should  first  have  recourse  on  the  land,  and  the  obligor 
should  only  be  liable  for  the  deficiency  which  might  arise  after 
the  foreclosure;  this  stipulation,  it  was  held,  protected  the 
obligor  personally,  and  could  not  })e  taken  advantage  of  by  the 
grantee  who  had  promised  to  pay  the  debt.*  The  result  of  these 
and  other  decisions  is,  that  the  third  person,  for  whose  benefit  an 
undertaking  is  entered  into  between  other  parties,  may  sue  upon 
it,  although  such  undertaking  is  an  instrument  in  writing  and 
under  seal.^     This  doctrine  is  plainly  a  departure  from  the  tech- 

1  Cone  V.  Niagara  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  3  N.  Y.     see  Sacramento  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wagner, 
Sup.  Ct.  33,  39,  60  N.  Y.  G19   (lo.s.s  made     67  Cal.  293. 

payable  to  an  encumbrancer  of  the  jirop-  ^  Lawrence  v.  Fox,  20  N.  Y.  268  ;  Burr 

erty  in.sured  ;  encumbrancer  can  sue  alone,  v.  Beers,  24  N.  Y.  178;  Brewer  v.  Maurer, 

even  thougli  his  debt  lias  been  fully  paid,  38  Ohio  St.  550;  Pope  r.  Porter,  33  Fed. 

so  tliat  he  will  hold  the  amouut  recovered  Rep.  7  ;  Stevens  r.  F]anna_u;an  (Ind.  1892), 

as  a  tru.-<tee  for  the  owner ;  to  the  same  30  N.  E.  898  ;  and   see   the   subject   fully 

effect,  Bartlett  v.  Iowa  State  Ins.  Co.,  77  discussed   in  3  Pom.   Eq.  Jur.,   §§  1206- 

lowa,   80;    Newman    v.    Sjtringfield    Ins.  1208,  and  notes.     [See  also  note  1,  p.  106, 

Co.,    17    Minn.    123,    126;     (^Phccnix    Ins.  su/irn.] 

Co.  V.  Omaha  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  (1894),  *  Thorp  v.  Keokuk  Coal  Co.,  48  N.  Y. 

41   Neb.  834,  60  N.  W.  1.33.     On  the  con-  2.53. 

trary,  in   Williamson  v.  Michiiran  Fire  &  ''  Coster  v.  Mayor  of  Albany,  43  N.  Y. 

Marine  Ins.  Co.  (1893),  86  Wis.  393,  57  399,411;  Van  Schaick  r.  Third  Avenue 

N.  W.  46,  it  was  held  that  the  action  must  R.  R.,  38  N.  Y.  346  ;  Ricard  v.  Sanderson, 

be  broujjht  in   the  name  of   the  assured,  41  N.  Y.  179;   Lawrence  i'.  Fox,  20  N.  Y. 

though  the  mortgagee,  to  whom  the  loss  268;  Burr  r.  Beers,  24  N.  Y.  178;  Thorp 

was  payable,  might  be  joined.]  v.  Keokuk  Coal  Co.,  48  N.  Y.  253  ;    Kim- 

2  Hall    (•.    Roberts,  61    Barb.   33;   and  ball   v.    Noyes,    17    Wis.    695;    Devol    v. 


THE   KEAL    PARTY   IN    INTEREST   TO    BE    THE    PLAINTIFF. 


Ill 


nical  notions  of  the  common  law,  which  did  not  permit  a  person 
to  sue  upon  a  contract  unless  he  was  a  party  to  it,  or  unless  the 
consideration  moved  from  him,  and  wliicli  especially  forbade  an 
action  upon  a  sealed  undertaking  by  a  stranger.  The  courts  of 
some  States  adhere  strictly  to  this  old  notion,  and  utterly  repu- 
diate the  innovation.^  The  new  rule,  however,  is  as  convenient 
as  it  is  just.  The  objections  to  it  are  every  way  technical  and 
arbitrary,  —  a  repetition  of  verbal  formulas  without  any  convinc- 
ing reasons.  It  certainly  avoids  a  circuity  of  actions,  and  it 
enables  the  only  person  beneficially  interested  in  the  promise  — 
the  real  party  in  interest  —  to  come  into  court  in  the  first  instance 
and  establish  his  rights,  without  being  driven  to  enforce  them  in 
a  roundabout  manner  through  the  intervention  of  a  third  person, 
who,  if  successful,  must  account  to  him  for  the  proceeds  of  the 
litigation.  The  true  extent  and  application  of  the  doctrine,  and 
the  proper  limitations  upon  it,  have  been  discussed  and  fixed  by 
the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  in  very  recent  cases. ^ 


Mclntoph,  23  Ind.  529 ;  Barker  v.  Brad- 
ley, 42  N.  Y.  316,  319;  Secor  v.  Lord,  3 
Keyes,  525;  Claflin  v.  Ostrom,  54  N.  Y. 
581,  584;  Glen  v.  Hope  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co., 
56  N.  Y.  379,  381  ;  McDowell  v.  Law,  35 
Wis.  171.  The  principle  applies  to  con- 
tracts nnder  seal :  Em  mitt  u.  Brophy,  42 
Ohio  St.  82  ;  co)itra,  Woodbury  Sav.  Bk. 
V.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co.,  29  Conn.  374. 

1  Exchange  Bank  v.  Rice,  107  Mass. 
37,  per  Gray  J. 

2  Garnsey  v.  Rogers,  47  N.  Y.  233,  240, 
per  Kapallo  J. ;  Merrill  v.  Green,  55  N.  Y. 
270,  273;  Turk  v.  Ridge,  41  N.  Y.  201, 
206.  See  also  Hinman  v.  Bowen,  5  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  234,  which  holds  that  a  defence, 
good  as  against  the  immediate  promisee, 
is  also  available  against  the  beneficiary, 
(s.  c.  3  Hun,  192.)  Phillips  v.  Van  Schaick, 
37  Iowa,  229.  See  also  Green  v.  Richard- 
son, 4  Colo.  584 ;  McKinnon  v.  McKinnon, 
81  N.  C.  201 ;  Cone  v.  Niagara  Ins.  Co., 
60  N.  Y.  619;  Barlow  v.  Meyers,  64  id. 
41  ;  Arnold  v.  Nichols,  64  id.  117  ;  Simson 
V.  Brown,  68  id.  355 ;  Lake  Ontario  Shore 
R.  Co.  V.  Curtiss,  80  id.  219;  Dunning  v. 
Leavitt,  85  id.  301 ;  Root  v.  Wright,  84 
id.  72,  74,  75  ;  Pardee  r.  Treat,  82  id.  385  ; 
Vroomau  r.  Turner,  69  id.  280;  Rowe  v. 
Parsons,  6  Hun,  338;  Bean  v.  Edge,  84 
N.  Y.  514;  Todd  v.  Weber,  95  N.  Y.  181, 


194;  Wheat  v.  Rice,  97  N.  Y.  296;  Sew- 
ard V.  Huntington,  94  N.  Y.  116;  Litch- 
field V.  Flint,  104  N.  Y.  543  ;  Vilas  v.  Page, 
106  N.  Y.  439;  Berry  v.  Brown,  107  N.  Y. 
659;  St.  Mark's  Church  v.  Teed,  120 
N.  Y.  583;  Lorillard  v.  Clyde,  122  N.  Y. 
498.  The  principal  limitations  upon  the 
doctrine,  as  determined  by  the  New  York 
cases,  may  be  stated  as  follows.  In  order 
that  the  third  person  may  sue  upon  the 
promise,  it  must  be  designed  to  be  pri- 
marily for  his  benefit,  and  not  primarily 
for  the  exoneration  of  the  promisee.  Ar- 
nold V.  Nichols,  64  N.  Y.  117.  There  must 
have  been  some  obligation  or  duty  owing 
from  the  promisee  to  the  third  person 
which  would  give  the  third  per.son  a  legal 
or  equitable  claim  to  the  benefit  of  the 
promise,  or  an  equivalent  from  him  per- 
sonally ;  a  mere  stranger  to  the  contract 
cannot  sue.  Simpson  v.  Brown,  68  N.  Y. 
355 ;  Vroomau  v.  Turner,  69  N.  Y.  280 ; 
Litchfield  v.  Flint,  104  N.  Y.  543;  Loril- 
lard V.  Clyde,  122  N.  Y.  498;  Pulver  i: 
Skinner,  42  Hun,  322 ;  Duruherr  v.  Rau 
(N.  Y.),  32  N.  E.  491.  While  it  is  im- 
material whether  or  not  the  third  person 
is  designated  by  name  (Simson  i'.  Brown, 
68  N.  Y.  355),  it  is  necessary  that  he  be 
so  indicated  tliat  he  may  be  ascertained. 
Wlieat   ;-.  Rice,   97    N.   Y.    296    (creditors 


112 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  78.  *140.  Commercial  Paper.  Action  by  Legal  Promisee. 
Upon  the  same  principle,  the  equitoble  owner  of  a  promissory 
note  is  the  real  party  in  interest  within  the  statute,  and  is  the 
proper  person  to  sue  upon  it,  although  there  may  be  no  indorse- 
ment, and  possession  of  tlie  instrument  is  prima  facie  evidence  of 


of  a  firm  have  no  legal  interest  in  a  con- 
tract with  the  firm  hv  which  the  promisor 
agrees  to  pay  a  specified  portion  of  the 
firm's  debts,  as  it  rests  entirely  with  the 
promisor  to  designate  what  creditors  shall 
have  the  benefit  of  the  promise) ;  see  also 
Edick  V.  Green,  38  Hun,  202;  Weller  v- 
Goble,  66  Iowa,  113.  Some  acceptance  of 
the  promise  by  the  creditor,  by  word  or 
act,  must  be  shown.  Wlieat  v.  Kice,  97 
N.  Y.  296.  On  the  other  liand,  the  rule 
as  stated  in  more  general  terms  seems 
to  be  recognized  in  Todd  u:  Weber,  95 
N.  Y.  181  (the  j)romise  of  the  father  of 
a  bastard  child,  made  to  certain  persons, 
ou  consideration  that  these  persons  pro- 
vide for  tlie  child's  education  and  support, 
to  "  make  it  up  to  them  "  in  his  will,  may 
be  sued  upon  by  the  child,  as  being  the 
party  beneficially  interested).  See  also 
vSt.  Mark's  Church  v.  Teed,  120  N.  Y.  583. 
Tlie  question  of  the  acceptance  of  the 
promise  by  C,  the  third  person,  has  been 
much  discussed  iu  Indiana.  Until  accepted 
by  C,  the  contract  may,  of  course,  be  re- 
scinded by  A.  and  B.  Davis  ?;.  Calloway, 
30  Ind.  112.  But  where  the  obligation  or 
sum  is  specific,  and  is  due  at  a  known  or 
certain  time,  a  demand  by  C.  is  not  neces- 
sary before  suit.  Rodenbarger  r.  Bram- 
blett,  78  Ind.  213;  distinguishing  Durham 
V.  Bischof,  47  Ind.  211  (wliere  A.  had  made 
no  absolute  and  specific  promise,  being 
assignee  of  a  stock  of  goods  under  an 
agreement  "to  compromise  or  otherwise 
to  settle  all  debts  owing  by  the  assignors," 
it  is  manifestly  just  and  proper  tliat  a  ile- 
niand  by  C.,  a  creditor,  should  be  required 
before  suit).  Bringing  the  action  by  C. 
is  usually  sufficient  evidence  of  his  ac- 
ceptance of  the  contract ;  no  averment 
of  acceptance  is  necessary.  Carnahau  i'. 
Tousey,  93  Ind.  561,  Elliott  J.  dis.senting; 
Kisk  V.  Hoffman,  69  Ind.  137.  Many  ca.ses, 
in  addition  to  those  cite<l  from  New  York, 
bold  tiiat  the  promise  must  have  been  in- 
tended to  be  primarily  for  C.'s  benefit,  in 
enter  that  he  may  sue  ui)on  it.     See  Dun- 


dee Mortgage,  etc.  ('o.  i\  Hughes,  20  Fed. 
Hep.  39;  Burton  v.  Larkin,  36  Ivans.  246; 
Johnson  r.  Bamberger  (Ark.  1892),  19 
S.  W.  920  (agreement  among  creditors 
not  to  sue  debtor  without  concurrence  of 
a  majority  of  the  creditors  is  not  intended 
for  his  benefit) ;  Civil  Code  of  California, 
§  1559;  Chung  Kee  v.  Davidson,  73  Cal. 
522 :  "  It  must  appear  from  the  direct 
terms  of  the  contract  that  it  was  made 
for  the  benefit  of  third  parties.  It  can- 
not be  implied  from  the  fact  that  the 
contract  would,  if  carried  out  between 
the  parties  to  it,  operate  incidentally  to 
their  benefit."  P'or  further  ilhistratious, 
see  Waltz  v.  Waltz,  84  Ind.  403  (contract 
for  benefit  of  promisee's  heirs)  ;  Western 
Development  Co.  v.  Emery,  61  Cal.  611 
(contract  of  subscrijjtion)  ;  Baker  v. 
Bryan,  64  Iowa,  561  ;  Jordan  v.  Kava- 
naugh,  63  Iowa,  152.  Promisor  assumes 
promisee's  debts,  and  creditors  of  the  lat- 
ter sue.  Stariha  v.  Greenwood,  28  Minn. 
521  ;  Ellis  v.  Harrison,  104  Mo.  270; 
Knott  V.  Dubuque  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.  (Iowa, 
1892),  51  N.  W.  57;  compare  Anderson 
V.  P'itzgerald,  21  Fed.  Rep.  294.  Persons 
whose  property  iu  a  city  was  destroyed 
by  fire  were  allowed  to  sue  a  water  com- 
j)any  for  breach  of  its  contract  to  supply 
the  city  with  water,  in  Paducah  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Paducah  Water  Supply  Co.,  89  Ky. 
340 ;  contra,  Davis  v.  Clinton  Water  Works, 
54  Iowa,  59 ;  Ferris  v.  Carson  Water  Co , 
16  Nev.  44  ;  s.  c.  40  Am.  Rep.  485.  The 
principle  under  discussion  was  stated 
without  any  limitation  in  Hecht  i\  Caugh- 
ron,  46  Ark.  132  ;  Chamblee  v.  McKenzie, 
31  Ark.  155;  Talbot  v.  Wilkins,  31  Ark. 
411;  Green  r.  Morrison,  5  Colo.  1 8  ;  Lehow 
r.  Simonton,  3  Colo.  346;  Dodge's  Adm. 
r.  Muss,  82  Ky.  441  ;  Kaufman  v.  U.  S. 
Nat.  Bk.,  31  Neb.  661  ;  Shainp  v.  Meyer, 
20  Neb.  223;  Miliani  v.  Tognini,  19  Nev. 
133;  Schneider  r.  White,  12  Or.  503;  B.as- 
.sett  i:  Hughe.s,  43  Wis.  319.  [See  note  1, 
J).  106,  supra.] 


THE    EEAL   PARTY    IN    INTEREST   TO   BE    THE    PLAINTIFF.         113 

such  ownership.^  In  fact,  wherever  the  spirit  of  the  reformed 
system  is  carried  out,  —  and  tliis  is  now  very  generally,  if  not 
universally,  the  case,  —  the  equity  rule  as  to  parties  is  freely 
applied  to  all  legal  actions,  and  this  one  principle  will  easily 
solve  aU  particular  cases  of  difficulty  or  doubt.^  But,  as  has 
been  shown  in  preceding  paragraphs,  the  law  as  to  commercial 
paper  has  not  been  changed  in  several  of  the  States  by  this  pro- 
vision of  the  statute  in  reference  to  the  parties  plaintiff  ;  and  in 
those  States,  therefore,  the  indorsee,  and,  a  fortiori,  the  payee  of 
a  negotiable  note  or  bill  may  maintain  an  action  upon  it,  even 
though  there  may  be  relations  between  himself  and  third  persons 
which  give  them  a  right  of  action  over  against  him  for  the  pro- 
ceeds. As,  for  example,  if  A.,  having  in  his  hands  money  be- 
longing to  B.,  should  loan  it,  and  take  a  note  from  the  borrower 
payable  to  himself,  he  could  sue  upon  it ;  however  much  B.  might 
have  been  interested  in  the  original  money,  and  however  valid  a 
demand  he  may  have  against  A.,  he  is  not  a  party  to  the  note  nor 
the  holder  of  it.^  In  the  class  of  cases  already  mentioned,  where 
an  express  contract  is  made  with  one  for  the  benefit  of  another, 
and  the  person  thus  beneficially  interested  is  permitted  to  sue  in 
his  own  name,  the  one  to  whom  the  promise  was  expressly  given 
may,  in  general,  also  maintain  an  action.^  The  promise  being 
actually  made  to  him,  and  the  consideration  moving  from  him,  he 
is  legally/  the  contracting  party,  and  is  clothed  with  the  legal 
right;  indeed,  he  falls  under  the  definition  of  trustee  of  an  ex- 
press trust  given  in  another  section  of  the  codes.^ 

1  Garner  ?■.  Cook,  30  Ind.  331 ;  Comp-  against  the  purcliaser  for  the  value  of  the 

ton  r.  Davidson,  31  Ind.  62.     In  the  latter  property.] 

case,  the  answer  denied  that  the  plaintiff  ^  See    Kice   v.    Savery,  22   lovt^a,  470, 

was   "the   legal   owner   of    the   note   in  477;  Cottle  i'.  Cole,  20  Iowa, 481,485.    In 

suit."     This   was  held  no  defence,   as  it  the  former  of  these  cases  Dillon  J.  said : 

was   sufficient    if    he   was    the    equitable  "  If  the  promise  is  made  for  the  benefit  of 

owner.  another,  who  is  the  real  jiarty  in  interest, 

'^  Conyngham  v.  Smith,  IG  Iowa,  471  ;  the  latter  may  sue,   though   the  contract 

Tate  y.  Ohio  &  Miss.  K.  Co.,  10  Ind.  174;  was   made   to   an   agent    or   trustee;    or 

Swift  V.  Ellsworth,  10  Ind.  20.5.  the  agent  or  trustee,  or  person  in  whose 

8  Robbins  v.  Cheek,  32  Ind.  328 ;  Rob-  name  a  contract  is    made    for  the    beue- 

bins  V.  Dishon,  19  Ind.  20.5.  fit  of  another,  may  sue  without  joining  the 

*  fHeld  in  Dorr  Cattle  Co.  v.  Jewett  party  for  wliose  benefit  the  suit  is  prose- 
<1902),  116  la.  93,  89  N.  W.  109,  that  one  cuted."  This  subject  is  treated  at  large 
who  sells  property  to  another  under  an  in  a  subsequent  section.  See  also  Tinkler 
ngreement  that  its  value  shall  be  credited  v.  Swaynie,  71  Ind.  .562  ;  Ward  v.  Cow- 
on  the  note  of  a  third  person,  may,  drey,  5  N.  Y.  S.  282,  affirmed  119  N.  Y. 
on  failure  of  the  purcliaser  to  make  614;  and  Albere  r.  Kingsland,  13  N.  Y.  S. 
the  credit  as  agreed,  maintain  an  action  794;  Lev  v.  Miller,  28  Neb.  822. 


114  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

^  79.  *  141.  Instances  of  Real  Party  in  Interest.  Actions  on 
Bonds.  Actions  by  Principals  and  Agents,  etc.  The  following  are 
additional  examples  of  actions  maintained  by  the  real  party  in 
interest,  and  in  which  the  equity  doctrine  on  this  subject  has 
been  freely  applied,  although  the  rights  to  be  protected  and  the 
remedies  to  be  obtained  ■were  legal.  After  a  judgment  had  been 
obtiiined  in  an  action  of  ejectment  prosecuted  according  to  the 
old  form  b}-  John  Doe  as  the  fictitious  plaintiff,  the  succeeding 
action  to  recover  the  mesne  profits  of  the  land  should  be  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  actual  owner  of  the  fee,  —  the  lessors  of  the 
plaintiff  in  the  ejectment,  —  they  being  the  real  parties  in  interest.^ 
An  undertaking  given  to  the  sheriff  by  the  defendant  in  an  action 
for  the  recovery  of  chattels,  in  order  to  procure  a  return  of  the 
goods,  should  be  prosecuted  by  the  plaintiff  in  that  action,  since 
he  is  the  real  party  in  interest  ;2  and  it  is  said  to  be  a  general 
rule  in  Iowa  that  when  a  bond  or  undertaking  is-  given  to  an 
ofl&cer,  in  the  course  of  some  judicial  proceeding,  for  the  security 
of  any  particular  person,  such  person  may  sue  upon  it  in  his  own 
name  without  the  formality  of  an  assignment.^  If  a  levy  by  virtue 
of  an  execution  is  made  upon  chattels  by  a  deputy  sheriff,  and  the 
goods  are  wrongfully  taken  from  his  possession,  an  action  against 
the  wrong-doer  should  be  brought  by  the  sheriff ;  he  is  the  real 
party  in  interest,  since  the  deputy  sheriff  acted  simply  as  his 
agent.'*  An  injunction  bond  having  been  given  to  two  obligees, 
defendants  in  the  action,  one  of  thera  only  w^as  injuriously  affected 
by  the  injunction  and  suffered  any  damage  therefrom ;  he  alone, 
it  was  held,  could  maintain  an  action  on  the  undertaking,  as  he 
was  the  only  party  in  interest,  and  a  suit  in  the  names  of  both 
united  as  plaintiffs  was  declared  to  be  improperly  brought  under 
the  code.^     A  plaintiff  in  a  pending  suit  having  moved  for  the 

1  Mastertoii  v.  Hagan,  17  B.  Mon.  325.  3  Moormiui  r.  Collier,  32  Iowa,  138. 

It  must  be  understood  that  tlie  new  sys-  *  Terwilliger  *•.  Wheeler,  35  Barb.  620. 

tern  had  gone  into  effect  after  the  com-  ^  Siunniers  c.  Parish,  10  Cal.  347. 

mencement  of  the  ejectment,  and  before  QA  contrary  conclusion  was  readied  by 

that  of  tlie  second  action  for  mesne  profits,  the  Supreme  Conrt  of  Montana  in  Mon- 

-  McBetii   V.  Van  Sickle,  6   Nev.  134.  tana  Mining  Co.  r.  St.  Louis  Co.  (1897),  19 

See  also,  a.s  to  actions  on  ntlfichment  honds,  Mont.  313,  48  I'ac.  305,  where  it  was  hfld 

National  Park  Bank  y.  Goddard,  131  N.  V.  that  in  an  action  on  an  injunction   bond. 

494    (the   person    at    whose    instance   an  all  of  the  obligees  are  nece.ssary  parties  to 

oflRcfT  levies  an  attachment  is  the  proper  the  action,  and  the  fact  that  .some  of  tlie 

plaintiff)  ;  Munzesheimer  i'.  BjTue  (Ark.,  obligees  have  no  interest  in  tlie  subject  of 

1892),  19  .'<.  W.  320  (action  on  attachment  the  suit,  does  not  change  thf  rule.     The 

bond  for  witness  fees).  court  said,  "  But,  sav  counsel,  the  code 


THE    REAL    I'AKTY    IN    INTEREST    TO    BE    THE    I'LAINTIFF. 


n, 


appointment  of  a  receiver,  the  application  was  denied  on  condition 
that  the  defendant  give  a  bond  or  undertaking  to  account  liiniself 
as  though  he  \A^ere  a  receiver  for  all  assets  which  might  come  into 
his  hands,  and  in  pursuance  of  tins  order  he  gave  a  bond  in  form 
running  to  the  State ;  the  plaintiff  having  recovered  judgment, 
and  the  defendant  failing  to  account,  the  action  on  tlie  under- 
taking was  propeily  brought  at  once  by  the  plaintiff  in  his  own 
name,  without  any  assignment  to  him  by  the  State. ^  A  person, 
in  whose  name  a  business  was  secretly  carried  on  by  the  defend- 
ant and  others  in  order  to  conceal  their  property  and  interest  from 
their  creditors,  was  permitted  to  recover  the  value  of  assets  re- 
ceived in  the  course  of  the  business,  which  had  been  taken  by  the 
defendant  and  converted  to  his  own  use.^  Where  several  persons 
were  owners  of  a  chattel,  but  for  purposes  of  convenience  the  title 
stood  in  the  name  of  one  of  them  alone,  and  he  executed  a  bill  of 
sale  of  it  in  his  own  name  to  a  purchaser  who  supposed  that  his 
immediate  vendor  was  solely  interested,  it  was  held  that  all  the 
owners  might  join  as  plaintiffs  to  recover  the  price  ;  they  were 
the  real  parties  in  interest  under  the  provision  of  the  code.^ 
This  case  is  a  particular  instance  of  a  general  rule.      It  is  now 


provision  that  the  suit  shall  be  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  real  party  in  interest 
has  changed  the  common-law  rule,  and 
any  party  shown  to  have  no  interest  in 
a  recovery  sought  would  be  improperly 
joined.  This  is  true ;  but,  considering 
what  we  have  said,  is  the  argument  cor- 
rectly invoked  in  this  instance  ?  The  ac- 
tion sho\ild  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the 
real  party  in  interest,  but  as  the  bond,  on 
its  face,  declared  them  to  be  the  real 
])arties  in  interest,  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  truth  of  the  matter  alleged,  that  one 
obligee  alone  was  damaged,  it  was  neces- 
sary to  join  all  the  obligees  as  plaintiffs, 
or  make  them  defendants  "  Iti  support 
of  the  text:  Pilger  r.  Harder  (1898),  55 
Xeb.  113,  75  N.  W.  559,  where  the  action 
was  on  a  replevin  bond. 

In  Gyger  v.  Tourtnev  (1900),  59  Neb. 
555.  81  N.  W.  437,  it  was  held  that  "  a 
trustee  of  an  express  trust,  who  was  re- 
strained with  respect  to  matters  concern- 
ing the  trust  estate,  may  maintain  an 
action  on  the  bond  given  in  the  injunction 
suit  in  which  he  is  named  as  obligee."] 


1  Baker  v.  Bartol,  7  Cal.  551.  Qn 
Curry  v.  Gila  County  (1898),  Ariz.,  53 
Pac  4,  it  was  held  that  a  county  for  whose 
use  and  benefit  a  bond  is  executed,  may 
sue  upon  it,  although  the  bond  is  executed 
to  the  Territory  of  Arizona.  But  in  Myers 
V.  Baughman  (1901),  61  Neb.  818,  86 
N.  W.  507,  it  was  held  that  the  prosecu- 
trix in  a  bastardy  proceeding  could  not 
sue  on  the  bastardy  bond  in  her  own  name, 
but  the  action  could  be  brought  only  in 
the  name  of  the  State,  which  was  named 
as  obligee,  for  the  use  of  the  pro.secutrix 
as  her  interest  might  appear,  the  State 
being  in  fact  a  beneficiary  under  the  bond 
as  well  as  the  prosecutrix.] 

2  Paddon  r.  W^illiams,  2  Abb.  Pr.  n.  S. 
88. 

^  Silliman  ?•.  Tuttle,  45  Barb.  171. 
nin  Chamberlain  v.  Woolsey  (1903),  — 
Xeb.  — ,  95  N.  W.  38,  it  was  held  that 
"one  having  legal  title  and  the  right  of 
possession  to  personal  pro])erty  may  main- 
tain an  action  for  its  wrongful  conversion 
bv  a  stranger,  without  joining  a  party  wl>o 
mav  have  a  beneficial  interest  therein."] 


116  CIVIL    REMEDIKS. 

settk'd  that  wlieu  a  simple  contract,  whether  verbal  or  written, 
is  entered  into  by  an  agent  in  his  own  name,  but  really  acting 
on  behalf  of  an  undisclosed  principal,  and  tiie  fact  of  the  agency 
is  unknown  at  the  time,  but  the  parties  suppose  that  they  are 
dealing  with  lum  on  his  own  individual  account,  the  principal 
may  bring  an  action  and  recover  upon  it  as  tliough  he  had  been 
the  party  expressly  contracting.^  In  these  cases,  however,  the 
agent  may  also  bring  the  action ;  he  being  one  of  the  contracting 
parties,  the  agreement  being  in  express  terms  made  with  him,  he 
is  a  proper  party  to  enforce  its  observance ;  ^  the  agent  may  also 
sue,  even  where  tlie  principal  was  disclosed,  and  it  was  shown 
that  he  was  acting  in  behalf  of  such  principal,  if  the  contract  is 
of  such  a  form  that  the  promise  is  in  express  terms  made  to  the 
agent  himself.^  Where  the  promise  in  favor  of  a  principal  is 
implied,  the  agent  cannot  in  general  sue  upon  it  in  his  own  name, 
but  the  action  must  be  brought  by  the  principal  himself.  Thus, 
where  a  person  making  a  bet  in  his  own  name  deposited  S3,000, 
the  amount  thereof,  ^^ith  the  stakeholder,  but  of  this  sum  only 
S600  was  his  own  money,  and  the  rest  had  been  furnished  by 
other  parties  —  not  as  a  loan  —  who  united  with  him  in  the  wager, 
and  he  brought  an  action  under  the  statute  against  the  stakeholder 
to  recover  back  the  wliole  amount  of  the  money  so  deposited  by 
him,  it  was  held  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  that  he  could 
only  recover  the  $600  which  he  had  actually  furnished  of  his  own 
funds ;  that  he  was  simply  an  agent  for  the  owners  of  the  remain- 
ing portion  of  the  moneys  advanced,  and  the  implied  promise  to 
refund  arose  in  their  favor  alone;  and  they  must  therefore  sue  in 
their  own  names  to  recover  their  respective  shares.* 

1  St.  .John  V.  Griffith.  2  Abb.  Pr.  198  ;  .Toneis,  6  Iowa,   169;  Usparicha  v.  Noble, 

Hall   V.  Plaine,  14  Ohio  St.  417  ;  Hisg'm.s  13  I':a.<!t,3.32  ;  Buffiim  r.  Cliadwick,  8  Mass. 

V.    Senior,    8   Mees.   &   W.  834  ;    Sims   r.  103;   Fairfield  r.  Adams,  16  Pick.  381. 
Bond,  .5  B.  &  Ad.  389,  393,  per  Ld.   ])eu-  Qln  Ward  r.  Rylia  (1897),  .58  Kan.  741. 

man  ;  Bastalde  v.  Poole,  1  Cromp.  M.  &,  R.  51  Pac.  223,  an  agent  took  a  hill  of  .sale  of 

410,  fier   Parke   B. ;    Hicks  r.  Whitmore,  personal  property  in  liis  own  name,  in  pay- 

12  Wend.  548;  Taintor  v.  I'reudergast,  3  mcnt  of  a  debt  due  to  his  principal,  and 

Hill,  72.     See /Jos<,  §  *  177.  u])on  taking  j)os.session    of   the    property 

^  See  cases  cited  in  last  note.     Tyler  r.  was  dispo.^isessed  of  it  by  a  third  person. 

Freeman,  3  Cush.  261  ;  QHernian  v.  City  It  w:us  held  that  the  agent  could  not  main- 

of  Oconto  (1898),  100  Wis.  391,  76  N.  W.  tain  replevin  for  it  under  a  general  alle- 

364  I  Barhani  (•  Bell  (1893),  112  N.  C.  131,  gation  of  ownership  in  himself,  without 

16S.  K.  903;   Brown  i\  Siiarkey  (1894),  93  stating    facts    in    respect    to    his    special 

la.  157,  61  X.  W.  364  ;  Brannon   v.  White  interest  and   rigiit  of  possession.] 
Lake  Tp.  (1903),— la. —,95  N.  W.  284.]  *  Huckman    r.    Pitcher,   20   N.    Y.   9. 

*  Ca.ses  citeil  in    last    notes.     Fear   v.  For  furtiier  examples  of  the  real  party  in 


ACTIONS    BY   TAX-PAYERS. 


117 


§  80.  *  142.  Particular  Injury  to  Plaintiff  Essential  in  Certain 
Cases.  People  cannot  maintain  Action  to  redress  Private  Wrong. 
It  is  the  established  doctiiiie  in  sevenil  States,  and  l)y  many 
cases,  that  an  action  cannot  be  maintained  by  a  private  person, 
citizen,  freeholder,  or  tax-payer,  either  suing  alone  or  on  behalf 
of  all  others  similarly  situated,  to  restrain  or  remove  or  redress 
any  public  wrong,  or  nuisance,  or  unlawful  act  done  under  color 
of  legal  authority  by  the  officers  of  a  county,  town,  city,  or  other 
municii)ality,  unless  the  plaintiff  has  suffered  some  special  wrong, 
unless  some  particular  injury  is  done  to  him  which  is  not  sus- 
tained by  all  others  in  the  community  alike.  As  a  result  of  this 
rule,  no  citizen  or  tax-payer  or  freeholder  can  prosecute  an  action 


interest,  see  Winona  &  St.  Peter  R.  Co. 
r.  St.  Paul  &  S.  C.  R.  Co.,  23  Minn.  359  ; 
Lafayette  Cy.  v.  Hixon,  69  Mo.  581  : 
Quilien  r.  Arnold,  12  Nev.  234  ;  Kahn- 
weiler  v.  Anderson,  78  N.  C.  133;  Maun 
I'.  ^<;tua  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  38  Wis.  114;  Kel- 
loj^g  V.  Adams,  51  id.  138;  Sigel  Sch. 
Dir.  r.  Coe,  40  id.  103,  action  on  the  official 
bond  of  a  school  district  treasurer  by  the 
official  successors  of  the  obligee ;  Terri- 
tory r.  Co.x,  3  Mont.  197;  Dunning  v. 
Ocean  Nat.  Bk.,  61  N.  Y.  497  ;  Olrastead 
V.  Keys,  85  id.  593 ;  Greene  r.  Republic 
F.  Ins.  Co.,  84  id.  572;  Conn.  F.  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Erie  R.  Co.,  73  id.  399,  405  ;  Rowe  v. 
Parsons,  6  Hun,  338,  action  on  adminis- 
trator's bond  running  to  the  people,  by 
j)cr.<ons  interested  in  the  estate ;  Dodson 
V.  Lomax  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  25. 

QFor  other  instances  of  actions  main- 
tained by  tiie  real  party  in  interest,  see 
Rogers  v.  Galloway  (1898),  64  Ark.  627, 
44  S.  W.  454  (college  suing  on  subscrip- 
tions made  to  secure  its  estahli-shuient)  ; 
State  ex  rel  y.  S.andford  (1894),  127  .Mo. 
368,30  S.  W.  112  (State  on  relation  of 
county  tax-collector) ;  Hodges  r.  2salty 
(1899),  104  Wis.  464,  80  N.  W.  726  (per- 
sons who  paid  for  building  a  church  su- 
ing on  unpaid  .subscriptions)  ;  Railway 
Co.  I'.  Taylor  (1893),  57  Ark.  136,  20  S.  W. 
1083  (one  who  lias  a  special  jjroperty  in 
an  animal  killed  by  a  railway  train); 
Ettlinger  i-.  P.  R.  &  C.  Co.  (1894),  142 
N.  Y.  189,  36  N.  E.  1055  (holder  of  bonds 
secured  by  trust  mortgage,  suing  for  fore- 
closure) ;  Kiusella  v.  Sharp  (1896),  47  Neb. 
664,  66   N.    W.   634    (suit  for  conversion, 


by  donee  or  nominal  vendee) ;  German 
Savings  Bank  i\  Citizens  Nat.  Bank 
(1897),  101  Iowa,  .530,  70  N.  W.  769  (in- 
tervention by  bank  wliich  paid  a  check  on 
a  forged  indorsement,  in  suit  between 
drawer  of  check  and  tlie  drawee  bank, 
not  allowed)  ;  City  of  Des  Moines  v.  Polk 
County  (1899),  107  Iowa,  525,  78  N.  W. 
249  (suit  by  city  for  fees  earned  by  city 
officers);  Cabe  v.  Vanhook  (1900),  127 
N.  C.  424,  37  S.  E.  464  (suit  ])y  trustees 
of  a  cemetery  to  compel  an  executor  to 
erect  a  fence  according  to  the  terms  of  a 
will);  Alexander  v.  Overton  (1893),  36 
Neb.  503,  54  N.  W.  825  (suit  for  wrongful 
sale  of  land  brought  by  nominal  vendee)  ; 
Union  Nat.  Bank  v.  llill  (1899),  148  Mo. 
380,49  S.  W.  1012  (suit  by  stockholders 
of  an  insolvent  bank  ag.ainst  directors  for 
negligent  management,  where  assignee 
refuses  to  sue). 

It  was  held  in  United  States  ex  rel.  v. 
Railroad  Co.  (1895),  3  Okla.  404,  41  Pac. 
729,  that  where  private  parties,  as  rela- 
tors, are  authorized  to  u.se  the  name  and 
authority  of  the  United  States  for  the 
protection  of  their  interests,  the  exemption 
from  payment  of  or  security  for  costs, 
enjoyed  by  the  United  States,  does  not  in 
any  way  attach  to  them.  They  are  the 
real  parties  in  interest  and  are  subject  to 
the  same  liabilities  for  costs  as  other  liti- 
gants. Illinois  Cent.  li.R.  Co.  ;•.  Matthews 
(1903),  —  Ky.  — ,  72  S.  W.  302  :  One  not 
the  owner  of  baggage  which  he  checks, 
but  who  is  liable  to  the  owner,  may  sue 
the  carrier  for  damage  to  it.^ 


118 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


to  restrain  official  acts  which  would  create  a  municipal  indebted 
ness ;  or  to  set  aside  and  annul  such  public  acts  when  done, 
although  the  indebtedness  must  sometime  be  paid  b}-  means  of 
increased  taxation,  and  the  plaintiff's  property  would  be  liable 
for  his  proportionate  share  of  the  tax  when  levied.^  On  the 
other  hand,  actions  of  the  nature  and  for  the  purposes  described, 
brought  by  a  citizen,  tax-payer,  or  freeholder,  are  permitted  in 
many  and  perhaps  in  a  majority  of  the  States,  and  are  common 
forms  of  judicial  proceeding  to  restrain  the  abuse  of  local  legisla- 
tive and  administrative  power  by  municipal  officials.  Among 
these  remedial  processes  are  actions  l)y  a  citizen,  tax-payer,  or 
freeholder  to  restrain  or  set  aside  tax  proceedings,  the  levying  of 
assessments  for  local  improvements,  the  issue  of  bonds  by  muni- 
cipal corporations  in  aid  of  railways,  and  similar  acts  of  a  public 
or  quasi  public  nature.^     On  the  other  hand,  the  people  cannot 


1  Doolittle  V.  Broome  Cy.  Supervisors, 
18  N.Y.  15  j  ;  Roosevelt  v.  Draper,  23 
N.  Y.  318;  People  r.  Mayor,  32  Barb.  102  ; 
Sargeut  v.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  Co.,  1  Hamly, 
52;  Carpenter  v.  Maiiu,  17  Wis.  155; 
Kittle  V.  Fremont,  1  Keb.  329 ;  Craft  v. 
Jackson  Cy.  Com'rs,  5  Kau.  518;  Kirk- 
jiatrick  v.  State,  5  Kan.  673 ;  Tift  r.  Buf- 
falo, 1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  150;  Comins  r. 
Jefferson  Cy.  Sup.,  3  id.  296;  Ayres 
V.  Lawrence,  63  Barb.  454  ;  Dcmarest  v. 
Wickiiani,  63  N.  Y.  320 ;  Kilbourn  c.  St. 
John,  50  ill.  21  ;  Lutes  v.  Briggs,  64  id. 
404;   Wood  v.  Bangs,  1  Dak.  179. 

-'  [Kirchery.  Pederson  (1903),  117  Wis. 
68,  93  N.  W.  813  ;  Zuelly  v.  Casper  (1903), 
—  Ind.  — ,  67  N.  E.  103.  j  Rice  i-.  Smith, 
9  Iowa,  570;  State  v.  Bailoy,  7  id.  390; 
State  (.■.  Marshall  Cy.  Judge,  7  id.  186; 
Litchfield  v.  Polk  Cy.,  18  id.  70;  01m- 
stead  c.  Henry  Cy.  Sup.,  24  id.  33  ;  Wil- 
liams V.  Peinny,  25  id.  436;  Stokes  v. 
Scott  Cy.,  10  id.  166;  McMillan  v.  Boyles, 
14  id.  107;  Rock  v.  Wallace,  14  id.  593; 
Ten  Kyck  v.  The  Mayor,  15  id.  486; 
Chamberlain  v.  Burlington,  19  id.  395; 
IlanHon  v.  Vernon,  27  id.  28 ;  Hubbard 
V.  John.son  Cy.  Sup,  23  id.  130;  Harney 
V.  Cliarles,  45  Mo.  157;  Scrihner  ti.  Allen, 
12  Minn.  148;  Howes  i\  Racine.  21  Wis. 
514  ;  Mitchell  r.  Milwaukee,  18  id.  92.  97; 
Bond  >-.  Kenosha,  17  id.  2^4,287  ;  Veeder 
V.  Lima,  19  id.  2«0,  295-299;  Rochester 
«•.   .Mfrc  1    r,:uik,    13   id.  432,  439;  Sauer- 


hering  v.  Iron  Ridge  &  M.  R.  Co.,  25  id. 
447  ;  Warden  v.  Fond  du  Lac  Cy.  Sup., 
14  id.  618;  Kellogg  v.  Oshkosh,  14  id. 
623;  Nill  v.  Jenkinson,  15  Ind.  425; 
Lewis  I'.  Henley,  2  iil.  332  ;  La  Fayette  r. 
Fowler,  34  id.  140;  Harney  v.  Indianapo- 
lis, C.  &  D.  R.  Co.,  32  id.  244  ;  Coffman  r. 
Keightley,  24  id.  509  ;  Oliver  r.  Keiglitley, 
24  id.  514;  Nave  v.  King,  27  id.  356  ;  Har- 
rison Cy.  Com'rs  v.  McCarty,  27  id.  475  ; 
Madison  Cy.  Com'rs  v.  Brown,  28  id.  161  ; 
Andrews  v.  Pratt,  44  Cal.  309 ;  Bncknall 
V.  Story,  36  Cal.  67  ;  Douglass  v.  Placer- 
ville,  18  Cal.  643  ;  Vanover  v.  Justices, 
etc.,  27  Ga.  354  ;  Brodnax  v.  Groom,  64 
N.  C.  244;  Galloway  r.  Jenkins,  63  N.  C. 
147;  Worth  v.  Fayettevilie,  1  Wins.  (No. 
2  Eq.  N.  C.)  70;  Mobile  v.  Waring,  41 
Ala.  139  ;  Gilmer  r.  Hill,  22  La.  An.  465  ; 
White  Sulphur  Springs  Co.  v.  Holly,  4 
W.  Va.  597;  Bull  r.  Read,  13  Gratt.'78; 
Baltimore  v.  CM,  31  Md.  375,  395  ;  Stod- 
dert  V.  Ward,  31  Md.  562;  Lane  v.  Schomp, 
20  N.  J.  E(i.  82;  Merrill  v.  Plainfield,  45 
N.  H.  126  ;  Barr  r.  Deniston,  19  X.  H.  170, 
180;  New  Loudon  v.  Brainard.  22  Conn. 
552;  Scofield  r.  Eighth  Scliool  Dist.,  27 
id.  499,  504  ;  Webster  v.  Harwinton,  32 
id.  131;  Terrett  v.  Sharon,  34  id.  105; 
Mercer  Cy.  Sup.  v.  Hubbard,  45  111.  139: 
Vieley  v.  Thompson,  44  111.  9;  Cleghorn 
V.  Postlewaite,  43  id.  428;  Taylor  r. 
Thomp.son,  42  id.  9 ;  Clarke  v.  Hancock 
Cy.  Sup.,  27  i  !.  ;:05,  311  ;  Butler  v   Dun 


ACTIONS    BY    GRANTORS    OF    LAND.  119 

maintiiin  a  civil  action  for  the  redress  of  mere  private  wrongs. 
An  action  can  be  brought  in  their  name  only  to  iiphohl  and  en- 
force a  distinct  right  on  their  part  in  respect  to  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  controversy.^ 

§  81.  *  143.  Special  Provision  iu  New  York  respecting  Action 
by  Grantee  of  Land  held  by  Disseisor  at  Time  of  Conveyance. 
Partnerships.  The  last  clause  of  §  111  (1501,  449,  1909,  1910)  in 
the  New  York  Code  was  added  as  an  amendment  merely  for 
purposes  of  certainty,  and  to  remove  all  possible  doubts  as  to  the 
true  meaning  of  the  section.  As  it  was  originally  enacted  with- 
out this  clause,  a  doubt  had  sometimes  been  suggested  whether 
any  action  at  all  could  be  brought  under  the  circumstances  men- 
tioned in  the  amendment,  that  is,  when  land  had  been  conveyed 
by  an  owner  which  at  the  time  was  held  by  a  disseisor  adversely 
to  such  true  owner.  If  brought  by  the  grantee,  he  could  show 
no  title,  because  the  conveyance  to  him  would,  by  virtue  of  other 
rules  of  the  law,  be  deemed  a  nullity.  If  brought  in  the  name  of 
the  grantor,  it  might  be  said  that  he  was  not  the  real  party  in 
interest,  and,  under  the  requirements  of  this  section,  was  for- 
bidden to  sue.  The  code  was  therefore  amended  so  as  to  exclude 
the  latter  construction,  by  adding  the  final  provision  as  it  now 
stands.  The  purpose  of  this  amendment  is  really  to  limit  and 
restrict  the  operation  and  effect  of  the  section  as  originally 
enacted,  and  not  to  create  any  new  authority  or  right  as  between 
the  grantor  and  the  grantee  for  the  use  of  the  former's  name  by 
the  latter,  nor  to  create  any  new  title  to  the  land  in  the  grantee 
liimself.^     An   express    provision    exists  in  the  codes  of  certain 

ham,  27  id.  474 ;  Perkius  v.  Lewis,  24  id.  v.  Port  Washington,  37  Wis.  168  ;  Benton 

208;  Robertson  v.  Rockford,  21  id.  4.51;  Cy.    Com'rs   v.  Templeton,   51   Ind.   266; 

J'rettyman  v.  Tazewell  Cy.   Sup.,   19  id.  Delaware  Cy.  Com'rs  v.   McClintock,  bl 

406  ;  Drake  v.  Phillips,  40  id.  388  ;  Colton  Ind.  325  ;  Turpin  v.  Eagle  Creek,  etc.  Co., 

V.  Hanchett,  13  id.  615  ;  Dews  i'.  Chicago,  48  Ind.  45;  Ayers  v.  Lawrence,  59  N.  Y. 

]  1  Wall.  108.     See  Dillon  on  Munic.  Corp.  192  ;  Metzger  v.  Attica  &  A-  Arc  R.  Co., 

§§906,  914-924  (4th  ed.) ;  Allison  f.  Louis-  79  id.  171  ;  Kewton  v.  Keech,  9  Hun,  355. 

ville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9   Bush,  247.     See  also  See   also,   on    this    subject,    1    Pomeroy's 

later  ca.ses,  Longley  v.  City  of  Hudson.  4  Equity,  §§  258,  259,  260,  265,  266. 

N.  Y.   Sup.   Ct.    353  ;    Marsh   r.  City  of  i  People  v.  Albany  &  Su.'iq.  R.  R.,  57 

Brooklyn,  id.   413;  Clay    Cy.    Com'r.s  v.  N.  Y.  161;  People   v.  Ingersoll,  58  N.  Y. 

Markle,  46  Ind.  96,  103-105;    Zorger  r.  1;  People  v.   Fields,  58  N.  Y.  491.     See 

Rapids  Tp.,  36  Iowa,  175;  Minnesota  Oil  People  v.  Sherwin,  2  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  59R ; 

Co.  y.  Palmer,  20  Minn.  468;   Hodgman  and   Wood  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  7.1  N.  Y. 

V.  Chicago  &  St.  P.  R.  Co.,  28  Minn.  48;  556. 

Moses  V.  Kearney,  31  Ark.  261  ;  Normand  -  Hamilton    v.    Wright,  37  N.  Y.  505, 

V.  Otoe  Cy.  Com'rs,  8  Neb.  18;   Noesen  507,  per  Woodruff  J.;  Steeple   y.  Down- 


120  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

States,  authorizing  partnerships  to  sue  and  to  be  sued  by  and  in 
their  firm  names,  without  making  the  individual  members  by 
name  parties  to  the  action.^  This  provision  is  merely  permissive, 
and  not  at  all  compulsory ;  it  is  not  a  substitute  for,  but  an 
addition  to,  the  former  existing  methods  of  conducting  suits.^ 


SECTION   THIRD. 

THE  EFFECT  OF  AN  ASSIGNMENT   OF  A  THING  IN  ACTION  UPON 

THE   DEFENCES   THERETO. 

5  82.  *  154.  statutory  Provisions  respecting  the  Effect  of  As- 
signment upon  Defences.  The  statutory  provision  found  in  the 
various  State  codes  which  relates  to  the  subject-matter  of  this 
section  is  the  following:  "In  the  case  of  an  assignment  of  a  thing 
in  action,  the  action  by  the  assignee  is  without  prejudice  to  any 
set-off  or  other  defence  existing  at  the  time  of  or  before  notice 
of  the  assignment;  but  this  section  does  not  apply  to  a  negoti- 
able promissory  note  or  bill  of  exchange,  transferred  in  good 
faith  and  upon  good  consideration,  before  maturity."^  In  Ohio, 
Kansas,  and  Nebraska,  the  phraseology  is  slightly  different.  It 
reads:  "The  action  of  the  assignee  shall  be  without  prejudice  to 
any  set-off  or  other  defence  now  allowed."*  The  consideration 
of  the  topics  embraced  in  this  provision  should,  in  a  strictly 
scientific  method,  form  a  part  of  the  general  subject  of  Defences, 
and  might  properly  be  postponed  until  this  portion  of  the  work 
is  reached ;  but  I  have  chosen  to  pursue  the  order  of  the  codes 
themselves,  which  is  the  same  in  all  the  States,  rather  than  to 

ing,   60  Ind.  478;    Voorhis   v.    Kelly,  31  §6071;  Arizoua,  Rev.  St.,  1901,   §  1301; 

Hun,   293;    Smith   v.   Loug,  12  Abb.  N.  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,    §  3899;    Montana, 

Cas.  113.  §571;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3156  ; 

'  See  statutory  provisions  cited  in  note  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3467;  Colo- 

to  ^  *\2\,  ante.  rado.   §    4;    Connecticut,  (Jen.    St.,    1902, 

^  Whitman  v.  Keith,  18  Ohio  St.  134.  §  650,  in  a  somewhat  different  form  from 

»  New  York,  §  112   (502,  1909,   1910);  that  given   in  the  text;  Indiaua,  Burns' 

(^Minnesota,  St.,   1894,  §  5157;;]   Califor-  St.,    1901,    §  277;    Wisconsin,    St.,    1898, 

nia,  §  368;  Kentucky,  §  31  ;  South  Caro-  §  2606.] 

lina,  §  135;  Oregon,  §§  28.  382;  Nevada,  ^  QOhio,   Bates'    Ann.   St.,    §   4993;] 
§  5  ;  Iowa,  §  2546  (slightly  altered) ;  North  Kansas,  §  27  ;  [^Nebraska,  §  31  ;  Washing- 
Carolina,   §  55;    [;Utah,    Rev.    St.,    1898,  ton,  Bal.  Code,  §  4835,  in  a  quite  different 
§  2903;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1«99,  form.] 
§  5222;    South    Dakota,    Ann.  St.,  1901, 


THE    ASSIGNMENT    SUBJECT   TO    DEFENCES.  121 

adopt  one  more  theoretically  correct,  yet  perhaps  not  more  prac- 
tically advantageous. 

§  83.  *  155.  Defences  and  Counter-Claims  Distinguished.  It  is 
important  that  the  defences  which  this  clause  admits  should  be 
carefully  distinguished  from  the  counter-claim  subsequently  pro- 
vided for  by  the  statute.  This  section,  speaks  of  defences  which, 
as  they  ask  no  affirmative  relief,  and  simply  prevent  the  plaintiff 
from  succeeding,  may  be  made  available  against  an  assignee  as 
well  as  against  the  original  creditor.  The  counter-claim  is  more 
than  a  defence:  it  assumes  a  right  of  action  against  and  demands 
a  recovery  of  affirmative  relief  from  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit,  and 
is,  therefore,  impossible  as  against  an  assignee  suing,  if  it  existed 
against  the  assignor.  The  proposition  here  stated  is  very  simple 
and  plain,  and  yet  the  defences  permitted  against  the  assignee 
by  this  section  have  been  sometimes  confounded  with  counter- 
claims, and  that  even  by  judges  and  courts.^ 

§  84.  *  156.  Interpretation  of  the  Statute.  The  section  quoted 
above,  and  which  is  substantially  the  same  in  all  the  States,  does 
not  change  the  then  existing  law  as  to  defences  under  the  cir- 
cumstances mentioned  in  it.  It  was  not  intended  to  alter  the 
substantial  rights  of  the  parties,  but  only  to  introduce  such 
modifications  into  the  modes  of  protecting  them  as  were  rendered 
necessary  by  the  provisions  of  the  preceding  section  requiring 
the  real  party  in  interest  in  most  cases  to  be  the  plaintiff.  Tak- 
ing the  two  sections  together,  the  plain  interpretation  of  them  is  r 
The  assignee  of  a  thing  in  action  must  sue  upon  it  in  his  own 
name,  but  this  change  in  the  practice  shall  not  work  any  altera- 
tion of  the  actual  rights  of  the  parties ;  the  defendants  are  still 
entitled  to  the  same  defences  against  the  assignee  who  sues  which 
they  would  have  had  if  the  former  rule  had  continued  to  prevail, 
and  the  action  had  been  brought  in  the  name  of  the  assignor,  but 
to  no  other  or  different  defences.  In  other  words,  the  section 
must  be  interpreted  as  though  it  read  as  follows :  "  In  the  case 
of  the  assignment  of  a  thing  in  action,  the  action  of  the  assignee 
shall  be  without  prejudice  to  any  set-off  or  other  defence  existing 
at  the  time  of  or  before  notice  of  the  assignment,  which  would 

1  Qu  Iowa,  Washington,  and  Wyoming  ton,  Bal.  Code,  §483.5;  Wyoming,  Rev. 

the  statute  expres,sly  names  both  counter-  St.,    1899,    §   34G7  ;     Iowa,    Code,    1897, 

claim   and   set-off  as  being  unprejudiced  §  34C1.3 
by  the  action  of  the  assignee.     Wasliiug- 


122  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

have  been  available  to  the  defendant  had  the  action  been  brought 
in  the  name  of  the  assignor."  This  construction  is  now  firmly 
and  universally  established.^ 

J^  85.    *  157.      The   Rule,   as   Existing  Prior  to   the   Codes,  Stated. 
Assignee    takes    Subject    to   Equities   and   Legal    Defences.      As    the 

pre-existing  rule  is  thus  reaffirmed,  a  full  discussion  of  the  stat- 
utory provision  requires  an  examination  and  statement  of  that 
rule  itself.  In  the  first  place,  the  general  doctrine  is  elementar}' 
that  the  purchaser  of  any  thing  in  action,  not  negotiable,  takes 
the*  interest  purchased  subject  to  all  the  defences  legal  and 
equitable  of  the  debtor  v:ho  issued  the  ohliyation  or  security.  That 
is,  when  the  original  debtor,  the  obligor  on  the  bond,  or  the 
promisor,  in  whatever  form  his  promise  is  made,  if  it  is  not 
negotiable,  is  sued  by  the  assignee,  the  defences  legal  and  equi- 
table which  he  had  at  the  time  of  the  assignment,  or  at  the  time 
when  notice  of  it  was  given,  against  the  original  creditor,  avail 
to  him  asrainst  the  substituted  creditor.^  This  doctrine  has  been 
applied  to  all  kinds  of  defences  as  well  as  to  set-off,  and  to  all 
forms  of  contract  not  negotiable:  as,  for  example,  in  an  action 
on  a  bond  and  mortgage  by  the  assignee,  the  defence  that  the 
bond  and  the  mortgage  collateral  thereto  were  given  on  con- 
sideration that  the  obligee  should  perform  certain  covenants 
contained  in  an  agreement  between  the  parties,  which  was  set 
out,  and  that  he  had  wholly  failed  to  perform  the  same,  was  held 
good; 3  in  an  action  brought  on  a  warehouseman's  receipt,  the 
same  being  held  not  negotiable;^  in  an  action  by  an  assignee  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors ;  ^  and  in  an  action  to  compel  a  specific 
performance,  brought  by  the  assignee  of  the  vendee,  under  a  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  lands,  although  the  vendee  was  in  possession.^ 

1  Beckwith   »•.   Union   Bank,  9  X.  Y.  given  of  it,  when  there  is  an  interval  be- 

211,  212,  per  Johnson  J. ;  Myers  v.  Davis,  tween  the  execution  of  the  transfer  and 

22  N.  Y.  489,  490,  per  Denio  .1.  the    notice."     Commercial   Hauk  v.  Colt, 

-  Ingrahamr.  Dishrough,  47  N.  Y.42I  :  15  Barh.  .506;  Ainslie  v.  Bovnton,  2  Barb. 

Anlrcw.s  v.  Gilk-spie,  47  N.  Y.  487;  Biisli  058;  Wood  c.  Perry,  1  Barb.    114  ;  We.st- 

r.  Lathrop,  22  N.  Y.  ."j.l.i,  .538,  per  Denio  em   Bank   /•.    Sherwood,    29    Barb.   383 ; 

•T. ;  Blydenburgh  f.  Thayer,  3  Keyes,  293  ;  Reeve.<»  >•.  Kimball,  40  X.  Y.  299. 

("allanan  c  Kdwanls,  32  X.  Y.  483,  486,  »  Western  Bank  i-.  Sherwood,  29  Barb, 

per  Wriglit  J.,  who  thus  states  the  rule  :  383. 

"  An  jwsif^nee  of  a  ^/lox*'  iti  anion  not  ne-  *  Commercial  Bank  r.  Colt,  15  Barb. 506. 
gotiable  takes  the  thing  assigned  subject  6  Maas  v.  Goodman,  2  Hilt.   275 ;  Ma- 
te all   the  rights  which  the   debtor  had  rine  &  F.  Ins.  Bk.  of  Ga.  v.  Jauncey,  1 
acquired  in  respect   thereto  prior  to  the  Barb.  4S6. 
assignment,  or  to    the   time   notice   was  «  Reeves  v.  Kimball,  40  N.  Y.  299. 


EQUITIKS    BETWEEN    ASSIGNOR   AND    ASSIGNEE.  123 

§  86.  *  158.  Doctrine  applies  also  to  Second  and  Subsequent 
Assignees.  The  doctrine  is  not  coiilined,  however,  in  its  operation 
to  the  case  of  the  debtor  —  the  promisor  in  the  thing  in  action  — 
setting  up  a  defence  to  an  action  brought  by  an  assignee  upon  the 
demand  itself  to  enforce  the  collection  or  performance  thereof ;  it 
applies  also  to  the  second  and  subsequent  assignees  of  a  non- 
negotiable  thing  in  action,  although  transferred  to  the  purchaser 
and  holder  for  full  value,  and  without  notice,  if  there  were 
equities  subsisting  between  the  original  assignor  and  his  imme- 
diate assignee  in  favor  of  the  former.  If  the  owner  and  holder 
of  a  thing  in  action  not  negotiable  transfers  it  to  an  assignee 
upon  condition,  or  subject  to  any  reservations  or  claims  in  favor 
of  the  transferrer,  although  the  instrument  of  assignment  be 
absolute  on  its  face,  this  immediate  assignee,  holding  in  it  a 
qualified  and  limited  property  and  interest,  cannot  convey  a 
greater  property  and  interest  than  he  himself  holds;  and  if  he 
assumes  to  convey  it  to  a  second  assignee  by  a  transfer  absolute 
in  form,  and  for  a  full  consideration,  and  without  any  notice  on 
the  part  of  such  purchaser  of  a  defect  in  the  title,  this  second 
assignee  nevertheless  takes  it  subject  to  all  the  equities,  claims, 
and  rights  of  the  original  owner  and  first  assignor.  The  doctrine 
of  so-called  ^'' latent  equities,"  which  has  received  some  judicial 
support,  —  that  is,  the  doctrine  that  the  equities  of  the  original 
assignor,  under  the  circumstances  thus  stated,  are  latent  and 
cannot  prevail  against  the  title  of  the  second  assignee,  —  is 
unsound;  it  is  an  attempt  to  extend  the  peculiar  qualities  of 
negotiable  paper  to  things  in  action  not  negotiable,  and  destroys 
the  fundamental  distinction  between  the  two  classes  of  negotiable 
and  non -negotiable  demands.^ 

§  87.  *  159.  Illustrations.  A  few  illustrations  of  this  rule 
will   serve   to   show   its    true   meaning,  and    the    extent  of   its 

1  Bushy.  Lathrop,  22  N.  Y.  53.5;  Au-  v.  Equitable  Life  Ins.   Soc,  59  id.  587; 

derson  v.  Nicholas,  28  N.  Y.  600,  approved  Greene  v.  Warwick,  64  id.  220  ;  Loomis  w 

by  Woodruff  J.  iu  Reeves  v.   Kimball,  40  Ruck,  56  id.  620;  Davis  v.   Bechstein,  69 

N.  Y.  311  ;  Mason  r.  Lord,  40  N.  Y.  476,  id.  440,  442;  Matthews  v.  Sheehan,  69  id. 

487,  per  Daniels   J. ;   Williams  r.   Thorn,  585  ;  Cutts  v.  Guild,  57  id.   229,  232,  233  ; 

1 1  Paige,  459 ;  McNeil  v.  Tenth  Nat.  Bank,  Reid  v.  Sprague,  72  id.  457,  462  ;  Crane  r. 

55    Barb.    59,    68;    s.   c.    46  N.  Y.   325;  Turner,  67  id.  437, 440 ;  Combes  y.  Chand- 

Schafer  v.  Reilly,  50  N.  Y.  67;  Mangles  let,  33  Ohio  St.,   178,   181-185;  Farmers' 

I'.  Di.Kon.  3  H.  of  L.  Cas.  702.     See  also,  Nat.  Bk.  v.   Fletcher,  44   Iowa,  252 ;  and 

on  the  subject  discussed  in  this  and  the  see    in    Pomeroy's    Equity,    §§  707-715, 

succeeding    paragraphs,    Union    Coll.   v.  where  this  subject  is  fully  discussed. 
Wheeler,  61  N.  Y.  88,  104,  112;    Barry 


124  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

application.  The  holder  of  a  bond  and  mortgage  for  $1,400 
assigned  and  delivered  them  to  secure  an  indebtedness  of  !?-T(\ 
the  assignee  giving  back  a  written  undertaking  to  return  the  same 
upon  being  paid  that  amount.  This  assignee  afterwards  trans- 
ferred the  securities  to  a  second,  and  he  to  a  third  assignee,  the 
latter  paying  full  value,  and  having  no  notice  of  any  outstanding 
claims  or  defects  in  the  title.  The  original  owner  tendered  to 
this  assignee  the  $270  and  interest  thereon,  and  demanded  a 
return  of  the  bond  and  mortgage.  Upon  refusal  he  brought  an 
action  to  compel  such  return ;  and  it  was  held  by  the  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals,  after  a  most  exhaustive  discussion,  that  he 
should  recover.^  Certificates  of  stock  being  wrongfully  taken 
from  the  owner  and  sold  to  the  defendant,  it  was  held  that  the 
latter  acquired  no  better  or  higher  title  than  that  held  by  his 
immediate  transferrer,  —  the  one  who  wrongfully  converted  the 
stock,  —  and  that  the  original  owner  could  recover  the  value  of 
the  securities  with  interest;  but  the  decision  was  partly  placed 
upon  the  special  circumstances  of  the  transfer,  which  deprived 
the  defendant  of  the  character  and  position  of  a  bona  fide  pur- 
chaser.2  The  lessee  of  premises  assigned  the  lease  by  an  instru- 
ment valid  on  the  face,  but  the  transfer  was  in  fact  given  as 
security  for  a  usurious  loan  made  to  him  by  the  assignee.  This 
lease  was  afterwards  transferred  by  the  assignee,  passed  through 
divers  hands,  and  was  finally  purchased  by  the  defendant,  who 
knew  that  the  first  transfer  was  intended  as  a  security  for  a  loan, 
but  who  had  no  knowledge  nor  notice  of  the  usurious  taint  which 
affected  the  loan,  and  who  paid  full  value  as  the  consideration 
of  the  transfer  to  himself.  Su])sequent  to  the  original  assign- 
ment by  the  lessee,  but  before  the  tiansfer  to  the  defendant,  the 
plaintiffs  recovered  a  judgment  against  such  lessee,  which  was 
regularly  entered  and  docketed,  and  the  lessee's  interest  in  the 
premises  leased  and  in  the  lease  itself   was  sold  on  execution, 

>  IJush  c.  Lathrop,  22  N.  Y.  535.  The  doctrine.  See  Ballard  r.  Burgett,  40  N.  Y. 
opinion  of  Deuio  J.  is  a  mo.st  able  review  314,  and  the  cases  cited. 
of  all  the  autlioritie.s  which  seem  to  su.s-  '■^  Anderson  v.  Nicholas,  28  N.  \' .  600. 
tain  the  doctrine  that  certain  so-called  On  account  of  the  peculiar  facts  referred 
"  latent  e(/uities  "  a.TG  uot  protected  afjainst  to  in  the  text,  which  prevented  the  de- 
an assignment.  He  shows  that  all  the  fendant  from  relying  upon  the  defence  of 
expressions  of  judicial  opinion  to  that  ^/ona/ic/e.s,  this  case  cannot  he  regarded  a.s 
effect  are  oliltf-r  dicta,  while  a  large  iium-  a  direct  autiiority  for  the  doctrine  of  the 
l>er  of  direct  decisions  necessarily  involv-  text, 
ing    the    (juestiou    are    opposed    to    the 


ASSIGNMENT   OF   STOCK    CERTIFICATES.  125 

bought  in  by  the  phiintiffs,  and  a  .sheriff's  deed  of  such  interest 
was  delivered  to  them,  which  deed,  however,  was  executed  after 
the  assignment  to  the  defendant.  The  plaintiff's  thereupon  com- 
menced an  action  to  recover  possession  of  the  leased  premises, 
and  to  avoid  the  transfer  of  the  lease  to  the  defendant  on  account 
of  the  usury  which  affected  and  nullified  the  first  assignment 
made  by  the  lessee  to  his  immediate  assignee.  The  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals,  following  the  doctrine  of  the  decisions  quoted 
above,  held  that  the  action  could  be  maintained ;  that  the  lessee 
might  have  set  aside  the  transfer  from  himself  on  account  of  the 
usury  which  tainted  it;  that  the  subsequent  assignees,  including 
the  defendant,  succeeded  to  all  the  rights,  and  were  subjected  to 
all  the  disabilities,  possessed  by  and  imposed  upon  the  person 
who  transferred  the  security  to  them,  — the  first  assignee;  and, 
finally,  that  the  judgment  creditors  of  the  lessee  were  clothed 
with  his  rights  and  powers  in  the  matter.^ 

v^  88.  *  160.  Doctrine  of  Estoppel  Applied  against  the  Assignor 
in  Case  of  Quasi-Negotiable  Demands.  The  principle  thus  settled, 
and  the  cases  which  support  it,  are  entirely  consistent  with 
another  doctrine  that  has  lately  been  approved  and  established 
by  the  same  distinguished  court,  namely,  the  doctrine  of  estoppel 
as  applied  to  the  transfer  of  certain  species  of  things  in  action 
which,  in  the  customary  practice  of  business  men,  have  acquired 
a  qiiasi-negotiahle  character.  The  doctrine  as  thus  invoked  by 
the  court  may  be  stated  as  follows :  The  owner  of  certain  kinds 
of  things  in  action  not  technically  negotiable,  but  which,  in  the 
course  of  business  customs,  have  acquired  a  semi-negotiable 
character  as  a  matter  of  fact,  may  assign  or  part  with  them  for 
a  special  purpose,  and  at  the  same  time  may  clothe  the  assignee 
or  person  to  whom  they  have  been  delivered  with  such  apparent 
indiciu  of  title,  and  instruments  of  complete  ownership  over 
them,  and  power  to  dispose  of  them,  as  to  estop  himself  from 
setting  up  against  a  second  assignee,  to  whom  the  securities  have 
been  transferred  in  good  faith  and  for  value,  the  fact  that  the 

^  Mason  v.  Lord,  40  N.  Y.  476,   487.  v.  Lathrop  is  reaffirmed,  and  its  ])rinciple 

The  doctrine  is  directly  sustained  in  the  pronounced   to   be    "  well   settled."     The 

following  more  recent  cases  :  Schafer  v.  result  of  these  authorities  is  to  limit  the 

Reilly,  .50  N.  Y.  61,  67  ;  Reeves  v.  Kim-  decision  in  Moore  v.  Metrop.  Nat.   Bank, 

ball,   40  N.    Y.   399  ;   Ingraham    v.   l)is-  infra,  and  to  confine  it  to  the  doctrine  as 

borough,  47  N.  Y.  421  ;  Cutts  v.  Guild,  57  laid  down  in  McNeil  v.  Tenth  Nat.  Bank, 

N.  Y.  229,  232,  233.    In  the  last  case  Bush  inft-a. 


126  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

title  of  the  first  assignee  or  holder  was  not  absolute  and  perfect. 
After  some  conflict  of  opinion  in  the  lower  courts,  the  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  has  recently  applied  the  foregoing  doctrine  to 
the  customary  mode  of  dealing  with  certificates  of  stock.  It 
holds  that  if  the  owner  of  such  stock  certificates  assigns  them  as 
collateral  security,  or  pledges  them,  or  puts  them  into  the  hands 
of  another  for  any  purpose,  and  accompaiiies  the  deliver}^  by  a 
blank  assignment  and  power  of  attorney  to  transfer  the  same  in 
the  usual  form,  signed  by  himself,  and  this  assignee  or  pledgee 
wrongfully  sells  them  to  an  innocent  purchaser  for  value  in  the 
regular  course  of  business,  such  original  owner  is  estopped  from 
asserting,  as  against  this  purchaser  in  good  faith,  his  own  higher 
title  and  the  want  of  actual  title  and  authority  in  his  own  imme- 
diate assignee  or  pledgee.  This  principle,  thus  applied  to  the 
peculiar  state  of  facts  described,  and  to  the  particular  kind  of 
securities,  is  in  no  respect  necessarily  antagonistic  to  the  general 
doctrine  in  relation  to  things  in  action  before  stated  in  the  text. 
The  court  rested  its  decision  exclusively  upon  the  form  of  the 
blank  assignment  and  power  of  attorney  executed  by  the  assignor 
and  delivered  to  the  assignee,  which  clothed  him  with  all  the 
apparent  rights  of  ownership  which  are  recognized  by  business 
men  in  their  usual  course  of  dealing  with  like  securities,  as  suffi- 
cient to  confer  a  complete  title  and  power  of  disposition  upon  the 
assignee.  The  decision  was  nothing  more  than  the  application 
of  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  in  circumstances  to  which  it  had  not 
before  been  applied.^ 

1  McNeil  V.  Tenth  Nat.  Bank,  46  N.  Y.  particular  species  of  securit}'  then  before 

325,   reversing   s.  c.   55   Barb.    59.     The  the  court,  —  certificates  of  stock  in  stock 

Supreme  Court  held  (1)  that  certificates  corporations;  and,  while  he  does  not  claim 

of  stock  were   in    no    respect   negotiable,  for   them  absolute  negotiability,  he  does 

and  (2)  the  rule  as  laid  down  by  Denio  J.  in  fact  render  them  indirectly  negotiable 

in  Bush  v.  Lathrop.     The  law  of  estoppel  by  means   of   the   estoppel   which   arises 

w;ts  not  invoked  nor  alluded  to.     In  the  upon    ilealing  with    them  in  the  manner 

Court  (jf  Appeals  the  doctrine  of   latent  described,  which  is  the  mode  universally 

eijuities  was  discussed  ;  the  dcci.sion  of  the  j)revalent  among  business  men.     Ballard 

court  in  Bush  c.  Lathrop,  and  the  reason-  ;•.   Burgett,  40  N.  Y.  ."{14.     In    Ilolbrook 

ing  of  Mr.  Justice  Denio,  were  expressly  r.  N.  .1.  Zinc  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  616,  622,  623, 

recognized  as  correct,  and  as  applicable  to  the   doctrine  of   estoppel  was  applied  to 

all  cases  in  which  the  facts  do  not  warrant  the   corporation    itself,  whose  stock    had 

the   application    of  the    princijde    of    e.s-  been  transferred  in  good  faith,  and  in  the 

toppfl.     Mr.  Justice  Kapallo,  in  his  al)le  usual  manner,  to  the  jdaintiff.     McNeil 

judgment,  does   not   discuss   the  rule    in  c  Tenth  Nat.  Bank,  snpta,  and  Leitch  r. 

relation  to  things  in  action  of  all  kinds;  Wells,    48    N.   Y.   5S5,   were    held    to   be 

he   confines    himself   exclusively   to    the  controlling;  and   Leilwicb  v.  McKim,  53 


EQUITIES    BF.TWEEN    ASSIGNOR    AND   ASSIGNEE.  127 

^  89.  *161.  Extension  of  Doctrine  of  Estoppel  to  all  Things  in 
Action,  making  them  all  practically  Negotiable.  This  clecisioil, 
and  the  rule  which  it  establishes  in  reference  to  certificates  of 
stock,  are  doubtless  in  the  interests  of  modern  business  methods. 
For  several  years  these  certificates  of  stock,  with  an  assignment 
in  blank  and  a  blank  power  of  attorney  to  effect  their  surrender 
and  transfer,  have  been  practically  regarded  by  business  men  as 
negotiable  instruments;  they  have  been  used,  transferred  from 
hand  to  hand,  and  assigned  by  delivery,  in  exactly  the  same 
manner  as  bills  and  notes  payable  to  bearer,  and  millions  of 
property  are  constantly  ventured  upon  their  use.  It  was  a 
matter  of  absolute  necessity  that  the  courts  should  pronounce 
these  securities  practically  negotiable ;  a  contrary  ruling  would 
have  interrupted  and  jeoparded  the  whole  financial  system  of 
the  country.  It  would  have  been  well  if  the  court  had  boldly 
met  the  question  face  to  face,  and  liad  expressly  held  these 
securities  to  be  negotiable  to  all  intents  and  purposes.  This 
course  of  decision  would  have  produced  no  unexpected  interfer- 
ence with  other  general  doctrines,  and  it  has  a  precedent  in  the 
acts  of  the  American  courts  holding  that  municipal  and  corpora- 
tion coupon  bonds  of  the  ordinary  form  are  negotiable.  As  the 
court  did  not  pursue  this  course,  it  accomplished  the  same  pur- 
pose by  resorting  to  the  doctrine  of  estoppel ;  and  I  repeat,  that. 
when  confined  to  these  peculiar  forms  of  securities  wdiich  had 
been  made  practically  negotiable  by  the  course  of  business,  the 
judgment  and  its  ratio  decidendi  do  not  affect  the  general  prin- 
ciple in  relation  to  the  transfer  of  things  in  action  which  has 
been  stated  and  illustrated  in  preceding  paragraphs.  But  the 
same  court  has,  in  a  still  later  case,  gone  far  beyond  both  the 
conclusions  and  the  reasoning  of  its  judgment  in  McNeil  v.  Tenth 
National  Bank,  and  has  virtually  obliterated  the  distinction 
between  negotiable  and  non-negotiable  things  in  action,  at  least 
so  far  as  the  relations  between  assignors  and  assignees  of  them 
are  concerned.  The  doctrine  of  estoppel,  which  had  been  used 
to  protect  the  customary  modes  of  transacting  business  with 
certificates  of  stock,  is  now  extended  to  all  species  of  things  in 

N.  Y.  307,  was   said   not   to   conflict   in  stolen  and  transferred  in  the  customary 

any    manner.     It    is   decided   in   Nevada  manner  to  a /^ona^c/e  purchaser  for  value, 

that  certificates  of  stock  in  the  ordinary  the  latter  acquired  no  title  as  against  the 

form  are  not  negotiable   instruments,  so  owner.     Bercich  v.  Marye,  9  Nev.  312. 
that    when    such    certificates    had    been 


128  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

action,  and  the  effect  of  an  estoppel  is  declared  to  be  produced 
from  ((  mere  assignment  of  the  securiti/,  absolute  on  its  face,  executed 
bi/  the  original  owner,  (ind  delivered  to  his  assignee.  In  short, 
whenever  the  owner  of  a  non-negotiable  thing  in  action  delivers 
the  same  to  another  person,  and  accompanies  the  delivery  by  an 
assignment  thereof,  absolute  on  its  face,  and  this  person  transfers 
the  same  to  a  purchaser  for  value  who  relies  upon  the  apparent 
ownerehip  created  by  the  written  assignment,  and  has  no  notice 
of  anything  limiting  that  apparent  title,  the  original  owner  is 
estopped  from  asserting  as  against  such  purchaser  any  equities 
existing  between  himself  and  his  immediate  assignee,  and  any 
interest  or  property  in  the  security  which  he  may  have,  notwith- 
standing the  written  transfer.  The  Court  of  Appeals,  in  reach- 
ing this  conclusion,  expressly  overrules  the  decision  made  upon 
the  facts  involved  in  Bush  v.  Lathrop,  but  at  the  same  time 
declares  that  ic  does  not  intend  to  shake  the  general  doctrine 
controlling  the  transfer  of  non-negotiable  things  in  action  upon 
whiuh  that  decision  is  based.  It  is  plain,  however,  that  the 
ancient  and,  as  it  was  supposed,  well-settled  doctrine  is  sub- 
stantially abrogated  by  this  last  application  of  the  principle  of 
estoppel.  The  estoppel  is  made  to  arise  from  a  mere  naked 
transfer  in  writing,  absolute  in  form;  the  rationale  of  the  deci- 
sion is  the  apparent  ownership  thus  bestowed  upon  the  assignee ; 
and  these  elements  of  the  judgment  will  clearly  apply  to  so  many 
cases  that  things  in  action  are  practically  rendered  negotiable  in 
their  nature  as  between  the  series  of  successive  holders,  —  the 
assignors  and  assignees.  This  point  being  attained,  it  will  be  a 
short  and  easy  step  to  apply  the  doctrine  of  estoppel  to  the  debtor 
himself,  —  the  obligor  or  promisor  who  utters  the  security.  If 
negotiability  is  produced  by  means  of  estoppel  between  the 
assignor  and  assignee,  arising  from  the  fact  and  form  of  a  trans- 
fer from  one  to  another,  by  parity  of  reasoning  the  debtor  may 
be  regarded  as  estopped  l)y  the  fact  and  form  of  his  issuing  the 
undertaking  and  delivering  it  to  the  tirst  holder,  and  thus  creat- 
ing an  apparent  liability  against  himself.  In  short,  there  is 
exactly  the  same  reason  for  holding  the  debtor  estopped  from 
denying  his  liability  upon  a  written  instrument  which  ai)parently 
creates  an  absolute  liability,  when  that  instrument  lias  passed 
into  the  hands  of  a  purchaser  wlio  has  no  notice  of  tlie  actual 
relations  Ijctween  the  original  parties,  as  for  holding  an  assign  )r 


EQUITIES    BETWEEN    ASSIGNOU    AND    ASSIGNKK.  129 

estopped  from  denying  the  completeness  of  a  transfer  made  by 
liim  absolute  on  the  face.  This  result,  if  reached,  would  render 
all  things  in  action  practically  negotiable.^ 

§  90.  *  162.  Recapitulation  of  Rules  Established  independently 
of  the  Codes.  As  the  result  of  adjudications  of  which  the  fore- 
going are  examples,  the  rules  of  the  law  as  established  independ- 
ently of  the  codes  may  be  summed  up  in  the  following  manner: 
(1)  All  defences,  either  legal  or  equitable,  which  existed  in  favor 
of  the  debtor  himself  against  the  original  creditor  at  the  time  of 
the  assignment,  or  of  notice  to  him  of  the  assignment,  of  a  non- 
negotiable  thing  in  action,  avail  to  him  against  the  assignee  who 
seeks  to  enforce  the  demand  against  such  debtor;  (2)  When  the 
owner  and  holder  of  a  non-negotiable  thing  in  action  transfers  it 
to  an  assignee  for  a  special  purpose  —  such  as  security  for  a  loan, 
and  the  like  —  by  an  assignment  absolute  on  its  face,  but  as 
between  himself  and  his  assignee  retains  an  interest  in  or  claim 
upon  the  demand,  and  this  assignee  assumes  to  transfer  the  same 
absolutely  to  a  second  assignee  who  purchases  in  good  faith 
without  notice  and  for  value,  the  first  assignee  in  fact  transfers 
no  higher  title  than  he  possesses,  and  the  second  assignee  takes 
the  thing  in  action  subject  to  the  equities  and  claims  of  the 
original  assignor;  but  (3)  in  the  State  of  New  York  a  modification 
of  this  second  rule  has  been  introduced  in  very  recent  decisions, 
and  in  pursuance  thereof,  if  the  original  owner  accompanies  the 
delivery  of  the  thing  in  action  with  a  written  assignment  thereof 
absolute  in  form,  and  therefore  apparently  vesting  the  complete 
ownership  in  his  immediate  assignee,  an  innocent  purchaser  for 
value  from  the  latter  is  protected  against  any  claims,  demands, 
or  equities  existing  in  favor  of  the  first  assignor;  the  latter  is 
estopped  from  asserting  his  true  right  and  property  in  the  secur- 
ity. This  modification,  which  was  at  first  confined  to  certificates 
of  stock  transferred  by  means  of  the  customary  blank  assignment 
and  power  of  attorney,  has  been  extended  to  all  things  in  action. 

§  91.  *  163.  Effect  of  Code  Provision  upon  Defence  of  Set-off. 
No  Substantial  Change.  What  construction  has  been  put  by  the 
courts  upon  the  provision  of  the  codes  embodying  and  reaffirming 
these  general  rules  ?  I  shall  consider  in  the  first  place  the  effect 
of  this  provision  upon  the  defence  of  set-off.  No  substantial 
change  has  been  made  in  the  rights  of  the  several  parties.     The 

1  Moore  v.  Metropolitan  Nat.  Bank,  55  N.  Y.  41. 

9 


130  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

assignee  takes  the  demand  assigned  subject  to  all  the  rights 
which  the  debtor  had  acquired  prior  to  the  assignment,  or  prior 
to  the  time  when  notice  was  given,  if  there  was  an  interval 
between  the  execution  of  the  transfer  and  the  notice;  but  he 
cannot  be  prejudiced  by  any  new  dealings  between  the  original 
parties  after  notice  of  the  assignment  has  been  given  to  the 
debtor.  When  two  opposing  debts  exist  in  a  perfect  condition 
at  the  same  time,  either  party  may  insist  upon  a  set-off.  If, 
therefore,  the  holder  of  sucli  a  claim  already  due  and  payable 
assign  the  same,  and  the  debtor  at  the  time  of  tliis  transfer  holds 
a  similar  claim  against  the  assignor,  which  is  also  then  due  and 
payable,  he  may  set  off  his  debt  against  the  demand  in  the  hands 
of  the  assigrnee.  If,  however,  the  assignment  is  made  before  the 
opposing  demand  becomes  mature,  and  the  latter  does  not  thus 
become  actually  due  and  payable  until  after  the  transfer,  the 
debtor's  right  of  set-off  is  destroyed  by  the  mere  fact  of  the 
assignment,  and  no  notice  thereof  to  him  is  necessary  to  produce 
that  effect.^  The  following  special  rule  also  exists  under  the 
peculiar  circumstances  mentioned.  If  an  insolvent  holder  of  a 
claim  not  yet  matured  assigns  the  same  before  maturity,  and  the 
debtor  at  the  time  of  this  transfer  holds  a  similar  claim  against 
the  assignor,  which  is  then  due  and  payable,  his  right  of  set-off 
against  the  assignee,  when  the  latter's  cause  of  action  arises,  is 
preserved  and  protected. ^     This  latter   doctrine   is  based   upon 

1  [[  This  is  not  the  rule  in  California,  against  D.  as  a  valid  set-off.     The  statute 

In   St.  Louis  Nat.  Bank   v.   Gay    (1894),  provided  that  "  In  the  case  of  an  assign- 

101  Cal.  286,  35  I'ac.  876,  the  facts  were  meiit  of  a  thing  in  action,  the  action  hy 

as  follows:    On   Feb.  4,   1891,  defendant  the  a.ssignee  is  without  prejudice  to  any 

made  and  delivered  to  D.  two  non-nego-  set-off  or   other  defence  existing  at  the 

tiahle  notes  payable  one  year  from  date,  time   of  or   before   notice  of  tiie  assigu- 

which  1).  assigned  on  Feb.  24,   1891,   to  nient,"  Code  of  Civ.  Pro,  §  .'?68 ;  and  it 

plaintiff.     On  Feb.  12,  1891,  D.  made  and  was  contended   by   plaintiff   that  at   the 

delivered  his  negotiable  note,  payable  one  time  of  the  notice  of  jussignment  defend- 

year  from  date,  to  C,  which  was  regularly  ant's  demand  against  1).  was  not  an  exist- 

assigned   to  defendant  on  Oct.  21,   1891.  ing  set-off,  becau.se  it  was  not  then  due. 

Wlien  defendant  purchased   D.'s  note  he  But  the  court  held  that  the  thing  itself  — 

liad  no  notice  that  his  note  to  1).  had  been  the  note,  the  chose  in  action  —  was  then 

assigned,  and  was  not  notified  thereof  until  existing,  which  satisfied  tiie  statute.] 
Feb.  1,  1892.     Thus,  neither  at  the  time  {jrac  §  *  797,  infra,  and  notes.] 

of   the   assignment  by  D.  of  defendant's  '-  {_h\    the    case  of   Storts    v.   George 

notes  nor  at  the  time  when  notice  of  such  (1899),  1.50  Mo.  1,  ."jl  S.  \V.  489,  the  court 

assignment  was  given  to  defendant,  were  said :    "  It  has   been  often   ruled    in   the 

any   of   the   demands   due    and    payable.  State  of  New  York,  and  is  now  the  law 

But  it  was  held  that  in  a  suit  by  plaintiff  in  this  State,  that,  if  tlie  claim  against  the 

on  defendant's  notes,  commenced  Aug.  1,  assignee  was  due  at  the  date  of  the  as- 

1892,  defendant  might  plead  his  demand  eigunicnt,  then  there  is  an  equity  because 


EQUITIES    r.ETWEEN    ASSIGNOR    AND    ASSIGNEE. 


131 


considerations  of  equity,  and  is  intended  to  prevent  one  party 
from  losing  his  own  demand  on  account  of  the  insolvency  of  Ins 
immediate  debtor,  an.d  from  being  at  the  same  time  compelled 
to  pay  the  debt  originally  due  from  himself  to  that  insolvent. 
These  three  rules  existed  prior  to  the  codes,  and  have  not  been 
changed  by  the  provisions  of  the  statute  under  consideration.^ 


of  the  insolvency  of  the  assignor,  and  the 
debt  so  due  may  he  set  off  against  the 
claim  in  favor  of  the  assignee,  though 
the  claim  held  by  the  assignee  was  not 
due  at  the  date  of  the  assignment.  .  .  . 
But  the  claim  against  the  assignee  must 
be  due  at  tlie  date  of  the  assignment,  and 
if  it  is  not  then  due,  there  is  no  equitable 
set-off."  See  also  Homer  v.  Bank  of 
Commerce  (1897),  140  Mo.  225,  41  S.  W. 
790. 

But  in  St.  Paul,  etc.  Trust  Co.  v.  Leek 
(1894),  57  Minn.  87,  58  N.  W.  826,  the 
court  held  that  this  equitable  right  of  set- 
off was  available  against  an  assignee  wlien 
the  opposing  claim  held  by  the  defendant 
was  not  only  unmatured  at  the  time  of 
the  assignment,  but  was  not  due  at  the 
time  the  set-off  was  pleaded.  Same  rule 
affirmed  in  Stolze  i'.  Bank  of  Minnesota 
(1897),  67  Minn.  172,  G9  N.  W.  172.  In 
Lay  bourn  v.  Seymour  (189.3),  53  Minn. 
105,  54  N.  W.  941,  defendants  were  in- 
debted to  a  corporation  on  account.  They 
also  held  the  express  contract  oliligation 
of  the  corporation  to  deliver  a  certain 
amount,  in  value,  of  manufactured  goods. 
In  an  action  on  the  account  brought  by 
the  general  assignee  of  the  corporation, 
the  defendants  properly  set  off  their  claim 
again.st  the  corporation,  though  no  demand 
had  been  made  for  the  goods,  the  insol- 
vency and  assignment  making  the  demand 
unnecessarv. 

The  einiitable  riglit  of  set-off  cannot  be 
used  to  obtain  an  unjust  preference  by  a 
creditor  of  an  insolvent  debtor.  Thus,  in 
Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Healy  (1895),  61 
Minn.  230,  6.3  N.  W.  625,  where  the 
debtor  of  an  insolvent  purchased  a  claim 
held  by  a  third  person  against  tlie  insol- 
vent, for  the  purpose  of  using  tlie  same 
as  a  set-off,  having  reasonable  cause  to 
believe,  when  he  purcliased  it,  that  his 
creditor  was  insolvent  it  was  held  that  he 
could  not  use  the  claim  as  a  set-off.] 


i  [Stadler  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1899), 
22  Mont.  190,  56  I'ac.  Ill,  quoting  §  *163 
of  the  text  with  approval.]  Beckwith  v. 
Union  Bank,  9  N.  Y.  211;  Myers  v. 
Davis,  22  N.  Y.  489  ;  .Martin  ?'.  Kunzmul- 
ler,37  N.  Y.  396  ;  Blydenburgh  v.  Thayer, 
3  Keyes,  293;  34  How.  Pr.  88;  Watt  v. 
Mayor,  etc.,  1  Sandf.  23;  Wells  r. 
Stewart,  3  Barb.  40 ;  Ogden  v.  Prentice, 
33  Barb.  160;  Adams  r.  Rodarmel,  19 
lud.  339;  Morrow's  Assignees  c.  Bright, 
20  Mo.  298';  Walker  v.  McKay,  2  Mete. 
(Ky.)  294;  Roberts  v.  Carter,' 38  N.  Y. 
1U7;  Williams  ?:.  Brown,  2  Keyes,  486; 
Piobinson  o.  Howes,  20  N.  Y.  84  ;  ]\Iaas  v. 
Goodman,  2  Hilt,  275  ;  Merrill  v.  Green, 
55  N.  Y.  270,  274 ;  Lathrop  v.  Godfrey,  6 
N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  96;  Frick  v.  White,  57 
N.  Y.  103;  Gildersleeve  v.  Burrows,  24 
Ohio  St.  204.  When  negotiable  paper  is 
transferred  after  maturity,  tlie  maker  has 
the  same  right  to  avail  himself  of  a  claim 
against  the  assignor  as  a  set-off  that  he 
would  have  if  the  demand  assigned  was 
not  negotiable.  Norton  v.  Foster,  12  Kan. 
44,  47,  48 ;  Leavenson  v.  Lafontane,  3 
Kan.  523,  526.  As  further  illustrations  of 
the  text,  see  Martin  v.  Pilsbnry,  23  Minn. 
175;  Davis  v.  Sutton,  23  id.  307  ;  Davis  v. 
Neligh,  7  Neb.  84 ;  Downing  v.  Gibson, 
53  Iowa,  517;  Chapman  v.  Plumer,  36 
Wis.  2G2  ;  Harte  v.  Houchin,  50  Ind.  327  ; 
Heavenridge  v.  Mondy,  49  Ind.  434  ;  Tur- 
ner V.  Campbell,  59  Ind.  279  ;  Barlow  v. 
Mvers,  64  N.  Y.  41,  reversing  3  Hun,  720; 
6  T.  &  C.  183  ;  Shipman  v.  Lansing,  25 
Hun,  290;  Seymour  v.  Dunham,  24  id. 
93  ;  Taylor  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  20  id.  292  ; 
Huse  V.  Ames,  104  Mo.  91  ;  IJayburn  v. 
Hurd.  20  Or.  229  ;  Fuller  v.  Sciglitz,  27 
Ohio  St.  355.  The  defendant,  it  has  been 
held,  in  pleading  his  set-off  or  counter- 
claim must  allege  tli.at  it  matured  before 
the  assignment  of  the  claim  on  which  he 
is  sued.  Francis  v.  Leak  (Ind.  App.,  1893), 
33  N.  E.  807.     In  .support  of   the  tliird 


132  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

§  92.  *  164.  Illustrations.  The  true  extent  and  limitiitions 
of  the  doctrine  will  best  he  seen  in  its  application  to  the  facts 
of  decided  cases.  On  the  24th  of  August,  1850,  the  firm  of 
W.  C.  &  A.  A.  Hunter,  having  on  deposit  in  the  Union  Bank 
the  sum  of  S3, 000,  made  a  general  assignment  to  one  Beck  with. 
At  the  time  the  bank  was  holder  of  a  bill  of  exchange,  which 
was  indorsed  by  the  firm  and  had  been  discounted  by  the  bank 
for  them.  This  bill  fell  due  on  the  27th  of  August,  and,  not 
being  paid,  the  amount  of  it  was  charged  against  the  firm  in  their 
account  by  the  bank.  On  the  next  day,  the  28th,  the  assignee 
for  the  first  time  notified  the  bank  of  the  assignment,  and  de- 
manded payment  of  the  sum  on  deposit  to  the  firm's  credit, 
which  was  refused.  The  assignee  brought  a  suit  to  recover  the 
debt,  and  the  bank  set  up  the  amount  due  on  the  bill  of  exchange 
as  an  offset.  It  was  held  by  the  Superior  Court  of  New  York 
City,  and  by  the  Court  of  Appeals,  that  the  demand  in  favor  of 
the  bank  could  not  be  set  off,  as  it  was  not  an  existing  demand 
payable  when  the  assignment  was  made ;  and  that  no  notice  was 
necessary  by  the  assignee  to  protect  himself  against  such  a 
defence.  Notice  is  only  necessary  against  subsequent  acts  and 
dealings  of  the  debtor  with  an  assignor,  which  might  prejudice 
the  rights  of  the  assignee,  such  as  payment.^     In  March,  1855, 

(special)  rule  stated  in  the  text,  see  Smith  .indebtedness  to  him  of  the  assignor,  wlio 

V.  Sj)ingler,  83  Mo.  408;  Green  v.  Conrad  was  the  orii^inal   judgment   creditor,  ex- 

(Mo.  Suj),  1893),  21  S.  \V.  839  ;  Armstrong  isting  at  the  time  of  the  assignment  of 

V.   Warner   (Mhio,    1892),  31    N.   E.   877;  tlie  judgment. 

Fera  v.  Wickham,  61   Mun,  343  ;  Layhourn  Wolf  r.  Slielton  (1902),  1.59  lud.  531,  G.") 

*•.  Seymour  (Minn.,  1893),  54  N.  \V.  941,  N.    E.    582:  A    purchaser   of   real  estate 

and  cases  cited;   Vardley  r.  Clothier,  .51  under  a  warranty  deed  has  the  right  to  set 

Fed.    Kep.    508,   and   cases   cited  ;   Louis  off  against  his  warrantor's  assignee  of  a 

Snyder's  Sons  Co.  i'.  Armstrong,  37  Fed.  nnn-negotiable  note,  given  for  the  unpaid 

Rep.   18;  Balbach    »».    Frelinghuysen,    15  purchase  money,  a  sum  that  the  purchaser 

Fed.   Kep.  685;  Jones  v.  Pieuing  (Wis.,  has  been  coni])elled  to  pay  to  relieve  Ins 

18;t3),  55  N.  \V.  413.  jmrcha.'ie  from  a  ])re-existing  debt.] 

Qln  Wyman   v.  Hobbins   (1894),  51  O.  i  Beckwith  f.  Union  Hank,  9  N.  Y.  211. 

St.  98, 37  N.  E.  264,  it  was  held  that  wiiere  212.    QSce,  as  to  necessity  of  notice,  Stadler 

an  indorsee  of  a  promijjsory  note  brings  r.  Fir.-^t  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  22  Mont.  190,  56 

an  action  on  it  against  the  maker,  the  latter  Pac.  111.]     See,  however.  Smith  v.  Fox, 

may  set  off  an  indebtedness  due  him  from  48  N.  Y.  674,  which  was  an  action  by  an 

a  previ(jus  ind<jrsee,  wlien  sucli  indebted-  assignee  for  the  benefit  of  the  creditors  of 

ness  existed  wliile  sucli  indor.see  held  the  one  R.,  a  private  banker,  brought  on  a  note 

note  and  botli  note  and  indebtedness  were  given  by  defendant  to  R.,  and  transferred 

then  past  due.  to  the  plaintiff.     At  the  time  of  the  assigu- 

Way  V.  Colyer  (1893),  54  Minn.  14,  55  ment  <lefendant  had  an  amount  of  money 

N.  W.  744:   In  an  action  by  aa  assignee  on  deposit  with  R.,  —  more  tlian  sufficient 

of  a  judgment,  the  defendant  may  plead  to  pay  the  note  ;  and  this  demand  was  hcM 

aa   a  set-off    against    tiie    judgment    an  to  be  a  good  setoff  against  the  note,  on 


SET-OFF    AGAINST    THE    ASSIGNEE.  133 

the  firm  of  Watrous  &  Lawrence  made  a  general  assignment  to 
one  Meyers,  having  before  that  time  sold  goods  to  the  defendants 
on  credit,  the  price  of  which  did  not  become  due  and  payable 
until  September,  1855.  In  February  of  the  same  year,  W.  &  L. 
had  ordered  from  the  defendants  a  (piantity  of  articles  —  patent 
churns  —  to  be  manufactured  and  delivered  at  a  certain  agreed 
price.  There  had  been  such  mutual  dealings  between  the  parties 
before.  In  May,  1855,  the  defendants  completed  the  churns, 
and  tendered  them  to  the  assignee,  who  declined  to  receive  them. 
The  assignee  brought  an  action  foi-  the  price  of  the  goods  when 
it  became  due  in  September,  and  the  defendants  insisted  upon 
the  value  of  the  churns  as  an  offset.  The  defence  of  offset  was 
rejected.  The  court  held  that  the  situation  of  the  parties  at  the 
date  of  the  assignment  must  determine  the  question,  and  unless 
a  right  of  offset  existed  then,  it  could  not  arise  afterwards.  It 
did  not  exist  then,  because  neither  of  the  demands  had  matured; 
but  it  was  enough  that  the  defendant's  claim  was  not  yet  pay- 
able, even  if  the  one  assigned  was  presently  due.^  If  the 
defendant's  demand  had  become  mature  at  the  time  of  the  assign- 
ment, it  could  undoubtedly  have  been  set  off  under  the  equitable 
rule  before  stated,  on  account  of  the  insolvency  of  W.  &  L.  A 
tirm  made  a  general  assignment,  having  at  the  time  a  claim  due 
and  payable  against  the  defendants.  The  assignee  brings  an 
action  upon  the  demand,  and  the  defendants  set  up  a  note  of  the 
assignors  which  they  held  at  the  time  of  the  assignment,  but 
which  did  not  fall  due  until  after  that  date.  The  attempted  set- 
off was  rejected.  "An  allowance  to  a  party  by  way  of  set-off  is 
always  founded  on  an  existing  demand  in  priesenti,  and  not  on 
one  that  may  be  claimed  in  futuro.^'"^     In  an  action  bv  an  as- 

the  authority  of  Smith  v.  Felton,  43  N.  Y.  See  also  Fera  r.  Wiciihani,  135  N.  Y.  223, 
419.  The  claim  made  against  the  defend-  reversing  s.  c.  61  Hnn,  343,  and  over- 
ant,  and  the  demand  set  up  by  him,  ruling  llothschild  v.  Mack,  42  Hun,  73. 
must  both  affect  him  iu  the  same  capac-  In  Kentucky,  however,  the  assignor's  insol- 
ity  ;  thus,  when  the  defendant  is  sued  for  vcncy  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  allowing  the 
a  personal  debt,  he  cannot  interpose  as  a  set-off  of  a  claim  not  due  at  the  time  of 
set-off  a  demand  due  him  as  au  executor,  the  assignment.  Kentucky  Flour  Co.'s 
Barlow  v.  Myers,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  183.  As.signee  r.  Merchants'  Bank  (Ky.,  1890), 
5  Myers  v.  Davis,  22  N.  Y.  489,  490,  13  S.  W.  910.  |[Samc  rule  in  Minnesota: 
citing  Chance  v.  Isaacs,  5  Paige,  592;  St.  Paul,  etc.  Trust  Co.  c  Leek  (1894),  57 
Bradley  v.  Angell,  3  N.  Y.  475,  493.  Minn.  87,  58  N.  W.  826.] 
[|This  case,  Myers  v.  Davis,  was  quoted  '^  Martin  v.  Kunzmuller,  37  N.  Y.  396  ; 
and  approved  in  Stadler  v.  First  Nat.  Watt  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  1  Sandf.  23 ; 
Bank  (1899),  22  Mont.   190,  56  Pac.  111]  Wells  r.   Stewart,  3   Barb.  40. 


134  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

signee  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  the  defendant  relied  upon  a 
judgment  for  costs  recovered  by  himself  against  the  assignor 
after  the  making  of  the  transfer.  This  set-off  was  not  admitted, 
and  it  was  decided  that  no  notice  of  the  assignment  was  neces- 
sary to  cut  off  such  a  defence.^  And  when  the  defendants,  in 
an  action  brought  upon  an  assigned  demand,  alleged  payments 
which  they  had  made,  subsequent  to  the  assignment,  as  sureties 
for  the  assignor  upon  a  liability  existing  prior  to  and  at  the  time 
thereof,  this  set-off  was  overruled  on  the  same  principle ;  for, 
although  there  was  a  liability  which  might  result  in  a  debt,  there 
was  no  existing  debt  until  the  payment  had  actually  been  made.^ 
In  another  action  by  an  assignee  the  defendant  insisted  that  a 
similar  set-off  arising  from  his  payment  as  surety  for  the  assignor, 
made  under  the  same  circumstances  as  the  last,  should  be  allowed 
as  within  the  equitable  rule  on  account  of  the  assignor's  insol- 
vency. The  set-off  was  rejected,  however,  because  there  was  no 
existing  indebtedness  in  favor  of  the  defendant  against  the  as- 
signor at  the  date  of  the  assignment.  Such  a  present  indebted- 
ness is  indispensable,  whether  the  case  is  to  be  governed  by  the 
ordinary  rule,  or  whether  the  equitable  doctrine  based  upon  the 
assignor's  insolvency  ^  is  relied  upon.*     When  a  negotiable  proni- 

1  Ogden  y.  Prentice,  33  Barb.  160.     See  tomers ;  and  that  it  does  not  become  so 

also  Lucas  v.  East  Stroudsburg  Glass  Co.,  until,  at  the  least,  it  commits  an  act  of  in- 

38  Hun,  581.  solvency,  and  probably  not  until  it  sus^pends 

-  Adams  v.  Rrjdarmel,  19  Ind.  339.  payment  or  is  closed  by  the  governme'nt."] 
3  QThe  meaning  of   the  word  "  insol-         '«  Walker  y.  McKay,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  294. 

vency,  "  as   used  in  this  connection,  was  [^And  in  Merchants' Nat.  Bank  y.  Robinson 

con.sidered  by  the  supreme  court  of  Mon-  (1895),   97    Ky.  552,  31    S.   W.    136,  the 

tana  in  Stadler  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  court  said  :  "An  unmatured  debt  cannot 

22  Mont.   190,  56  Pac.    111.     The  court,  be  set  off  against  a  /wHayj(/e  assignee  for 

after  quoting  the   above   portion   of   tbe  value  of  a  demand  due  from  the  defend- 

text,   said :    "  Insolvency  has   two    mean-  ant  to  the  assignor."   See  also  Stadler  v. 

ings.     In    its    popular   sense,  it    signifies  First  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  22  Mont.  190,56 

the   condition   of   a   person   whose  entire  Pac.  Ill,  quoting  the  te.xt.     See,  to  the 

assets  are   insufficient   to   pay    his   debts  contrary,    Stolze    v.    Bank  of    Minnesota 

in    full.     The     terra    is,    however,    used  (1897),  67  Minn.  172,69  N.  W.  172;  St. 

in    a    restricted    sense    to    express    the  Paul,  etc.,  Trust  Co.   v.   Leek   (1894),  57 

present   ability   of   a   trader   to   pay    his  Minn.  87,  58  N.  W.  826  ;  St.  Louis  Nat. 

current  obligations  as  they  mature,  in  tbe  Bank  v.  Gay  (1894),  101  Cal.  286,  35  Pac. 

usual   course   of    business.  .  .  .  Tlie    Na-  870.]     See,"  however,  Morrow's  Assignees 

tional  Bank  Act  seems  strongly  to  imply  r.  Hriglit,  20  Mo.  298,  in  whidi  the  set-off 

that,  so  long  as  an  jissociation  is  carrying  was  allowed,  the  court  plainly  mistaking 

on  Its  business  and  meeting  its  obligations  or  misconceiving  the  extent  and  limita- 

as  they  mature,  whatever  its  actual  condi-  tions   of   the    equitable   doctrine   flowing 

tion  as  to  future  ability  may  be,  it  is,  in  from  the  insolvency  of  the  assignor.     See 

the  absence  of  fraud,  not  to  be  deemed  in-  also  the  decision  iii  Chenault  v.  Bush,  84 

solvent,   as   betweeu    itself    and   its   cu.s-  Kv.    528,    which    is    similar    to    that    iu 


SET-OFF   AGAINST  THE    ASSIGNEE.  135 

issory  note  is  assigned  before  it  becomes  due,  the  maker  thereof 
cannot  offset  against  the  assignee  a  claim  existing  against  the 
original  payee  and  assignor  of  the  note,  although  the  assignee 
liave  notice  of  such  claim  at  and  before  the  time  of  the  transfer 
to  him ;  there  is  no  case  for  the  set-off  between  the  original 
parties  at  the  date  of  the  assignment,  because  the  demands  are 
not  then  matured,  and  the  notice  given  to  the  assignee  is  not  of 
any  existing  legal  defence.^  There  being  no  possibility  of  setting 
off  a  claim  of  damages  arising  from  a  tort  or  fraud  against  a 
demand  growing  out  of  contract,  if  two  such  opposing  claims 
exist  and  are  in  suit,  and  the  creditor  in  the  contract  assigns  his 
cause  of  action,  which  is  afterwards  merged  in  a  judgment  in 
favor  of  the  assignee,  and  subsequently  to  that  assignment  the 
opposing  party  —  the  debtor  in  the  contract  —  obtains  a  judgment 
for  the  damages  in  his  action  on  the  tort,  the  latter  is  not  entitled 
to  set  off  this  judgment  against  the  one  recovered  against  himself 
by  the  assignee.  No  rights  of  set-off  existed  at  the  date  of  the 
transfer,  and  none  could  spring  up  after  that  time.^ 

§  93.  *  165.  Right  of  Set-off  may  be  Available  although  once 
Suspended.  Illustration.  It  is  possible  that  a  right  of  set-otf 
may  be  available  at  the  time  an  action  is  brought,  although  at 
some  prior  period  it  was  suspended,  as  is  well  illustrated  by  the 
following  case:  On  the  29th  of  August  the  Hollister  Bank  dis- 
counted for  one  Monteath  a  sight  draft  on  New  York  drawn  by 
him,  and  passed  the  proceeds  to  his  credit  as  a  deposit.  He  did 
not  draw  them  out.     This  draft  was  dishonored  on  presentment. 

Morrow's  Assignees  r.  Bright.     The  latter  same  riglits  of  set-off  also  when  the  note 

case  has  recently  been  overruled  by  Huse  is  assigned  before   maturity,  but   not    iu 

V.  Ames,    104   Mo.   91,  and    the   rule   in  good   faith    and    for   a   valuable    consid- 

Walker  v.  McKay,  stated  in  the  text,  now  eration.     Bone  v.   Tharp,    63   Iowa,  223. 

prevails  in  Missouri.     See  also,  in  support  In  Richards  v.  Union  Village,  48  Hun,  263, 

of  the  text,  Kinsey  v.  Ring  (Wis.,  1892),  and  in  Richards  v.  La  Tourette,  .53  Ilun, 

53  N.  W.  842.  623,  claims  iu  the  hands  of  the  defendants 

1  Williamsr.  Brown,  2  Keyes,486.    See  were  not  allowed  to  be  offset  against  de- 

also  Barlow  v.  Myers,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  183  ;  mauds  sued  upon  by  assignees  not  due  at 

s.  c.  reversed  on  appeal,  64  N.  Y.  41.     But,  the  time  of  the  assignment;    in  the  first 

where  negotiable  paper  is  assigned  after  case,  against  an  order  for  the  payment  of 

maturity,   the    maker's    rights  of    set-off  money;  in  the  second  case,  against  a  bond 

are    the    same    as    though    the    demand  and  mortgage.     It  is  fair  to  say,  however, 

assigned  was  not  negotiable.     Norton   v.  that  in  neither  of  these  cases  was  Barlow 

Foster,  12  Kan.  44,  47,  48;  Leavenson  r.  v.  Myers  mentioned. 

Lafontane,  3  Kan.  523  ;  Harris  v.  Burwell,  2  Roberts  v.  Carter,  38  N.  Y.  107.    See 

65  N.  C.  584 ;  contra,  Richards  r.  Darly,  Martin  v.  Richardson,  68  N.  C.  255. 
34  Iowa,  427,  429.     The   maker  has  the 


136  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

On  the  31st  the  bank  failed,  and  in  the  course  of  time  Robinson 
was  appointed  its  receiver.  On  the  21st  of  September  ISIonteath 
assigned  to  the  Howes  liis  chiim  against  the  bank  for  the  sum  on 
deposit,  the  same  being  partly  or  wholly  the  proceeds  of  the  said 
draft.  At  the  time  of  the  assignment  the  draft  in  question  was. 
held  by  parties  in  New  York,  to  whom  the  bank  had  transferred 
it  as  collateral  security;  and,  of  course,  during  the  interval  in 
which  the  draft  was  thus  held,  the  bank  could  have  had  no  pos- 
sible set-off  by  means  of  it  against  the  demand  of  Monteath  for 
his  deposit,  either  made  by  him  or  by  his  assignee.  But  before 
any  action  was  brought,  the  bank  again  became  owner  of  the 
draft.  An  action  was  afterwards  commenced  by  the  receiver  ta 
recover  an  indebtedness  due  to  the  bank  from  the  Howes;  they 
set  up  the  claim  of  Monteath  for  his  deposit  assigned  to  them, 
as  above  stated ;  and  the  receiver  in  fact  opposed  the  demand  of 
the  bank  against  Monteath  upon  the  dishonored  draft  as  a  set-off 
to  the  defendants'  set-off.^  Although  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals  held  that  the  debt  against  the  bank  assigned  to  the 
defendants  by  ^Monteath  should  be  disallowed,  yet  their  entire 
reasoning  shows  that  it  was  disallowed,  not  because  it  w^ould  not 
in  itself  have  been  a  valid  set-off,  but  because  its  effect  was 
entirely  destroyed  by  the  counter  set-off  of  the  draft  in  the 
hands  of  the  bank.  If  the  bank  had  retained  the  continuous 
ownership  of  the  draft,  as  soon  as  it  was  dishonored  it  would 
have  been  a  good  claim  against  Monteath,  and  w^ould  have  ex- 
tinguished, in  whole  or  in  part,  his  claim  for  the  money  due  on 
deposit;  this  set-off  existing  at  the  date  of  the  assignment  to  the 
defendants  would  have  been  equally  available  against  them ;  and 
as  the  bank  became  owner  of  the  draft  before  the  action  was 
brought,  its  original  right  revived  with  the  same  force  and  to 
the  same  extent  as  though  the  draft  had  never  been  out  of  its 
control. 2 

§  94.  *  166.  California  Rule.  Set-off  of  Demand  Accruing  after 
Assignment  but  before  Notice.  It  is  held,  ill  California,  that  a 
demand  against  an  assignor,  which  was  obtained  by  the  debtor 
or  accrued  in  his  favor  before  notice  of  the  assignment,  although 
in  fact  subsequent  to  tlie  assignment  itself,  may  be  set  off  against 

3  Qln  Ilaminer  v.  Downing  (1901 ),  39     stitutes   a   departure   in    pleading.      See, 
Ore.  504,  G4   I'ac.  051,  it  was  1ip1<1  that  a     however,  oases  cited  in  note  to  §  *748.] 
B€t-off  to  a  plea  of  set-off  is  had,  anil  con-  ^   Kohiusuu  r.  Howes,  20  X.  Y.  84. 


SET-OFF   AGAINST   THE    ASSIGNEF^  137 

the  cause  of  action  in  the  hands  of  the  assignee.  ^  This  ruling, 
however,  is  clearly  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  the  New  York 
cases  already  quoted,  and  to  the  theory  of  set-off  generally 
adopted.  Notice  may  be  required  in  order  to  cut  off  other 
defences ;  but  a  set-off,  according  to  the  accepted  rule,  must  exist 
in  the  form  of  a  debt  then  due  and  payable  to  the  debtor  at  the 
date  of  the  transfer.  A  note,  payable  on  demand,  with  or  with- 
out interest,  transferred  at  a  considerable  interval  of  time  after 
its  date,  is  taken  and  held  by  the  assignee,  subject  to  all  defences- 
existing  in  favor  of  the  maker  against  the  payee  at  the  time  of 
the  transfer;  in  other  words,  such  a  note  is  transferred  after 
maturity.^ 

§  95.  *  167.  Nature  of  Notice  Necessary  to  protect  Assignee. 
Defendant's  Rights  as  against  Assignee  purely  Defensive.  When 
notice  to  the  debtor  is  necessary  to  a  complete  protection  of  the 
assignee  against  subsequent  transactions  between  the  assignor 
and  the  debtor,  such  as  payment,  release,  and  the  like,  an  actual 
notice  is  not  indispensable.  Such  information  or  knowledge  as 
would  be  sufficient  to  put  any  reasonable  man  upon  the  inquiry, 
when  an  inquiry  reasonably  followed  up  would  have  led  to  an 
ascertaining  of  the  truth,  is  equally  effective  to  protect  the 
assignee;  in  short,  the  equitable  rule  in  reference  to  purchasers 
of  land  applies  to  the  assignees  of  things  in  action.^  In  Ohio,  a 
set-off  against  the  person  beneficially  interested,  for  whose  benefit 
the  suit  is  prosecuted,  may  be  interposed  when  the  action  is 
brought  by  one  who  is,  within  the  meaning  of  the  code,  a  trustee 
of  an  express  trust,  and  there  has  been  no  assignment  at  all. 
Thus,  where  a  promise  is  made  to  A.  for  the  benefit  of  B.,  and 

1  xMcCabe  v.  Grey,  20  Cal.  509.     [|The  after  the  as.sipiiment,  when  the  certificate 

case  of  McCabe  c  Grey  was  atiirmed  in  of  deposit  became  due  before  he  had  notice 

St.  Louis  Nat.  Bank '.-.  Gay  (1894),  101  Cal.  of  the  assignment.]]     See  also  Martin  v. 

286,  3.5  I'ac.  876,  the  court  saying:  "  Ap-  Well.*,  Fargo,  &  Co.'s  Exp.  (Ariz.,  1892), 

pellant  refers  to  the  fact  that  in  Pomeroy  28  Pac.  958. 

on  Remedies  and  Remedial  Rights,  §  *166,  "  Herrick  v.  Woolverton,  41  N.  Y.  581, 

McC'abe  y.  Grey,  20  Cal.  510,  was  hostilely  reversing    s.    c.   42   Barb.   50.     This  case 

criticised;  but  in  tliis  instance,  at  least,  <U'cides  notliing  new  in  the  law  of  set-off ; 

the   opinion    of   the   text-writer    has   not  it  simply  ends  a  long  controversy  in  the 

overruled  the  decision  of  the  court."  New    York    courts     upon     the    question 

The  same  rule  seems  to  obtain  in  Ken-  whether   notes   on    demand    with    intnest 

tucky.     In   Huber  i\  Egner  (1901),  Ky.,  are  continuing  securities,  or  whether,  like 

61  S.  W.  353,  it  was  held  that  the  maker  such  notes  without  interest,  they  become 

of  a  note  is  entitled,  in  an  action  by  the  due  at  once. 

assignee,  to  plead  as  a  set-off  the  amount  ''  Wilkius  v    Batterman,  4  Barb.  47  ; 

of  a  time  deposit  he  made  with  the  payee  Williamson  r.  Brown,  15  N.  Y.  354. 


138  CIVIL   llEMEDIES. 

the  former,  in  pursuance  of  the  express  permission  of  the  code, 
brings  the  action  in  his  own  name,  a  set-off  existing  against  B., 
who  is  the  real  party  in  interest,  the  beneficiary  for  whose  behalf 
the  contract  Avas  made  and  the  suit  is  maintained,  may  be  pleaded, 
and,  if  proved,  will  be  allowed  in  total  or  partial  "bar  of  the 
recovery.^  While  in  actions  prosecuted  by  assignees  the  defend- 
ant can  always  avail  himself  of  any  existing  valid  set-off,  and 
sometimes  counter-claim,  as  a  defence,  he  cannot  recover  a  judg- 
ment against  the  assignee  for  the  excess  of  any  of  his  claim  over 
the  amount  of  debt  established  by  the  plaintiff;  as  against  the 
assignee,  a  set-off  and  a  counter-claim  of  the  same  nature  —  that 
is,  a  right  of  action  which  would  be  a  counter-claim  if  prosecuted 
against  the  original  assignor  —  can  only  be  used  defensively',  and 
can  do  no  more  than  defeat  the  action  entirely.^ 

§  96.  *  168.  Actions  to  -wind  up  Insolvent  Corporations.  Doc- 
trine of  Set-off  Complicated  by  other  Considerations.  Many  diffi- 
culties have  arisen,  and  many  cases  have  been  decided,  growing 
out  of  proceedings  to  wind  up  insolvent  corporations,  and  espe- 
cially insolvent  insurance  companies ;  but,  as  the  questions 
generally  turned  upon  particular  provisions  of  charters,  or  of 
statutes  regulating  such  proceedings,  little  or  no  aid  can  be 
obtained  from  these  decisions  in  construing  the  section  of  the 
code  under  consideration.  A  portion  of  these  companies  were 
mutual,  in  which  every  person  assured  became  at  once  a  corpo- 
rator, so  that  in  any  business  transaction  between  himself  and 
the  company  he  would  necessarily  occupy  both  the  position  of 
creditor  and  of  debtor.  This  double  relation  is  destructive  to 
any  power  on  his  part  of  invoking  the  doctrine  of  set-off.  Other 
companies  were  stock  corporations,  and,  in  addition  to  the  rules 
as  to  set-off  common  to  all  creditors  and  debtors,  there  are  special 
statutory  provisions  in  many  States  regulating  the  winding  up  of 
these  bodies,  which  greatly  enlarge  the  scope  of  set-off.  The 
adjudications  made  in  the  settlement  of  such  corporations,  and 
the  particular  rules  applicable  to  them  adopted  by  the  courts, 
have,  therefore,  little  or  no  connection  with  the  subject-matter 
of  the  present  discussion.  In  the  case  of  a  mutual  company  there 
is    no   room  for  any  set-off,  as  has  been  expressly  determined. 

>  Miller  &  Co.  v.  Florcr,  1.")  Ohio  St.  525;  Looinis  v.  Eagle  Bank,  10  Ohio  St. 
148,  151.  .327  ;  Casad  v.  Hughes,  27  lud.  141. 

2  Leavenson  v.  Lafontaue,  3  Kaiis.  523, 


SET-OFF   AGAINST   THE    ASSIGNEE.  139 

A  marine  insurance  company  having  become  insolvent,  and  a 
receiver  of  its  affairs  appointed,  he  brought  an  action  on  certain 
notes  given  by  tlie  maker  thereof  for  the  premium  of  several 
policies  of  insurance.  A  loss  had  occurred  on  one  of  these 
policies  which  became  due  and  payable  before  any  of  the  notes 
fell  due,  and  before  the  appointment  of  the  receiver  and  the 
assignment  to  him.  There  was  an  interval  of  time,  tlien,  both 
before  the  appointment  of  the  receiver  and  afterwards,  during 
which  the  company  first  and  the  receiver  subsequently  were 
holders  of  a  claim  against  the  defendant  not  yet  matured,  while 
the  defendant  was  holder  of  a  claim  against  the  company  which 
was  due  and  payable.  Upon  the  general  doctrine  as  heretofore 
stated  in  the  text,  the  maker  of  these  premium  notes  could  not 
have  had  an  available  set-off  against  the  assignee,  because  at  the 
date  of  the  transfer  both  demands  had  not  matured ;  but,  as  his 
own  claim  was  then  due  and  payable,  the  equitable  rule  founded 
upon  the  insolvency  of  the  assignor  would  have  relieved  him. 
The  set-off  was  entirely  rejected,  however,  on  the  ground  that 
the  compan}'  was  mutual,  the  defendant  being  a  corporator,  and 
both  a  debtoi-  and  a  creditor.  ^  In  other  cases  brought  by  the 
receiver  of  an  insolvent  insurance  company,  not  mutual,  upon 
premium  notes,  claims  by  the  makers  of  the  notes  on  account  of 
losses  which  occurred  previous  to  the  appointment  of  the  re- 
ceiver, but  not  adjusted  so  as  to  become  actually  payable  until 
after  the  transfer  to  him,  have  been  allowed  as  offsets,  not,  how- 
ever, by  virtue  of  the  general  law  as  to  offsets,  —  it  being  held 
that  they  did  not  fall  within  the  settled  rules,  —  but  by  virtue  of 
certain  provisions  contained  in  the  statute  relating  to  insolvent 
corporations  which  describe  such  claims  as  "mutual  credits,"  and 
direct  them  to  be  set  off.^ 

§  97.  *  169.  Right  of  Set-off  in  Actions  by  Personal  Representa- 
tives. Rule  in  New  York.  When  an  executor  or  administrator  sues 
individually  on  a  note  given,  or  a  promise  made  to  him  as  such 
personal  representative  for  a  debt  owing  to  the  deceased  at  the 
time  of  his  death,  it  is  the  rule  in  New  York  that  the  defendant 
cannot  set  off  claims  due  to  himself  from  such  decedent,  although 

1  Lawrence  v.  Nelson,  21   N.  Y.  158.  -  Osgood  v.  De  Groot,  36  N.  Y.  348. 

It  was  conceded,  liy  way  of  a  dictum,  that     See,  however,  Osgood  v.  Ogden,  4  Keyes, 
if  the  corporation  had  not  been  mutual,     70. 
the  set-off  would   have  been  allowed  as 
stated  in  the  text. 


140  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

accruing  prior  to  the  death,  "  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's 
demand  arose  after  the  death  of  the  testator ;  and  in  such  a  case, 
no  set-off  can  be  received,  notwithstanding  it  existed  at  the  time 
of  the  death  of  the  deceased."  ^ 

S  98.  *  170.  Rules  as  to  Set-off  apply  to  other  Defences,  except 
that  it  is  Notice,  not  Assignment,  -which  cuts  off  Availability.  The 
foregoing  cases  and  statements  relate  to  the  special  defence  of 
set-off  as  against  the  assignee.  Exactly  the  same  rules  apply 
to  every  other  species  of  defence,  with  the  single  modification  that, 
in  respect  of  many  such  defences,  the  point  of  time  which  limits 
the  effect  or  cuts  off  the  availability  of  the  defence  is  not  the 
date  of  the  assignment,  but  the  date  of  the  notice  thereof,  actual 
or  implied,  which  is  given  to  the  debtor.  If  the  debtor  is  not 
notified  actually  or  impliedly  of  the  assignment,  it  is  possible 
that  many  transactions  between  himself  and  the  assignor,  done 
in  good  faith  on  his  part,  may  have  the  same  effect  in  discharg- 
ing his  indebtedness  as  if  the  demand  had  not  been  assigned,  — 
such  as  payment  to  or  release  by  the  original  creditor,  the  as- 
signor.^  But  no  transaction  can  have  tliis  effect  if  entered  into 
subsequently  to  a  notice  of  the  assignment  given  to  the  debtor, 
or  to  such  information  received  by  him  as  in  law  amounts  to 
the  same  thing  as  actual  notice.  Thus,  if  after  a  notice  to  the 
debtor  that  the  demand  against  him  is  assigned,  he  make  a  pay- 
ment to  the  assignor,  he  cannot  rely  upon  it  as  a  defence  par- 
tial or  total  to  an  action  brought  by  the  assignee  to  enforce  the 
claim.^ 

The  scope  of  this  work  does  not  require  nor  even  permit  that 

1  should  discuss  the  defence  of  set-off,  or  any  other  particular 
defence,  in  an  exhaustive  manner.  The  sole  purpose  of  this  sec- 
tion is  to  construe  and  interpret  the  provision,  found  in  almost 
the  same  language  in  all  the  State  codes  of  j)rocedure,  and  to 
ascertain  what  change,  if  any,  that  provision  had  wrought  in  tlie 
pre-existing  rules  of  the  law  in  relation  primarily  to  parties,  and 
incidentally  to  the  availability  of  defences  where  the  party  plain- 
tiff is  an  assignee  of  a  thing  in  action. 

1  Mf-rrittr.  Seaman,  G  N.  Y.  168.  citing  •  Hogan  v.  Black,  6G  Cal.  41  ;  Randall 

Root   V.   Taylor,    20   .lolins.   137  ;  Fry  v.  v.  Roynold.s,  20  J.  &  S.  145. 

Evans,  8  Wend.  5.J0 ;  Mercein  v.  Smith,  '  Field  v.  The  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y..  6 

2  Mill,  210;  2  U.  S.  279.  N.  Y.  179;  McClo,skey  v.  San  Franciaco, 

66  Cal.  104. 


ACTION    BY    OTHER   THAN    REAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST.  141 


SECTION  FOUKTH. 

WHEN   A   PERSON   OTHER   THAN   THE    REAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST 

MAY  SUE. 

§  99.  *1T1.  Statutory  Provisions.  There  are  two  forms  of  the 
statutory  provision,  which  differ,  however,  very  slightly.  The 
first  is  :  "  An  executor,  an  administrator,  a  trustee  of  an  express 
trust,  or  a  person  expressly  authorized  by  statute,  may  sue  with- 
out joining  with  him  the  person  for  whose  benefit  the  action  is 
prosecuted.^  A  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  within  the  meaning 
of  this  section,  shall  be  construed  to  include  a  person  with  whom 
or  in  whose  name  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of  another."  ^ 
The  second  form  is  a  little  more  special :  "  An  executor,  adminis- 
trator, trustee  of  an  express  trust,  a  person  with  whom  or  in 
whose  name  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of  another,  or  a 
person  expressly  authorized  by  statute,  may  bring  an  action  with- 
out joining  with  him  the  person  for  whose  benefit  it  is  prosecuted. 
Officers  may  sue  and  be  sued  in  such  name  as  is  authorized  by 
law,  and  official  bonds  may  be  sued  upon  in  the  same  way."  ^ 
The  only  difficulties  of  interpretation  presented  by  this  section 
are  the  determining  with  exactness  what  persons  are  embraced 
within  the  three  classes,  described  as  "  trustees  of  an  express 

1  [[The   use    of  the  word  "  may  "  in-  cieut   ground    for   the   abatement  of  the 

stead  of  "  must "  allows  the  action  to  he  action.] 

brought  either  by  the  trustee  or  the  bene-  '^  N.  Y.  §  1 1.3  (449) ;  Cal.  §  369  ;  South 
ficiary.  In  Hutchison  v.  Myers  (1893),  Carolina,  §  136;  Oregon,  §  •!%  ;  Nevada, 
5-i  Kan.  290,  34  Pac.  742,  the  court  said  :  §  6;  North  Carolina,  §  .57  ;  [^Utah,  Rev, 
"But  granting  that  Holmes,  who  is  St.,  1898,  ij  2902;  North  Dalcota,  Rev. 
named  as  trustee  in  the  instrument,  is  Codes,  1899,  4}  5223  ;  South  Dakota,  Ann. 
the  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  we  see  St.,  1901,  §  6072  ;  Arizona,  Uev.  St.,  1901, 
no  reason  wiiy  the  beneficiary  may  not  §§  1299,  1300;  Wasliington,  Bal.  Code, 
properly  bring  the  action.  ...  As  will  §  482.5;  Montana,  §  .570;  Idalio,  Code 
be  observed,  the  provision  authorizing  Civ.  Pro.  1901,  §  3157;  Colorado,  §  5; 
the  trustee  to  bring  an  action  is  per-  Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.  §  5626; 
missive  rather  than  mandatory  in  its  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  620;  Wis- 
terms,  and  hence  will  not  preclude  the  cousin,  St.,  1898,  §  2607;  Indiana,  Burns' 
maintenance  of  an  action  in  the  name  St.,  1901,  §  252;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894, 
of  the  real  party  in  interest."  And  in  §  5158;  Mi.ssouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  541.] 
Snell  V.  Harrison  (1895),  131  Mo.  495,  3  Ohio,  §  27;  Kansas,  §  28;  Iowa, 
32  S.  W.  37,  it  was  held  that  where  a  §  2544;  ^Oklahoma,  St..  1893,  §  3900; 
trustee  of  an  express  trust  holding  the  Wyoming,  Rev.  St ,  1899,  §  3469,  Ken- 
legal  title  to  land  institutes  a  partition  tucky,  §  21,  in  a  somewhat  different  form; 
proceeding  3i,nA.\omsthQ  cestaisipietrnfitent,  Nebraska,  §  32.] 
who  are  minors,  such  joinder  is  not  suffi- 


142  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

« 

trust,"  *'  persons  with  whom  or  in  whose  name  a  contract  is  made 
for  the  benefit  of  another,""  and  "  persons  expressly  authorized  by 
statute  to  sue."  It  is  phiin  that  there  are  substantially  three 
classes.  The  second  and  better  form  of  the  provision  actually 
separates  them,  and  does  not  represent  one  as  a  subdivision  of  tlie 
other.  The  first  form  in  terms  speaks  of  "the  person  with  whom 
or  in  whose  name  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of  another," 
as  an  instance  or  individual  of  the  wider  and  more  inclusive 
group,  "  trustees  of  an  express  trust."'  It  should  be  carefully 
noticed,  however,  that  these  two  expressions  are  not  stated  to  be 
synonymous ;  the  former  is  not  given  as  a  definition  of  the  latter. 
The  section  does  not  read,  "a  trustee  of  an  express  trust  shall  be 
construed  to  mean  a  person  with  M'hum  or  in  whose  name  a  con- 
tract is  made  for  the  benefit  of  another ; "  but  simply  that  the 
latter  shall  be  regarded  as  one  species  of  the  genus.  There  is 
liere  no  limitation,  but  rather  an  extension,  of  the  meaning,  and 
the  clause  of  course  recognizes  other  kinds  of  trustees  besides  the 
party  to  the  special  fonn  of  contract,  who  is  not  very  happily 
termed  a  "  trustee. "'  The  section  of  the  New  York  code,  when 
originally  passed,  contained  but  the  first  sentence  as  it  now 
stands.  Some  doubt  arose  as  to  its  meaning,  and  a  judicial 
decision  having  held  that  the  pln-ase  embraced,  among  others, 
a  person  with  whom  or  in  \\hose  name  a  contract  is  made  for 
the  benefit  of  another,  the  legislature,  to  remove  all  possibility 
of  doubt,  added  this  judicial  language  as  an  explanatory  clause. 
The  two  forms  of  the  provision,  although  their  phraseology  differs 
somewhat,  mean  exactly  the  same  thing,  and  establish  exactly 
the  same  rule.  As  these  two  phrases,  whether  they  be  regarded 
as  separated,  or  one  as  partially  explanatory  of  the  other,  are  the 
most  comprehensive  ones  in  the  section,  and  present  the  main 
difficulties  of  construction,  I  shall  discuss  them  first  in  order,  and 
shall  endeavor  to  ascertain  what  particular  classes  of  persons 
were  intended  to  be  described  by  them.  This  discussion  will 
consist  in  discovering,  if  possible,  some  general  principle  of 
interpretation  by  which  to  test  each  particular  case,  and  in  stating 
the  instances  which  have  been  definitely  passed  upon  by  the 
coui'ts. 

§  100.  *172.  Meaning  of  Term,  "Trustee  of  an  Expreaa  Trust." 
Theoretical  View.  What  is  a  "trustee  of  an  express  trust"? 
The  section  uses  the  term  in  its  most  general  sense  without  limi- 


ACTION    BY    OTHER    THAN    REAL    TARTY    IN    INTKKEST.  143 

tation,  so  that  when  its  full  legal  signification  is  ascertained,  tliat 
must  be  its  meaning  in  this  connection.  If  the  legislature  has 
said,  as  in  New  York  and  other  States,  that,  in  addition  to  its 
generally  accepted  technical  import,  it  shall  also  include  certain 
persons  who  are  not  usually,  nor  perhaps  with  strict  accuracy, 
denominated  "trustees,"  this  exercise  of  the  legislative  power 
within  the  domain  of  definition  does  not  change,  certainly  does 
not  lessen,  its  signification,  as  it  stands  without  the  explanatory 
comment.  In  Ohio,  and  in  several  of  the  States,  the  phrase  is 
used  alone,  but  accompanied  by  the  clause  which  is  descriptive 
of  another  class,  and  is  not  a  mere  partial  explanation.  We  must 
find  the  true  legal  definition  of  "trustees  of  an  express  trust," 
and  add  to  this  the  "persons  with  whom  or  in  whose  name  con- 
tracts are  made  for  the  benefit  of  others ; "  the  combined  result 
will  be  the  entire  class  intended  by  the  legislature. ^  It  is  obvi- 
ous that  the  trust  must  be  "express,"  in  contradistinction  to 
implied.  In  the  large  number  of  instances  where  a  trust  is 
raised  by  implication  of  law  from  the  acts,  circumstances,  or 
relations  of  the  parties,  the  trustee  is  certainly  not  embraced 
within  the  language  of  the  provision.  An  express  trust  assumes 
an  intention  of  the  parties  to  create  that  relation  or  position,  and 
a  direct  act  of  the  parties  by  which  it  is  created  in  accordance 
with  such  intention,  outside  of  the  mere  operation  of  the  law. 
In  the  case  of  an  implied  trust,  the  law,  for  the  purpose  of  doing 
justice,  and  usually  for  the  purpose  of  working  out  some  equi- 
table remedy,  lays  hold  of  the  prior  situation,  acts,  or  circum- 
stances of  the  parties,  declares  that  a  trust  arises  therefrom,  and 
imposes  the  quality  of  trustee  upon  one,  and  of  beneficiary  upon 
another,  in  a  manner  and  with  a  result  that  are  often  the  furthest 
possible  from  their  actual  design.  In  an  express  trust  the  parties 
intend  such  a  relation  between  themselves,  carry  out  their  inten- 
tion by  suitable  words,  and  the  law  confirms  and  accomplishes 
the  object  which  they  had  in  view.  An  express  trust  primarily 
assumes  three  parties :  the  one  who  by  proper  language,  creates, 
grants,  confers,  or  declares  the  trust;  the  second  who  is  the 
recipient   of   the   authority   thus  conferred;    and    the    third   for 

^  QThe  statute  authorizing  the  trustee  the  suit  is  to  give  the  trustee  powers  not 

of  an  express  trust  to  sue  in  his  own  name  conferred    upon    him    by   the   instrument 

without  joining  the    beneficiary,    has   no  creating  the  trust:  Sampson   v.   Mitchell 

application  to  a  case  where  the  object  of  (1894),  125  Mo.  217,  28  S.  W.  768j 


144  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

whose  benefit  the  authority  is  received  and  held.  It  is  true  that 
in  many  instances  the  first-named  parties  are  actually  but  one 
person ;  that  is,  the  same  individual  declares,  confers,  receives, 
and  holds  the  authority  for  the  benefit  of  another;  but  the  theory 
of  the  transaction  is  preserved  unaltered,  for  the  single  person 
who  creates  and  holds  the  authority  acts  in  a  double  capacity, 
and  thus  takes  tlie  place  of  two  persons.  It  is  impossible,  how- 
ever, to  conceive  of  an  express  trust  as  a  legal  transaction  or 
condition,  without  assuming  the  prior  intention,  and  the  express 
language  by  which  this  intention  is  effected,  and  the  trust  created 
resting  upon  one  as  the  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  a  second  as  the 
beneficiary;  and,  except  as  every  grant,  transfer,  or  delegation 
of  authority  and  power  is  in  a  certain  broad  sense  a  contract,  the 
notion  of  a  contract  is  not  essential  to  our  conception  of  an 
express  trust.  The  authority  may  be  conferred  by  the  public 
acting  through  governmental  machinery,  as  in  the  case  of  officers, 
or  by  the  intervention  of  courts,  as  in  the  cases  of  administrators, 
executors,  receivers,  and  the  like ;  or  by  private  persons,  as  in 
innumerable  instances  of  trusts  relating  to  real  or  personal  prop- 
erty ;  but  there  must  be  the  intent  to  accomplish  that  very  result, 
and  this  intent  must  be  expressed  by  language  or  by  some  process 
of  delegation  which  the  law  regards  as  an  equivalent.  Further- 
more, in  its  accurate  legal  signification,  a  trust  implies  something 
which  is  the  subject  thereof.  Although  the  word  may  have  a 
more  extensive  meaning  in  its  popular  use,  so  that  a  trust  may 
be  spoken  of  where  the  trustee  is  simply  clothed  with  a  power  to 
do  some  personal  act  unconnected  with  any  property  in  which  he 
has  an  interest  or  over  which  he  has  a  control,  yet  this  is  not  its 
legal  import.  An  illustration  of  this  legal  notion  of  a  trustee 
may  be  seen  in  the  case  of  a  guardian  over  the  j)erson  alone  of 
his  ward,  without  any  interest  in  or  power  over  his  estate,  or 
the  committee  of  the  person  of  a  lunatic.  Such  a  guardian  or 
committee,  althougli  [)(>.ssessing  a  power  to  be  exercised  for  the 
benefit  of  another,  is  not  a  trustee;  and  the  term,  when  applied 
to  him,  could  be  used  only  in  a  popular  and  not  a  legal  sense. 
Su(.h  a  guardian  or  connuittee  would  not  therefore,  by  virtue 
merely  of  the  permission  granted  in  the  provision  of  the  statute 
under  examination,  be  entitled  to  sue  in  his  own  name  as  a 
trustee  of  an  express  trust.  In  the  light  of  this  analysis  of  the 
expression  as  a  term  of  legal  import,  it  is  plain  that  "a  person 


ACTION    BY    OTHER    THAN    UKAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST.  145 

with  whom  or  in  whose  name  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit 
of  another,"  is  not  necessarily  a  trustee.  He  may  be;  and 
whether  he  is  or  is  not  must  depend  entirely  upon  the  nature  and 
subject-matter  of  the  contract  itself.  The  contract  may  be  of 
such  a  kind,  stipulating  concerning  property  in  such  a  manner, 
that  the  contracting  party  will  be  made  a  trustee.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  may  be  of  such  a  kind,  having  no  reference  perhaps  to 
property,  or  stipulating  for  personal  acts  alone,  that  the  con- 
tracting party  will  not  be  a  trustee  in  any  proper  sense  of  the 
word,  but  will  be  at  most  an  agent  of  the  person  beneficially 
interested.  There  are  numerous  instances,  therefore,  in  which 
an  agent,  w4io  enters  into  an  agreement  for  either  a  known  or 
for  an  unknown  principal,  is  permitted,  in  accordance  with  the 
particular  clause  under  consideration,  to  sue  in  his  own  name. 

§101.  *173.  Judicial  View.  I  shall  proceed  to  show,  in 
the  first  place,  how  far  the  foregoing  description  is  sustained 
by  judicial  authority.  Few  cases  have  attempted  to  define  the 
phrase,  "trustee  of  an  express  trust,"  in  any  comprehensive 
manner,  for  the  courts  have  in  most  cases  been  content  with 
determining  whether  the  particular  instance  before  them  fell 
within  the  term.  The  following  definitions  or  descriptions, 
however,  have  been  given :  "  An  express  trust  is  simply  a  trust 
created  by  the  direct  and  positive  acts  of  the  parties,  by  some 
writing,  or  deed,  or  will.  And  it  is  to  be  observed,  in  reference 
to  §  4  of  the  code  [of  Indiana],  that  it  does  not  assume  to  define 
the  meaning  of  the  term  '  trustee  of  an  express  trust '  in  its 
general  sense;  it  simply  declares  that  these  words,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  section,  '  shall  be  construed  to  include  a  person 
with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit 
of  another. '  Evidently  this  provision  was  not  intended  to  limit 
the  meaning  of  the  general  term,  'express  trust,'  or  to  confine 
the  operation  of  the  statute  to  the  particular  class  of  cases  re- 
ferred to,  but  rather  to  enlarge  its  sense  b}-  including  also  that 
class  within  it."^  In  another  case  it  was  said:  "In  order  to 
constitute  a  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  as  I  understand  the 
statute,  there  must  be  some  express  agreement  to  that  effect,  or 
something  which  in  law  is  equivalent  to  such  an  agreement. 
The  case  of  factors  and  mercantile  agents  may  or  may  not  con- 
stitute an  exception  under  the  custom  and  usage  of  merchants. 

1  Weaver  v.  Wabash,  etc.  Canal  Co.  Trs.,  28  Ind.  112,  119, 
10 


14G  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

Bat  in  every  other  case  the  trust  must,  I  think,  be  expressed  by 
some  agreement  of  the  parties,  not  necessarily,  perhaps,  in  writ- 
ing, but  either  written  or  verbal,  according  to  the  nature  of  tlie 
transaction.  In  this  case  no  agreement  is  shown  that  the  plaintiff 
was  to  take  or  hold  as  trustee,  and  that  he  is  a  trustee  results 
merely  from  other  circumstances.  It  is  implied  from  the  fact 
of  partnership,  and  from  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  received  the 
assignment  on  account  of  a  debt  due  the  firm.  If  it  is  not  a  case 
purely  of  implied  trust,  as  distinguished  from  an  express  trust, 
then  I  am  at  loss  to  conceive  of  one ;  and  to  hold  the  plaintiff  to 
be  a  trustee  of  an  express  trust  would,  in  my  judgment,  be  a 
palpable  disregard  of  the  statute,  and  a  violation  of  the  intent  of 
the  legislature."^  In  a  case  where  a  contract  in  the  nature  of  a 
lease  was  effected  by  a  person  describing  himself  in  the  instru- 
ment as  agent  of  the  owners,  but  who  had  no  interest  whatever 
in  the  premises  leased,  and  did  not  execute  the  instrument,  and 
to  whom  no  promise  was  made  as  the  lessor,  it  was  held  that  he 
could  not  maintain  an  action  for  the  rent  or  for  possession  of  the 
land  forfeited  by  non-payment  of  the  rent.  He  could  not  sue  as 
the  "person  with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is  made 
for  the  benefit  of  another,"'  because  no  promise  at  all  was  made 
to  him,  and  he  was  not  a  "trustee  of  an  express  trust."'  The 
court  said:  "One  who  contracts  merely  as  the  agent  of  another, 
and  has  no  personal  interest  in  the  contract,  is  not  the  trustee  of 
an  express  trust  within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and  cannot, 
under  the  code,  sue  upon  such  contract  in  his  own  name."  Of 
course  this  last  expression  must  be  taken  in  connection  with  the 
facts  of  the  case;  namely,  that  no  promise  was  made  to  the 
plaintiff  individually.^ 

1  Robbins  r.  Deverill,  20  Wis.  142,  per  nor  the  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  witliiu 

Dixon  C.J.     This   was  an  action  by  the  the  moanin<r  of  the  statute.     He  is  not  a 

pi  lintiff    as    assignee   of  V.   &    W.     The  trustee  of  an    express   trust,  because  no 

a-isigninent  was  in  writing,  but  was  taken  such  trust  appears  from  the  assignment, 

on   account    of   a   debt   due    from    P.    &  and  none  is  shown  to  exist  between  him- 

W.   to  the  firm   of   K.  &,  L.,  which  con-  self  and  his  copartners  by  virtue  of  any 

sisted  of  the  plaintiff  and  the  two  others,  other   instrument."      lie    then   adds   the 

with  an  understanding  that  P.  &  W.  were  remark  quoted   in  the  text. 

nut  to  be  credited  on  their  debt  to  R.  &  L.  2  Kawlings  r.  Fuller,  31  Ind.  255.     Qln 

imtil   the    money    was    collected.     Dixon  Mitchell  i.  St.  Mary  (1897),  148  Ind.  Ill, 

C.  J.  sai  1  :  "The  demand  was  transferred  47  N.  E.  224,    the   court  said:     "There 

to  the  plaintiff  alone  by  words  of  absolute  must  be  .something  in  the  nature  of  the 

a.««ignment,  no  trust  beincr  erprfssed.  .  .  .  contract,  appearing  upon  its  face  or  from 

ITp'in  these  facts  the  plaintiff  cannot  re-  alUgations   in    the    pleadings,  disclosing 

cover.     He  is  not  the  real  party  in  interest,  that  a  trust  relation  exists  and  is  sought 


ACTION  BY  OTHER  THAN  KEAL  PARTY  IN  INTEKEST.     147 

§  102.  *174.  Same  Subject.  New  York  Cases.  The  nature  uf 
an  express  trust,  and  tlie  elasses  of  persons  embraced  within  the 
statutory  phrases  in  question,  were  determined,  upon  great  con- 
sideration, by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  in  the  leading 
case  of  Considerant  v.  Brisbane.^  ''The  term  'trustee  of  an 
express  trust '  had  acquired  a  technical  and  statutory  meaning. 
Express  trusts,  at  least  after  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the 
[New  York]  Revised  Statutes,  were  defined  to  be  trusts  created 
Ijy  the  direct  and  positive  acts  of  the  parties,  by  some  writing  or 
deed,  or  will;  and  the  Revised  Statutes  had  abolished  all  express 
trusts  except  those  therein  enumerated  which  related  to  land. 
If  this  section  (§  113  [449j)  of  the  code  was  to  be  restricted  and 
limited  to  those  enumerated  express  trusts,  the  practical  incon- 
venience arising  from  making  the  beneficial  interest  the  sole  test 
of  tlie  right  to  sue,  and  Avhich  that  section  (§  113)  was  intended 
to  obviate,  would  continue  to  exist  in  a  large  class  of  formal  and 
informal  trusts.  Accordingly,  in  1851,  the  section  was  amended 
by  adding  the  provision  that  '  a  trustee  of  an  express  trust, 
within  the  meaning  of  this  section,  shall  be  construed  to  include 
a  person  with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is  made  for 
the  benefit  of  another.'  It  is  to  be  observed  that  there  is  no 
attempt  to  define  the  meaning  of  the  term  '  trustee  of  an  express 
trust'  in  its  general  sense;  but  the  statutory  declaration  is  that 
these  words  '  shall  be  construed  to  include  a  person,'  etc.  The 
counsel  for  the  respondent  insists  that  the  sole  intention  of  the 
legislature  in  amending  the  section  was  to  remove  a  doubt  that 
had  been  expressed,  whether  a  factor  or  other  agent,  wdio  had  at 
common  law  a  right  of  action  on  a  contract  made  for  the  benefit 

to  be  enforced  for  the  benefit  of  the  cestui  Hun^  644  ;    Heavenridge    v.    Mondv,   49 

ijue  trust.     It  is  not  enough  that  an  agent  Ind.  434  ;  34    id.   28  :  when    a   jndgnient 

who  exceeds  his  authority  in  suing  in  his  lias   been   obtained    by    a   trustee   of   an 

own  name  upon  a  demand  due  his  j)rinci-  express  trust,   defendant    may   set   off   a 

pal  is  an  agent  and  may  intend  to  account  judguient  in  his  favor  against  the  bene- 

for   the   recovery.     He   cannot    bind    his  ficiary,    and    plaintiff    is    estopped    from 

j)rincipal  without  authority  expressed  or  setting  up  that  he   is  the  real   party    in 

implied,  and  it  is  only  when  the  ]irincipal  interest;    North     W.   Conf.    of   Univ.    r. 

may  be  deemed  to  be  in  court  and  bound  Myers,  36  id.  375  ;  Brooks  v.  Harris,  42 

by  tlie  proceeding  that  sec.  251  [allowing  id.    177;   Wiley   v.   Starbuck,   44   id.  298  ; 

.suit  by  a  trustee  of   an  express  trust]  is  Washington   Tp.    v.    Bonney,   45   id.    77. 

intended  to  apply."]  For   further  examples,    see    Wetmore  r. 

1  Considerant   v.   Brisbane,   22    N.    Y.  Hegeman,  88  N.  Y.  69 ;  White  v.  Allatt, 

389,  395,  per  Wright  J.     As  to  action  by  87  Cal.   245  ;    Cassidy  v.   Woodward,   77 

trustees    of   an    express    trust,   see    also  Iowa,  354 ;  and  i«/}-a,  §  *  178. 
I'resb.    Soc.   of    Kuoxboro    v.    Beach,    8 


148  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

of  his  principal  b}'  reason  of  liis  legal  interest  in  the  contract, 
was  by  the  code  deprived  of  that  right.  But  no  such  limited 
intention  can  be  inferred  from  the  words  of  the  statute.  Indeed, 
it  is  only  by  a  liberal  construction  of  the  section  that  the  case  of 
u  contract  by  a  factor  (an  individual  contract)  can  be  brought 
within  it  at  all.  It  is  intended  manifestly  to  embrace,  not  only 
formal  trusts  declared  by  deed  inter  pra^tes,  but  all  cases  in  which 
a  person  acting  in  behalf  of  a  third  party  enters  into  a  written 
express  contract  with  another,  either  in  his  individual  name, 
without  description,  or  in  his  own  name  expressly,  in  trust  for, 
or  on  behalf  of,  or  for  the  benefit  of,  another,  by  whatever  form 
of  expression  such  trust  may  be  declared.  It  includes  not  only 
a  person  with  whom,  but  one  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is  made 
for  the  benefit  of  another."  These  definitions  and  descriptions 
of  the  term  fully  sustain  the  conclusions  reached  in  the  preceding 
paragraph  as  to  the  legal  meaning  of  the  phrase  "  trustee  of  an 
express  trust."  It  is  abundantly  settled  that  an  agent  cannot  sue 
in  his  own  name  to  enforce  an  implied  liability  to  his  principal; 
if  by  any  possibility  he  should  be  a  trustee  under  such  circum- 
stances, he  would  not  be  the  trustee  of  an  express  trust. ^ 

§  103.  *  175.  Statute  includes  an  Agent  ■with  ■whom  an  Express 
Contract  is  made.  Illustrations.  Having  thus  attempted  to  arrive 
at  a  general  definition  of  the  term,  I  shall  proceed  to  consider  the 
cases  which  are  embraced  within  it,  and  shall  take  at  first  those 
in  which  a  "person  with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is 
made  for  the  benefit  of  another"  has  sued  in  his  own  name.  It 
is  fully  established  by  numerous  decisions  that  when  a  contract 
is  entered  into  expressly  with  an  agent  in  his  own  name,  the 
[)romise  being  made  directly  to  him,  although  it  is  known  that 
he  is  acting  for  a  principal,  and  even  although  the  principal  and 
liis  beneficial  interest  in  the  agreement  are  fully  disclosed  and 
stipulated  for  in  the  very  instrument  itself,  the  agent  in  such 

'  Palmer  r.  Fort  Plain,  etn.  I'lk.  K.  Co.,  name  of,  the  town."    Ruckman  v.  Pitcher. 

11  N.  Y.  37(),  390,  i)er  SeMeii  .1.  :    "There  20  N.  Y.  9:  "The  aj^ent  may,  in  many 

is  no  covenant  or  agreement  miming  to  ca.ses,  sue  upon  express  contracts,  made 

these  officers  in  terms.     Tiiey,  as  agents  with  him.self  by  name.  .  .  .  Hnt  this  im- 

of  the  town,  convey  the  riglit  to  use  the  plied   duty   or    assiun/isit    arises   only   in 

highway  upon   a  certain  condition.     It  is  favor  of  those  to  whom  the  money  in  fact 

virtually   the   act   of   the    town   through  belonged,   and   therefore    caimot    be  en- 

thein.     If  an  implied  covenant  arises  upon  forced  in  the  name  of  another  person  to 

the  instrument,  it  is   a  covenant  with  the  whom   the  obligation   is  not  due." 
town,  and  must  ho  cnfiirced  liv,  and  in  the 


ACTION  BY  OTHER  THAN  REAL  PARTY  IN  INTKRKST. 


149 


case  is  described  by  the  language  of  the  statute,  and  may  main- 
tain an  action  upon  the  contract  in  his  own  name  without  join- 
ing the  person  thus  beneficially  interested.^     The  following  are 


1  [Leach  v.  Hill  (1898),  100  Iowa,  171,  76 
N.  W.  667  :  A  bank  fashier,  who  cashes  a 
check  upon  the  uiidcrtaking  of  a  third 
person  that  the  check  will  he  honored  by 
tlie  drawee,  may  sue,  as  trustee  of  an  ex- 
press trust,  u])ou  the  check  and  the  third 
person's  agreement,  without  joining  the 
bank  for  which  he  was  acting.  In 
Mitchell  V.  St.  Mary  (1897),  148  Ind.  Ill, 
47  N.  E.  224,  on  the  other  hand,  where  a 
note  was  endorsed  in  blank  and  given  to 
the  treasurer  of  a  corporation  as  a  mere 
custodian  of  the  corporation,  with  no 
intention  to  make  him  a  trustee,  such 
treasurer,  it  was  held,  could  not  sue  upon 
it  in  his  own  name  as  the  trustee  of  an 
express  trust.  See  also  Hudson  c.  Archer 
(1893),  4  S.  D.  128,  .55  N.  W.  1099,  quot- 
ing the  text.  See  also  Herman  v.  City  of 
Oconto  (1898),  100  Wis.  391,  76  N.  W. 
364;  Ward  r.  Tlyba  (1897),  58  Kan.  741, 
51  Pac.  223;  Brown  /•.  Sharkey  (1894),  93 
low. I,  157,61  N.  W.3G4.]  Considerant  v. 
Hrisbanc,  22  N.  Y.  389,  reversing  s.  c.  2 
Mosw.  471.  The  plaintiff  was  agent  for  a 
foreign  corporation  wliich  did  business 
under  the  name  of  "  Bureau,  Guillon, 
Goden,  &  Co."  The  defendant  applied  to 
the  plaintiff  for  stock  in  said  corporation, 
and  authorized  the  plaintiff  to  subscribe 
in  his  name  for  such  stock  to  the  amount 
of  $10,000,  and,  in  payment  of  the  sub- 
scription, gave  plaintiff  two  notes,  each  in 
the  following  form  :  "  New  York,  March  1, 
1855.  On  the  first  day  of  July,  1855,  I 
promise  to  pay  V.  Considerant,  executive 
agent  of  the  company  Bureau,  Guillon, 
Goiien,  &Co.,  the  sum  of  $5,000,  for  which 
I  am  to  receive  st(3ck  of  said  companv 
known  as  premium  stock,  to  the  amount 
of  .^5,000,  value  received.  A.  Brisbane." 
The  plaintiff  alleged  that  he  had  entered 
defendant's  name  as  a  subscriber;  averred 
a  tender  of  the  stock  and  a  refusal  to 
accept  the  same ;  and  sued  in  his  own 
name  on  the  notes.  The  Court  of  Ap- 
l)eals  held  that  he  could  maintain  the 
action.  The  judgment  of  Wright  J.  is  an 
exhaustive  discussion  of  the  whole  sub- 
ject. Denio  J.  dissented,  but  not  from  the 
general  reasoning  as  to  the  true  interpre- 


tation of  the  code.  His  dissent  was  basO(l 
entirely  upon  a  construction  of  the  notes 
sued  upon.  He  insisted  that  the  promise 
in  these  notes  was,  in  fact,  made  to  the 
company,  and  not  to  the  agent;  and  so 
the  case  did  not  fall  within  the  terms  of 
the  statutory  provision.  Rowland  v. 
Phalen,  1  Bosw.  43 ;  Cheltenham  Fire- 
brick Co.  V.  Cook,  44  Mo.  29  ;  Wright  v. 
Tinsley,  30  Mo.  389  ;  Weaver  r.  Wabash, 
etc.  Canal  Co.  Trs.,  28  Ind.  112;  Hice  r. 
Savery,  22  Iowa,  470,  in  which  it  was  held 
that  either  the  agent  or  the  beneficiary 
might  sue.  See  supra,  §  *140.  Winters 
V.  Rush,  34  Cal.  136  ;  Ord  v.  McKee,  5  CaL 
515;  Scantliu  i;.  Allison,  12  Kan.  85,88; 
Noe  r.  Christie,  51  N.  Y.  270,  274.  In 
Hubbell  V.  Medbury,  53  N.  Y.  98,  the 
provision  of  the  code  was  held  to  be  per- 
missive only,  and  not  to  prohibit  an  action 
by  the  beneficiary,  even  without  the 
trustee.  (Compareanie,  §  *I38.)  And  see 
Presb.  Soc.  of  Knoxboro  v.  Beach,  8  Hun, 
644  ;  People  v.  Slocum,  1  Idaho,  62.  It 
is  held  in  New  York  that  an  action  against 
a  common  carrier  for  a  breach  of  his 
contract,  or  of  his  duty  to  carry,  must  be 
brought  in  the  name  of  the  owner  of  the 
goods,  although  the  contract  may  have 
been  made  or  the  goods  shipped  by 
another.  Green  v.  Clarke,  12  N.  Y.  343; 
Krulder  v.  Ellison,  47  N.  Y.  36  ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Fargo,  63  N.  Y.  479  ;  49  N.  Y.  1 88. 
But  when  the  consignor,  although  not  the 
general  owner,  has  a  lien  upon  or  a  special 
interest  in  the  goods,  and  makes  the  con- 
tract and  pays  tiie  consideration  for  their 
carriage,  he  may  bring  an  action  for  the 
breach  of  the  contract  iu  Jiis  own  name,  in 
order  that  he  may  protect  his  rights. 
Swift  V.  Pacific  Mail  S.  S.  Co.,  106  N.  Y. 
206.  The  usual  rule,  however,  seems  to 
b(!  that  the  person  with  whom  the  common 
carrier  contracts,  although  for  another's 
benefit,  may  sue,  whether  or  not  he  has  a 
special  interest  in  the  goods.  Snider  v. 
Adams  Exp.  Co.,  77  Mo.  533 ;  Wolfe  v. 
Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  97  Mo.  473  ;  Hooper  v. 
Chicago  &'n.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  27  Wis.  91  ; 
Waterman  v.  C.  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co., 
61    Wis.   464.     For    further    instances   of 


150  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

particular  instances,  or  examples  of  particular  classes  of  cases,  in 
Avliieh  an  agent  has  been  permitted  to  sue,  or  may  always  sue,  in 
liis  own  name,  because  the  contract  is  made  with  him  directly, 
although  on  behalf  of  a  known  principal:  on.  a  sealed  lease 
between  the  plaintiff,  as  agent  for  the  owner,  of  the  first  part, 
and  the  defendant  as  the  lessee;^  on  a  sealed  contract  between 
])laintiff  and  defendant,  the  plaintiff  describing  himself  as  agent 
for  his  sisters,  and  stipulating  that  they  should  act  in  defendant's 
theatre  at  specified  wages,  wdiich  the  latter  covenanted  to  pay, 
the  action  being  brought  for  such  wages  ;2  where  the  plaintiff, 
being  the  holder  of  the  legal  title  to  certain  land,  which  he  held, 
however,  merely  for  the  benefit  of  a  married  woman,  was  in- 
duced, by  false  representations,  to  execute  a  mortgage  thereon, 
supposing  it  to  be  for  her  benefit  and  at  her  request,  but  in  fact 
without  any  consideration  paid  to  himself  or  to  her,  brought  an 
action  in  his  own  name  to  restrain  a  foreclosure  of  the  mortgage ;  ^ 
in  an  action  on  a  policy  of  marine  insurance  "for  the  account  of 
whom  it  may  concern,"  and  in  case  of  loss  the  amount  insured  to 
be  paid  to  the  plaintiff  or  order ;  ^  where  a  promise  was  made  to 
the  administrator  of  an  estate,  and  he  afterwards  resigned,  and 
another  was  appointed  in  his  place,  it  being  held  that  he  was  the 
proper  party  to  sue;^  where  a  grantee  in  a  deed  of  land  was 
simply  acting  as  agent  for  another,  and  the  purchase  price  was 
paid  with  that  other's  money,  the  grantee  is  the  proper  party  to 
sue  for  the  breach  of  a  covenant  which  was  broken  immediately 

suits  by  agents   on  contracts  made  witli  Rockwell  r.  Holconib  (Colo.  1892),  31  I'ac. 

tliein  expressly  iu   their  own  names,  see  944;  Beck  v.  Haas,  31  Mo.  App.  180. 
McLaughlin  i-.  Deadwood  First  Nat.  Bk.,  ^  Morgan  r.  Reid,  7  Abb.  Pr.  21.5. 

6    Dak.    406  ;    Consol.   Barb- Wire    Co.    v.  "  Nelson  i:  Ni.xon,  13  Abb.  Pr.  104. 

Purcell,  48  Kan.  267  ;   Cremer  v.  Winmier,  ■'  Brown  c.  Cherry,  38  How.  Pr.  3.")2. 

40  Minn.   511   (contract  by  agent  for  sale  *  Walsh   v.    Wash.  Mar.    Ins.    Co.,   3 

of  land);  Close  v.   Hodges,  44  Minn.  204  Robt.    202;  Greenfield    v.  Mass.  Mut.  L. 

(njortgage  to  agent) ;   Lake  v.  Albert,  37  Ins.  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  430.     See  also  Sturm  v. 

Minn.  453;  Stoll  r.  Sheldon,  13  Neb.  207 ;  Atlantic    Mut.    Ins.    Co.,    63    N.    Y.   77; 

Seymour  ".  Smith,  114  N.    Y.  481  ;  Coffin  Waring  v.  ludem.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  45  id.  606; 

?•.  Grand  Rapids  Hydr.  Co.  (1892),  18  N.  Y.  Strolm   r.   Hartford  F.   lus.  Co.,  37  Wis. 

Suppl.  782  ;   HoUingswortb  r.  Moulton,  .53  625  ;  Protection  Ins.  Co.  v.  WiLson,  6  Ohio 

Hun,   91  ;  Albatiy  &  R.  Iron,  etc.  Co.  v.  St.  553.     [^Insurance  taken  out  by  an  em- 

Lundberg,    121    U.    S.    451;    Merchaiits'  plover  for  the    benefit   of  his  employees 

Bank  i-.  .McClelland,  9   Colo.  608  (cashier  may  be  .lued  for  by  tiie  employer  without 

of  bank) ;   Holmes   r.  Boyd,   90  Ind.  332  joining  the  beneficiaries,  becau.^e  he  is  a 

(same).     Further  illustrations  of  the  text :  trustee   of  an   expre.><s  trust:    Fidelity  & 

Coffin    r.    Grand    Rapids    Hydraulic    Co.  Casualty  Co.  ;•.   Ballard  (1899),    105  Ky. 

(N.  Y.  App.  1893),  32  N.  E.1076;  Lewis  253,  48  "s.  W.  1074.] 
r.  Whittcri  (.Mo.  Sup.  1892),  20  S.  W.  617  ;  ^  Harney  v.  Dutcher,  15  Mo.  89. 


ACTION    BY    OTHER    THAN    REAL    PARTY    IN    INTEREST.  151 

upon  the  execution  of  the  deed,  c.  ^.,  a  covenant  iigainst  incum- 
brances;^ a  guest  at  an  inn  who  had  property  of  another  in  liis 
possession,  which  was  lost,  was  held  to  he  the  projjcr  party  to 
sue  for  its  value ;  ^  an  auctioneer  may  sue  for  the  price  of  goods 
sold  by  him,  whether  lie  have  any  interest  in  the  price  or  not,^ 
iind  a  sheriff,  for  the  price  of  property  sold  by  him  on  execution  ;  * 
the  master  of  a  ship  or  other  vessel  may  maintain  an  action  iov 
freight,  or  on  any  contract  concerning  the  ship,  entered  into  on 
behalf  of  tlie  owners,"  or  for  the  taking  and  carrying  away,  con- 
version of,  or  injury  to,  the  cargo. ^ 

§  104.  *  176.  Actions  on  Bonds  given  to  protect  other  Persons. 
Obligee  may  sue.  Various  kinds  of  bonds  and  undertakings 
generally  required  by  statute,  and  given  to  some  designated 
obligee,  although  showing  on  the  face  that  they  are  designed  to 
protect,  secure,  or  indemnify  other  persons,  are  also  contracts 
made  "with,  or  in  the  name  of,  one  person  for  the  benefit  of 
another;  "  and  although  the  party  immediately  interested  may  in 
general  sue  in  his  own  name,''  yet  the  obligee  or  person  to  whom 
the  promise  is  made  may  always,  unless  forbidden  by  statute, 
maintain  the  action,  and  in  some  States  is  the  only  one  who  is 
permitted  to  do  so.^  Among  these  are  bonds  in  great  variety 
given  to  the  "people"  or  to  the  "State,"  conditioned  upon  the 
faithful  discharge  of  their  duties  by  public,  local,  or  municipal 
officers,  actions  on  which,  except  when  otherwise  directed  bv 
statute,  may  be  brought  by  the  people  or  the  State ;  ^  bonds 
running  to  the  people  or  to  the  State,  conditioned  upon  the 
faithful  discharge  of  duties  by  various  private  or  semi-private 
trustees,  or  by  persons  appointed  in  judicial  proceedings  and  the 

1  Hall  V.  Plaine,  14  Ohio  St.  417,  423.       contractor  with  labor  ami  materials,  is  a 

2  Kellogg  V.  Sweeney,  1  Lans.  397.  trustee  of   au   express   trust.     The  same 
8  Minturn  v.  Main,  7  N.  Y.  220,  224 ;     question    was    raised    in  United  States  r. 

Bogart  V.  O'Regan,  1  E.  I).  Smith,  590.         Kundle  (1901),  27   Wash.  7,  67  Pac.  395; 

*  Armstrong  I'.  Vroman,  11  Minn.  220;  and  the  United  States,  as  obligee  of  tbo 
McKee  v.  Lineberger,  69  N.  C.  217,  239.        bond,  was  held  a  proper  plaintiff,  as  trustee 

5  Kennedy  v.  Eilau,  17  Abb.   Pr.  73;  of  an  express  trust,  j 
Braithwaite  i\  Power,  1  N.  Dak.  455.  ^  Hunter  v.  Mercer  Cy.  Com'rs  of,  etc., 

•*  Houghton  v.  Lynch,  13  Minn.  85.  10  Ohio  St.  515  (countv  treasurer's  bond 

*  See  supra,  §§  *139,  *141.  running  to  the  State) ;  State  r.  Moore,  19 

*  [^United  States  >\  McCann  (1901),  40  Mo.  369  (sheriff's  bond) ;   Meier  r.  Lester, 
Ore.  13,    66  Pac.  274,   quoting   the  text,  21    Mo.    112    (constable's    bond);    Shelby 
where  it  was  hehl  that  a  person  to  whom  Cy.   v.    Simmonds,  33  Iowa,  345   (county 
a   contractor's    bond  is   executed    condi-  treasurer's  bond  running  to  the  county), 
tioned  to  pay  all  persons  supplying  the 


152  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

like,  such  as  those  given  by  administrators,  executors,  or  re- 
ceivers ;  ^  those  given  by  the  trustees  of  an  estate,  although 
entirely  for  the  benefit  of  the  persons  having  an  interest  in  the 
estate; 2  bastardy  bonds ^  and  the  like;  bonds  given  directly  to  a 
sheriff  or  other  superior  officer  to  indemnify  a  deputy  sheriff  or 
other  subordinate  officer  against  the  consequences  of  acts  done  in 
the  discharge  of  the  latter's  official  duties ;  *  a  bond  given  by  a 
town  superintendent  of  common  schools  to  the  supervisor  of  the 
town,  an  action  on  which  must  be  brought  by  the  supervisor  or 
his  successor  in  office.^ 

§  105.  *  177.  Actions  on  Contracts  Made  for  Undisclosed  Prin- 
cipals. Agent  may  sue.  In  all  the  instances  heretofore  men- 
tioned, the  contract  has  been  made  with  an  agent  in  his  own 
name,  and  the  promise  given  to  him,  although  the  principal  or 
beneficiary  was  known,  and  even  expressly  designated  and  pro- 
vided for  by  the  terms  of  the  agreement.  The  rule  is  the  same,, 
and  even  more  emphatically  so,  if  the  principal  or  beneficiary  is, 
at  the  time  of  the  contract,  unknown  or  undisclosed,  or  not  men- 
tioned in  the  instrument.  When  a  contract,  even  in  writing, 
is  made  with  and  by  an  agent,  and  no  mention  is  made  of  any 
principal  or  beneficiary,  but  the  other  contracting  party  supposes 
he  is  dealing  with  the  former  on  his  own  private  account,  but  in 
fact  such  person  is  an  agent  for  an  undisclosed  principal  and 
enters  into  the  agreement  in  the  course  of  his  agency,  actually 
effecting  the  contract  on  behalf  of  that  superior  behind  him,  the 
rule  is  Avell  settled  that  the  one  who  was  thus  a  direct  party  to 
the  agreement  —  the  actual  agent  —  may  bring  an  action  upon  it 
in  his  own  name,  or  the  principal  may  sue  in  his  name.^ 

1  People    V.    Laws,   3    Abb.    Pr.   450 ;  prosecutrix  as  her  interest  might  appear, 

Annett  v.  Kerr,  28  How.  Pr.  324  ;  People  the  State  being  in  fact  a  beneficiary  under 

V.    Townsend,    37    Barb.     520.     Tiie    re-  the  bond  as  well  a.'*  the  jirosecutri.x.] 
porter's  head-note  reads  .should  be  sued  by  ••  Stiiwell  i-.  llurlbert,  18  X.   Y.   374, 

the  people  ;  this  is  more  than  was  decided.  375. 

Haggott   V.   Boulger,    2  Duer,  160.     The  ^  Fuller  v.  Fullerton,  14  Barb.  59. 

bond  may  also  be  pro.secuted  by  the  per-  '^  QStewart  v.  Gregory,    Carter  &  Co. 

son  interested    and  benefited.     See,  how-  (1900),  9  N.  D.  618,84  N.  W.  553;  Carter 

ever,  Carmichael  i;.  Moore,  88  X.  C.  29.  v.   Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  111   Ga.  38, 

^  People  V.  Norton,  9  N.  Y.  176,  179.  36  S.  E.  308;  Tustin  Fruit  Assn.  f.  Earl 

3  People  V.  Clark,  21  Barb.  214.     QSee  Fruit    Co.    (1898),    Cal.,    53    Pac.    693.] 

Myers  i;.  Baughman    (1901),  61   Neb.  818,  Erickson  v.    Compton,    6  How.  Pr.   471; 

80  N.  W.  507,  where  it   was  held  that  an  Grinnell  v.  Schmidt,  2  Sandf.  706  ;  Union 

action  on  a  bastardy  bond  could  be  lirought  India   Rubber  Co.  f.  Tomlin.son,   1  E.  D. 

only  in  the  name  of  the  State,  which  was  Smith,  364;  Van  Lien  v.  Byrnes,  1   Hilt, 

named    as    obligee,   for   the    use   of    the  13!;    Iliggius   v.   Senior,   8  Mees.  &   W. 


ACTION    BY    OTHER    THAN     KKAL    I'ARTY    IN    INTEREST.  153 

§  106.  *  178.  other  Classes  of  Trustees.  I  liave  tliUS  far  con- 
sidered oiily  the  particular  class  of  trustees  of  an  express  trust 
specially  described  in  some  of  the  codes  as  "persons  with  whom 
or  in  whose  name  a  contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of  others." 
There  are  numerous  other  and  more  properly  designated  classes 
of  such  trustees ;  and  whatever  be  their  nature,  or  the  object  of 
the  trust,  they  may,  by  virtue  of  this  section  of  the  statute, 
maintain  an  action  in  their  own  names.  They  are  generally 
created  or  appointed  by  some  instrument  in  the  nature  of  a  grant 
or  conveyance,  or  they  may  be  appointed  in  judicial  proceedings 
by  a  court.  Although  the  rule  is  simple  and  peremptory  that 
these  trustees  may  sue  without  joining  the  beneficiaries,  the 
following  instances  in  which  the  rule  has  been  applied  may  be 
enumerated:  assignees,  general  or  special,  in  trust,  to  pay 
creditors ;  ^  the  assignees  of  a  contract  in  trust  to  reimburse  out 
of  the  proceeds  thereof  third  persons  for  advances  made;^ 
trustees  appointed  to  take  and  collect  subscriptions  for  colleges 
and  other  similar  purposes;^  a  receiver  appointed  in  another 
State ;  *  the  grantee  of  lands  in  trust  for  the  use  and  benefit  of 
another  is  the  proper  party  to  sue  for  possession  or  for  damages 
by  trespass  or  other  injury ;  ^  a  person  who  agreed  to  hold  notes 

834;    Sims   r.   Bond,    5    B.    &   Ad.   389,  161;  Simonton  i'.  First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Min- 

393.    per     Lord    Deunian.      Ludwig    v.  neapolis,  24   Minu.  216 ;  Witter  i".  Little, 

Gille.spie,  10.5  N.  Y.  653;  McLaughlin  v.  66  Iowa,  431.     Compare  Wynne  v.  Heck, 

Great  Western  In.s.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  Suppl.  92  N.  C.  414. 

(Com.    PI.   1892),  536  ; ' Manette  ?7.  Simp-  ^  Cummiii.s  t-.  Barkalow,  4  Keyes,  514. 

son,  15  N.  Y.  Suppl.  (Supreme  Ct.  1891),  [^Aud  in  Bates  v.  Richards  Lumber  Co. 

448  ;  Snider  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co.,  77   Mo.  (1893),  56  Minn.  14,  57  N.  W.  218,  it  was 

523  ;  Keown  ?-.  Voirel,  25  Mo.  App.  35.   As  held  that  a  beneficial    interest  in  a  con- 

against  right  of  undisclosed  princi})al  to  tract  for  work  and  labor  may  be  a.ssigned 

sue,  see  Kelley  c.  Thuey,  102  Mo.  522.     In  by   a  party  who  engages  therein  to  per- 

ordiuary  contracts    made    by   agents   for  form  the  same,  so  as  to  entitle  the  assignee 

tiieir   principals,  the    latter  are   the  real  to  recover  the  contract  jjrice  upon  tlie  ful- 

parties  in  interest,  and  inn.st  sue.     Swift  filmeut  of  the  contract  by  tlie  assignor, 

V.  Swift,   46    Cal.   266,  269  ;    Chin    Kem  and  that  the  assignee  in  such  a  case  is  a 

You  ?;.  Ah  Joan,  75  Cal.  124;  Ferguson  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  as  he  is  obliged 

I'.    McMahon,    52    Ark.    433.     See,   also,  to  account  for  the  jiroceeds.] 
ante,  §  *141.  ^  Slocum   v.   Barry,  34  How.  Pr.   320; 

»   Lewis    r.   Graham,  4   Abb.  Tr.   106;  Dix  v.  Akers,  30  Ind.  431  ;  Musselman  v. 

St.  Anthony's  Mill  Co.  v.  Vandall,  1  Minn.  Cravens,  47  Ind.  4.    See  Lathrop  v.  Knapp, 

246.     See   Foster  v.  Brown,  65  Ind.  234.  37  Wis.  307. 

Assignee  to   pay  creditors  distinguished  *  Runk  v.  St.  John,  29  Barb.  585  ;  per 

from  a  mere  agent  to  collect  claims  and  contra,    Hope   Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Taylor,  2 

pay  <iebts:  Sandmeyer  v.  Dak.  F.  &  M.  Robt.   278.     See  Lathrop   v.   Knapp,   37 

Ins.  Co.  (S.   Dak.    1891),   50  N.   W.   353;  Wis.  307  ;  Garver  r.  Kent,  70  Ind.  428. 
citing  Brockmeyer   v.  Wash.  Nat.  Bk.,  40  •■>  Goodrich  v.  Milwaukee,  24  Wis.  422; 

Kan.  376;  Cornley  u.  Dazian,   114  N.  Y.  Boardmau    r.    Beckwith,    18    Iowa,    292, 


lo-i  cmL  hemedil;s. 

aud  a  mortgage  for  the  benefit  of  another,  and  to  apply  the  pro- 
ceeds thereof  when  collected  in  payment  of  a  debt  owned  by 
himself  to  that  other,  may  sue  to  enforce  the  securities ;  ^  the 
assignee  of  a  stock  subscription,  who  holds  it  for  the  benefit  of 
a  bank,  is  the  proper  party  to  bring  an  action  upon  it;^  a  person 
to  whom  chattels  had  been  transferred  for  the  benefit  of  a  married 
woman  in  trust,  to  permit  her  to  have  exclusive  use  and  posses- 
sion, and  to  dispose  of  them  by  her  direction,  is  the  proper  party 
to  briuff  an  action  to  restrain  interference  with  or  disturbance  of 
her  possession. 3  It  has  been  held  in  Kentucky  that  where  a 
railroad  company  issued  bonds  which  were  held  by  many  dif- 
ferent persons,  and  executed  a  mortgage  to  a  trustee  for  the 
purpose  of  securing  such  bonds,  this  trustee,  who  was  the  sole 
mortgagee  named  in  the  instrument,  could  not  maintain  an  action 
in  his  own  name  alone  to  foreclose  the  mortgage  on  account  of  the 
non-payment  of  the  money  due  on  the  bonds,  but  he  must  join 
the  bond-holders  as  parties  plaintiff  with  himself.*  The  correct- 
ness of  this  decision  may  well  be  doubted  in  the  light  of  the  other 
cases  above  cited,  which  uniformly  proceed  upon  a  different 
doctrine. 

§  107.  *179.  Actions  Brought  by  Public  Officers.  Many  public 
officers  are  authorized  by  law  to  bring  actions  in  their  own  names, 
and  by  virtue  of  their  official  character,  in  respect  of  matters 
falling  within  the  scope  of  their  official  functions.  As  this 
subject  is  entirely  regulated  by  special  statutes,  which  greatly 
vary  in  different  States,  and  as  it  is  not  in  fact  a  portion  of  the 
general  civil  procedure,  but  rather  a  matter  exceptional  and 
collateral  thereto,  I  shall  not  attempt  any  discussion  of  the  cases 
in  which  such  officers  may  sue,  but  shall  simply  mention  a  few 

295.     See  Holden  r.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  Bank,  lected  anything,  was  held  to  be  a  trustee 

72  N.  Y.  280,  297  ;  Tyler   v.  Gran<;eT,  48  of  an  express  trust,  aud  could  therefore 

Cal.  259  ;  McKiunon  v.  McKinnon,  81  N.  C.  maintain  the  action  in  his  own  name/] 
201;   [^Lewis   v.    ,St.    Paul,   etc.    IJy.    Co.  -  Kimball'!;.  Spicer,  12  Wis.  668. 

(189+),  5  S.  D.  148,  53  X.  W.  580.]  ^  j^egj    j._    Harris,    7    Robt.    151.      A 

1  Gardinier    r.   Kellogg,  14    Wis.  605.  trustee   under  separation  articles,  by  the 

See    Davidson    v.    Kims,    67    N.  C.    228 ;  terms   of    which    lie    was   to    receive   au- 

Thompson    v.    Toland,   48   Cal.  99,    114;  uual   payments    from    the   husband   and 

Moorehead   v.  Hyde,  38  Iowa,  382.     Qln  for   the   support    of    the   wife,   may   sue 

Strucicmeyer  v.   Lamb    (1896),  64    Minn,  for   the   recovery  of   such  sums   without 

57,  65  N.  W.  930,  the  assignee  of  certain  joining  the  wife.     Clark  v.  Fosdick,  118 

notes  and  chattel  mortgages,  who  was  to  N.  Y.  7. 

bring  suit  against  the  maker  and  account  *  Bardstown  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Metcalfe, 

to  hi.s  as.-ignor  fur  the  proceeds  if  he  col-  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  199. 


ACTION  BY  UTHEK  THAN  KEAL  PARTY  IN  INTEREST.     155 

decisions  which  may  have  some  general  interest.^  Actions  by 
pubhc  officers  suing  as  such  shoukl  be  brought  in  their  individual 
names,  but  with  their  official  titles  added  ;2  but  the  mere  use  of 
the  official  title  will  not  be  enough,  without  the  proper  averments 
of  the  official  character  in  the  pleadings ;  in  the  absence  of  such 
averments,  the  title  will  be  regarded  as  only  a  description  of  the 
person.'  In  New  York,  counties  cannot  sue  nor  be  sued.  All 
actions  and  judicial  proceedings  in  favor  of  or  against  counties, 
except  those  which  some  county  officer  is  expressly  authorized  to 
maintain  in  his  own  name  for  the  benefit  of  the  county,  must  be 
brought  by  or  against  the  "Board  of  Supervisors"  of  the  county 
named,  as  an  organized  unit,  and  by  that  designation,  and  not 
against  the  supervisors  individually ;  *  but  when  the  action  is  by 
or  against  the  supervisors,  not  as  the  immediate  representatives 
and  in  the  place  of  the  county,  it  must  be  brought  by  or  against 
them  individually,  with  their  title  of  office  added. ^  The  rule  in 
respect  to  towns  in  New  York  is  different.  They  are  municipal 
corporations,  and  inust  sue  and  be  sued  by  their  corporate  name,' 
except  in  the  few  cases  where  town  officers  are  expressly  author- 
ized by  statute  to  sue  in  their  name  of  office  for  the  benefit  of  the 
town.^  In  accordance  with  this  rule,  where  the  supervisor  and 
commissioner  of  highwaj'S  had  entered  into  a  contract  on  behalf 
of  the  town,  which  contained  no  promise  to  or  undertaking  with 
themselves,  as  such  officers,  it  was  held  that  they  could  not 
maintain  an  action  upon  it  in  their  joint  names,  but  the  action 
should   have  been   by  the  town,  as  the  real  party  in  interest." 

^  QA  county  judge,  suing  on  a  trustee's  fayette  Cy.  i\  Ilixon,  69  Mo.  581  ;  Vanars- 

bond  under  R.  S.  §  4015,  is  the  trustee  of  dall  v.  The  State,  65  lud.   176;  Garver  v. 

an  express  trust  :  Ilichter  i;.  Leiby  (1898),  Kent,  70  id.  428;   Jefferson  Cy.   Com'rs 

99  Wis.  512,  75  N.  \V.  82.3  v.   Lineberger,  3  Mont.  31  ;    San   Benito 

2  Paige    V.   Fazackerly,  36  Barb.  392.  Cy.  v.  Whitesides,  51  Cal.  416. 
As  to  actions  by    towns,  counties,  super-  ^  Gould  v.    Glass,   19    Barb.    179.     [It 

visors,  and  similar  officers,  see  Hathaway  was  held  in   Atkinson  v.  Cawley  (1900), 

V.  Cincinnatus,    62  N.  Y.  434;    Lewis  i-.  112  Ga.  485,37  S.  E.  715,  that  where  an 

Marshall,  56  N.  Y.  663  ;  Guilford  v.  Cooley,  action  is  instituted  by  "  W.  Y.  Atkinson, 

58  id.  116  ;  Chautauqua  t'.  Gifford,  8  Ilun,  Governor,    etc.,"    the   words   "Governor, 

152;    Sutherland    v    Carr,  85  N.  Y.  104;  etc.,"  pltb  merely  descriptio  persoiue,  and  do 

Hagadorn  v.  Raux,  72  id.  583  ;  Cairns  v.  not  designate  the  capacity   in  which  the 

O'Bleness,    40    Wis.    469 :    Beaver   Dam  suit  is  brought.] 

t'.  FriuL's,  17  id.  398  ;  Franklin  T.  Sup.  v.  *  Hill  r.  Livingston  Cy.  Sup  ,  12  N.  Y. 

Kirby,  25   id.  498 ;    Dutcher  v.  Butcher,  52 ;  Magee  v.  Cutler,  43  Barb.  239. 
39  id.  651  ;  Pine  Valley  v.  Unity,  40  id.  »  Wild  v.  Columbia  Cy.  Sup.,  9  How. 

682:    La  Cro.sse    v.  Melrose.  22  id.  459;  Pr.  315,  per  Harris  J. 
School  Dir.  of  Sigel  !?.  Coe,  40  id.  103;  ^  Duanesburgh  i-.  Jenkins,  46  Barb.  294. 

Oconto  Cy.  Sup.  v.   Hall,  42  id.  59  ;  La-  ^  Palmer  v.  Fort  Plain  &  C.  Plk.  R. 


156  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

The  Secretary  of  State  for  the  War  Department  of  Great  Britain 
was  permitted  to  sue  in  his  individual  name  to  recover  pubUc 
moneys  which  had  been  embezzled  by  a  subordinate  official,  it 
beincr  shown  tliat  by  the  British  statute  the  property  was  vested 
in  him  as  such  secretary.^  The  "Metropolitan  Fire  Depart- 
ment," a  commission  created  by  statute  for  the  city  of  New 
York,  is  declared  to  be  a  qiLasi  corporation,  capable  of  suing  and 
being  sued,  and  not  a  mere  official  agency  of  the  municipality. "-^ 

§  108.  *  180.  Meaning  of  Phrase,  "Persons  expressly  Author- 
ized by  Statute "  to  sue.  Classes  of  Persons  Included.  Hardly 
any  attempt  lias  been  made  by  the  courts  to  determine  in  a 
general  manner  the  classes  of  persons  who  fall  within  the  desig- 
nation of  "expressly  authorized  by  statute"  to  sue.  The  Su- 
preme Court  of  Indiana  in  one  case  made  an  approach  towards 
such  an  interpretation.  In  an  action  upon  a  promissory  note  by 
the  assignee  thereof,  his  right  to  sue  was  denied  by  the  defend- 
ant. The  evidence  tended  to  show  that  he  was  not  the  real 
party  in  interest.  To  meet  this  objection,  he  invoked  a  prior 
general  statute,  which  expressly  provides  that  indorsees  and 
assignees  of  bills  and  notes  may  sue  in  their  own  names,  and 
urged  that  he  was  thus  brought  directly  within  the  class  of 
"persons  expressly  authorized  by  statute"  mentioned  in  the 
section  of  the  code  under  consideration.  The  court,  however, 
refused  to  adopt  this  construction  of  the  code.  It  said:  "Is  the 
assignee  of  a  note  who  holds  it  as  such,  without  any  real  interest, 
one  of  that  class  of  persons  here  referred  to  as  being  '  expressly 
authorized  by  statute  to  sue  '  ?  or  does  the  provision  have  refer- 
ence to  another  class  of  persons,  such  as  the  guardians  of  an 
idiot,  etc.  ?  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  clause  of  the  section 
above  quoted  does  not  have  reference  to  the  rights  of  an  assignee 
of  a  promissory  note,  but  to  such  persons  as  may  be  authorized 
to  sue  in  their  own  names  because  of  holding  some  official  posi- 
tion, as  the  president  of  a  bank,  the  trustees  of  a  civil  township, 
and  the  like."^  There  have  been  held  embraced  within  the  same 
class,  not  only  the  presidents  and  other  managing  officers  of 
joint-stock  associations  for  business    purposes,   but  also   similar 

Co.,  II   N.  Y.  376,  390,  per  Selden  J.  "A  -  Clarissy  v.  Metropolitan  Fire  Dep., 

town    is  a  political  corporation,  and  suits  7  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  352. 

in    Its  behalf   must   be  prosecuted  in  the  ^  Swift  v.   Ellsworth,  10  Ind    205,  per 

name  of  the  town."     See  su/<ra,  §  •  174.  Hanoa  J. 
»  reel  V.  Elliott,  7  Abb.  Pr.  433. 


ACTION    BY    OTUEll   THAN    KEAL    PAKTV    IN    INTEREST.  157 

officers  of  some  voluntary  societies  organized  for  purposes  not 
connected  with  business,  when  the  action  is  brought  on  behalf 
of,  or  in  relation  to  matters  belonging  to,  the  society,  and  among 
other  instances  the  following;  ^  a  suit  brought  by  the  president  of 
a  voluntary  unincorporated  religious  and  missionary  association 
to  recover  a  legacy  bequeathed  to  it;^  by  the  treasurer  of  a  divi- 
sion of  'the  Sons  of  Temperance,  a  voluntary  social  organization ;  ^ 
by  the  president  of  a  bank  of  which  he  was  the  nominal  pro- 
prietor, all  the  contracts  and  transactions  being  in  his  name  as 
such  proprietor ;  ^  by  the  trustee  of  the  "  Pittsburg  Trust  Com- 
pany," an  unincorporated  business  association,  in  an  action 
brought  to  recover  damages  for  negligence  in  not  protesting  a 
bill  of  exchange  belonging  to  such  association,  by  which  the 
amount  thereof  was  lost.^  An  officer  of  the  Bank  of  England 
was  permitted  to  sue  in  New  York  upon  a  bill  of  exchange 
belonging  to  the  bank,  by  showing  that  the  statutes  of  England 
authorized  him  to  bring  an  action. ^^  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  held  in  the  same  State  that  an  action  brought  by  a  person 
as  foreman  of  a  certain  named  fire  company  —  unincorporated  — 
could  not  be  maintained ;  that  the  provisions  of  the  code  and  of 
other  statutes  authorizing  suits  in  the  name  of  officers  of  unin- 
corporated bodies  do  not  apply  to  such  societies  as  fire  com- 
panies.' If  the  doctrine  stated  by  the  Indiana  court  cited  above 
be  taken  as  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  clause,  it  follows 
that  the  whole  section  provides  for  three  classes  of  persons  who 
may  sue  in  their  own  name,  although  not  the  real  parties  in 
interest;  namely,  fird,  those  with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a 
contract  is  made  for  the  benefit  of  another,  to  whom  the  promise 
is  directly  given,  and  who  sue  because  they  are  the  actual 
promisees;  secondly,  trustees  proper  of  an  express  trust,  who, 
by  virtue  of  being  trustees,  have  an  interest  in  or  title  to  some 

1  QThe  president  of  an  unincorporated  ^  Tibbetts  v.  Blood,  21  Barb.  650;  ex- 
ussociatiou  was  allowed,  under  §  1919  of  pressly  hokliug  that  these  statutes  are  not 
the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  to  bring  an     confined  to  business  associations. 

iiction  to  recover  the  property  belonging  ■»  Burbank  v.  Beach,  l.'j  Barb.  326. 

to  all  the  members  of  the  same  :  Ostrom  ^  Lau<;hlin  v.  Greene,  14   Iowa,  92,  94. 

V.  Greene  (1900),  161  N.  Y.  353,  55  N.  E.  The  plaintiff  was  said  to  be  a  trustee  of 

■919.3  ^"  express  trust. 

2  De   Witt  V.  Chandler,    11   Abb.  Pr.  «  Myers  v.  Machado,  6  Abb.  Pr.  198. 
459   (General  Term).     It  was  held   that  '  Mastersou  v.   Botts,  4  Abb.  Pr.   130 
the    action    might    be    maintained    under  (Sp.  T.), 

statutes  of  1848,  1849,  citing  Tibbetts  v. 
Blood,  21  Barb.  650. 


158 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


property  which  is  the  subject-matter  of  the  trust;  and,  thirdly^ 
certain  persons  clothed  with  authority  to  do  various  acts  for,  or 
in  behalf  of,  others,  but  who  are  not  vested  with  any  interest  in 
or  title  to  property,  so  as  to  render  them  trustees  in  the  strict 
meaning  of  that  term,  and  who  are  authorized  by  various  statutes 
to  maintain  actions  in  the  exercise  of  their  personal  authority, 
such  as  officers  of  voluntary  societies,  guardians,  or  committees 
of  the  person,  and  the  like. 

^  109.  *  181.  Actions  by  Executors  and  Administrators.  That 
executors  and  administrators  can  maintain  actions  relating  to  the 
estate  in  their  own  names  alone,  is  a  proposition  too  familiar  and 
elementary  to  require  discussion  or  the  citation  of  authority.  ^ 
Although  in  general  a  foreign  executor  or  administrator  cannot 
sue  as  such  in  the  courts  of  another  State  or  country  than  that  in 
wiiich  he  was  appointed,  yet,  if  the  objection  is  not  raised  by 


1  [In  Bern  v.  Shoemaker  (1898),  10 
S.  D.  453,  74  N.  W.  239,  it  was  held 
that  on  the  refusal  of  the  administrator  to 
hriug  an  action  for  the  recovery  of  lands 
alle<!;ed  to  belong  to  the  estate,  the  heirs 
may  bring  such  action,  on  the  broad 
ground  that  when  one  whose  duty  it  is  to 
protect  the  estate  refuses  to  do  so,  the 
))arties  beneficially  interested  may  take 
steps  to  do  so.  See  also  Tecumseh  Nat. 
Bank  r.  McGee  (1901),  61  Neb.  709,85 
N.  W.  949,  where  the  court  said  that 
"while  the  general  rule  is  that  an  admin- 
istrator or  personal  representative  of  a 
decedent's  estate  must  prosecute  actions 
for  recovery  of  debts  due  the  estate,  tliere 
are  exceptions  to  the  rule ;  and  in  the 
present  case  held  that  the  order  of  the 
trial  court,  substituting  an  heir  at  law  and 
jtermitting  her  to  prosecute  the  action  for 
her  interest  in  the  claim  in  controversy 
in  her  own  name,  the  other  heir.s  having 
.•■■ettled  and  compromised  theirs,  was  not 
erroneous." 

Ives  V.  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  129 
N.  C.  28,  39  S.  E.  631  :  Only  the  personal 
representative,  and  not  the  heirs,  of  a 
deceased  beneficiary  can  bring  an  action 
on  a  life  insurance  policy.  Burrell  v. 
Kern  (1899),  34  Ore.  501,  56  Pac.  809: 
"  When  the  cause  of  suit  or  action, 
whether  in  contract  or  in  tort,  accrues 
after  the  death  of  the  testator  or  intestate, 
the  money,  if  recovered,  will  bo  assets  of 


the  estate,  and  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator may  sue,  at  his  option,  in  either  his 
representative  or  individual  capacity." 

Hook  r.  Garfield  Coal  Co.  (1900),  112 
la.  210,  83  N.  W.  963:  An  administrator 
cannot  maintain  trespass  for  injuries  to 
the  real  estate  of  his  intestate.  In  this 
case  the  court  held  that  where  adminis- 
trators sue  for  trespass  to  real  estate  of 
their  intestate  under  an  assignment  from 
the  heirs,  and  request  that  the  heirs,  who 
assigned  simply  to  avoid  a  multiplicity 
of  suits,  be  substituted  as  parties  plaintiff, 
sucli  request,  while  discretionary  with  the 
court,  should  ordinarily  be  granted. 

Bunker  v.  Taylor  (1900),  13  S.  D.  433, 
83  N.  W.  555  :  Where  an  executrix  of  au 
estate  dies  pending  a  suit,  and  adminis- 
trators are  appointed  to  continue  the 
ailministration  of  tlie  estate,  they  are 
"  successors  in  interest  "  to  the  executri.x 
within  the  statute  providing  that  on  the 
death  of  a  party,  if  the  cause  of  action 
survive,  the  action  may  be  continued  by 
his  successor  in  interest.  Strauss  v.  Rend- 
heim  (1900),  162  N.  Y.  469,  .56  N.  K.  1007  : 
A  contract  of  sale  may  be  made  by  ex- 
ecutors and  enforced  by  them  in  an  action 
for  specific  performance,  witliout  making 
the  beneficiaries  parties,  where  such  ex- 
ecutors have  an  unqualified  and  imperative 
power  to  sell  real  estate  and  convert  it 
into  cash  in  order  to  divide  it  among 
legatees.] 


ACTION  BY  OTHER  THAN  KEAL  PARTY  IN  INTEREST.     159 

answer  or  deniurrer,  it  is  waived  under  the  codes  of  procedure ; 
that  is,  the  objection  goes  simply  to  the  parties'  capacity  to  sue, 
and  not  to  the  cause  of  action  set  up  in  the  complaint  or  petition.^ 
In  California,  lands  owned  in  fee  by  the  deceased  do  not  descend 
at  once  to  his  heirs  or  pass  to  his  devisees,  but  go  with  the 
personalty  into  the  estate  in  the  hands  of  his  administrator  or 
executor  as  a  part  of  the  assets  to  be  administered  upon.  Any 
action,  therefore,  relating  to  such  land,  —  to  recover  its  posses- 
sion, or  damages  for  injuries  done  to  it,  or  rents,  or  the  like,  — 
brought  at  any  time  before  a  final  settlement  of  the  estate  and 
distribution  thereof,  must  be  prosecuted  by  the  administrator  or 
executor  alone. ^  In  an  action  by  the  administrator  of  a  mort- 
gagee, brought  to  foreclose  the  mortgage,  the  heir  of  the  mort- 
gagee is  not  a  proper  party  to  be  joined  as  a  co-plaintiff.  In 
California,  as  in  New  York,  the  mortgage  is  a  mere  security, 
incident  and  collateral  to  the  debt,  and  belongs  wholly  to  the 
j)ersonalty.^ 

§  110.  *  182.  Actions  by  General  Guardians.  How  far  general 
guardians  of  infants,  testamentary  or  appointed  by  the  probate 
courts,  are  authorized  to  maintain  actions  in  their  own  names, 
relating  to  the  personal  property  of  their  wards,  depends  rather 
upon  the  provisions  of  the  statutes  which  define  their  powers  and 
duties  than  upon  those  of  the  codes.*     The  codes  in  general  can 

1  l\obbius  V.  Wells,  18  Abb.  Pr.  191.  from  the  complaint  that  the  plaintiff  had 
^Held  in  Gregory  v.  McCorniick  (1893),  capacity  to  sue  as  admiuistratrix,  but  it 
120  Mo.  6.57,  25  S.  W.  565,  that  the  ob-  must  appear  from  the  complaint  that  she 
jection  that  plaintiff  is  a  foreign  executor  did  not  have  capacity.  The  former  objec- 
or  administrator,  if  it  appears  on  the  face  tion  can  be  taken  only  by  answer.] 
of  the  petition,  if  not  raised  by  special  As  to  foreign  administrator,  see  Con- 
demurrer  on  the  ground  that  plaintiff  has  nor's  Adm.  v.  Paul,  12  Bush,  144;  as 
not  le^^al  capacity  to  sue,  is  waived.  To  to  executors  and  administrators  generally, 
the  same  effect  see  Wilson  v.  Wilson  see  Duncan  v.  Whedbee,  4  Colo.  1 43 ; 
(1894),  26  Ore.  251,  38  Pac.  185,  citing  the  MuUin's  Appeal,  40  Wis.  154;  Harte  v. 
text.  Houchin,  50  Ind.  327  ;  Wright's  Adm.  v. 

But  see  Louisville  &  Nashville  R.  R.  Wriglit,  72  Ind.  149  (A.  as  administrator 

Co.  V.  Brantley's  Adm'r  (1894),  96  Ky.  of  B.'s  e.state  can  sue  A.  as  administrator 

297,  28  S.  W.  477,  where  it  was  held  that  of   C.'s  estate)  ;  Ham    v.    Henderson,    50 

where  a  foreign  administrator  attemjits  to  Cal.  367  ;   Cashman  v.  Wood,  6  Hun,  520. 

bring  suit,  defendant  may  demur  gener-  -  Curtis  i".  Herrick,  14  Cal.  117;  Meeks 

ally  on  the  ground  that  the  petition  does  v.  Ilahn,  20  Cal.  620;  Grattan  v.  Wiggins, 

not  state  a  cause  of  action.     It  is  not  a  23  Cal.  16;  Emeric  v.  Peuuiman,  26  Cal. 

case   of   want   of  legal   capacity   to  sue.  119. 

And  it  was   held    iu    Locke    v.    Klunker  ^  Grattan  r.  Wiggins,  23  Cal.  16. 

(1898),  123  Cal.  231,  55  Pac.  993,  that  a  *  [In  an  action  brought  in   behalf  of 

demurrer  for  want  of 'facts  will   not   be  minors  by  a  guardian,  it  is  necessary  for 

Bustained  where  it  merely  does  not  appear  the  guardian  to  allege  issuable  facts  show- 


160 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


luirdly  be  deemed  to  have  enlarged  their  powers  in  this  respect. 
In  a  few  States,  the  guardian  is  specitically  mentioned  and 
coupled  with  the  executor  and  administrator  in  the  section  of 
the  statute  under  consideration ;  and  this  language  may  be  inter- 
preted as  authorizing  him  to  sue  in  respect  of  all  property  which 
is  under  his  control  by  virtue  of  his  office.^  In  New  York,  it 
has  been  determined  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  a  very  carefully 
considered  case,  the  decision,  however,  being  rested  upon  a  con- 
struction of  the  Revised  Statutes,  and  not  of  the  code,  that  the 
general  guardian  may  ])ring  all  actions  in  his  own  name  respect- 
ing the  personal  property  of  the  ward  and  the  rents  and  profits 
of  his  real  estate.^  This  same  power  is  expressly  conferred  upon 
him  by  the  statutes  of  certain  States.'^  On  the^  other  hand,  it  is 
held  in  Kentucky  that,  while  the  guardian,  who  has  taken  a  note 
expressly  made  to  himself  as  payee  for  moneys  belonging  to  the 
ward,  may  prosecute  an  action  thereon,  because  the  promise  is 
given  directly  to  him,  he  cannot  sue  in  respect  of  his  ward's 
property  in  general,  since  he  has  no  estate  or  interest  therein ; 
such  actions  must  be  brought  in  the  name  of  the  infant.^     The 


int^  his  representative  capacity,  and  if  he 
does  not  do  so  the  complaint  is  demurrable 
upon  the  ground  of  want  of  capacitv  to 
*ue,  but  unless  so  made  the  ol)jection  is 
waived :  Dalrymple  v.  Security  Loau  Co. 
(11)00),  9  X.  b.  306,  83  N.  w".  245.  The 
objection  that  the  parties  to  an  action  are 
minors  who  appear  without  guardians  ad 
lllpiii  is  waiveil  by  pleading  to  the  merits  : 
Blumauer  v.  Clock  (1901),  24  Wash.  590, 
€4  Pac.  844.  A  father  may  su(!  as  guar- 
dian (til  litem  for  services  of  his  minor 
child  rendered  to  a  third  party  :  Grosov- 
sky  (.'.  Goldenberg  (1902),  86  Minn.  378, 
90  N.  W.  282.3 

1  This  interpretation  is  given  to  the 
language  of  the  code  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Indiana  in  Shepherd  v.  Evans, 
9  Ind.  200,  which  holds  that,  by  virtue  of 
the  provision,  the  guardian  is  empowered 
to  bring  such  actions  in  his  own  name. 
See  Wilson  v.  Houston,  70  X.  C.  37.5  (when 
wards  arc  necessary  plaintiffs)  ;  Crawford 
I'.  Xeal.  50  Cal.  321  (necessary  al-iegationa 
in  suit  by  infant  by  a  guardian  nd  litem). 
A  ceneral  guardian  may  sue,  Hanonstein 
V.  Knll.  59  Flow.  Vr.  24:  Fox  '•,  Kcrpor, 
61    Ind.  14-<;   and  see  Carrillo  ,•    Mcl'hil- 


lips,  55  Cal.  130 ;  per  contra  he  cannot  sue 
in  his  own  name,  Vincent  v.  Starks,  45 
Wis.  458. 

^  Thomas  v.  Bennett,  56  Barb.  197; 
Seaton  i'.  Davis,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  91 ;  and 
see  White  r  Parker,  8  Barb.  48,  52; 
Mebane  v.  Mebane,  66  N.  C.  334 ;  Biggs 
r.  Williams,  66  N.  C.  427. 

■^  See  [[Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  3982.] 

*  Anderson  v.  Watson,  3  Mete.  (Ky.) 
509.  [[So,  also,  in  Missouri,  in  Webb  v. 
lI.^ydon  (1901),  166  Mo.  39,  65  S.  W.  760, 
it  was  held  tliat  a  suit  to  recover  property 
belonging  to  a  ward  .slioiild  be  brought  in 
the  name  of  tlie  ward  by  tlie  curator,  and 
not  in  the  name  of  the  curator,  since  the 
title  is  in  the  ward.  McLean  '■.  Dean 
(1890).  60  Minn.  369,  69  N.  W.  140: 
Where  a  note  is  purchased  by  a  guardian, 
payable  to  himself,  but  witli  the  funds  of 
his  ward  and  for  the  ward's  benefit,  the 
guardian  may  sue  upon  it  in  his  own 
name. 

Dixon  V.  Cardozo  (1895),  106  Cal. 
506,  39  Pac.  857  :  After  the  commence- 
ment of  the  action  plaintiff  liecame  insane, 
and  a  guardian  was  appointed  and  substi- 
tuted,   upon    motion,  as   ])laintifT.      Held 


JOINDKR    OF    I'LAINTIIFS.  161 

statutes  which  provide  for  the  appointment  of  guardians  or  com- 
mittees over  the  property  of  lunatics,  confirmed  drunkards,  and 
other  such  persons  not  sui  juris,  generally  confer  uj)on  them  the 
same  powers  that  are  given  to  the  general  guardians  of  infants, 
and  a  similar  rule  should  therefore  prevail  in  reference  to  their 
prosecution  of  actions.  Although  there  is  some  conflict  in  the 
decided  cases,  yet,  as  these  guardians  or  committees  do  not 
acquire  any  estate  or  interest  in  the  property  subjected  to  their 
control,  but  only  a  power  of  possession  and  management,  the 
correct  doctrine  upon  principle  would  seem  to  be  that  they  can- 
not maintain  actions  concerning  it  in  their  own  names,  unless 
expressly  authorized  to  do  so  by  statute ;  other  actions  may  be 
brought  by  them.^ 

SECTION  FIFTH. 
WHO   MAY   BE   JOINED   AS   PLAINTIFFS. 

§111.  *183.  Statutory  Provisions.  The  following  are  the 
provisions  relating  to  the  joinder  of  parties  plaintiff  in  one  action 
found  in  the  various  State  codes,  and  it  will  be  seen  that  there 
is  an  absolute  identity  of  language  in  all  the  legislation  upon 
this  subject.  "  All  persons  having  an  interest  in  the  subject  of 
the  action,  and  in  obtaining  the  relief  demanded,  may  be  joined 

error,  as  the  suit  should  have  been  prose-  with  another,  the  ward  is  not  a  necessary 

cuted  in  the  name  of  the  original  plaintiff,  party.] 

by  J.  D..  his  guardian.     Dennison  v.  Will-  i  Kingr.  Cutts,  24  Wis.  625;  McKillip 

cut    (1894),    Idaho,    35    Pac.    698:    "The  r.  McKillip,  8  Barb.  552.     Bnt,  per  contra, 

guardian  of  a  minor  is  not  permitted  to  see  Person  v.  Warren,  1 4  Barl).  488,  which 

bring  suit  in  his  own  name  for  money  or  expressly  holds  that   the  cominittoe  is  a 

property  belonging  to  the  ward,  and  wliich  "trustee  of  an  express  tru.-<t"  within  the 

he    has  a    right   to  the   possession   of   as  meaning  of  tiie  code.     The  whole  subject 

such   guardian,   but    mu.st   bring  suit   as  was  discussed  and  determined  in  the  very 

guardian."  late  case  of  Fields  v.  Fowler,  4  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Plympton  v.  Hall  (1893),  55  Minn.  22,  Ct.  598.     The  action  was  brought  by  the 

56  N.  W.  351  :  The  suit  instituted  in  be-  committee  of  the  person  and  estate  of  a 

half  of  a  lunatic  should  be  in  the  name  of  lunatic  to  set   aside  the  sale  of  a  farm 

the  lunatic,  but  brought  by  his  guardian  made   by    defendant    to    tlie    lunatic,   to 

or  next  friend.     Row  v.   Kow  (1895),  53  cancel    tlie    satisfaction   of    a    mortgage 

O.St.  249,  41   N.  E.   239:    An  action   to  which    had    been    executed    by   him,   and 

recover  property  belonging  to   an   imbe-  also  a  check  which  he  had  given  on  such 

•cile  must    be  brought   by   guardian   and  sale.     The  action  was  held  to  be  properly 

not  by  next  friend.     R.  S.  §  4998.     How-  brought  by  the  committee.     E.  Darwin 

ard  V.  Singleton  (1893),  94  Ky.  336,  22  Smith   J.,  in   giving  the  opinion  of   the 

S.  W.  337  :  In  an  action   by  a  guardian  to  court,  says :   "'J'he  rule  undoubtedly  wa-;, 

sell  his  ward's  real  estate  owned  j(;intly  and  still  is,  at  law,  where  the  action  is 


162 


CIVIL    KEMKDIES. 


as  plaintiffs,  except  as  otherwise  provided  in  this  title."  ^  This 
is  the  important  section;  but  the  following  one  somewhat  en- 
larges its  scope  and  effect  in  certain  cases:  "Of  the  parties  to 
the  action,  those  who  are  united  in  interest  must  be  joined  as 
plaintiffs  or  defendants;  but,  if  the  consent  of  any  one  who 
should  have  been  joined  as  plaintiff'  cannot  be  obtained,  he  may- 
be made  a  defendant,  tlie  reason  thereof  being  stated  in  the  com- 
plaint."- The  particular  statutory  rules  relating  to  married 
women  as  parties,  and  prescribing  Avhen  wives  may  sue  alone 
or  when  husbands  must  be  joined,  will  be  stated  in  a  subsequent 
portion  of  this  section.  Many  of  these  special  enactments  are 
not  found  in  the  codes  of  procedure,  but  in  separate  and  inde- 
pendent legislation. 

§  112.  *  195.  Scope  of  Statutory  Provisions.  The  Provisions 
respecting  Plaintiffs  Compared  -with  those  respecting  Defendants. 
Apply  to  Legal  as  well  as  Equitable  Actions.  It  must  be  con- 
ceded   at  once    that  there  is  no    repeal    or    modification  of    the 


brouf>;ht  to  assert  the  title  of  the  lunatic 
to  real  and  personal  property,  it  must  be 
brought  in  his  name,  as  held  in  Mclvillip 
V.  Mclvillip,  8  Barb.  552."  He  cites  the 
laws  of  1845,  ch.  112,  which  authorize  the 
committee  to  sue  for  any  debt,  claim,  or 
demand  transferred  to  them,  or  to  the 
possession  and  control  of  which  they  are 
entitled ;  also  Gorliam  v.  Gorham,  3  Barb. 
Ch.  32;  Ortley  v.  Messere,  7  Johns.  Ch. 
139,  and  §  111  of  the  code,  and  reaches 
the  conclusion  that  the  equity  rule  as  to 
parties  is  controlling  in  actions  of  this 
kind.  The  decision  in  Person  c.  Warren, 
U  Barb.  488,  is  expressly  approved  and 
followed.  S.  P.  Bearss  c.  Montgomery, 
40   Ind.  544. 

1  New  York,  §  117  (446)  ;  Ohio,  §  34  ; 
Kansas,  §  35  ;  California.  §§  378,  381  ; 
Iowa,  §  2545;  South  Carolina,  §  140;  Ne- 
vada, §  12;  Oregon,  §  380,  but  limited  to. 
e()iiitable  actions;  North  Carolina,  §  60; 
QVVi.scoiisin,  St.,  1898,  §  2602  ;  Utah.  Uev. 
St.,  1898,  §  2913;  North  Dakota,  Rev. 
Codes,  1899,  §  5229;  South  Dakota,  Ann. 
St.,  1901,  §  6077;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893, 
§  3907  ;  WjLshingion,  Bal.  Code,  §  48.33, 
in  somewhat  different  form  ;  Montana, 
§  580  ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1 901 ,  §  3 1 66 ; 
Wyominj;,  Ilev.  St.,  1899,  §  3479;  Colo- 
rado, §  10;  Arkansa.s,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig., 


§  5G29  ;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §617; 
Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  263;  Ken- 
tucky, §  22;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§  542;  Nebraska,  §  40.] 

2  New  York,  §  119  (448);  California, 
§  382;  South  Carolina,  §  142;  Oregon, 
§  381,  but  limited  to  equity  actions;  Ne- 
vada, §  14;  Ohio,  §  36;  Kansas,  §  37; 
Iowa,  §  2548;  North  Carolina,  §  62; 
QUtah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2917;  North 
Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5232;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6079;  Arizona, 
Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1313;  Montana,  §  584; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3170; 
Colorado,  §  12;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901, 
270;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2G04  ;  Okla- 
homa, St.,  1893,  §  3909;  Wa.shington, 
Bal.  Code,  §  4833;  Wyoniin-i,  Kcv.  St, 
1899.  §3481  :  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902, 
§  617;  Nebraska,  §  42;  Arkansas,  Sand. 
&  Hill's  Di^'.,  §  5631  ;  Kentucky,  §  24; 
Missouri,  Rev.   St.,  1899,  §  544.] 

QThe  code  provision  requiring  the  rea- 
son to  be  given  for  making  a  person  de- 
fendant w'ho  should  ])roperly  be  a  plaintiff, 
requires  the  reason  for  not  joining  him, 
that  is,  his  refusal,  to  be  stated,  and  not 
his  reason  for  such  refusal :  Union  Pac. 
Rv.  Co.  V.  Vincent  (1899),  58  Neb.  171, 
78  N.  W.  457.] 


GENERAL    THEORY    AND    INTENT    OF    THE    CODES.  iG.'j 

common-law  rules  in  detail;  the  requirements  of  the  old  law  as 
to  joint  and  several  rights,  and  the  union  or  severance  of  the 
parties  holding  such  rights,  are  not  in  any  express  manner 
referred  to.  It  should  also  be  carefully  observed — and  the  fact 
is  one  of  great  practical  importance  —  that  the  provisions  in  the 
various  codes  relating  to  parties  plaintiff  are  not  so  full,  minute, 
and  express  as  those  relating  to  parties  defendant.  Even  in 
those  State  codes  where  the  common-law  distinctions  between 
joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several  liabilities  are  utterly  abol- 
ished, and  the  practical  requirements  as  to  the  union  or  severance 
of  parties  defendant  based  upon  them  are  wholly  swept  away, 
there  is  no  corresponding  express  legislation  as  to  the  distinctions 
between  joint  and  several  rights  and  the  union  or  severance  of 
plaintiffs.  This  difference  in  the  mode  of  treatment  may  be 
made  the  ground — and  has  been  by  many  judges  —  of  inferring 
that  the  legislature  intended  to  leave  the  ancient  legal  doctrines 
as  to  plaintiffs  untouched,  and  to  confine  its  work  of  reform  to 
the  case  of  defendants.  The  legislative  intent,  therefore,  what- 
ever it  may  be,  must  be  found  in  the  few  general  provisions 
quoted  at  the  commencement  of  the  present  section,  and  in  the 
subsequent  provisions  which  regulate  the  rendition  of  judgments, 
so  far  as  the  same  depends  upon  or  is  connected  with  the  parties 
to  an  action.  Referring  to  these  provisions,  it  is  plain  that  their 
language  is  general,  inclusive,  without  exception,  and  applying 
alike  to  all  kinds  and  classes  of  actions.  Whatever  doctrines  in 
reference  to  parties  plaintiff  the  legislature  has  adopted,  what- 
ever regulations  it  has  established,  its  intention,  as  shown  by  the 
language  of  all  the  codes  but  one  or  two,  is  to  apply  them  equally 
to  legal  and  to  equitable  actions.  No  exception  being  made  nor 
even  suggested,  the  courts  cannot,  unless  by  an  act  of  positive 
legislation,  by  an  act  of  direct  usurpation,  create  an  exception, 
and  say  that  these  general  terms  were  intended  to  apply  to 
equitable  suits  alone,  while  legal  actions  were  intended  to  be 
left  outside  of  their  scope  and  effect. 

§  113.  *  196.  The  Statute  in  Effect  an  Enactment  of  the  Equity 
Doctrine.  Practical  Question  herein.  These  statutory  provisions 
themselves  are  confessedly  an  enactment,  with  hardly  a  verbal 
change,  of  the  general  principles  long  ago  established  by  courts 
of  equity  for  the  regulation  of  the  parties  plaintiff  in  suits  pend- 
ing before  them.     The  legislature  has,  therefore,  in  a  very  brief 


164  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

but  comprehensive  form,  adopted  the  equitable  doctrine,  and  has 
applied  it  to  tiie  civil  action  rec^uired  to  be  used  in  the  enforce- 
ment of  all  rights  and  the  pursuit  of  all  remedies,  whether  legal 
or  equitable.  This  proposition  cannot  be  denied,  without  deny- 
ing to  the  language  of  the  statute  its  plain  meaning  and  ordinary 
significance  and  force.  The  practical  question,  then,  arises  at 
once.  How  far  is  this  equitable  doctrine  inconsistent  with  the 
positive  rules  as  to  parties  plaintiff  in  legal  actions,  long  estab- 
lished as  a  part  of  the  common-law  procedure?  To  what  extent 
does  it,  as  thus  generally  stated,  necessarily  abrogate  or  modify 
these  special  rules?  That  some  change  is  wrought,  if  we  adhere 
to  the  simple  language,  is  very  manifest.  For  example,  the 
common  law  required  that  all  partners,  or  other  joint  contractors, 
should  unite  as  plaintiffs,  and  admitted  no  ordinary  exception  or 
excuse  for  the  non-joinder.  The  new  procedure,  after  requiring, 
as  did  the  common  law,  that  all  those  parties  "  united  in  interest 
must  be  joined  as  plaintiffs,"  adds,  "but  if  the  consent  of  any 
one  who  should  have  been  joined  as  plaintiff  cannot  be  obtained, 
he  may  be  made  a  defendant,  the  reasons  being  stated  in  the 
complaint  or  petition."  The  practice  permitted  by  this  clause 
was  familiar  to  courts  of  equity,  but  was  utterly  unknown  in 
courts  of  law.  Here,  however,  it  is  applied  to  all  actions;  no 
exception  is  suggested;  and  if  we  follow  the  plain  language  of 
the  codes,  this  important  alteration  is  made  in  the  ancient  legal 
rules  regulating  the  parties  plaintiff. 

§  114.  *  l'.>7.  Statutory  Provisions  confirm  Common-Law^  Rules 
to  a  Certain  Extent.  Assuming  that  the  provisions  in  relation 
to  plaint! ifs  are  an  enactment  in  a  statutory  form  of  the  general 
equitable  doctrine  in  regard  to  the  same  subject,  and  that,  as 
they  stand  in  the  codes,  they  equally  embrace  within  their  scope 
actions  of  all  kinds,  legal  and  equitable,  and  giving  full  force  to 
their  language,  they  do  not  abrogate  but  rather  confirm  a  large 
portion  of  the  common-law  rules,  those,  I  mean,  which  require 
all  persons  jointly  interested  to  l^e  united  as  plaintiffs.  The 
general  requirements,  "all  persons  having  an  interest  in  the 
subject  of  the  action,  and  in  obtaining  the  relief  demanded,  may 
be  joined  as  plaintiffs,"  and  "those  who  are  united  in  interest 
must  be  joined  as  plaintiffs,"  plainly  include  the  case  of  persons 
"having  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter,"  or  "united  in  in- 
terest "  by  virtue  of  their  being  joint  obligees,   covenantees,  or 


GENERAL    THEORY    AND    INTENT    OF    THK    CODES.  165 

promisees  at  law,  as  well  as  the  case  of  persons  having  some 
connnon  equitable  interest.  The  two  sections  of  the  codes  from 
which  I  have  quoted  do  not  contemplate  nor  permit  a  severance 
among  parties  plaintiff  when  the  old  law  requires  a  joinder;^  the 
changes  introduced  by  them  rather  tend  in  the  opposite  direction, 
and,  talking  their  language  simply  as  it  stands,  they  would  seem 
to  allow  the  uniting  of  parties  plaintiff  in  many  cases  where  such 
union  was  forbidden  in  legal  actions;  as,  for  example,  the  unit- 
ing of  survivors  of  joint  promisees  and  the  personal  representa- 
tives of  those  deceased.  In  fact,  the  practical  rule  of  equity  in 
regard  to  suits  by  persons  jointly  interested,  or  having  a  joint 
right,  was  the  same  as  that  which  prevailed  at  law,  with  the 
single  exception  or  addition  which  provided  for  the  case  of  a 
refusal  by  one  or  more  of  the  joint  holders  of  the  right  to  unite 
with  their  fellows  as  plaintiffs.  In  equity,  as  well  as  in  law,  the 
joint  owners  of  property,  and  the  joint  obligees,  or  covenantees, 
were  in  general  required  to  be  all  made  co-plaintiffs,  but  if  one 
or  more  refused  to  join,  he  or  they  could  be  made  defendants. ^ 
This  equitable  doctrine  is  now,  if  we  accept  the  express  language 
of  the  codes,  and  not  the  glosses  put  upon  it  by  some  of  the 
courts,  extended  to  all  actions  alike. 

§  115.  *  198.  Code  allows  a  Freer  Union  of  Parties  Plaintiff 
than  under  the  Common  Law.  As  already  Stated,  these  sections 
of  the  codes,  if  full  force  be  given  to  their  plain  and  simple  term?, 
look  to  a  more  free  union  of  parties  as  plaintiffs  in  the  same 
action  than  was  allowed  by  the  courts  of  law  under  the  former 
system.  In  order  to  be  a  proper  plaintiff,  according  to  the 
ancient  theory,  the  person  must  be  interested  in  the  whole  of 
the  recovery,  so  that  one  judgment  could  be  rendered  for  all  the 
plaintiffs  in  solido ;  that  a  judgment  should  be  given  to  one 
plaintiff  for   a   certain  sum   of   money,   or  for  certain  lands  or 

^  Qln  Burkett  v.  Lehmen-Higginson  shouW  have  been  joined  as  plaintiff  can- 
Co.  (1899),  8  Okla.  81,  56  Pac.  856,  the  not  be  obtained,  he  may  be  made  a  defend- 
oourt  said  :  '■  The  provisions  of  our  Code  ant,  and  the  respective  rights  of  the  several 
do  not  contemplate  or  permit  a  severance  parties,  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  whether 
among  parties  plaintiff  when  the  old  law  equitable  or  legal,  may  be  determined  and 
reijuired  a  joinder.  .  .  .  Our  Code,  by  adjudicated  in  the  one  action,  although  in 
abolishing  distinctions  in  forms  of  action,  the  case  of  joint  plaintiffs  or  joint  defend- 
)ias  preserveil  all  the  rights  of  litigants  ants  their  rights  and  liabilities  may  not  in 
that  are  equitable  or  legal,  without  cliaug-  all  particulars  be  the  .>jame."  ]  ' 
ing  the  common-law  rules  relating  to  the  ^  ^ee  1  Daniel's  Chan.  PI.  (4th  Am. 
joinder  of  parties  to  actions,  except  in  the  ed.),  pp.  192,  206,  207,  208,  21 1,  216. 
particular  that,  if  tiie  consent  of  one  who 


166  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

chattels,  and  a  judgment  for  a  different  sum,  or  other  lands  or 
chattels,  be  awarded  to  another  plaintiff,  was  regarded  as  the 
sheerest  impossibility.  The  legal  notion  of  survivorship  forbade 
the  union  of  the  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased  joint 
contractor  with  the  others  who  were  living,  and  even  the  union 
of  the  representatives  of  all,  if  all  were  dead.  The  text  of  the 
codes  is  broad  enough,  and  explicit  enough,  if  it  is  taken 
literally,  to  abolish  these  legal  restrictions  upon  the  freedom  of 
joining  parties  as  plaintiffs.  The  clauses,  "All  persons  having 
an  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action,  and  in  obtaining  the 
relief  demanded,"  and  "those  who  are  united  in  interest,"  do 
not  necessarily  require  that  the  interest  of  all  those  who  are  to 
be  united  as  plaintiffs  should  be  equal  or  the  same,  and  they  do 
require  the  union  of  all  those  having  such  an  interest  without 
any  restriction  as  to  its  nature,  whether  it  be  legal  or  equitable. 
The  interest  of  the  survivors  of  joint  obligees,  covenantees,  or 
promisees,  was,  under  the  ancient  system,  strictly  legal.  The 
interest  of  the  executors  or  administrators  of  the  deceased  joint 
obligee  or  promisee  was  equitable,  but  was  none  the  less  a  full 
interest,  for  it  enabled  the  estate  to  obtain  its  entire  portion  of 
the  benefit  flowing  from  the  contract.  The  unequivocal  language 
of  the  codes  declares  that  persons  holding  this  common  interest 
in  the  subject-matter  of  the  action,  or  in  obtaining  the  relief 
demanded,   may  be  united  as  plaintiffs. 

§  116.  *  199.  Joinder  of  Holders  of  Interests  •wrhich  are  Several. 
In  one  otlier  class  of  cases  these  provisions  of  the  reform  legis- 
lation would  seem  to  have  modified  the  former  practice  in  legal 
actions,  if  their  meaning  is  to  be  found  in  their  exact  terms. 
At  the  common  law,  the  different  holders  of  several  rights 
must  sue  separately,  although  tlie  rights  were  created  by  a 
single  instrument,  and  although  there  might  be  some  kind  of  a 
common  interest;  no  election  was  given  to  bring  a  joint  action 
by  all,  or  a  separate  action  by  each.  This  rule  is  directly  within 
the  modifying  effect  of  the  sections  under  consideration.  "All 
persons  having  an  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action,  and  in 
obtaining  the  relief  demanded,  may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs."  The 
extent  of  the  interest  is  not  the  criterion,  nor  its  source  nor 
origin.  If  the  persons  have  anij  interest,  whether  complete  or 
partial,  whether  absolute  or  contingent,  whether  resulting  from 
a  common  share  in  the  proceeds  of  the  suit,  or  arising  from  the 


GENERAL    THEORY    AND    INTENT    OF    THE    CODES.  1G7 

stipulations  of  the  agreement,  the  language  applies  without  any 
limitation  or  exception,  and  without  any  distinction  suggested 
between  actions  which  are  equitable  and  those  which  are  legal.  ^ 
This  was  the  established  equity  doctrine  which  in  many  cases 
permitted  parties  to  be  united  as  plaintiffs  whose  rights  were, 
in  a  legal  aspect,  not  joint,  but  several.  It  is  possible,  indeed  it 
frequently  happens,  that  several  rights  may  be  held  by  two  or 
more  persons,  who  nevertheless  have  ''an  interest  in  the  subject 
of  the  action  and  in  the  relief  demanded;"  audit  would  seem 
that  these  persons,  according  to  the  interpretation  given  above, 
may  now,  if  they  so  elect,  join  as  plaintiffs  in  bringing  a  legal 
action  as  well  as  in  maintaining  an  equitable  suit. 

§  117.  *  200.  Recapitulation  of  Foregoing  Theoretical  Analysis. 
I  have  thus  far  intentionally  examined  the  sections  of  the  various 
State  codes  which  relate  to  the  joinder  of  ])arties  plaintiff  in  the 
civil  action,  without  any  reference  to  judicial  authority  and  con- 
struction ;  I  have  endeavored  to  ascertain  and  to  state  the  object 
and  design  of  the  legislature  as  the  same  could  be  gathered  with 
reasonable  certainty  from  the  very  words  which  it  has  employed. 
This  legislative  intent,  when  the  field  of  investigation  is  thus 
limited,  depends  upon  the  prior  rules  controlling  the  choice  of 
parties  plaintiff  both  in  legal  and  in  equitable  actions  and  upon 
the  exact  text  of  the  statute  itself.  I  recapitulate  the  results 
reached  by  this  analysis :  (1)  The  common-law  doctrines  defining 
joint  and  several  rights,  and  the  special  rules  relating  to  joint 
and  several  actions,  are  not  specifically  abrogated  or  modified; 
whatever  changes  have  been  made  are  the  result  of  very  general 
and  comprehensive  language  used  by  the  legislature.  (2)  There 
is  a  striking  difference  between  the  general  character  of  the  pro- 
visions having  reference  to  plaintiffs  and  that  of  the  provisions 
referring  to  defendants ;  the  latter  are  more  special  in  their 
nature,  and  in  many  of  the  States  much  more  reformatory.  (3) 
The  new  system  has,  in  a  very  comprehensive  form,  established 
the  doctrine  of  equity  in  regard  to  the  choice  and  joinder  of 
plaintiffs,  and,  by  making  no  exceptions  or  limitations,  has 
applied  this  doctrine  to  all  actions,  whether  legal  or  equitable. 
(4)  The  effect  of  extending  this  doctrine  of  equity  to  legal  actions 
is  not  to  prevent  the  union  of  parties  as  co-plaintiffs  in  cases 
where,  on  account  of  the  joint  right,  the  common  law  required 

1  First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Central  City  v.  Hummel,  14  Colo.  250. 


168  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

such  union;  the  common-law  rule  making  the  joinder  of  all  such 
persons  necessary  is  left  unaffected,  with  the  single  exception 
that  if  one  who  should  regularly  be  made  a  plaintiff,  in  pursuance 
of  such  rules,  refuses  to  permit  his  name  to  be  thus  used,  he  may 
be  made  a  defendant  instead;  and  this  exceptional  provision 
being  without  limitation  or  restriction  in  the  text,  applies  as 
well  to  legal  as  to  equitable  actions.  (5)  Persons  having  an 
interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action,  and  in  obtaining  the  relief 
demanded,  may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  in  all  actions,  whatever 
be  their  nature,  although  the  rights  of  such  persons  are  legally 
several,  and  although  at  the  common  law  they  would  be  required, 
to  institute  separate  actions ;  or,  in  other  words,  the  plain  import 
of  the  legislation  —  its  language  not  being  confined  to  any  class 
of  suits  —  is  to  enlarge  the  number  of  cases  in  which  persons  may 
be  joined  as  co-plaintiffs,  and  to  place  legal  actions  in  this  respect 
upon  exactly  the  same  footing  as  those  which  are  equitable  in 
their  nature.  (6)  The  special  rules  of  the  common  law  as  to- 
husband  and  wife  have  been  entirely  abolished  in  some  States  by 
provisions  contained  in  their  codes  of  procedure,  and  in  other 
States  by  separate  statutes  relating  exclusively  to  the  status  of 
marriage. 

§  118.  *201.  General  Theory  of  Judicial  Interpretation.  Intro- 
ductory. The  foregoing  results  were  obtained  from  an  examina- 
tion of  the  language  alone  which  the  legislatures  have  used ;  I 
shall  now  proceed  to  compare  them  with  the  general  conclusions 
which  have  been  reached  by  the  courts  in  their  interpretation  of 
the  same  provisions,  and  shall  thus  test  their  correctness  and 
their  value  as  practical  guides  in  the  administration  of  justice. 
In  pursuing  this  investigation,  the  inquiry  will  at  present  be 
confined  to  those  judicial  decisions  which  have  dealt  with  the 
subject  of  parties  plaintiff,  those  which  discuss  the  analogous 
topic  of  parties  defendant  being  reserved  to  the  succeeding  sec- 
tion of  this  chapter.  This  course  will  necessarily  produce  some 
repetition  of  general  principles ;  but  as  the  questions  relating  ta 
plaintiffs  and  those  relating  to  defendants  arise  from  provisions- 
of  the  codes  quite  different  in  their  scope  and  import,  a  separate 
consideration  of  them  will  prevent  confusion  and  uncertainty.  I 
shall /r.s<  ascertain,  if  possible,  and  formulate  the  general  theory 
of  construction  upon  which  the  courts  have  proceeded  in  their 
decision  of  special  cases ;  and,  secondhj^  shall  classify  :ind  arrange 


JUDICIAL  INTERPRETATION  OF  THE  CODES.         169 

these  cases,  and  deduce  therefrom  the  particular  rules  as  to  the 
joinder  of  plaintiffs  in  the  civil  action  which  have  been  judicially 
settled  as  a  part  of  the  reformed  system  of  procedure.  The 
number  of  instances  in  which  the  courts  have  laid  down  a  broad 
and  comprehensive  principle  of  interpretation,  v/hich  might  be 
the  guide  in  whole  classes  of  adjudications,  is  very  few,  and 
such  a  principle  must  rather  be  gathered  by  a  process  of  induc- 
tion from  an  analysis  and  comparison  of  particular  cases.  The 
few  attempts  at  the  statement  of  a  general  theory  which  have 
been  made,  I  shall  quote  somewhat  at  length. 

§  119.  *  202.  Interpretation  Given  by  the  Courts  of  New  York 
and  Ohio.  Liberal  Construction.  In  an  early  case,  —  an  action 
brought  by  the  three  obligees  in  an  injunction  bond,  —  the  objec- 
tion was  raised  that  the  rights  of  the  plaintiffs  were  not  joint, 
and  that  they  had  been  improperly  united.  Their  interests, 
which  had  been  interfered  with  by  the  injunction,  were  in  fact 
distinct  and  separate,  and  it  was  assumed  throughout  the  judg- 
ment that,  under  the  former  system,  each  should  have  brought 
a  several  action  on  the  undertaking.  The  court,  after  stating 
the  old  rule  applicable  to  the  circumstances,  proceeded  as  fol- 
lows: "We  are  now  to  determine  this  question  as  it  arises  under 
the  code  of  procedure.  With  the  view  of  embracing  all  cases, 
whether  of  law  or  equit3%  and  of  making  them  conform  to  one 
general  rule,  the  code  provides,  in  §  117,  that  '  all  persons  hav- 
ing an  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action  and  in  relief  demanded 
maybe  joined  as  plaintiffs.'  This  is  now  the  rule  in  all  cases, 
whether  such  as  were  formerly  the  subjects  of  suits  in  equity  or 
of  actions  at  law,  and  we  are  to  administer  it  according  to  its 
spirit  and  true  intent,  however  the  practice  may  differ  from  the 
rule  that  has  heretofore  prevailed  in  actions  at  law.  ...  It  will 
be  perceived  that  this  case  falls  within  the  precise  words  of  the 
section  before  cited.  All  have  an  interest  in  the  subject  of  the 
action  and  in  the  relief  demanded  —  that  is,  in  the  damages 
arising  out  of  the  operations  of  the  injunction.  It  is  not  said  to 
be  a  joint  or  an  equal  or  even  a  common  interest,  but  simply  an 
interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action  with  the  view  of  doing  full 
justice  and  settling  the  rights  of  all  the  parties  in  interest  in  one 
suit."  1     The  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio  has  adopted  the  same  prin- 

1  Loomis  V.  Brov/n,  16  Barb.  325,  330,     Telly  v.  Bowyer,   7  Bush,  513,  the  Court 
332,  per  Gridley  .1.     lu  tlie  recent  case  of     of  Appeals  of   Kentucky  gave  a  very  dif- 


170  CIVIL    IIE.MEDIES. 

ciple  of  interpretation,  and  has  given  a  construction  to  important 
terms  of  the  statutory  provision.  An  action  was  brought  upon 
an  undertaking  called  a  forthcoming  bond,  executed  by  the 
defendant  and  sureties  in  attachment  proceedings.  Certain 
creditors  had  commenced  suit,  and  had  attached  the  property  of 
their  common  debtor.  The  latter  gave  the  bond  in  question  to 
the  sheriff  running  to  all  these  plaintiffs,  the  condition  of  which 
was  that  the  property  attached,  or  its  equivalent  in  money, 
should  be  forthcoming  to  answer  the  judgments  which  might 
be  obtained.  Subsequently  other  creditors  issued  attachments 
against  the  same  debtor,  which  were  delivered  to  the  same 
sheriff,  and  he  returned  on  each  that  he  had  levied  upon  the 
same  goods  before  mentioned.  All  these  creditors  united  in  an 
action  upon  the  bond,  and  the  objection  was  taken  that  there 
was  a  misjoinder  of  parties  plaintiff.  The  court,  after  examining 
the  clauses  of  the  code  relative  to  attachments,  and  showing  that 
the  bond  enured  to  the  benefit  of  all  the  creditors,  disposed  of 
the  objection  as  to  parties  in  the  following  manner:  "The  first 
question  presented  for  our  consideration  is  the  right  of  joinder  of 
the  plaintiffs  in  the  action.  The  provisions  of  the  code  are  as 
follows  [citing  the  sections].  In  order  to  correctly  determine 
this  question,  it  is  only  necessar}^  to  ascertain  what  was  the 
subject  of  the  action,  and  how  the  parties  stood  related  to  it. 
The  subject  of  the  action  is  the  attachment  undertaking."  The 
court  proceeds  to  hold  that  all  the  plaintiffs  had  a  beneficial 
interest  in  this  undertaking,  although  not  named  as  parties  in 
it,  and  concludes:  "It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  subsequent 
attaching  creditors  had  an  interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action 
and  in  obtaining  the  relief  deman<le(l  by  the  action  upon  the 
undertaking,  and  might  properly  ])C  joined  as  plaintiffs."^  It 
should  be  observed  that  the  court  here  gave  a  very  broad  inter- 
pretation to  the  phrase  "  the  subject  of  the  action  "  and  to  the 

fereut  construction  to  the  statutory  pro-  the  settlement  of  estates  several  distribu- 
vision.  The  action  was  brought  by  tees  may  unite  as  jtlaintiffs.  But,  except 
several  distributees  to  recover  from  the  iu  a  j)articular  class  of  ciises,  not  embrac- 
ailniiuistrator  the  shares  found  to  be  due  ing  this,  we  know  of  no  authority  for  unit- 
each  on  a  settlement  of  the  estate,  and  it  ing  as  co-plaintiiTs  several  parties  having 
resulted  in  a  joint  judgment  for  the  aggre-  separate  and  independent  rights  of  action 
gate  amount  of  such  shares.  The  action,  against  the  same  defendant,  or  for  a  joint 
it  was  held,  was  entirely  irregular.     Quot-  recovery  thereon." 

ing  §  'Ml  of  the  code,   in   relation   to  the  ^  Ilutledge  i:  Corliin,  10  Ohio  St.  478, 

joinder  of  i)liiintiffs,  the  court  said  :  ''There  484,  per  Sutliff  J. 
can  be  no  doubt  that  in  eijuity  actions  for 


JUDICIAL    INTEUPKETATION    OF   THE    CODES.  171 

term  "interest."  The  "subject  of  the  action"  was  said  to  be 
the  contract  upon  which  the  suit  was  brought,  and  not  the  mere 
individual  rights  arising  from  that  contract,  nor  the  breach  of 
those  rights  by  the  defendant.  The  "interest"  required  is 
equally  general,  and  the  huiguage  of  the  clause  is  satisfied  by  a 
beneticial  interest  created  by  operation  of  law,  even  though  the 
person  in  whom  it  resides  is  not  named  in  the  contract,  and  could 
not  possibly  have  had  any  interest  at  the  time  the  instrument 
was  executed.  Again,  the  rights  of  the  plaintiffs  were  clearly 
several;  the  undertaking  of  the  defendants  was  for  different 
amounts  due  to  separate  individuals,  and  payable  upon  the  hap- 
pening of  different  events  having  no  legal  connection  and  no 
common  element.  It  was,  in  its  legal  effect,  a  collection  of 
independent  promises  to  pay  distinct  sums  of  money  to  separate 
persons  contained  in  one  written  instrument. 

§  120.  '  203.  Same  Liberal  View  Adopted  in  Indiana.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  has  stated  the  same  general  principles 
of  interpretation  in  a  clear  manner,  and  with  the  evident  desire 
to  comply  with  the  spirit  of  the  new  system  which  characterizes 
all  the  decisions  of  that  able  tribunal.  An  action  was  brought 
by  three  plaintiffs  upon  a  peculiar  contract,  entered  into  between 
themselves  and  the  two  defendants,  in  which  each  of  the  five 
stipulated  for  indemnity  against  a  certain  contingent  liability  to 
be  given  by  the  four  others,  and  in  which  the  rights  and  liabili- 
ties were  clearly  several  according  to  the  common-law  conception. 
The  court  say :  "  The  code  itself  is  not  exactly  definite  as  to  who 
may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs.  It  provides,  however,  that  judgment 
may  be  given  for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  plaintiff's, 
which  was  the  practice  in  equity,  though  it  was  otherwise  at  law. 
It  also  provides  that  all  persons  having  an  interest  in  the  subject 
of  the  action,  and  in  the  relief  demanded  may  be  joined  as  plain- 
tiffs. Indeed,  the  code  seems  to  have  re-enacted  the  rules  which 
had  prevailed  in  courts  of  equity  as  to  who  iiuist  join  as  plaintiffs, 
and  may  be  joined  as  defendants.  But  as  to  those  cases  in  which 
in  equity  plaintiffs  might  or  might  not  have  joined  at  their 
option,  the  code  does  not  expressly  speak,  for  the  reason,  prob- 
ably that  the  general  rule  in  equity  was  not  founded  upon  any 
uniform  principle,  and  could  not  be  expounded  by  any  universal 
theorem  as  a  test.^     And  it  may  have  been  thought  safe,  there- 

1  Story  Ivi-  PI.  §  539. 


172  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

fore,  to  leave  each  case  to  be  decided  by  the  courts  upon  authority 
and  analogy.  That  it  was  intended  the  rules  of  pleading  in 
courts  of  equity  should  govern  the  subject,  is  quite  evident  from 
tliose  provisions  of  the  code  which  prescribe  the  relief  that  may 
be  granted,  and  to  whom;  in  this  respect  conforming  entirely  to 
the  established  practice  of  those  courts,  —  a  mode  of  administra- 
tion quite  imj^racticable  in  a  great  many  cases,  unless  the  parties 
might  be  as  in  chancery.  The  present  inquiry  is,  then,  in  view 
of  the  considerations  above  stated,  reduced  to  this:  Could  these 
plaintiffs  have  formerly  been  joined  in  chancery?"  The  opinion 
proceeds  to  examine  the  provisions  of  the  contract,  and,  holding 
that  the  rights  as  well  as  the  liabilities  of  all  the  parties  were 
entirely  several,  and  would  have  been  so  regarded  in  equity, 
concludes  as  follows:  "In  the  case  before  us  there  is  in  the 
plaintiffs  no  community  of  interest  in  any  matter  involved  in  the 
suit;  no  right  common  to  all  is  claimed;  everj'thing  is  separate, 
save  only  that  the  right  asserted  by  each  is  founded  in  a  contract 
which,  for  convenience,  happens  to  be  on  the  same  sheet  of  paper. 
We  have  failed  to  find  any  warrant  in  the  adjudged  cases  for  a 
joinder  of  plaintiffs  under  such  circumstances."^  The  equitable 
interpretation  of  the  sections  relating  to  the  union  of  parties 
plaintiff  is  here  fully  admitted,  and  it  is  declared  that  the  estab- 
lished rule  of  the  equity  courts  is  to  be  taken  as  the  criterion  by 
which  to  determine  all  questions  as  to  the  proper  joinder  of 
plaintiffs  now  arising,  even  in  legal  actions.  The  attempt  to 
maintain  this  particular  suit  by  the  three  co-plaintiffs  was  con- 
demned, not  because  their  rights  were  several  according  to  the 
legal  notion,  but  because  they  were  so  unconnected  that  they 
could  not  have  Ijeen  enforced  by  a  single  action  in  equity.  The 
same  court  reiterated  this  principle  of  interpretation  in  another 
well-considered  case,  and  it  may  be  regarded  as  the  settled  doc- 
trine of  that  State.  "  The  code  requires  all  persons  having  an 
interest  in  the  subject  of  the  action,  and  in  the  relief  demanded, 
except  as  otherwise  provided,  to  be  joined  as  plaintiffs.  It  also 
requires  those  who  are  united  in  interest  to  be  joined  as  plaintiffs 
or  defendants.  And  it  then  declares  that,  when  the  question  is 
one  of  common  or  general  interest  to  many  persons,  or  when  the 
parties  are  numerous  and  it  is  impracticable  to  bring  them  all 

'  Goodnifrht  »•.  Goar,  .'iO  Ind.  418,  419,     Iiid.  .51,   59;    Hume  lus.  Co.  v.    Oilman, 
jKir  Frazer  J.     See   Maple  c    Beacli,  4.'3      112  Ind.  7. 


JUDICIAL    INTERPRETATION    OF   THE    CODES.  173 

before  tlie  court,  one  or  more  may  sue  or  defend  for  the  benefit 
of  the  whole. ^  These  provisions  substantially  re-enact  the  old 
equity  rules  on  the  subject  of  parties.  All  who  are  united  in 
interest  must  join  in  tlie  suit,  unless  they  are  so  numerous  us  to 
render  it  impracticable  to  bring  them  all  before  the  court;  while 
tliose  who  have  only  a  common  or  general  interest  in  the  contro- 
versy may  one  or  more  of  them  institute  an  action.  This,  how- 
ever, must  not  be  understood  as  allowing,  in  all  cases,  two  or 
more  persons  having  separate  causes  of  action  against  the  same 
defendant,  though  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  to  unite 
and  pursue  their  remedies  in  one  action.  Several  plaintiffs,  by 
one  complaint,  cannot  demand  several  matters  of  relief  which  are 
plainly  distinct  and  unconnected.  But  where  one  general  right 
is  claimed,  where  there  is  one  common  interest  among  all  the 
plaintiffs  centering  in  the  point  in  issue  in  the  cause,  the  objec- 
tion of  improper  parties  cannot  be  maintained. "^ 

§  121.  *  204.  In  Missouri  and  California.  Statute  Held  to 
apply  only  to  Equitable  Actions.  Notwithstanding  the  common 
principle  which  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  foregoing  opinions,  and 
which  has  undoubtedly  been  adopted  by  a  great  majority  of,  the 
various  State  courts  in  their  construction  of  these  statutory  pro- 
visions, there  has  not  been  an  absolute  unanimity  of  decision. 
By  som.e  individual  judges,  and  even  by  some  courts,  the  opera- 
tion of  the  sections  under  consideration  has  been  confined  exclu- 
sively to  equitable  actions,  while  the  ancient  common-law  rules 
as  to  parties  have  been  declared  controlling  in  all  legal  actions. 
A  reference  to  two  or  three  cases  in  which  this  ancient  distinc- 
tion has  been  still  preserved  will  be  sufficient  for  my  purpose. 


1  pndiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901 ,  §§  263, 270.]]  [[In  the  recent  case  of  Trompen  v.  Yates 

-Tate  ?;.  Ohio  &  Mi.ss.  R.  Co.,  10  Ind.  (1902),    —  Neb.  — ,   92  N.    W.   647,  the 

174;  citing  McKeuzie  v.  L'Amoureux,  11  court  said,  affirming  the  liberal  interjire- 

Barb.  516;  Bouton  v.  Brooklyn,  15  Barb,  tation  indir-ated  in  the  text:  "We  think, 

375;  Murray  v.  Hay,  1  Barb.  Ch.  59.   The  under  the  holding  of  this  court  in  Karle  r. 

following  cases,  among  others,  assert  the  Burch,  21    Neb.  710,  and   in   the    earlier 

general   doctrine   that   the   provisions   of  case  of  Kaufman  r.  Wessel,  14  Neb.  162, 

the   code   apply   to    legal    and    equitable  and   the   approval    that     has   been   often 

actions   alike.     Cummings  v.   Morris,   25  given  to  both  those  cases,  that  this  court 

N.  Y.  625  ;  Grinnell  v.  Schmidt,  2  Sandf.  is  committed  to  the  applying  in  law  ac- 

706 ;    Cole    v.    Reynolds,    18    N.    Y.    74.  tions  of  tlu;  equity  doctrine  that  interest' 

Earle    r.  Burch,    21    Neb.    702  ;    Schiffer  in  the  subject  of  the  action  gives  a  right 

V.   Eau  Claire,  51   Wis.  385;    Home  Ins.  to  join  as  plaintiff."] 
Co.    V.   Oilman,    112   Ind.  7;    Hughes   v. 
Boone,  81  N.  C.  204. ' 


174  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

Two  persons,  A.  and  B.,  entered  into  a  written  contract  with  a 
third.  C,  for  the  performance  of  certain  work  and  labor  at  a 
stij)uhited  price.  The  work  having  been  completed,  and  C. 
refusing  to  pay  the  price  agreed  upon,  A.  brought  an  action 
upon  the  contract;  demanding  judgment  for  one  half  of  said 
sum,  and  making  B.,  his  co-contractor,  a  defendant,  allegiog 
that  he  had  refused  to  be  a  party  plaintiff,  and  had  confederated 
with  C.  to  hinder  and  delay  the  plaintiff  from  obtaining  his 
demand.  The  Supreme  Court  of  ^Missouri,  in  affirming  a  nonsuit 
which  had  been  ordered  at  the  trial,  said :  "  If  C.  has  violated  his 
contract,  he  is  liable  to  an  action;  but  that  action  could  only  l)e 
brought  in  the  joint  names  of  A.  and  B.,  the  contractors.  That 
provision  of  the  Practice  Act  which  allows  a  party  to  be  made  a 
defendant  when  he  will  not  join  as  a  plaintiff,  has  nothing  to  do 
with  this  question.  That  was  a  rule  of  equity  practice  which 
was  necessarily  incorporated  into  a  system  which  abolished  all 
distinction  of  actions.  In  adopting  it,  it  was  not  designed  that  it 
should  have  any  operation  but  in  cases  where  it  was  applicable 
under  the  former  system  of  practice.  It  was  never  intended  that 
it  should  affect  the  rights  of  parties  arising  out  of  written  con- 
tracts. Nothing  is  better  settled  than  the  rule  tliat,  on  an 
undertaking  to  two,  both  must  join  in  an  action  on  it,  otherwise 
there  is  no  cause  of  action.  It  is  a  part  of  the  contract  that  both 
sliall  sue,  otherwise  no  action  shall  be  brought.  If  one  will  say 
that  he  had  no  right  of  action,  and  will  not  sue,  why  should  he 
not  have  as  much  right  as  the  other  who  says  there  is  a  cause  of 
action?"^  The  same  general  doctrine  was  accepted  as  the  basis 
of  interpretation,  and  the  same  restriction  of  the  statutory  provi- 
sions to  suits  in  equity  was  announced  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
California  in  an  early  case  arising  upon  similar  facts.  ''  The 
simple  question  presented  for  our  consideration  is,  whether  there 
was  a  non-joinder  of  parties  plaintiff  or  not;  it  being  contended 
that  §  14  of  the  Practice  Act  has  introduced  a  new  rule,  and  that 
one  of  several  parties  may  maintain  an  action  on  a  joint  contract, 
in  his  own  name,  by  simpl}^  suggesting  the  impossibility  of  ob- 
taining the  consent  of  the  others  to  join  in  the  action.  Upon 
examination  of  this  section,  we  are  satisfied  that  it  was  intended 


1  Kainey  v.   Smizer,  28  Mo.  310,  per   Scott  J.     Sec,  per  contra,   Ilill    i'.   Marsh, 
46  Ind.  216. 


JUDICIAL  INTERI'RETATION  OF  THE  CODES.         175 

to  apply  to  suits  in  equity,  and  not  to  actions  at  law."  ^  I  have 
placed  in  a  foot-note  a  number  of  cases  which  contain  expressions 
of  opinion  by  individual  judges,  that  the  sections  and  clauses  of 
the  codes  and  practice  acts  regulating  the  choice  and  joinder  of 
parties  are  confined  in  their  scope  and  operation  to  equitable 
actions  alone,  and  were  not  intended  by  the  legislature  to  inter- 
fere with  the  former  rules  applicable  to  legal  actions. ^ 

§  122.  *  205.  Recapitulation  of  Judicial  Views.  Cases  in  ■which 
there  is  an  Election.  The  citations  given  in  the  foregoing  para- 
graplis  confirm  the  conclusions  which  were  reached  by  a  mere 
analysis  of  the  language.  That  these  provisions  as  to  the  parties 
plaintiff  do  enact  the  general  doctrines  which  had  prevailed  in 
courts  of  equity,  is  admitted  by  both  schools  of  interpretation ; 
and  that  these  equitable  rules,  thus  embodied  in  a  statutory 
form,  do  apply  to  all  actions,  and  are  not  by  any  implied  limita- 
tion restricted  to  equitable  actions,  is  now,  I  think,  declared 
by  the  courts  in  most  of  the  States  which  have  adopted  the  re- 
formed procedure.  Assuming  these  facts  as  premises,  all  the 
other  propositions  stated  in  my  preliminar}^  analysis  follow  as  a 
necessary  consequence.  In  this  immediate  connection  it  should 
be  remarked  that  individual  judges  will  give  greater  or  less  scope 
to  the  liberty  granted  by  the  legislative  rule,  according  to  their 
personal  notions  of  expediency.  There  was  a  numerous  class  of 
cases,  under  the  former  system,  in  which  courts  of  equity  recog- 
nized an  election  on  the  part  of  claimants  either  to  join  in  one 
proceeding  or  to  sue  separately.  This  power  of  choice,  then 
confined  of  course  to  suits  in  equity,  still  remains  in  similar 
instances,  and  may  even  be  extended  to  certain  controversies  in 
which  the  cause  of  action  is  legal.  Thus,  where  the  right  is 
strictly  several,  and  would  be  regarded  as  such  by  the  common 
law,  equity  might  have  allowed  them  an  election  to  sue  sepa- 
rately or  jointly.  This  power  of  choice,  contained  in  the  equity 
doctrine,  is  introduced  into  the  new  procedure,  and  is  of  course 
not  confined  to  suits  equitable  in  their  nature.  We  must  there- 
fore expect  to  find,  within  certain  narrow  bounds,  some  conflict 

1  Andrews  v.  Mokelumne  Hill  Co.,  7  to  preserve  a  distinction  between  actions 

Cal.  330,  333.     The   same  court   lias,  in  at  law  and  suits  in  equity, 

later  cases,  pursued  a  course  of  decision  -  Voorhis  v.  Child's  Ex.,  17  N.  Y.  3.54, 

more  in  accordance  with  the  spirit  of  the  per   Seldcn   J.;     Habicht    v.   Pembertou, 

code,  and  has,  as   completely  perhaps  as  4  Sandf.  6.57;  Van  Home  v.  Everson,  13 

any  other  tribunal,  abandoned  all  attempt  Barb.  526. 


176  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

of  decision  from  judges  who  accept  and  heartily  approve  the 
general  principles  of  interpretation  vehich  have  been  developed 
in  the  foregoing  discussion. 

§  123.  *  206.  Manner  of  Raising  Question  as  to  Proper  Parties 
PlaintiflF.  Defect  of  Parties  means  too  Few.  Before  proceeding  to 
the  discussion  of  particular  cases  and  special  rules,  a  preliminary 
question  may  he  here  properly  answered :  How  can  the  objection 
that  an  action  has  not  been  brought  by  the  proper  plaintiff  or 
plaintiffs  be  raised  and  regularly  presented  to  the  court  for  its 
decision?  The  codes  of  procedure  all  agree  in  prescribing, 
among  other  grounds  of  demurrer  to  the  complaint  or  petition, 
the  following:  "When  it  shall  appear  on  the  face  of  the  com- 
plaint or  petition ;  2,  that  the  plaintiff  has  not  legal  capacity  to 
sue;  or,  -4,  that  there  is  a  defect  of  parties  plaintiff  or  defendant; 
or,  6,  that  the  complaint  or  petition  does  not  state  facts  sufficient 
to  constitute  a  cause  of  action ; "  ^  and  also  that,  "  when  any  of 
the  matters  enumerated  in  section  [the  foregoing]  do  not  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  the  objection  may  be 
taken  by  answer; "'  ^  and,  finally,  "if  no  objection  be  taken,  either 
by  demurrer  or  answer,  the  defendant  shall  be  deemed  to  have 
waived  the  same,  excepting  only  the  objection  to  the  jurisdiction 

1  New  York,  §  144(488)  ;  Kansas,  §  89 ;  In  the  following   codes  it  is   made  a 

Nebraska,  §  94  ;  Ohio,  §  87  ;  Oregon,  §  G6  ;  special  cause  of  demurrer  that  there  is  a 

California,  §  430;  N.  C.  §  95 ;  S.  C.  §  167.  misjoinder    of    ])laintiffs    or     defendants. 

[^Arizona,  Uev.  St.,  1901,  §  13.51  ;   Arkan-  Cal.  §  430;  Nevada,  §  40;  Colorado,  §  ."JO. 

sas,  Sand.   &  Hill's    Dig.,  §  5717;  Idaho,  Misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  is  now  a  ground 

Code   Civ.  Pro.,   1901,    §3206   (including  of  demurrer  in  New  York,  §  488. 
misjoinder    as   a   ground);     Iowa,    Code,  -  New  York,  §  147  (498) ;  Kansas,  §  91 ; 

1897,  §  3561  ;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  Nebraska,  §  96  ;  Ohio,  §  89  ;  Oregon,  §69; 
§342;  Kentucky,  Codes,  1895,  §§  92,93;  Cal.  §  433;  N.  C.  §  98;  S.  C.  §  170. 
Montana,  §  680  (including  misjoinder  as  [^Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1353,  in  re- 
a  ground);  Missouri,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §598  spect  only  to  the  ground  numbered  4  in 
(including  misjoinder  as  a  ground)  ;  Min-  the  text;  Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig., 
nesota,  (ien.  St.,  1894,  §5232;  North  §  5720 ;  Colorado,  §  54 ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ. 
Dakota,  Kev.  Codes,  1899,  §5268;  Okla-  Pro,  1901,  §  3209;  Iowa,  Code,  1897, 
homa,  St.,   1893,  §  3967  ;   Utah,  Rev.  St.,  §  3563;  Indiana,  Burns'  St..  1901,  §  346; 

1898,  §2962  (including  misjoinder  as  a  Montana.  §  684 ;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
ground);  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §602:  Minnesota,  Gen.  St.,  1894,  §  5234; 
§0115;  Washington,  Bal.  Code.  §  4907  ;  Nevada.  §  44  ;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  CodeB, 
Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3535  (includ-  1899.  §  .5271  ;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893.  §  3969  ; 
mg  misjoinder  as  a  ground);  Wisconsin.  Utah,  Rev.  St..  1898.  §2966:  South  Da- 
St.,  1898,  §  2649.]  kota.  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §6118;  Washington, 

Cln   Connecticut    the  statute  provides     B.al.  Code,  §4909;    Wyoming,  Rev.  St., 
merely  that"  all  demurrers  shall  distinctly     1899.     §     3537;     Wisconsin,     St.,    1898, 
specify  the  reasons  why  the  pleading  <le-     §  2653.] 
mnrred  to  is  insufficient  "    Gen.  St.,  1902, 
§  60S.] 


DEFECT    OF    TAKTIES    PLAINTIFF. 


177 


of  the  court,  and  the  objection  that  the  complaint  or  petition 
does  not  state  facts  sulhcient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action."  ^ 
The  construction  to  be  placed  upon  these  clauses,  and  the  result- 
ing rules  prescribing  the  methods  by  which  an  objection  as  to 
proper  parties  must  be  interposed,  in  order  to  present  a  question 
for  judicial  decision,  have  been  settled  in  the  various  States 
with  almost  complete  uniformity.  In  regard  to  defect  of  parties 
-plaintiffs  the  interpretation  is  now  established,  that  "defect  of 
parties,"  given  as  one  ground  of  demurrer,  means  too  few,  and 
not  too  many.  A  demurrer  alleging  this  particular  objection 
€an  only  be  interposed,  therefore,  in  case  of  a  ?io?i-joinder  of 
necessary  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  and  never  in  case  of  a  mi&- 
joinder.  The  word  "defect"  is  taken  in  its  literal  sense  of 
"deficiency,"  and  not  in  a  broader  sense  as  meaning  any  error  in 
the  selection  of  parties.  Upon  this  point  the  courts  are  nearly 
unanimous. 2  It  has  been  held,  however,  in  Wisconsin,  that 
this  is  the  proper  form  of  demurrer  where  the  objection  is  to  a 
misjoinder.^ 


1  New  York,  §  148  (499) ;  Kansas,  §  91 ; 
Nebraska,  §  96  ;  Ohio,  §  89  ;  Oregon,  §  70  ; 
€al.  §434;N.  C.  §  99;  S.  C.  §  171.  QAri- 
zona.  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1353;  Arkansas, 
Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5720;  Colorado, 
§  55 ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3210  ; 
Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §§  3563,  3564  (substan- 
tially different  from  the  provision  given 
in  the  text);  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901, 
§  346;  Kentucky,  Codes,  1895,  §§  92,  93; 
Montana,  §  685  ;  xVIissouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§  602;  Minnesota,  Gen.  St.,  1894,  §  5235; 
Nevada,  §  45  ;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes, 
1 899,  §  5272  ;  ( /klahoma,  St.,  1 893,  §  3969 ; 
Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2967  ;  South  Da- 
Tcota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6119;  Washing- 
ton, Bal.  Code,  §  4911;  Wyoming,  Rev. 
St,  1899,  §  3537;  Wiscon.sin,  St.,  1898, 
§  26.54.] 

-  [Union  Pac.  Ry  Co.  v.  Smitli  (1898), 
■59  Kan.  80.  52  Pac.  102;  Weber  r.  Dillon 
(1898),  7  Okla.  568,  .54  Pac.  894;  Allen  v. 
Cooley  (1898),  53  S.  C.  414,  31  S.  E.  6.34  ; 
Dolan  1-.  Hubinger  (1899),  109  Iowa,  408, 
^0  N.  W.  514  ;  Cedar  Rapids  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Lavery  (1900),  110  Iowa,  575,  81  N.  W. 
775.]  "  Palmer  v.  Davis,  28  N.  Y.  242  ;  Ca.so 
r  Carroll,  35  N.  Y.  385;  Richtmyer  r. 
Richtmver,  50  Barb.  55  ;  Powers  r.  Bum- 


cratz,  12  O.  St.  273  ;  Berkshire  v.  Shultz, 

25  Ind.  523;  Bennett  v.  Preston,  17  Ind. 
291 ;  Mornan  v.  Carroll,  35  Iowa,  22 ; 
Hill  V.  Marsh,  46  Ind.  218.  As  the  .same 
is  true  of  defendants,  —  the  section  in- 
cluding both  parties  in  a  single  formula, 
—  the  decisions  in  reference  to  them  are 
in  point.  See  Peabody  v.  Washington, 
iSbc.  Ins.  Co.,  20  Barb.  339;  Voorhis  v. 
Baxter,  18  Barb.  592  ;  s.  c.  17  N.  Y.  354  ; 
Bank  of  Havana  v.  Magee,  20  N.  Y.  355. 
See  al.so  We.stern,  etc.  Co.  v.  ^"tna  Ins. 
Co.,  40  Wis.  373  ;  Marsh  v.  Board  of 
Supervisors,  38  id.  250;   Willard  v.  Reas, 

26  id.  540  (settling  the  rule  as  given  in  the 
text,  and  limiting  Read  v.  Sang,  21  id. 
678)  ;  Schiffer  v.  Iviu  Claire,  51  Wis.  385; 
Lowry  V.  .Tackson,  27  S.  C.  318  ;  McKee 
V.  Eaton,  26  Kan.  226;  White  v.  Scott, 
26  Kan.  476  ;  Boldt  r.  Budwig,  19  Neb. 
739  ;  Clark  v.  Crawfordsville  Coffin  Co  , 
125  Ind.  277;  Evans  v.  Schafer,  119  Ind. 
49  ;  Murray  v.  McGarigle,  69  Wis.  483. 

3  Head  ' i:  Sang,  21  Wi.s.  678.  The 
demurrer  was  held  proper  upon  the  au- 
thoritv  of  an  early  New  York  decision,  — 
Dunderdale  v.  Grymes,  16  How.  Pr.  195, 
which  has  since  been  many  times  overruled 
in  tliat  State. 


12 


178 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  124.  ^  207.  Question  of  Defect  of  Parties  must  be  raised  by 
Demurrer  or  Answer.  When  u  defect  of  piU'ties  plaintiff — that 
is,  a  non-joinder  —  appears  on  the  face  of  tlie  coni[)laint  or  peti- 
tion, the  defendant  must  raise  the  question  by  denuirrer,  and 
not  by  answer.^  If  he  neglects  to  interpose  a  denuirrer  upon 
this  specific  ground,  he  waives  the  objection  entirely,  even 
though  he  sets  up  the  defence  in  his  answer.  The  reason  given 
for  this  somewhat  technical  rule  is  the  following:  The  mere 
defence  of  a  defect  of  parties,  not  going  to  the  real  merits  of  the 
controversy,  and  not  denying  the  cause  of  action  existing  in 
some  persons,  is  not  favored  by  the  courts ;  it  is  regarded  as  a 
"dilatory  defence,"  because  it  does  nothing  more  than  postpone 
the  decision  of  the  substantial  issues ;  and,  although  the  defend- 
ant is  permitted  to  avail  himself  of  it,  he  must  follow  exactly  the 
modes  prescribed  by  the  rules  of  practice,  or  by  the  statute  for 
its  interposition.^  If  the  defect  does  not  appear  upon  the  face  of 
the  complaint  or  petition,  the  defendant  must  set  up  the  defence 
specially  in  his  answer,  or,  failing  this,  he  waives  the  objection.* 


1  [^Foster  v.  Lyon  County  (1901),  63 
Kau.  43,  64  Pac.  1037  ;  Masoii  i-.  St.  Paul 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1901 ),  8-2  Minn.  336,  8b  N.  W. 
13;  Cooper  v.  Thomason  (1896),  30  Ore. 
161,  45  Pac.  295;  Carskaddon  v.  Pine 
(1899),  154  Ind.  410,  56  N.  E.  844 ;  Castile 
r.  Ford  (1897),  53  Neb.  507,  73  N  W.945; 
.lolmsou  I'.  Gooch  (1894),  114  N.  C.  62,  19 
S.  E.  62  ;  Radant  v.  Werheim  Mfg.  Co. 
(1900),  106  Wis.  600,  82  N.  W.  562;  Os- 
horn  V.  Logus  (1895),  28  Ore.  300,  42  Pac. 
997.  But  a  demurrer  will  not  lie  where 
tiie  complaint  does  not  sh(jw  that  the  party 
for  whose  non-joiyder  tlie  demurrer  is 
interposed  was  living  when  the  suit  was 
<-ommenced :  Deegau  v.  Deegan  (1894), 
22  Xev.  185,  37  Pac.  360] 

•^  Zabriskie  v.  Smith,  13  N.  Y.  322; 
l)e  Puy  V.  Strong,  37  N.  Y.  372,  3  Keyes, 
003  ;  Patchip  r.  Peck,  38  N.  Y.  39  ;  Fi.shor 
r.  Hall,  41  N.  Y.  416;  Wells  v.  Cone,  .55 
Barh.  585  ;  Hees  v.  Ncllis,  1  N.  Y.  Sup. 
Ct.  118;  Alexander  v.  Gaar,  15  Ind.  89; 
Ju.stice  u.  Phillips,  3  Bush,  200 ;  Andrews 
r.  .Mokelumne  Hill  Co.,  7  Cal.  330  ;  'len- 
nant  v.  Pfister,  45  Cal.  270;  Dailey  v. 
Houston,  58  Mo.  361,  366;  Mcliobcrts  v. 
So.  Minn.  R.  R.,  18  Minn.  108,  110;  Me- 
clianics'  Bank  v.  Gilpin,  105  Mo.  17.  As 
the  same  rule  ajiplies  in  case  of  defect  in 


parties  defendant,  see  Dillaye  v.  Parks, 
31  Barb.  132;  Wright  v.  Storrs,  32  N.  Y. 
691  ;  s.  c.  6  Bos.  600  ;  Abbe  v.  Clarke,  31 
Barl).  238.  See  also  Biakeley  r.  Le  Due, 
22  Minn.  476  ;  Baldwin  v.  Canfield,  26  id. 
43;  Gimbel  v.  Pignero,  62  Mo.  240;  Kel- 
logg V.  Maliu,  id.  429 ;  McConuell  v. 
Braynor,  63  id.  461  ;  Dunn  r.  Hannibal  & 
St.  J.  R.  Co.,  68  id.  268 ;  State  v.  Saffiug- 
ton,  id.  454  ;  Donnan  r.  Intelligencer  Co., 
70  id.  168  ;  Parchin  c.  Peck,  2  Mont.  567  ; 
Ross  V.  Linder,  12  S.  C.  592;  Lillie  v. 
Case,  54  Iowa,  177  ;  Bouton  v.  Orr,  51  id. 
473  ;  Ryan  r.  MuUin,  45  id.  631  ;  Taylor 
r.  Collins,  51  Wis.  123 ;  Thomas  v.  Wood, 
61  Ind.  132 ;  Cox  v.  Bird,  65  id.  277  ;  Bar- 
nett  V.  Leonard,  66  id.  422 ;  Davis  i'. 
Beciistein,  69  N.  Y.  440 ;  Risley  v.  Wight- 
man,  13  Hun,  163  ;  Porter  r.  Fletcher,  25 
Minn.  493 ;  Mackenzie  v.  Edinburg  Sch. 
Trs.,  72  Ind.  191  (an  unincorporated  asiso- 
ciation  cannot  sue  by  its  name  ;  all  the 
members  must  join  as  jtlaintiffs) ;  Beeler 
V.  First  Xat.  Bk.  of  Earned  (Neb.,  1892), 
51  N.  W.  857;  Steiling  v.  Grabowsky,  19 
N.  Y.  Suppl.  280  ;  McCallister's  Adm.  v. 
Sav.  Bk.  of  Louisville,  80  Ky.  684;  Tal- 
mage  v.  Bierhause,  103  Ind.  270. 

a  [Johnson  c.  Gooch  (1894),  114  N.  C. 
62,  19  S.  E.  02;  Moore  v.  Harmoiv(1895), 


DEFECT    OF    I'AUTIES    PLAINTIFF. 


179 


To  sum  up:  if  a  defect  of  parties  plaintiff  appears  in  the  plead- 
ing, the  mode  of  raising  the  defence  is  by  demurrer  alone;  if  it 
does  not  appear  in  the  pleading,  by  answer  alone;  and,  unless 
the  defendant  complies  with  these  requirements  as  to  method,  he 
waives  all  objection.^     It  has    been  expressly  decided  in  Ohio, 


142  Ind.  555,  41  N.  E.  599.  Held  in 
Mason  v.  St.  Paul  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  82 
Minn.  .'536,  85  N.  W.  13,  that  a  defect 
of  parties  plaintiff,  when  the  question  is 
raised  bv  answer,  does  not  entitle  the  de- 
fendant to  a  verdict  on  the  merits,  but 
only  to  a  dismissal ;  but  if,  in  such  a  case,  a 
motion  to  dismiss  is  not  made  uyion  proof  of 
the  defect  of  parties  plaintiff,  the  objection 
is  waived.  And  in  Atcheson,  Topeka,  etc. 
|}y.  Co.  V.  Hucklebridge  (1901),  62  Kan. 
506,  64  Pac.  58,  it  was  held  that  the  Code 
provision  requiring  defects  in  petitions 
other  than  those  appearing  on  face  of 
same  to  be  set  up  by  answer,  does  not 
apply  to  a  petition  by  a  partner  who  con- 
ceals the  fact  of  partnership  and  wrong- 
fully brings  suit  in  his  own  name  for  an 
injury  to  partnership  property.  In  such 
case  defendant,  if  ignorant  of  partnership 
until  disclosed  upon  the  trial,  may  then 
raise  the  question  without  amending 
answer.     See  dissenting  opinions    herein. 

A  demurrer  to  a  petition,  stating  in 
general  terms  that  "  there  are  no  proper 
parties,"  i.s  too  vague  and  general.  It 
should  point  out  who  would  be  proper 
parties :  Dawson  !•.  Equitable  Mortgage 
Co.  (1899),  109  Ga.  389,  34  S.  E.  668; 
Parker  r.  Cochran  (1895),  97  Ga.  249,  22 
S.  E.  961-3  Also  Merritt  v.  Walsh,  32 
N.  Y.  685  ;  Donnell  v.  Walsh,  33  N.  Y. 
43;  s.  c  6  Bosw.  621  ;  Gock  r.  Keneda, 
29  Barb.  120;  Umsted  v.  Buskirk,  17 
Ohio  St.  113;  Dickinson  v.  Vauderpoel, 
5  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  168.  See  also  Trenor 
V.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  R.,  50  Cal.  222  ;  Maxwell 
r.  I'ratt,  24  Hun,  448  (an  answer  setting 
up  a  defect  of  parties  must  give  the  names 
of  tlic  plaintiffs  to  be  joined). 

1  [Kngel  V.  Dado  (1902),  —  Neb. 
— ,  92  N.  W.  629;  Hannegan  v.  Roth 
(1896),  12  Wash.  695,44  Pac.  256;  Stephens 
V.  Harding  (1896),  48  Neb.  659,  67  N.  W. 
746  ;  Bridge  Co.  v.  Fowler  (1895),  55  Kan. 
17,  39  Pac.  727  ;  Gilland  v.  Union  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  (1895),  6  Wyo.  185,  43  Pac.  508; 
Moore  v.  Bevier  (1895),  60  Minn.  240,  62 


N.  W.  281  ;  Bell  v.  Mendcnhall  (1898).  71 
Minn.  331,  71  N.  W.  1086;  Allen  v. 
Cooley  (1898),  53  S.  C.  77,  30  S.  E.  721  ; 
Howe" I'.  Harper  (1900),  127  N.  C.  356,  37 
S.  E.  505 ;  Medano  Ditch  Co.  v.  Adams 
(1902),  29  Colo.  317,  68  Pac.  431  ;  Prich- 
ard's  Executrix  v.  Peace  (1895),  98  Ky. 
99,  32  S.  W.  296;  Rittenhouse  v.  Clark 
(1901),  110  Ky.  149,  61  S.  W.  33;  Radant 
V.  Werheim  Mfg.  Co.  (1900),  106  Wis. 
600,  82  N.  *W.  562 ;  Osborn  r.  Logus 
(1895),  28  Ore.  306,  42  Pac.  997;  Ross 
V.  Page  (1902),  11  N.  D.  458,  92  N.  W. 
822;  Bates-Smith  Inv.  Co.  v.  Scott  (1898), 
56  Neb.  475,  76  N.  W.  1063  ;  Coe  v.  An- 
derson (1894),  92  Iowa,  51.5,  61  N.  W. 
177;  Hellams  y.  Prior  (1902),  64  S.  C. 
296,  43  S.  E.  25;  Wyman  v.  Herard 
(1899),  9  Okla.  35,  59  Pac  1009. 

A  plea  in  abatement  for  defect  of 
parties  must  show  affirmatively  the  names 
of  tlie  parties  omitted,  that  they  are  alive, 
and  that  they  are  within  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court :  Cone  v.  Cone  (1901),  61  S.  C. 
512,  39  S.  E.  748.  A  demurrer  or  plea  on 
the  ground  of  defect  of  parties  should 
show  in  what  the  defect  consists  and 
should  name  the  party  not  joined:  Emer- 
son V.  Schwindt  (1900),  108  Wis.  167,  84 
N.  W.  186;  Johnson  v.  Gooch  (1894), 
114  N.  C.  62,  19  S.  E.  62;  Boseker  v. 
Chamberlain  (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E. 
448. 

The  objection  of  defect  of  parties  can- 
not be  raised  for  the  first  time  on  ap- 
peal :  Thompsou  v.  Rush  (1902),  —  Neb. 
— ,  92  N.  W.  1060;  nor  by  an  in- 
struction: Loomis  V.  Hollister  (1902),  75 
Conn.  275,  53  Atl.  579  ;  Osborn  v.  Logus 
(1895),  28  Ore.  306,  42  P; '^..  995;  nor 
by  oral  demurrer  at  the  trial :  Shull  v. 
Caughman  (1898),  54  S.  C.  203,  32  S.  E. 
301  ;  nor  is  it  ground  for  dismissing  the 
complaint  on  the  trial  upon  the  merits  : 
liadant  r.  Werheim  Mfg.  Co.  (1900),  106 
Wis.  600,  82  N.  W.  562  ;  nor  can  it  be 
raised  by  motion  for  a  new  trial :  Mather 
V.  Dunn"  (1898),  11  S.  D.  196,  76  N.  W. 


180 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


and  this  is  plainly  the  correct  rule,  that  a  demurrer  for  want  of 
sufficient  facts  does  not  raise  the  question  of  a  defect  —  non- 
joinder—  of  plaintiffs  or  defendants.^ 

§  125.  *  208.  Meaning  of  "Want  of  Legal  Capacity  to  Sue.  A 
demurrer  or  defence  for  this  cause  must  relate  exclusively  to 
some  legal  disabilit}^  of  the  plaintiff,  —  such  as  infancy,  cover- 
ture, idiocy,  and  the  like, — and  not  to  the  absence  of  facts 
sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action.  ^  The  facts  constituting 
a  cause  of  action  may  be  sufficiently  averred,  and  yet  the  plaintiff 
may  not  have  a  legal  capacity  to  sue.  The  objection  that  the 
plaintiff  has  not  legal  capacity  cannot,  therefore,  be  raised  and 


922-2  See,  however,  post,  §  *  287,  to  the 
effect  that  the  objection  of  *the  defect  of 
indispensable  parties  is  not  so  waived  in 
equitable  suits. 

1  Umsted  v.  Buskirk,  17  Ohio  St.  113. 
Nevil  V.  Clifford,  55  Wis.  161  ;  Whipper- 
man  v.  Dunn,  124  lud.  349.  QTo  the 
same  effect  are  Walton  v.  Washburn 
(1901).  Ky,  64  S.  W.  634;  Bell  v.  Men- 
denhall  (1898),  71  Minn.  331,  73  N.  W. 
1086;  Carskaddon  t;.  Pine  (1899),  154 
lud.  410.  56  N.  E.  844i  Boseker  r.  Cham- 
berlain (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  448; 
Beyer  r.  Town  ui  Crandon  (1898),  98 
Wis.  306,  73  N.  W.  771  ;  Ross  v.  Page 
(1902),  11  N.  D.  458,  92  X.  W.  822  ;  Svan- 
burg  V.  Fosseen  (1899),  75  Minn.  350,  78 
N.  W.  4.3 

-  [  Wlien  the  plaintiff's  incapacity  to  sue 
appears  on  tlie  face  of  the  complaint  tlie 
objection  must  be  taken  by  denmrrer  or  it 
is  waived  :  Blackwell  v.  Britisii-American 
Co.  (1902),  65  S.  C.  105,  43  S.  E.  395; 
Cooper  c.  The  People  (1900),  28  Colo.  87, 
63  Pac.  314;  Meyer  v.  Barth  (1897),  97 
Wis.  352,  72  N.  W.  748 ;  Swing  r.  White 
Kiver  Lumber  Co.  (1895),  91  Wis.  517, 
65  N.  W.  174.  When  it  does  not  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  pleading,  the  remedy  is 
by  answer  :  Clark  v.  Carey  ( 1 894),  41  Ncl). 
780.  60  N.  W.  78  ;  Blackwell  >:  British- 
American  Co.  (1902),  65  S.  C.  105,  43  S.  E. 
395;  Hankinson  i-.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1893),  41  S.  C.  1,  19  S.  E.  206.  In  either 
case  the  grounds  of  the  objection  must  be 
specified :  Blackwell  c.  British-American 
Co.  (1902),  65  S.  C.  105,  43  S.  E.  305,  and 
they  cannrjt  be  shown  under  a  goneral 
denial:   llicks  v.  Beam  (I89.5),  112  N.  C. 


642,  17  S.  E.  490;  Hankinson  r.  Charlotte, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1893),  41  S.  C.  1,  19  S.  K. 
206.  Held  in  State  v.  Ohio  Oil  Co.  (1897). 
150  Ind.  21,49  N.  E.809,  that  the  capacity 
of  the  State  to  sue  should  be  questioned 
by  demurrer  under  the  second  statutory 
ground,  —  want  of  legal  capacity  to  sue. 
Gager  v.  Marsden  (1899),  101  Wis.  598, 
77  N.  W.  922 :  Mere  error  of  the  trial 
court  in  making  substitution  of  plaintiffs 
does  not  go  to  the  legal  capacity  of  the 
substituted  plaintiffs  to  sue,  and  on  a 
demurrer  for  want  of  such  capacity  the 
complaint  stands  as  if  the  action  were 
originally  commenced  by  tJie  substituted 
plaintiffs.  Rogers  r.  Levy  (1893),  36  Nei>. 
601,  54  N.  W.  1080:  A  judgment  of  di.s- 
missal  on  the  ground  of  want  of  legal 
capacity  to  sue  is  not  a  bar  to  a  future 
action  on  the  same  cause  of  action.  Ward 
V.  Petrie  (1898),  157  N.  Y.  301,  51  N.  E. 
1002:  The  ground  of  demurrer  that  lite 
plaintiff  has  not  lesral  capacity  to  sue  dues 
not  ap]ily  to  a  receiver  duly  appointed  in 
8ui)plementary  proceedings,  where  the 
defendant  claims  that  he  cannot  maintain 
the  action  by  reason  of  the  nature  of  the 
relief  .sought.  Such  objection  is  not 
waived  by  failure  to  plead  or  demur. 

In  order  that  this  question  may  1  *'■ 
raised  by  demurrer,  the  want  of  capacity 
to  sue  must  affirmatively  appear  on  the 
face  of  the  complaint,  and  hence  it  is  not 
enough  that  the  complaint  fails  to  show 
that  the  plaintiff  has  capacity  to  sue: 
Locke  V.  Kluiikcr  (1898),  123  c'al.  231,  55 
Pac.  99.'5  ;  Xortlirup  v.  A.  G.  Wills  Liitii- 
ber  Co.  (1902),  65  Kan.  769,  70  J'ac.  879.] 


MISJOINDER   OF    PLAINTIFFS. 


181 


relied  upon  under  a  demurrer  for  want  of  sufficient  facts,  nor  the 
ohjcetion  of  a  want  of  facts  under  a  demurrer  alleging  an  absence 
of  legal  capacity.  1 

§  126.  *  201*.  Efifect  of  Misjoinder  of  Parties  Plaintiff.  Common 
Law  and  Equity  Rules.  .\  misjoinder  of  parties  plaintiff  is  not 
made  a  specific  ground  of  demurrer,  or  mentioned  as  a  defence, 
except  [in  a  few  of  the  codes]. ^  At  the  common  law  two  or 
more  persons  could  not  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  upon 
contract,  unless  they  possessed  a  joint  right;  and  if,  on  the  trial. 


1  [|State  ex  rel.  v.  Moores  (1899),  ."JS 
Neb.  28.5,  78  N.  W.  529  ;  Berkin  o.  Marsh 
(1896),  18  Mont.  152,  44  Pac.  528,  where 
it  was  held  that  legal  di.sability  to  sue 
pertains  to  the  person  desiring  to  sue,  and 
not  to  the  cause  of  action,  and  the  fact 
tiiat  the  cause  of  action  has  not  accrued 
does  not  give  rise  to  the  objection  of  dis- 
ability to  sue.  To  the  same  effect  .«ee 
Weirich  v.  Dodge  (1899),  101  Wis.  621, 
77  N.  \V.  906.  See  also  Zinn  v.  Baxter 
(1901),  65  Ohio  St,  341,  62  N.  E.  327, 
where  it  was  lield  that  the  fact  of  an  as- 
signment of  the  cause  of  .action,  upon 
which  plaintiff  sues,  before  the  commenee- 
ment  of  the  action,  goes  not  to  plain- 
tiff's capacity  to  sue  but  to  the  right  of 
action. 

The  following  cases  support  the  rule 
stated  in  the  text :  ^tua  Life  Ins.  Co. 
V.  Sellers  (1899),  154  Ind.  370,  56  N.  E. 
97;  Bern  v.  Shoemaker  (1895),  7  S.  D. 
510,  64  N.  W.  544  ;  Coddington  v.  Canaday 
(1901),  1.57  Ind.  243,  61  K  E.  567;  Rada- 
baugh  V.  Silvers  (1893),  135  Ind.  605,35 
N.  E.  694;  Knight  v.  Le  Bea  (1897),  19 
Mont.  223,  47  Pac.  952 ;  Birmingham  v. 
Cheetham  (1898),  19  Wash.  657,  54  Pac. 
37. 

But  the  question  of  the  right  of  plain- 
tiff to  maintain  the  action  may  be  raised 
by  general  demurrer :  Kinsley  v.  Kinslcv 
(1897),  150  Ind.  67,  49  N.  E.  819  ;  Ameri- 
can Trust,  etc.  Bank  y.  McGettigan  (1899), 
152  Ind.  532,  52  N.  E.  793.] 

De  Bolt  V.  Carter,  31  Ind.  355;  Berk- 
shire V.  Shultz,  25  Ind.  523;  People  v. 
Crooks,  53  N.  Y.  648 ;  Haire  r.  Baker,  5 
N.  Y.357  ;  Fulton  F.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Baldwin, 
37  N.  Y.  648;  Allen  v.  Buffalo,  38  N.  Y. 
280  ;  Palmer  v  Davis,  28  N.  Y.  242  ;  Bank 
of  Lowville  V.  Edwards,  11  How.  Pr.  216  ; 


Viburt  V.  Frost,  3  Abb.  Pr.  120;  Myers  v. 
Machado,  6  Abb.  Pr.  198,  14  How.  Pr.  149  ; 
Hobart  v.  Frost,  5  Duer,  672;  Saxton  v. 
Seiberling,  48  Ohio  St.  5.54.  In  New 
York,  a  corporation  is  not  required  to 
aver  tlie  acts  creating  its  corjjorate  char- 
acter; and,  in  an  action  by  a  bank  where 
the  complaint  omitted  any  such  allega- 
tion, a  demurrer  on  the  ground  of  a  want 
of  legal  capacity  was  overruled.  Phoenix 
Bk.  of  N.  Y.  V.  Donnell,  40  N.  Y.  410, 
41  Barb.  571.  As  to  legal  capacity  to 
sue,  see  Excelsior  Petroleum  Co.  v.  Lacey, 
63  N.  Y.  422  ;  Beers  v.  Shannon,  73  iii. 
292,  297 ;  Minneapolis  Harvester  Works 
)-.  Libby,  24  Minn.  327  ;  White  ( )ak  Dist. 
Tp.  V.  Oskaloosa  Dist.  Tp.,  44  Iowa,  512; 
Smith  V.  Peckham,  39  Wis.  414;  Rogers 
V.  Lafayette  Agr.  Works,  52  Ind.  296 ; 
De  Bolt  V.  Carter,  31  id.  355;  Langsdale 
V.  Girton,  51  id.  99;  Perkins  v.  Stimmel, 
114  N.  Y.  3.59;  Bray  v.  Black,  57  Ind. 
417  ;  Wilhoit  i'.  Cunningham,  87  Cal. 
453 ;  Beville  v.  Cox,  109  N.  C.  265 ; 
Brookmire  v.  Rosa  (Neb.  1892),  51  N.  W. 
840;  Farrell  v.  Cook,  16  Nebr.  483  ;  Pence 
V.  Aughe,  101  Ind.  317  ;  Campbell  v.  Camp- 
bell, 121"  id.  178  ;  Murray  v.  McGarigle,  69 
Wis.  483.  The  demurrer  must  be  overruled 
if  any  one  of  several  plaintiffs  has  capacity 
to  sue.  O'Callaghan  v.  Bode,  84  Cal.  689. 
[]The  question  of  plaintiff's  capacity  to 
sue  cannot  be  raised  by  an  interveuor  : 
Pitts  Agricultural  Works  v.  Baker  (1898), 
1 1  S.  D.  342,  77  N.  W.  586.] 

-  ^This  is  made  a  specific  ground  of 
demurrer  in  the  following  codes :  Colo- 
rado, §  50 ;  Nevada,  §  40 ;  New  York, 
§488;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.  (1901),  §3206; 
Montana,  §680;  Utah,  Rev.  St.  (1898), 
§  2962;  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.  (1899), 
§  3535  ;  Mi-s-xouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  598.] 


182  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

they  failed  to  establish  such  right  as  alleged  residing  in  all,  a 
nonsuit  was  inevitable.  If  two  or  more  persons  were  united  as 
plaintiffs  in  a  legal  action  based  upon  their  right  of  property  in 
lands  or  chattels,  they  must  necessarily  have  been  either  joint 
owners  or  owners  in  common,  and  a  failure  to  prove  the  joint 
right  of  action  was  followed  ])y  the  same  consequence,  — a  defeat 
of  all  the  plaintiffs.  In  equity,  no  such  doctrine  prevailed? 
because  when  two  or  more  persons  were  made  plaintiffs  in  the 
same  action  it  by  no  means  followed  that  they  held  and  alleged 
a  joint  light  residing  in  themselves.  When,  therefore,  there  was 
an  improper  or  unnecessary  union  of  co-plaintiffs  in  an  equity 
action,  the  suit  did  not  necessarily  fail  as  to  all;  the  bill  might 
be  dismissed  at  the  hearing  as  to  certain  of  the  plaintiffs,  and  a 
decree  rendered  for  the  others;  or  some  might  be  struck  off, 
upon  motion,  at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings,  and  the  cause  go 
on  in  the  name  of  the  residue. 

§  127.  ''  210.  Same  Subject.  Under  the  Codes.  Preliminary 
Analysis.  Has  any  change  in  these  conceptions,  and  in  the  prac- 
tical rules  derived  from  them,  been  wrought  by  the  codes  of  pro- 
cedure? If  the  old  distinction  between  joint  legal  rights  and 
several  legal  rights  is  maintained;  if  the  ancient  notion  of  the 
common  law,"  that  two  or  more  parties  plaintiff  in  a  legal  action, 
brought  upon  a  contract  or  upon  the  ownership  of  land  or  chattels, 
must  hold  a  joint  cause  of  action,  is  still  preserved,  with  all  of 
its  teL;hnical  incidents;  if  it  be  considered  that  the  reform 
legislation  has  confined  its  equitable  doctrine  as  to  parties  to 
equitable  actions  alone,  while  it  has  left  the  doctrines  regulat- 
ing legal  actions  untouched,  —  then  no  change  has  been  wrouglit 
in  the  practical  rules  which  determine  the  effect  of  a  misjoinder 
of  plaintiffs,  as  stated  in  the  foregoing  paragraph.  Under  this 
assumption,  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  in  a  legal  action,  brought 
upon  a  contract  or  upon  property  in  lands  or  chattels,  must 
now,  a.s  formerly,  entail  the  consequence  of  a  complete  failure; 
while  now,  as  formerly,  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  in  an  equity 
suit  does  not  entail  such  a  consofjuence;  a  judgment  can  be 
recovered  by  a  portion  of  the  plaintiffs,  and  the  action  be 
dismissed  as  to  the  residue.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  system 
is  to  l)e  accepted  and  acted  upon  in  the  spirit  which  (lesigii('(l 
it, — if  its  requirements  as  to  parties,  which,  as  is  nnivcu'sally 
conceded,  enact  the  established  doctrines  of  tlie  ec^uity  courts, 


MISJOINDER   OF   TLAINTIFFS.  183 

extend  the  one  principle  to  all  actions,  legal  as  well  as  equi- 
table, —  then  there  is  a  single  rule  governing  all  actions,  and, 
so  far  as  the  dogmas  of  the  common  law  are  inconsistent  there- 
with, they  are  necessarily  abrogated,  and  form  no  part  of  the 
reformed  American  procedure.  The  most  conspicuous  and  char- 
acteristic of  these  dogmas  are  the  notions  as  to  joint  rights, 
and  as  to  the  impossibility  of  severing  in  the  judgment  when 
such  rights  have  been  averred  as  the  causes  of  action;  and 
these  notions  must  be  abandoned,  if  full  force  and  effect  are 
to  be  given  to  the  language  used  by  the  legislature.  The 
whole  discussion  is  thus  reduced  to  a  single  question:  Are 
these  provisions  of  the  code  to  be  accepted  in  their  entirety, 
with  all  their  legitimate  and  necessary  consequences,  or  are 
they  to  be  limited  and  restricted  by  some  exception  grafted 
upon  them  by  the  courts,  and  are  their  consequences  to  be 
abridged  and  their  operation  to  be  confined  to  those  actions 
which,  under  the  former  system,  would  have  been  called  equi- 
table? I  have  already,  in  the  former  portion  of  this  section, 
stated,  as  the  guiding  principle  of  interpretation  adopted  b}' 
most  of  the  courts,  the  doctrine  that  the  equitable  rules  of  the 
codes  were  to  be  applied  in  all  actions,  whatever  be  their  nature. 
This  is  certainly  the  inference  to  be  drawn  from  the  judicial 
decisions  when  a  general  theory  of  interpretation  vjas  the  subject  of 
discussion;  and  one  theory,  when  accepted,  ought,  beyond  a 
doubt,  to  be  carried  out  in  all  the  minor  details,  in  the  work  of 
creating  all  the  practical  rules  for  administering  justice,  if  any 
consistent  and  symmetrical  result  is  desired.^  But  unfortunately, 
in  comparing  the  decided  cases,  and  in  endeavoring  to  deduce 
from  them  a  body  of  pi-actical  rules,  we  shall  find  so  much  in- 
consistency and  vacillation  in  the  judgments  of  even  the  same 
tribunals,  that  we  are  sometimes  forced  to  doubt  whether  any 
general  principle  of  construction  was  ever  intended  to  be  adopted 
by  the  courts,  whether  they  ever  accepted  any  theory  of  intei'- 
pretation,  and  proceeded  to  work  from  it  as  a  foundation  in 
constructing  a  system  of  procedure.  In  regard  to  the  particular 
matter  now  under  consideration,  if  we  collect  and  compare  the 

^  ^The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  in  dealing  with  the  subject  is  set  out  in  full 

the  very  recent  case  of  Castle  >•.  Madison  as  follows  :  "  Under  the  technical  rules  of 

(1902),  113  Wis.  346,  89   N.  W.   156,  so  the   common   law  it  was  not   considered 

fully   and   clearly   supports    the   author's  possible  for   two  or   more  persons  to  be 

views,   that   the   portion   of    the  opinion  united  as  plaintiffs   in   the   same   action 


]84 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


decisions  which  have  been  made  in  the  different  States,  it  ^^'ill  be 
difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  say,  upon  their  authority,  that  any 
definite  rule  has  been  established  determining  the  effect  of  a 
misjoinder  of  plaintiffs. 

§  128.  *211.  Misjoinder  of  Plaintiffs  no  Defence  in  an  Equi- 
table Action.  It  is  certainly  settled  beyond  a  doubt  that,  in 
all  equitable  actions,  and  in  all  actions  where,  upon  equitable 
principles,  a  co-plaintiff  may  sometimes  be  added,  not  because  he 
is  jointly  interested  with  the  other,  but  because  his  presence  as  a 
party  is  considered  necessary  to  a  complete  determination  of  the 
issues,  —  as  where  a  husband  is  sometimes  added  in  an  action 
brought  by  a  wife  touching  her  separate  property, —  the  equitable 
rule  applies  in  its  full  force,  and  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  is  not 
a  defence  to  the  suit;  it  is  neither  a  ground  of  demurrer,  nor  can 
it  be  set  up  in  the  answer  as  a  bar  to  the  relief  demanded  in  the 


upon  a  contract  unless  they  were,  for  all 
the  purposes  of  that  action,  equally  united 
in  interest,  unless  the  benefit  of  the  con- 
tract belonged  to  them  as  a  unit,  and  un- 
less the  right  in  them  was  created  at  the 
same  time  and  by  the  same  act.  And  the 
same  rule  was  applied  to  the  joinder  of 
defendants.  The  common  law  knew  noth- 
ing of  defendants  against  whom  a  judg- 
ment for  the  entire  amount  of  debt  and 
damages  was  not  to  be  rendered,  nor  of 
defendants  who  become  liable  at  different 
times,  and  u|)on  separate  instruments.  .  .  . 
The  revolution  contemplated  by  the  code 
has  been,  in  a  measure,  defeated  by  at- 
tempting to  interpret  it  according  to  com- 
mon-law principles.  It  was  deemed  that 
it  had  not  abolished  the  ancient  legal  con- 
ceptions as  to  parties  and  joint  rights  and 
liabilities,  and  hence  the  code  was  fenced 
around  by  a  series  of  decisions  on  this  sub- 
ject renderinj;  it  much  less  revolutionary 
than  its  framers  evidently  designed.  It 
has  been  said  —  and  the  statement  appeals 
to  us  with  considerable  force  —  that  these 
ancient  rules  of  the  common  law  ouglit  to 
have  but  meagre  weight  as  against  the 
plain  and  obvious  purpose  of  the  code  to 
simplify  and  remove  the  difficulties  of  the 
former  practice.  The  rules  of  practice 
under  the  regime  of  etjuity  were  in  every 
way  different  from  these  legal  doctrines. 
The  legal  notion  of  a  necessary  unity  in 


the  rights  of  the  plaintiffs  or  in  the  liabili- 
ties of  defendants  was  not  known  or  rec- 
ognized in  equity.  The  great  range  of 
precedents  on  this  subject  may  be  found 
in  any  text-book  on  equity  jurisprudence. 
It  is  plain  from  a  cursory  reading  of  the 
sections  of  our  statute  mentioned  that  they 
are  broad  and  comprehensive  enough  to 
cover  the  entire  field  of  ancient  equity 
rules.  They  are  without  exception  or 
limitation,  and  usually  have  been  con- 
strued as  being  of  equal  breadth  and  scope 
with  the  rules  of  equity  as  administered  in 
England  when  applied  to  suits  in  equity. 
It  is,  perhnps,  to  be  regretted  that  the 
early  expositors  of  the  code  should  have 
found  it  necessary  to  apply  its  language 
in  one  way  as  to  legal  actions,  and  the 
same  language  in  another  way  as  to  suits 
in  equity.  The  natural  and  fundamental 
ideas  which  seemed  to  control  in  suits  in 
equity  were  that  the  suit  should  be  prose- 
cuted by  the  party  really  in  interest,  al- 
though there  might  be  joined  with  him 
others  who  bad  an  interest  in  the  subject- 
matter  an<l  in  the  relief  sought,  and  that 
all  persons  whose  presence  was  necessary 
to  a  complete  determination  of  the  (jues- 
tions  involved  should  be  made  ])arties,  so 
that  in  one  decree  their  rights,  claims, 
interests,  and  liabilities,  however  varying 
in  importance  or  extent,  might  be  adjudi- 
cated and  enforced  by  the  court."] 


MISJOINDER    OF    PLAINTIFFS. 


185 


complaint  or  jjetition.^  The  name  of  the  unnecessary  plaintiff 
may  be  struck  out  b}'  the  court,  upon  motion ;  or,  if  the  cause 
proceeds  to  trial,  a  judgment  may  be  rendered  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff  entitled  thereto,  and  the  action  dismissed  as  against  the 
others.  2  The  changes  made  b}^  the  codes  themselves,  and  also 
by  special  statutes  relating  to  the  property  rights  of  married 
women,  have   certainly  extended    this  rule  to    many  cases    not 


1  [^Misjoinder  was  held  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Indiana  to  constitute  a  defence  in 
an  action  which,  while  not  strictly  equita- 
ble, involved  an  equitable  cause  of  action. 
This  was  the  case  of  Mcintosh  v.  Zaring 
(1897),  150  lud.  301,49  N.  E.  164.  Three 
firms  of  attorneys  had  executed  a  contract 
with  defendants,  by  the  terms  of  which  an 
action  was  to  be  brought  by  the  said  at- 
torneys to  set  aside  the  will  of  the  father 
of  one  of  the  defendants.  Each  firm  was  to 
receive  one-third  of  the  total  fee,  said  total 
to  amount  to  a  certain  per  cent  of  the  sum 
defendant  should  realize  out  of  the  estate 
of  her  father,  whether  by  suit  or  com- 
promise. The  attorneys  fully  performed 
the  contract  on  their  part,  but  defendant 
falsely  and  fraudulently  represented  to 
them  that  she  had  received,  as  the  result 
of  the  compromise  entered  into,  $50,000 
from  her  father's  estate,  whereas  in  fact 
she  had  received  the  sum  of  $250,000. 
Relying  on  her  representations  plaintiffs 
settled  with  her  on  the  basis  of  §50,000. 
When  the  fraud  was  di.scovered  this  action 
was  brought,  the  members  of  the  three 
firms  joining  as  plaintiffs,  demanding 
judgment  for  tlie  amount  still  due  and 
unpaid  on  the  contract,  and  other  proper 
relief.  One  of  the  members  of  one  of  the 
firms  had  previously  died,  and  his  admin- 
istratrix juined  as  plaintiff.  The  com- 
plaint alleged  the  contract,  the  settlement, 
and  the  facts  constituting  the  fraud.  De- 
fendants filed  a  general  demurrer  for  want 
of  facts. 

The  court  held  that  tlie  contract  was 
several  as  to  each  firm  of  attorneys,  and 
hence  did  not  create  a  joint  right  of  action 
in  said  attorneys.  "  But,"  said  the  court, 
"  there  is  an  element  in  the  complaint  be- 
yond the  .scope  of  the  mere  written  con- 
tract that  exerts  an  influence  upon  the 
right  of  the  several  obligees  or  payees 
therein  to  maintain  a  joint  action  thereon. 


That  element  is  the  allegation  of  fraud 
and  misrepresentation  of  the  defendants" 
as  to  the  amount  Mrs.  Mcintosh  had  re- 
ceived from  the  estate  of  her  father  on 
the  compromise.  .  .  .  While  neither  one 
of  the  firms  of  attorneys  in  the  contract 
mentioned  were  interested  in  either  of  the 
other  firms  recovering  thereon,  so  as  to 
enable  them  to  join  in  a  suit  thereon,  yet 
they  were  all  interested  in  the  other 
element  which  was  essential  to  be  estab- 
lished, without  which  neither  of  them 
could  recover,  namely,  the  fraud  by  which 
they  had  been  induced  to  .accept  a  smaller 
sum  in  full  settlement  and  discharge  of 
the  contract  than  was  really  due  them 
In  other  words,  they  were  all  alike  inter- 
ested in  avoiding  the  settlement."  There 
was  no  specific  prayer  to  have  the  settle- 
ment set  aside,  but  the  facts  showed  plain- 
tiffs entitled  to  it,  and  the  court  held  it 
proper  to  grant  such  relief  under  the  gen- 
eral prayer.  Accordingly  the  court  held 
that  in  respect  of  this  joinder  the  com- 
plaint was  not  bad  for  want  of  sufficient 
facts. 

But  the  administratrix  of  one  of  the 
attorneys  had  joined  as  plaintiff,  although 
under  the  law  the  partnership  assets  went 
to  the  survivor.  Hence  she  had  no  inter- 
est in  the  action.  And  on  this  account 
the  court  held  the  complaint  bad  as  again.st 
the  demurrer,  as  to  all  the  plaintiffs,  not- 
withstanding that  the  equitable  cause  of 
action  for  setting  aside  the  settlement 
had  been  deemed  sufficient  to  warrant  the 
joinder  of  the  firms  of  .attorneys. 

See  also  People,  ex  rel.  v.  District  Court 
(189.3),  18  Colo.  29.3,  32  Pac.  819,  which 
is  controlled  l)y  the  statute  making  mi.s- 
joinder  of  plaintiffs  aground  of  demurrer.] 

^  Ackley  r.  Tarbox,  31  N.  Y.  564  ; 
Allen  V.  Buffalo,  38  N.  Y.  280 ;  QKucera  ;•. 
Kucera  (1893),  86  Wis.  416,  57  N.  W.  47. ] 


1S(1  CIVIL    KH.MEDIES. 

Strictly  equitable,  even  to  cases  which  could  not  have  been 
maintained  at  all  Avliile  the  common  law  was  in  its  integrity. 

§  129.  *  212.  Doctrine  that  Demurrer  -will  lie  or  Dismissal  as  to 
Party  improperly  Joined.  There  is  another  class  of  decisions, 
made  in  actions  of  a  similar  nature  to  those  last  mentioned,  — 
that  is,  actions  strictly  equitable,  and  those  in  which  a  plaintiff 
is  added  in  pursuance  of  a  supposed  positive  rule  of  practice, 
although  no  joint  legal  right  is  alleged,  —  in  which  it  has  been 
held  that,  if  the  misjoinder  of  a  plaintiff  appears  upon  the  face 
of  the  complaint  or  petition,  the  defendant  may  demur  as  against 
the  party,  thus  improperly  joined,  on  the  ground  that  the  plead- 
ing does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action 
in  his  favor;  or,  if  no  demurrer  is  interposed,  the  same  objection 
may  be  raised  at  the  trial,  and  the  action  dismissed  as  to  him-. 
If  the  misjoinder  does  not  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  pleading, 
the  defence  must  be  set  up  in  the  answer.^  The  principle  of  this 
class  of  decisions  is  the  same  as  that  involved  in  the  cases 
described  in  the  preceding  paragraph.  The  actions  in  which 
this  method  of  raising  the  objection  of  a  misjoinder  is  permitted, 
may  be  equitable  or  may  be  legal;  but,  if  the  latter,  they  are 
not  based  upon  a  joint  legal  right  alleged  to  be  held  by  all  the 
plaintiffs.  In  all  of  them  the  right  of  action  is  assumed  to  be 
possessed  by  one  or  more  of  the  plaintiffs,  who  are  the  real  parties 
in  interest,  and  the  other  parties  are  added  through  some  sup- 
posed requirement  of  form  or  of  policy. 

§  130.  "^  213.  Misjoinder  Fatal  as  to  all  the  Plaintiffs  in  a  Legal 
Action.  View  of  some  Courts.  We  are  finally  brought  to  the 
case  of  an  action  strictly  legal  in  its  nature,  brought  by  two  or 
more  plaintiffs  in  whose  favor  a  joint  riglit  is  averred  as  the 
ground  of  recovery.  The  cotirts  of  some  States  have  distinctly 
asserted  and  applied  the  ancient  common-law  rule  under  these 
circumstances,  notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  the  codes,  and 
notwithstanding  even  the  liberal  scheme  of  interpretation  which 

1  Palmer    v.    Davis,    28    N.    Y.    242.  hini,  Imt  uot  as  to  both.    No  joint  cause  of 

I'almer  and  wife  sued  on  an  award  made  action  was  liere  alie^'cd,  although,  nomi- 

in  her  favor.     The  Court  of  Apjx-als  ]i<ld  tuilli/,    the    action    was    joint.     See    also 

that  the  husband  was  not  a  proper  plain-  Willard  v.  Keas,  26  Wis.  540,  544,  which 

tiff ;  that,  as  this  appeared  on  the  face  of  holds  that,  in  an  action  by  two  or  more 

tiie  complaint,  the  defendant  might  have  plaintiffs,  a  general  demurrer  Mgainst  all 

demurred  generally  as  to  him;  and  that  these  plaintiffs,  on  the  ground  of  a  want 

the  same  objection  could  l)e  raiser!  on  the  of  sufficient  facts,  is  bad  if  a  good  cause 

trial,  and  the  complaint  dismissed  as  to  of  action  i»  alleged  in  favor  of  one  of  them. 


MISJOINDER   OF   PLAINTIFFS.  187 

had,  as  a  general  thcorij,  been  adopted  by  the  same  tribunals. 
When,  in  such  an  action,  a  joint  right  is  averred  as  arising  from 
contract  or  from  tlie  ownership  of  hind  or  chattels,  while  in  fact 
no  joint  right  in  all  exists,  but  only  a  several  right  held  by  one 
or  a  joint  one  held  by  some,  this  error,  according  to  the  con- 
struction now  stated,  goes  to  the  entire  proceeding  and  defeats 
the  suit  as  against  all  the  plaintiffs.  If  the  error  appears  upon 
the  face  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  the  objection  may  be  raised 
by  a  general  demurrer  interposed  against  all  the  plaintiffs,  on 
the  ground  that  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action  are 
not  stated  in  the  pleading;  and,  in  the  absence  of  a  demurrer, 
the  same  objection  may  be  taken  at  the  trial  by  a  motion  for  a 
nonsuit  or  for  a  dismissal  of  the  action.  Finally,  if  the  error  is 
not  apparent  on  the  face  of  the  pleading,  the  defence  may  be  set 
up  in  the  answer,  and  is,  perhaps,  admissible  under  the  general 
denial.  This  is  plainly  the  original  common-law  doctrine,  un- 
affected by  the  reform  legislation,  and  it  proceeds  upon  the 
assumption  that  the  cause  of  action  is  a  joint  one,  that  this 
attribute  of  jointness  is  as  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
alleged  right  as  any  other  material  fact,  and  that  the  inability  to 
establish  the  particular  averment  is  not  a  mere  variance,  but  is  a 
complete  failure  of  proof. ^     As  an  illustration:  if  the  complaint 

1  Bartges  v.  O'Neil,  13  Ohio  St.  72  ;  jointly,  as  was  averred,  and  that  this  de- 
Masters  V.  Freemau,  17  Ohio  St.  323;  feet  could  be  taken  advantage  of  by  a 
])e  Bolt  v.  Carter,  31  Ind.  355;  Goodnight  general  demurrer  for  a  want  of  sufficient 
I'.  Goar,  30  Ind.  418  ;  Berkshire  y.  Schujtz,  facts;  and  that  the  action  should  have 
25  Ind.  523  ;  Lipperd  v.  Edwards,  39  Ind.  been  dismissed  on  the  trial  for  the  same 
165;  Estabrook  v.  Messersmith,  18  Wis.  reason.  Compare  this  decision  with  that 
545;  Frans  v.  Young,  24  Iowa,  375;  Gi-  made  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals 
raud  V.  Beach,  3  E.  D.  Smith,  337.  Cer-  in  Simar  v.  Canaday,  .53  N.  Y.  298,  which, 
tain  of  these  cases  inferentiallij  support  to  a  certain  extent,  presented  the  same 
the  propositions  contained  in  the  text,  by  peculiar  features.  The  Ohio  court  re- 
holdiug  that  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  in  affirmed  the  doctrine  in  the  subsequent 
.sucli  actions  may  be  taken  advantage  of  case  of  Masters  v.  Freemau,  17  Ohio  St. 
by  a  general  demurrer,  upon  the  ground  323.  Estabrook  v.  Messersmith,  18  Wis. 
tiiat  sufficient  facts  are  not  alleged ;  the  545,  was  an  action  by  two  partners, 
others,  however,  sustain  these  propositions  alleging  their  partnership,  their  joint 
to  their  full  extent.  As  the  subject  is  one  ownership  of  certain  goods,  and  a  wrong- 
of  great  practical  importance,  I  shall  quote  ful  conversion  thereof  by  the  defendants, 
from  the.se  decisions  at  .some  length.  Bart-  It  appeared  on  the  trial  that  one  of  the 
ges  V.  O'Neil,  13  Ohio  St.  72,  was  an  action  plaintiffs  had  been  guilty  of  a  fraud  upon 
by  a  husband  and  wife  to  recover  daniiiges  his  creditors  in  respect  of  the  property  in 
for  deceit  in  the  .sale  of  lands  purchased  question,  which,  as  the  court  hell,  pre- 
froin  the  defendant.  The  Supreme  Court  eluded  him  from  recovery;  and  it  was 
of  Ohio  held  that  the  petition  <iisclo.sed  no  thereupon  claimed  by  the  defendants  that, 
cause  of  action  belonging  to  the  phiintiffs  although  the  other  plaintiff  was  innocent 


188 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


should  allege  that  the  plaintiffs  A.  and  B.  were  partners,  and  as 
such  had  sold  and  delivered  to  the  defendant  certain  goods,  for  a 


of  the  fniutl,  there  could  be  uo  recovery 
ill  any  form,  —  not  by  the  plaintiffs  jointly, 
because  one  of  them  was  unable  to  main- 
tain the  action  ;  and  not  by  the  innocent 
partner,  because  the  right  averred  in  the 
complaint  was  a  joint  one.  The  plaintiffs 
were  permitted,  however,  to  recover  the 
value  of  the  innocent  partner's  interest. 
This  judgment  was  reversed  by  the  Su- 
jireme  Court,  and  the  grounds  of  the 
decision  were  thus  stated  by  Dixon  0.  J. 
(p.  .549):  "The  plaintiffs  were  partners, 
and  sued  for  the  alleged  wrongful  conver- 
sion of  their  partnership'  property  ;  and 
such  is  the  nature  of  their  legal  right  — 
they  are  so  iudissolubly  blended  —  that 
they  must  not  only  join  in  an  action  at  law, 
but  a  right  of  action  must  be  established 
in  both,  or  no  recovery  can  be  had.  It  is 
a  general  principle,  applicable  to  suits  of 
this  nature,  that  all  must  be  entitled  to 
judgment,  or  none ;  and  in  cases  where 
either  party  is  precluded  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  the  fraud  binds  not  only  the  guilty 
partner,  but  the  innocent  partner  in  that 
suit.  ...  It  would  seem  that,  if  the  de- 
frauded party  [meaning  the  innocent  jiart- 
ner]  lias  any  remedy,  it  is  only  by  a  suit 
in  ecjuity,  in  which  the  objection  of  joining 
his  guilty  copartner  as  a  party  plaintiff  is 
e.xsily  obviated."  I  must  remark,  in  pass- 
ing, that  the  last  observation  is  certainly 
a  strange  one,  in  the  face  of  the  statutory 
provision  contained  in  the  Wisconsin  code, 
which  purports  to  abolish  all  distinctions 
between  legal  and  ecjuitable  actions.  That 
a  plaintiff  should  be  turned  out  of  court  in 
one  action  called  Ifg'il,  and  should  be  told 
that  he  must  bring  another  action  called 
equitable,  for  exactly  the  same  demand, 
and  upon  exactly  the  s.ame  allegations  of 
fact,  and  that,  in  the  latter  suit,  the  par- 
ticular and  technical  ground  of  his  defeat 
in  the  former  one  could  not  be  objected 
to  his  recovery,  seems,  to  say  the  least,  to 
be  a  recognition  of  the  "distinction  "which 
the  law-making  power  had  so  expressly 
abrogated. 

I^.Xn  interesting  illustration  of  the  evo- 
lution of  judicial  opinion  is  afforded  by 
a  comparison  of  this  case  of  Estabrook 
V.  Messersmith  with  the   recent   case    of 


Castle  V.  Madison  (1902),  113  Wis.  346, 
89  N.  W.  156,  in  which  the  court  fully 
supports  the  author  in  his  view  of  the 
unity  of  procedure.  This  case  is  quoted 
at  length  in  note  to  §  *210.] 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  has  ap- 
proved the  doctrine  Qof  Estabrook  v. 
Messersmith]  in  substance,  although  in  a 
form  somewhat  modified.  Berkshire  v. 
Shultz,  25  Ind.  523.  QSee  the  case  of 
Mcintosh  V.  Zaring  (1897),  150  Ind.  301, 
49  N.  E.  164,  in  which  the  court  said: 
"It  is  tirmly  settled  in  this  State  that 
a  complaint  which  does  not  state  a  good 
cause  of  action  as  to  all,  though  it  does 
as  to  some  of  the  plaintiffs,  is  bad  as 
to  all,  for  want  of  suthcient  facts  to  con- 
stitute a  cause  of  action."  The  court  in 
this  case  quoted  from  the  case  of  Nico- 
deinus  v.  Simons  (1889),  121  Ind.  564,  z& 
follows :  "  If,  therefore,  two  or  more 
persons  bring  a  joint  action,  alleging  a 
joint  cause  of  action,  and  it  turns  out  upon 
the  trial  that  upon  the  facts  alleged  in  the 
complaint  some,  but  not  all,  of  the  plain- 
tiffs are  entitled  to  recover,  the  court  or 
jury,  as  the  case  may  be,  will  so  find,  and 
judgment  will  be  rendered  accordingly. 
.  .  .  But,  as  we  have  already  held,  the 
complaint  is  good,  and  the  question  before 
us  is  one  of  evidence,  and  not  of  pleading; 
upon  the  evidence  before  them,  the  jury 
found  for  the  female  appellee  and  the 
court  rendered  judgment  in  her  favor. 
This,  we  think,  was  proper."  And  the 
court,  in  Mcintosh  v.  Zaring,  goes  on  to- 
say :  "  It  is  very  clear  that  the  section 
quoted  is  in  no  way  inconsistent  with  the 
long  line  of  cases  cited  hohliiig  that  a 
comijlaint  by  plaintiffs  will  be  bad  for 
want  of  sufhcient  facts  if  it  does  not  state 
a  cause  of  action  in  favor  of  all  the  plain- 
tiffs." See  also  Brunson  v.  Henry  (1894), 
140  Ind.  455,  39  N.  E.  256  ;  Medlock  i;. 
Merritt  (1897),  102  Ga.  212,  29  S.  E. 
185.]  Goodnight  r.  Goar,  30  Ind.  418; 
I)e  Holt  V.  Carter,  31  Ind.  355;  Lipperd 
I'.  Edwards,  39  Ind.  165,  170.  In  Viles 
V.  Bangs,  36  Wi.s.  131,  1.39,  140,  the 
ca.se  of  Estabrook  v.  Messersmith,  18 
id.  545,  quoted  supra  in  this  note,  was 
severely    criticised     and    its    correctness 


MISJOINDER    OF    I'LAINTIFFS.  .1  SIJ 

stipulated  price,  and  slioiild  demand  a  judgment  therefor,  and  on 
the  trial  it  should  appear  that  A.  and  B.  were  not  partners  as 
averred,  and  did  not  jointly  sell  and  deliver  the  chattels  to  the 
defendant,  but  that  in  fact  the  same  were  sold  and  delivered  by 
A.  alone,  B.  having  no  interest  in  or  connection  with  the  trans- 
action, in  pursuance  of  the  rule  adopted  in  these  decisions  no 
judgment  could  be  rendered  for  A.  separately;  the  action  would 
entirely  fail  as  respects  both  the  plaintiffs.  It  thus  appears  that, 
in  at  least  three  States,  the  courts  have,  in  the  most  explicit 
manner,  and  in  well  considered  opinions,  reaffirmed  the  ancient 
common-law  doctrine  in  respect  to  legal  actions  brought  by  two 
or  more  plaintiffs  jointly;  and  have  held  that  the  joint  right 
must  be  proved  as  alleged,  or  the  action  must  fail  as  to  all  the 
plaintiffs.  In  other  States,  it  is  merely  said  that  a  misjoinder  is 
ground  for  a  demurrer  interposed  to  all  the  plaintiffs  for  the 
cause  that  the  complaint  or  petition  does  not  state  facts  sufficient 
to  constitute  a  cause  of  action. 

§  131.  *  214.  New  York  Cases.  Criticism.  The  question 
has  been  presented  to  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  but 
has  not  been  passed  upon  in  such  an  explicit  manner  as  neces- 
sarily to  establish  the  rule  for  that  State.  In  an  action  brought 
by  two  plaintiffs,  G.  and  C,  to  recover  damages  for  an  alleged 
fraud,  the  action  being  in  form  joint,  and  the  demand  of  judg- 
ment being  for  damages  due  to  the  plaintiffs  jointly,  the  com- 
plaint was  dismissed  at  the  trial,  because  it  appeared  that  the 
right  of  action  was  held  by  one  of  the  plaintiffs  alone.  In  respect 
to  this  ruling,  the  Commission  of  Appeal  said:  "Probably  the 
court  had  the  power  in  this  action,  if  the  claim  had  been  made, 
to  have  awarded  to  C.  his  damages,  giving  judgment  against  the 
other  plaintiff.  But  the  court  was  not  bound  to  do  this,  and 
committed  no  error  in  defeating  the  plaintiffs,  because  they  did 

doubted.     Cole  J.  made,  in  fact,  tlie  same  lyn,    5    Ilun,    149  ;     Marie    v.    Garrison, 

criticism  which  I  have  made  in  the  fore-  83   N.  Y.    14,  29  ;   Loomis    i-.    Brown,   16 

going  note.      See  also  Graham  Tp.  Indep.  Barb.  331  ;    Great  W.  Compound    Co.  v. 

Sch.  Dist.  V.  Indep.  Sch.  Dist.  No.  2,  .50  ^.tna   Ins.    Co  ,  40   Wis.  373.     See  also 

Iowa,  322  (in  an  action  to  recover  money,  Ilellams  v.  Switzer,  24  S.  C.  39;  Sira  v. 

the  objection  to  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  Hurst,  44  Ind.   579  ;    Yates   v.  State,  58 

should    be   made   by  motion,  not    by  de-  Ind.  299  ;   Hyatt  v.  Cochran,  85  Ind.  231  ; 

murrer).       As    to    proper    or    improper  Dill  v.  Voss,  94  Ind.  590;   Pixley  v.  Van 

joinder   of    plaintiffs,   see   Bort   v.   Yaw,  Nostern,    100    Ind.   34;    Morningstar    v. 

46    Iowa,  323;  Fuller  v.  Fuller,    5  Hun,  Cunningham,  110  Ind.  328. 
593 ;  Brett  v.  First  Univ.  Soc.  of  Brook- 


190  CIVIL  ki:medies. 

not  establish  a  cause  of  action  in  which  they  were  hoth  inter- 
ested."'' Tlii:i  conchision  is  certainly  very  unsatisfactory.  It 
can  hardly  be  possible  that  it  is  a  matter  of  discretion  with  the 
court,  at  the  trial,  whether  it  will  permit  a  severance  in  the 
judgment  or  will  dismiss  the  action  entirely.  The  rights  of 
litigant  parties  cannot  depend  upon  so  A^arying  a  criterion  as  the 
opinion  or  whim  of  an  individual  judge.  In  a  subsequent  case, 
where  the  action  was  brought  by  a  husband,  and  wife  to  recover 
damages  for  a  fraud  alleged  to  have  been  done  to  them  jointly, 
and  in  which  a  joint  right  of  action  was  distinctly  averred,  the 
same  court  announced  the  rule  in  the  following  manner,  but,  as 
it  was  entirely  unnecessary  to  the  decision  of  the  case,  the  ex- 
pression of  opinion  cannot  be  regarded  as  anything  mo  e  than  a 
dictum :  "  The  defendant  moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint  upon 
several  grounds,  and,  1st,  that  the  plaintiffs  could  not  maintain 
a  joint  action,  and  that  there  was  thereby  a  misjoinder  of  parties 
plaintiff.  This  point  is  not  rested  upon  the  marital  relation  of 
the  plaintiffs,  and  the  existence  of  that  relation  may,  in  con- 
sidering it,  be  put  out  of  view.  It  is  an  objection  which  may 
be  taken  on  the  trial.  '  But  it  is  not  an  objection  which  affords 
good  grounds  for  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  complaint  of  both 
plaintiffs,  if  either  of  them  has  shown  that  he  or  she  has  a  good 
cause  of  action.  In  such  case  the  motion  must  be  for  a  dis- 
missal of  the  complaint  of  the  plaintiff  in  whom  no  right  of  action 
appears. 2  Whether  either  of  the  plaintiffs  had  shown  a  good 
cause  of  action  will  be  considered  under  the  next  two  heads.  "^ 

§  132.  *  215.  True  Interpretation  of  the  Codes  as  to  Conse- 
quences of  Misjoinder.  Although  not  entitled  to  the  weight  of 
authority  as  a  decision^  the  doctrine  last-quoted  from  the  opinion 
of  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  is  in  complete  accordance 
with  the  true  spirit  and  evident  intent  of  the  reform  legislation. 
The  conclusions  reached  by  the  courts  of  Ohio,  Wisconsin,  and 
Indiana,  in  the  cases  heretofore  cited,  plainly  result  from  a  failure 

'  Calkins  v.  Smith,  48  N.  Y.  61 1,  G19,  191  ;  Fry  v.  Street,  37  Ark.  39;  Lancaster 

per  Karl  J.  Cy.  v.  Kush   (Neb.   1892),  52  N.  W.  837; 

2  Citing  rode,  §  144  (6),§  148;   I'alnicr  Wiesner  v.  Young  (Minn.  1892),  52  N.  W. 

r.  Davis,  28  N.  Y.  242.  390  ;  Hurd  c.  Simpson,  47  Kan.  372  ;  Arts 

•'*  Simar  v.  Canady,  53  N.  Y.  298,  301,  r.    Guthrie,    75    Iowa,   674;    White   Oak 

per  Folger  J.     S.   1'.  Green  v.  Green,  C9  Dist.  Tp.  v.  Oskaloosa  Di.st.  Tp.  44  Iowa. 

N.  C.  294,  298;   Burns  v.   Ashworth,    72  512.     A  preponderance  of  recent  authority 

N.  C.  496;   Warrcnton  v.  Arrington,  101  supports  the  opinion  of  the  author  and  the 

N.  C.  109  ;  Oliphint  v.  Mansfield,  3G  Ark.  dictum  of  Folgcr  J. 


MISJOINDKU    UF    PLAINTIFFS. 


101 


to  grasp  tlie  central  principle  of  interpretation  which  should  be 
applied  in  construing  the  codes  of  procedure,  and  to  push  it  to 
its  legitimate  consequences.  That  principle,  which  had  been 
fully  recognized  by  the  same  tribunals  under  other  circumstances, 
is  the  purely  equitable  nature  of  the  statutory  provisions  regulat- 
ing the  subject  of  parties,  and  the  application  of  the  equitable 
theory  to  the  civil  action  in  all  its  phases,  and  under  all  its  uses, 
without  exception  or  limitation.  This  is  now  conceded,  almost 
universally,  to  be  the  true  interpretation  of  the  clauses  of  the 
codes  under  consideration,  whenever  the  mode  of  interpretation 
is  to  be  stated  in  a  general  and  comprehensive  manner.*  The 
confusion  and  conflict  of  decision  shown  in  the  preceding  para- 


1  [_"  A  misjoinder  or  uniting  of  parties 
who  should  not  he  joined  cannot  he  taken 
advantage  of  hy  demurrer:"  Dolan  v. 
Hubiuger  (1899),  109  la.  408,  80  N.  W. 
514.  To  the  same  effect,  Cedar  Kapids 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Lavery  (1900J,  110  la. 
57.5,  81  N.  W.  775.  A  motion  is  the  proper 
remedy :  Lull  v.  Auamosa  Nat.  Bank 
(1900),  110  la.  537,  81  N.  W.  784; 
Martin  v.  Clay  (1899),  8  Okla.  46,  50  Pac. 
715;  Hornish  v.  Ringen  Stove  Co.  (1902), 
116  la.  1,  89  N.  W.  95;  Stiles  v.  City  of 
•Guthrie  (1895),  3  Okla.  26,  41  Pac.  383 ; 
Powell  V.  Banks  (1898),  146  Mo.  620,  48 
S.  VV.  664  (even  after  judgment).  The 
question  cannot  be  raised  hy  demurrer  on 
the  ground  of  defect  of  parties  or  mis- 
joinder of  causes  of  action  :  Wunderlich 
V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  R.  Co.  (1896),  93 
Wis.  1.32,  66  N.  W.  1144.  Nor  can  it  be 
raised  by  a  demurrer  for  want  of  juris- 
diction or  want  of  facts:  Svanburg  t-. 
Fosseeii  (1899),  75  Minn.  350,  78  N.  W.  4. 

"  A  misjoinder  apparent  upon  the  face 
of  the  petition  is  waived  if  not  objected  to 
before  trial :"  Goble  v.  Swobe  (1902),  64 
Neb.  838,  90  N.  W.  919.  The  objection  of 
misjoinder  cannot  be  made  for  tiie  first 
time  on  appeal:  Brook  i-.  Rayless  (1898), 
6  Okla.  568.  52  Pac.  738;  Breault  v. 
Merrill  &  Ring  Lumber  Co  (1898),  72 
Minn.  143,  75  N.  W.  122.  The  objection 
comes  too  late  at  the  trial :  Harrell  v. 
Davis  (1899),  108  Ga.  789,  33  S.  E.  8.52. 
"  There  is  no  such  reason  for  demurrer  as 
misjoinder  of  parties : "  Cargar  >•.  Fee 
(1894),  140  Ind.  572,  39  N.  E.  93.  In 
North  Carolina,  on  the  other  hand,  mis- 
joinder of  parties  must  he  taken  advantage 


of  by  demurrer  and  not  by  motion,  but  the 
defect  is  considered  a  mere  matter  of  sur- 
plu.sage  and  not  fatal :  McMiHan  v.  Baxley 
(1893),  112  N.  C.  578,  16  S.  E.  845;  Tate 
V.  Douglas  (1893),  113  N.  C.  190,  18  S.  E. 
202;  Sullivan  v.  Field  (1896),  118  N.  C. 
358,  24  N.  E.  735  ;  Hocutt  v.  Wilmington 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1899),  124  N.  C.  214,  32 
S.  E.  681.  See  contra,  Wool  v.  Edeuton 
(1893),  113  N.  C.  33,  18  S.  E.  76. 

See  in  this  connection  the  case  of  Hurd 
V.  Hotciikiss  (1900),  72  Conn.  472,  45  Atl. 
11,  where  the  court  said  :  "  Plaintiffs  may 
ordinarily  bring  actions  jointly  or  sev- 
erally, as  they  consider  their  rights  re- 
(]uire;  just  as  plaintiffs  may  claim  the 
relief  to  which  they  conceive  themselves 
to  be  entitled.  If  it  turn  out  in  the 
progress  of  the  trial  that  the  plaintiffs 
are  not  properly  named,  then  the  court 
makes  such  order  as  the  circumstances 
require,  or  renders  judgment  against  them 
all,  or  for  only  such  of  tliem  as  may  have 
established  a  right  to  recover.  This  is 
autliorized  to  be  done  by  §§  888  and  1108 
of  the  General  Statutes.  These  sections 
furnish  the  only  authority  of  which  we 
are  aware,  for  a  court  to  make  an  order 
that  one  or  more  of  the  persons  joined  as 
plaintiffs  in  a  complaint  shall  be  forbidden 
to  prosecute."     Citing  tlie  text. 

In  Colorado,  where  misjoinder  is  a 
statutory  ground  of  demurrer,  it  is  held 
tliat  the  objection  cannot  be  raised  by 
answer,  where  the  defect  appears  upon 
the  face  of  the  complaint :  Sams  Car 
Cou{.ler  Co.  v.  League  (1898),  25  Colo. 
1 29,  54  Pac.  642.] 


192  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

graphs  arise  from  the  fact  that  courts,  in  determining  the  special 
rules  applicable  to  particular  classes  of  cases,  have  been  unwilling 
to  carry  out  the  principle  which  they  have  accepted  in  its  most 
general  form,  and  to  adopt  the  results  which  necessarily  flow 
from  it;  they  have  shrunk  from  the  changes  in  the  old  and  familiar 
methods  which  sucli  a  course  would  produce.  It  is  very  plain, 
however,  that,  if  we  are  ever  to  have  a  uniform,  consistent, 
simple,  and  symmetrical  system  of  procedure  as  the  outcome  of 
the  reform  legislation,  the  courts  must  be  willing  to  follow  the 
general  principles  of  interpretation  to  their  legitimate  conclu- 
sions. A  system  in  which  the  equital)le  doctrine  as  to  parties 
and  judgments  is  permitted  to  work  its  effect  upon  legal  actions 
to  a  partial  extent,  while  the  ancient  legal  doctrine  is  applied 
in  other  instances,  would  be  more  objectionable  even  than  the 
former  complete  division  between  equitable  and  legal  proceed- 
ings. As  the  codes  do  not  indicate  any  line  where  the  equitable 
doctrine  is  to  stop  and  the  legal  to  commence,  in  determining  the 
practical  rules,  the  position  of  this  line  must  depend  upon  the 
views  of  individual  judges  and  courts,  and  thus  an  element  of 
uncertainty  and  confusion  is  introduced  into  tlie  procedure, 
which  can  never  be  removed;  there  being  no  2^?T?iCijy/(?  by  which 
to  settle  the  respective  limits  of  the  two  theories  or  doctrines  as 
to  parties,  no  fixed  system  of  practical  rules  would  ever  be  estab- 
lished. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  equitable  doctrine  should  l)e 
not  only  stated  as  the  correct  general  theory  of  interpretation, 
but  should  be  honestly  followed  out  in  its  application  to  all  cases, 
the  same  practical  rules  would  be  deduced  alike  for  legal  and  for 
equitable  actions,  and  the  resulting  system  would  l)e  definite, 
certain,  and  consistent,  —  the  system  beyond  a  doubt  contem- 
plated by  the  legislatures  when  they  enacted  the  codes  in  the 
several  States.  If  this  were  done,  tlie  ancient  rules  of  the 
conniion  law  respectiiig  the  nature  of  joint  rights  when  set  up 
as  the  basis  of  recovery,  and  the  effect  of  alleging  such  a  right 
in  favor  of  two  or  more  plaintiffs,  would  disappear,  and  a  sever- 
ance in  the  judgment  would  be  a?  much  a  matter  of  course  in 
legal  actions  as  in  equitable  suits. 

§  133.  *  216.  When  Objection  may  be  made  by  Demurrer  or 
Answ^er  against  Party  improperly  Joined.  There  is  still  another 
case  in  respect  of  wliicli  tliere  seems  to  be  a  unanimity  of  deci- 
sion.     When  an  action  is  Ijrought  by  two  or  more  plaintiffs,  and 


RULKS    AS    TO    PLAINTIFFS.  193 

the  averments  of  the  complaint  or  petition  show  that  one  or  more 
of  them  have  been  improperly  joined  as  co-plaintitfs  with  the 
rest,  the  defendant  may  interpose  a  demurrer  as  to  such  plaintiff 
or  plaintiffs,  not  because  of  a  defect  of  parties,  nor  because  of  a 
misjoinder,  but  because  tlie  complaint  or  petition  does  not  state 
facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action  in  respect  to  these 
plaintiffs.  The  distinction  between  this  case  and  the  one  last 
considered  is  evident.  In  the  latter,  the  demurrer  is  to  all  the 
plaintiffs,  and  the  objection  extends  to  the  entire  action  upon 
the  alleged  ground  that  no  joint  claim  or  cause  of  action  is 
shown  to  exist  in  all  the  plaintiffs.  In  the  present  case,  it  is 
conceded  that  a  cause  of  action  is  shown  in  favor  of  one  or  more 
of  the  plaintiffs,  and  the  objection  goes  only  to  the  others  in 
whose  favor  no  cause  of  action  appears.  This  mode  of  objecting 
to  a  misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  may  be  used  in  legal  as  well  as  in 
equitable  actions.  Of  course,  if  the  objection  does  not  appear 
upon  the  face  of  the  pleading,  but  exists  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it 
may  and  should  be  set  up  as  a  defence  in  the  answer.^ 

Rules  as  to  Plaintiffs  in  Particular  Classes  of  Cases. 

§  134.  *  217.  Order  of  Proposed  Treatment.  I  now  pass  from 
this  examination  of  the  doctrine  in  its  general  scope  to  its  appli- 
cation in  the  various  classes  of  cases  which  can  arise  in  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice.  The  further  discussion  will  be  pursued 
in  the  following  order:  First.,  Parties  plaintiff  in  legal  actions; 
Second.,  Actions  by  or  between  husband  and  wife ;  Thirds  Parties 
plaintiff  in  equitable  actions.  The  first  of  these  divisions  will 
be  separated  into:  1.  Actions  by  owners  in  common  and  by  joint 
owners  of  land;  2.  Actions  by  joint  owners  of  chattels;  3. 
Actions  by  persons  having  a  joint  right  arising  from  contract;  4. 
Actions  by  persons  having  several  rights  arising  from  contract; 
5.  Actions  by  persons  having  a   joint  right  arising    from  tort; 

^  The   rule    as   stated    iu   the  text  is  complaint   must  siiow  a  cause  of  action 

either  expressly  approved,  or  is  impliedly  against  all  the  defendants,  or  it  is  bad  on 

acknowlediied,  in  several  of  the  cases  cited  a  general  demurrer  for  want  of  sufficient 

under  the  preceding  paragraph.     See  also  facts,  as  against  the  plaintiff  improperly 

Willard  r.   Heas,  26  Wis.  540,  544;  Peo-  joined);   People?-.   Ilaggin,  57  Cal.  579  (if 

pie  V.  Crooks,  53  N.  Y.  648.     In  Missouri  an  action  is   brought    by   entirely   wrong 

and  California  the  codes  expressly  stato,  jtlaintiff  or  jilaintiffs,  the  objection  can  be 

as  one  ground  of  demurrer,  the  misjoinder  raised  by  such  a  general  demurrer).     See 

of    the    parties,    plaintiff    or    defendant,  also    Teunant    v.   Pfester,    51    Cal.   511; 

See    Parker    v.    Small,   58    lud.   349    (a  Harris  r.  Harris,  61  Ind.  117. 

13 


194  CIVIL    liKMEDIES. 

6.  Actions  by  persons  having  several  rights  arising  from  torts.' 
The  second  and  third  of  the  general  divisions  do  not  admit  of  a 
similar  subdivision. 

First :  Legal  Actions. 

§  135.  *218.  I.  Legal  Actions  by  Joint  Owners  and  Owners  in 
Common  of  Land.  Modern  Statutes.  Common-Law^  Rules.  The 
change  in  the  common  law  produced  by  statute  throughout  the 
United  States  has  practically  abolished  joint  ownership  in  land, 
except  in  the  case  of  those  holding  alicni  juris,  as  trustees.  The 
statutory  rule  is,  I  believe,  quite  universal  among  the  States,  that 
when  two  or  more  persons  succeed  by  inheritance  to  the  same 
land,  their  ownership  is  common  and  not  joint,  and  when  land 
is  conveyed  to  several  persons  in  tlieir  own  right,  without  any 
express  direction  to  the  contrary,  their  ownership  also  is  com- 
mon.^ The  exceptions  to  this  rule  are  trustees  who  are  generally 
omitted  from  the  operations  of  the  statutes,  so  that  a  grant  or 
devise  to  several  as  trustees  creates  a  joint  ownership;  and  in 
certain  States,  as  in  New  York,  the  peculiar  modification  of  joint 
estates  created  by  a  conveyance  to  a  husband  and  wife,  is  held  to 
be  unaffected  by  the  statutes,  and  to  exist  as  at  the  common  law. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  legislation  of  some  States  has  abolished 
joint  ownership,  in  an  absolute  manner,  so  that  it  cannot  be 
created  even  by  the  act  of  the  parties.  As  a  conclusion  it  is 
enough  to  say  that  the  common-law  joint  tenancy  of  land  by  per- 
sons holding  sui  juris  does  not  practically  exist  in  this  countr}-.'' 
At  the  common  law  all  the  joint  owners  were  required  to  unite 
in  any  action,  whether  real  or  personal,  based  upon  their  pro- 
prietiiry  riglit.  With  owners  in  common,  the  rule  was  not  so 
uniform.  In  personal  actions  for  injuries  done  to  the  land,  it 
was  proper  for  all  the  owners  to  unite;  in  actions  to  recover 
possession,  however,  each  sued  for  his  individual  interest,  al- 
though this  particular  doctrine  was  doubtless  modified  in  many 
States,  as  it  was  in  New  York.  Finally,  in  actions  for  rent,  if 
the  letting  was  joint,  or  if  the  reservation  was  of  an  entire  rent 
to  all,  all  would  unite  as  plaintiffs;  but  if  the  rent  was  reserved 
to  them  separately  in  distinct  parts,  each  must  sue  for  his  own 

1  Wash,  on  Real  Prop.,  vol.  1,  p.  40'J  -  Wash,  on  Real  Prop.,  vol.  1,  p.  409 

(uote).  (note). 


ACTIONS    BY   OWNERS    OF    LAND.  195 

share. ^  It  should  be  remembered  that,  in  the  action  of  ejectment 
at  the  common  law,  the  plaintiff  was  the  fictitious  person  called 
John  Doe,  and  the  real  claimant  was  his  lessor.  It  was  only  in 
the  United  States,  where  the  fictions  of  the  action  had  generally 
been  abolished  by  statute,  that  it  was  possible  for  joint  owners  or 
owners  in  common  to  appear  as  the  actual  plaintiffs  in  ejectment. 
I  now  pass  to  cases  decided  since  the  enactment  of  the  codes  in 
the  several  States. ^ 

§  136.  *  219.  Decisions  under  the  Codes.  Where  the  rent 
is  entire,  owners  in  common  of  the  demised  land  may  unite 
in  an  action  to  recover  it  from  the  lessee;  and  upon  the  same 
principle  they  may  join  in  an  action  to  recover  the  rent  from  a 
person  to  Avliom  it  had  been  paid  for  their  use;  for  example, 
devisees  in  fee  in  remainder,  after  a  life  estate,  may  join  in  a 
suit  against  the  executor  of  the  deceased  life-tenant  to  recover 
the  rent  which  he  had  collected  from  the  lessee  subsequent  to 
the  death. 2  A  joinder  of  all  does  not,  however,  seem  to  be  abso- 
lutely necessary.  It  seems  that  each  may  sue  for  his  own  share 
of  the  rent,  even  though  it  accrue  as  an  entire  sum  to  all  the 
owners  in  common.*  The  only  possible  alternative,  however,  is 
a  suit  by  all  or  a  suit  by  each  for  his  own  portion  separately;  an 
action  cannot  be  maintained  by  a  portion  more  than  one  and  less 
than  all.^  When  the  lessor  of  land  dies  intestate,  the  term  being 
unexpired,  his  administrator  is  the  only  proper  party  to  sue  for 
the  unpaid  rent  which  accrued  prior  to  the  death,  while  the  heirs, 
either  jointly  or  separately,  must  sue  for  that  accruing  subse- 
quently thereto.^  In  actions  brought  to  recover  damages  for 
torts  done  to  the  land,  such  as  trespasses,  nuisances,  and  the 
like,  the  common-law  rule  remains  unchanged,  and  all  the 
owners  in  common  must  unite  as  plaintiffs;'^  even  when  they 

1  See  1  Ch.  I'l.    (Springfield  eil.,  1840),  i  Jones  v.  Felch,  3  Bosw.  63;  Porter 

pp.  13,  (;.-).  "  V.  Hleiler,  17  Barb.  149. 

-  UMiuher  v.   Dunn   (1898),   11    S.  D.  ^  Kiug  r.  Andersou,  20  Intl.  385. 
196,  76  N.  W.  922:  Teuant.s  in  common  "^  King  y.  Anderson,  20  Ind.  385  ;  Craw- 
are  not  "  united  in  interest"  within  Comp.  ford  r.  Gunn,  35  Iowa,  543. 
Laws,  §  4879,  requiring  all  such  persons  '<  De  Puy  v.  Stronj,',  37  N.  Y.  372 ;  3 
to  join  in  an  action.]  Keyes,   603;    Hill   r.    Gibbs,   5    Hill,   56; 

3  Marshall  v.  Moseley,  21  N.  Y.  280,  Parke  v.  Kilham,  8  Cal.  77  (diversion  of 

287.     See  Cruger  r.  McLaury,  41  N.  Y.  water)  ;   Sliepard  v.   Manhattan  Hy.  Co., 

219,  which  holds  that  one  of  the  owners  117    N.    Y.   442;    Wausau    Boom   Co.    r. 

in  common  may  sue  for  his  share  of  an  Plumer,  49  Wis.  112  (the  persons  in  ac- 

entire  rent.     See  infra,  §  *220,  n.  tual  possession    may  maintain    trespass). 


196 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


hold  under  different  titles,  they  must  still  join,  as,  for  example, 
the  heirs-at-la\v  and  devisees  of  the  same  land,  in  an  action  for 
injuries  done  to  the  inheritance,^  or  the  owners  in  common  of  a 
mill,  who  derive  their  rights  under  different  conveyances,  in  a 
suit  for  the  diversion  of  water  from  their  mill.^  The  owners  in 
common  must  also  join  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  fraud 
practised  in  the  sale  of  the  land  to  them ;  a  separate  suit  cannot 
be  maintained.^  Administrators  or  executors  cannot  sue  for 
trespasses  or  other  injuries  done  to  the  land  after  the  death  of 
the  owner  whom  they  represent ;  the  heirs  or  the  devisees,  as  the 
case  may  be,  are  the  only  proper  plaintiffs.* 

§  137.  *  220.  Same  Subject.  Owners  in  common  need  not 
not  unite  in  an  action  to  recover  possession ;  ^  each  may  bring  a 
separate  suit  for  his  \individed  share. ^     This  is  a  very  familiar 


The  remainder-man  and  life  tenants  may 
join  as  co-plaintiffs  in  suit  for  a  nuisance, 
e.  q.  a  dam.  Schiffer  v.  Eau  Claire,  51 
Wis.  385;  Seymour  v.  Carpenter,  51  id. 
413. 

The  separate  owners  of  separate  lands 
each  injured  by  the  same  nuisance,  e.  g. 
a  dam,  or  diversion  of  water,  cannot 
join  as  co-plaintiffs  in  an  action  for  dam- 
ages ;  but  they  can  join  in  an  equitable 
action  to  enjoin  and  remove  the  nuisance. 
Palmer  v.  Waddell,  22  Kan.  352 ;  QYouu- 
kin  V.  Milwaukee,  etc.  Co.  (1901),  112  Wis. 
15,  87  N.  W.  861  ;  Linden  Land  Co.  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  Co.  (1900),  107  Wis.  493, 
83  N.  W.  851  ;  Strobel  v.  Kerr  Salt  Co. 
(1900),  164  N.  Y.  303.  58  N.  E.  142; 
Beacii  V.  Spokane  Ranch  Co.  (1901),  25 
Mont.  379,  65  Pac.  Ill  ;  Brown  v.  Canal 
and  Reservoir  Co.  (1899),  26  Colo.  66,  56 
Pac.  183;  Rounow  v.  Delmue  (1895),  23 
Nev.  29,  41  Pac.  1074;  McDonough  ;•. 
Carter  (1896),  98  Ga  703,  25  S.  E.  938 ;] 
Foreman  v.  Boyle,  88  Cal.  290;  Hellams 
V.  Switzer,  24  S.  C.  39  ;  Spanish  Fork  City 
V.  Hopper  (Utah,  1891).  26  Pac.  Rep.  293 
(tenants  in  common  of  water).  [^Rut 
where  a  domestic  animal  breaks  into  a 
pasture  Held  and  injures  live  stock  belong- 


1  Van  Deusen  i-.  Young,  29  Barb.  9. 

2  Samuels  v.  Blanchard,  25  Wis.  329. 

'  Lawrence  r.  Montgomery,  37  Cal. 
183,  188,  per  Crockett  J.  See  Foster  v. 
Elliott.  33  Iowa,  216,  224. 

<  Aubuchon  r.  Lory,  33  Mo.  99  ;  Hart 
V.  Metrop.  Elev.  Ry.  Co.,  15  Daly,  391.  In 
a  suit  by  tenants  in  common,  the  personal 
representative  of  a  deceased  co-tenant  is 
projx'rly  joined  to  recover  damages  up  to 
the  time  of  the  death  of  the  decedent ; 
and  the  heirs  to  recover  damages  subse- 
quent to  that  date  :  Shepard  v.  Manhattan 
Ry.  Co.,  117  N.  Y'.  442. 

[^Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  R.  Co..  v.  Price 
(1899),  153  Ind.  31,  53  N.  E.  1018:  Where 
a  piece  of  real  estate  is  appropriated  by 
defendant,  while  plaintiffs  and  |)laintiffs' 
ancestor  are  tenants  in  common  therein, 
and  plaintiffs'  ancestor  dies  before  suit  is 
brought,  and  suit  is  brought  by  plaintiffs 
both  for  the  damages  to  their  own  intere.st 
.and  .13  heirs  of  the  deceased  tenant,  the 
fact  that  they  have  no  right  to  sue  as 
heirs  for  the  injury  sustained  by  decedent 
does  not  render  their  coniidaiut  bad  on 
demurrer.] 

"  QBut  where  an  action  is  joint,  if  it 
appears  that  the  defendants  have  a  good 


ing  to  one  of  the  tenants  in  common  of     defence  against  one  of  the  plaintiffs,  the 


the  field,  such  tenant  m.ay  maintain  an 
action  against  the  owner  of  the  animal 
without  joining  the  other  co-tenants  ;  Mor- 
gan V.  Hndnell  (1895),  52  O.  St.  552,  40 
N.  E.  710.]  See  ahio  §  *269,  post,  and 
cases  cited. 


action    must   fail :    Wooding    v.    Blanton 
(1900),  112  Ga.  509,  37  S.  E.  720.] 

«  Brown  v.  Warren,  16  Nev.  228;  Hart 
V.  Robertson,  21  Cal.  346;  Toucliard  v. 
Crow,  20  C-il.  1.50;  Thames  o.  .Jones,  97 
N.  C.   121;  Yancey  v.  Greenlee,  90  N.  C. 


ACTIONS    BY    OWNERS    OF    LANDS. 


197 


rule,  and  such  actions  are  constantly  brought  by  widows  to 
recover  their  dower  before  it  has  been  set  out  to  them  or  ad- 
measured, and  by  individual  heirs.  Of  course  all  the  owners 
viay  join,  and  must  join  if  the  design  is  to  recover  possession  of 
the  entire  tract  over  which  the  common  ownership  extends,  as  a 
separate  parcel  of  land ;  ^  when  one  sues,  he  can  only  demand  and 
obtain  a  judgment  for  his  own  undivided  portion  of  the  common 
premises. 2  The  election  between  modes  of  instituting  the  action 
goes  no  further,  however;  it  cannot  be  prosecuted  by  a  portion 
of  the  co-owners  less  than  all ;  it  must  be  by  all  or  by  one.^     In 


317;  Weese  v.  Barker,  7  Colo.  178. 
Cruger  i'.  McLaury,  41  N.  Y.  219.  Oue 
Iv.  had  a  given  lease  in  fee  of  lands,  re- 
serving rent,  with  a  clause  of  re-entry  on 
non-payment.  Oue  of  his  six  children 
and  heirs-at-law  sues  to  recover  an  un- 
divided sixth  part  of  the  ])remises,  on 
.iccount  of  the  condition  broken.  The 
Court  of  Appeals  held  the  action  properly 
brought ;  that  all  the  heirs  need  not  be 
joined  ;  and,  also,  that  each  of  the  heirs 
might  have  maintained  an  action  for  tlie 
rent.  This  last  proposition  settles  the 
doubt  ex})ressed  by  Conistock  J.  in  Mar- 
shall II.  Moseley,  cited  in  note  to  §  *219, 
80  far  as  the  law  of  New  Y'ork  is  con- 
cerned ;  and  in  that  State,  although  the 
rent  is  entire,  and  accruing  to  all  the 
owners  iu  common,  each  may  sue.  See 
Fisher  v.  Hall,  41  N.  Y.  416,  in  which  it 
may  seem  to  be  intimated  that  all  must 
join  in  a  suit  to  recover  possession  of  the 
land  ;  but  there  is  actually  no  discrepancy 
in  the  two  decisions.  In  the  case  last 
cited  all  the  owners  but  one  united  in  a 
suit  to  recover  possession  of  tlie  entire 
jinrcel  of  land ;  and  in  such  an  action  a 
joinder  of  all  the  owners  is,  of  course, 
neces.sary.  The  court  did  not  intimate 
that  one  co-owner  may  not  sue  for  his 
undivided  share.  See  also  Hasbronck  r. 
Bunce,3  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  309,  311  ;  62  N.  Y. 
475.  The  above  conclusions  are  sup- 
ported bv  Mattis  v.  Boggs,  19  Neb.  698; 
(jray  v.  Givens,  26  Mo.  291. 

[^It  is  held  in  North  Carolina  that  a 
tenant  in  common  may  maintain  eject- 
ment against  his  co-tenant :  Kicks  v.  Pope 
(1901 ),  129  N.  C.  52,  39  S.  E.  638.  Same 
doctrine  obtains  in  Georgia:  Thompson 
V.  Sanders  (1901),  113  Ga.  1024,  39   S.  E. 


419.  Under  the  North  Carolina  code, 
§  627,  a  tenant  in  common  may  bring  an 
action  for  waste  against  his  co-tenant,  and, 
by  analogy,  he  may  bring  an  action  to  re- 
strain waste:  Morrison  v.  Morrison  (1898), 
122  N.  C.  598,  29  S.  E.  901.3 

1  QBut  see  Winborne  v.  Lumber  Co. 
(1902),  130  N.  C.  32,  40  S.  E.  825,  where 
the  court  said  :  "  One  tenant  in  common 
can  recover  the  entire  tract  against  a  third 
party,  for  each  tenant  is  entitled  to  pos- 
session of  the  whole,  except  against  a  co- 
tenant."  So  in  Shelton  r.  Wilson  (1902), 
131  N.  C.  499,  42  S.  E.  937.] 

2  [[In  Winborne  v.  Lumber  Co.  {supra), 
it  was  held  that  the  court  erred  in  direct- 
ing the  jury  to  respond  to  the  first  issue 
"  Yes,  one-fifth  of  the  land,"  if  they  be- 
lieved the  evidence  ;  whereas  the  defend- 
ant had  no  right  to  have  the  amount  of 
the  plaintiff's  right  to  possession  deter- 
mined, for,  as  against  defendant,  the 
plaintiff  was  entitled  to  recover  poBsession 
of  tlie  whole.] 

3  Fisher  v.  Hall,  41  N.  Y.  416.  See 
Hubbell  V.  Lerch,  58  N.  Y.  237,  241  ;  Ha.s- 
brouck  V.  Buuce,  62  N.  Y.  475.  [^The 
doctrine  announced  in  Hasbrouck  r.  Bunce 
(snpra)  has  been  rendered  obsolete  in 
New  York  Ijy  statute,  Code  Civ.  Pro.  §  1500, 
which  reads  as  follows  :  "  Where  two  or 
more  jiersons  are  entitled  to  the  possession 
of  real  property,  as  joint  tenants  or  ten- 
ants in  common,  oue  or  more  of  them  may 
maintain  such  an  action,  to  recover  his  or' 
their  undivided  shares  in  the  property,  in 
any  case  where  such  an  action  might  be 
maintained  by  all."  See  Deering  i\ 
Reilly  (1901),  167  N.  Y.  184,  60  N.  E. 
447,  where  this  statute  is  construed.]  One 
co-tenant  may,  in  general,  sue  alone   for 


198 


CIVIL  rp:mediks. 


piii-suance  of  this  general  principle,  the  same  rule  has  been  ex- 
tended to  actions  brought  to  recover  a  fund,  or  a  portion  thereof, 
when  l)y  reason  of  some  judicial  proceedings  this  fund  stands  in 
the  place  of  the  land  itself.  Thus,  where  the  land  of  two  co-^ 
owners  had  been  taken  for  public  purposes,  and  the  amoimt 
awarded  as  compensation  had  not  been  paid  over,  because  the 
owners  were  at  the  time  unknown,  one  of  them  was  permitted  to 
recover  his  portion  of  the  whole  sum  in  a  separate  action,  the 
money  representing  the  land,  and  the  action  itself  being  analo- 
gous to  one  brought  to  recover  an  undivided  share  of  that  land.^ 
In  certain  States,  the  subject  now  under  consideration  is  regu- 
lated by  express  statute. ^  Thus,  in  California,  joint  owners  and 
owners  in  common  may  sue  jointly  or  severally,  or  any  number 


his  share,  ilorenhaut  v.  Wilson,  52  Cal. 
262.  But  in  an  action  to  recover  land  for 
a  breach  of  a  condition  subsequent,  all  the 
grantors  or  their  heirs  must  join ;  ap 
action  cannot  be  maintained  by  one  of  the 
co-tenants  for  his  share.  Cook  v.  St.  Paul's 
Church,  5  Ilun,  293.  It  seems  that  in 
South  Carolina  a  joint  action  for  recovery 
of  possession  may  be  brought  by  a  j)ortion 
of  the  co-owners  less  than  all  to  recover 
their  shares.  See  Bannister  r.  Bull,  16 
S.  C.  220.  Two  tenants  in  common  joined 
in  an  action  to  recover  possession  of  land, 
making  the  remaining  tenants  in  common, 
who  refused  to  jom,  defendants.  It  was 
held  that  a  verdict  for  the  whole  land  was 
improper,  and  should  have  been  for  the 
undivided  shares  of  the  plaintiffs  only. 
The  joinder  as  defendants  of  the  uon- 
con.senting  co-tenants  was  unnecessary  for 
the  recovery  of  the  partial  interest,  and 
ineffectual  for  the  recovery  of  the  whole. 

QA  joint  grantee  in  a  deed  is  not  a  nec- 
essary party  in  a  suit  in  ejectment  by  the 
other:  McNear  v.  Williamson  (1902),  166 
Mo.  358,  66  S.  W.  160.  Where  tlie  land 
of  a  deceased  person  is  sold  for  taxes  and 
one  of  his  heirs  is  not  made  a  party  to  tlie 
suit,  such  heir  may  maintain  an  action  for 
the  whole  tract  and  recover  his  ali(]Uot 
part:  Walcott  v.  Hand  (1894),  122  Mo 
621,  27   S.   W.  .3.31. 

Where  an  action  for  tlie  recovery  of 
land  is  brought  by  three  plaintiffs  jointly, 
and  the  evidence  does  not  show  title  in  all 
of  tlioni,  none  of  tlicin  are  entitled  to  re- 


cover: Towns  V.  Mathews  (1893),  91  Ga. 
546,  17  S.  E.  955  ;  McGlamory  v.  McCor- 
mick  (1896),  99  Ga.  148.  24  S.  E.  941.] 

1  Van  Wart  v.  Price,  14  Abb.  Pr.  4 
(note). 

^  [[California  and  Idaho  have  the  fol- 
lowing statute  :  "  All  persons  holding  as 
tenants  in  common,'  joint  tenants,  or  co- 
parceners, or  any  number  less  than  all, 
may  jointly  or  severally  commence  or 
defenci  any  civil  action  or  proceeding  for 
the  enforcement  or  protection  of  the  rights 
of  such  party."  California,  Code,  §  384 ; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3173. 

Utah  and  Montana  have  the  following 
statute:  "All  persons  holding  as  tenants 
in  common  or  as  joint  tenants,  or  any 
number  less  than  all,  may  jointly  or 
severally  commence  or  defend  any  civil 
action  or  proceeding  for  the  enforcement 
or  protection  of  the  rights  of  such  party. 
In  all  cases  one  tenant  in  common  or  joint 
tenant  can  sue  his  co-tenant."  Utah,  Rev. 
St.,  1898,  §  2919;  Montana,  Code,  §  586. 

The  Connecticut  statute  reads  as  fol- 
lows :  "  Any  joint  tenant  or  tenant  in 
common  of  land  may  maintain  an  action 
in  his  own  name  for  any  injury  thereto  ; 
but  the  non-joinder  of  the  other  tenants 
may  be  shown  by  tlie  defendant  in  reduc 
tion  of  damages,  and  the  plaintiff  shall 
only  recover  for  the  damage  to  his  in- 
terest."    Gen.  St.,   1902,  §  589. 

The  Georgia  Code,  §  4941,proviiles  that 
"a  tenant  in  common  need  not  join  hiu 
co-teuant,  but  may  sue  separately  for  his 


ACTIONS   BY    OWNEHS    OF   CHATTELS.  199 

of  them  may  sue,  and  in  like  manner  they  may  be  sued.^  Under 
this  statute  a  portion  of  the  co-owners  of  a  mine  were  suffered 
to  unite  in  an  action,  and  recover  possession  of  their  shares 
from  intruding  wrong-doers. ^ 

^  138.  *  2-1.  II.  Legal  Actions  by  Joint  Owners  of  Chattels. 
At  Common  Law.  Under  the  Codes.  The  ownership  of  chattels 
by  two  or  more  persons  is  quite  dilt'erent  in  its  incidents  from 
the  similar  ownership  of  lands,  and  it  must  be  described  rather 
than  defined.  It  is  not  a  joint  ownership  in  the  pure  common- 
law  signification  of  that  term,  since  it  does  not  involve  the  right 
of  survivorship;  there  is  no  survivorship  among  the  co-owners 
of  chattels,  whether  partners  or  not,  and  at  the  death  of  one  his 
interest  passes  to  his  personal  representatives.  On  the  other 
hand,  this  united  interest  of  the  co-proprietors  is  so  close  that  it 
cannot  be  separated  except  by  mutual  consent.  The  conmion 
law  provides  no  mode  of  partition.  The  right  of  either  co-owner 
may  be  transferred  by  any  valid  act  'biler  vivos,  and  it  may  be 
devolved  at  his  death ;  but  it  is  impossible  by  any  legal  compul- 
sory means  for  one  to  enforce  a  partition  against  his  fellow- 
owners,  even  when  such  a  division  would  be  physically  possible, 
unless  it  be  true,  as  said  in  one  case,  that  such  owner  may  manu- 
ally separate,  and  afterwards  hold  for  his  own  exclusive  use, 
when  the  chattels  themselves  are  capable  of  being  weighed  or 
measured,  so  that  an  accurate  division  can  be  easily  made,  —  as 
in  the  case  of  grain. ^  Even  in  the  settlement  of  a  partnership, 
the  only  judicial  mode  of  a  final  division  is  a  sale  of  all  the 
assets,  and  their  consequent  conversion  into  money,  which  is 
distributed  among  the  partners.     In  this  respect,  the  ownership 

interest,  and  the  jiulgineut  in  such  case  an  action  brought  to  recover  damages, 
affects  only  himself."  being  the  value  of  the  land  which  had 
In  Nevada  the  statute,  which  is  the  last  been  sold  on  a  judgment  obtained  by  the 
part  of  §  3109,  Coinp.  Laws,  1900,  reads  as  defendant,  which  judgment  had  been  sub- 
follows  :  "  Tenants  in  common,  joint  ten-  sennently  reversed  on  appeal.  If  one  of 
ants,  or  copartners,  or  any  number  less  the  co-owners  dies,  his  executor  or  ad- 
than  all,  may  jointly  or  severally  bring  or  ministrator  may  be  joined  with  the  other 
defend  or  continue  the  prosecution  or  co-owners  in  California, 
defence  of  any  action  for  the  enforcement  ^  Tri])p  v.  Kiley,  15  Barb.  333.  See 
of  the  rights  of  such  person  or  persons  "2  also  Channon  i;.  Lusk,  2  Lans.  213  ;  Stall 

1  See  last  preceding  note.  v.  "Wilbur,  77  N.  Y.  158,  164   (a  crop  of 

2  Goller  V.  Fett,  30  Cal.  481.  See  grain),  Lobdell  v.  Stowell,  37  How.  Tr. 
Touchard  v.  Keyes,  21  Cal.  202.  See  88  (grain);  and  see  Potter  v.  Xeal,  62 
also  Reynolds   v.    Hosmer,   45   Cal.    616,  How.  Tr.  158  (cattle). 

631.     The  statute*  was   held  to  apply  to 


200 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


of  chattels  by  two  or  more  persons  is  more  joint  in  its  nature  than 
the  joint  ownership  of  lands.  From  this  notion  of  the  oneness  of 
the  interest  residing  in  the  owners  of  things  personal,  it  follows 
that  a  joinder  of  all  in  any  actions  founded  upon  the  property  in 
the  chattels  is  even  more  necessary,  and  is  less  open  to  exception, 
than  in  the  case  of  an  ownership  of  land,  since  one  co-owner  of 
a  chattel  has  no  right  to  its  exclusive  possession  as  against  the 
others,  and  cannot  recover  its  possession  from  them  by  action 
analogous  to  replevin,^  or  its  value  in  actions  like  trover  or  tres- 
pass;^ and  since  a  direct  judicial  partition  of  the  interests  is 
unknown,  it  follows  by  the  clearest  logic  that  such  exclusive 
possession,  or  such  partition,  cannot  be  permitted  indirectly  by 
means  of  an  action  against  a  third  person  in  the  name  of  one  co- 
owner,  the  result  of  which,  if  successful,  would  be  to  give  him 
an  exclusive,  or  an  apparently  exclusive,  right.  When  the 
object  of  the  property  is  land,  the  interest  of  each  co-owner  is 
regarded  as  separate  fur  all  furjioses  except  possession ;  and,  in 
strict  accordance  with  this  notion,  he  is  permitted  to  sue  alone, 
to  recover  his  undivided  part  of  the  land,  or  his  part  of  the  rent 
payable  for  the  use  of  it;  but  when  the  object  of  the  property  is 


^  Q"  One  tenant  in  common  cannot 
maintain  replevin  for  the  possession  of 
any  of  the  common  property  against  his 
cotenant,  nor  against  one  in  possession  of 
the  property  as  the  joint  agent  of  the 
tenants  in  common  :  "  Smith-McCord  Dry- 
Goods  Co.  r.  Burke  (1901),  63  Kan.  "40, 
06  Pac.  10-36/]  Cross  u.  Hulett,  53  Mo. 
397;  Mills  v.  Malott,  43  Ind.  248,  251; 
Davis  V.  Lottich,  46  N.  Y.  393 ;  Balch  c. 
.Jones,  61  Cal.  234;  Bowen  v.  Roach,  78 
Ind  361  ;  Spooner  v.  Ross,  24  Mo.  App. 
599;  Carle  v.  W^all  (Ark.  1891).  16  S.  W. 
293.  As  to  suits  by  one  co-owner  of  chat- 
tels against  the  other  for  a  conversion, 
see  Hewlett  v.  Owens,  51  Cal  570;  Stall 
V.  Wilbur,  77  N.  Y.  158  in  last  note. 

2  (^But  see  Sullivan  v.  Sherry  (1901), 
111  Wis.  476,  87  N.  W.  471.  where  the 
court  said  :  "  The  general  rule  is  that  one 
tenant  in  common  cannot  maintain  tres- 
pass or  trover  against  his  cotenant  or  the 
lalter's  licensee  of  the  joint  proj)erty  in 
respect  thereto.  The  trial  court,  supposing 
that  such  rule  was  controlling  in  this  ca.se, 
sustained  the  demurrer.  It  is  not  infre- 
«jueut  that  courts  are  misled  into  giving  a 


general  the  effect  of  a  universal  rule. 
There  are  but  few  of  the  former  that  are 
not  subject  to  exceptions  as  well  estab- 
lished and  important  as  the  general  prin- 
ciple ;  and  the  rule  in  question  does  not 
belong  to  that  few.  It  is  subject  to  sev- 
eral exceptions,  one  being  that  if  a  co- 
tenant  or  his  licensee  destroys  the  common 
property  or  converts  it  to  his  own  use,  he 
may  be  sued  in  trespass  or  trover  to  re- 
dress the  wrong  wherever  such  a  remedy 
would  exist  in  the  absence  of  the  relation- 
ship between  cotenants  .  .  .  The  author- 
ities clearly  indicate  that  the  exception 
we  have  stated  to  the  general  rule  is  not  a 
modern  creation.  It  has  been  recognized, 
by  courts  and  law  writers  at  least  from 
the  time  of  the  Year  Books."  So  in  Wood 
V.  Steina  (1896),  9  S.  I).  110,  68  N.  W. 
160,  it  was  held  that  a  tenant  in  common 
of  chattels  may  maintain  trover  against 
his  co-tenant  who  appropriates  them  to 
his  own  use  so  as  to  render  any  future 
enjoyment  on  the  part  of  the  complaining 
tenant  impossible]  See  Schouler  Pera. 
Prop.  200;  compare  Waller  v.  Bowling, 
108  N.  C.  289,  and  cases  cited. 


ACTIONS    BY   OWNERS    OF   CHATTELS,  201 

a  chattel  or  chattels,  the  interest  of  all  the  owners  is  conceived 
of  as  a  unit,  both  in  respect  to  the  right  of  proprietorship  and  to 
the  possession,  and  a  single  one  cannot  sue  for  his  part  of  the 
thing  itself,  nor  for  his  share  of  the  profits  payable  for  its  use,  or 
of  its  value  if  it  be  taken,  converted,  or  sold,  or  of  the  damages 
if  it  be  injured;  all  must  join  so  as  to  represent  this  unity  of 
interest.^  These  general  doctrines,  which  were  fully  settled  in 
the  common  law,  are  unchanged  by  the  new  procedure,  as  will 
appear  from  the  rules  established  by  the  following  cases. 

§  139.  *  222.  Code  Decisions.  Part-Owners  of  Ships.  The 
part-owners  of  ships  and  other  vessels  are  jointly  interested, 
80  far  as  concerns  the  maintaining  of  actions  touching  the  prop- 
erty in  them  or  their  use,  and  must  all  unite  in  such  actions; 
as,  for  example,  in  a  suit  to  recover  freight,  whether  from  the 
shipper  or  from  a  person  to  whom  it  has  been  paid  by  the  shipper.^ 
It  would  seem,  however,  that  a  portion,  one  or  more,  of  such 
owners  may  sue  when  the  residue  refuse  to  join  as  plaintiffs,  by 
making  such  dissentients  defendants,  and  inserting  appropriate 
averments  in  the  complaint  or  petition ;  this  course  is  certainly 
proper  if  full  effect  is  to  be  given  to  the  provisions  of  the  codes 
regulating  this  particular  subject,  and  they  are  not  to  be  re- 
stricted in  their  application  to  equitable  actions.^  Under  peculiar 
circumstances,  a  portion  of  the  part-owners  have  been  suffered 
to  maintain  an  action  of  a  similar  general  nature  without  even 
making  the  others  defendants,  as  stated  in  the  foot-note.* 

§  140.  *  223.  Joint  Owners  of  Chattels.  It  is  clearly  the  rule, 
established  under  the  new  system  as  well  as  under  the  old,  that, 
properly,  all  the  owners  of  a  chattel,  whether  partners  or  not, 
must  join  in  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  done  to 

^  QCinfel  r.  Malena  (1903),  —  Neb. — ,  the  action  without  joining  the  other  co- 

93  N.  W.  165.]  owner.      This   reason    given    for   the  de- 

^  Merritt  v.  Walsh,  32  N.  Y.  685  ;  Don-  cisiou   was  clearly  wrong.     The  decision 

nell  V.  Walsh,  33  N.  Y.  43,  6  Bosw.  621.  would  have  been  in  exact  conformity  with 

3  Coster  V.  New  York  &  Erie  11.  Co.,  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the  code  if 

5  Duer,  677,  3  Abb.  Pr.  332.  McL.  had  been  made  a  defendant,  and  the 

*  Bishop  r.  Kdmiston,  16  Abb.  Pr.  466  facts  in  regard  to  him  had  been  alleged. 

(G.  T.).    The  two  plaintiffs  and  one  McL.  In  Peck  v.  McLean,  36  Minn.  228,  one  of 

owned  a  ship.     It  was  insured  and  lost,  the   part-owners  of  a  certain  vessel  was 

and   defendant    collected    the    insurance  allowed  to  sue  alone,  without  joining  her 

money.      He  had  settled  with   McL.  for  co-owners  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defend- 

the  latter's  share,  and  the  plaintiffs  sue  ants;    since  they  could   not  be  joined  as 

for  their  shares.    The  court  held  that  they  defendants,  being  out  of  the  jurisdiction, 

were  tenants  in  common,  and  could  bring  and  refused  to  join  as  plaintiffs. 


202 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


it,^  or  for  a  wrongful  taking  or  conversion  of  it,^  or  to  recover 
its  possession.^  This  rule  is  so  firmly  settled  that  nothing  less 
than  an  express  contract  in  reference  to  the  chattel  with  one  of 
the  co-owners  in  his  own  name,  by  which  promises  are  made 
directly  to  him,  will  suffice  to  permit  a  severance.  In  such  a 
case,  while  he  may  sue  alone,  in  virtue  of  the  express  under- 
taking to  and  with  him,*  3'et  all  the  others  may,  if  they  so  elect, 
join  with  him  in  an  action  on  the  contract:  for  example,  a  sale 
of  the  chattel  and  a  promise  to  pay  the  price. ^ 


1  Wells  V.  Cone,  55  Barb.  585  ;  Hays  v. 
Crist,  4  Kan.  350.  See  also  Swarthout 
v.  Chicago,  &c.  R.  Co.,  49  Wis.  625  ;  Pratt 
i;.  Radford,  52  id.  114.  [[vSuininers  v. 
Heard  (1899),  66  Ark.  5.50,  .50  S.  W.  78  : 
Where  partnership  property  is  seized  on 
execution  ajjaiust  one  of  tlie  partners,  an 
action  for  damages  suffered  by  reason  of 
the  loss  of  the  equity  to  have  the  assets 
of  the  firm  applied  to  tlie  payment  of  the 
joint  debts  contracted  on  account  of  the 
partnership,  should  be  brought  by  both 
partners,  but  tliis"  defect  of  parties  is 
waived  by  failure  to  take  advantage  of  it 
by  demurrer  or  answer.] 

2  Gock  V.  Keneda,  29  Barb.  120.  See 
also  Fullerr.  Fuller,  5  Hun,  595;  Keeder 
V.  bayre,  70  N.  Y.  ISO,  181,  190;  Spalding 
i".  Black,  22  Kan.  55 ;  State  v.  True,  25 
Mo.  A  pp.  451 ;  Welch  v.  Sackett,  12  Wis. 
24.3  ;  but  see  Soule  v.  Mogg,  35  Ilun,  79  ; 
as  to  action  by  one  co-owner  against  an- 
other for  conversion,  see  Stall  c.  Wilbur, 
77  N.  Y.  158;  Hewlett  v.  Owens,  51  Cal. 
570;  see  ante,  §  *221,  and  cases  cited. 
In  accordance  with  the  principle  of  these 
cases,  it  was  held  in  Soule  i\  Mogg, 
35  Hun,  79,  that  an  ownerin-commou  of 
property  separable  by  weight  or  measure 
—  in  that  case,  money — might  maintain 
a  separate  action  for  its  conversion  by  a 
third  party,  as  well  as  for  its  conversion 
by  a  co-owner. 

^But  see  Balletine  i-.  Joplin  (1898),  105 
Ky.  70,  48  S.  W.  417,  where  it  was  held 
that  where  one  mortgaged  as  his  own  a 
marc  which  another  owned  jointly  with 
him,  the  mortgagee  and  the  purchaser  at 
a  sale  whiili  he  procured  to  be  made  under 
attachment  are  liable  to  tlie  other  joint 
owner  as  for  a  conversion  of  his  interest. 
Aii'l  Holey  c.  Allred  (1903),  25  Utali,  402, 


71  Pac.  869,  where  it  was  held  that  under 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2919,  the  owner  of  an 
undivided  half  interest  in  personal  prop- 
erty may  maintain  an  actiun  for  con- 
version without  joining  his  co-owner  as 
either  plaintiff  or  defendant,  and  the 
complaint  need  not  state  who  owns  the 
other  lialf. 

Holders  of  mortgage  liens  upon  chattels, 
created  by  different  mortgages  filed  at 
different  times,  have  such  a  joint  interest 
in  such  chattels  as  to  properly  join  in  an 
action  against  a  sheriff  for  conversion, 
such  property  being  in  their  joint  posses- 
sion:  Trompen  v.  Yates  (1902),  —  Xeb. 
— ,  92  N.  W.  647.] 

'  [[Vermont  Loan  &  Trust  Co  v.  Car- 
din  (1898),  19  Wash.  304,  53  Pac.  164; 
Miller  v.  Crigler  (1899),  83  Mo.  App. 
395.  See  also  Trompen  v.  Yates  (1902), 
—  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  647,  where  it  was 
held  that  "  Mortgagees  holding  mortgages 
of  various  priority  on  the  same  goods  who 
are  jointly  in  possession  of  them,  may 
join  in  an  action  against  the  sheriff  for 
depriving  tliem  of  possession  and  con- 
verting the  goods  to  his  own  use."  (Syl- 
labus iiy  the  court.)]  Bush  v.  Groom, 
9  Bush,  675,  678  ;  Luke  v.  Marshall,  5  ,1.  J. 
Marsh.  356.  See  also  Russell  v.  Lermon, 
39  Wis.  570.  Contni,  Stewart  v.  Brown, 
37  N.  Y.  350;  Seip  i-.  Tilghman,  23  Kan. 
289 ;  contra,  joint  owners  sliould  unite  in 
action  to  recover  property  exempt  from 
execution:  here,  however,  the  nonjoinder 
had  been  waived. 

*  .Justice  I'.  Pliillips,  3  Bush,  200. 

*  Silliman  v.  Tuttle,  45  Barb,  171.  Ac- 
tion by  all  the  co-owners  where  a  sale 
had  been  made,  as  in  tlie  last  preceding 
case,  by  one  of  them  alone. 


ACTIONS    BY   OWNKKS    OF   CllATTKLS.  203 

§  141.  *  224.  Surviving  Partners.  The  new  procedure  has 
not,  in  general,  changed  the  former  rules  as  to  the  rights  and 
powers  of  surviving  partners  when  one  or  more  of  the  firm 
Jiave  died.  Now,  as  before,  the  surviving  partner  or  partners 
have  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  firm  assets,  for  the  purpose 
of  paying  its  debts  and  settling  its  affairs.  They  alone  can 
prosecute  all  actions  of  a  legal  nature,  to  recover  debts,  or 
the  possession  of  property,  or  its  value,  or  damages  for  its  wrong- 
ful conversion  or  misuse.  The  remedy  on  all  rights  of  action 
held  by  or  due  to  the  firm  is  to  be  pursued  in  their  names,  and 
the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased  member  or  members 
cannot  be  joined  in  such  actions  by  virtue  of  any  interest  which 
they  may  have  in  the  proceeds,  and  in  the  final  winding  up  of 
the  partnership  accounts. ^  This  doctrine,  however,  does  not 
mean  that  every  thing  in  action,  belonging  to  the  firm  at  the 
time  of  the  death  of  a  member,  must  invariably  be  enforced  by 
the  survivor,  or  not  at  all;  he  is  simply  the  proper  and  only 
person  to  sue,  as  long  as  the  thing  in  action  or  other  personal 
property  remains  a  part  of  the  firm  assets. ^  The  survivor  may 
assign  such  a  firm  asset,  and  the  assignee  would  thereupon  be 
entitled  to  sue  in  his  own  name,  as  in  the  case  of  any  other 
assignment.  When,  therefore,  a  surviving  partner  had  trans- 
ferred a  firm  demand  to  the  administrator  of  the  deceased  partner, 
such  administrator  would  be  alone  able  to  enforce  the  collection 
by  suit  in  his  own  name,  not,  however,  by  virtue  of  his  original 
representative  capacity,  but  only  in  his  character  as  assignee.'' 

§  142.  '  225.  Extreme  Limits  to  which  some  Courts  have 
carried  Doctrine  as  to  Joint  Rights.  The  rule  that  all  the  CO- 
owners  of  a  chattel  must  unite  in  any  action  founded  upon  the 
property  in  it   has   been  pushed   by  some  of   the  courts    to   its 


^  QSee  Mcintosh  i'.  Zaring  (1897),  150  only  be  maintained  by  the  personal  repre- 

Ind.  301,  49  N.  E.  164,  set  out  at  length  iu  sentative  of  the  deceased  partner.] 
note  to  §  *211,  a»;e.     But  see,  also,  Hard-  »  Roys  r.  Vilas,   18   Wis.    169;  Brown 

wood  Log  Co.  V.  Coffin   (1902),  130  N.  C.  v.  Allen,  3.5  Iowa,   306,    311.     See,   also, 

432,  41  S.  E.  931,  where  it  is  said  that  the  especially,  Robinson   i'.  Hintrager  (Iowa), 

personal  representative  should  be  made  a  36  Fed.  Rep.  752,  per   Shiras  J.,  p.  756 

party. 3  Hargadine  v.  Gibbons,  45  Mo.  App.  460, 

■•^  [jK'obertson  r.  Burrell  (1895),  110  Cal.  per   Thompson   J.,    and    numerous    cases 

568,  42  Pac.  1086:  The  heirs  of  a  deceased  cited;  8    C.   (Mo.    Sup.   1893),    21    S.   W. 

partner  are  not  proper  parties  to  bring  an  726;  Crook  v.  TuU  (Mo.  Sup.  1892),  20 

action  for  an  accounting  iu  respect  to  the  S.    W.    8  ;    State  v.  Stratton    (Mo.   Sup. 

partnership  property,  but  such  action  can  1892),  19  S.  W.  803. 


204  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

extreme  limits,  —  to  the  extent,  as  it  seems  to  me,  in  fact,  of 
nullifying  an  express  and  very  salutary  provision  of  the  reform 
legislation.  I  have  already  discussed  the  general  principle  of 
interpretation  referred  to  with  sufficient  fulness,^  and  shall 
simply  state  the  additional  decisions,  without  further  comment. 
When,  in  the  case  of  partners  or  other  joint  owners  of  personal 
property,  one  of  them  is  legally  disabled,  V)y  means  of  some  act 
of  his  own,  from  asserting  or  maintaining  any  right  in  himself, 
or,  in  other  words,  when  he  has  put  himself  in  such  a  condition 
that,  if  he  were  the  sole  owner,  he  would  not  have  a  right  of 
action  in  reference  to  the  property,  it  has  been  held  that  all  the 
partners  or  co-owners  cannot  prosecute  an  action  in  their  joint 
names,  even  in  respect  of  the  interest  of  those  who  have  done  no 
acts  impairing  their  individual  rights.  It  is  said  that,  as  the 
right  of  action  is  essentially  and  completely  joint,  and  as  there- 
fore all  the  co-owners  must  be  able  to  sue,  this  unity  of  interest 
cannot  be  severed  and  a  recovery  permitted  for  that  share  of  the 
interest  which,  as  between  themselves,  belongs  to  the  innocent 
rather  than  to  the  guilty  owners.  Upon  the  same  principle,  and 
applying  in  the  like  manner  the  rigid  doctrine  of  an  absolute 
unity  of  right  among  the  co-owners  of  chattels,  the  one  who  had 
done  no  act  affecting  his  individual  interest  cannot  sue,  in 
respect  of  that  interest,  to  recover  the  portion  of  the  entire 
demand  due  to  himself  by  making  the  others  defendants.^  It  is 
plain  from  the  propositions  contained  in  this  subdivision,  and 
from  the  cases  cited  in  their  support,  that  the  courts  have  made 
no  substantial  changes,  as  results  of  the  reformatory  legislation, 
in  the  rules  concerning  the  parties  plaintiff  in  actions  by  the  co- 
owners  of  personal  property. 

§  143.  *  226.  m.  Legal  Actions  by  Persons  having  Joint  Rights 
arising  from  Contract.  Tlie  general  effect  of  the  provisions  con- 
tained in  the  codes  upon  the  common-law  doctrines  respecting 
joint  rights  of  action  has  already  been  discussed  with  sufficient 

1  See  supra,   §§   *221-»223,  and  cases  Allen,  13  N.  Y.  173;  Tripp  v.  Riley.  15 

cited.  Barb.  333.     See    Hill  v.   Marsh,  46"lud. 

^  Estabrook  t;.   Messersmith,   18   Wis.  218.     The   case  of  P^stabrook   r.  Messer- 

545  ;    Frans    v.    Young,    24    Iowa,   375 ;  smith,  cited  above  in  ihi.s  note,  has  been 

Nightingale  u.  Scannell,  6  Cal.   506;  and  severely    criticised,   and    its    correctness 

see  Kainey  v.  Smizer,  28  Mo.  310;  Clark  que.'»tioned,  in  Viles  v.  Bangs,  36  Wis  131, 

r.  Cable,  21  Mo.  223  ;    Andrews   v.   Moke-  139,  140,  per  Cole  J. 
lumiie    Hill  Co.,   7    Cal.   330;  Kussell    v. 


JOINT    ACTIONS    ON    CONTRACT.  205 

fulness,  and  I  shall  simply  add  to  that  discussion  some  examples 
and  illustrations  furnished  by  the  decided  cases.  It  was  shown 
that  the  ancient  rule,  requiring  all  the  joint  obligees,  covenantees, 
and  promisees  to  unite  in  actions  brought  upon  their  contracts, 
had  not  been  abrogated,  and  only  modified  perhaps  in  the  single 
particular  of  permitting  parties  to  be  made  defendants  who  refuse 
to  join  as  plaintiffs.  The  doctrine  of  equity  in  this  respect  was 
substantially  the  same  as  that  of  the  law,  and  demanded  a  union 
of  all  joint  claimants  to  prosecute  their  joint  right  by  a  suit  in 
chancery.  When  the  doctrine  of  equity  was  made  statutory,  and 
was  applied  to  all  classes  of  actions,  it  therefore  wrought  no 
change  in  the  practical  rules.  Of  course  these  provisions  of  the 
codes  as  to  parties  have  not  of  themselves  altered  in  any  manner 
the  principles  which  the  common  law  had  established  for  deter- 
mining whether  a  right  created  by  any  contract  is  joint  or 
several.  In  actions  ex  contractu^  all  the  persons  having  a  joint 
interest  must  be  made  plaintiffs,  and,  when  one  of  them  dies, 
the  action  must  be  brought  or  must  proceed  in  the  names  of  the 
survivors,  the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased  obligee 
or  promisee  cannot  be  joined  as  co-plaintiffs;  and  in  the  same 
manner,  in  actions  ex  delicto  for  injuries  to  personal  property,  all 
the  joint  owners  must  unite,  and,  if  one  of  them  dies,  the  action 
is  to  be  prosecuted  by  the  survivors  alone.  These  common-law 
rules  remain  in  full  force.  ^     It  has  been  held  that  two  or  more 

'  QMcIntosh  V.  Zaring  (1897),  150  Ind.  cannot  maintain  an  action  thereon  in  his 
501,  49  N.  E.  164,  quoting  the  text.]  In-  own  name  witiiont  joining  the  other 
diana,  B.  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Adam.son,  114  owner,  though  the  note  is  payable  to 
Ind.  282  ;  Bucknam  v.  Brett,  35  Barb,  bearer  and  is  in  his  possession).  All  per- 
596;  13  Abb.  Pr.  119;  Daby  r.  Ericsson,  sons  entitled  to  shares  in  the  same  debt 
45  N.  Y.  786.  The  survivor  was  held  to  may  join  in  an  action  to  recover  it,  e.  g. 
be  the  proper  party  to  sue,  although,  by  assignees  of  different  portions.  Brett  v. 
an  arrangement  between  him.self  and  the  First  Univ.  Soc.  of  Brooiilyn,  5  Hun,  149. 
representatives  of  the  estate  of  the  de-  Where  the  wards  should  be  joined  as  co- 
ceased,  the  proceeds  were  to  belong  e.\-  plaintiffs  in  a  suit  by  a  new  guardian  on 
clusively  to  them,  and  he  disclaimed  all  tlie  former  guardian's  bond,  see  Wilson 
interest  therein.  See  also  Carrere  v.  v.  Houston,  76  N.  C.  375. 
Spofford,  15  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  47,  48,  49.  |[See,  however,  Hardwood  Log  Co.  v. 
That  all  joint  creditors  or  promi.sees  must  Coffin  (1902),  130  N.  C.  432,  41  S.  E.  931, 
join  as  plaintiffs,  see  Porter  v.  Fletcher,  in  which  it  is  held  that  where  a  firm  is  a 
25  Minn.  493;  McConnell  v.  Brayner,  63  party  jdaintiff,  and  a  member  of  the  firm 
Mo.  461  ;  Marie  v.  Garrison,  83  X.  Y.  14,  dies,  his  personal  representative  should  be 
29;  Tinkler  v.  Swaynie,  71  Ind.  562;  made  a. party.  Jameson  y.  Bartlett  (1902), 
Henry  c.  Mt.  Pleasant  Tp.,  70  Mo.  500;  63  Neb.  638,  88  N.  W.  860:  "Where 
Lyford  r.  No.  Pac.  C.  R  Co.,  92  Cal.  93 ;  one  of  .several  plaintiffs  or  defendants 
McNamee  v.  Carpenter,  56  Iowa,  276  (one  dies,  in  an  action  pending  in  this  court  on 
of  two  joiut  owners  of  a  promis.-^ory  note  error,  the  right  of  arlion,  if  it  survives  ta 


206 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


obligees  in  an  injunction  undertaking,  although  their  interests 
were  entirely  separate,  and  no  joint  claim  for  damages  existed, 
may  unite  in  an  action  upon  it;^  but  in  another  similar  case, 
where  the  action  was  joint  in  form,  the  recovery  was  limited  to 
the  damages  suffered  by  the  plaintiffs  jointly,  and  they  were  not 
permitted  to  show  what  each  had  separately  sustained. ^  In  an 
action  on  a  penal  bond  running  to  several  persons  jointly,  the 
common-law  rule  required  all  the  obligees  to  be  made  plaintiffs, 
although  the  condition  avus  to  perform  distinct  acts  for  the 
benefit  of  the  obligees  severally.^     When  a  deed  of  conveyance 


or  against  the  remaining  parties,  may  be 
enforced  without  bringing  tlie  representa- 
tive or  successor  of  the  deceased  party  into 
the  case."] 

1  Loomis  V.  Brown,  16  Barb.  325.  See 
opinion  of  Gridley  J.  The  decision 
was  not  placed  upon  the  ground  that 
the  plaintiffs'  rights  were  joint.  It  was 
considered  that  the  code  permitted  a  union 
of  plaintiffs  in  legal  actions,  which  was 
not  possible  at  the  common  law.  Q"  A 
contract  entered  into  and  performed  jointly 
by  two  or  more  persons,  the  c'>mpen- 
sation  for  the  performance  of  wliich  is 
separate  and  distinct  as  to  each  of  such 
person.-?,  may  be  sued  upon  separately  by 
each  of  them,  to  recover  tlie  amount  due 
to  him  or  the  damages  sustained  by 
him:"  Curry  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897),  58 
Kan.  6,  48  Pac.  579.  See,  to  the  same 
effect,  Mcintosh  v.  Zaring  (1897),  150  lud. 
.301,  49  N.  K.  164.  In  the  enforcement  of 
a  joint  contract  all  mu.st  jo<n :  Slaughter 
V.  Davenport  (1891)),  151  Mo  26,  51  S.  W. 
471, 

Where  a  contract  ig  made  by  a  carrier 
with  a  funeral  party  juiuMy  to  hold  a  train 
for  them,  each  member  of  tlie  party  has  a 
separate  cause  of  action  for  the  breach  of 
the  contract :  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
shall (1901),  1 1 1  Ky.  560,  64  S.  W.  418,  fol- 
lowing Baughman  v.  Hailroad  Co.,  94  Ky. 
150. 

In  a  joint  action  by  several  plaintiffs, 
if  the  evidence  shows  that  at  least  part  of 
them  cannot  recover,  a  verdict  for  tlie 
defendant  must  result:  Medlock  r.  Merritt 
(1897),  102  Ga.  212,  29  S.  E.  185.] 

^  Fowler  v.  Frisbie,  37  Cal.  34.  A 
number  of  persons  were  in  possession  of 
laud,  not  jointly,  nor  in  common,  but  each 


possessing  and  cultivating  a  separate  par- 
cel of  the  whole.  An  action  was  brought 
to  recover  the  entire  tract,  and,  by  the 
provisions  of  the  California  statute  re- 
ferred to  in  a  preceding  paragraph,  all 
these  occupants  were  made  defendants. 
An  injunction  was  granted  restraining 
them  all  from  interfering,  etc.  with  the 
crops,  and  the  ordinary  undertaking  was 
given  to  them.  The  persons  thus  enjoined 
bring  this  action  on  the  undertaking ;  and 
the  rule  stated  in  the  text  was  expressly 
lai<l  down  by  the  court.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  reconcile  these  two  cases. 

3  Pearce  v.  Hitchcock,  2  N.  Y.  388,  per 
Jewett  C.  J.  See  also  Koeniger  v.  Creed, 
58  lud.  554;  Thomas  v.  Irwin,  90  Ind. 
557  ;  McLeod  v.  Scott,  38  Ark.  72.  See, 
however,  Sprague  v.  Wells,  47  Minn.  504; 
Alexander  v.  Jacoby,  23  Ohio  St.  358,  383. 
Vandermulen  i'.  Vandermulen,  108  N.  Y. 
195,  204,  was  an  action  on  a  covenant  run- 
ning to  several  persons  jointly,  conditioned 
to  pay  distinct  amounts  for  the  benefit  of 
tlie  covenantees  severally.  It  was  held  that 
a. separate  action  was  maintainable  by  each 
of  the  covenantees ;  and,  strangely  enough, 
Pearce  r.  Hitchcock  was  cited  as  authority 
for  this  ruling.  The  learned  judge  ap- 
jioars  to  have  overlooked  the  fact  tiiat  the 
actual  decision  in  Pearce  r.  Hitchcock, 
which,  contrary  lo  the  common-law  rule 
tliere  stated,  allowed  separate  actions  by 
the  obligees,  was  based  entirely  on  the 
statute  relating  to  attachment  bonds. 
[[Where  an  attachment  bond  is  made  to 
two  jointly,  both  are  necessary  parties  to 
an  action  for  the  full  amount  of  the  bond: 
King  V.  Kehoe  (1894),  91  la.  91,  58  N.  W. 
1071.] 


JOINT   ACTIONS    ON    CONTRACT, 


207 


of  land  is  given  to  two  or  more  grantees,  the  implied  covenants 
of  title,  if  there  be  any,  are  joint,  and  give  only  a  joint  right  of 
action,  so  that  one  of  the  grantees  cannot  sue  alone  for  a  breach.^ 
This  is  a  reaffirmance  of  the  rule  applicable  to  the  same  circum- 
stances under  the  common  law.^ 

§  144.  *  227.  Same  Subject.  Illustrations.  It  has  been  said, 
in  a  decision  made  since  the  code,  that  in  an  action,  whether 
legal  or  equitable,  by  a  firm,  all  the  partners,  even  those  (hat  are 
dormant,  must  unite  as  plaintiffs ;  ^  but  this  case  can  hardly  be 


1  Lawrence  v.  Montgomery,  37  Cal. 
183. 

2  [[Proctor  V.  Georgia  Ins.  Co.  (1899), 
124  N.  C.  265,  32  S.  E.  716  :  A  mortgagor 
of  realty  took  out  a  fire  insurance  policy, 
expressed  to  be  paid  to  the  plaintiff  (the 
mortgagee)  and  assured,  "  as  their  inter- 
ests may  appear."  Held  that  the  mort- 
gagor is  a  necessary  party. 

Ermeutrout  v.  American  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
(1895),  60  Minn.  418,  62  N.  W.  543  :  The 
owner  of  certain  property  took  out  a 
policy  of  insurance  upon  the  same,  the 
loss  to  be  paid  to  the  assignee  of  the 
mortgagee  "  as  interest  may  appear,"  said 
assignee  being  named  in  the  policy.  After 
the  loss  the  said  assignee  assigned  all  his 
interest  under  the  policy  to  a  third  party, 
and  it  was  held  that  the  third  party  and 
the  owner  might  properly  be  joined  in  an 
action  upon  the  policy.]  The  defendant, 
C,  entered  into  a  contract  with  the  plain- 
tiff, D.,  for  the  construction  of  a  building 
upon  a  lot  belonging  to  them,  upon  which 
the  other  plaintiff,  S.,  held  a  mortgage  ; 
and  for  the  faithful  performance  of  the 
contract  C.  gave  his  bond  to  S.  for  the 
benefit  of  all  the  plaintiffs;  in  an  action 
for  a  breach  of  the  bond  it  was  held  that 
both  mortgagor  and  mortgagee  were 
properly  joined  as  plaintiffs.  Daley  ;'. 
Cunningham,  60  Cal.  530.  Where  an  in- 
surance policy  is  made  payable  to  the 
mortgagee  of  the  property  "  to  the  extent 
of  his  interest,"  or  ''  as  his  interest  may 
appear,"  the  mortgagor  and  mortgagee 
may  join  in  suing  on  the  policy,  as  they 
have  a  common  interest  in  enforcing  the 
contract :  Winne  r.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co., 
91  N.  Y.  185  ;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oilman, 
112  Ind.  7.  When,  in  such  a  case,  the 
mortgage  debt,  after  the  loss  becomes  pay- 


able, is  greater  than  the  sum  insured  the 
mortgagee  may  sue  alone.  Hammel  v. 
Queen  Ins.  Co.,  50  Wis.  240;  Travelers' 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Cal.  Ins.  Co.,  1  N.  D.  151. 
Where,  bowever,  the  interest  of  the  mort- 
gagee in  the  premises  insured  has  ended, 
be  is  no  longer  a  proper  party,  either 
plaintiff  or  defendant.  So  held  in  Great 
W.  Compound  Co.  v.  JEtna  Ins.  Co.,  40 
Wis.  373.  See,  however,  ante,  §  *139, 
and  cases  cited.  A  policy  having  been 
assigned  by  the  assured  to  his  mortgagees 
as  collateral  security,  the  assured,  it  has 
been  held,  was  pro])erly  joined  as  co- 
plaintiff  with  the  assignees,  although 
he  had,  by  alienation  of  the  property, 
rendered  the  policy  void  except  as  to  the 
interest  of  his  assignees;  to  this  extent 
he  was  interested,  as  payment  of  the  loss 
to  them  would  inure  to  his  benefit:  Boyn- 
ton  V.  Clinton,  etc.  Ins.  Co.,  16  Barb.  254 
(these  plaintiffs,  it  was  said,  could  not 
have  been  joined  at  common  law).  Contra, 
Michael  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  17 
Mo.  App.  23. 

3  Secor  V.  Keller,  4  Duer,  416.  See 
Beudel  v.  Hettrick,  45  How.  Pr.  198; 
Lewis  V.  Greider,  51  N.  Y.  231 ;  49  Barb. 
606.  That  dormant  partners  need  not 
be  joined,  see  Piatt  v.  Iron  Exch.  Bk. 
(Wis.   1892),  53  N.   W.  737. 

Qln  Williams  i\  Southern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1895),  110  Cal.  457,  42  Pac.  974,  plaintiff 
brought  an  action  to  recover  compensation 
for  certain  work  which  he  alleged  was 
done  by  him  at  defendant's  request.  The 
answer  consisted  of  denials.  It  was  dis- 
closed by  the  evidence  that  the  contract 
was  made  by  the  plaintiff  in  behalf  of  a 
partnership  of  which  he  was  a  member 
and  was  executed  at  joint  expense. 
Thereupon   defeudiut  moved  for  a  non- 


208  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

regarded  as  correct,  for  it  was  well  settled  at  the  common  law 
that  dormant  partners  need  not  be  joined,  and  it  does  not  seem 
that  anything  in  the  code  has  changed  the  rule  in  this  particular. 
When  eleven  officers,  harbor  masters,  all  engaged  in  the  same 
duties,  and  each  entitled  to  an  equal  share,  one-eleventh  of  the 
total  fees,  made  an  agreement  by  which  one  of  them  undertook 
to  collect  all  the  fees,  and  to  account  for  and  pay  over  to  the 
other  ten  their  portions  of  the  same,  it  was  held  that  all  of  the 
ten  must  unite  in  an  action  brought  against  the  eleventh  to 
recover  from  him  the  amounts  due  to  them  which  he  had  re- 
ceived; one  could  not  sue  alone. ^  Persons  may  sometimes  be 
united  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  upon  a  written  contract,  even 
though  they  are  not  parties  thereto,  and  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment make  no  direct  reference  to  them,  if  they,  notwithstanding, 
have  an  actual  interest  jointly  with  the  ostensible  parties  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  contract,  and  in  the  cause  of  action  arising 
upon  it.'*  The  authorities  of  a  county  appropriated  $117,600  to 
procure  volunteers  to  fill  the  quota  of  the  county,  and  ordered 
$300  to  be  paid  as  bounty  to  each  volunteer  out  of  this  fund. 
Eighty-six  persons,  who  had  already  enlisted  in  the  military 
service,  agreed  with  the  county  officials  that,  in  consideration 
of  being  paid  said  bounty,  they  would  form  a  part  of  its  quota, 
and  they  were  thereupon  actually  enrolled  in  and  credited  to  the 

suit,  on  the  ground  that  one  partner  could  ship  name,  under  §  5011,  R.  S.,  and  one 

not  maintain  an  action  to  enforce  a  part-  of  the  partners  dies  while  it  is  pending, 

nership  demand,  which  motion  was  over-  the  action  cannot  go  on  in  the  name  of 

ruled.     On    appeal    the    ruling    was   ap-  the  partnership,  even  under  order  of  the 

proved.     The    court   said  :    "  We    are   of  court,  for  it   has  ceased  to  exist,  and  the 

opinion,  following  the  incontestable  trend  action    must    be  revived  and   proceed   in 

of  authority,  that  the  absence  sus  parties  the  name  of  the  representative  or  successor 

of  some  of  the  partners  from  a  complaint  of  the  firm,  and  the  court  held  further,  in 

by  one  or  more  of  them  on  a  partnership  the  same  case,  that  where  a  suit  is  brought 

<lemaud  does  not,  speaking  strictly,  affect  in  the  partnership  name, an  averment  as  to 

the  merits,  and  in  order  to  he  considered  who  the  partners  are  is  mere  surplusage, 

must  be  pleaded  by  the  defendant.     The  Citing  Winters  v.  Means,  50  Neb.  209,  and 

motion  for  nonsuit  was  therefore  properly  D.imond  v.  Bank,  70  Minn.  298.] 
denied."    Cases  are  cited  from  New  York,         i  Deau    ;;.    Cliamberlin,    6    Duer,   691. 

Minnesota  and  Missouri.  The   complaint,  stating   these   facts,  and 

As   to    actions    between    partners,   see  alleging   tliat   defendant    had   refused  to 

§  '104,  ante.  account  for  and   pay  over  to  the  single 

In  some  states  the  statute  permits  part-  plaintiff     his    sliare,    was    held    bad  ou 

nerships  to  sue  in   the   firm  name.     See  demurrer ;     all    should    have    joined    as 

§  •121,  ntite.   The  Supreme  Court  of  Ohio,  plaintiffs. 

in   Ph(i-nix   Ins.  Co.  v.  Carnahan    (1900),         '■^  Kutledge  v.  Curhiii,  10  Ohio  St.  478. 

6.3   O.   St.    25S,    58   N.    E.  80"),   lield  that  See  the   facts  and  opinion,  su/>ia,  §  *202. 

where  a  suit  is  cummeuced  in  the  partner-  Moore  v.  Jackson,  35  Ind.  SCO. 


JOINT   ACTIONS    ON    CONTRACT.  209 

number  of  volunteers  required  from  the  county.  The  bounty 
not  being  paid,  the  entire  eighty-six  united  in  an  action  demand- 
ing judgment  for  the  total  amount  of  their  bounties,  $25,800, 
and  the  action  was  held  to  be  properly  brought.^ 

§  145.  *  228.  Criticism  of  Cases  holding  that  a  Joint  Promisee 
cannot  be  made  a  Defendant.  The  COmmon-law  theory  of  joint 
right,  growing  out  of  contract,  equally  with  the  joint  right  aris- 
ing from  the  ownership  of  chattels,  has  been  carried  by  certain 
cases  so  far  that  manifest  injustice  has  been  done,  and  the  en- 
forcement of  conceded  rights  has  been  defeated,  in  order  that  the 
courts  should  not  depart  from  an  arbitrary  and  technical  rule. 
These  cases  have  held  that,  where  a  contract  is  made  by  or  with 
two  or  more  on  the  one  part,  so  that  a  joint  right  of  action  is 
held  by  them,  the  only  possible  action  is  one  brought  by  all,  if 
living;  that  one -of  them  cannot  sue  on  the  contract  making  his 
co-contractor  a  defendant,  with  proper  averments  in  the  pleading, 
whether  he  seeks  to  recover  the  whole  amount  due,  or  only  his 
own  individual  interest  therein,  and  though  the  co-contractor 
refuses  to  join  in  the  suit  for  any  reason,  even  if  the  latter  has 
been  paid  his  share. ^  I  have  already  discussed  this  topic  at  large, 
and  fully  expressed  my  opinion  upon  it.^  The  decisions  last 
mentioned,  and  the  rule  which  they  approve,  are  directly  opposed 
to  the  letter  of  the  codes,  which  makes  no  restriction  to  equitable 

1  Young  V.  Franklin  Cy.  Com'rs,  25  join  in  an  action  on  the  policy.  Kausal  v. 
Ind.  295,  299.  Each  plaintiff  was  only  Minn.  Farm.  Mat.  F.  Jus.  Ass'n,31  Minn, 
interested  to  the  extent  of  $.300.  There  17.  Sureties  who  have  paid  money  for 
was  no  joint  right  in  the  whole  fund,  their  principal  may  have  a  joint  action 
This  case  therefore  illustrates,  in  a  clear  for  the  whole  amount ;  or  each  may,  as 
manner,  the  proposition  heretofore  made,  before  the  code,  bring  a  separate  action 
—  that  the  code  admits  of  a  joinder  of  for  the  amount  he  has  paid :  Skiff  v. 
plairitiffs  in  instances  where  such  join-  Cross,  21  Iowa,  459.  Two  persons  were 
der  was  not  permitted  at  the  common  allowed  to  join  in  suing  a  common  carrier 
law.  for  the  value  of  a  chest,  their  joint  prop- 
For  a  single  premium  a  joint  policy  erty,  and  of  its  contents,  part  of  which 
of  insurance  was  issued  to  the  owner  of  was  the  property  of  one  plaintiff,  part  of 
a  building  and  to  the  owner  of  a  stock  of  the  other;  a  check  having  been  issued 
goods  therein,  neither  having  any  interest  to  them  jointly  for  the  transportation  of 
in  the  property  of  the  other,  except  as  it  the  chest  and  its  contents:  Anderson  i". 
arose  from  their  relation  as  husband  and  Wabash,  etc.  Ky.  Co.,  65  Iowa,  131. 
wife,  and  his  occupancy  of  her  store  build-  '^  Kainey  r.  Smizer,  28  Mo.  310;  Clark 
ing.  It  was  held,  that  they  properly  v.  Cable,  21  Mo.  223  ;  Andrews  v.  Moke- 
joined  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  on  the  lumiie  Hill  Co.,  7  Cal.  330 ;  Kyan  v. 
policy ;  Graves  v.  Merchants'  &  B.  Ins.  Co.,  Kiddle,  78  Mo.  521  ;  Hogendobler  v.  Lyon, 
82  Iowa,  637.     Property  of  a  married  man  12  Kans.  276. 

on  the  land  of  his  wife  was  insured  in  their  ^  See  supra,  §  *204,  and  notes,  and  Hill 

joint  names;  it  was  held  that  they  might  v.  Marsh,  46  Ind.  218. 

14 


210  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

suits,  and  are  in  violent  antagonism  with  the  evident  intent  of 
the  reformed  procedure.  It  was  said  hy  the  court,  in  one  case, 
that  if  an  action  by  one  of  the  creditors  was  permitted,  under  the 
circumstances  stated,  the  debtor  would  be  exposed  to  subsequent 
suits  and  recoveries  from  the  other  creditors.  This  remark  shows 
an  entire  misapprehension  of  the  meaning  and  purpose  of  the 
statutory  provision.  It  requires  the  dissenting  creditor  or  co- 
contractor,  who  refuses  to  be  a  plaintiff,  to  be  made  a  defendant, 
for  the  very  purpose  of  concluding  liim,  by  the  judgment,  from 
any  subsequent  prosecution  on  his  own  behalf.  He  is  added  as 
a  party,  and  "has  his  day  in  court,"  and  tliis  will  be  a  complete 
bar  to  a  future  attempt  on  his  own  part,  if  he  sliould  change  his 
mind.  No  possible  injustice  could  therefore  be  done  to  the 
defendant,  and  great  injustice  would  necessarily  be  done  to  the 
creditor  who  desires  to  enforce  his  lawful  demand,  if  the  utterly 
arbitrary  rule  sustained  by  these  and  similar  cases  should  be 
generally  approved  as  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  codes. 
The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  has  determined  that  an  action 
may  be  maintained  by  one  firm  against  another  firm  to  recover  a 
sum  ascertained  to  be  due,  although  the  two  partnerships  have  a 
common  member  who  is  made  a  defendant,  with  proper  aver- 
ments, in  the  complaint;  and  the  action  need  not  be  brought  for 
the  equitable  relief  of  an  accounting,  but  for  the  legal  relief  of 
an  ordinary  money  judgment.^ 

§  146.  *  229.  IV.  Legal  Actions  by  Persons  having  Several 
Rights  Arising  from  Contract.  As  the  principles  have  been  already 
stated  in  the  preliminary  discussions  of  this  section,  it  is  only 

^  Cole  y.  Reyiioliis,  18  N.  Y.  74.    [^Willis  it  was  deemed  absurd  to  permit  a  party 

V.  Barron  (1898),  143  Mo.  450,  4.')  S.   W.  to  be  both  a  plaintiff  and  a  defendant  in 

289.     The  court  said :  "  At  common  law  the  same  action,  and  for  the  further  rea- 

partnership  contracts  were  construed  to  he  son  that  until  the  jiartiier.'ship  affair.s  were 

joint  only,  not  joint  and  several.     As  a  adjudged  and  tlic  balance  struck  it  could 

consequence  of  this  rule  in  actions  by  or  not  be  said  one  partner  was  indebted  to 

afjainst  partners  it  was  nece-ssary  that  all  another.  .  .  .  l^ut   since  the   statute  now 

the  p:\rtners  should  join  as  plaintiffs  or  makes  the  note  the  several  contract  of  each 

Lc  joined  as  defendants.     A  further  con-  member   of   the   firm,    and    makes    each 

sequence  of  this  doctrine  was  tliat  a  part-  partner  liable  in  soliJo,  the  payee  is  no 

ner  could  not  sue  a  firm  of  which  he  was  Ion<rer  under  the  necessity  of  suing  him- 

a  member  on  a  note  executed  by  the  firm  self,  and  hence  so  far  as  the  question  of 

to  himself.   .  .  .   All  the  law  writers  and  j)arties  to  pleadings   is  concerned,  be  can 

all  tlk-  adjudged  cases  place  the  disability  sue  either  or  all    of   the    other    partners 

of  one  partner  to  sue  his   firm   upon   its  without  infringing  the  common-law   rule 

note  to  him  u[)on  the  ground  that  a  man  of  pleading."] 
cannot  contract  with  himself,  and  because 


SEVERAL   ACTIONS   ON    CONTRACT.  211 

necessary  to  add  some  further  illustrations  furnished  by  the 
decided  cases.  The  common-law  doctrine  in  respect  to  several 
rights  and  actions  does  not  seem  to  have  been  changed,  unless, 
possibly,  under  the  operation  of  the  equitable  rule  embodied  in 
the  codes,  plaintiffs  having  stricth^  several  rights  may  be  allowed 
to  unite  in  legal  actions,  under  circumstances  which  establish  a 
certain  community  of  interest  among  them,  although  under  the 
same  circumstances  they  would  have  had  no  such  election  at  the 
common  law.  There  is  at  least  a  tendency  shown  by  some  of 
the  decisions  towards  such  a  m.odification  of  the  rule  which 
formerly  prevailed  in  reference  to  several  rights  and  causes  of 
action.'  The  following  examples  will  serve  to  illustrate  the 
nature  of  several  rights,  and  the  doctrine  as  to  parties  plaintiff 
in  suits  brought  to  enforce  them.  Tenants  in  common  of  a  tract 
of  land,  who  hold  their  titles  by  different  conveyances  from  the 
same  grantor,  each  of  which  contains  covenants  relating  to  the 
land  and  its  use,  cannot  unite  in  an  action  brought  against 
the  grantor  to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of  such  covenants; 
their  interests  under  the  covenants  and  their  rights  of  action  are 
in  every  sense  several.^  The  obligees  in  an  injunction  bond, 
M'here  the  interests  interfered  with  by  the  injunction  are  separate, 
and  the  injury  done  to  each  is  distinct,  cannot  join  in  a  suit  to 
recover  damages  for  these  several  causes  of  action ;  their  recovery 
in  such  proceeding  must  be  limited  to  the  damages  that  are 
strictly  joint.  ^'  Certain  persons  executed  the  following  written 
/agreement:  "We,  the  undersigned,  agree  to  guarantee  the  de- 
positors of  W.  E.  C.  [a  banker]  in  the  payment  in  full  of  their 
demands  against  said  W.  E.  C.  on  account  of  money  deposited 
with  him."  Each  depositor,  it  was  held,  must  sue  separately 
upon  this  guaranty  to  recover  the  amount  of  his  individual 
claim;  all  the  depositors  could  not  join  in  a  single  action, 
because  their  interests  were  entirely  several,  neither  one  having 

1  See  ante,  §  *  227  and  note.  whose  firm  property  had  been  wrongfully 
^  Samuels  v.  Blanchard,  25  Wis.  329.  .seized  under  the  attachment,  was  sus- 
'  Fowler  v.  Frisbie,  37  C'al.  34 ;  but,  tained.  Alexander  r.  Jaeoby,  23  Ohio 
per  conira,  see  Loomis  v.  Brown,  16  Barb.  St.  358,  383.  See  ante,  §  *2G6,  and  notes, 
325.  It  is  held  in  Ohio  that  the  interests  and  Vandermulen  v.  VandermnleTi,  108 
of  the  obligees  in  an  attachment  bond  N.  Y.  195,  204,  there  cited.  For  further 
are  several,  although  the  undertaking  is  ,  ilhistrations  see  Great  West.  Compound 
in  terms  joint.  Where  such  a  bond  was  Co.  v.  vEtna  Ins.  Co.,  40  AVis.  373 ;  Hub- 
given  to  three  persons,  an  action  on  it  by  bard  v.  Burrell,  41  id.  365  ;  Eldridge  v. 
two   of  them,   who   were   partners,    and  Putnam,  46  id.  205 ;  Brett  v.  First  Univ. 


212  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

any  interest  in  the  demand  of  another.^  A  nnmLer  of  persons 
having  each  subscribed  different  sums  of  money  for  a  loan  to  a 
certain  party  in  aid  of  a  proposed  enterprise,  and  a  committee  of 
three  having  been  appointed  to  act  as  agents  for  the  subscribers, 
which  committee  entered  into  a  written  contract  with  him  con- 
taining various  stipulations  concerning  the  use  of  the  money,  and 
also  an  undertaking  on  his  part  to  repay  the  amounts  advanced, 
each  of  the  subscribers  was  held  entitled  to  maintain  a  separate 
action  against  the  borrower  to  recover  the  sum  loaned  by  himself.^ 
Five  persons  entered  into  a  written  agreement  stipulating  that, 
if  either  or  any  of  them  should  be  drafted  during  the  late  war, 
the  others  would  contrilnite  equal  sums  to  enable  him  or  them 
to  hire  substitutes.  Three  of  the  parties  having  been  drafted 
and  procured  substitutes,  one  at  a  cost  of  SI, 500,  and  the  others 
for  SI,  100,  each,  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana 
that  each  must  sue  the  others  in  a  separate  action  for  the  stipu- 
lated indemnity,  and  a  joint  action  by  the  three  was  dismissed.-' 
A  number  of  persons,  being  interested  in  opposing  a  certain 
claim  and  in  defending  suits  thereon,  appointed  a  committee  to 
employ  counsel  and  to  conduct  the  defence,  and  agreed  to  pay 
the  expenses  incurred  by  such  committee.  The  cost  of  the 
defence  not  having  been  contributed,  the  committee  paid  the 
same,  and  thereby  became  entitled  to  reimbursement.  This 
right,  it  was  held,  was  a  several  one  in  each  member  thereof,  and 
a  separate  suit  by  each  to  recover  the  sum  paid  out  by  himself 
was  proper,  rather  than  a  joint  action  by  all  to  recover  the  whole 
amount  which  had  been  disbursed.*  Under  the  general  statutes 
of  New  York,  providing  for  the  formation  of  corporations  for 
various  purposes,  and  making  the  stockholders  personally  liable 
under  certain  circumstances  to  the  creditors  of  the  corporation 
for  the  debts  thereof,  this  right  of  action  in  the  creditors  is  a 
several  one,  and  a  separate  action  may  therefore  be  maintained 
by  each  creditor.     It  is  admitted,  however,  that  a  proper  action 

Soc.  of  Brooklyn,  5  Ilun,  149;  Small  c.  -  Rice  v.   Savery,  22    Iowa,  470.     The 

Kobinson,  9  id.  418;  Koeiiip;er  r.  Creed,  court  held  that  the  committee  might  al.'WJ 

58  Ind.  .'J54 ;  Durham  v.  Hall,  67  iil    123;  sue  as  trustees  of  an   express  trust,  the 

Graham  Tp.  Indep.  Sch.  Dist.   v.  Indep,  promise   having    been    made   directly   to 

Sch.  Dist.  No.  2,  50  Iowa,  .T22 ;  Goldsmith  them,  and  also  that  each  creditor  could 

»•.  Sachs,  8  Sawy.  110,  17  P'ed.  IJep.  726.  sue. 

1  Stoadn)an    r.   Guthrie,  4   Met.   (Ky.),  »  Goodnight  r.  Goar,  30  Ind.  418. 

147,  1.'>1.                                                           '  *  Fiunev  v.  Hrant,  19  Mo.  42. 


SEVERAL   ACTIONS    ON   CONTRACT. 


213 


may  he  brought  against  all  the  stockholders  for  the  benefit  of  all 
the  creditors.^  A  bond  having  been  given  for  the  j)aynient  of  a 
certain  sum  to  the  heirs  of  A.,  eight  in  number,  upon  the  death 
of  their  mother,  it  was  held  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  New  York 
that  an  action  might  be  maintained  by  one  heir  against  the 
obligor,  or,  he  being  dead,  against  his  administrator,  to  recover 
one-eighth  of  the  entire  sum ;  that  the  right  of  the  obligees  was 
several  and  not  joint.^  Where  three  towns  were  each  liable  for 
a  share  of  the  cost  of  erecting  a  bridge,  and  the  proper  officers 
of  each  —  the  highway  commissioners  —  procured  the  same  to  be 
erected,  but  the  entire  expense  thereof  was  actually  advanced 
and  paid  out  by  two  of  these  commissioners,  their  right  of  action 
asrainst  the  third  commissioner  to  recover  the  amount  thus  dis- 
bursed  for  his  use  was  declared  to  be  several,  and  a  joint  action 
against  him,  it  was  held,  could  not  be  maintained.^ 


1  Weeks  v.  Love,  50  N.  Y.  568.  It  was 
said  that  all  the  cases  impliedly  huld  the 
doctrine  above  stated  ;  and  the  following 
were  cited :  Briggs  r.  Penniman,  8  Cow. 
387  ;  Manu  v.  Pentz,3  N.  Y.  415  ;  Osgood 
V.  Laytin,  5  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  1  ;  Garrison  v. 
Howe,  17  N.  Y.  458. 

2  Hees  I'.  Nellis,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  118. 

'  Corey  v.  Rice,  4  Lans.  141.  There 
■was  no  joint  or  common  interest  held  by 
the  towns  which  the  plaintiffs  represented 
in  tlie  sum  which  was  thus  advanced  ;  it 
was  not  like  an  advance  made  by  a  part- 
ncrshi]),  or  made  out  of  a  fund  owned  liy 
the  plaintiffs  together.  The  implied  prom- 
ise of  the  defendant  was,  therefore,  not  to 
the  plaintiffs  jointly. 

Where  a  policy  of  insurance  provided 
for  the  ])ayment  of  different  sums  to 
different  parties,  it  was  held  improper 
for  the  beneficiaries  to  join  in  one  action 
to  recover  the  several  sums  due :  Keary 
V.  Mutual  Reserve  Fuud  L.  A.ss'n,  30 
Fed.  Rep.  359.  Two  of  three  contracting 
parties  agree  to  perform  certain  services 
for  the  third,  and  eacli  of  the  two  is  to 
receive  t'lerefor  a  separate  and  distinct 
compensation  ;  each  may  bring  a  separate 
action,  it  being  quite  immaterial  that  in 
the  rendition  of  the  services  for  which 
they  were  to  receive  their  several  com- 
pensation tlieir  joint  action  may  have 
been  necessary :  Richey  v.  Branson,  33 
AIo.  A  pp.  418;  Bowman  r.  Branson   (Mo. 


1892),  19  S.  W.  634.  The  plaintiff  and 
two  others,  H.  and  B.,  acting  on  behalf 
of  the  S.  Company,  covenanted  that  the 
plaintiff  should  perform  certain  work  for 
the  defendants,  in  consideration  of  which 
the  defendants  promised  to  pay  the  plain- 
tiffs a  stipulated  sum.  It  was  held  that 
tlie  plaintiff  could  maintain  an  action  to 
recover  a  balance  alleged  to  be  due  on  the 
contract  price,  without  joining  H.,  B.,  or 
the  S.  Company :  Craig  i'.  Fry,  68  Cal. 
363.  One  of  the  sureties  in  an  official 
bond  covenanted  to  indemnify  his  co- 
sureties against  liability  on  the  bond,  and 
one  of  the  latter  was  compelled  to  pay 
part  of  a  defalcation  of  the  princip.al ;  it 
was  held  that  he  could  sue  alone  upon  the 
covenant.  Cross  r.  Williams,  72  Mo.  577  : 
"  If  the  consideration  for  the  promise  of 
indemnification  made  by  the  defendant 
was  that  the  sureties  should  go  on  H.'s 
bond,  though  it  moved  from  many  per- 
sons, yet  it  moved  from  each  one  sever- 
ally," citing  Parsons  on  Contracts,  p.  18. 
See  also  Bush  v.  Ilaeussler,  26  Mo.  App. 
263.  In  general,  one  surety  can  sue  alone 
at  law  to  enforce  contribution  from  a 
co-surety,  without  joining  his  otlier  co- 
sureties: Voss  V.  Lewis,  126  Ind.  155. 

QDuucan  v.  Willis  (1894),  51  O.  St.  433, 
38  N.  E.  13;  Defendant,  having  knowl- 
edge that  the  plaintiff  and  his  brother 
were  desirous  of  purchasing,  each  for  his 
own  separate  use,  a  number  of  head   of 


?14 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  147.  *  230.  V.  Legal  Actions  by  Persona  having  Joint  Rights 
Arising  from  Personal  Torts.  The  COmmoil-law  rule  governing  the 
selection  of  parties  plaintiff  in  such  actions  is  entirely  unchanged. 
When  the  personal  tort  produces  a  common  injury  to  all,  and 
thus  creates  a  common  damage,  all  the  persons  affected  by  the 
wrong  must  join  in  an  action  to  recover  the  damages.  In  pur- 
suance of  this  principle,  all  the  members  of  a  partnership  may 
and  must  unite  in  an  action  for  a  libel  or  slander  on  the  firm,  by 
which  its  business  is  injured.  Undoubtedly,  the  instances  in 
which  a  common,  as  distinguished  from  a  several  injury,  can  be 
done  to  a  number  of  individuals  by  personal  torts,  must  neces- 


light  feeding  hogs,  represented  to  them 
that  he  had  one  hundred  hogs  to  sell  of 
the  kind  and  quality  desired,  which  were 
sound,  healthy  and  free  from  disease,  and 
for  which  he  had  paid  $5.00  per  hundred 
pounds,  but  declined  to  sell  in  separate 
lots;  he  would  sell  the  Duncans  the  entire 
lot  and  they  could  divide  them  to  suit 
themselves.  Relying  upon  these  repre- 
sentations the  brothers  purchased  the  one 
liuudred  hogs,  jiaying  $5.12^  per  hundred 
pounds,  the  plaintiff  and  his  brother  each 
to  have  fifty  head  of  the  hogs  as  his  sepa- 
rate and  individual  j)roperty,  and  to  feed 
separately  on  their  respective  farms.  On 
the  same  day  the  hogs  were  divided  in 
accordance  with  the  agreement,  and  plain- 
tiff took  his  fifty  at  once  to  his  own  farm, 
where  some  of  them  died  on  the  same  day 
by  reason  of  hog  cholera.  They  had  been 
exposed  to  this  disease  and  were  infected 
with  it  at  the,  time  of  the  sale,  all  of  which 
was  known  to  the  defendant,  who  had  in 
fact  purchased  them  as  diseased  hogs,  and 
for  a  much  less  sum  than  S^.OO  i)er  hun- 
dred pounds.  Not  only  did  plaintiff  lose 
the  diseased  hogs  which  died,  but  the 
diseAse  was  communicated  to  bis  other 
hogs,  and  he  was  greatly  injnreil  thereby. 
Held,  that  this  contract  of  purchase, 
though  joint  in  form,  and  based  upon  a 
consideration  moving  jointly  from  the 
two,  wxs  in  spirit  and  essence,  a  separate 
contract  as  to  each,  and  that  the  rights 
acquired  under  it  by  the  purchasers  were 
separate  and  distinct.  Citing  many  cases, 
P^nKlish  and  American. 

Union   P.   K.  Co.  u.  Vincent   (1899),  58 
Neb.    171,   78    N.    W.  457:    "A    railroad 


company  made  with  two  persons  a  con- 
tract, in  form  joint,  for  the  transportation 
of  horses,  a  portion  of  which  belonged  to 
one  of  the  shippers  and  the  remainder  to 
the  other.  None  was  owned  in  common. 
The  horses  of  one  were  injured,  and  he 
sued,  naming  the  other  as  a  defendant 
because  he  refused  to  join  as  plaintiff. 
No  objection  was  made  for  defect  of 
parties  until  the  trial  began.  Held,  with- 
out deciding  how  an  action  in  such  case 
should  be  brought,  that  the  railroad  com- 
pany could  not  complain  because  one  of 
throe  situations  must  exist.  The  suit  was 
sufficriently  brought  by  the  person  whose 
stock  was  injured,  as  the  real  party  in 
interest ;  or  else  it  was  sufficient  to  make 
the  other  a  defendant  alleging  that  he 
would  not  join  as  plaintiff;  or  if  ho  must 
necessarily  have  joined  as  plaintiff,  the 
defect  appeared  on  the  face  of  the  petition 
and  was  waived  by  not  demurring  on  that 
ground." 

Baughman  v.  Louisville,  etc.  K.  R.  Co. 
(I89;5),  94  Ky.  150,  21  S.  W.  757  :  Where 
a  contract  for  the  shipment  of  horses 
owned  by  different  persons  was  made 
with  the  carrier  by  one  person  acting  as 
agent  for  them  all,  each  owner  had  a 
separate  action  for  damages  suffered  by 
him  for  breach  of  the  contract  of  ship- 
ment, and  all  could  not  unite  in  one 
action. 

Brown  v.  Farnham  (189.3),  55  Minn.  27, 
56  N.  W.  352  ;  In  an  action  upon  a  com- 
position agreement,  any  creditor  being  a 
party  thereto  may  bring  a  several  action 
for  his  damages  for  the  breach  thereol.J 


ACTIONS    ARISING   FROM    PERSONAL   TORJS. 


21, 


saiily  be  rare;  but  wlien  they  do  occur,  tlie  rule  as  stated  must 
be  applied.^  A  single  illustration  will  sufiice.  False  and  fraudu- 
lent representations  concerning  the  pecuniary  responsibility  of  a 
certain  person  having  been  made  to  a  partnership,  by  which  it 
was  induced  to  sell  goods  to  him  on  credit,  and  the  price  of  the 
goods  not  being  paid  or  recoverable  by  reason  of  the  purchaser's 
insolvency,  it  was  decided  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals 
that  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the  deceit  should  be  brought 
by  all  the  partners  jointly. ^ 

§  148.  *231.  VI.  Legal  Actions  by  Persons  having  Several 
Rights  Arising  from  Personal  Torts.  The  Converse  of  the  proposi- 
tion stated  in  the  preceding  paragraph  is  also  as  true  now  as  it 
was  prior  to  the  new  system  of  procedure.  Where  a  personal 
tort  has  been  done  to  a  number  of  individuals,  but  no  joint  injury 
has  been  suffered  and  no  joint  damages  sustained  in  consequence 
thereof,  the  interest  and  right  are  necessarily  several,  and  each 
of  the  injured  parties  must  maintain  a  separate  action  for  his  own 


1  [^Mclutosh  V.  Zaring  (1897),  150  Ind. 
301,  49  N.  E.  164:  Where  several  con- 
tracts are  made  between  defendant  and 
three  firms  of  attorneys  for  legal  services, 
tlie  fees  to  depend  upon  the  amount  of 
recovery  or  the  sum  obtained  through 
compromise,  and  defendant  fraudulently 
represents  that  as  a  result  of  compromise 
a  smaller  sum  was  obtained  than  was  in 
fact  the  case,  upon  the  basis  of  wjiich 
representations  the  firms  of  attorneys 
settle  with  defendant,  a  joint  right  of 
action  arises  iu  the  firms  of  attorneys  by 
reason  of  such  fraud,  since  all  are  alike 
interested  in  avoiding  the  settlement. 

Beetle  v.  Anderson  (1897),  98  Wis.  5, 
73  N.  W.  560:  "Where  several  persons 
induced  by  false  representations,  purchased 
a  mortgage,  each  contributing  one-fourth 
of  the  money,  held,  that  their  interests  in 
the  securities  were  joint ;  and  they  might 
properly  sue  jointly  for  the  fraud." 

Cohen  v.  Wolff  (1893),  92  Gsi.  199,  17 
S.  E.  1029:  Where  different  persons  have 
been  induceil  by  fraud  to  sell  goods  to  a 
firm,  and  the  firm  executes  mortgages 
upon  the  goods  so  purchased,  all  the  per- 
sons so  defrauded  may  ji)in  in  an  action  to 
have  the  mortgages  declared  void. 

Wunderlich  v.  Chicago  &  Northwestern 
11.  Co.  (189G),93  Wis.  132,66  N.  W.  1144: 


An  insurer  who  has  paid  the  loss  on 
insured  property  to  the  assured,  becomes 
subrogated  pro  tanto  to  the  latter's  right 
of  action  against  the  third  person  through 
whose  negligence  the  loss  occurred,  and 
the  insurer  and  assured  should  properly 
join  in  an  action  for  the  negligent  burning. 

Elliott  V.  Pontius  (1893),  136  Ind.  641, 
35  N.  E.  562  :  Several  plaintiffs  who  have 
independent  demands  as  creditors  against 
a  defendant  debtor,  may  sue  jointly  for 
relief  against  a  fraudulent  scheme  to 
remove  the  debtor's  property,  but  when  the 
fraud  alleged  is  shown  not  to  exist,  the 
joint  right  ceases  and  each  must  revert  to 
his  several  right  against  the  debtor.] 

^  Zabriskie  v.  Smith,  13  N.  Y.  322. 
See  also  Cochrane  v.  Quackenhush,  29 
Minn.  376  (joint  action  by  partners  for  a 
malicious  prosecution,  to  recover  for  in- 
juries theicby  caused  to  their  joint  credit, 
business,  and  jiroperty)  ;  Peakes  i».  Graves, 
25  Neb.  235  (joint  action  by  partners  for 
deceit).  An  action  brought  liy  members 
of  a  firm  to  recover  damages  for  an  alleged 
slander  relating  to  the  credit  of  the  firm 
does  not  abate  by  the  death  of  a  mem- 
ber; the  entire  cause  of  action  vests 
in  the  survivors.  Shale  v.  Schautz,  35 
Hun,  622. 


216  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

personal  redress.^  It  follows,  therefore,  that  when  a  tort  of  a 
personal  nature,  an  assault  and  battery,  a  false  imprisonment,  a 
libel,  a  slander,  a  malicious  prosecution,  or  the  like,  is  committed 
upon  two  or  more,  the  right  of  action  must,  except  in  a  very  few 
special  cases,  be  several.  In  order  that  a  joint  action  may  be 
possible,  there  must  be  some  prior  bond  of  legal  union  between 
the  persons  injured  —  such  as  a  partnership  relation  —  of  such  a 
nature  that  the  tort  interferes  with  it,  and  hy  virtue  of  that  very 
interference  produces  a  wrong  and  consequent  damage  common  to 
all.  It  is  not  every  prior  existing  legal  relation  between  the 
parties  that  will  impress  a  joint  character  upon  the  injury  and 
damage.  Thus,  if  a  husband  and  wife  be  libelled  or  slandered, 
or  beaten,  although  there  is  a  close  legal  relation  between  the 
parties,  it  is  not  one  which  can  be  affected  by  such  a  wrong,  and 
no  joint  cause  of  action  will  arise.  The  doctrine  above  stated 
has  been  fully  recognized  and  asserted  by  the  courts  since  the 
codes  were  enacted. ^  Afire  company  —  a  voluntary  association 
—  having  been  libelled,  a  joint  action  by  its  members  to  recover 
damages  against  the  libeller  was  held  improper;  not  being  part- 
ners, and  not  having  any  community  of  legal  interest  whereby 
they  could  suffer  a  common  w^rong,  the  right  of  action  was  sev- 
eral, and  each  must  sue  alone. ^  The  same  rule  has  been  applied 
in  the  case  of  two  or  more  persons,  not  partners,  suing  jointly  to 
recover  damages  for  a  malicious  prosecution ;  the  action  cannot 
be  maintained.* 

§  149.  *  232.  Vn,  Actions  iu  Specisd  Cases.  Some  special 
cases  which  do  not  fall  within  the  foregoing  classification  will 
conclude  this  branch -of  the  discussion.^     A  policy  of  fire  insur- 

1  ^See,  however,  Shall  v.  Barton  (1899),  not  join  in  a  suit  against  a  telegraph  com- 
.•iS  Neb.  741,  79  N.  W.  732,  where  the  court  pany  for  mental  anguish;  each  has  a 
8aid :  "  This  court  is  committed  to  the  separate  cause  of  action,  if  any :  Morton 
doctrine  that  two  parties  having  separate  i;.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  (1902),  130 
and  distinct  claims  to  the  possession  of  the  N.  C.  299,  41  S.  E.  484. 

same  property  may  join    in    an  action  of  3  Qiraud  v.  Beach,  3  E.  D.  Smith,  337  ; 

replevin  therefor. "3  Hinkle    v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa,  355,  358; 

2  Rhull  V.  Barton  (1898),  56  Neb.  718,     Stepank  i-.  Kula,  36  id.  563. 

77   N.  W.  132:  "Two  creditors  who  lost  *  Riioads    v.     Booth,    14     Iowa,    575. 

their  several  claims  and  attachment  liens,  See  Swales  v.  Grubbs  (Ind.  App.  1893), 

because  a  coroner  negligently  approved  a  33  N.  E.  1 124,  and  see  al.so,  on  the  general 

worthless  replevin  bond  in  a  suit  in  which  subject   of    tiiis    paragraph,    Ilellanis    r. 

the  attached  property  was  taken  from  tlie  Switzor,  24  S.  C.  39. 

sheriff,    cannot   join    as    ])laintiffs    in    an  *  QA  proceeding  in  mandamus  is  proji- 

ac.tion  for  damages  against  the  coroner  for  erly    brongiit  in   tiie    name  of   the  State, 

approving  such  bond."     Two  persons  can-  evLii  though  the   application  is   made   in 


ACTIONS   IN    SPECIAL    CASES. 


217 


ance,  containing  the  clause,  "loss,  if  any,  payable  to  E.  B.  G., 
mortgagee,"  the  assured,  it  was  held,  could  not  maintain  an 
action  without  making  E.  B.  G.  a  co-plaintiff,  unless  it  was 
alleged  and  proved  that  the  mortgage  to  him  had  been  paid  off 
so  that  his  interest  had  ended. ^  In  several  of  the  States,  by 
virtue  of  special  provisions  contained  in  their  codes,  partnerships 
may  sue  and  be  sued  by  the  use  of  the  firm  name  as  the  parties 
plaintiff  or  defendant,  in  the  same  manner  as  though  they  were 
corporations.  The  judgments  recovered  in  such  actions  against 
the  partnership  can  only  be  enforced,  in  the  first  instance,  against 
the  firm  property,  and  can  only  be  extended  so  as  to  bind  the 
individual  property  of  the  several  partners  by  a  subsequent  direct 
proceeding  against  them,  or  some  of  them,  in  the  nature  of  a  scire 
facias."^     The  Kentucky  code   contains  a  peculiar  provision    in 


the  interest  of  a  private  person :  State  v. 
I'ac.  Brewing  Co.  (1899),  21  Wash.  451, 
58  Pac.  584. 

lu  a  suit  for  a  penalty  the  person  suing 
and  not  the  State  is  the  proper  party 
plaintiff,  unless  the  statute  otherwise 
directs:  Burrell  v.  Huglies  (1895),  116 
N.  C.  430,  21  S.  E.  971.  In  such  a  suit 
several  may  sue  jointly  for  their  joint 
use  :  Carter  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1900),  126  N.  C.  437,  36  S.  E.  14. 

State  ex  rel.  v.  Bradley  (1901 ),  10  N.  D. 
157,  86  N.  W.  354:  Under  §  7605,  Rev. 
Codes,  a  citizen  of  a  county  in  which  a 
liquor  nuisance  exists  may  maintain  an 
action  in  the  name  of  the  State  without 
authority  from  the  State's  attorney  or  the 
attorney  general. 

Persons  whose  interests  are  separate 
and  independent  cannot  be  joined  as  re- 
lators iu  mandamus :  State  ex  rel.  v. 
Fraker  (1901),  166  Mo.  130,  65  S.  W.  720. 
But  where  a  board  of  election  com- 
missioners refuses  to  place  the  names  of 
a  number  of  nominees  for  the  office  of 
appellate  judge  upon  the  official  ballot, 
such  nominees  have  sufficient  common 
interest  in  obtaining  a  unit  of  mandate 
agair'st  tlia  board,  to  unite  in  an  action 
therefor:  State  ex  rel.  v.  Mount  (1898), 
151   Ind.  679,  51  N.  E.  417.;] 

1  Ennis  v.  Harmony  F.  Ins.  Co.,  3 
Bosw.  516.  ^  Where  an  insurance  policy  is 
ptiyable  absolutely  to  a  mortgagee,  the 
mortgagee  is  a  necessary  party  plaintiff, 
tliougli  the  assured  may  proj)erly  Ijc  made 


a  party  also  to  protect  his  interest  in  the 
policy :  Burlington  Ins.  Co.  r.  Lowery 
(1895),  61  Ark.  108,  .32  S.  W.  383.  See 
also  §  *226,  infra,  and  notes.]  And  see 
Hammell  v.  Queen  Ins.  Co.,  50  Wis.  240  ; 
Winne  r.  Niagara  F.  Ins.  Co.,  91  N.  Y. 
185;  Connecticut  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Erie  Ry. 
Co.,  73  N.  Y.  399.  Where  insured  prop- 
erty is  destroyed  by  fire,  caused  by  the 
wrongful  act  or  negligence  of  a  third 
party,  if  the  value  of  the  property  ex- 
ceeds the  amount  of  insurance  paid,  the 
insurer  paying  the  loss  acquires  thereby 
to  the  extent  of  the  payment  a  joint  in- 
terest with  the  owner  in  the  cause  of 
action  against  the  wrongdoer,  hence,  in 
prosecuting  such  cause  of  action  the  in- 
surer must  join  the  owner  as  co-plaintiff. 
Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  & 
Nav.  Co.,  20  Oreg.  569.  That  such  joinder 
is,  at  any  rate,  permissible,  see  Crandall 
V.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  16  Fed.  Rep.  75. 
But  where  the  insurance  company  has 
paid  the  insured  the  full  value  of  tiie 
property  destroyed,  it  may  maintain  tlie 
action  in  its  own  name.  Marine  Ins.  Co. 
V.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  41  Fed.  Rep. 
643  ;  Home  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Oregon  Ry.  & 
Nav.  Co.,  20  Oreg.  569. 

2  See  supra,  §  *121.  Ryerson  v.  Ilen- 
drie,  22  Iowa,  480.  See  Wills  v.  Sim- 
mond.s,  8  Hun,  189,  200  (legal  action  by 
one  of  several  partners  against  another 
one  without  joining  the  remaining  co- 
partners). 


213  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

reference  to  actions  brought  by  an  assignee  of  a  tiling  in  action 
where  the  assignment  is  equitable,  merely,  —  that  is,  where  it  is 
not  expressly  authorized  by  statute ;  in  such  a  case  the  assignor 
must  be  joined  as  a  party  either  plaintiff  or  defendant,  at  the 
option  of  the  assignee  who  brings  the  suit.^  The  code  of  the 
same  State  expressly  authorizes  the  owner  of  land  to  maintain 
approriate  actions  to  recover  damages  for  any  trespasses  or  other 
injuries  committed  thereon,  although  he  may  not  be  in  the  actual 
possession,  or  have  the  right  to  the  immediate  possession,  at  the 
time  when  the  trespass  or  other  injury  complained  of  was  com- 
mitted.^  This  is  undoubtedly  the  true  interpretation  of  the 
codes  of  all  the  States  without  any  express  provision  to  that 
effect.  The  common-law  distinction  between  "  trespass "  and 
"case"  being  abolished,  the  owner  is  entitled  to  maintain  an 
action  and  recover  damages,  by  alleging  the  actual  facts  which 
constitute  the  cause  of  action,  although  under  the  former  proce- 
dure he  would,  under  certain  circumstances,  sue  in  "trespass," 
and  under  other  circumstances  in  "case."  The  nature  of  the 
rii/Jit  of  action  has  not  been  changed,  nor  has  the  amount  of 
damages  recoverable  been  affected,  but  the  special  and  technical 
rules  which  governed  the  use  of  the  two  common-law  actions 
mentioned  have   certainly  been   abrogated.^     A    legatee  or  dis- 

1  Dean  v.  English.  18  B.  Mon.  135.  tainly  entitled  to  recover  such  damages 
This  provision  is  somewhat  different  from  as  he  would  have  obtained  if  the  action 
that  found  in  the  code  of  Indiaua,  which  was  the  common-law  "  case,"  —  that  is, 
requires  the  assignor,  in  all  ca.«es,  where  damages  for  the  injury  to  the  inheritance, 
the  thing  in  action  is  not  assigned  by  To  nonsuit  the  plaintiff  is  to  restore  the 
indorsement,  —  that  is  where  it  is  not  a  old  distinctions  between  these  technical 
negotiable  instrument,  —  to  be  joined  as  actions.  This  doctrine  is  expressly  sus- 
a  defendant,  in  order  to  answer  to  the  tained  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mis- 
assignment.  [^Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  souri :  Fitch  i;.  Gosser,  54  Mo.  267;  and 
§  277.]  by  a  very  recent  decision  in   New  York: 

2  Bebee  v.  Hutchinson,  17  B.  Mon.  Adams  i;.  Farr,  5  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.,  59, 
496.  citing  Robinson  v.  Wheeler,  25  N.  Y.  252. 

8  Brown  V.  Bridges,  31  Iowa,  138,  145.  S.  P.  Foster  v.  Elliott,  33  Iowa,  216,  224  ; 

A   plaintiff  suing,  as  owner  of  land,  for  Rogers  i'.  Duhart  (Cal.  1893),  32  Pac.  570 

injuries   done    by   a   wrongdoer,    cannot,  (an  allegation,  not  sustained  by  the  evi- 

consisteutly  with  the  plain  import  of  the  deuce,  tiiat  the  plaintiff  was  in  posses.sion 

codes,  be  nonsuited,  because  lie  was  out  may  be  treated  as  surplusage).     But  see 

of  possession,  and  not  entitled  to  posses-  Townscnd  v.  Bissell,  5  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  583, 

Bion.     Undoubtedly,  he  may  not  be  able  per  Gilbert  J.,  a  contrary  dictum,  which, 

to    recover    such   damages   a.s   he    would  in  the  face  of  these  authorities,  and  of  the 

have  recovered  if  the  action  was  the  com-  code  itself,  is  clearly  a  mistake.    The  char- 

mon-law    "trespass," — that    is,   damages  acter  of  the  possession  required  to  maintain 

for  the  wrong   done    to    his  possession    as  "  trespass  "  is   illustrated   in  Alexander  '•. 

well  as  to  the  inheritance;  but  he  is  cer-  Ilurd,  64  N.  Y.  228.     The  plaintiff's  wife 


ACTIONS    BY   ]>AUENTS    OR   GUARDIANS. 


219 


tributee  of  an  estate  in  the  liands  of  an  executor  or  administrator 
may,  under  certain  circumstances,  maintain  an  action  to  recover 
a  debt  or  demand  due  to  the  deceased,  if  for  any  reason  the 
personal  representative  is  legally  disabled  from  suing.  Thus, 
for  example,  where  B.  in  his  lifetime  was  indebted  to  A.,  both 
die,  and  the  same  person  is  made  administrator  or  executor  of 
each  estate,  a  legatee  or  distributee  of  A.'s  estate  may  bring  an 
action  in  his  own  name  against  the  one  who  is  thus  the  adminis- 
trator of  B.'s  estate,  as  well  as  executor  or  administrator  of  A.'s 
estate.  This  person,  as  the  representative  of  one  estate,  cannot 
sue  himself  as  representative  of  the  other,  and  therefore  the 
beneficiaries  of  the  creditor  estate  are  permitted  to  prosecute  the 
action.  It  seems,  also,  that  such  action  can  be  brought  either  by 
one  of  the  legatees  or  distributees,  or  by  all  of  them  jointly.^ 

§  150.     "  233.     Actions  by  Parents  or  Guardians  for  the  Seduction 
of,  or  Injury  to,  their  Children   or  "Wards.      It  is  held  in  New  York 


owned  the  farm  ;  the  plaintiff  built  tlie 
house  on  it,  in  which  he  and  his  family  had 
lived  for  years,  and  were  still  living ;  he 
worked  the  farm,  owned  the  stock  and 
tools,  and  provided  for  his  family.  It  was 
held  that  he  had  such  a  possession  of  the 
farm  that  he  could  maintain  an  action  for 
trespass  upon  it  in  breaking  into  and  in- 
juring it. 

1  Fisher  v.  Hubbell,  65  Barb.  74 ;  s.  c. 
1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  97.  It  was  also  held  that 
Hubbell  —  the  common  trustee  —  should 
be  made  a  defendant,  both  as  adminis- 
trator of  A.'s  estate,  and  as  executor  of 
B.'s  estate ;  of  the  latter,  because  he  thus 
represented  the  debtor;  and  of  the  for- 
mer, because  he  was  the  regular  plaintiff, 
and  should  be  made  a  party  in  order  to 
conclude  the  estate  by  the  judgment.  It 
was  said  that,  in  order  to  bind  the  estate 
of  a  deceased  person,  his  administrator 
or  executor  must  be  made  a  party  /?;  his 
representative  capacity;  it  is  not  sufficient 
that  he  be  made  a  party.  See  Haynes  v. 
Harris,  33  Iowa,  516.  In  Missouri,  the 
distributees  of  an  estate  in  the  hands  of 
an  administrator  may,  before  an  order  for 
distribution  is  made,  all  unite  in  a  joint 
action  on  the  administrator's  bond  against 
him  and  his  sureties.  Whether  such  joint 
action  would  be  proper  after  the  order  for 
a  (listri!)ntion,7/((:E7-e.     Kelley  v.  Thornton, 


56  Mo.  325.  In  Kentucky  it  has  been  ex- 
pressly decided  that  several  distributees 
cannot  unite  in  a  legal  action  against  the 
administrator  to  recover  the  shares  found 
due  to  each  upon  a  settlement  of  the 
estate.  Felly  v.  Bowyer,  7  Bush,  5)3. 
For  various  actions  by  administrators, 
executors,  legatees,  and  heirs,  see  Smith 
V.  Van  Ostraud,  64  N.  Y.  278;  Tyson 
)•.  Blake,  22  N.  Y.  558;  Dunning  r. 
Ocean  Nat.  Bank,  61  id.  497 ;  Cashman 
V.  Wood,  6  Hun,  520;  Pendleton  v.  Dal- 
ton,  77  N.  C.  67  ;  Filbey  v.  Carrier,  45  Wis. 
4G9  ;  Catlin  v.  Wheeler,  49  id.  507  ;  Harris 
f.  Harris,  61  Ind.  117;  Taylor  v.  Fickas, 
64  id.  167  ;  McDowell  v.  Hendrix,  67  id. 
513  ;  Colton  v.  Uuderdouk,  69  Cal.  155  (a 
sole  devisee  in  possession  of  the  estate  may 
sue  for  trespass) ;  Segelken  v.  Meyer,  94 
N.  Y.  473  (special  circumstances  under 
which  plaintiff  may  recover  personal  prop- 
erty of  a  deceased  person  as  next  of  kin, 
without  the  intervention  of  an  adminis- 
trator) ;  Grubb  r.  Lookabill.  100  N.  C.  267 
(in  an  action  by  an  administrator  against 
his  decedent's  vendee  to  recover  the  pur- 
chase-money due  on  a  bond  for  title  by 
selling  the  land,  the  vendor's  heirs-at-law 
are  necessary  parties).  As  to  co-plaintiffs 
in  action  for  contribution,  see  Hughes 
V.  Boone,  81  N.  C.  204. 


220 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


that  a  mother  may  maintain  an  action  for  the  seduction  of  her 
infant  daughter  where  the  father  is  dead,  and  the  daughter  is 
dependent  upon  the  mother,  although  the  latter  has  remarried.^ 
This  rule  has  also  been  extended  to  the  case  where  the  father  is 
not  dead,  but  has  abandoned  his  wife,  who  lives  separate  and 
apart  from  him,  and  maintains  herself  and  family  by  carrying  on 
a  business  in  which  the  daughter  is  actually  employed  as  an 
assistant,  rendering  substantial  services.  The  action  being 
founded  upon  the  relation  of  master  and  servant,  and  not  upon 
that  of  parent  and  child,  and  the  mother  carrying  on  a  business 
in  which  the  daughter  is  employed  as  a  servant,  all  the  requisites 
of  the  general  doctrine  relating  to  the  action  of  seduction  are 
fully  complied  with.^  These  decisions  are  based  upon  common- 
law  principles  independently  of  any  changes  made  by  statute.'^ 
The  codes  of  several  States,  however,  contain  special  provisions 
authorizing  actions  to  be  brought  by  fathers,  or,  in  case  of  their 
death  or  desertion  of  tlieir  families,  by  mothers,  and  by  guard- 
ians, to  recover  damages  for  the  seduction  of,  or  for  the  death 
of,   or  injuries  to,   their  children  or  wards.*     A  woman  is  per- 


1  Lampman  v.  Hammond,  3  N.  Y.  Sap. 
Ct.  293:  Gray  v.  Durland,  50  Barb  100, 
51  N.  Y.  424 ;  Furman  v.  Van  Sise,  56 
N.  Y.  435;  Badgley  r.  Decker,  44  Barb. 
577. 

■^  Badgley  v.  Decker,  44  Barb.  577.  See 
Certwell  v  Hoyt,  6  Hun.  575  (by  a  grand- 
father). Action.s  to  recover  earnings  of  an 
infant  child  ;  see  Hollingsworth  r.  Sweden- 
burg,  49  Ind.  378 ;  Monaghaii  v.  Randall 
Sch.  Dist.,  38  Wis.  100;  Matthew.s  ;•.  Mo. 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  26  Mo.  App.  75  (action  by 
widow  to  recover  for  loss  of  services  of  her 
minor  child,  su.stained,  independently  of 
statute).  QSenn  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1894), 
124  Mo.  621,  28  S.  W.  66:  Where  the 
mother  dies  pending  an  action  brought  by 
both  parents  for  the  death  of  an  unmarried 
minor  son,  the  father  may  continue  the 
action  in  his  own  name.  Keller  r.  City  of 
St  Louis  (1899),  152  Mo.  596,  54  S.'w. 
4-38:  Where  a  wife  secures  a  divorce  from 
her  hu.^band,  and  the  "  care  and  custody  " 
of  the  cliild  is  awarded  to  the  wife,  but  no 
order  is  made  respecting  the  "  mainte- 
nance "  of  the  child,  the  duty  of  supporting 
the  cliild  still  devolves  upon  the  husband, 
and  the  wife  caimot,  during  the  husband's 


life,  maintain  an  action  alone  for  damages 
due  to  injuries  to  the  minor  child.  Pierce 
V.  Conners  (1894),  20  Colo.  178,  37  Pac. 
721  :  By  statute  the  father  and  mother 
have  an  equal  interest  in  the  judgment  re- 
covered for  wrongfully  causing  the  death 
of  a  minor  child.  But  suit  may  be  brought 
either  by  the  father  alone  or  by  both  to- 
gether. Buechner  v.  Columbia  Shoe  Co. 
(1895),  60  Minn.  477,  62  N.  W.  817  :  Under 
G.  S.  1894,  §  5164,  a  father  may  maintain 
an  action  in  his  own  name  to  recover 
damages  for  an  injury  to  his  minor  child. 
Same  holding  in  Lathrop  v.  Schutte  (1895), 
61  Minn.  196,  63  N.  W.  493.] 

3  [^Mut  .see  Anthony  v.  Norton  (1899),  60 
Kan.  341,56  Pac.  529  and  Snider  v.  Newell 
(1903),  132  N.  C.  614,  44  S.  E.  3.54,  where 
it  was  held  that,  under  the  general  code 
provisions,  without  any  special  statute,  a 
parent  might  recover  for  the  seduction  of 
a  daughter  without  showing  any  loss  of 
services.] 

■•  Sec  supra,  §  *120,  where  the  States 
are  enumerated.  A  statute  which  dis- 
penses "  with  any  allegation  or  proof  of 
loss  of  service  "  does  not  change  the  rules 
of  the  law  as  to  the  parties;  the  seduced 


ACTIONS   BY    HUSBAND    AND    WIFE.  221 

raitted,  in   a   few   States,    to    maintain    an    action    and    recover 
damages  for  her  own  seduction.  ^ 

Second:  Actions  by  and  between  Husband  and  Wife. 

§  151.  *  234.  Common  Law  and  Equity  Rules.  The  COmmon- 
law  rules  as  to  the  power  of  a  wife  to  bring  actions  in  her  own 
name,  and  as  to  the  necessity  of  making  husband  and  wife  co- 
plaintiffs  in  all  actions  where  she  could  be  party  at  all,  relating 
to  her  property  or  to  wrongs  suffered  by  her,  have  been  either 
swept  away  or  greatly  modified  in  all  the  States  which  have 
adopted  the  reformed  system  of  procedure.  These  common-law 
requisites  were  concisely  stated  in  a  former  paragraph  of  this 
section. 2  In  equity,  while  as  a  general  rule  the  husband  was 
joined  as  a  co-plaintiff  even  in  suits  touching  her  equitable  sepa- 
rate estate,  yet  when  their  interests  were  at  all  antagonistic,  and 
especially  Avhen  the  proceeding  was  in  any  manner  adverse  to 
him,  she  was  permitted  to  sue  without  uniting  him  with  her, 
and  even  to  make  him  a  defendant.  Her  action,  however,  was 
prosecuted  in  her  name  by  a  next  friend.^ 

[§  152.  statutory  Provisions.  There  are  two  general  types  of 
the  statutory  provision  as  found  in  most  of  the  codes.  The 
statutes  of  the  first  type  abolish  the  necessity  of  joining  the  hus- 
band and  wife  where  such  joinder  would  not  be  necessary  aside 
from  the  marriage  relation.  The  Kansas  statute  is  illustrative 
of  this  type,  and  reads  as  follows :  "  A  married  woman  may  sue 
and  be  sued  in  the  same  manner  as  if  she  were  unmarried,"* 
The  statutes  of  Oklahoma  and  Utah  are  identically  the  same,  and 
those  of  Colorado,  Montana,  and  Nebraska  differ  only  slightly.^ 

woman  cannot  bring  the  action.     Wood-  action  the  complaint  must  allege  that  the 

ward  V.  Anderson,  9  Bush,  624.  plaintiff  is  unmarried. 

[_ConJIict  of  lines.     In  Thorpe  v.  Union  ^  ggg  supra,  §  *19l. 

Pacific  Coal  Co.  (1902),  24  Utah,  475,  68  ^  Story,   Eq.  PI.   §§  61.    631  ;    Daniell 

Pac.  145,  it  was  held  that  where  the  statute  Chan.  PI.  (4th  Am.  ed.),  pp.  109,  110. 

of   Wyoming   requires  an  action   for  the  *  QGen.  St.,  1901,  §  4457.] 

negli'^ent  death  of  a  person  to  be  brought  *  \_Oklahnma  :  St.,  1893,  §  3901.    Utah  : 

by  and  in  the  name  of  the  personal  rcpre-  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2S04. 

sentative  of  the  deceased,  and  the  statute  Colorado:    "A    married   woman    may 

of  Utah  allows  such  action  to  be  brought  sue,  and  be  sued  in  all  matters,  the  same  as 

by  the  heirs,  the  statutes  of  Wyoming  must  if  she  were  sole."     Code,  §  6. 

control  where  such  an  action  is  brought  in  ^fontana  :    ''  A    married    woman    mav 

the  courts  of  Utah  for  the  death  of  a  person  sue  and  be  sued  in  the  same  manner  as  i  f 

negligently  killed  in  Wyoming]  she  were  sole."     Code,  §  572. 

1  See  .^i(/)ra,  §  *1 20.     And  see  Thotnp-  Nehrashi :     "A     woman    may,    while 

son  V.   Young,  51    Ind.  £99;    in  such  an  married,  sue   and    be   sued,  in   the  same 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


Substantially  the  same  provision,  but  expressed  in  different  form, 
is  found  in  Iowa,  Minnesota,  North  Dakota,  Ohio,  South  Dakota^ 
and  Wyoming.  1  The  Missouri  statute  allows  a  married  woman 
to  sue  "  with  or  without  joining  her  husband "  in  the  same 
manner  as  though  she  were  sole.^  The  New  York  statute  also 
falls  in  this  group,  but  in  addition  to  the  general  provision 
allowing  a  married  woman  to  sue  or  defend  "alone  or  joined 
with  other  parties  as  if  she  were  single,"  it  specifies  certain 
classes  of  cases  where  the  husband  should  not  be  joined.^  The 
second  type  requires  that  the  husband  and  wife  be  joined  except 
in  certain  enumerated  cases.  The  Indiana  statute  is  a  good 
example  of  this  form.  It  reads  as  follows:  "A  married  woman 
may  sue  alone :  First.  When  the  action  concerns  her  separate 
property.  Second.  When  the  action  is  between  herself  and  her 
husband ;  but  in  no  case  shall  she  be  required  to  sue  or  defend  by 
guardian  or  next  friend,  except  she  be  under  the  age  of  twenty- 


manner  as  if  she  were  unmarried."  Comp. 
St.,  1901,  §  3661.] 

^  [_Ioira:  "A  married  woman  may  in 
all  cases  sue  and  be  sued  without  joining 
her  husband  with  her,  and  an  attachment 
or  judgment  in  such  action  shall  be  en- 
forced by  or  against  her  as  if  she  were 
single."     Code,  1897,  §  3477. 

Minnesota :  "  A  married  woman  may 
sue  or  be  sued  as  if  unmarried,  and  with- 
out joining  her  husband,  in  all  cases  where 
the  husband  would  not  be  a  necessary 
party  aside  from  the  marriage  relation." 
St.,  1894,  §  5159. 

North  Dakota :  "  When  a  married 
woman  is  a  party,  her  appearance,  the 
prosecution  or  defence  of  the  action,  and 
the  joinder  with  her  of  any  other  person  or 
party,  must  be  governed  by  the  same  rules 
as  if  she  were  single."  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
§  5224. 

Ohio :  "  A  marrieil  woman  shall  sue 
and  be  sued  as  if  she  were  unmarried,  and 
her  husband  shall  lie  joined  with  her  only 
when  the  cause  of  action  is  in  favor  of  or 
against  both  her  and  her  husband."  Bates' 
St.,  §  4996. 

South  Dakota  :  Identical  witli  North 
Dakota  statute,  supra.  Ann.  St.,  1901, 
§  6073. 

Wtjomin') :  "In  any  civil  action,  suit 
or  proceeding,  whenever  any  married 
woman  is  a  party,  it  shall  not  be  necessary 


to  join  her  husband  with  her  as  a  party 
except  in  such  cases  where  it  would  be 
necessary  to  join  such  husband  without 
reference  to  the  fact  of  his  marriage  to 
such  woman."     Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3470.J 

2  ][_Mis>iouri :  "  A  married  woman  may, 
in  her  own  name,  with  or  without  joining 
her  husband  as  a  party,  sue  and  be  sued 
in  any  of  the  courts  of  this  State  having 
jurisdiction,  with  the  same  force  and  effect 
as  if  she  was  a  feme  sole,  and  any  judg- 
ment in  the  cause  shall  have  the  same 
force  and  effect."     Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  546.] 

8  Q.Ve?(;  York :  "  In  an  action  or  special 
proceeding  a  married  woman  appears, 
prosecutes  or  defends  alone  or  joined  with 
other  parties  as  if  she  was  single.  It  is 
not  necessary  or  proper  to  join  her  hus- 
band with  her  as  a  party  in  any  action  or 
special  proceeding  affecting  her  separate 
property.  The  husband  is  not  a  necessary 
or  proper  party  to  an  action  or  special 
proceeding  to  recover  damages  to  the  per- 
son, estate  or  character  of  his  wife,  and  all 
sums  that  may  be  recovered  in  such  actions 
or  special  proceedings  shall  be  the  separate 
property  of  the  wife.  The  liusband  is  not 
a  necessary  or  proper  party  to  an  action  or 
special  proceeding  to  recover  damages  to 
the  person,  e.<tate  or  character  of  another 
on  account  of  the  wrongful  acts  of  his 
wife  committed  without  his  instigation." 
Code  Civ.  Pro.  §  450.] 


ACTIONS    BY    HUSBAND    AND    WIFE. 


223 


one  years."  ^  This  statute  is  found  in  substantially  the  same  form 
in  Arizona,  Arkansas,  Nevada,  Xorth  Carolina,  Oregon,  South 
Carolina,  and  Wisconsin. ^  In  California  a  third  class  of  excep- 
tions is  added,  namely,  where  the  husband  has  deserted  the  wife 
or  where  there  is  an  agreement  in  writing  between  them.^  Idaho 
has  adopted  the  California  statute,  and  Washington  has  a  statute 
very  similar  to  it.'*     The  statutes  of  Connecticut,   Georgia,  and 


1  QBurns'  St.,  1901.  §  2.55.] 

2  ^Arizona  :  "  When  a  married  woman 
is  a  party,  her  husband  shall  be  joined 
with  her,  except  that :  First,  When  the 
action  concerns  her  separate  property,  she 
may  sue  alone.  Second,  When  tlie  action 
is  between  herself  and  her  husband,  she 
may  sue  or  be  sued  alone."  Rev.  St.,  1901, 
§  1302. 

Arkansas  :  "  Where  a  married  woman 
is  a  party,  her  husband  must  be  joined 
with  her,  except  in  the  following  ca.ses: 
First,  She  may  be  sued  alone  upon  con- 
tracts made  by  her  in  respect  to  her  sole 
and  separate  property,  or  in  respect  to 
any  trade  or  business  carried  on  by  her 
under  any  statute  of  this  state.  Second, 
She  may  maintain  an  action  in  her  own 
name  for  or  on  account  of  her  sole  or 
separate  estate  or  property,  or  for  dam- 
ages against  any  person  or  body  corporate 
for  any  injury  to  her  person,  character  or 
property.  Third,  Where  the  action  is  be- 
tween herself  and  her  husband,  she  may 
sue  and  be  sued  alone."  Sand.  &  Hill's 
Dig.,  §  .5641. 

Nevada:  Identical  with  the  statute  of 
Arizona,  s«/)ra.  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3102. 

North  Carolina :  Identical  with  the 
statute  of  Arizona,  supra,  adding  "  and  in 
no  case  need  she  prosecute  or  defend  by  a 
guardian  or  next  friend."  Code  Civ.  Pro., 
1883,  §  .56. 

Oregon  :  "  Where  a  married  woman  is 
a  party,  her  husband  shall  be  joined  with 
her,  except  that, —  1.  Where  the  action 
affects  her  separate  property,  or  where  the 
cause  of  action  is  for  a  wrong  committed 
against  her  person  or  character,  or  is  for 
wages  due  for  her  personal  services,  she 
may  sue  or  be  sued  alone ;  2.  Where  the 
action  is  between  herself  and  her  husband, 
.she  may  sue  or  be  sued  alone ;  and  in  no 
case  need  she  prosecute  or  defend  by  a 
guardian  or  next  friend."  Hill's  Code,  §  30. 


South  Carolina:  "Where  a  married 
woman  is  a  party  her  husband  must  be 
joined  with  her,  except  that  (1)  Wlier© 
the  action  concerns  her  separate  property, 
she  may  sue  or  be  sued  alone :  Provided, 
That  neither  her  husband  nor  liis  property 
shall  be  liable  for  any  recovery  against 
her  in  any  such  suit;  but  judgment  mav 
be  enforced  by  execution  against  her  sole 
and  separate  estate  in  the  same  manner 
as  if  she  were  sole.  (2)  Where  the  ac- 
tion is  between  herself  and  her  husband 
she  may  sue  or  be  sued  alone ;  and  in  no 
case  need  she  prosecute  or  defend  by  a 
guardian  or  next  friend."  Rev.  St.,  1893, 
Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  135. 

Wisconsin  :  "  Where  a  married  woman 
is  a  party  her  husband  must  be  joined 
with  her,  except  that  where  the  action  con- 
cerns her  separate  property  or  business  or 
alleged  antenuptial  debts,  or  is  between 
herself  and  her  husband,  she  may  sue  or 
be  sued  alone."     St.,  1898,  §  2608.] 

8  ^California:  "Where  a  married 
woman  is  a  party,  her  husband  must  be 
joined  with  her,  except :  (1 )  Where  the  ac- 
tion concerns  her  separate  property,  or  her 
right  or  claim  to  the  homestead  property, 
she  may  sue  alone  ;  (2)  Where  tlie  action 
is  between  herself  and  her  husband,  siie 
may  sue  or  be  sued  alone ;  (3)  Where  she 
is  living  separate  and  apart  from  her  hus- 
band, by  reason  of  his  desertion  of  her,  or 
by  agreement  in  writing  entered  into  be- 
tween them,  she  may  sue  or  be  sued 
alone."     Code,  §  370.] 

*  [_ldaho:  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3158. 
Washington :  "  Where  a  married  wo- 
man is  a  party,  her  husband  must  be 
joined  with  her,  except  —  1.  Where  the 
action  concerns  lier  separate  property,  or 
her  right  or  claim  to  the  homestead  proji- 
erty,  she  may  sue  alone;  2.  AYhere  the 
action  is  between  herself  and  her  lius- 
band,   she   may  sue  or  be  sued    alone; 


224 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


Kentucky  are  peculiar   and    do  not  fall  within   either  of   these 
groups.  ]  ^ 

§  153.  *  239.  "Wife  xnuBt  sue  Alone  in  Some  States.  The  fol- 
lowing are  instances  in  which  it  has  been  held,  under  the  special 
provisions  of  the  New  York  statutes,  that  the  wife  must  sue 
alone,  although  the  joinder  of  the  husband  does  not,  as  decided 
by  the  Court  of  Appeals,  defeat  the  action  entirely.  The  doc- 
trine which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  these  decisions  is  also  em- 
bodied in  the  statutes  of  the  other  States  which  have  followed 
the  example  of  New  York  by  abrogating  the  common-law  rules 
concerning  suits  by  husband  and  wife.  The  cases  themselves 
are  therefore  authoritative  precedents  in  interpreting  the  corre- 
sponding statutory  provisions  of  those  States.  The  wife  should 
sue  alone  on  an  award  made  in  her  favor ;  ^  to  recover  damages 
for  the  taking  or  the  conversion  of  her  personal  property;^  in  an 
action  on  a  lease  executed  in  her  name ;  *  to  recover  possession  of 


3.  Where  she  is  living  separate  and  apart 
from  her  hushand,  she  may  sue  or  be  sued 
alone."     Bal.  Code,  §  4826-3 

1  ^Connecticut :  "Where  a  married 
woman  shall  carry  on  any  business,  and 
any  riglit  of  action  shall  accrue  to  her 
therefrom,  she  may  sue  upon  the  same  as 
if  she  were  unmarried. 

"  In  any  civil  action  by  or  against  a 
married  woman,  her  husband  may  be 
joined  with  her,  as  a  co-plaintiff  or  co- 
defendant,  as  the  case  may  be ;  and  when 
ao  joined,  if  a  cause  of  action  is  found  to 
exist  in  favor  of  or  against  one  of  them 
only,  a  judgment  or  decree  shall  be  ren- 
dered accordingly ;  and  in  such  cases  no 
costs  shall  be  taxed  for  such  husband  or 
wife  in  favor  of  whom  no  cause  of  action 
is  found,  nor  against  such  husband  or 
wife  against  whom  no  cause  of  action  is 
found."     Gen.  St.,  1902,  §§  SQ."?,  594. 

(jporqin  :  "  If  a  tort  be  committed  upon 
the  person  or  reputation  of  tlie  wife,  the 
husband  or  wife  may  recover  therefor ;  if 
the  wife  is  living  separate  from  her  hus- 
band, she  may  sue  for  such  torts,  and  also 
torts  to  her  children,  and  recover  the 
flame  to  lier  use.  She  may  enforce  con- 
tracts made  in  reference  to  her  own  ac- 
quisition."    Code,  189.^),  §  247.5. 

Kentiirki/ :  1.  "In  actions  between  hus- 
band and  wife;  in  actions  concerning  her 
separate    property;    and    in    actions  con- 


cerning her  general  property,  and  in  ac- 
tions for  the  personal  suffering  of  or  injury 
to  her  person  or  character,  in  which  he 
refuses  to  unite,  she  may  sue  or  be  sued 
alone.  2.  In  all  other  actions  by  or 
against  a  wife,  she  and  her  husband  may 
join  or  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  or  defend- 
ants. 3.  She  may  defend  an  action  against 
her  and  her  husband  for  herself,  and  for 
him  also  if  he  fails  to  defend.  4.  If  a 
husband  desert  his  wife  she.  may  bring 
or  defend  for  him  any  action  which  he 
might  bring  or  defend,  and  shall  have  the 
powers  and  riglits  with  reference  thereto 
which  he  would  have  had  but  for  such 
desertion.  5.  If  a  female  party  to  an 
action  marry,  her  husband  may  be  made 
a  party  by  a  motion,  causing  the  fact  to  be 
stated  upon  the  record ;  and  the  action 
shall  not  be  delayed  by  rea.son  of  the 
marriage.  6.  But  if  a  wife  be  of  unsound 
mind,  or  imprisoned,  the  actions  mentioned 
in  subsections  one,  three,  and  four  of  this 
section  must  be  prosecuted  or  defended 
by  her  committee  or  curator,  if  she  have 
one  ;  and  if  she  have  none,  must  be  prose- 
cuted by  iier  next  friend,  or  defended  by 
her  guardian  ad  litem."  Codes,  1895, 
§34.3 

2  Palmer  v.  Davis,  28  N.Y.  242. 

»  Ackley  v.  Tarbox.  31  N.  Y.  564. 

*  Draper  v.  Stouvenel,  33  N.  Y.  507. 


ACTIONS    BY   HUSBAND   AND    WIFE.  225 

her  lands ;  ^  to  recover  damages  for  trespasses  upon  her  lands ;  ^ 
to  recover  damages  for  an  assault  and  battery  upon  herself ;  ^  to 
recover  damages  for  the  seduction  of  her  own  female  servant, 
when  she  carries  on  a  business  in  which  the  servant  is  employed;* 
to  recover  damages  for  tlie  alienation  of  her  husband's  affection 
and  deprivation  of  his  society ;  ^  to  recover  damages  for  false  and 
fraudulent  representations  by  which  she  was  induced  to  convey 
her  lands  ;'^  in  an  action  against  a  common  carrier  to  recover 
the  value  of  articles  lost  or  destroyed,  although  gifts  from  her 
husband;"  to  recover  the  price  agreed  to  be  paid  for  personal 
services  rendered  to  the  defendant.^ 

§  154.  *  240.  Result  of  New  York  Statutes.  As  the  result  of 
the  New  York  statutes  modifying  the  legal  relations  between 
the  husband  and  wife,  either  may,  under  certain  circumstances, 
maintain  actions  of  a  legal  nature ;  that  is,  upon  a  legal  cause  of 
action,  and  seeking  to  obtain  legal  relief,  against  the  other.  It 
would  seem,  however,  that  such  actions  must  be  based  upon 
rights  of  property  or  of  contract.  When  the  husband,  prior  to 
the  marriage  and  in  consideration  thereof,  gave  his  intended  wife 
a  promissory  note,  it  is  a  valid  demand  in  her  hands,  and  she 
may,  subsequent  to  the  marriage,  maintain  an  action  against  him 
upon  it.^  The  wife  may  bring  an  action  in  her  own  name  against 
her  husband  to  recover  the  possession  of  land  which  is  her  sepa- 
rate property.  ^°     She  may  also  sue  him  to  recover  her  personal 

1  Darby  v.  Callaghan,   16   N.   Y.    71;  further,  to  the  same  effect,  Wyandotte  f. 

Hillman  v.  Hillinan,  U  How.  Pr.  456.  Agan,  37  Kan.  528  ;   Porter  v.   Dunn,  131 

■■2  Fox  I'.  Duff,  1  Daly,  196.  N.  Y.   314.     For  further    illustrations  in 

^  Maan  v.  Marsh,  35  Barb.  68.     And  suits  on  contracts,  or  concerning  Iier  own 

also  in  Iowa  for  torts  to  her.     Mewhirter  property,  see  Bitter  v.  Rath  man,  61  N.  Y. 

V.  Hatteu,  42  Iowa,  288.  512 ;  Curtis  v.  Del.,  L.  &  W.  K.  Co.,  74  N.  Y. 

*  Badgley    i-.    Decker,    44    Barb.    577.  116;  Fitch  y.  Rathbun,  61   id.  579  ;  Kava- 

In  this   case,   the    wife,   living  separate  nagh  v.  Barber,  131  N.  Y.  211  (nuisance); 

from  her  husband,  kept  a  boarding-house,  Hufnagel  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  49  Huii,  286. 
and  her  daughter  aided  her  by  personal  ^  Wright  v.    Wright,  54  N.  Y.  437,  59 

services.  Barb.  505. 

5  Bennett  y.  Bennett,  116  N.  Y.  584.  lo  Wood    v.    Wood,    83    N.     Y.     575; 

^  Newberry  v.  Garland,  31  Barb.  121.  Minier  v.  Minier,  4  Lans.  421.     The  court 

'  Rawsou  I'.  Pennsylvania  Railroad,  2  in  the  latter  case  draw  a  distinction  be- 

Abb.  Pr.  N.  s.  220.  tweeu  a  suit  like  this,  affecting  her  sepa- 

'  Adams  v.    Honness,  62    Barb.   326  ;  rate  property,  and  one  brought  to  recover 

but  see,  per  contra.  Beau  v.  Kiah,  6  N.  Y.  damages  for  a    tort,  such  as  slander,  or 

Sup.  Ct.  464.    Brooksv.  Schwerin,  54  X.  Y'.  assault  and    batterv.     See,  liowever,  per 

543;  Sloan  v.  New  York  Central  R.  Co.,  contra,  Gould  v.   Gould,  29   How.  Pr.  441. 

4  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  135.     See  also  Reynolds  Tliis  decision  is  in  plain  opposition  to  tlio 

V.   Robiuson,   64    N.    Y.    580,    593.      See  spirit  and  letter  of  the  remedial  statutes. 

1.') 


226  CIVIL    REMEDIES, 

property ;  or  for  money  loaned  to  him ;  qr  to  recover  the  value  of 
services  rendered  in  his  business  under  an  express  contract,  or 
under  such  circumstances  that  a  promise  to  pay  therefor  would 
be  implied.^  When  the  husband  and  wife  are  owners  in  common 
of  land,  she  may  maintain  a  suit  against  him  for  a  partition. ^ 
The  foregoing  cases  all  involve  and  are  based  upon  rights  of 
action  growing  oat  of  her  ownership  of  property,  or  out  of  con- 
tract in  reference  to  such  property,  or  to  her  services.  No  rights 
of  action  arise  from  personal  torts  committed  by  the  husband, 
and  she  is  not  permitted  to  maintain  actions  against  him  to 
recover  damages  for  such  torts,  as  an  assault  and  battery, ^  or  a 
slander.^  A  husband  cannot  recover  in  an  action  against  his  wife 
for  his  services  rendered  to  her  in  the  oversight  and  management 
of  her  separate  property,  there  having  been  no  express  agreem.ent 
for  the  payment  of  a  compensation,  and  the  circumstances  being 
such  that  no  promise  could  be  implied.^ 

§  155.  *  241.  Actions  for  Personal  Torts  and  for  Fraud  and 
Deceit.  At  the  common  law  the  husband  and  wife  were  required 
to  join  as  plaintiffs  in  all  actions  for  damages  from  the  wife's 
personal  suffering,  either  bodily  or  mental,  while  he  sued  alone 
in  all  actions  for  damages  suffered  by  himself  exclusively,  from 
the  loss  of  her  society,  and  from  expenses  and  the  like  occasioned 
by  her  injuries.     Except  in  New   York,  and   the    other   States 


1  Adams  v.  Curtis,  4  Lans.  164.     The  in  Kaufman  v.  Schoeffel,  37  Hun,  140,  thai 

action  was  against  a  firm  of    which  the  husband  and    wife   cannot   legally   enter 

husband    was   a   member.     She    may    be  into  a  business  copartnership  :  to  the  con- 

his    creditor.     Re    Alexander,    37    Iowa,  trary,  Graflf  v.  Kinney,  1  How.  Pr.  N.  8. 

4.54.     He  maj'  sue  her  for  conversion  of  59  ;  Zimmerman  i-.  Erhard,  58  How.  Pr. 

his   property;    Berdell    f.    Parkhurst,    19  11.     See  also,  on   the  general  subject  of 

Hun,  358.     She  may  sue  him  for  conver-  the  wife's   mental   disabilities,  Bertles  r. 

sion  ;  Ryerson  v.  Ryerson,  55   Hun,  191,  Nunan,  92  N.  Y.  152;  Coleman  r.  Burr, 

38  N.    Y.   St.   Rep.  375;   to   recover  her  93  N.  Y.  17. 

personal  property  ;   Howland  r.  Howland,  2  Moore  v.  Moore,  47  N.  Y.  467.    The 

20  Hun,  472.     She  may  sue  her  husband,  husband  and  wife  may  .sue  jointly  for  the 

or   be   sued  by  him,  on  a  contract  made  conversion   of    chattels   which   they   own 

for   the   benefit   of    her  .separate    estate;  jointly.     Chambovet  i-.  Cagney,  35  N.  \- 

Granger   f.  Granger  (1886),  2   N.  Y.St.  Superior  Ct.  474. 

Rep.  211  (suit  by  husband  on   promissory  *  Longendyke  v.  Longendyke,  44  Barb, 

note  of    wife) ;    Benedict   v.    Driggs,   34  366  ;  Schultz  v.  Schultz,  27   Hun,  26,  63 

Hun,    94,   and    cases    cited.     Whether   a  How.  Pr.  181,  contra,  was  reversed  with- 

partnersliip  agreement  is  such  a  contract  out  opinion  by  the  Court  of  Appeals,  89 

is  a  question  on  which  the  decisions  are  N.  Y.  644. 

at   variance.     It    is    held    in    Fairlee    v.  *  Freethy  r.  Freethy,  42  Barb.  641. 

Bloomingdale,  67  How.   Pr.  292.  in  Noel  ^  Perkins   v.    Perkins,    62    Barb.    531. 

V.  Kinney  (1885),  31  Alb.  Law  J.  328,  and  Alward  v.  Ahvard  (1888),  2  N.  Y.  Suppl.42. 


ACTIONS   BY   HUSBAND    AND    WIFE.  227 

which  have  made  the  wife  in  all  respects  like  the  single  woman 
in  regard  to  the  capacity  of  instituting  and  prosecuting  judicial 
controversies,  these  ancient  doctrines  of  the  common  law  have 
been  preserved.^  The  wife  should  certainly  not  be  joined  as  a 
plaintiff  with  her  husband  in  any  action  for  tort  to  his  property, 
or  for  fraud  in  relation  thereto,  unless  she  has  some  interest  in 
or  ownership  of  the  subject-matter  which  has  also  been  affected 
by  the  wrong.-  Thus,  where  a  husband  is  induced  by  the  false 
and  fraudulent  representations  of  the  grantor  to  purchase  land, 
and  the  title  is  taken  in  his  wife's  name,  but  the  consideration 
is  wholly  paid  by  him,  she  having  in  fact  no  prior  legal  interest 
in  the  land  or  in  the  price,  an  action  for  the  deceit  cannot  prop- 
erly be  brought  in  their  joint  names ;  he  is  the  only  person 
interested,  and  should  be  the  sole  plaintiff.^  The  same  has  been 
decided  in  respect  to  an  action  for  fraud  practised  upon  a  hus- 
band and  wife,  by  which  a  convej'ance  of  land  was  obtained  from 
them.  The  land  thus  conveyed  was  alleged  to  have  been  their 
homestead,  but  in  fact  the  wife  had  no  legal  interest  in  it,  the 
title  having  been  exclusively  in  the  husband.  A  joint  action  to 
recover  damages  for  the  deceit  under  these  circumstances  was 
held  to  be  improper.^  If,  however,  the  wife  has  a  legal  interest 
or  ownership  in  the  subject-matter  which  has  been  injured  or  lost 
by  the  wrongful  act  or  fraud  of  the  defendant,  a  joint  action  in 
the  names  of  both  husband  and  wife  to  recover  damages  is 
proper.  This  doctrine  has  very  recently  been  approved  by  the 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  and  applied  to  the  following  state 
of  facts.  The  owner  in  fee  of  land  in  which  his  wife  had  no 
interest  except  her  inchoate  right  of  dower,  was  induced  by  false 
and  fraudulent  representations  to  sell  and  convey  the  premises 
to  the  defendant  by  a  deed  in  which  the  wife  joined,  and  to 
receive  in  consideration  thereof  certain  mortgages  which  were 
in  fact  worthless.  A  joint  action  by  the  husband  and  wife  to 
recover  damages  for  the    deceit  was  sustained,   the  husband,  it 

1  [|See  notes,  pp.  221,  222,  an?e.]  '^  Bartges   v.   O'Neil,   13   Ohio    St.  72; 

2  [|Edmisonw.  Zborowski  (1896),9S.  D.     Barrett  y.  Tewksbnry,  18  Cal.  334.     See 
40,  68  N.  W.  288  :  The  court  said  :  Stepank  v.  Kula,  36  Iowa,  563. 

"  A  wife  who  joins  in  an  acceptance  of  *  Read    v.    Sang,    21    Wis.    678;    and 

an  offer  for  her  husband's  property,  and     see   Davies   i'.    Cole,  28   Kau.    259.     But 
in  a  deed  tendered  to  the  person  making     see  Simar  v.  Canaday,  53  N.  Y.  298. 
the  offer,  is  not  a  necessary  party  plaintiff 
iu  an  action  for  specific  performance."] 


228 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


was  said,  being  entitled  to  sue  on  account  of  his  ownersliip  of  the 
fee,  and  the  wife  on  account  of  her  inclioate  (h)\vei'  right.  ^ 

§  156.  *  242.  Actions  for  Personal  Torts  to  Wife.  When  a 
wife  has  suffered  bodily  injury,  either  by  violence  or  by  negli- 
gent or  unskilful  acts  of  the  wrong-doer,  and  the  injury  is  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  disable  her  for  a  while  and  make  medical  or 
other  attendance  necessary,  a  joint  action  is  not  the  proper  one 
in  which  to  recover  the  husband's  damages  for  his  loss  of  her 
society  and  for  the  expenses  caused  by  the  wrong  done  to  her; 
such  damages  can  only  be  recovered  in  an  action  brought  by  the 
husband  as  the  sole  plaintiff.^  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  com- 
pensation sought  is  for  the  personal  wrong  done  to  her,  both  must 
unite  as  plaintiffs  [in  all  those  States  which  follow  the  second 


1  Simar  v.  Canadav,  53  N.  Y.  298,  305. 
This  is  certainly  au  extraordinary  decision, 
and  introduces  a  rule  before,  I  think,  un- 
thought  of,  —  namely,  that  whenever  the 
owner  in  fee  is  induced  liy  fraud  to  con- 
vey his  laud,  and  the  wife  joins  in  the 
deed,  the  two  may  maintain  a  joint  action 
and  recover  a  single  judgment  in  solido 
for  tiieir  joint  damages.  The  decision 
cannot  be  supported  either  on  principle 
or  on  authority  ;  the  essential  difference 
between  the  husband's  fixed,  certain  in- 
terest, capable  cf  being  ascertained,  and 
the  wife's  uncertain,  contingent  interest, 
under  all  possible  circumstances  much 
less  than  her  husband's,  seems  to  have 
utterly  escaped  the  attention  of  the  court. 
ByR.  S.  Ind.,  1881,  §  2506,  a  wife's 
common-law  right  of  dower  Wius  enlarged 
into  a  contingent  fee,  which  may  become 
vested,  not  only  by  the  death  of  her 
husband,  but  l)y  a  judicial  sale  where 
her  inchoate  interest  is  not  directed  by 
the  judgment  to  be  barred  or  sold.  It 
was  held  that  by  virtue  of  this  statute 
the  wife  was  a  proper  party  plaintiff 
witli  the  husband  in  an  action  to  com- 
pel a  railroad  coin[)any  to  maintain  a 
crossing  over  its  right  of  way,  in  accord- 
ance with  a  condition  in  a  deed  by  tiie 
husband  and  wife  of  the  land  for  the 
right  of  way.  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Priest  (Ind.  Sup.  1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  77. 
For  a  nuisance  to  premises  owned  by 
husband  ami  wife  <as  tenants  by  the  en- 
tirety, he  may  sue  alone.  Demby  v.  City 
of  Kingston,  GO  Ilun,  294. 


2  Kavanaugh  v.  Janesville,  24  Wis. 
618,  action  for  injuries  to  wife  from  a 
defective  sidewalk ;  Barnes  v.  iMartin,  15 
Wis.  240,  assault  and  battery  on  wife ; 
Smith  V.  St.  Joseph,  55  Mo.  456,  458; 
Dailey  v.  Houston,  58  Mo.  361,  366  ;  Tell 
V.  Gibson.  66  Cal.  247.  The  joint  action 
mentioned  in  the  text  was  allowed  by 
Laws  of  Wisconsin,  1873,  ch.  96 ;  II.  S. 
Wis.  §  2680  ;  Holmes  v.  Fond  du  Lac.  42 
Wis.  282.  But  in  construing  ch.  91,  Laws 
of  1881,  wliich  allows  the  wife  to  sue 
alone  for  a  personal  tort,  it  is  lield  that 
the  husband's  cause  of  action  for  damages 
special  to  himself  cannot  be  so  joined 
with  the  wife's.  Siiauahan  v.  Madison, 
57  Wis.  276. 

QMcKune  r.  Santa  Clara,  etc.  Co.  (1 895), 
110  Cal.  480,  42  Pac.  980:  In  an  action 
for  injuries  to  a  wife's  person,  husband 
and  wife  must  join ;  but  in  an  action  for 
the  consequential  injury  to  the  husi)and, 
in  loss  of  service  and  expenses  incurred, 
he  must  sue  alone  ;  and  these  two  actions 
cannot  be  joined  in  one  suit.  Williams  v. 
Casebeer  (1899),  126  Cal.  77,  58  Pac.  38": 
Whore  a  single  .act  against  both  imsl)aml 
and  wife  has  given  each  a  cause  of  action 
for  malicious  prosecution,  they  cannot 
unite  their  separate  causes  of  action  iu 
one  complaint  and  sue  jointly,  but  each 
must  bring  a  separate  action.  The  wife, 
however,  in  bringing  her  suit  must  join 
her  husband  as  party  plaintiff.  McDevitt 
V.  City  of  St.  Paul  (1896),  66  Minn.  14, 
68  N.  W.  178:  a  husband  may  recover 
damages  against  a  city  for  injuries  suffered 


ACTIONS    BY    HUSBAND    AND   WIFE. 


229 


type;i]  as,  for  example,  in  suing  for  a  slander  or  libel  upon  the 
wife,  the  husband  and  wife  must  sue  jointly,  unless  he  has  suf- 
fered some  special  damage,  and  the  object  of  the  proceeding  is 
to  obtain  compensation  therefor.''^  The  same  rule  applies  to  all 
torts  to  the  person  of  the  wife;  for  the  injuries  to  her,  both 
husband  and  wife  must  join ;  for  the  injuries  special  to  him,  such 
as  loss  of  her  society,  expenses  incurred,  and  the  like,  he  must 
sue  alone. ^  It  has  even  been  held,  in  a  State  where  the  cause 
of  action  for  a  personal  tort  survives,  that,  when  a  claim  for 
damages  against  a  physician  for  malpractice  existed  in  favor  of  a 
wife,  and  she  died,  her  husband  must  be  joined  as  a  co-plaintiff 
with  her  administrator  in  prosecuting  an  action  to  enforce  such 
demand.*  If  the  gravamen  of  the  action  is  a  tort  to  the  wife's 
{)erson,  the  general  rule  above  stated  applies,  and  the  husband 


by  his  wife  by  reasou  of  a  defective  side- 
walk, and  for  expenses  for  medical  attend- 
ance. In  City  of  Eskridge  v.  Lewis  (1893), 
.■jl  Kan.  376,  32  Pac.  1104,  "  An  action 
was  brought  by  a  married  woman  against 
a  city  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  re- 
sulting from  a  defective  sidewalk,  and  her 
husband  was  joined  with  her  as  plaintiff, 
who  sought  to  recover  for  the  loss  of  ser- 
vices of  tlie  wife.  Held,  that  the  wife 
suffered  a  loss  from  the  injuries  sustained 
which  was  personal  to  herself,  and  th.at  a 
demurrer  to  the  petition  because  of  mis- 
joinder wiis  well  taken ;  but  dismissing 
ttie  husband  from  the  case  before  its  sub- 
mission cured  the  error  committed  in 
overruling  the  demurrer."] 

1  QGiffen  v  City  of  Lewiston  (1898), 
Idaho,  .5.5  Pac.  .545  :  Where  a  husband  and 
wife  sue  for  personal  injuries  received  by 
the  wife,  the  judgment  should  run  to  both. 
But  the  right  of  action  for  injuries  re- 
ceived by  a  single  woman  who,  before 
action  commenced,  married,  is  in  the  wo- 
man alone,  and  her  husband  is  not  prop- 
erly to  be  joined  with  her :  Kippen  v.  Ollas- 
.son  (1902),  136  Cal.  640,  69  Pac.  293.] 

•^  Johnson  v.  Dickcn,  25  Mo.  580;  En- 
ders  V.  Beck,  28  Iowa.  86.  Tliis  latter 
decision  was  made  under  a  .statute  differ- 
ent from  that  which  is  now  in  force  in 
Iowa.  See  also  McFadden  ;)  Santa  Ana, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.,  87  Cal.  464 ;  Gibson  v.  Gib- 
son, 43  Wis.  23 ;  Barnett  v.  Leonard,  66 
lud.  422.     The  wife  mav  now  sue  alone, 


in  Indiana,  -for  a  personal  tort.  Ante, 
p.  222.  QSee  also  Lamb  d.  Harbaugh 
(1895),  105  Cal.  680,  39  Pac.  56;  Harper 
V.  Pinkstou  (1893),  112  N.  C.  293,  17  S.  E. 
161  :  An  action  by  a  husband  for  slander 
of  his  wife,  the  wife  not  being  a  party  and 
the  complaint  alleging  no  special  damages 
to  the  husband,  states  no  cause  of  action.] 

3  Long  V.  Morrison,  14  Ind.  595,  597  ; 
McKinney  i-.  Western  Stage  Co.,  4  Iowa, 
420.  See  remark  in  last  preceding  note. 
Dailey  v.  Houston,  58  Mo.  361,  366; 
Smith  V.  St.  Joseph,  55  Mo.  456,  458; 
Rogers  v.  Smith,  17  Ind.  323  ;  Ohio  &  M. 
R.  Co.  V.  Tindall,  13  Ind.  366;  Boyd  v. 
Blaisdell,  15  Ind.  73.  See  also  Hammond 
V.  Town  of  Muskwa,  40  Wis.  3.54 ;  Beau- 
dette  V.  Fond  du  Lac,  40  id.  44;  Hunt  v. 
Town  of  Winfield.  36  id.  154;  Oliver 
V.  Town  of  La  Valle.  36  id.  592  ;  Gibson  v. 
Gibson,  43  id  23;  Meese  v.  Fond  du  Lac. 
48  id.  323  ;  Barnett  r.  Leonard,  66  Ind. 
422 ;  Matthew  v.  Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  63 
Cal.  450;  Mann  v.  Rich  Hill,  28  Mo. 
App.  497  (joint  action  for  injuries  to  the 
wife  not  a  bar  to  action  for  injuries  special 
to  the  liushand). 

^Baltimore,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Glenn 
(1902),  66  O.  St.  672,  64  N.  E.  438  :  while 
a  wife  has  a  rigiit  of  action  for  injuries 
negligently  inflicted,  a  husband  also  has  a 
right  of  action  for  loss  of  lier  services  and 
necessary  expenses  in  iiealing  her  injuries, 
and  her  recovery  is  no  bar  to  his.] 

*  Long  r.  .Morrison,  14  Ind.  595. 


230  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

must  be  joined,  although  the  action  might  be  brought  in  form  ex 
contractu.  As  an  example,  if  the  wife  has  been  injured  by  the 
negligence  or  other  wrongful  act  of  a  carrier,  who  was  trans- 
porting her  as  a  passenger,  although  the  action  might  be  in  form 
based  upon  the  contract  of  passage  made  with  her,  the  injury 
being  proved  in  enhancement  of  damages,  or  might  be  in  form 
directly  based  upon  the  tort,  yet  in  either  case  the  very  gist  of 
the  claim  would  be  the  negligent  or  tortious  act  of  the  defendant, 
and  the  husband  and  wife  must  therefore  unite  as  co-plaintiffs 
in  order  to  recover  the  damages  resulting  from  her  personal 
injuries.-' 

§  157.  *  243.  Actions  for  Tort3  to  Wife's  Person  in  New^  York 
and  States  having  Similar  Statutes.  In  those  States  whose  Stat- 
utes have  abrogated  the  ancient  principles  respecting  the  marriage 
relation,  the  wife  must  sue  alone  in  her  own  name  in  actions 
based  upon  torts  to  her  own  person,  as  well  as  in  actions  concern- 
ing her  own  property,  or  in  those  founded  upon  her  contracts. 
Cases  illustrating  this  rule  as  it  prevails  in  New  York  have 
already  been  given. ^  Similar  conclusions  have  been  reached 
by  the  courts  of  the  other  States  whose  legislation  is  substantially 
the  same  as  that  of  New  York.^  Thus  it  is  held  in  Iowa,  under 
the  existing  statutory  provisions,  that  a  wife  must  be  the  sole 
plaintiff  in  an  action  instituted  to  recover  damages  for  a  malicious 

1  Sheldon  v.  Steamship  "  Uncle  Sam,"  the  courts  of  the  State.  Texas,  etc.  \\j. 
18  Cal.  526;  Warner  v.  The  Same,  9  Cal.  Co.  v.  Humble  (1899),  97  Fed.  (C.  C.  A. 
697.  'Ark.),   837.     In  Brockett  v.  Fair  Haven, 

2  See  supra,  §  *239.  etc.  K.  K.  Co.  (1900),  73  Conn.  428,  47  Atl. 

3  QWilliams  I'.  Williams  (1894),  20  Colo.  763,  it  was  held  that  the  joinder  of  the 
51,  37  Pac.  614:  The  common  law  doc-  husband  in  an  action  for  personal  injury 
trine  that  the  wife,  as  an  inferior,  could  to  the  wife,  was  permissive. 

not  briiif^  an  action  for  damages  against  Bains  v.  Bullock  (1895).  129  Mo.  117, 

one  who  wrongfully  induces  her  Imsband  31  S.  W.  342  :    A  deed  of  land  to  a  hui*- 

to  abandon  iier,  does  not  exist  in  Colorado,  band  and  wife  in  fee  creates  an  estate  by 

The  wife  has  rights  equal  to  her  husband  entirety  and  each  is  entitled  to  the  posses- 

in  this  respect.     Citing  Foot  r.  Card,  58  siou   of   the    entire    premises   as    against 

Conn.  1  ;  Westlake  v.  Westlake,  .34  0.  St.  third  persons.     The  married  women's  att 

621.     Mayor /;.  Smith  (1900),  111  Ga.  870,  has    destroyed    the    legal    unity    between 

36  S.  E.  953  :  "  A  married  woman  living  husband  and  wife  which  gave  rise  to  the 

with  her  husband  may  bring  an  action  in  estate  by  entirety,  but  the  estate  has  not 

her  own  name  for   physical    injuries  sua-  been   abolished.     And  under   this  act  al- 

tained  by  her.     Civil  Code,  §  2475."  lowing  a  married  woman  to  sue  for  the 

A  State  statute  giving  a  married  wo-  possession  of  her  separate  property  in  her 

man   a   right  to  maintain  an   action    for  own  name,  she  may  bring  ejectment  for 

personal    injuries    in    her    own    name,    is  her  estate  by  entirety  without  joining  lier 

applif-able  to  suits  commenced  in  the  fed-  husband.] 
eral  courts  as  well  as  to  suits  brought  in 


ACTIONS    BY    HUSBAND    AND    WIFE. 


231 


prosecution  of  herself;  the  joinder  of  her  husband  is  iniprojKT, 
since  the  damages  when  recovered  are  her  own  separate  property-, 
in  which  he  has  no  interest  or  share ;  ^  and,  on  the  same  prin- 
ciple, a  suit  for  a  libel  upon  herself  must  be  brought  by  the  wife 
alone. 2 

§  158.  *  244.  Actions  for  Torts  to  "Wife's  Property.  [In  those 
states  where  statutes  of  the  second  type  exist,  a  married  woman] 
may  sue  alone  to  recover  damages  arising  from  torts  and  negli- 
gences and  other  wrongs  to  her  own  property ;  these  actions  fall 
within  the  language  of  the  codes,  and  plainly  "  concern  her  sepa- 
rate property."^  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  the  wife  may  main- 
tain a  suit  in  her  own  name  to  recover  damages  for  a  trespass 
to  land  owned  by  her,  "although  her  husband  occupied  the  land 
in  the  usual  manner  with  her  and  their  family,  and  cultivated  it, 
but  had  no  legal  or  other  rights  in  it."^  If  she  can  prosecute 
a  suit  for  trespass,  she  can  certainly  do  the  same  when  the  injury 
is  negligent  instead  of  violent  and  intentional.  On -the  other 
hand,  there  are  circumstances  under  which  an  action  should  be 
maintained  by  the  husband  alone,  although  the  wife  may  have  or 
seem  to  have  some  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  contro- 
versy. Thus,  in  California  he  must  sue  alone  in  actions  relating 
to  the  "  common  property  "  of  the  husband  and  wife,  and  in  those 
relating  to  "homesteads"  as  the  same  are  defined  and  regulated 
by  the  statutes  of  the  State. ^     These  subjects,  however,  depend 


^  Musselman  ;•.  Gallif^her,  32  Iowa, 
383.  [See  Williams  v.  Casebeer  (1899), 
126  Cal.  77,  58  Par..  380.^ 

2  Pancoast  v.  Burnell,  32  Iowa,  394. 
See  Shuler  v.  Millsap's  Ex'or,  71  N.  C.  297. 
In  a  suit  by  a  married  woman  for  per- 
sonal injuries,  .she  cannot  recover  for  the 
loss  of  her  services  in  the  household  ;  the 
husband  alone  can  sue  for  these.  Wyan- 
dotte V.  Agan,  37  Kan.  528. 

3  [Hand  v.  Scodeletti  (1900)  128  Cal. 
674,  61  Pac.  373  ;  where  a  married  woman 
sues  for  conversion  of  her  separate 
property,  it  is  not  necessary  for  her  to  al- 
lege that  it  is  her  separate  property  where 
she  does  not  allege  in  the  same  count  that 
she  is  a  married  woman.] 

*  Boos  V.  Gomber,  24  Wis.  499.  [T'rey 
V.  Stanley  (1895)  110  Cal.  423,  42  Pac. 
908 :  A  wife  may  bring  an  action  to 
quiet    title    in    respect    of    her   separate 


property  even  though  a  homestead  has 
been  declared  upon  the  premises  for  the 
joint  benefit  of  herself  and  husband,  with- 
out joining  her  husband.  A  wife  may  sue 
alone  for  the  protection  of  any  right  she 
may  have  in  her  separate  property,  even  if 
that  right  be  merely  that  of  a  joint  tenant. 
But  see  Friburk  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.  (1896), 
66  Minn.  277,  68  N.  W.  1090,  where  the 
court  said  :  "  The  fact  that  a  wife  is  fur- 
nishing the  dwelling  in  which  tlie  family 
resides  does  not  change  the  common-law 
rule  that  the  husband  is  the  head  of  the 
family,  nor  will  it  give  to  the  wife  the 
right  to  recover  for  damages  resulting 
from  the  maintenance  of  a  nuisance."] 
5  Barrett  i;.  Tewksbury,  18  Cal.  334  ; 
Guiod  V.  Guiod,  14  Cal.  506 ;  Cook  v. 
Klink,  8  Cal.  347  ;  Poole  v.  Gerrard,  6  Cal. 
71.  [But  see  Anderson  t-.  Davis  (1898),  18 
Utah,  200,  55  Pac.   363 :   when  the  legal 


232  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

entirely  upon  the  special  provisions  of  the  statutes  in  the  several 
commonwealths,  and  have  no  proper  connection  with  the  general 
system  of  procedure  established  by  the  various  codes.  It  seems 
that  the  husband  alone  can  sue  for  a  conversion  or  loss  of  or 
injury  to  those  articles  of  personal  use  belonging  to  the  wife,  — 
her  clothing  and  ornaments,  —  which  at  the  common  law  consti- 
tute her  par apher7ialia.^ 

§  159.  *  245.  Tort  Actions  between  Husband  and  Wife.  Whether, 
under  the  legislation  of  the  various  States,  actions  for  tort  can  be 
maintained  by  the  wife  against  the  husband,  or  by  the  husband 
against  the  wife,  does  not  seem  to  have  been  definitively  settled 
by  judicial  decision.  The  departure  from  the  ancient  theory  of 
the  marriage  relation  has  been  as  great  in  New  York  as  in  any 
other  commonwealth,  and  yet,  as  has  been  shown,  the  courts  of 
that  State  have  declared  against  the  possibility  of  actions  between 
the  spouses  for  any  personal  torts  committed  by  one  upon  the 
other,  such  as  libels,  assault  and  battery,  and  the  like.^  The 
same  result  would  seem  to  be  inevitable  under  the  more  restricted 
legislation  of  other  States,  for  their  statutes  which  modify  the 
common-law  doctrines  of  marriage  are  confined  in  their  terms 
to  her  power  over  her  separate  property  and  over  contracts. 
Actions  between  husband  and  wife,  based  upon  torts  done  to 
property,  have  arisen,  but  their  propriety  has  not  been  finally 
determined.^     There    does    not,  however,  seem  to   be   any   real 

title  to  a  homestead  is  in  a  wife,  but  the  her  separate  property,  be  held  account- 
larger  portion  of  the  purchase  price  was  able,  in  a  suitable  case,  for  the  violation 
paid  by  the  husband,  their  joint  interest  in  of  his  trust,  but  that  the  mere  possession 
the  preservation  of  the  homestead  gives  of  the  property  by  the  husband,  uuex- 
them  the  right  to  join  as  plaintiffs  in  an  plained,  was  not  such  a  breach  of  trust; 
action  to  enjoin  its  sale.]  and  remarks :  "  It  is  hardly  necessary  to 
^  McCormick  »■.  Penn.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  49  add  that,  if  she  had  a  riglit  of  action  at 
N.  Y.  302,  317.  See  also  Curtis  v.  Del.,  all  against  her  husband,  it  could  only 
L.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  Y.  116.  have  been  asserted  in  equity ;"  and  that 
2  See  §  *240,  and  notes.  the  only  practical  effect  of  §  49  of  the 
8  Owen  V.  Owen,  22  Iowa,  270;  David-  Kentucky  code  was  to  dispense  with  the 
son  V.  Smith,  20  Iowa,  466.  In  Matson  r.  intervention  of  the  next  friend ;  that  it 
Matson,  4  .Met.  (Ky.)  262,  the  wife  sued  conferred  no  new  right  of  action.  See 
the  husl)and  in  an  ordinary  action  to  also  Kalfus  r.  Kalfus  (Ky.  1892),  18  S.  W. 
recover  possession  of  slaves  devised  to  Rep.  366 :  and  compare  Manning  i'.  Man- 
her  as  her  separate  property,  which    he  ning,  79  N.  C.  293. 

refused  to  deliver  to  her,  no  other  ground  [^I5ut  see  Gillespie   v.   Gillespie  (1896), 

of  relief,  legal  or  eriuitable,  being  alleged.  64   Minn.  381,   67   N.   W.  20,   where  it  i» 

In  reversing  a  judgment  rendered  for  the  held  that  a  wife  may  sue  her  husband  in 

ydaintiff,  Duvall  C.  J.  points  out  that  the  her  own   name,  in  any  form  of  action,  to 

husband  might,  as  trustee  for  the  wife  of  enforce  any  right  affecting  her  property. 


ACTIONS    BY   HUSBAND    AND    WIFE.  233 

difficulty  in  principle.  If  a  wife  is  clothed  with  full  authority 
over  her  own  property  as  though  she  was  unmarried,  and  if,  in 
pursuance  thereof,  she  is  permitted  to  invoke  the  aid  of  judicial 
proceedings  in  enforcing  contracts  against  her  husband,  and  in 
recovering  from  him  the  possession  of  lands  and  chattels,  there 
can  be  no  valid  ground  for  refusing  to  her  the  power  of  main- 
taining actions  against  hira  for  the  wrongful  taking,  detention, 
or  conversion  of  her  chattels,  or  for  injuries  done  to  her  property 
by  violence  or  by  negligence.^  Both  classes  of  actions  depend 
upon  the  same  fundamental  rights, —  the  rights  of  property  which 
the  statute  fully  confers  upon  her.  If  the  owner  may  recover 
from  her  husband  the  very  thing  itself  —  the  land  or  chattel  —  in 
a  real  action,  it  is  not  an  enlargement  of  her  power  to  suffer  her 
to  recover  the  value  of  such  things  wholly  or  partially  in  a  per- 
sonal action.  The  notion  that  the  proceeding  must  be  equitable  is 
a  remnant  of  the  ancient  system  which  has  been  abrogated,  and 
is  conceived  in  forgetfulness  of  the  radical  changes  made  by  the 
statutes  in  the  common-law  theory  of  the  marriage  relation.  If 
the  facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action  are  stated  in  the  plead- 
ing, it  is  both  unnecessary  and  improper  to  call  the  action  equi- 
table, since  the  relief,  if  granted,  is  the  ordinary  pecuniary 
judgment  against  the  defendant  personally,  and  not  a  judgment 
in  rem  against  his  property. 

§  160.  *  246.  Desertion  by  Husband  as  Affecting  "Wife's  Capacity 
to  sue.  The  desertion  of  his  wife  and  familj^  by  the  husband 
does  not  increase  her  powers  and  capacities  in  reference  to  the 
bringing  and  maintaining  of  judicial  proceedings,  unless  provi- 
sion is  made  for  such  an  emergency  by  express  statute.     Thus, 

the  same  as  if  she  were  a  stranger.     Also  21  S.  W.  354  ;  although  contracts  between 

Grubbe  v.  Grubbe  (1894),  26  Ore.  363,  38  husband   and   wife  are  void  at  law,  thej 

Pac.  182.     Under  Hill'.s  Code,  §  2870,  pro-  may  be   held  valid  in  equity  where  they 

vidiug   that   either    husband    or    wife,    as  are   fair   and    just.     Snedager  v.  Kincaid 

owner,    may   sue    to    recover  ])roperty  of  (1901),  Ky.,   60    S.    W.    522;    under  Civ. 

which  the  other  has  secured  possession  or  Code  Prac.  §  35,  the  action  of  an  infant 

control,  either  may  sue  the  other  at  law  married  woman  for  divorce  and  alimony 

not  only  f(-r  property  wroni^fullv  obtained,  need  not  be  brought  by  guardian  or  next 

but    on    contracts    as    well.       I3ut    under  friend,    but    may  be   brought  in  her  own 

identically  the  same  statute  the  Supreme  name.] 

Court  of  Iowa  held,  in  Heacock  y.  Heacock  '  In  Wisconsin  a  husband  may  main- 

(1899),    108  la    540,  79  N.   W.  353,   that  tain  "  replevin  "  against  his  wife  for  cliat- 

a  wife  cannot  sue  her  husband  on  his  per-  tels    claimed    by  her  to    be    her   separate 

sonal  contract      Iowa  code,  §  2904.  property ;    Carney    v.  Gleissner,    62   Wis. 

Bohannon  v.  Travis  (1893),  94   Ky.  59,  493. 


234  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

after  such  desertion,  the  wife  cannot  maintain  an  action  in  her 
own  name  to  set  aside  a  conveyance  of  land  alleged  to  have 
been  obtained  from  him  by  fraud.  ^  In  several  States,  however, 
the  codes  contain  express  provisions,  which,  in  case  of  desertion 
by  the  husband,  permit  the  wife  to  prosecute  and  defend  such 
actions  as  he  might  have  done.^ 

Third :  Eqititahle  Actions. 

§  161.  *  247.  Grand  Prfticiple  Underlying  Equity  Doctrine. 
Scope  of  Inquiry.  The  grand  principle  which  underlies  the 
doctrine  of  equity  in  relation  to  parties  is,  that  every  judicial 
controversy  should,  if  possible,  be  ended  in  one  litigation;  that 
the  decree  pronounced  in  the  single  suit  should  determine  all 
rights,  interests,  and  claims,  should  ascertain  and  define  all 
conflicting  relations,  and  should  forever  settle  all  questions 
pertaining  to  the  subject-matter.  Since  the  chancery  judges 
were  not  hampered  by  the  legal  dogma  that  one  judgment  must 
be  rendered  alike  for  all  the  plaintiffs  and  against  all  the  defend- 
ants on  the  record,  they  were  enabled  to  adopt  and  enforce  such 
practical  rules  as  would  render  this  principle  operative  and 
efficient.  In  disclosing  these  rules,  and  in  explaining  their 
application,  I  am  not  confined  to  decisions  made  by  courts  pro- 
fessedly'governed  by  the  reformed  procedure.  The  codes,  as 
has  already  been  shown,  have  taken  the  most  general  doctrines 
of  equity  in  relation  to  parties,  have  put  them  into  a  statutory 
form,  and  have  made  them  applicable  without  exception  to  all 
actions.^     Whether  these  doctrines  have  been  entirely  incorpo- 

1  Green  v.  Lyndes,  12  Wis.  404.     See  Wis.  598,  77   N.  W.   922,  the  court  .said: 

also  Barnett  i'.  Leonard,  66  lud.  422.  "  It  ^ttie  Code]  was  designed  to  preserve 

-  See   supra,  §  152;   Andrews  v.  Run-  and  make  more  perfect  l)y  new  forms  the 

yon,65  Cal.  629  ;  Baldwin  r.  Second  Street  method  for  the  settlement  in  one  action, 

Cable  Ry.    Co ,    77    Cal.   3'JO ;    Tobin   i'.  denominated   the  civil   action,  of  all  the 

Galvin,  49   Cal.  34  (the  statute  does  not  rights   of    a    party    plaintiff,   or   parties 

apply  where  the  wife   is  merely  tenipora-  plaintiff  united   in  interest  in  the  subject 

rily absent  from  the  husband).    ^Browne,  thereof,  and  the  rights  of  adverse  parties 

Brown  (1897),  121   N.  C.  8,  27  S.  K.  998:  both  as  between  them,  and  between  them- 

Under   the  constitution  and  section   1832  selves,  not  only  as  to  the  subject  of  the 

of  the  Code,   which   declares    that  every  action,  but  the  subjects  germane  thereto, 

woman  whose  husband  shall  abandon  her  .  .  .  The  system  is  complete,  as  said  in 

shall    1)6   deemed   a   free   trader,    a   wife  KoUoch  i\  Scribner,  98  Wis.  104,  enabling 

abandoned  by  her  husband  may  maintain  the  court  in  a  single  action,  by  the  presen- 

an  action  in  tort,  in  her  own  name,  against  tation  of  i.ssues  made  up  by  the  complaint. 

a  third  party. ]  answer,  and  reply,  to  take  within  its  jiiris- 

*  Qln    Gager   v.   Marsden  (1899),    101  diction  a  single   subject   or   controver.sy, 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    LqUITABLE    ACTIONS.  235 

rated  into  the  legal  actions  under  the  codes  has  sometimes  been 
doubted;  it  is  universally  admitted,  however,  that  they  are 
operative  with  their  full  force  and  ejffect  in  all  equitable  actions 
which  may  be  brought  in  accordance  with  the  new  procedure. 
For  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  the  existing  rules  which  control 
the  selection  of  parties  in  equitable  actions,  we  are  not,  there- 
fore, restricted  to  those  States  which  have  accepted  the  reform ; 
we  nlay  and  must  extend  our  inquiry  to  England  and  to  other 
States  of  this  country  wherever  equity  exists  as  a  separate  divi- 
sion of  the  municipal  law.  1  shall  endeavor,  in  a  very  condensed 
and  summary  manner,  to  give  the  doctrine  of  parties  plaintiff, 
which  has  been  established  by  courts  of  equity  and  in  equitable 
actions,  whether  prior  or  subsequent  to  the  great  reform  intro- 
duced into  so  many  of  the  States,  and  the  result  will  express  the 
law  as  it  now  exists  in  those  States.^ 

§  162.  *  248.  Equity  Rules  more  Explicit  respecting  Defendants 
than  Plaintiffs.  Two  Classes  of  Co-Plaintiffs  in  Equity.  It  is  im- 
possible to  lay  down  with  precision  many  rules  in  reference  to 
plaintiffs,  because  equity  does  not  particularly  concern  itself 
with  determining  that  such  a  person  shall  be  a  plaintiff,  and 
such  another  a  defendant,  but  rather  requires  in  a  more  general 
form  that  the  persons  shall  be  parties,  so  as  to  be  bound  by  the 

and  all  parties  interested  tlierein  adverse  ested  may  be  before  the  court,  so  that  the 
to  the  plaintiffs,  and  all  necessary  to  be  relief  may  be  properly  adjusted  amonj^ 
before  the  court  for  their  due  protection  those  entitled,  the  liabilities  properly  ap- 
and  for  the  determination  of  the  entire  portioned,  and  the  incidental  or  conse- 
controversy,  includin<^  such  matters  as  quential  claims  or  interests  of  all  may  be 
may  be  germane  to  the  primary  subject  of  bound  in  respect  thereto  by  the  sinf^le 
the  action."  decree."  See  also  Castle  v.  Madison 
And  in  Siever  v.  Union  Pac.  Ey.  Co.  (1902),  11.3  Wis.  346,  89  N.  W.  15C,, 
(1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W.  943,  the  quoted  at  length  in  note  to  p.  183,  anip. 
court  said:  "Equitable  doctrines  with  In  Tobin  v.  Portland  Mills  Co.  (!00'2), 
respect  to  parties  and  judgments  are  41  Ore.  209,  68  Pac.  743,  the  court  said  : 
•wholly  unlike  those  which  prevail  at  "  Courts  of  law  require  no  more  parties  t« 
common  law  —  different  in  their  funda-  an  action  than  those  immediately  inter- 
mental  conception,  in  their  practical  op-  ested  in  the  subject-matter,  but  in  equity 
eration,  in  their  adaptability  to  circum-  all  persons,  including  those  remotely  inter- 
stances,  and  in  their  results  upon  the  ested  therein,  may  be  joined,  and  are  often 
rights  and  duties  of  litigants.     The  gov-  necessary  parties."] 

erning  motive  of  equity  in  the  admini.stra-  ^  In  this  subdivision  I  have  drawn  very 

tion  of  its  remedial  system  is  to  grant  full  largely  upon  the  fourth  American  edition 

relief,  and  to  adjust  in  one  suit  the  rights  of  Dauiell's  Chancery  Pleadings,  and  the 

and  duties  of  all  the  parties  which  really  learned  notes  of  Mr.  Perkins,  the  Ameri- 
grow  out  of,  or  are  connected  with,  the     can  editor,  and  have  closely  followed  that 
subject-matter  of  that  suit.     The  primary     most  admirable  work, 
object  is  that  all  persons  sufficiently  inter- 


236  CIVIL   KEMEblES. 

decree,  and  is  in  general  satisfied  if  they  are  thus  brought  before 
the  court  either  as  plaintiffs  or  as  defendants.  In  other  words, 
the  rules  of  equity  seldom  declare  that  a  given  person  or  class  of 
persons  must  be  plaintiffs,  but  simply  declare  that  such  person 
or  class  must  he  made  parties,  if  not  as  plaintiffs,  then  as  de- 
fendants.^ The  result  is  that  the  positive  rules  as  announced  by 
courts  and  as  gathered  from  a  comparison  of  decisions,  are  much 
more  full  and  explicit  in  reference  to  defendants  than  they  are  in 
reference  to  plaintiffs.  In  actual  practice,  all  persons  having  an 
interest  in  the  subject-matter,  and  therefore  either  necessary  or 
proper  parties,  except  the  actual  plaintiff  who  institutes  and 
prosecutes  the  suit,  are  generally  made  defendants,  even  though 
their  interests  may  be  concurrent  with  those  of  this  plaintiff. 
Still,  different  individuals  holding  different  rights  may  be  united 
as  plaintiffs  in  equitable  actions ;  such  a  joinder  is  often  provided 
for  by  well-settled  doctrines,  and,  although  their  requirement  is 
not  peremptory,  these  doctrines  must  be  discussed  and  fully 
stated.  The  persons  that  can  be  made  co-plaintiffs  in  an  equity 
suit  may  be  roughly  separated  into  two  general  classes:  (1) 
Those  whose  rights,  claims,  and  interests,  as  against  the  defend- 
ant, are  joint,  —  not  necessarily  joint  in  the  strict,  technical  sense 
of  the  common  law,  but  in  a  broader  and  popular  sense,  —  that 
is,  those  whose  interests,  claims,  and  rights,  whether  legal  or 
equitable,  are  concurrent,  arising  out  of  the  same  events,  having 
the  same  general  nature,  and  entitled  to  the  same  sort  of  relief. 
All  such  persons  must  be  brought  before  the  court  as  parties,  and 
naturally  they  should  be  plaintiffs,  and  so  the  rules  primarily 
require ;  but  the  requirement  is  by  no  means  peremptory,  and  in 
many  and  in  even  the  great  majority  of  instances,  the  equity 
principle  is  satisfied  if  all  but  the  one  who  actually  sets  the  cause 
in  motion  are  placed  among  the  defendants.  (2)  In  the  second 
class  are  found  all  those  persons  who  are  collaterally  interested 
in  the  subject-matter  of  the  controversy ;  whose  interests  and 
claims,  although  antagonistic  to  the  defendant,  and  to  that 
extent,  therefore,  in  harmony  with  those  of  the  real  plaintiff,  are 
still  several  and  distinct  in  tlu-ir  nature,  arising  from  different 

'  See  WilkiijB  v.  Frv,  1   M<-riv.  244,  262.  fprnlants  :   but  in  equity  the  arrangement 

f  Keys  ft  al.  v.  McDermott  (1903), —  Wis.  of  parlies  is  of  little  importance,  and  can 

— ,  9^  N.  W.  553,  the  rnnrt  saying :  "To  \,e  regulated  by  the  court  at  any  time,  ia 

tlii»  <iid.    they,  as    well  —  perhaps   more  its  discretion. "j 
properly  —  miglit    h;ivc    been    made   de- 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  237 

facts  and  circumstances,  and  demanding  perhaps  a  different  re- 
lief. Although  the  individuals  or  the  class  which  have  been 
thus  vaguely  described  may  be  joined  as  co-plaintiffs  with  the 
one  who  is  the  chief  actor  in  the  suit,  and  although  the  rules 
speak  of  such  a  joinder  as  possible,  yet  in  actual  practice  they 
are  almost  invariably  placed  among  the  defendants.  With  this 
preliminary  explanation,  which  modifies  the  entire  doctrine  of 
equity  in  relation  to  plaintiffs,  I  shall  proceed  to  state  the  gen- 
eral principles  which  underlie  the  whole  equitable  system  of 
parties,  and  to  illustrate  the  working  of  these  principles  in  the 
more  important  species  and  varieties  of  actions  by  which  equitable 
remedies  are  conferred. 

§  163.  *  249.  Statement  of  Fundamental  Principle  and  •wrhat  it 
assumes.  Special  Subject  of  Inquiry  Stated.  The  fundamental 
principle  maybe  stated  as  follows :  The  plaintiff  who  institutes 
an  equitable  action  must  bring  before  the  court  all  those  persons 
who  have  such  relations  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  controversy 
that,  in  order  to  prevent  further  litigation  by  them,  they  must  be 
included  in  and  bound  by  the  present  decree;  in  other  words, 
all  those  persons  who  are  so  related  to  the  controversy  and  its 
subject-matter,  that,  unless  thus  concluded  by  the  decree,  they 
might  s"et  up  some  future  claim,  and  commence  some  future 
litigation  growing  out  of  or  connected  with  the  same  subject- 
matter,  against  the  defendant  who  is  prosecuted  in  the  present 
suit,  and  from  whom  the  relief  therein  is  actually  obtained.  The 
principle  as  thus  expressed  assumes,  what  is  always  true  in  prac- 
tice, that  in  every  equitable  action  there  is  some  person,  or  group 
of  persons,  like  a  firm  or  joint  tenants,  who  primarily  institutes 
the  proceeding,  and  demands  the  relief  for  his  own  benefit;  and 
him,  or  them,  we  may  designate  "  the  plaintiff ; "  and  there  is 
also  some  person  or  group  of  persons  against  whom  all  the  real 
demands  are  made,  and  from  whom  the  substantial  remedy  sought 
b}'  the  action  is  asked,  —  and  him  we  denominate  "  the  defend- 
ant." In  addition  to  these  two  contestants,  there  are  the  other 
individuals  described  in  the  foregoing  proposition,  who  must  also 
be  brought  before  the  court  and  made  parties  to  the  controversy 
either  as  co-plaintiffs  or  as  co-defendants.  Equity  is  satisfied 
in  most  instances  by  making  them  co-defendants,  and  they  are 
generally  so  treated  in  actual  practice,  unless  their  interests  are 
so  identical  with  those  of  the  plaintiff  that  they  must  participate 


238  CIVIL    KEMKDIES. 

• 

in  the  substantial  relief  awarded  by  the  decree.  The  special 
subject  of  our  present  inquiry-  may  therefore  be  stated  thus:  In 
what  cases  and  under  what  circumstances  are  such  persons 
primarily  and  naturally  to  be  associated  as  co-plaintitfs  rather 
than  as  co-defendants  ?  The  answer  to  this  question  embodies 
the  principle  in  its  most  general  form  which  equity  courts  have 
applied  in  all  species  of  actions  to  determine  the  proper  joinder 
of  plaintiffs.  All  those  persons  whose  rights  and  interests  in  the 
subject-matter,  and  in  the  relief  demanded,  are  concurrent  with 
the  plaintiffs,  must  be  made  parties,  and  naturally  wall  be  made 
co-plaintiffs,  although  it  is  sufficient  in  most  instances  if  they 
are  brought  into  the  cause  as  co-defendants.  The  principle  in 
this  very  general  form  is  too  vague  to  be  of  any  value  as  a  prac- 
tical rule,  and  I  shall  therefore  take  up  in  order  the  most  impor- 
tant classes  of  cases  in  which  it  is  applied.^ 

§  164.  *  250.  Subordinate  General  Principles  herein.  Where 
Actual  Plaintiff  holds  only  Equitable  Right  or  Title,  Holder  of  Legal 
Right  or  Title  should  be  made  Co-Plaintiff.  The  lirst  of  the  sub- 
ordinate general  principles  into  which  the  foregoing  vague 
doctrine  may  be  subdivided,  is  the  following:  When  the  actual 
plaintiff,  as  above  described,  has  only  an  equitable  estate, 
interest,  or  primary  right  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit,  the 
person  who  holds  the  legal  estate,  interest,  or  right  therein, 
should  be  made  a  party,  and  primarily  a  co-plaintiff;  for  without 
such  joinder  the  defendant  might  be  subjected  to  another  litiga- 
tion from  this  legal  owner  or  holder  of  the  legal  title,  a  result 
wliich  equity  strives  in  every  way  to  prevent.^  One  of  the  most 
familiar  as  well  as  important  illustrations  of  this  general  prin- 
ciple is  the  rule  which  prevails  in  suits  relating  to  trust  property. 
When  property  is  held  in  trust,  and  an  action  concerning  it  is 
brought  by  the  beneficiary  or  person  claiming  under  the  trust, 
the  trustee,  or  one  in  whom  the  legal  title  is  vested,  must  be 
made  a   co-i)laintiff.^     As,   for   example,   when  a  mortgage   has 

'  See  Jones  v.   Williams,  31   Ark.  175;  Heirs,  9  Rush,  408.     See  also  Weetjin  i\ 

Pfohl  v.  Simpson,  74  N.  Y.  137.  Vihbard,  5  Hun,  205  ;   Sandford  i:  Jodrell, 

2  1  Dani.ll's,  p.  192.  2  Sm.  &  G.    176;  O'Brien  v.  O'Connell, 

•■'  1  Danieirs,  p.   193.     See  Western  R.  7  Hun,  228;  Holden   v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  Bk  , 

Co.  r.  Nolan.  48  N.  Y.  513  ;  Malin  v  Malin.  72  N.  Y.  286,  297  ;   Eldridge  v.  Putnam,  46 

2. Johns.  Ch.  238;  Fish  I'.  Howand,  1  Paige,  Wi.s.  205  ;   Dewey  c.  Mover,  9  Hun,  473  ; 

20;  f'aasiday  I.  Mcl)aniel,8  B.  Mon.  519;  Fort  Stan wix   Hk.  r.   Leggctt,  51    N.   Y. 

Covington    &.    Lex.    R.    Co.    v.    Bowler's  552;  Fox  i.  Mover,  54  id.   125;  Bowdoin 


PLAINTIFFS   IN    EQUITABLE   ACTIONS.  239 

been  given  to  a  trustee  in  trust  for  certain  beneficiaries,  the 
trustee  and  the  beneficiaries  must  unite  in  a  suit  to  foreclose.^ 
The  principle  applies  to  all  cases  where  the  legal  title  to  sue 
stands  in  one,  and  the  beneficial  interest  in  the  subject  and  in 
the  result  is  held  by  another;  both  must  unite  as  plaintiffs.^ 
Thus,  if  a  covenant  is  made  with  a  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  a 
cestui  que  trusty  both  must  join  in  an  action  to  compel  a  specific 
performance.^  The  case  of  a  simple  contract,  made  by  an  agent, 
when  the  agency  appears  on  the  face  of  the  agreement,  or  can  be 
easily  established  by  extrinsic  evidence,  does  not  fall  Avithin  the 
operation  of  this  rule,  for  the  principal  can  sue  alone  and  prove 
the  agency  if  it  is  disputed.  If,  however,  the  agency  does  not 
appear  in  the  contract  itself,  and  the  principal  or  person  for 
whom  the  agreement  is  made  cannot  prove  it  with  ease  and  cer- 
tainty, then  the  agent  may  be  made  a  party  so  as  to  bind  his 
interest.*  When  an  agent  acts  in  any  transaction  on  his  own 
account  as  well  as  on  account  of  his  principal,  so  that  he  has  a 
beneficial  interest  in  the  subject-matter,  he  must  be  made  a  co- 
plaintiff  with  his  principal.^ 

§  165.  *  251.  Case  of  Suits  by  Assignees.  Change  Effected  by- 
Codes.  The  case  of  suits  brought  by  the  assignees  of  things  in 
action   is    another   special    example    of    this   general   principle. 

College  V.  Merritt,  54  Fed.  Rep.  55  (suit  the  terms  of  a  trust,  the  party  or  parties 

to  remove  cloud  from  title  to  trust  prop-  beneficially   interested   may  maintain  an 

erty  ;  cestuis  que   trustent  may  bring  suit  action  in   their  own  right  to  enforce  the 

if  the  trustees  neglect  to  sue,  making  the  trust,  and  to  obtain  the  benefit  thereof." 

latter   defendants)  ;    Sawtelle    v.    Ripley  Same  rule  announced  in   Zimmerman  v. 

(Wis.  1893),  55  N.  W.  156  (action  to  con-  Makepeace  (1899),  152  Ind.   199,  52  N.  E. 

strue  trust  in  a  will ;  the  trustee  named  992.] 

therein  is  a  necessary  party).  ^  story  Eq.  PI.   §  209  ;  Cope  r.  Parry, 

1  Story  Eq.   PI.  §§  201,  209  ;  Wood  v.  2  Jac.   &  Walk.    53S.     See   McCotter  v. 

Williams,  4   Mad.  86  ;  Ilichens  v.  Kelly,  Lawrence,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  392,  395. 

2  Sm.  &  G.  264  ;  Boyd  v.  Jones,  44  Ark.  *  1  Daniell's,  p.  196  ;  Botsford  v.  Burr, 

314  ;  Tyson  v.  Applegate,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  305  ;  2  Johns.  Ch.  409  ;  Bartlett  v.  Pickersgill, 

Applegate  v.  Tyson,   39  N.  J.   Ei]    365;  1  Cox,  15.     It  should  be  remembered  that 

Harlow  v.  Mister,  64  Miss.  23;   Wolff  u.  when  a  contract- is   made   by  an   agent  in 

Ward,  104  Mo.  127.  his  own  name  expressly  for  the  benefit  of 

2  [^But  see  Cape  v.  Plymouth  Congre-  another,  he  i.s,  according  to  the  codes,  a 

gational   Church    (1903),  117  Wis.  150,  93  trustee  of  an  express  trust,  and  may  sue 

N.  W.  449,  where  it  was  held  that  a  cestui  upon  it  in  his  own  name,  without  joining 

que   trust,   entitled   to   pos.session  of   real  the  beneficiary  as  a  party.     To  this  extent 

estate,  may,  witliout  the  trustees,  maintain  tlie  new  procedure  has  modified  the  rule 

an  action   to  enjoin   interference  witli  its  which    prevailed    in    equity,    and    which 

rights.     And  in   Goble   v.    Swobe    (1902),  required   tliat    both    persons    should   join 

—  Neb.  — ,  90  N.  W.  919,  the  coui;t  said  :  in  bringing  the  action. 

"  Where  a  trustee   refuses   to  carry   out  ^  Small  v.  Attwood,  1  Younge,  407. 


240  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

Where  a  legal  thing  in  action  had  been  assigned,  the  assignee 
was  permitted  to  sue  in  equity  for  its  enforcement  in  his  own 
name,  but  the  assignor,  or  his  personal  representative  if  he  was 
dead,  was  an  indispensable  party,  if  not  as  a  co-plaintiff,  then  as 
a  defendant;  otherwise  the  debtor  might  be  subjected  to  a  second 
action  at  law  in  the  name  of  the  assignor.^  This  particular  rule, 
however,  as  has  been  shown  in  the  preceding  sections  of  the 
present  chapter,  has  been  entirely  abrogated  in  most  of  the  States 
that  have  adopted  the  new  procedure,  since  their  codes  expressly 
permit  the  assignee  to  sue  alone  without  joining  the  assignor 
either  as  a  co-plaintiff  or  as  a  defendant;  but  it  is  substantially 
retained  by  the  codes  of  Kentucky  and  of  Indiana. 

§  166.  *  252.  Case  of  Suita  for  Administration  of  Decedents' 
Estates.  In  ordinary  suits  for  the  administration  of  the  estates  of 
deceased  persons  brought  by  creditors,  legatees,  or  distributees, 
a  general  personal  representative  of  the  estate  —  an  administrator 
or  executor  —  is  indispensable,  and  is  a  necessary  party,  and 
should  properly  be  made  a  co-plaintiff,  although  he  may  be 
put  with  the  defendants. ^  These  ordinary  administration  suits, 
which  are  the  common  means  in  England  of  winding  up  and 
settling  the  estates  of  decedents,  are  practically  unknown  in  this 
country.  It  is  only  under  some  exceptional  circumstances  that 
the  equity  jurisdiction  is  with  us  invoked,  not  to  supersede  the 
action  of  the  probate  courts,  but  to  aid  it,  when  if  left  to  itself  it 
would  fail  to  afford  complete  relief  and  to  do  complete  justice. 
Whenever  such  exceptional  circumstances  exist,  and  by  reason 
of  fraud,  collusion,  or  other  similar  cause  on  the  part  of  the 
executor  or  administrator,  a  creditor,  or  legatee,  or  distributee 
of  an  estate,  may  and  does  bring  an  action  on  behalf  of  the  estate, 
even  in  such  a  case  the  personal  representative  —  the  adminis- 

1  1  Daniell's,  pp.  197-200,  and  cases  2  i  Darnell's,  p.  201;  Penny  v.  Watts, 
there  citeil.  Where  an  equitable  thing  in  2  Phil.  149,  153;  Donald  v.  Bather,  16 
action,  or  an  equitable  interest,  was  as-  Beav.  26;  Croft  v.  Waterton,  13  Sim. 
signed,  the  nssignee  could  sue  alone,  since  653.  For  illustrations  of  suits  -by  ad- 
there  was  no  possible  danger  of  an  action  raiui.strators,  heirs,  etc.,  see  Marsh  v. 
at  Uw  by  the  assignor.  Fad  wick  y.  Piatt,  Waupaca  Cy.  Sup.,  38  Wis.  250 ;  Jones 
11  Beav.  503;  Bagshaw  r.  Ertstern  Union  ,-.  Billstein,  28  id.  221  ;  Chipman  v  Mont- 
R.  Co,  7  Hare,  lU;  Blake  r.  Jones,  3  gomery,  63  N.  Y.  221;  Allison  i-.  Robin- 
Anst.  651.  There  is  no  difference,  under  son,  78  N.  C.  222  ;  Harris  v.  Bryant,  83  id. 
the  codes  generally,  between  the  assign-  568. 
ment  of  a  legal  and  of  an  equitable  thing 
in  action  in  re»[)ect  to  the  parties. 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE   ACTIONS.  241 

trator  or  executor  —  is  a  necessary  part}- ;  if  he  is  not  united  as  a 
co-plaintiff,  he  must  be  added  as  a  defendant.  ^ 

§  167.  *  253.  Rule  Applicable  to  Persons  Having  Legal  Demands 
Arising  out  of  Same  Subject-Matter.  In  all  the  foregoing  in- 
stances the  rule  has  been  applied  to  the  holders  of  a  legal  and  of 
an  equitable  estate  or  interest  in  the  subject-matter;  it  extends 
also  to  all  persons  having  legal  demands  against  the  defendant 
arising  out  of  the  same  subject-matter  or  event.  Thus,  where  a 
lease  has  been  assigned  by  the  lessee,  both  the  lessor  and  the 
lessee  may  each  sue  the  assignee  at  law  for  a  breach  by  him  of 
the  covenants.  In  equity,  however,  neither  is  permitted  to  sue 
the  assignee  without  joining  the  other  also,  so  that  the  defendant 
cannot  be  subjected  to  a  double  action  and  recovery.^ 

§  168.  *  254.  All  Holders  of  Concurrent  Equitable  Rights  against 
the  Defendant  should  be  made  Co-Plaintiffs.  Ill  the  class  of  caseS 
thus  far  examined,  either  an  equitable  right  existed  in  one  person 
and  a  legal  right  in  another,  or  a  legal  right  was  held  by  all. 
The  same  principle  extends  to  the  very  numerous  class  of  cases 
in  which  the  rights  against  the  defendant  arising  from  the  same 
subject-matter  or  event  are  all  equitable.  Whenever,  therefore, 
in  addition  to  the  plaintiff  who  actually  institutes  the  action, 
there  are  other  persons  having  concurrent  equitable  rights  against 
the  defendant  growing  out  of  the  same  subject-matter,  they  should 
in  general  be  made  parties  to  the  action,  primarily  no  doubt  as 
co-plaintiffs,  but,  if  not,  then  as  defendants.^  The  doctrine  thus 
stated  in  general  terms  has  a  very  wide  application,  and  upon  it 

^  Attorney  General  v.  Wynne,  Mos.  Hardy  v.  Miles,  91  N.  C.  131.  For  a  full 
126;  Wilson  v.  Moore,  1  My.  &  K.  126,  discussion  of  the  circumstances  under 
142;  Saunders  y.  Druce,  3  Drew.  140.  As  which  the  equity  jurisdiction  maybe  in- 
«xamples  of  such  actions,  see  Fisher  v.  voked  in  this  country  in  aid  of  the  probate 
Hubbell,  7  Lans.  481,  65  Barb.  74,  1  N.  Y.  courts,  see  3  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  §§  1152-1154, 
Sup.  Ct.  97  ;  in  which  the  same  person  and  extended  note  to  §  1154. 
was  executor  of  the  estates  of  A.  and  of  ^  I  Daniell's,  pp.  206,  207  ;  Sainstry  v. 
B.,  and  the  plaintiffs,  legatees  of  A.,  had  Grammer,  2  Eq.  Cas.  Abr.  165 ;  London  v. 
claims  which  placed  them  in  the  position  Richmond,  2  Vern  421  ;  1  Bro.  P.  C.  516. 
of  creditors  to  the  estate  of  B. ;  and  Lan-  ^  QSanborn  v.  People's  Ice  Co.  (1900), 
caster  v.  Gould,  46  Ind.  397,  which  was  82  Minn.  43,  84  N.  W.  641  :  In  a  suit  to 
.an  action  by  legatees  and  next  of  kin,  restrain  defendant  from  cutting  and  carry- 
■against  a  creditor  of  the  estate  and  the  ing  away  ice  from  a  lake  on  which  plain- 
executor,  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  allow-  tiff  is  a  riparian  owner,  there  is  no  defect 
ance  and  payment  of  a  claim  made  by  the  of  parties  plaintiff  where  the  plaintiff 
executor  to  the  creditor;  and  Stronach  shows  himself  specially  affected  by  de- 
V.  Stronach,  20  Wis.  129,  133.  See  also  fendant's  acts,  on  account  of  his  peculiar 
Hills  V.  Sherwood.  48  Cal.  386,  392  ;  relations  to  the  water,  not  shared  in  com- 
Haynes  v.  Harris,  33  Iowa,  516,  518-520  ;  mon  by  other  shore  owners.] 

IG 


242 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


is  based  a  very  large  portion  of  the  special  rules  as  to  parties 
which  prevail  in  equity.  It  includes  not  only  those  who  have 
concurrent  rights  in  the  whole  subject-matter  of  the  suit,  but 
those  also  who  have  similar  rights  in  a  part  of  it,  such  as  joint 
tenants,  who  must  all  be  parties  in  an  action  concerning  the 
property.^  In  a  suit  by  joint  tenants  or  tenants  in  common  for 
a  partition,  all  must  be  before  the  court;  but  it  is  not  necessary 
of  course  that  all  should  be  plaintiffs.^  There  have  been  relaxa- 
tions of  this  general  rule.  An  action  by  three  out  of  forty-seven 
tenants  in  common,  brought  to  restrain  the  defendants  from 
quarrying  stone  upon  the  land  which  was  owned  in  common  by 
the  whole  number,  has  been  sustained,  notwithstanding  an  objec- 
tion on  the  ground  of  the  non- joinder  was  interposed.  ^  And 
where  one  tenant  in  common  had  leased  his  share  for  a  long 
period  of  years,  the  lessee  was  permitted  to  maintain  a  partition 
against  the  other  tenants  in  common,  without  making  the  rever- 
sioner of  his  own  share  —  the  lessor— a  party.*  And  generally 
a  tenant  for  life  may  institute  a  partition  without  bringing  in  the 
remainder-men.^     When  land  is  held  by  tenants  in  common  for 


1  1  Daniell's,  pp.  207,  208;  Haycock 
I'.  Haycock,  2  Ch.  Cas.  124;  Weston  (.-. 
Keighley,  Finch,  82 ;  Stafford  v.  London, 
1  P.  Wms.  428 ;  1  Stra.  95.  Where  there 
are  two  or  more  trustees,  they  must  all 
unite,  since  their  interest  is  strictly  joint, 
riiatcher  u.  Candee,  33  How.  Pr.  145 
(N.  Y.  Ct.  of  App.).  In  a  suit  by  tenants 
in  common  to  restrain  a  nuisance,  the 
widow  of  a  deceased  co-tenant  is  properly 
joined  as  plaintiff,  for  the  protection  of 
her  dower  interest.  Shepard  v.  Man- 
hattan Ky.  Co.,  117  N.  Y.  442,  446,  447. 
In  Woodruff  v.  No.  Bloonifield  Gravel 
Min.  Co.,  8  Sawy.  62S,  s.  c.  15  Fed. 
Rep.  25,  it  was  held  that  one  tenant 
in  common  mif^ht  bring  suit  to  enjoin 
a  nuisance  affecting  the  property  with- 
out joining  his  co-tenants.  And  one  heir 
may  bring  an  action  to  restrain  the  dese- 
cration of  his  ancestor's  grave,  and  for 
damages,  without  joining  the  other  heirs. 
Mitchell  r.  Thorne,  57  Hun,  40.').  Where 
tenants  in  cr)mmon  of  a  tract  have  by 
separate  clccds  and  at  separate  times  and 
places  conveyed  their  interests  to  a  com- 
mon vendee,  they  cannot  join  in  a  .suit  to 
i:iiiccl  the  deeds,  as  neither  vendor  has 


an  interest  in  the  relief  demanded  by  the 
other.  Jeffers  v.  Forbes,  28  Kan.  174, 
179,  per  Brewer  J.  See  ante,  §  *219,  and 
notes. 

2  Anon.,  3  Swanst.  139;  Brashear  v. 
Macey,  3  J.  J.  Marsh.  93 ;  B raker  v.  Dev- 
ereaux,  8  Paige,  513;  Borah  v.  Archers, 
7  Dana,  176;  Cornish  v.  Gest,  2  Cox,  27. 
In  j)artition  by  a  tenant  in  common,  his 
wife  is  not  a  necessary  co-jilaintiff ;  she 
should  be  made  a  party  to  the  action,  but 
rather  as  a  defendant  than  as  a  j)laintiff. 
Rosekrans  v.  White,  7  Lans.  486.  The  ad- 
ministrator of  a  deceased  tenant  in  com- 
mon may,  under  certain  circumstances, 
be  a  proper  party,  together  with  liis  heirs, 
in  a  partition.  Scott  v.  Guernsey,  60  Barb. 
163,  181.  See  Sullivan  v.  Sullivan.  4  Hun, 
198  (partition). 

='  Ackroyd  v.  Briggs,  14  W.  R.  25. 
[Hannegan  v.  Roth  (1896),  12  Wash.  695, 
44  Pac.  256  :  Any  or  all  of  the  tenants  in 
common  may  maintain  an  action  to  quiet 
title,  under  Code  §  529.] 

^  Baring  i-.  Nash,  1  Vcs.  &  B.  551  ; 
Heaton  v.  Dearden,  16  Be:iv.  147. 

'  Wills  I'.  Slade,  6  Ves.  498 ;  Brassey 
1-.  Chalmers,  4  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  5l>.S. 


PLAINTIFFS   IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  243 

life,  or  when  there  are  future  contingent  interests  which  may 
finally  vest  in  persons  not  yet  in  being,  a  partition  may  l)e  had 
between  those  who  possess  the  present  estates;  but  it  will  only 
be  binding  upon  the  parties  who  are  before  the  court  and  those 
who  are  virtually  represented  by  such  parties. ^  In  an  action 
brought  to  determine  boundaries,  all  persons  interested,  whether 
their  estates  are  present  or  future,  remainder-men  and  rever- 
sioners, must  be  parties,  although  of  course  all  need  not  be 
plaintiffs. 2  It  is  not  necessary,  as  a  general  rule,  to  make  the 
actual  occupying  tenants  or  lessees  parties  in  suits  relating  to 
real  property.  They  must,  however,  be  parties  in  special  cases 
where  they  are  directly  interested  and  their  concurrence  is 
necessary;  2  as,  for  example,  in  a  partition  suit  where  a  tenant 
in  common  has  leased  his  share,  and  in  a  suit  brought  to  restrain 
an  ejectment  which  was  instituted  against  the  tenants  themselves 
instead  of  against  their  lessor.*  If,  on  the  other  hand,  lessees, 
or  any  persons  holding  limited  interests,  sue  to  establish  some 
general  right,  that  is,  some  right  belonging  to  or  affecting  the 
whole  estate  and  not  merely  their  own  temporary  possession  and 
user,  the  ultimate  owners  of  the  inheritance  must  also  be  made 
parties,  so  that  they  may  be  bound  by  the  decree,  but  the  require- 
ment will  be  satisfied  by  making  them  defendants.^  Thus,  where 
a  lessee  brought  an  action  to  establish  a  right  of  way  against  a 
person  who  had  erected  an  obstruction,  it  was  held  that  his  lessor 
should  have  been  joined  as  a  party  to  the  suit.^ 

1  Wotten  V.  Copeland,  7  Johns.  Ch.  fully  extracting  coal  from  the  leased 
140;  Striker  v.  Mott,  2  Paige,  387,389;     premises.] 

Woodworth  v.  Campbell,  5    Paige,    518;  ■♦  1    Daniell's,  p.  209;    Story  Eq.   PL 

Gaskell  v.  Gaskell,  6  Sim.  643;  Gayle  v.  §  1.51  ;  Lawley  v.  Walden,  3  Swanst.  142; 

Johnston,  80  Ala.  395.  Poole  v.  Marsh,  8   Sim.  528.     See  Saloy 

2  1    Daniell's,  p.  209;    Story   Eq.   PL  i;.  Bloch,  136  U.  S.  338. 

§  165;  Bayley  v.  Best,  1  Uuss.  &  My.  »  1  Daniell's,  pp.  209,  210. 
659;  Miller  v.  Warmington,  1  Jac.  &  ^  Poore  v.  Clarke,  2  Atk.  515.  [^Co- 
Walk.  484;  Speer  v.  Crawter,  2  Meriv.  lumhia  Water  Power  Co.  v.  Electric  Co. 
410;  Attorney  General  v.  Stephens,  1  K.  (1894),  43  S.  C.  154,  20  S.  E.  1002:  The 
&  J.  724;  6  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  Ill;  Pope  plaintiff  was  the  purchaser  of  a  canal  from 
V.  Melone,  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  239.  the  State.    Tiie  defendant  was  lessee  from 

3  [[United  Coal  Co.  v.  Canon  City  Coal  the  State  of  500  horse  power  of  water 
Co.  (1397),  24  Calo.  116,  48  Pac.  1045:  power  in  said  canal,  reserved  by  the  State 
Where  a  lessee  coal  company  is  under  in  the  sale  to  plaintiff,  the  lease  providing 
contract  to  pay  the  lessor  company  a  cer-  that  defendant  should  supply  the  State 
tain  royalty  on  every  ton  of  coal  mined,  as  penitentiary  with  100  horse  power,  and 
rental  for  the  property,  both  the  companies  should  have  the  remainder  for  its  own 
may  join  as  plaintiffs  in  an  injunction  profit.  Defendant  erected  a  steam  plant 
suit  against  other  parties  who  are  wrong-  on  the  banks  of  the  canal  as  supplemental 


244 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


^  169.  *  255.  Doctrine  extends  to  Actions  relating  to  Personad 
Property.  lUuatrations.  The  doctrine  that  persons  having  or 
chiiinin>'-  a  joint  interest  or  estate  must  unite,  extends  to  actions 
which  relate  to  personal  property  as  well  as  to  those  which  relate 
to  real  property. ^  The  following  particular  instances  will  illus- 
trate this  application.  If  a  legacy  is  given  to  two  jointly,  both 
must  sue  for  it;  but  if  legacies  are  given  separately,  there  being 
no  common  interest  in  any  particular  one,  each  legatee  may  sue 
for  his  own.-  Where  two  or  more  persons  are  jointly  interested 
in  the  money  secured  by  a  mortgage,  that  is,  according  to  the 
law  prevailing  in  this  country,  when  they  are  joint  mortgagees 
or  joint  assignees  of  a  mortgage,  they  must  all  unite  in  a  fore- 
closure. ^  And  it  is  not  even  necessary  that  they  should  be  joint 
holders  of  the  debt  secured  by  the  mortgage.  All  persons  who 
are  entitled  to  share  in  the  proceeds,  whether  their  interest  is 
joint  or  in  common,  or  several,  must  be  made  co-plaintiffs,  or  at 
least  must   be  brought  into  the  action  as  defendants.*     When, 


to  its  use  of  the  leased  water  power. 
Plaintiff  brought  a  suit  ia  equity  to  en- 
join defendant  from  using  the  water 
power,  and  also  asked  for  damages  for 
the  erection  of  the  steam  plant  on  plain- 
tiff's land.  Held,  that  inasmuch  as  the 
State,  being  owner  of  the  penitentiary,  is 
interested  in  the  use  of  the  water  power, 
the  State  is  an  indispensable  party  to  the 
injunction  proceedings,  but  that  in  the  law 
action  the  State  is  not  a  necessary  party.^ 

1  1  Daniell's.  p  211. 

2  Haycock  i-.  Haycock,  2  Ch.  Cas.  124; 
Haghsen  v.  Cookson,  3  Y.  &  C.  578. 

«  Story  Eq.  PI.  §  201  :  Stucker  v. 
Stucker,  .3  J.  J.  Mursh.  301  ;  Wing  v. 
Davis,  7  Greenl.  31  ;  Noyes  v.  Sawyer,  3 
Vt.  100  ;  WiKxlward  v.  Wood,  19  Ala.  213  ; 
Palmer  v.  Karl  of  Carlisle,  1  S.  &  S.  423 ; 
Lort-e  V.  Morgan,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  368 ;  Stans- 
field  f.  Hobson,  16  Beav.  189.  For  an  e.\- 
ample  of  misjoinder,  because  there  was 
no  community  of  interest,  see  Ferris  v. 
Dickerson,  47  Ind.  382.  See  also  Thomp- 
son V.  Smith,  63  N.  Y.  301  (a  vendor's 
lien);  Simpson  v.  Satterlee,  64  id.  6.57, 
6  Hun,  30.')  (where  the  holder  of  a  mort- 
(^age  lia.s  a'<8iirned  it  as  collateral  security, 
he  may  foreclose,  but  the  assignee  must 
alw>  be  joined  as  a  necessary  party):  see 
also  Cerf  v.  Ashley,  68  Cal.  419  ;  Church 


V.  Smith,  39  Wis.  492  (in  an  action  by 
a  grantor  to  enforce  the  grantor's  lien, 
when  a  portion  of  the  notes  given  for 
instalments  of  tlie  fund  have  been  as- 
signed, the  assignees  are  necessary  par- 
ties). Mesechaert  v.  Kennedy,  4  McCrary 
C.  Ct.  133  (joint  owners  of  bonds  must 
join  in  a  suit  to  declare  them  a  lieu  on 
property).  Contra,  Swenson  v.  Moliiie 
Plow  Co.,  14  Kan.  387  (wliere  a  mortgage 
was  given  to  secure  two  notes,  and  one  of 
the  notes  was  assigned,  the  mortgagee, 
and  the  assignee  of  the  note  cannot 
maintain  a  joint  action  on  the  notes  and 
mortgage). 

«  Story  Eq.  PI.  §  201  ;  Goodall  r. 
Mopley,  45  Ind.  355,  358.  In  this  case  a 
mortgage  had  been  executed  to  several 
different  mortgagees.  All  but  one  joined 
in  a  foreclosure,  and  he  was  afterwards 
permitted  to  foreclose  for  his  own  behalf, 
making  the  other  mortgagees,  as  well  a.s 
all  other  persons  interested,  defendants. 
See,  per  contra,  Montgomerie  v.  Marquis 
of  Bath,  3  Ves.  560.  —  a  case  whicli  has 
been  severely  criticised.  Two  mortga- 
gees of  land,  holding  several  mortgages 
given  at  the  same  time  to  secure  several 
obligations,  are  tenants  in  common,  and 
may  join  in  a  suit  to  foreclose  their  mort- 
gages.   Cochran  v.  Goodell,  131  Mass.  464. 


PLAINTIFFS   IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  245 

however,  the  mortgage  has  been  assigned  to  trustees  in  trust  for 
the  benefit  of  creditors,  the  trustees  are  the  only  necessary  parties 
plaintiff  in  a  foreclosure  suit,  and  the  creditors,  being  represented 
b}^  them,  need  not  be  joined.^  Actions  to  foreclose  mortgages 
upon  land,  and  those  to  enforce  and  foreclose  the  vendor's  lien 
upon  land  for  the  purchase-price  thereof,  are  in  all  respects 
based  upon  the  same  principles.  The  equitable  doctrine  prevail- 
ing in  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  States,  and  which  has  entirel}^ 
displaced  the  legal  notion,  regards  the  debt  as  the  essential  fact, 
and  the  mortgage  as  a  mere  incident  thereto.  The  holder  of  the 
mortgage  has  therefore  no  estate  in  the  mortgaged  premises.^ 
Whoever  is  interested  in  the  debt  as  one  of  the  creditors  is 
therefore  interested  in  the  mortgage  or  in  the  vendor's  lien,  and, 
upon  the  well-settled  rules  of  equity  procedure,  all  must  be  made 
parties  in  order  to  avoid  a  division  of  the  claim  and  a  multiplicity 
of  actions.^  In  the  Western  States  it  is  very  common,  on  the 
sale  of  land,  for  the  vendor  to  take  the  vendee's  notes  payable  at 
successive  dates  for  the  price,  and  either  to  receive  back  a  mort- 
gage given  to  secure  such  notes,  or  to  rely  upon  the  equitable 
lien  arising  from  the  sale  as  the  security.  All  the  holders  of 
such  notes  must  join  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  to  foreclose, 
whether  the  security  be  a  mortgage  or  the  mere  vendor's  lien.* 
A  note  and  mortgage  having  been  given  to  a  husband  and  wife 
as  security  for  money  of  the  wife  loaned  to  the  mortgagor,  and 
the  husband  dying,  the  wife  was  held  to  be  the  proper  party  to 
sue  in  her  own  name,  either  as  the  surviving  promisee  and  mort- 
gagee, or  because  the  contract  concerned  her  separate  estate.^ 

1  Morley    v.    Morley,    25   Beav.    253  ;  ^  Pettibone  v.  Edwards,   15  Wis.    95 ; 

Thomas  v.  Dunning,  5  De  G.  &  S.  618;  Jenkins    v.    Smith,    4    Mete.    (Ky.)   380; 

Knight  V.  Pocock,  24  Beav.  436.  Merritt  r.  Wells,  18  Ind.  171;  Goodall  v. 

-  ^It  was  held  in  Sidney  Stevens  Imple-  Mople\',  45  Ind.  355,  358.     See,  however, 

ment  Co.  i\  South  Ogden  Laud  Co.  (1899),  Rankin  r.  Major,  9  Iowa,  297.     Upon  the 

20  Utah,  267,   58  Pac.  843,  that  since  by  death  of  a  vendor,  it  is  held,  in  Kentucky, 

the  law  of  Utah  trustees  in  a  deed  of  trust  that  his  heirs  must  be  joined  as  plaintiffs 

are  not  vested  with  any  title  to  the  prop-  in  a  suit  to  enforce  the  lien  for  purchase- 

erty,    legal    or    equitable,    they   are    not  money,    that    the    administrator    cannot 

necessary  parties  in  an  action  to  foreclose  maintain  the  action   alone.     Anderson  v. 

the  deed  of  trust.]  Sutton,  2  Duv.  480,  486  ;  Smith  (•.  West's 

s  [[Held  iu  Casey  V.  Gibbons  (1902),  136  Ex.,  5   Litt.  48;    Edwards   v.  Bohannon, 

Cal.  368,  68  Pac.  1032,  that  the  plaintiff,  2  Dana,  98;  Thornton  v.  Knox's  Execu- 

in  her  individual  capacity  as  distributee  of  tors,  6  B.  Mon.  74 ;  Etheridge  v.  Vernoy, 

one  half  the  mortgage,  might  join  with  71    N.  C.   184,  185,   187.     [[See,   however, 

herself  as  executrix  representing  the  other  §  *340,  and  cases  cited  in  the  note.] 

half  of  the  mortgage.]  5  Shockley  v.  Shockley,  20  Ind.  108. 


246  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

§  170.  *  256.  Suits  to  Redeem.  The  rule  which  regulates 
actions  to  foreclose  prevails  also  in  those  brought  to  redeem. 
As  all  the  persons  entitled  to  share  in  the  mortgage  debt  must 
unite  in  the  foreclosure  suit,  so  in  a  suit  to  redeem,  the  mort- 
o-atror,  and  all  others  who  have  a  common  right  with  him  to 
redeem,  must  be  made  parties;  in  strict  theory  they  should  be 
co-plaintififs,  but  it  is  sufficient  if  the  one  who  for  his  own  pur- 
poses institutes  the  action  adds  the  others  as  defendants.^  Where 
a  judgment  of  foreclosure  had  been  obtained  on  a  mortgage,  and, 
with  the  authority  or  knowledge  of  the  mortgagee,  the  sheriff 
.sold  the  premises  in  the  usual  manner,  but  at  a  merely  nominal 
price,  it  was  held,  in  Indiana,  that  the  mortgagor  and  the  niort- 
jrasree  micjht  unite  in  an  action  to  set  the  sale  aside,  and  to 
redeem  the  land  from  the  purchaser,  —  the  mortgagor  by  virtue 
of  his  ownership,  and  the  mortgagee  by  virtue  of  his  interest  in 
having  a  price  produced  at  the  sale  large  enough  to  pay  his 
entire  claim. ^  The  general  doctrine  above  stated  is  strictly 
enforced  in  redemption  suits  of  all  varieties,  the  underlying 
principle  being  that  a  redemption  must  be  complete  and  total, 
that  the  creditor  shall  not  be  compelled  to  accept  a  partial  pay- 
ment of  his  claim,  or  to  make  a  partial  surrender  of  liis  securities. 
When  two  tracts  of  land  are  mortgaged  to  the  same 'person  to 
secure  the  same  debt,  and  they  afterwards  come  into  the  hands 
of  different  proprietors,  one  of  them  cannot  be  redeemed  without 
the  other;  the  owners  of  both  the  parcels,  and  all  persons  in- 
terested in  them,  must  be  parties  to  the  action,  if  not  all  as 
plaintiffs,  then  at  least  as  defendants.^  This  joinder  of  the 
persons  interested  in  the  two  estates  is  only  necessary,  however, 
while  the  mortgages  are  held  by  the  same  mortgagee  or  other 
holder.  If  one  of  them  is  assigned,  or  if  by  any  other  means 
they  come  into  the  hands  of  different  holders,  they  being  on  dis- 

1   1   Daniell's,  pp.  212,  2i;i;  Story  Kq.  liii.[,'sworth,    27    lud.    115;     Stringfield    v. 

V\.  §  201  ;  Chapman  v.  Hunt,  1  McCarter,  Graff,  22  Iowa,  438. 

149;    Large   v.    Van   Doren,   1    Mc-Carter.  »  Story  Eq.  PI.,  §§  182,  287;    Palk  ?•. 

208.     See  also    Haggerson  v.  Phillii).<,  37  Lord   Clinton,    12    Ves.   48;    Lord    Cliol- 

\Vi«.   3C4    (widow   of    a    decea-sed    inort-  raondeley  v.  Lord  Clinton,  2  Jac.  &  W.  1, 

gagor  i.-i  not  a  necessary  party)  ;   Parker  134;  Ireson  v.  Denn,  2  Cox,  42.');  Jones 

r.  Small,  ."iS  Ind.  349  (in  a  suit  to  redeem  v.    Smith,  2  Ves.  372.    6   Ves.  229   (n.); 

by  a  griintee,  the  grantor  is  not  a  neces-  Watts    v.    Symes,    1    De   G.,    M.    &    G. 

Bary  party)  ;  Southard  v.  Sutton,  68  Me.  240;  Tassell  v.  Smith,  2  De  G.  &  J.  713; 

57.V          '  Vint  IV    P.adget,  2  De  G.  &  .L  611  ;  Sell.y 

-  Berkshire  c.Shullz,  2.5  Ind.523.     See  i'.  Poinfrf.t.  1  .1.  &  II.  336.  3  De  G,  F.  & 

also   MeCuUoch's   Administrator   r.   IIol-  J.  59 J ;  Bailey  v.  Myrick,  36  Me.  50. 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  247 

tinct  parcels  of   land,  all  connection  between  them  is  severed, 
and  the  actions  to  redeem  must  be  separate.^     If  the  action  to 
redeem  is  brought  by  an  incumbrancer,  the  same  rule  applies. 
In  a  suit  by  an  incumbrancer,  who  seeks  to  redeem  from  a  prior 
incumbrance,  the  mortgagor  or  owner  of  the  land  subject  to  the 
incumbrances,  whatever  they  may  be,  is  an  indispensable  party, 
although  not  necessarily  a  plaintiff. ^     While  a  second  mortgagee, 
in  an  action  to  redeem,  must  thus  bring  in  the  mortgagor  or  his 
heir  or  other  owner  of  the  land,  he  may  foreclose  the  mortgagor 
and  a  third  mortgagee  without  joining  the  first  mortgagee  as  a 
party,  since  his  proceeding  does  not  in  the  least  affect  the  rights 
of  such  first  mortgagee,  but  its  effect  is  merely  to  put  himself  in 
the  place  of  the  mortgagor  and  of  the  third  mortgagee.^     This 
rule  may  be  stated  in  a  more  general  form.     In  suits  brought  to 
enforce  subsequent  claims,  intei-ests,  or  incumbrances,  on  prop- 
erty subject  to  prior  charges  which  are  to  be  left  unaffected,  the 
holders  of  such  prior  liens  or  interests  need  not  be  made  parties.* 
§  171.     *  257.     Suits   for   Accounting.       All   Persons  interested   in 
Jbaving  an   Account   Taken,   or   in   its    Result,   should    be   made    Co- 
Plaintiffs.      The  general    principle  that   all  persons  concurrently 
interested   in   the   subject-matter  of   the   suit   or  in   its    result, 
whether   that   relate    to   real   or   to  personal  property,  must  be 
parties,  is  invoked  and  strictly  enforced  in  all  species  of  actions 
which  are  brought  to  obtain  an  accounting  against  the  defendant. 
The  remedy  of  accounting  is  multiform,  and  it  is  often  made  the 
basis  of  some  further  and  ulterior  relief,  such  as  rescission  and 
cancellation,  redemption,  and  the  like ;  but  wherever  an  account- 
ing is  sought,  either  for  its  own  sake  or  as  the  preliminary  step 
to  further  judicial  action,  the  rules  as  to  parties  are  controlling. 
When  several  persons  are  interested  in  having  an  account  taken, 
or  in  its  result,  one  of  them  cannot  be  permitted  to  institute  a 

1  Willie  V.  Lugg,  2  Eden,  78.  371  ;    Arnold    v.    Bainbrigge,    2   De   G., 

2  1  Daniell's,  p.  214;  Story  Eq.  PI.  F.  &  J.  92;  Audsley  v.  Horn,  26  Beav. 
§§84,  186,  195;  Thomson  v.  BaskerviU,  195,  I  De  G.,  F.  &  J.  226;  Person  v. 
3  Ch.  Rep.  215;  Farmer  v.  Curtis,  2  Sim.  Merrick,  5  Wis.  231  ;  Wright  v.  Bundy, 
466;  Hunter  r.  Macklew,  5  Hare,  238;  11  Ind.  398.  In  England,  if  the  plain- 
Fell  V.  Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  276  ;  Palk  v.  tiff  in  such  an  action  brings  in  the  prior 
Lord  Clinton,  12  Ves.  48;  Hallock  i:  mortgagee,  he  must  offer  to  redeem  liis 
Smith,  4  Johns.  Ch.  649.  mortgage.     Gordon  v.  Horsfall,  5  Moore, 

s  1    Daniell's,   p.  214;    Story  Eq.  PI.     393. 
§  193;  Rose  v.  Page,  2  Sim.  471;  Bris-  *  1  Daniell's,  p.  214;    Rose  v.  Page,  2 

foe    V.    Kenrick,    1    Coop.    temp.    Cott.     Sim.  471  ;  Parker  f.  Fuller,  1  R.  &  M.  C.'jG. 


248  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

proceeding  for  that  purpose  by  himself  alone  and  without  joining- 
the  othei-s  in  some  manner,  so  that  they  shall  be  bound  by  the 
decree,  for  otherwise  the  defendant  would  be  exposed  to  as  many 
actions  as  theie  are  persons  interested,  each  brought  and  main- 
tained for  the  same  purpose  and  upon  substantially  the  same 
proofs.^  The  actions  in  which  an  accounting  is  necessary  are 
very  numerous,  and  arise  out  of  external  circumstances  very 
unlike,  but,  in  all  of  them,  the  rule  as  thus  stated  must  be  fol- 
lowed in  the  selection  of  the  parties.  Thus  in  a  partnership,  or 
any  other  like  adventure  where  there  is  a  sharing  of  profits  or 
losses,  all  the  persons  having  shares  must  be  made  parties  to  a 
suit  brought  for  an  accounting. ^  Under  the  proper  circum- 
stances one  may  sometimes  sue  on  behalf  of  himself  and  all  the 
others  interested,  and  it  is  not  indispensable  that  the  individuals 
having  concurrent  rights  should  all  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  in  the 
action. 2  If,  however,  one  or  more  of  the  parties  are  non-resi- 
dents, and  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  the  rule,  under 
such  circumstances,  is  sometimes  relaxed,  and  the  action  is 
allowed  to  proceed  with  those  parties  who  are  within  the  reach 
of  the  court  and  its  process.  The  admission  of  this  exception, 
or  of  similar  ones,  is  not,  however,  a  matter  of  absolute  right;  it 
depends  rather  upon  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court  regulated 
by  considerations  of  equity  and  justice.*  The  heirs  of  a  deceased 
partner  must  be  parties  in  an  action  brought  to  sell  real  estate  of 
the  firm  in  winding  up  the  partnership  and  paying  the  firm  debts ; 
although  the  land  is,  for  the  purpose  of  paying  firm  debts,  treated 
in  equity  as  a  personal  asset,  yet  the  legal  title  of  the  heir  must 
be  divested,  and  to  that  end  he  must  be  brought  in  as  a  party. ^ 

1  1  Daniell's,  p.  216;  Petrie  r.  Petrie,  7     Phila.  594;  Wells  r.  Strange,  5  Ga.  22  ; 
Laus.  90.     See  also  Getty  c  Develin,  70,     Mudgett  c.  Gager,  52  Me.  541. 

N.  Y.  504  (accounting)  ;  I'fohl /■.  Simpson,  *  The    following    cases   will   show   to 

74  i<l.  1.37  (action  against  a  fund  or  a  class  what    extetit,    and    under   what    circum- 

of  persons) ;  Eldridge  i-.  Putnam,  4G  Wis.  stances,  the  rule  has  been  relaxed  :  Story 

205  (all   the  cestuis  que  trustent  must  join  Eq.  PI.  §  78;  Darwent  i\  Walton,  2  Atk. 

in  an  action  against  the  trustee  for  an  ac-  510;  Walley  v.  Walley,  1  Vern.487;  Towle 

counting)  ;  Hughes  i-.  Boone,  81  N.  C.  204  v.  Pierce,  12  Mete.  329 ;  Vo.'se  v.  Philbrook, 

(action    for  contribution);    Hammond    t-.  3  Story,  3.35 ;  Lawrence  r.  Rokes,  53  Me. 

Pennock,  61  N.  Y.    145  (rescission  on  ac-  110,  116;  Fuller  y.  Benjamin,  23  Me.  255  ; 

count  of  fraud).  Drage  v.  ILirtupp,  28  Ch.  D.  414  ;  Palmer 

2  IreUiu  V.  Lewes,  Finch,  96;  MofTat  v.  Stevens,  100  Mass.  461.     See  Bowdoiu 
V.  Farquharson,  2  liro.  C.  C.  338.  College  v.  Merritt,  54  Fed.  Rep.  55. 

»  Story  Eq.  PI.  §  16C;  Good  f.  Blewitt,  ''  Piigh  v.  Currie,  5  Ala.  446;   Lnng  r. 

M  Vm.  397  ;  Cullen  r.  Duke  of  Queens-  Waring.  25  Ala.  625;  Andrews  w.  Brown, 
bury,  1    Bro.  C.  C.   101  ;  Hills  v.  Nash,  1      21  Ala.  437. 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE   ACTIONS.  249 

On  the  death  of  a  partner,  his  personal  representative  may  at 
once  maintain  an  action  against  the  survivors  for  an  accounting; 
and  when  there  was  no  real  estate  held  by  the  firm  as  a  part  of 
its  assets,  so  that  no  question  can  arise  as  to  the  title  of  any 
lands,  the  heirs  of.  the  deceased  are  neither  necessary  nor  proper 
parties  to  such  action.^ 

§  172.  "'  258.  Residuary  Legatees,  Distributees,  and  Next  of  Kin. 
Statement  of  General  Rule  herein.  Another  example  is  found  in 
the  action  by  a  residuary  legatee,  brought  to  obtain  an  account 
of  his  share  of  the  residue ;  he  must  make  all  persons  interested 
in  the  residue  parties,  even  though  their  interest  may  be  quite 
remote  and  contingent.^  One  residuary  legatee  may  sometimes 
sue  on  behalf  of  all  others  interested.^  Also  in  a  suit  by  next  of 
kin  or  distributees  against  the  administrator  for  an  account,  all 
of  the  next  of  kin  or  distributees  must  be  parties,  naturally  as 
plaintiffs,  but  if  not,  then  as  defendants.  This  is  the  established 
equity  rule  prior  to  or  independent  of  any  changes  made  by  stat- 
utes.* These  instances  of  distributees  and  residuary  legatees 
thus  given  are  in  fact  particular  cases  of  a  more  general  rule  in 
reference  to  actions  which  have  for  their  object,  in  whole  or  in 
part,  an  accounting  by  the  defendant,  which  may  be  stated  as 
follows:  When  the  persons  assert  the  claim  to  an  account  as  a 
portion  of  a  class  entitled  under  a  general  description,  all  the 
members  of  that  class,  or  all  the  individuals  included  under  that 
general  description,  must  be  before  the  court ;  if  not  among  the 
original  parties  to  the  suit,  they  must  be  brought  in  before  the 
final  hearing,  so  that  the  rights  of  the  entire  body  can  be  deter- 

1  Cheeseman  v.  Wiggins,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  ghan  v.  Smith,  2  Phil.  301 ;  Smith  v.  Snow, 
Ct.  595  3  Mad.  10;    Hares  v.  Stringer,  15  Beav. 

2  1  Daniell's,  pp.  216,  217;  Story  Eq.     206;  Grace  v.  Terrington,  1  Coll.  3. 

PI.  §§  89,  203,  204;  Parsons  v.  Neville,  3  »  Kettle  v.  Crary,  1  Paige,  417,  419, 
Bro.  C.C.  365;  Cockburn  i\  Thompson,  16  420;  Ross  v.  Crary,  1  Paige,  416;  Hal- 
Ves.  328;  Brown  v.  Hicketts,3  Johns.  Ch.  lett  v.  Ilallett,  2  Paige,  15, 19  ;  Egberts  v. 
553;  Davoue  i-.  Fanning,  4  Johns  Ch.  Woods,  3  Paige,  517. 
199;  Pritchard  v.  Hicks,  1  Paige,  270;  *  1  Daniell's,  pp.  217,218;  Story  Eq. 
Sheppard  v.  Starke,  3  Munf.  29  ;  West  v.  PI.  §  89  ;  Hawkins  r.  Hawkins,  1  Hare,  543, 
Randall,  2  Mason,  181,  190-199;  Huson  546;  Noland  y.  Turner.  5  J.  J.  Marsh.  179  ; 
V.  McKenzie,  Dev.  Eq.  463  ;  Arendell  v.  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason,  181,  190;  Kel- 
Blackwell,  Dev.  Eq.  354  ;  Bethel  v.  Wil-  lar  v.  Beelor,  5  Monr.  573  ;  Oldham  v.  Col- 
son,  1  Dev.  &  Bat.  Eq.  610.  See  Mc-  lius.  4  J.  J.  Mar^h,  50.  See  Petrie  v.  Pe- 
Arthnr  v.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340,  395.  As  trie,  7  Lans.  90;  McArthur  v.  Scott,  113 
illustrations  of  such  remote  and  contin-  U.S.  340, 395;  Bland  y.Fleeman,  29  Fed. 
gent  interests,  see  Sherrit  u.  Birch,  3  Bro.  Rep.  669;  Richtmyer  v.  Richtmyer,  50 
C  C.  229  (Perkins's  ed.  note)  ;  Davies  i:  Barb.  55. 
Davies,  11   Eng.  L.  &.  Eq.  R.  199;  Lena- 


250  CIVIL    KEMEUIES. 

mined  in  one  decree,  and  the  defendant  relieved  from  the  possi- 
bility of  a  multiplicity  of  actions.  Primarily,  all  these  persons 
being  interested  in  the  account  adversely  to  the  defendant,  they 
should  all  be  made  co-plaintiffs;  but,  as  has  often  been  observed, 
the  rules  of  equity  do  not  demand  this  strict  distinction  between 
plaintiffs  and  defendants,  and  they  are  satisfied  if  all  the  indi- 
viduals, besides  the  one  actually  instituting  the  suit,  are  placed 
among  the  defendants.  It  is  also  often  possible,  when  the  class 
is  numerous,  that  one  should  sue  on  behalf  of  all  the  others. 
This  general  rule  is  most  comprehensive  in  its  practical  applica- 
tion, and  must  be  invoked  in  a  very  large  number  of  cases  which 
have  little  external  resemblance;  it  was  well  established  both  in 
England  and  in  this  country  as  a  doctrine  of  equity  procedure, 
l)ut  has  of  late  years  been  much  modified  and  relaxed  in  England 
by  statutes.^ 

§  173.  *  259.  Same  Subject.  Exceptions.  Statement  of  Dis- 
tinction herein  referred  to.  There  are  some  exceptions,  however, 
to  the  foregoing  rule  which  requires  all  persons  interested  in  the 
result  of  an  accounting  to  be  made  parties.  When  some  of  the 
individuals  who  were  originally  interested  have  been  abeady 
separately  accounted  with  and  paid,  they  need  not  be  made 
parties  to  the  suit.^  And  when  the  accounts  and  shares  of  the 
different  persons  have  been  kept  entirely  separate  and  distinct 
from  each  other,  so  that  neither  one  is  interested  in  that  of  the 
others,  although  all  relate  to  the  same  adventure  or  undertaking, 
there  need  be  no  joinder  of  all.^  And  where  persons  are  each 
entitled  to  a  certain  fixed  portion  of  an  ascertained  sum  in  the 
hands  of  a  trustee,  each  may  sue  for  his  own  share  without 
joining  his  co-beneficiaries.^  The  distinction  here  referred  to  is 
important,  and  should  be  stated  more  fully,  as  follows:  If  a 
trustee  holds  a  fund  which  he  is  bound  to  distribute  to  different 
beneficiaries  in  unequal  proportions,  and  the  proportionate  share 
of   each  has  not  yet  been  ascertained,  all  the  persons  who  are 

1  See  1  Daiiiell's,  p.  217;  Story  Eq.  PI.  De  Taatet,  Jac.  28-4;  Bray  v:  Fromont, 
§  90.     See  Lancaster  Baptist  Cliurch  v.     6  Mad.  5. 

Presb.  Church,  18  B.  Mon.  635;  Ilutchin-  ♦  1  Daniell's,  p.  219;    Story    Eq.    PI. 

8on  r.  Roberts,  67  N.  C.  22.3.  §§  207  n,   212;    Perry  v.   Knott,    5   Beav. 

2  D'Wolf  f.  D'Wolf,  4  U.  L4.'J0;Branch  2'J3  ;  Smith  v.  Snow,  3  Mad.  10;  Hares 
V.  Booker,  3  Munf.  43;  Moore  v.  Beau-  r.  Stringor,  15  Beav.  206;  Lenaghan  v. 
champ,  5  Dana,  70.  Smith,   2    Phil.    301  ;    Hunt    v.    Peacock, 

*  Weymouth   v.    Boyer,    1    Ves.   416;     6  Hare,  301. 
Hills  V.  Na«li,  1  Phil.  5'J4,  597  ;    Brown  c. 


PLAINTIFFS   IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  251 

interested  in  the  distribution  are  necessary  parties  to  an  action 
brought  to  enforce  the  trust;  but  where  the  proportionate  share 
of  each  beneficiary  has  been  definitively  ascertained  by  a  proceed- 
ing binding  oh  the  trustee,  each  is  entitled  to  demand  payment 
of  the  share  belonging  to  himself,  and  when  the  payment  is  with- 
held he  may  maintain  a  separate  action  for  its  recovery.  The 
liability  of  the  trustee  to  each  is  then  exactly  the  same  as  though 
the  sum  ascertained  to  belong  to  him  was  the  only  sum  which 
the  trustee  had  received  and  had  been  directed  to  pay.^  When 
a  person  jointly  interested  in  the  account  is  out  of  the  jurisdic- 
tion, the  cause  has  sometimes  been  allowed  to  go  on  without  him 
as  a  party. ^ 

§  174.  *  260.  Special  Applications  of  General  Principles  above 
Stated.  General  Rule.  Important  Exceptions,  I  shall  now  briefly 
describe  some  of  the  most  important  special  applications  of  the 
foregoing  general  principles  in  relation  to  community  and  con- 
currence of  interests.  As  a  result  of  these  principles,  it  is  a 
general  rule,  with  but  few  well-defined  exceptions,  that  trustees 
cannot  alone  maintain  actions  relating  to  the  trust  property,  but 
the  beneficiaries  must  also  be  made  parties  to  the  suit  in  some 
form,  either  as  co-plaintiffs  with  the  trustees  or  as  defendants.^ 

1  Gen.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Benson,  5  Duer,  Malin,  2  Johns.  Ch.  238  ;  Fish  v.  Howland, 
168,176,  per  Duer  J.;  Walker  v.  Paul,  1  Paige,  20;  Schenck  v.  Elliugwood, 
Stanton's  (Ky.).  code,  p.  37  ;  Hubbard  i\  3  Edw.  Ch.  175;  Helm  v.  Hardin,  2  B. 
Burrell,  41  Wis.  365.  A  fund  had  been  Men.  232;  Barney  v.  Spear,  17  Ga.  223; 
devised  to  a  trustee  for  the  benefit  of  the  Woodward  v.  Wood,  19  Ala.  213  ;  Kirk  v. 
superannuated  preachers  of  a  certain  Clark,  Prec.  Cha.  275  ;  Phillipson  v.  Gatty, 
"  conference."  It  was  held  that  the  6  Hare,  26 ;  Brokaw  v.  Brokaw's  Ex.,  41 
superannuated  preachers  of  that  body  N.  J.  Eq.  215 ;  Northampton  First  Nat. 
might  unite  in  an  action  to  enforce  the  Bk.  v.  Crafts,  145  Mass..  444  ;  Boyd  r. 
trust  for  their  own  benefit  and  that  of  Jones,  44  Ark.  314.  Where  two  or  more 
future  persons  entitled  under  it.  Lan-  trustees  have  been  appointed,  they  must 
caster  Bapt.  Church  v.  Presb.  Church,  18  all  unite  in  actions  brought  by  them,  as 
B.  Mon.  635.  their  right  is  strictly  joint ;  and  this  rule 

2  Story  Eq.  PI.  §§  78,  89  ;  West  ?•.  Ran-  applies,  although  some  one  of  them  may 
dall,  2  Mason,  196  ;  Vose  r.  Philbrook,  have  attempted,  by  assignment  or  other- 
3  Story,  335 ;  Lawrence  v.  Kokes,  53  Me.  wise,  to  divest  himself  of  tlie  trust. 
110;  Mudgett  r.  Gager,  52  Me.  541;  Thatcher  v.  Candee,  33  How.  Pr.  145 
Drage  v.  Hartopp,  28  Ch.  D.  414  ;  Palmer  (N.  Y.  Ct.  of  App.).  And  see  cases  cited 
V.  Stevens,  100  Mass.  461.  supra  under  §  *  250. 

3  1  Daniell's,  pp.  220-224  ;  Story  Eq.  \J.t  was  held  in  Bennett  v.  Bennett 
PL  §§  207,  209;  Covington  &  Lex.  R.  Co.  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W.  409,  that  in 
V.  Bowler's  Heirs,  9  Bush,  468 ;  Western  an  action  by  a  guardian  the  ward  need  not 
R.  Co.  V.  Nolan,  48  N.  Y.  513;  Large  u.  be  joined  as  plaintiff,  under  §  32  of  the 
Van  Doren,  l' McCarter.  208 ;  Stilwell  V.  code.  Becker  r.  Strooher  (1902),  167 
McNeely,  1  Green,  Ch.  305;  Van  Doren  Mo.  306,  66  S.  W.  1083:  The  court  said, 
V.  Robinson,  1  C.  E.  Green,  256 ;  Malin  v.  "  It  is  well  settled  in  tliis  state  that  the 


252  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

The  following  are  simple  illustrations  of  this  general  doctrine. 
Where  trustees  in  trust  to  sell  lands  brought  an  action  against 
the  purchaser  at  their  sale  to  compel  a  specific  performance  of 
their  contract  of  purchase,  it  was  held  that  the  cestuis  q^ce  trustcnt 
of  the  purchase-money  must  be  made  parties.  ^  Again,  where  the 
trustees  of  a  numerous  unincorporated  society  brought  an  action 
to  compel  the  specific  performance  of  an  agreement  entered  into 
by  themselves  for  the  benefit  of  the  association,  it  was  held  that 
the  members  of  the  society  should  be  joined,  or,  if  they  were  too 
numerous,  then  some  of  them  ought  to  be  made  co-plaintiffs, 
suing  as  representatives  on  behalf  of  the  others. ^  There  are, 
however,  as  already  stated,  certain  well-defined  exceptions  to 
this  general  rule  requiring  trustees  and  cestuis  que  trustent  to  be 
joined  in  suits  concerning  the  trust  property,  of  which  the  fol- 
lowing are  the  most  important:  (1)  When  trustees  appointed  to 
sell  lands  are  expressly  authorized  by  the  deed  of  trust  to  sell  in 
their  own  names,  and  it  is  further  expressly  provided  in  such 
deed  that  their  own  receipt  of  the  price  shall  be  a  complete  dis- 
charge to  the  purchaser,  it  is  settled  that  they  may  maintain  a 
suit  to  compel  a  specific  performance  against  the  purchaser  with- 
out joining  the  cestuis  que  trustent  with   themselves  as  parties.^ 

(2)  In  some  special  instances,  where  the  interest  of  the  bene- 
ficiaries was  simply  collateral  to  the  rights  of  the  trustee  against 
the    defendant,   the    trustee  has  been  permitted   to   sue   alone.* 

(3)  And  in  suits  between  the  trustees  themselves,  brought  by 
one  to  compel  the  other  to  account  for  and  restore  trust  property 
misappropriated  by  him,  the  beneficiaries  need  not  be  made 
parties.^     But  if   the  cestuis  que  trustent  have  concurred  in    the 

beneficiary  and  trostee  in  a  deed  of  trust  selves    and   all   other    members    of    said 

executed  upon  land  the  subject  of  parti-  church."] 

lion,  prior  to  the  institution  of  a  suit  for  '^  See    1    Daniell's,    pp.    221,   222,    and 

that  purpose,  are  proper  parties  to  such  cases  cited. 

suit,  but  no  such  rule  prevails  with  re-  *  As,  for  example,  in  Saville  v.  Tan- 
spect  to  a  beneficiary  or  trustee,  in  a  crcd,  I  Ves.  Sen.  101,  3  Swanst.  141, 
mortgage  or  deed  of  trust  executed  after  Story  Eq.  PI.  §  221. 
a  partition  suit  has  been  instituted. "J  **  Story  Eq.  I'l.  §  21.3;  Franco  r. 
>  Calverley  v.  I'help,  6  Mad.  229.  Franco,  3  Ves.  77  ;  Bridget  v.  liames, 
2  Douglas  V.  Ilorsfall,  2  S.  &  S.  184.  1  Col.  72;  May  ?•.  Selby,  1  Y.  &  C.  235; 
QHeld  in  Lilly  v.  Menke  (1894).  126  Mo.  Horsley  v.  Fawcett,  11  Beav.  .565;  Peake 
190.  28  S.  W.'  643,  that  where  plaintiffs,  v.  Ledger,  8  Mare,  313,  4  De  G.  &  S.  137  ; 
iu  behalf  of  an  unincorporated  church  Baynard  r.  Woollcy.  20  Beav.  583  ;  Allen 
a.ssoriation,  bring  a  suit  in  partition,  the  v.  Knight,  5  Hare,  272,  277  ;  Cunningham 
petition  should  allege  th-it  plaintiffs  as  v.  Pell.  5  I'aige,  C07.  But  see  Chancel- 
trustees  of   the   church    "sue    for   theni-  lor  r.  Morecrafl,  1 1  Beav.  262.     Whcu  the 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  253 

breach  of  trust,  they  must  be  joined  in  the  suit  brought  by  one 
trustee  against  his  co-trustee  to  repair  the  fault.  ^ 

§  175.  *  261.  Case  of  Suits  by  Executors  and  Administrators, 
and  Suits  by  Assignees  in  Insolvency.  Important  Exceptions  Con- 
tinued. (4)  The  most  important  exception  by  far,  as  well  as  the 
most  familiar  one,  is  the  case  of  executors  and  administrators; 
they  can  always  sue  alone,  without  joining  the  legatees,  dis- 
tributees, creditors,  or  other  persons  interested  in  the  estate,  as 
parties  either  plaintiff  or  defendant.  The  legal  title  to  the 
personalty  is  so  completely  vested  in  the  executors  and  adminis- 
trators, that,  both  in  law  and  in  equity,  they  are  considered  as 
fully  representing  the  rights  and  interests  of  all  the  other  persons 
who  have  ultimate  claims  upon  such  estate  as  legatees,  distribu- 
tees, or  creditors.  In  all  actions,  therefore,  relating  to  the 
«state,  they  sue  alone.  This  rule  is  fully  established  in  equity 
as  well  as  at  law.^  All  the  acting  executors  or  administrators 
must  join ;  ^  but  if  a  portion  only  have  proved,  the  others  need 
not  be  made  parties,  although  they  may  not  have  formally 
renounced.*  It  is  not  indispensable,  however,  that  all  the  ex- 
ecutors or  administrators  should  be  plaintiffs ;  for  it  is  enough  in 
equity  if  all  the  parties  are  before  the  court,  so  that  one  executor 
or  administrator  may  sue  as  plaintiff,  if  he  make  his  co-executor 

suit  by  the  trustee  is  merely  to  recover  or  though   not  at  all  necessary,  is  not  im- 

reduce  to  possession  the  trust  property,  proper.     Richardson's    Administrator    v. 

and  is  in  no  way  intended  to  control  the  Spencer,  18  B.  Mon.  450.     An  adminis- 

administration  or  disposition  of  it,  or  to  trator  may  maintain  an  action  to  set  aside 

affect  the  right  or  relation  of  the  cestui  que  transfers  of  his  intestate  in  fraud  of  cred- 

trust,  the  latter  is  not  a  necessary  party,  itors,  since  he  represents  the  creditors  as 

Horsley  f .  Fawcett,  11  Beav.  .565;  Carey  well  as  the  deceased.     Cooley  v.  Brown, 

V.  Brown,  92  U.  S.  172,  and  cases  cited;  30  Iowa,  470,  47.3,  474.      And   see  cases 

Hickox   V.  Elliott,  10  Sawy.  415,   s.  c.  22  cited  supra  under  §  *252. 
Ted.  Rep.  13,  19,  20;  Smith  v.  Portland.  ^  1  Daniell's,  p.  226;   Offley  v.  Jenney, 

30  Fed.  Rep.  734  (suit  to  protect  the  trust  3  Ch.  Rep.  92  ;  Cramer  v.  Morton,  2  Mol- 

pnjperty    by    injunction)  ;     Re     Straut's  loy,  108. 

Estate,  126  N.  Y.  201  ;   Western  R.   Co.  *  Davies  ».  Williams,  I  Sim.  5;  Dyson 

V.   Nolan,  48  N.  Y.  513.     See  also  ante,  v.  Morris,  I  Hare,  413;   Rinehart  ?;.  Rine- 

§*178.  hart,   2   McCarter,  44;  Marsh  v.   Oliver, 

1  Jesse  V.  Bennett,  6  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  1  McCarter,  262.  But  an  executor  who 
€09.  has  not  proved  the  will  n)ay,  nevertheless, 

2  1  Daniell's,  p.  224  ;  Jones  v.  Good-  be  a  necessary  defendant  in  a  suit  brought 
child,  3  P.  Wms.  33  ;  Peake  v.  Ledger,  to  carry  its  trusts  into  effect.  Ferguson 
8  Hare,  313;  Smith  v.  Bolden,  33  Beav.  v.  Ferguson,  1  Hayes  &  J.  300;  Yates  v. 
262.  It  has  been  held  that  an  adminis-  Compton,  2  P.  Wms.  308 ;  Cramer  v. 
trator.  suing  in  equity  to  recover  assets  of  Morton,  2  Moll.  108;  Thompson  v.  Gra- 
the   estate,  may   join   the   distributees  as  ham,  1  Paige,  384. 

co-plaintiffs  ;  that  such  uniting  of  parties. 


254  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

or  co-administrator  a  defendant. ^  When  a  residuary  legatee 
sues  for  his  share  of  the  residue,  all  the  other  residuary  legatees 
must  be  joined  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants. ^  And  in  a 
suit  for  distribution,  all  the  distributees  must  be  brought  in  as 
parties,  primarily  as  plaintiffs,  but  at  all  events  as  defendants.^ 
Where  legacies  are  charged  upon  real  estate,  the  executors  alone 
are  not  sufficient  parties;  but  all  the  other  legatees  must  be 
brought  in,  so  that  the  assets  may  be  marshalled,  and  the  re- 
spective rights  of  all  may  be  determined.*  (5)  Another  impor- 
tant exception  to  the  rule  requiring  the  union  of  beneficiaries 
and  trustees  in  suits'  relating  to  the  trust  property  is  the  case  of 
assignees  in  trust  for  creditors,  and  the  assignees  in  bankruptcy 
or  insolvency.  These  particular  trustees,  as  well  as  executors 
and  administrators,  may  always  sue  and  defend  alone  in  such 
actions,  without  joining  with  themselves  the  creditors  whom  they 
represent  as  cestuis  que  trustent.^  Nor  need  the  assigning  debtor, 
bankrupt,  or  insolvent  be  made  a  party. ^ 

§  176.  *  262.  General  Principle  Applicable  to  those  Having 
Future  and  Expectant  Interests.  Equity  Doctrine.  Illustrations. 
The  principle  which  requires  all  persons  claiming  interests  in  the 
subject-matter  concurrent  with  the  plaintiff  who  instituted  the 
suit  to  be  made  parties,  is  applicable  in  general  to  those  having 
future  and  expectant  interests,  as  well  as  to  those  whose  inter- 
ests are  present,  and  whether  they  are  in  possession,  remainder, 
or  reversion.  It  is  the  established  doctrine  of  equity  that  when 
a  person  claims  an  estate,  either  under  a  will  or  a  deed  by  which 
successive  estates  or  interests  have  been  created,  all  the  other 
persons  claiming  under  the  same  will  or  deed,  down  to  the  one 
who  is  entitled  to  the  first  vested  estate  of  inheritance,  must  be 

>  Wilkins  v.  Fry,  1   Meriv.  244,  262  ;  v.  llallett,  2  Paige,  15;  Rowland  v.  Fish, 

Blonnt  i\  Burrow,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  90;  Dare  1    Paige,   20;  Toild    v.   Sterrett,   6   J.   J. 

i:  Allen,  1  Green,  Ch.  288.  Marsh.    432.      QIu    Youngson    i-.    Bond 

2  1  Daniell's.  p.  22.'> ;  Harvey  v.  Harvey,  (1902),  64  Neb.  615,  90  N.  W.  556,  it  was 

4   Beav.   215,   220;    Smart   f.    Bradstotk,  held  that  an  administrator  could  not  bring 

7    Beav.    500 ;     Bateman    v.    Margerisou,  an  action  to  quiet  title,  since   his  right  to 

6    Hare,    496,    499  ;    Doody    v.     Iliggins,  the  real  estate  was  ))ossess(>ry  only.] 

9   Hare,  Ap.  32,  38;  Gould  v.   Hayes,  19  ^  1  Daniell's,  p.  224;  Spragg  r.  Binkes, 

Ala.  438.  .'-,  Vf.s.  587.     See  also  .Jewett  v.  Tucker. 

"  HiiwkinB  V.  Craig,    1    B.    Mon.    27;  139   Ma.ss.  566  ;  Smith  v.  Jones,  18  Neb. 

Osborne  i:  Taylor.  12  Gratt.  117.    But  .see  481  ;  Warren  v.  Howard,  99  N.  C.  190. 

Kcfler  1-.  Keeler,  3  Stockn.  458 ;   Moore  f.  «  I)e  (iolls  r.  Ward,  3    P.    Wms.   311 

Gleaton,  23  Ga.  142.  (n.)  ;  Kayc  r.  Fosbrooke,  8  Sim.  28;  Dy- 

*  Morse  '■.  Sadler,  1  Co.\,  352  ;  Hallett  son  c.  Hornby,  7  l)e  G.,  M.  &  G.  1. 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  255 

joined  in  the  .action  as  parties,  either  as  co-plaintiffs  or  as  de- 
fendants. To  illustrate  by  a  simple  example:  If,  by  a  deed, 
land  has  been  given  to  A.  for  years,  with  remainder  to  B.  for 
life,  and  remainder  to  C.  in  fee,  and  A.  is  in  possession  as  the 
tenant  for  years,  B.  cannot  alone  maintain  an  action  against  A. 
to  restrain  tlie  commission  of  waste;  but  C,  the  remainder-man 
in  fee,  must  also  be  brought  in  as  a  party,  naturally  as  a  co- 
plaintiff,  but  if  not,  then  as  a  defendant,  so  that  he  may  be 
before  the  court  representing  the  ultimate  ownership.  All  those 
entitled  to  intermediate  estates  prior  to  the  first  vested  inherit- 
ance must  also  be  joined,  so  that  the  entire  ownership  may  be 
brought  before  the  court,  and  may  be  bound  by  its  decree.^ 

§  177.  *  263.  General  Rule  in  Suits  for  Specific  Performance. 
Illustrations.  In  actions  to  compel  the  specific  performance  of 
contracts,  the  immediate  parties  to  the  agreement  are,  as  a 
general  rule,  the  only  necessary  parties  to  the  suit;  but  this 
Includes,  of  course,  those  who  by  substitution  become  clothed 
with  the  rights  or  duties  of  the  original  contractors,  as  heirs, 
devisees,  or  sometimes  the  personal  representatives. ^  If  a  tract 
of  land  is  sold  in  separate  parcels  to  different  purchasers,  the 
latter  cannot  unite  in  an  action  for  a  specific  performance  against 
the  vendor,  since  each  sale  is  distinct,  and  depends  upon  its  own 
circumstances.  But  if  there  is  only  one  contract  of  sale  to  several 
persons  covering  the  land  in  question,  although  it  may  have 
stipulated  for  different  shares,  the  purchasers  may  unite ;  it  is 
not  necessary  that  the  vendees  should  be  jointly  interested  in  the 
purchase,  in  the  legal  import  of  that  term,  it  is  enough  if  they 
have  common  or  concurrent  interests  in  the  subject-matter. ^  If 
the  vendee  in  a  land  contract  dies,  his  heirs  are  the  parties  to 

1  1  Daniell's,  pp.  227-330;  Story  Eq.  5  Eq.  17;  Aberaman  Iron  Works  c.  Wick- 
Pl.  §  144;  Finch  v.  Finch,  2  Ves.  Sen.  ens,  L.  II.  4  Ch.  App.  101;  Feuwick  v. 
492;  Molineux  I'.  Powell,  3  P.  Wms.  268  Bulman,  L.  R.  9  Eq.  165;  Daking  v. 
(n.) ;  Herring  v.  Yoe,  1  Atk.  290;  Pyn-  Whimper,  26  Beav.  568;  Morgan  y.  Mor- 
cent  V.  Pyucent,  3  Atk.  571;  Sohier  v.  gan,  2  Wheat.  290;  Lord  v.  Underdunck, 
Williams,  1  Curtis,  479.  1    Saudf.    Ch.   46 ;    Hoover    v.    Donally. 

2  1  Daniell's,  p.  230 ;  Tasker  y.  Small,  3   Hen.   &  Man.  316.      See   McCotter  v. 

3  My.   &    Cr.  63,   69 ;    Wood   v.  White,  Lawrence,   6    N.  Y.    Sup.   Ct.    392.   395, 

4  My.  &  Cr.  460;  Robertson  v.  Gr.  West,  and  Maire  v.  Garrison,  83  N.  Y.  14,  29. 
Ry.  Co.,  10  Sim  314;  Humphreys  c.  Hoi-  \^¥or  an  interesting  case  concerning  the 
lis,  Jac.  73 ;  Patersoi^  v.  Long,  5  Beav.  186 ;  que.stiou  of  parties  plaintiff  in  an  actiou  of 
Peacock  v.  Peuson,  11  Beav.  355;  Petre  specific  performance,  see  Daly  v.  Ruddell 
V.  Duucomhc,  7  Hare,  24;  De  Hoghton  v.  (1902),  137  Cal.  671,  20  Pac.  784.3 
Money,  L.  11.  2  Ch.  App.  164, 170;  Bishop  "  Owen  v.  Frink,  24  CaL  171,  177. 

of  Winchester  v.  Mid.  Hants  Ry.  Co.,  L.  R. 


256  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

bring  an  action  for  a  specific  performance;  but  his. administrator, 
when  the  suit  is  simply  to  recover  damages.^  It  follows,  from 
the  general  rule  given  above,  that  a  mere  stranger  claiming  an 
interest  or  estate  under  an  adverse  title  is  neither  a  necessary  nor 
a  proper  party  to  the  suit  for  a  specific  performance ;  his  rights 
cannot  be  affected  by  the  decree  made  therein,  and  must,  in  fact, 
be  determined  in  another  and  distinct  proceeding. ^  But  a  person 
claiming  under  a  prior  agreement  is  not  such  a  mere  stranger, 
and  he  is  a  proper  party  in  an  action  brought  by  the  vendee  to 
compel  a  specific  performance,  and  to  determine  the  right  to  the 
purchase-money.^  Another  person  than  the  vendor  may  also  be 
so  interested  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  contract,  that  his  pres- 
ence or  aid  will  be  needed  in  order  to  make  out  a  complete  title ; 
and,  when  this  is  the  case,  such  person  may  also  be  joined  as  a 
party  to  the  suit  for  a  specific  performance,  although  not  an 
actual  party  to  the  contract  sought  to  be  enforced.*  Also,  when 
a  third  person  has,  after  the  making  of  the  contract,  acquired  some 
interest  in  the  subject-matter  under  the  vendor,  but  with  notice 
of  the  vendee's  rights,  he  may  be  brought  in  as  a  co-defendant 
■with  the  vendor  in  the  suit  for  a  specific  performance.^ 

§  178.  *  264.  Co-PIaintiffs  in  Suits  to  enforce  the  Trusts  of  a 
"Will.  It  was  a  well-established  doctrine  of  equitable  procedure, 
that,  in  suits  to  carry  into  effect  and  enforce  the  trusts  of  a  will, 
the  heirs-at-law  must  be  made  parties.  This  rule  has,  however, 
been  greatly  modified,  if  not  actually  abrogated,  in  England  by 
recent  statutory  legislation;  and  in  the  United  States  it  is  not 
often  invoked  because  such  suits  are  comparatively  infrequent.^ 

1  Webster  v.  Tibbitts.    19    Wis.    438;  Lawrence,    6    N.  Y.    Sap.   Ct.    392,   395; 

Peters  v.  Jones,  35  Iowa,  512,  518.     See  Story  Eq.  PI.  §  209. 

Gardner  v.   Kelso,  80  Ala.  497  ;    Hill  v.  ^  Spence  v.  Hogg,  1   Coll.  225 ;  CoUett 

Smith,  32   N.  J.  Eq.  473.     The  adminis-  v.  Hover,  1  Coll.  227  ;  Cutts  v.  Thodey,  13 

trator  is  not  a  proper  plaintiff  in  a  suit  Sim.  206 ;    Leuty  v.  Hilla.s,  2  De  G.  &  .1. 

for    .specific  performance  when  the   pur-  HO.      See   Carter  v.   Mills,   30    Mo.  432. 

cha,se-money  has  been  wholly  paid:  McKay  This   rule,    given    in    the   text,   must    be 

f.  Broad,  70  Ala.  377.  applied  under  a  great  variety  of  external 

-  Ta.sker  v.  Small,  3  My.  &  Cr.  63,  69 ;  circumstances,    and    is   exceedingly   com- 

De  Hoghtoa  v.  Money,  L.  R.  2  Ch.  App.  prehensive  in  its  operation. 
164,  170.  8  See,  on  the  subject  of  the  heirs  being 

*  West  Midland  Ry.  Co.  i;.  Nixon,  1  parties,  and  of  the  statutory  changes  in 
Hem.  &  M.  176;  Chadwick  v.  Maden,  England,!  Daniell's,  pp.  231,  232  ;  Story 
<>  Hare.  188.  Eq.  PI.  §  163.     As  to  actions  for  the  con- 

♦  Wood  V.  White,  4  M.  &  C.  460,  483;  struction  of  wills,  see  Chipman  v.  Mont- 
Chadwick  v.  Maden,  9  Hare,  18S;  Cope  gomery,  63  N.  Y.  221,  and  1  Pomeroy's 
V.  Parry,  2  Jac.  &  W.  538;  McCotter  v.  Equity,  §  352,  n.  (1). 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  257 

Where,  on  the  other  hand,  an  action  is  brought  to  set  aside  a 
will,  then  all  the  devisees  are  necessary  parties,  and  the  executor, 
unless  he  has  renounced ; '  and  all  the  legatees  residuary  and 
other.  2 

§  179.  *  265.  Principle  Underlying  Special  Rules.  Connecting 
Link.  General  Principle.  The  broad  principle  which  underlies 
most  of  the  foregoing  special  rules  is,  that  when  an  action  is 
instituted  by  some  determinate  individual  for  his  own  benefit, 
whom  we  call  the  plaintiff,  all  persons  having  interests  or  claims 
against  the  defendant,  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter,  concur- 
rent with  his,  must  be  brought  in  as  parties ;  if  they  do  not  wish 
to  unite  as  co-plaintiffs,  they  must  be  added  as  defendants.  The 
connecting  link  is  the  concurrence  of  the  interests.  If  this  element 
is  wanting,  the  principle  itself  is  not  operative.^  It  follows, 
therefore,  as  a  general  principle,  —  the  converse  of  that  already 
discussed,  —  that  when  a  suit  is  instituted  by  some  determinate 
individual,  whom  we  call  the  plaintiff',  and  there  are  other  per- 
sons asserting  claims  against  the  defendant,  even  in  respect  to 
the  same  subject-matter,  but  such  claims  are  set  up  under  titles 
antagonistic  to,  or  inconsistent  with,  that  of  the  plaintiff,  these 
persons  should  not  be  made  parties  to  the  action  either  as  plain- 
tiffs or  as  defendants,  since  the  indispensable  element  of  concur- 
rence in  their  interests  is  wanting,  so  that  if  they  were  joined  as 
parties,  two  distinct  controversies  at  least  would  be  carried  on  in 
the  single  litigation.*     Among  the  examples  of   such  improper 

1  Vancleave   v.   Beam,    2   Dana,    155;  joined  in  an   action  to  rescind   the  sale. 

Hunt  V.  Acre.  28  Ala.  580;   Vanderpoel  The  court  said:    "The  complaint    shows 

w.  Van  Valkenburgh,  6  N.  Y.  190.  that,  although    these    plaintiffs   severally 

'■2  McMaken  v.  McMaken.  18  Ala.  576.  owned  their  quota  of  shares,  they  never- 

'  Qln  an  action  to  enjoin  the  threatened  theless  acted  in  concert  respecting  them 

breach  of  a  contract,  there  is  a  misjoinder  and   the   interests    represented    by   them, 

of  parties  plaintiff  when  between  some  of  and  were  by  the  same   fraud  of  the  de- 

the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendant  there  is  fendaut  induced  to  act  in  concert  in  selling 

no  privity  of  contract  and  hence  no  in-  their  stock  to  him.     The  defendant  baited 

terest,  on  the  part  of  such  plaintiffs,  in  and  set  one  trap  for  both  and  caught  both 

the  outcome  of  the  litigation  :    Atlantic,  in   it.     The   wrong   of  the  defendant   de- 

-etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Southern  Pine  Co.  (1902),  stroyed  their  unity  of  action  as  owners  of 

116  Ga.  224,  42  S.  E.  500.  the   stock,  and   it   is   agreeable   to  equity 

In  Bradley  V.  Bradley  (1900),  165  N.Y.  that   the   plaintiffs   should    be  extricated 

183,  58  N.  Vj.  887,  the  two  plaintiffs,   by  together,  and  under  the  facts  tliey  allege 

reason  of  false  representations  respecting  be  permitted  to  act  together  in  rescinding 

the  value  and  condition  of  the  property  of  the  sale  and  in  reinstating  themselves  iu 

a  corporation   in   which  they  were  stock-  their  former  position. "J 
holders,  sold   their  shares  of   .stock  at  a  *  See  1  Daniell's,  pp.  229,  230-233. 

price  much  below  its  actual  value.     They 

17 


258  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

union  of  persons  whose  interests  are  antagonistic  is  the  case  of  an 
action  to  redeem  brought  by  an  heir-at-law  and  a  devisee  under 
a  will ;  the  joinder  is  improper,  since  one  or  the  other  of  these 
parties  has,  of  course,  no  right  to  redeem  in  the  case  supposed. ^ 
And  a  person  liable  to  account  to  the  other  plaintiffs  cannot  be 
joined  as  a  co-plaintiff.''^  This  objection,  based  upon  the  incon- 
sistency of  rights  and  interests,  does  not  appl}',  however,  to 
causes  in  which  a  single  plaintiff  unites  in  himself  two  or  more 
conflictinor  claims  or  interests.^ 

^  180.  *  2G0.  Distinct  Claims  not  necessarily  Inconsistent. 
Conflicting  Decisions.  Because  claims,  titles,  and  interests  are 
distinct,  and,  in  a  certain  sense,  independent  of  each  other,  they 
are  not  therefore  necessarily  antagonistic  or  inconsistent;  and 
persons  having  such  distinct  claims  and  interests,  which  are  not 
antagonistic  or  inconsistent,  may  often  be  united  in  an  action  of 
which  the  object  is  their  common  benefit.'*  In  applying  this 
principle,  there  is  some  diversity  of  opinion,  and  even  conflict 
among  the  decided  cases.  In  certain  classes  of  actions  the  doc- 
trine is  well  settled,  and  the  joinder  of  such  persons  is  a  matter 
of  common  practice.  In  other  classes  of  suits  the  courts  have 
not  been  so  unanimous;  sometimes  they  have  yielded  to  the 
general  tendency  of  equity,  which  seeks  to  determine  all  disputes 
concerning  the  same  subject-matter  in  one  litigation,  and  have 

1  Lord  Cholmondeley  r.  Lord  Clinton,  certain  property.     Thomas  purchased  the 

2  Jac.  &  W.  1,  135,  4  Bligh,   1,  s.  c.  T.  property  and    jrave    Troxel    his  note  for 

&  R.   107,  11.5;    Fiilham  v.  McCarthy,  1  §400,  payable  when  Troxel  should  pay  off 

H.  L.  Cases,  703 ;  Saumarez  v.  Saumarez,  the  •?400  due  Freeze.     Freeze   foreclosed 

4  M.  &  C.  336 ;   Robertson  v.  Southgate,  and  took    judgment    against   Miller   and 

6  Hare,  536 ;  Bill  i'.  Cureton,  2  M.  &  K.  Troxel  for  $560.     Thomas,  to  protect  his 

503  ;  Jopp  V.  Wood,  2  I)e  G.,  J.  &  S.  323 ;  interest   in  the   property,    purchased   the 

Griggs  V.  Staplee,  2  I)e  G.  &  S.  572  ;  New-  judjrment.      Miller    was    thus    liable    to 

comb  I'.   Horton,  18    Wis.  566;    Gates  v.  Thomas    on    the    judgment,    and    hence 

Boomer,  17   Wis.  455;  Crocker  i;.  Craig,  was  interested  in  having  the  amount  of 

46  Me.  327  ;    Fletcher  v.   Holmes,  40  Me.  Thomas's  note  to  Troxel  applied  on  the 

364.  judL'ment ;   and  Thomas,  having    himself 

■^  .Jacob  r.   Lucas,   1    Beav.   436,  443 ;  paid    the   judgment    which    Troxel    was 

Griffith  r.  Vanheythuysen.  9  Hare,  85.  liable    for.  was    interested    to    have    the 

'  Miles  r.  Durnford,  2  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  amount  of  his  note  to  Troxel  applied  on 

641;    Carter   ;;.   Sanders,    2    Drew,    248;  the    judgment   and    the    note    cancelled. 

Foulkc*  V.  Davies.  L   R.  7  Eq,  42.  /fold,  that  Miller  and  Thomas  had  suflB- 

*  QTroxel  i:  Thomjis  (1900).  155  Ind.  cient  common  interest  to  join  in  a  suit  to 

519,  58    X.    F    725:     Miller   and   Troxel  have   the   amount   of   the   note   held    by 

made   a   note  to  Freeze  for  S»00,  which  Troxel  applied  on  the  judgment  and  the 

Troxel  for  a  consideration  agreed  to  pay,  note  cancelled.] 
said  note  being  secured  by  mortgage  on 


PLAINTIFFS   IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  259 

therefore  permitted  the  union;  at  other  times  they  have  been 
controlled  by  the  fact  that  there  was  no  real  legal  community  of 
interest  among  the  parties,  and  have  refused  to  allow  the  at- 
tempted joinder.  As  it  will  be  impossible  to  deduce  any  general 
rule  covering  all  such  instances,  I  shall  first  mention  and  illus- 
trate those  classes  of  causes  in  which  the  doctrine  has  been 
established,  and  shall  in  the  second  place  collect  some  examples 
of  other  classes  in  which  there  is  no  such  unanimity  of  judicial 
decision.  The  most  familiar  and  important  case  of  persons 
having  distinct  but  not  conflicting  interests,  and  in  respect  of 
whom  the  rule  concerning  their  joinder  as  parties  is  well  settled, 
is  that  of  creditors.  There  are  several  species  of  actions  brought 
by  creditors,  in  which  the  various  creditors  of  a  single  debtor 
may  all  unite  as  co-plaintiffs.  Thus,  the  creditors  of  a  deceased 
debtor  m.ay  all  join  in  the  same  administration  suit  brought  to 
settle  his  estate,  and  to  administer  its  assets ;  but  this  species  of 
action  is  quite  uncommon  in  the  United  States.^  Such  union, 
however,  is  not  necessary;  one  may  sue  alone  if  he  choose ;2  and 
when  the  number  is  great,  one  may  sue  on  behalf  of  all  the 
others.  ^ 

§  181.  *  267.  Case  of  Creditors'  Suits.  The  most  common  and 
important  action  by  creditors,  to  which  the  rule  may  be  applied, 
is  the  creditor's  suit,  or  an  action  in  the  nature  of  a  creditor's 
suit.^  A  single  judgment  creditor  may  alone  maintain  an  action 
to  enforce  the  payment  of  his  judgment,  to  reach  equitable  assets, 
to  set  aside  fraudulent  transfers  by  his  debtor  and  thus  let  in  the 
lien  of  his  judgment,  and  for  other  similar  relief;  and  the  other 

1  1  Dauiell's,  p.  235;  Cosby  t-.  Wick-  v.  Dickinson    (1898),    100    Wis.    574,    76 

liffe,  7  B.  Mon.  120;  Conro  v.  Port  Henry  N.  W.  766.] 

Iron   Co.,    12    Barb.    27;    Cheshire   Iron  *  [^Doherty    v.    Holliday    (1893),    137 

Works  r.  Gay,  3  Gray,  531,  534,  535.  Ind.   282,   32   N.  E.    315:   While    it    is    a 

-  Anon.,  3  Atk.  572 ;  Peacock  v.  Monk,  general  rule  that  if  a  complaint  assumes 

1   Ves.  127,  131.     See  Hills  v.  Sherwood,  to  state  a  cause  of  action  in  favor  of  two 

48  Cal.  386,  392.  or  more  parties,  and    states   a   cau.se   of 

^  [^Gianella  v.  Bigelow  (1897),  96  Wis.  action  in  favor  of  a  part  only  of  the  par- 

185,  71  N.  W.  Ill  :  In  an  action  by  credi-  ties  thus  joined,  it   is  bad  on   demurrer, 

tors  to  enforce  the  liability  of  stockholders,  this  rule  does  not  apply  to  a  comjJaiut  in 

which  must  be  a  proceeding  in  equity,  all  the  nature  of  a  creditors'  bill  where  tliere 

the  creditors  should  join  or  one  or  more  is  a  statement    of  the   respective   claims 

should  sue  for  the  benefit  of  all,  such  lia-  of   creditors  showing   that  each  claim  is 

bilitv  being,  under  the  statute,  a  liability  several  and  distinct  and  there  is   no  at- 

of  all  the  stockholders  to  all  the  creditors,  tempt  to  state  a  joint  cause  of  action  in 

See  to  same  effect.  Van  Pelt  v.  Gardner  favor   of   those   who    are   named   iu   the 

(1898),  54  Neb.  701,  75  N.  W.  874  ;  Smith  title.] 


260  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

judgment  creditors  need  not  necessarily  be  joined,  either  as  co- 
plaintiffs  or  as  defendants,^  On  the  other  hand,  two  or  more 
of  the  judgment  creditors,  or  all  of  them  together,  may  unite  in 
bringing  such  an  action,^  or  finally,  one  may  sue  on  behalf  of 
himself,  and  all  others  who  are  in  the  same  position. ^  Since  all 
the  creditors  have  the  same  kind  of  interest  in  the  common  fund, 
the  assets  of  the  debtor,  and  since  a  receiver  is  frequently  ap- 
pointed over  that  fund,  the  utmost  latitude  is  permitted  in 
respect  to  the  union  of  different  creditors  as  co-plaintiffs.  One 
may  maintain  the  action  alone,  or  may  sue  on  behalf  of  himself 
and  of  all  the  others  similarly  situated,  or  all  may  join,  or  any 
number  less  than  all  may  at  their  election  institute  the  action. 
Such  an  action  may  also  be  brought  by  a  receiver  of  the  debtor's 
property,  appointed  in  proceedings  supplementary  to  execution, 
and  he  may  either  sue  alone,  or  the  judgment  creditors,  or  some 
of  them,  may  join  with  him.'* 

§  182.  *  268.  All  Beneficiaries  under  a  Trust  should  join  in  a 
Suit  to  enforce  it.  Different  Rule  in  Suits  to  overthrow  a  Trust. 
Where  an  assignment  has  been  made  in  trust  for  creditors,  one 
of  the  creditor  beneficiaries  cannot  maintain  an  action  to  enforce 


1  White's  Bank  of  Buffalo  i'.  Farthing,  citation  of  authorities.  When  the  debtor 
101  N.  Y.  344,  348.  i.s   dead,  a  judgment  creditor   may  bring 

2  Gorrell  v.  Gates,  79  Iowa,  632 ;  an  action  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  traus- 
[^Ganiet  i-.  Simmons  (1897),  103  la.  163,  fer  made  by  him.  Hills  v.  Sherwood, 
72  N.  W.  444  :  Several  judgment  credi-  48  Cal.  386,  392.  An  attaching  creditor 
tors  may  join  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  merely  cannot  maintain  the  action.  Weil 
fraudulent  conveyance.  Ferst's  Sons  v.  r.  Lankins,  3  Nel).  384,  386  ;  but  see,  for 
Powers  (1902),  64  S.  0.  221,  41  S.  E.  974  :  numerous  conflicting  decisions  on  this  last 
Two  or  more  creditors  may  join  in  an  ac-  point,  3  Pom.  Kq  .lur.  §  1415. 

tion  to  set  aside  a  sale  of  a  stock  of  goods  *  See    cases    cited    in    last    preceding 

as  a  fraud  upon  creditors  note;    also    Hamlin    v.   Wright,   23    Wis. 

Ellis  V.  Pullman  (1894),  95  Ga.  445,  22  491  ;  Gates  v.  Boomer,   17  Wis.  455,  458; 

S.  E.  568:   The  creditors  of  a  mercantile  Uuffing  r.  Tilton,  12  Ind.  259;   Burton  v. 

corporation  may  unite  in  an  equitable  peti-  Anderson,    Stanton's    (Ky.)   code,    p.   34; 

tion   against    the    corporators    wIkj   have  Baker  v.  Bartol,  6  Cal.  483.     For  further 

misap[)r<)priated  the  assets.]  illustrations  see    Ilann  v.  Van  Voorhis,  5 

«  Bartlett  v.  Drew,  57  N.  Y.  587,  588,  Ilun,   425;    Stewart  v.  Beale,  7  id.  405; 

589  ;    Clarkson    i;.    I)e    Peyster,  3  Paige,  Dewey  v.  Moyer,  9  id.  473  ;  Fox  v.  Moyer, 

320;    Parmelee   v.    Egan,    7   Paige,    610;  54N.  Y.  125;  Fort  Stanwix  Bank  ^'.  Lcg- 

Grosvenor  v.  Allen,    9   Paige,  74;    Farn-  gett,  51   id.   552;  Haines  v.  HoUistcr,  64 

ham  V.  Camyjbcll,  10  I'aige,  598  ;  Way  v.  id.  1  ;  Pierce  v.  Milwaukee  Constr.  Co.,  38 

Bra-raw,  1   C.  E.  Green,  213,  216;  Egdell  Wis.  2.53  ;  Hardy  v.  Mitcliell,  67  Ind.  485  ; 

r.  Haywood,  5   Atk.  357      See,  especially,  Smith  >•.  Schulting,  14  Hun,  .')2;   Green  r. 

Conro  c.  Port   Flenry  Iron   Co.,  12   Barb.  Walkill  Nat.   Bank,  7  id.  63;   Enright  -■. 

27,  57-60,  per  Willard  .1.,  for  a  full  di.scus-  Grant,  5  Utah,  334,  400. 
sion   of   the   subject,   and   an    exhaustive 


PLAINTIFFS    LNf    EQUITABLE   ACTIONS.  261 

the  trust,  to  compel  an  accounting  by  the  assignee,  and  to  pro- 
cure a  settlement  and  distribution  of  the  trust  estate.  All  the 
creditors  must  unite  in  bringing  such  an  action,  either  actually 
or  by  representation;  for  where  the  number  of  such  creditors  is 
great,  one  or  more  have  been  permitted  to  sue  on  behalf  of  them- 
selves and  all  the  others. ^  The  rule  thus  stated  in  respect  of 
creditors  is  simply  a  special  case  of  the  general  doctrine  appli- 
cable to  every  species  of  trust.  In  actions  based  upon  the  trust, 
recognizing  its  existence  and  validity,  and  seeking  to  carry  out 
its  terms  and  provisions,  all  the  persons  interested  must  be 
parties;  all  the  beneficiaries  must  therefore  unite  in  an  action 
against  the  trustee  brought  to  obtain  an  accounting,  and  a  wind- 
ing up  and  settlement  of  the  estate,  or,  in  technical  phraseology, 
an  action  brought  to  administer  the  trust. ^  While  the  bene- 
ficiaries as  a  class  must  all  unite,  either  actually  or  through  a 
representative  plaintiff,  in  actions  based  upon  the  trust  as  exist- 
ing, and  brought  to  administer  it,  one  person  who  would  be  a 
beneficiary  may,  without  joining  any  others,  maintain  a  suit 
which  is  based  upon  a  denial  of  the  trust  and  seeks  to  overthrow 
it,  and  to  set  aside  the  instruments  which  created  it,  and  the  acts 
of  the  trustee  done  under  it.  Thus,  for  example,  any  judgment 
creditor  may  bring  an  action  in  his  own  name  to  set  aside  an 
assignment  in  trust  for  himself  and  the  other  creditors.^ 

'  Story  Eq.  PI.  §§  150,  207;  Bainbridge  v.  Garrard,  25  Ga.  557  ;  High  v.  Worley, 

V.  Burton,  2   Beav.  539.     In   Harrison  v.  32  Ala.  709  ;  Gould  r.  Hayes,  19  Ala.  438; 

Stewardson,  2  Hare,  530,  twenty  creditors  Keeler  v.  Keeler,  3  Stockt.  458  ;  Case  v. 

was  held  to   be   too   small   a   number  to  Carroll,  35  N.  Y.  385 ;  Sortore  v.   Scott, 

allow  a  suit  by  representation.     After  a  6  Lans.  271,   275;    Munch  v.   Cockerell, 

receiver  of    a    national    bank    has   been  8  Sim.  219,  231.     See  French  v.  Gifford, 

appointed,   a  creditor    may    maintain   an  30    Iowa,    148,    158,    159;    O'Connor    v. 

action  to  establish  liis  demand,  and  the  Irvine,   74  Cal.   435  ;    Barrett  v.   Brown, 

bank  and  the  receiver  may  both  be  joined  86  N.  E.  556. 

as  co-defendants ;   the  appointment  of  the  ^  In  Hubbell  v.  Medbury,  53  N.  Y.  98, 

receiver  does  not  absolutely  dissolve  the  where  an  assignment   had  been  made  for 

corporation.     Green  u.  Walkill  Nat.  Bank,  the  benefit  of  creditors,  a  cestui  que  trust 

7  Hun,  63 ;  Nat.  Pahquioque  Bk.  c.  First  under  it  and  the  assignor  brought  an  ac- 

Nat.  Bk.  of  Bethel,  36  Conn.  325,  14  Wall,  tion  to  set  aside  a  wrongful  purchase  of 

283;  Kennedy  ?'.  Gibson,  8  Wall.  506;  Tur-  the  trust  property  by  the  assignee;   the 

ner  y.  Bank  of  Keokuk.  26  Iowa,  262.     In  action  was  sustained,  and  it  was  held  that 

Wilhelm  c.  Byles,  60  Mich.  561,  however,  a  .substituted  trustee  as  the  plaintiff  was 

it  was  held  tliat  all  the  creditors  are  not  unnecessary.     When  a  trustee  is  guilty  of 

necessary  parties  to  a  bill  brought  by  a  misconduct  in  his  tru.st,  by  misapplying 

creditor  to  enforce  the  trust.  the  assets,  or  converting  the  same  to  his 

'•2  De  la  Vergne  v.  Evertsoti,  1   Paige,  own  use,  a  single  cestui  que  trust  is  per- 

181;    Greene    v.    Sisson,    2    Curtis,    171;  milted  by  a  special  statute,  in  Minnesota. 

Hawkins   ;v  Craig,    1    B.   Mon.   27  ;    Flam  to  maintain  an  action  for  an  account,  and 


262 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  183.  *  269.  Joinder  of  Persons  Owning  Distinct  Parcels  of 
Land.  From  the  cases  of  creditors  and  cestuis  que  ti'ustciU,  in 
respect  of  whom  the  rule  is  well  settled,  I  now  pass  to  other 
classes  of  persons  having  distinct,  though  not  conflicting,  inter- 
ests and  claims,  and  I  collect  a  number  of  decisions  which  show 
the  tendency  of  the  courts  in  dealing  with  them.  Owners  of 
entirely  distinct  and  separate  parcels  of  land,  although  no  com- 
munity of  right  or  interest  existed  among  them,  have  been  per- 
mitted to  unite  in  equitable  actions  based  upon  their  individual 
separate  property,  simply  because  the  wrong  to  be  remedied  or 
prevented  was  a  single  act,  and  affected  all  of  them  and  all  of 
their  lands  in  the  same  manner.  ^  Thus,  owners  of  separate 
tenements  have  been  allowed  to  join  in  an  action  brought  to 
restrain  and  remove  a  nuisance  which  was  common  to  all.^  Two 
or  more  owners  of  separate  lots  assessed  for  a  local  street  im- 
provement, when  the  assessment  is  claimed  for  the  same  reason 
to  be  invalid  as  to  all,  may  unite  in  an  action  to  restrain  tiie 


to  enforce  the  trust,  and  to  remove  tlie 
trustee.  This  statute  is  general  in  its 
terms,  and  applies  to  all  trustees  and 
trusts.  "  Upon  petition  or  bill  of  any 
person  interested  in  the  execution  of  an 
express  trust,  the  Court  of  Chancery  may 
remove  any  trustee  who  shall  have  vio- 
lated, or  threatened  to  violate,  his  tru'^t." 
Compiled  Stat,  of  Minn.,  p.  38-t,  §  26; 
Goncelier  v.  Foret,  4  Minn.  13.  See 
French  t:  Gifford,  30  Iowa,  148,  1.58,  1.59. 
In  the  case  of  a  charitable  trust,  any 
beneficiary  having  an  interest  in  the  use 
or  in  the  subject  of  the  gift,  has  an  un- 
questionable right  to  institute  a  proceed- 
ing in  equity  for  the  purpose  of  securing 
a  faithful  execution  of  the  beneficent  ob- 
ject of  the  founder  of  the  charity.  Bapt. 
Church  at  Lancaster  v.  I'resb.  Church, 
18  B.  Mon.  635,  641. 

^  QDilTerent  riparian  owners  of  distinct 
parcels  of  riparian  land,  who  have  a  com- 
mon grievance  for  an  injury  of  the  same 
kind,  inflicted  at  the  .same  time  and  by  the 
same  act.s,  though  the  injury  differs  in 
(iegree  as  to  each  owner,  may  unite  in  a 
common  action  to  enjoin  a  higlier  riparian 
owner  from  diverting  or  ywlluting  the 
stream:  Strobel  v.  Kerr  Salt  Co.  (1900), 
164  N.  Y.  .303,  58  N.  E.  142.  See,  to  the 
Bame  effect,  Beach  i\  Spokane  Ranch  Co. 


(1901),  25  Mont.  379,  65  Pac.  Ill ;  Brown 
I'.  Canal  and  Reservoir  Co.  (1899),  26 
Colo.  66,  56  Pac.  183  ;  Ronnow  v.  Delmue 
(1895),  23  Nev.  29,  41  Pac.  1074.] 

■^  Peck  V.  Elder,  3  Sandf.  126.  But 
six  owners  of  distinct  tracts  of  laud 
through  which  a  stream  ran  were  not 
permitted  to  join  in  an  action  to  restrain 
another  riparian  owner  from  diverting 
the  water.  Schultz  v.  Winter,  7  Nev.  130. 
See,  per  contra,  Foot  v.  Bronson,  4  Lans. 
47,  52,  in  wliich  such  a  union  of  different 
owners  wjis  held  proper;  citing  Reid  r. 
Gifford,  Hopk.  416;  Murray  v.  Hay,  I 
Barb.  Ch.  59 ;  Brady  v.  Weeks,  3  Barb. 
157  ;  and  see  Keyes  v.  Little  York  Gold, 
&c.  Co.,  53  Cal.  724;  Churchill  r.  Lauer, 
84  Cal.  233.  Such  suit  may  be  main- 
tained by  separate  owners  of  distinct 
parcels  of  land  to  restrain  or  remove  a 
nuisance.  Pettebone  v.  Hamilton,  40  Wis. 
402  ;  Williams  i\  Smith,  22  id.  594;  Barnes 
V.  Racine,  4  id.  454  ;  First  Nat.  Bk.  of 
Mt.  Vernon  v.  Sarlls,  129  Ind.  201.  Such 
separate  owners  cannot,  however,  join  iu 
an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the  nui- 
sance :  ante,  §  *219,  and  note.  See  also 
Lutes  V.  Britrgs,  5  Hun,  67  (illegal  assess- 
ments). For  a  more  full  discussion  of  this 
subject,  see  1  Pomeroy's  Ei|uity,  §§  245, 
257,  258,  259,  260,  273,  and  c:iscs  cited. 


PLAINTIFFS    IX   EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  263 

collection;  and  when  the  number  of  such  owners  is  great,  one 
may  sue  as  a  representative  for  all  the  others.^  Also  a  number 
of  proprietors  of  adjacent  and  separate  lots  fronting  on  a  street 
through  which  a  railroad  was  laid  out,  were  permitted  to  join  in 
a  suit  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  company  from  construct- 
ing its  track  in  such  a  manner  as  to  interfere  with  access  to  all 
of  their  several  lots  alike. ^  The  question  as  to  the  joinder  of 
plaintiffs  who  own  distinct  parcels  of  land,  or  who  are  clothed 
with  distinct  primary  rights  of  the  same  kind,  which  are  all 
interfered  with  and  affected  in  the  same  manner  by  a  common 
wrong,  has  frequently  arisen  in  actions  brought  by  taxpayers  and 
freeholders  to  prevent  or  set  aside  some  proceeding  done  under 
the  forms  of  public  authority,  and  which  is  designed  to  create 
and  impose  a  public  burden,  such  as  a  tax  for  special  objects,  an 
assessment  for  some  local  improvement,  a  municipal  bonding  in 
aid  of  some  quasi  public  enterprise,  and  numerous  other  like 
proceedings  which  create  a  public  or  municipal  debt.  Such 
actions  are  permitted,  and  are  freely  used  in  most  of  the  States, 
although  not  allowed  in  New  York  and  a  few  others.  Where 
suits  of  this  character  are  sustained  by  the  courts,  the  question 
has  arisen,  whether  two  or  more  taxpayers  having  distinct  free- 
holds, or  distinct  pieces  of  property  subject  to  the  burden,  and 
who  have  no  connection  except  in  the  common  wrong  and  in  the 
like  relief  demanded  by  all,  may  unite  in  the  action,  or  whether 
one  may  sue  on  behalf  of  all,  or  finally,  whether  each  must  bring 
a  separate  suit  to  free  his  own  property  from  the  wrongful  incum- 
brance.^    It  would  seem,  upon  the  principle  of  the  decision  last 

1  Upingtoa  v.  Oviatt,  24  Ohio  St.  232,  owners  of  separate  parcels  of  land  were  not 

247  ;    Glenn  v.  Waddell,  23  Ohio  St.  605.  allowed  to  join  in  a  suit  to  quiet  title.] 

-  Tate  V.  Ohio  &  Miss.  R.  Co.,  10  Ind.  3  [^Street  v.  Town  of  Alden  (1895),  62 
174.  [[Abutting  land  or  lot  owners  may  Minn.  160,  64  N.  W.  157  :  An  action  to  set 
unite  as  ])laintiffs  to  restrain  the  improper  aside  a  judgment  fraudulently  obtained, 
use  of  a  street  by  a  railroad  company,  and  reversing  an  order  of  the  town  supervisors 
to  abate  the  nuisance,  but  cannot  join  in  a  vacating  a  road  running  through  plain- 
suit  to  recover  damages  :  Youukin  v.  Mil-  tiff's  farm,  is  properly  brought  by  plaintiff 
waukee,  etc.  Co.  (1901),  112  Wis.  15,  87  who  is  one  of  the  legal  voters  who 
N.  W.  861.  The  same  doctrine  was  stated  petitioned  for  such  vacating.  See  also 
in  Linden  Land  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  Elec-  McCaun  v.  City  of  Louisville  (1901), — 
trie,  etc.  Co.  (1900),  107  Wis.  493,  83  Ky.  — ,  63  S.  W.  446;  Commonwealth 
N.  W.  851,  where  it  was  held,  further,  that  v.  Scott  (1901),  —  Ky.  — ,  65  S.  W.  596  ; 
one  could  not  sue  for  all,  and  an  allega-  Stiles  v.  City  of  Guthrie  (1895),  3  OkLi. 
tion  in  the  complaint  that  plaintiff  does  26,  41  Pac.  383.  And  see,  generally,  the 
so  is  mere  surplusage.  In  Utterback  v.  subject  of  one  plaintiff  suing  on  behalf  of 
Meeker  (1896),  16  Wash.  185,  47  Pac.  423,  others,  *388  et  ser/.] 


264  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

quoted,  that  such  a  joinder  was  not  only  proper,  but  was  in  every- 
way expedient ;  but  the  cases  have  not  been  unanimous  upon  the 
point,  and  some  of  them  have  distinctly  pronounced  against  a 
joint  proceeding.  In  Wisconsin,  where  a  number  of  freeholders, 
owning  distinct  lots  of  land,  and  having  no  connection  except 
that  they  were  all  residents  of  the  municipality,  and  whose  per- 
sonal property  had  been  levied  upon  for  the  tax,  and  advertised 
for  sale,  united  in  an  action  to  set  aside  the  entire  proceedings 
of  the  local  authorities,  and  to  procure  the  tax  and  all  steps  taken 
in  relation  to  it  to  be  declared  void,  and  to  restrain  the  sale  of 
their  property,  it  was  held  that  these  plaintiffs  could  not  join  in 
a  suit  merely  to  prevent  the  sale  of  their  property  because  their 
interests  were  entirely  several ;  but  that  they  could  unite  in  an 
action  to  avoid  and  set  aside  the  proceedings  of  the  municipal 
authorities,  and  that  the  court,  having  thus  acquired  jurisdiction,. 
could  go  on  and  administer  complete  relief.^  In  another  case, 
two  plaintiffs  owning  distinct  lots  in  severalty,  and  suing  on 
behalf  of  all  other  taxpayers  of  the  city,  brought  an  action  to  set 
aside  a  local  assessment  and  tax  made  and  levied  by  the  city 
authorities,  and  to  restrain  the  sale  of  their  lots.  It  was  held 
that  they  could  not  maintain  the  joint  action.  The  court  said» 
if  the  tax  was  illegal  there  was  an  apparent  cloud  upon  each  lot, 
and  each  plaintiff  was  interested  only  in  removing  this  cloud 
from  his  own  land;  each  and  all  might  be  interested  in  the  legal 
question  involved  in  the  suit;  for  if  one  had  a  right  to  remove 
the  cloud  and  to  enjoin  the  assessment  as  illegal,  for  the  same 
reasons  and  upon  the  same  evidence,  each  of  the  others  might 
obtain  relief:  but  there  was  no  such  common  pecuniar}'  interest 
as  authorized  them  to  unite  in  one  suit  and  obtain  the  relief 
demanded ;  each  could  sue  alone,  and  the  others  were  not  neces- 
sary parties;  this  was  not  an  action  respecting  a  common  fund, 
nor  to  assert  a  common  right,  nor  to  restrain  acts  injurious  to 
property  in  which  all  the  plaintiffs  had  a  common  interest.^  In 
Ohio,  two  or  more  owners  of  separate  lots  assessed  for  a  local 
improvement  may  unite  in  an  action  to  restrain  the  enforcement 

'  Peck  I'.   Beloit  Sch.  Dist.  No.  4,  21  couclusions  wliich   they  reach.     See  also 

Wifl.  516.  N>wtomb  v.    Horton,   18  Wis.  566,  which 

^  Harnes  r.  Beloit,  19  Wis.  93.  94,  per  maintains  the  same  doctrine  as  Barnes  v. 

Downer  J.     It  is  impossilile  to  reconcile  Beloit. 
the  reasoning  in  tliese  two  cases,  or  the 


PLAINTIFFS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  265 

and  collection,  when  the  tax  is  claimed  for  the  same  reason  to  be 
invalid  as  to  all.^  In  Kansas  a  distinction  is  made  depending- 
upon  the  nature  of  the  tax  itself.  If  the  tax  is  wholly  illegal, 
that  is,  illegal  as  applied  to  all  persons  and  property,  —  as,  for 
example,  a  tax  to  pay  the  interest  on  illegal  bonds, —  any  number 
of  taxpayers  may  unite  in  the  action. ^  If,  however,  the  tax  is 
valid  as  a  tax,  —  as,  for  example,  the  ordinary  county  or  State 
tax,  —  and  becomes  illegal  for  some  cause  only  as  it  applies  to 
certain  persons  or  property,  then  each  person  severally  interested 
as  the  owner  of  distinct  and  separate  lots  of  land  must  sue  alone  ^ 
there  can  be  no  joinder  by  taxpayers  who  have  no  common  prop- 
erty.^ In  Iowa  it  has  been  recently  held  that  taxpayers  owning 
separate  property  cannot  unite,  nor  can  one  sue  on  behalf  of  all 
others  similarly  situated,  in  an  action  to  restrain  the  enforcement 
and  collection  of  an  illegal  tax,  but  each  must  bring  an  action  for 
himself.* 

§  184.  *  270.  Miscellaneous  Cases.  Joinder  of  Holders  of 
Separate  Liens,  Creditors  of  Corporations.  A  few  other  miscel- 
laneous cases  of  distinct  interests  may  be  mentioned.  When 
several  persons  have  simultaneous  but  entirely  separate  me- 
chanic's liens  upon  the  premises  of  the  same  person  for  work 
done  and  materials  furnished  by  them,  they  cannot  all,  nor  can 
any  two  or  more  of  them,  unite  in  an  action  brought  to  enforce 
and  foreclose  such  liens  under  the  statute.^  Under  the  con- 
struction given  to  statutes  of  Ohio,  making  the  shareholders  in 
corporations  liable  in  certain  contingencies  to  the  creditors  of  the 
companies,  it  is  held  that  a  suit  should  be  brought  by  or  for  all 
the  creditors  who  come  within  the  conditions;  that  is,  all  these 

1  Upiugton  V.  Oviatt,  24  Ohio  St.  232,  ^  Harsh  v.  Morgan,  1  Kan.  293,  298. 
247  ;  Glen  v.  VVaddell,  23  Ohio  St.  60.5.  The  following  are  further  illustrations  of 

2  Wyandotte,  etc.  Bridge  Co.  i\  Wyaii-  the  same  general  doctrine  :  actions  by  a 
dotte,  10  Kan.  326  ;  Gilmore  y.  Norton,  10  stockholder  or  the  stockliolders  against 
Kan.  491  ;  Gilinore  v.  Fox,  10  Kan.  hOd.  the  corporation  or  its  managing  officers  ; 

•*  Hudson  V.  Atchison  Cy.  Com'rs,   12  Osgood  r.  Maguire,  61  N.  Y.  524;  Youug 

Kan.  140,  146,  147.  v.  Drake,  8  Huu,  61  ;  Dousman  v.  Wis.,  etc. 

*  Fleming  v.   Mershon,  36  Iowa,  413,  Miu.  Co.,  40  Wi.s.  418;  Rogers  r.  Lafay- 

416-420.     The  question  was  carefully  ex-  ette  Agric.  Works,  52  Ind.  296,  and  numer- 

amined  with  a  reference  to  numerous  de-  ous  cases  cited  ;  Tippecanoe   Cy.  Com'rs 

cisions  of  equity  courts.     Cole  .1.  dissented  r.  Lafayette,  etc.  Tl.  K.,  50  Ind.  85  ;  action 

in  a  very  able  opinion  containing  a  review  to  remove  a  cloud,  Pier  v.  Fond  du  Lac, 

of  all  the   authorities,  pp    421-427.     For  38  Wis.  470  ;  action  by  one  firm  against 

an   extended    discussion   of    tin's    subject,  another  firm  where   there   is  a   coinmoni 

see  1  Pom.  Kq.  Jur.   §§  259,  260,  265,  266,  partner,  Ford  v.  Stuart  Indep.  Sch.  Dist., 

270,  and  notes.  4u  Iowa.  294. 


266  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

creditors  should  actually  be  made  plaintiffs,  or  the  action  should 
be  in  the  name  of  one  for  the  benefit  of  all.^ 


SECTION    SIXTH. 

WHO   MAT    BE   JOINKD   AS   DEFENDANTS. 

§  185.  *  271.  Statutory  Provisions.  The  Sections  of  the  various 
State  codes  and  practice  acts  which  prescribe  rules  for  the  proper 
selection  of  defendants  are  as  follows  ;  one  of  them  is  found  in 
all  the  statutes,  and  expresses  the  doctrine  in  its  general  form : 
*'  Any  person  may  be  made  a  defendant  who  has  or  claims  an 
interest  in  the  controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  or  who  is  a 
necessary  party  to  a  complete  determination,  or  settlement  of  the 
questions  involved  therein."  ^  To  this  general  declaration  there 
is  added  in  a  few  States  the  following  particular  clause :  "  And 
in  an  action  to  recover  the  possession  of  real  estate,  the  landlord 
and  tenant  thereof  may  be  joined  as  defendants,  and  any  person 
claiming  title  or  a  right  of  possession  to  real  estate  may  be  made  a 
party  plaintiff  or  defendant,  as  the  case  may  require,  to  any  such 
■action."  ^  The  codes  also  all  contain  the  following  provisions, 
either  embraced  in  a  single  section  or  separated  into  two,  namely : 
"  Of  the  parties  to  the  action,  those  who  are  united  in  interest 
must  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants  ;  but  if  the  consent  of 
any  one  who  should  have  been  joined  as  plaintiff  cannot*  be 
obtained,  he  may  be  made  a  defendant,  the  reason  thereof  being 
stated  in  the  complaint.*  When  the  question  is  one  of  common 
or  general  interest  of  many  persons,  or  when  the  parties  are  very 

1  Umsted  v.  Buskirk,  17  Ohio  St.  113.  »  New  York,  §  118  (447,  1503,  1598)  ; 
One  creditor  may  sue  on  behalf  of  all  to  South  Carolina,  §  141  ;  North  Carolina, 
enforce  .stockholders'  liability  for  unpaid  §  61  ;  California,  §  379;  QUtah,  Kev.  St., 
8ub.scriptions  in  California  :  Baines  v.  Bab-  1898,  §2914;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes, 
cock  (Cal.,  Sept.  2.J,  1891),  27  Pac.  674.  1899,  §  5230;    South    Dakota,   Ann.   St., 

2  (Jhio.  §  35;  Kansas,  §  36;  Iowa,  1901,  §  6078;  Montana,  §  581;  Idaho, 
§  2547;  Nebraska,  §  41;  Nevada,  §  13;  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3167;  Missouri, 
iJregon,  §  380;  hut  applied  only  to  e(iuita-  Rev.  St.  1899,  §  543.J 

bleactioiiH;  ^Oklahoma,  St.  1893,  §  3908;  ■•   Q"  If  such  a  defendant  answers  and 

Wa-shington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4833,  in  some-  admits  the  aliej^ations  of    the    complaint, 

what  different  form  ;   Wyoinin;^,  Rev.  St.,  .ind  asks  the  same  relief  as  the  jjhiintiff, 

1899,  §3480;  Colorado,  §  11;  Arkansas*,  he  will  be  regarded  as  a  plaintiff  and  given 

Sand.  &  llilKs  DIl'.,  §  5630;  Connecticut,  relief  as  such:   Cole  v.  Getziuger  (1897). 

Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  618  ;   Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  96  Wis.  559,  71  N.  W.  75.] 
§  2G03;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  269; 
Kentucky,  §  :i3.] 


WHO    MAY    BE    JOINED    AS    DEFENDANTS. 


267 


numerous,  and  it  may  be  impracticable  to  bring  them  all  before 
the  court,  one  or  more  may  sue  or  defend  for  the  benefit  of  the 
■whole."  ^  Finally,  a  section  is  found  in  every  code  particularly 
referring  to  the  case  of  persons  severally  liable  on  the  same  in- 
strument, of  which  the  ordinary  form  is  as  follows :  "  Persons 
severally  liable  upon  the  same  obligation  or  instrument,  includ- 
ing the  parties  to  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,  may 
all  or  any  of  them  be  included  in  the  same  action  at  the  option 
of  the  plaintiff."  ^ 

§  186.  *  272.  Subject-Matter  and  Plan  of  Treatment  herein. 
The  subject-matter  of  the  present  section  is  the  interpretation  of 
the  general  clauses  of  the  statute  quoted  above,  —  the  doctrine  of 
parties  defendant  in  its  general  scope  and  import, — the  general 
rules  which  prescribe  the  choice  and  direct  the  joinder  of  defend- 
ants in  civil  actions  of  all  kinds,  whether  legal  or  equitable.  The 
special  cases  described  in  the  other  clauses  of  the  statute,  — 
namely,  that  of  one  person   suing  or  being  sued  as  the  repre- 


^  These  provisions  are  thus  found  as  a 
single  section  in  New  York,  §  119  (448)  ; 
California,  §  382  ;  South  Carulina,  §  142  ; 
North  Carolina,  §  62 ;  Nevada,  §  14  (see 
page  81,  supra,  note  2)  ;  Oregon.  §  381 ; 
£Utah,    Rev.    St.,    1898,    §   2917;    North 
Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5232  ;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6079;  Arizona, 
Rev.   St.,  1901,  §  1313;  Montana,  §  584; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3170;  Colo- 
rado,   §    12;    Indiana,    Burns'    St.,    1901, 
§270;   Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §2604.]     In 
the  following  States  they  are  separated 
into  two  sections,  corresponding  to  the  tv/o 
paragraphs  of  the  text :  Ohio,  §§  36,  37 
Kansas,  §§  37,  38 ;   Iowa,  §§  2548,  2549 
^Nebraska,  §§  42,  43;  Kentucky,  §§  24 
25;  Oklahoma,   St.,  1893,  §§  3909,  3910 
Washington,   Bal.   Code,  §§  4833,  4834 
Wyomiug,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §§  3481,  3482 
Arkansas   Sand.    &    Hills  Dig.,  §§  5631 
5632;   Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §§  617 
619.]     The  Missouri  code  contains  only 
the  first  pjiragraph.  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  544 

2  New  York,  §  120  (454) ;  Kansas,  §  39 
Nebraska,  §  44  ;  Ohio,  §  38  ;  Oregon,  §  36 
South  Carolina,  §  143;  North  Carolina 
§  63  ;  Nevada,  §  15  ;  [^Minnesota,  St.,  1894 
§  5166,  "and  sureties  on  the  same  instru 
meut;"  Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2918 
North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5223, 


in  somewhat  different  form ;  South  Da- 
kota, Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6080,  same  form  as 
in  North  Dakota  ;  Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901, 
§  1306,  in  somewhat  different  form  ;  Okla- 
homa, St.,  1893,  §  3911  ;  Washington,  Bal. 
Code,  §  4836 ;  Montana,  §  585  ;  Idaho, 
Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3171;  Wyoming, 
Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3483  ;  Colorado,  §  13  ;  In- 
diana, Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  271  ;  Wisconsin, 
St.,  1898,  §  2609.]  In  California,  §  383, 
i.s  the  same,  adding,  "  and  sureties  on  the 
same  or  separate  instruments,"  after  the 
words  "  promissory  notes."  For  tlie  corre- 
sponding sections  in  the  codes  of  Kentucky, 
Iowa,  and  Missouri,  see  infi-a,  §  *  403.  In 
these  codes  the  change  in  the  common- 
law  doctrine  is  carried  to  a  much  greater 
length ;  tlie  distinctions  between  joint, 
joint  and  several,  and  several  liabilities 
are  utterly  abrogated.  The  same  radi- 
cal change  is  made  in  North  Carolina. 
"  §  63  a.  In  all  cases  of  joint  contract  of 
co-partners  in  trade  or  others,  suits  may 
be  brought  and  prosecuted  on  the  same 
against  all  or  any  number  of  the  persons 
making  such  contract."  Placing  "copart- 
ners  "  in  the  same  position  as  "  joint  ten- 
ants "  and  "  tenants  in  common,"  is  a  very 
strange  provision,  and  was  doubtless  an 
oversight. 


268  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

sentative  of  others,  and  that  of  persons  severally  liable  upon  the 
same  instrument  —  will  be  separately  discussed  in  the  two 
sections  which  follow  the  present  one. 

§  187.  *  286.  Intent  and  Object  of  Legislation.  Principle  of  Con- 
struction. Conclusions  Reached  in  Preceding  Section  Adopted  and 
Repeated  here.  Changes  Made  should  apply  to  all  Actions.  Posi- 
tion of  Courts.  What  is  the  general  intent  and  object  of  the 
legislation  in  reference  to  parties  defendant,  taken  as  a  whole  ? 
What  principle  of  construction  should  be  adopted  in  arriving  at 
the  practical  meaning  and  effect  of  the  various  provisions  of  the 
State  codes  already  quoted?  These  questions,  which  are  cer- 
tainly fundamental,  were  thoroughly  discussed  in  the  last  section, 
and  a  reiteration  of  the  reasoning  there  presented  would  be  en- 
tirely useless.  It  cannot  be  doubted  that  the  legislature  proposed 
to  itself  the  same  object,  and  was  actuated  by  the  same  intent, 
in  the  rules  which  it  has  prescribed  for  defendants  as  in  those 
which  it  has  adopted  for  plaintiffs.  I  dwell  upon  the  fact,  which 
is  apparent  upon  the  most  cursory  reading,  that  the  clauses  con- 
cerning defendants  are  more  full  and  detailed,  and  more  clearly 
set  forth  the  equitable  doctrines,  than  those  concerning  plaintiffs. 
This  fact  is  very  obvious  when  we  refer  to  the  subsequent  sec- 
tions of  the  codes  defining  the  forms  of  judgments,  and  authoriz- 
ing a  severance  among  the  parties  in  rendering  judgment,  and 
also  when  we  refer  to  the  special  provisions  in  many  codes  which 
utterly  abolish  the  ancient  legal  distinctions  between  joint,  joint 
and  several,  and  several  liabilities.  The  conclusions  reached  in 
the  preceding  section,  and  repeated  here,  are  the  following :  The 
legislature  does  not  seem  to  have  intended  to  abandon  the  ancient 
doctrine  in  respect  to  joint  and  several  rights ;  and,  in  fact,  the 
complete  adoption  of  the  equitable  principles  which  regulate 
the  union  of  parties  would  not  require  such  a  change,  for  in 
equity,  as  well  as  in  law,  all  persons  having  a  joint  right  must 
in  general  unite  in  a  suit  to  enforce  that  right.  The  legislature, 
on  the  other  hand,  does  seem  to  have  intended  to  effect  a  change 
more  or  less  thorough  in  the  common-law  rules  which  determine 
the  differences  between  joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several  lia- 
bilities, and  which  regulate  the  selection  and  union  of  defendants 
in  the  case  of  one  or  the  other  of  these  habilities.  This  intent, 
suflficiently  indicated  in  all  the  codes,  is  placed  beyond  a  doubt 
by   the  express  provisions  of  others.     The  general  conclusions 


GENERAL    DOCTRINES    AS    TO    DEFENDANTS.  26:) 

of  the  discussion  concerning  plaintiffs,  found  in  the  last  preced- 
ing section,  are  equally  true  of  parties  defendant.  Believing 
them  to  be  a  correct  interpretation  of  the  codes,  I  adopt  them 
here  without  any  unnecessary  repetition  of  the  reasoning  by 
which  they  were  established.^  The  rules  which  the  legislatures 
have  put  into  a  statutory  form  are  confessedly  the  general  doc- 
trines of  equity  concerning  defendants.^  They  apply  in  terms 
to  the  civil  action  appropriate  for  the  pursuit  of  all  remedies ; 
no  exceptions  are  made  or  suggested.  The  design  of  the  legis- 
lature is  therefore  plain,  that  these  equitable  doctrines  and  rules 
should  be  controlling  in  all  cases,  and  should  not  be  confined 
to  actions  which  are  equitable  in  their  nature.  It  must  be  con- 
fessed at  once,  however,  that  this  conclusion  has  not  been  ac- 
cepted by  all  the  courts,  nor  in  its  full  extent,  perhaps,  by  any. 
The  general  expressions  of  the  codes,  although  their  main  design 
is  e^^ident  enough,  have  not  been  regarded  as  sufficiently  explicit, 
detailed,  and  peremptory  to  abrogate  and  sweep  away  all  of  the 
long-settled  particular  rules  of  the  former  system.  In  other 
words,  the  change,  as  it  has  been  wrought  out  by  judicial  de- 
cision, has  been  made  partial  and  incomplete,  and  has  been  far 
more  radical  and  perfect  in  certain  of  the  States  than  in  others. 
It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  in  an  explicit  manner  any  more  defi- 
nite principle  of  interpretation  than  that  here  given.  The  actual 
position  of  the  courts  must  be  learned  from  their  decision  of  par- 
ticular cases,  and  from  the  special  rules  concerning  defendants  in 
various  classes  of  actions  which  have  been  established  by  them, 
and  which  will  be  detailed  in  the  following  portions  of  this 
section.^ 

1  See  supra,  §§*196-*200.  termine  who   is   liable,  and  who   is   not, 

2  Qn  Demarest  v.  Holdeman  (1901),  except  upon  a  full  hearing  in  which  all 
157  Ind.  467,  62  N.  E.  17,  it  was  said  that  the  persons  in  any  way  affected  or  inter- 
the  section  of  the  code  providing  that  any  ested  are  before  the  court,  equity  permits 
person  may  be  made  a  defendant  wlio  has  the  joinder  of  all  those  so  related  to  tiie 
■or  claims  an  interest  in  the  controversy  controversy,  and  who  have  a  common 
adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  or  who  is  a  neces-  interest  in  some  one  or  more  branches 
sary  party  to  a  complete  determination  or  of  it. "J 

settlement   of   the   questions   involved,  is  ^  The  general  theory  of  the  codes,  ami 

substantially  a  re-enactment  of  the  rules  the   principles   of  the  new  procedure   in 

governing  pleadings  in  chancery,  and  they  respect  of  parties  defendant,  are  discussed 

apply    to    all  suits  at   law  as  well  as  in  with  more  or  less  fulness  in  the  following 

equity.     And  "where  the  subject  of  the  cases:    Wilson    v.   Castro,   31    Cal.   420; 

action  has  become  so  complicated  and  en-  Bowers  v.  Keesecher,  9  Iowa,  422;  Nelson 

tangled  that  the  rights  of  the  parties  are  v.  Hart,  8  Ind.  293  ;  Braxton  v.  State,  25 

involved  in  doubt,  and  it  is  difficult  to  de-  Ind.  82  ;  Tinkum  i'.  O'Neale,  5  Nev.  93; 


270  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


Particular  Rules  and  Doctrines. 

S  188.  *  287.  How  take  Advantage  of  Nonjoinder  of  Defendants. 
"Waiver.  Power  of  Cdurt  herein.  Before  proceeding  to  the  ex- 
uniiiKition  in  detail  of  the  particular  rules  and  doctrines  as  to 
defendants,  which  have  been  established  by  judicial  decision,  1 
sluill  inquire  how  the  questions  may  be  raised  in  the  progress  of 
an  action;  when  the  objection  of  a  misjoinder  or  a  nonjoinder  is 
waived;  and  what  is  the  effect  of  such  an  error  in  the  proceed- 
ings, if  properly  brought  before  the  court  for  adjudication.  I 
have  already  quoted  and  discussed  the  statutory  provisions  which 
prescribe  the  modes  of  raising  the  questions  in  reference  to 
plaintiffs ;  ^  and  the  same  rules  exist  in  the  case  of  defendants, 
for  the  language  of  the  codes  in  defining  these  methods  applies 
alike  to  both  parties.^  It  was  shown,  in  the  paragraphs  referred 
to,  that  "defect"  of  parties  refers  solely  to  the  now- joinder  of  the 
proper  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  —  to  the  fact  of  too  feiv  parties. 
This  construction  is  universal.^'  It  is  settled  by  an  overwhelm- 
ing and  unanimous  array  of  authorities,  (1)  that  if  the  defect  of 
parties  defendant  —  as  thus  defined  —  appears  on  the  face  of  the 
complaint  or  petition,  the  defendant  who  desires  to  raise  the 
question  must  demur  upon  that  specific  ground,  an  allegation  of 
the  defect  in  the  answer  as  a  defence  being  nugatory;  (2)  when 
the  defect  does  not  thus  appear  on  the  face  of  the  plaintiff's 
pleading,  the  defendant  must  raise  the  objection  in  his  answer  as 
a  defence;  and,  (3)  if  both  of  these  methods  are  omitted,  or  if 
one  of  them  is  employed  when  the  other  is  proper,  the  defendant 
waives  all  objection  to  the  defect  or  nonjoinder.*     In  no  case  can 

Smetters  v.  Rainey,  14  Ohio  St.  287,  291  ;  Dist.  Tp.  v.  Pratt,  17  Iowa,  16;  Byers  v. 

Union  Banic  v.  Bell,  U  Ohio  St.  200,  211.  Kodabaugh,  17  Iowa,  53. 

Where  a  demand  exist.s  in  favor  of  a  firm,  ^  Ibid.;  Truesdale  v.  Rhodes,  26  Wis. 

and  one  partner  refuses  to  join  as  a  jjlain-  215,  219,  220.     Read  i'.  Sang,  21  Wis  678, 

liff,  he  may  he  m.ade  a  defendant  in  an  laid   down  a  different  rule,  but  the  Wis- 

ordinary  legal  action  brought  by  his  co-  consin  court  is  now  in  harmony  with  those 

partM<rs    to    recover    the   debt.     Hill    r.  of  all  the  other  States.     See  also  Marsh  r. 

Mar.xh.  40  Iiid.  218.     This  ruling,  in  my  WaupacnCy.  Sup..  38  Wis.  250;  Great  W. 

opinion,  exhibits  the   true  intent  of   the  Compound  Co.  r.  yEtna  Ins.  Co.,  40  id.  373. 

codes  in  the  clearest  possible  manner.  ♦  Bevier   c.    Dillingham.    18  Wis.  529; 

1  See  supra,  §§  •200,  «207.  Burhop  v.  Milwaukee^  18  Wis.  431  ;  Cord 

^  .See  tlie  citations  from  the  codes,  and  i-.  Hirsch,  17  Wis.  403  ;  Carney  v.  LaCros.-^, 

the  cases  collected  supra,  §§  *  200,  *207  ;  etc.  R.  Co.,  15  Wis.  503 ;  Lowry  v.  Harris, 

Hill   I'.    Marsh,  40    Ind.   218;    .Moruan    v.  12    Minn.   255;   Mitchell   v.    Bank    of    St. 

Carroll,  35   Iowa,  22,  24,  25  ;    Beckwith  v.  Paul,  7   Minn.  252  ;  Carr  v.   Waldron,  44 

Darg-rl.s,  13  lowa,  303;  Sioux   City  Sch.  Mo.    393;    Makepeace  v.   Davis,   27    Ind. 


NONJOINDER   OF    DEFENDANTS. 


271 


this  objection  be  raised  by  a  demurrer  on  the  ground  that  the 
pleading  does  not  state  facts  sul'ficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of 
action.  1  Although  this  rule  is  so  firmly  settled,  yet  if,  on  the 
trial,  or  even  on  appeal,  the  court  sees  that  other  parties  are 
indispensable  to  a  full  determination  of  the  questions  at  issue, 
it  may,  on  its  own  motion,  even  though  the  defect  has  not  been 
pointed  out  by  answer  or  demurrer,  order  the  additional  parties 
to  be    brought  in.^     This    power  is  expressly  given   by  all  the 


352  ;  Little  v.  Johnson,  26  Ind.  170  ;  John- 
son V.  Britton,  23  Ind.  105 ;  Shane  v. 
Lowry,  48  Ind.  205,  206  ;  Strong  v.  Down- 
ing, 34  Ind.  300 ;  Turner  v.  First  National 
Bank,  26  Iowa,  5G2  ;  Hosley  v.  lilack,  28 
N.  Y.  438  ;  Kingsland  v.  Braisted,  2  Laus. 
17  :  Sager  v.  Nichols,  1  Daly,  1  ;  Bridge  v. 
Payson,  5  Sandf.  210;  Lewis  v.  Williams, 
3  Minn.  151  ;  Hier  t:  Staples,  51  N.  Y. 
136;  Fort  Stanwix  Bank  v.  Leggett,  51 
N.  Y.  552;  Potter  v.  Ellice,  48  N.  Y.  321  ; 
Pavisich  v.  Bean,  48  Cal.  364  ;  Kuteuberg 
V.  JMain,  47  Cal.  213;  Gillam  i'.  Sigmau, 
29  Cal.  637.  See,  however,  Muir  v.  Gib- 
son, 8  Ind.  187  ;  Shaver  v.  Brainard,  29 
Barb.  25.  Also,  Hardy  v.  Miller,  11  Neb. 
395  ;  Black  v.  Duncan,  60  Ind.  522 ;  Gil- 
bert V.  Allen,  57  Ind.  524  ;  Hardee  v.  Hall, 
12  Bush,  327  ;  Rossi'.  Linder,  12  S.  C.  592  ; 
[^Beach  v.  Spokane  Ranch  Co.  (1901),  25 
Mont  379,  65  Pac.  Ill;  Coddington  v. 
Canaday  (1901),  157  Ind.  243,  61  N.  E. 
567;  Wyman  v.  Herard  (1899),  9  Okla. 
35,  59  Pac.  1009. 

Unless  the  objection  of  defect  of  parties 
defendant  is  made  before  trial,  it  is  waived : 
Thurston  v.  Thurston  (1894),  58  Minn. 
279,  59  N.  W.  1017 ;  Bignold  v.  Carr 
(1901),  24  Wash.413,64  Pac.  519.  Where 
the  case  was  tried  without  the  objection 
being  made,  it  was  waived  :  Lawrence  v. 
Congregational  Church  (1900),  164  N.  Y. 
115,  58  N".  E.  24  ;  Bowery.  Cassels  (1900), 
59  Neb.  620,  81  N.  W.  622.  The  objection 
of  defect  of  parties  defendant  must  be 
made  by  answer  or  demurrer  or  it  is 
waived  :  Henderson  v.  Turngren  (1894),  9 
Utah,  432,  35  Pac.  495  ;  Ayres  v.  Duggan 
(1899),  57  Neb.  750,  78  n'  W.  296;  Fitz- 
gerald V.  Fitzgerald,  etc.  Co.  (1895),  44 
Neb.  463,  62  N.  W.  899.  The  question 
cannot  be  raised  by  a  motion  for  a  non- 
suit:  Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Mayer  (1896), 
100  Ga.  87,  26  S.  E.  83  ;  Shull'r.   Caugh- 


man  (1898),  54  S.  C.  203,  32  S.  E.  301  ; 
nor  by  objection  to  testimony  at  the  trial : 
Dickerson  v.  Spokane  (1901),  26  Wash. 
292,  66  Pac.  381  ;  Greene  v.  Finnell  (1900). 
22  Wash.  186,  60  Pac.  144;  nor  by  an  af- 
firmative defence  setting  up  a  novation  : 
Scott  V.  Hallock  (1897),  16  Wash.  439,  47 
Pac.  968. 

In  State  ex  rel.  v.  Metschan  (1896),  32 
Ore.  372,  46  Pac.  791,  the  court  said  :  "At 
common  law  a  demurrer  for  want  of  neces- 
sary parties  defendant  was  required  to 
point  out,  either  by  name  or  in  some  other 
definite  way,  from  tlie  facts  stated  in  the 
bill,  those  who  should  have  been,  and 
were  not,  made  parties  to  the  suit,  so  as 
to  enable  the  plaintiff  to  obviate  the  objec- 
tion by  bringing  them  in  ;  and  this  rule 
has  not  been  abrogated  by  the  provisions 
of  the  code."  And  in  Jaeger  v.  Suude 
(1897),  70  Minn.  356,  73  N.  W.  171,  the 
court  said :  "  Under  the  code,  as  under 
the  old  chancery  practice,  a  demurrer  for 
defect  of  parties  defendant  is  bad  if  it 
does  not  in  some  suitable  manner  point 
out  the  persons  who  ought  to  be  made 
defendants. "3 

1  Leedy  v.  Nash,  67  Ind.  311. 

2  []An  important  case  dealing  with  the 
question  of  waiving  defects  of  parties  de- 
fendant, has  very  recently  been  decided 
by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals.  Stein- 
bach  V.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  (1902),  172 
N.  Y.  471,  65  N.  E.  281.  One  Fehrman 
was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff,  and  to  secure 
the  debt  a  policy  of  insurance  was  taken 
out  in  the  defendant  company  upon  the 
life  of  said  Fehrman,  the  plaintiff  agree- 
ing to  pay  the  premiums  in  considera- 
tion of  the  policy  being  made  payable  to 
her.  Plaintiff  paid  the  premiums  under 
the  alleged  representations  by  defendant 
tl  at  she  was  tlie  beneficiary  of  the  policy, 
anil  she  did  not  know  until  after  tlie  deatli 


272 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


codes,  and  was  a  familiar  doctrine  of  the  equity  procedure.  The 
language  of  the  statutes  is  certainly  broad  enough  to  permit 
the  exercise  of  this  power  in  legal  as  well  as  in  equitable  actions ; 


of  Fehrmau  that  said  policy  was  not  pay- 
able to  her  by  its  terms.  She  therefore 
brought  action  ajrainst  the  company  to 
have  the  policy  reformed  so  as  to  substitute 
iier  in  place  of  the  estate  of  the  lieceased 
as  beneficiary  of  the  policy,  and  for  judg- 
ment on  the  policy  as  reformed.  The 
personal  representatives  of  Fehrmau  were 
not  joined  as  defendants.  The  company 
did  not  raise  the  question  of  nonjoinder 
by  answer  or  demurrer,  but  at  the  close  of 
the  evidence,  on  the  trial,  moved  the  court 
to  dismiss  the  complaint  by  reason  of  the 
defect  of  parties  defendant.  The  motion 
was  deuied  and  defendant  excepted.  After 
affirmance  by  the  Appellate  Division,  two 
of  the  justices  dissenting,  the  defendant 
came  to  the  Court  of  Appeals. 

The  court,  by  Vaun,  J.,  said  :  "  By  the 
judgments  below  the  names  of  the  bene- 
ficiaries in  a  policy  of  life  insurance  were 
stricken  out  and  the  name  of  a  stranger 
substituted  as  sole  beneficiary  without 
making  the  former  parties  to  the  action  or 
giving  tliem  an  opportunity  to  be  heard. 
This  has  been  done  upon  the  ground  that 
the  insurance  company,  whicli  is  tlie  sole 
defendant,  waived  the  objection  that  there 
was  a  defect  of  parties  tiefendaiit  by  not 
taking  it  either  l)y  demurrer  or  answer  as 
provided  by  section  499  of  the  Code  of 
Civil  Procedure.  That  .section,  however, 
must  be  read  in  connection  witli  section 
452,  which  provides  that  'The  court  may 
determine  the  controversy,  as  between  the 
parties  before  it,  where  it  can  do  so  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  rights  of  others,  orhy 
saving  their  rights  ;  imt  where  a  comjdete 
determination  of  the  controversy  cannot 
be  had  without  the  presence  of  other  par- 
ties, the  court  must  direct  them  to  be 
brought  in.'  The  a])parent  inconsistency 
between  these  sections  was  tlie  subject  of 
controversy  before  tlie  courts  for  a  long 
time,  but  we  think  it  w.ia  dispelled  by  the 
judgment  in  <  tstcrlioudt  r.  Board  of  Super- 
visors of  the  County  of  T'lster  (98  N.  Y. 
239.24.3).  .  .  .  In  reversing  the  judgment 
in  favor  of  tlie  taxpayers  we  said  :  '  Con 
struinK  sections  4.'i2  and  499  together,  their 
m<;ining  is  that  a  defendant,  by  omitting 


to  take  the  objection  tiiat  there  is  a  defect 
of  parties  by  demurrer  or  answer,  waives 
on  his  part  any  objection  to  the  granting 
of  relief  on  that  ground,  but  when  the 
granting  of  relief  against  him  would  preju- 
dice the  rights  of  others,  and  their  rights 
cannot  be  saved  by  the  judgment  and  the 
controversy  cannot  be  completely  deter- 
mined without  their  presence,  the  court 
must  direct  them  to  be  made  parties  before 
proceeding  to  judgment.'  ...  A  com- 
plete determination  of  a  controversy  can- 
not 1)6  had  where  there  are  persons,  not 
parties,  whose  rights  must  be  determined, 
in  form  at  least,  at  the  same  time  that  tlie 
rights  of  tlie  parties  to  the  action  are 
determined  according  to  the  policy  uniler 
consideration,  as  it  was  written,  the  per- 
sonal representatives  of  Mr.  Fehrman  are 
entitled  to  the  proceeds,  yet  the  judgment 
below,  rendered  without  notice  to  them, 
take,s  the  policy  away  from  tliem  and 
gives  it  to  the  plaintiff.  They  had  a  ma- 
terial interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the 
action,  yet  they  were  deprived  of  it  without 
an  opportunity  to  he  heard  and  were  ciist 
in  jud<;meiit  without  being  sued.  While 
they  are  not  bound  by  the  judgment  which 
does  all  this  in  form,  still  tlie  determination 
of  the  controversy  is  necessarily  incom- 
plete because  they  are  not  bound.  .  .  . 
The  personal  representatives  of  Fehrman 
were  necessary  parties  and  the  court  should 
have  dismissed  the  complaint  unless  within 
a  reasonable  time  they  were  brought  in, 
not  necessarily  for  the  protection  of  the 
defendant,  as  it  had  neglected  its  rights, 
but  for  their  own  protection,  as  well  as 
the  seemly  and  orderly  administration  of 
justice." 

A  dissenting  opinion  was  written  by 
Ilaight,  J.,  in  which  two  justices  con- 
curred, holding  that  the  opinion  of  the 
court  })ractically  annulled  section  499  of 
the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure. 

See  Ilannecan  v.  Koth  (1896),  12  Wash. 
69.'),  44  Pac.  256,  where  it  was  held  that 
the  complaint  wonld  not  be  dismissed,  hut 
would  be  retained  until  the  necessary 
parties  should  be  brought  in.~| 


MISJOINDER    OF   DEFENDANTS.  273 

but,  practically,  the  courts  confine  its  operation  to  the  latter 
class.  1  When  the  defendant  sets  up  in  his  answer  the  defence 
of  nonjoinder,  he  must  state  the  names  and  places  of  residence 
of  the  other  persons  whom  he  alleges  to  be  necessary  defendants. 
This  old  rule  of  the  common-law  pleading  has  not  been  altered 
by  the  new  legislation. ^ 

§  189.  *  288.  Consequences  of  Nonjoinder  of  Defendants.  The 
foregoing  being  the  methods  of  raising  the  questions  as  to  a 
•defect  of  parties  defendant,  the  inquiry  arises,  What  is  the  effect 
•of  such  defect  when  established  in  either  of  these  methods  ?  If, 
upon  demurrer,  it  is  held  that  the  plaintiff  has  failed  to  unite  all 
the  necessary  defendants,  he  will  be  permitted  to  amend,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  upon  the  terms  as  to  costs  prescribed  by  the 
practice.  When  the  defence  is  set  up  in  the  answer,  the  same 
opportunity  is  given  to  the  plaintiff  to  amend,  and  to  reconstruct 
his  action.  If  the  defect  is  not  removed  in  this  manner,  it  will 
certainly  defeat  any  legal  action,  although  not  necessarily,  per- 
haps, an  equitable  one.  Undoubtedly,  the  codes,  adopting  the 
doctrine  of  equity  tribunals,  and  extending  it  to  all  cases,  permit 
the  court  in  its  discretion  to  retain  the  cause,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, until  the  other  necessary  parties  are  brought  in, 
instead  of  dismissing  it  altogether.  It  is  plain  that  the  language 
of  the  statutes  is  general,  and  embraces  all  species  of  actions, 
no  exception  being  expressed  or  intimated ;  and  there  can  be  no 
pretence  that  it  is  not  as  practicable  and  as  easy  to  deal  with 
legal  actions  in  this  manner  as  with  equitable  suits.  Practically, 
however,  the  authority  thus  given  to  the  courts  is  restricted  to 
equitable  actions,  while  legal  actions  are  disposed  of  in  the  same 
manner  and  by  the  same  rules  as  before  the  reformed  system  was 

1  As  illustrations,  see  Mnir  v.  Gibson.  N.  Y.  S.  861.  Where  such  an  answer  was 
S  Ind.  187  ;  Shaver  v.  Brainard,  29  Barb,  defective  in  certain  particulars,  although 
2.5;  O'Connor  v.  Irvine,  74  Cal.  43.5,  443,  it  conveyed  the  information  needed,  and 
where  it  was  held  that  the  failure  of  the  all  the  requisites  of  the  defence  were 
court  on  its  own  motion  to  order  necessary  proved  on  the  trial,  the  defect  was  held 
parties  brought  in,  although  the  defend-  cured.  Wooster  v.  Chamberlin,  28  Barb, 
antsomitted  to  raise  an  objection  of  defect  602.  It  has  been  held  in  Indiana  that  a 
■of  parties  by  demurrer  or  answer,  was  demurrer  to  the  complaint,  on  the  ground 
fatal  to  the  judgment.  See  also  Osterhoudt  of  a  nonjoinder  of  defendants,  must  also 
V.  Ulster  Cy.  Sup.,  98  N.  Y.  239  ;  Pirsson  show  who  ought  to  have  been  added  as 
»'.  Gillespie  (Supreme,  1889),  4  N.Y.Suppl.  defendants,  and  that,  failing  to  do  so,  it 
«91  ;  O'Fallon  v.  Clopton,  89  Mo.  284.  will  be  overruled.     Willett  v.  Porter,  42 

2  Kingsland  v.  Braisted,  2  Lans.  17;  Ind.  2.50,  2.54  ;  Nicholson  i;.  Louisville,  etc 
Schwartz  v.   Weehler  (Com.  PI.  1892),  20  Ry.  Co.,  55  Ind.  504. 

18 


274  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

adopted.  —  that  is,  the  nonjoinder  of  a  necessary  defendant, 
when  not  cured  hy  amendment,  defeats  that  action,  althongh  it 
does  not  destroy  the  cause  of  action.  It  may  be  instructiye  to 
compare  these  results  with  the  provisions  of  the  new  English 
procedure,  whicli  declare  that  under  no  circumstances  shall  a 
cause  be  defeated  or  dismissed  on  account  either  of  a  nonjoinder 
or  of  a  misjoinder  of  parties.^ 

§  190.  *  289.  Misjoinder  of  Defendants.  T'wo  Cases  herein. 
Two  Aspects  of  True  Case  of  Technical  Misjoinder.  I  paSS  now  to 
the  misjoinder  or  imj^roper  uniting  of  defendants. ^  Two  cases 
present  themselyes  which  might  perhaps  be  regarded  as  falling 
under  this  head:  naniel}',  (1)  Where  all  of  the  defendants  are 
improperl}'  sued ;  and,  (2)  AVhere  one  or  more  are  properly  sued, 
and  the  others  are  improperly  joined  with  them.  The  latter  only 
is  a  true  case  of  technical  "misjoinder."  The  first  is  the  ordi- 
nar}'  case  of  an  action  entirely  misconceived,  and  the  complaint 
or  petition  failing  to  disclose  any  ground  for  relief,  so  that  all 
the  defendants  jointly  or  each  of  them  separately,  according  to 
the  circumstances,  might  either  demur  for  want  of  sufficient 
facts,  or  move  to  dismiss  the  action  on  the  trial.  Such  a  case 
does  not  fall  within  the  special  rules  of  procedure  which  relate 
to  2^arties^  but  is  to  be  determined  by  the  general  doctrines  of 
the  law  defining  rights  and  liabilities.  The  second  of  the  two 
cases  just  described  does  come  within  the  subject-matter  of 
parties  defendant,  and  is  to  be  considered  under  two  aspects, 
which  give  rise  to  two  very  different  classes  of  questions.  These 
two  aspects  are  the  following:  It  being  supposed  that  one  or  more 
defendants,  whom  I  will  call  A.,  are  properly  sued,  and  that  one 
or  more  others,  whom  I  will  call  B.,  are  improperly  joined  in  the 
action,  the  matters  for  consideration  Mdiich  can  possibly  arise  from 
these  facts  are:  (1)  How  shall  the  proper  defendants.  A.,  take 
advantage  of   the    error,   and  what  effect  (if  any)  will    it  have 

1  The  "Supreme  Court  of  Judicature  improperly    united,    tlic    defendant    sliall 

Act''  of  1873;   Sclie<luk',  Mule  9.     QSce  have  judgment  against   them   for  cu!<ts; 

also    Sreinhach    v.    I'rudcntial    Ins.    Co.  if  defendants,  they  may  disclaim  and  have 

(1902),  172  N.  Y.  471,  65  N.  E.  281  ;   Ilan-  their  costs  against  the  plaintiff.     Tiiis  is 

ucgan  V.   Hoth   (1896),  12   Wash.  C9.j,  4i  carrying  out  the  true  sjiirit  of  the  reform  ; 

I'ac.  25G."]  it   fully  su.staius   the    theoretical   position 

*  The   admirable    rule   is   adopted    in  taken  in  the  text,  and  might  well  he  fol- 

North  Carolina  that  a  wi/s-joinder  of  par-  lowed  in  all  the  States.     Green  v.  Green, 

ties,  either  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  shall  69  N.  C.  294,  298. 
never  defeat  any  a<!tion.     If  plaintilfs  are 


MISJOINDER    OF   DEFENDANTS.  275 

■upon  their  rights?  and,  (2)  How  shall  the  improper  defendants, 
B.,  raise  the  objection,  and  what  effect  (if  any)  will  the  error 
have  upon  their  rights?  It  is  plain  that  these  two  sets  of  de- 
fendants occupy  very  dissimilar  positions  in  the  action;  that  their 
rights  are  very  different,  and  that  while  the  latter  are  entitled  to 
full  relief,  the  former  may  not  be  in  the  least  injured  or  affected 
by  the  misjoinder.  Much  confusion  in  practice  has  resulted  from 
the  neglect  to  distinguish  between  these  two  cases. 

§  191.  *  290.  Situation  of  Defendants  properly  Sued.  Change 
in  Common-Law  Rule  herein.  Doctrine  Established  by  the  Cases. 
Proceeding  to  the  discussion  of  these  two  cases  separately,  I 
shall  state  the  rules  established  in  respect  to  the  first  of  them, 
and  shall  illustrate  by  a  stiiking  example  the  extent  to  which 
the  common-law  doctrines  have  been  changed  b}'  the  reformed 
procedure.  When  a  legal  action  is  brought  against  two  or  more 
defendants  upon  an  alleged  joint  liability,  even  though  based 
upon  a.  joint  contract,  and  one  or  more  of  them  are,  so  far  as  they 
are  individually  concerned,  properly  sued,  but  the  others  are 
improperly  united,  the  defendants  properly  sued  have  no  cause 
of  complaint  whatsoever,  in  any  form,  on  account  of  the  misjoin- 
der; they  cannot  demur  or  answer  for  defect  of  parties,  because 
there  is  no  "  defect ;  "  they  cannot  demur  generally  for  want  of 
sufficient  facts,  because  sufficient  facts  are  averred  as  against 
them;  they  cannot  demur  or  answer  on  account  of  this  7nis- 
joinder,  because  that  particular  ground  of  objection  is  not  jn-o- 
vided  for  by  the  codes.  ^     If  on  the  trial  the  cause  of  action  is 

^  An  exception  mnst,  of  course,  be  him  as  co-defendant.  The  provision  au- 
made  of  those  codes  which  expressly  thorizing  a  demurrer  for  the  misjoinder 
provide,  as  a  distinct  cause  of  demurrer  of  parties  defendant  is  taken  from  the 
or  defence,  the  misjoinder  of  parties, —  system  of  equity  pleading  wliich  formerly 
namely,  Missouri,  California,  Qalso  New  prevailed.  Under  that  system  such  de- 
York,  Nevada,  Colorado,  Idaho,  Montana,  murrer  could  be  interposed  only  hy  the 
Utah,  and  Wyoming.  Sec  §  *206,  ante,  party  who  was  improperly  made  a  de- 
note. See  O'Brien  v.  Fitzgerald  (1894),  fendant.  The  defendant  against  whom 
143  N.  Y.  143,  38  N.  E.  371.  there  was  a  sufficient  complaint  could  not 

See,    however,    Gardner    v.    Samuels  object  that  others  who  had  no  interest  in 

(1897),  116  Cal.  84,  47  Pac.  935,  a  case  the  subject-matter  of  this  suit  were  made 

decided  under  a  code  making  misjoinder  defendants,  unless  it  also  appeared  that 

of    parties    a    cause   for   deumrrer.     The  his  interests  were  affected  therebv.     This 

court  said:    "The   complaint   sufRciently  ground  of  demurrer  is  authorized  by  the 

states  a  cause  of  action  against  the  de-  code  of  Missouri,  and  it  is  held  in  that 

fendant   Samuels.      It    is   urged    by   the  State  that  the  former  rule  in  equity  is  to 

respondent,  however,  that   the   demurrer  be  followed.     (Ashby  v.  Winston,  26  Mo. 

of    Samuels   was    properly   sustained    by  210.)"     See   also   Euffatti   v.   Lexington 

reason  of  the  mi.sjoinder  of  Morris  with  Mining  Co.  (1894),  10  Utah,  386,  37   I'ac. 


276  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

proved  against  them.^  but  none  against  them  and  the  others^  still 
the  phiintiff  will  not  be  absolutely  nonsuited;  he  will  recover  his 
judgment  against  them  according  to  the  right  of  action  estab- 
lished by  the  proof;  while  as  against  the  other  defendants  he  will 
fail,  and  will  be  nonsuited,  or  his  complaint  be  dismissed.  This 
result  of  the  reform  legislation  is  a  very  great  departure  from  the 
former  practice.  At  the  common  hnv,  if  a  plaintiff  alleged  a 
joint  cause  of  action  against  two  or  more  defendants,  and  failed 
to  prove  the  case  as  set  out  in  his  pleading,  he  was  defeated  as  to 
all ;  he  could  not  recover  against  a  part  and  fail  as  to  the  others. 
The  interpretation  of  the  codes,  as  thus  stated,  is  based  partly 
upon  the  sections  already  quoted  in  relation  to  defendants,  and 
partly  upon  other  sections  —  to  be  fully  discussed  hereafter  —  in 
relation  to  the  form  and  manner  of  recovery  and  entry  of  judg- 
ments. By  combining  these  various  provisions,  and  by  a  con- 
struction of  them  in  accordance  with  their  plain  spirit  and 
meaning,  the  courts  have  deduced  the  rules  here  given.  To 
those  defendants  who  are  sued  in  a  legal  action,  even  though 
upon  an  alleged  joint  liability,  and  who  are  actually  liable  upon 
the  contract  or  other  cause  of  action  averred,  the  fact  that  other 
persons  are  also  added  as  co-defendants,  however  improperly,  is 
no  defence,  is  no  answer  to  the  action  in  any  manner  or  form. 
This  doctrine  is  fully  established  by  the  cases  collected  in  the 
foot-note,  and  in  many  others  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  cite.^ 

591,  holding  that  one  defendant   cannot  has    run    in    favor   of   one   of  them,    the 

complain  that   another  is   joined  who  is  action     against    the    other    two    is    not 

not   bound.]  affected  tliereby.]     Mcintosh  v.  Ensign, 

1  Qlacksonu.  McAuley  (1895),  13  Wash.  28    N.  Y.   169,   172, —  see  also,  per    Km- 

298,  43    Pac.  41;    Lull   r.   Auamosa  Nat.  mott  J.,  pp.  174,  175  ;   Rrumskill  y.  James, 

Bank  (1900),  110  la.  537,  81    N.  W.  784;  11   N.  Y.  294;    Marquat   >•.   Marquat,   12 

Curran    v.    Stein    (1901),   —   Ky.  — ,    60  N.Y.  336;  Harrington  y.  Higham,  15  Barli. 

S.  \V.  8.39:  Hassler  r.  Hefele  (1898),  151  524;    Parker   v.   Jackson,    16    Barb.    33; 

Ind.  391,  50  N.  K.  361  ;    Huffatti  v.  Lex-  N    Y.  &  N.    H.  K.    Co.  v.  Schuyler,    17 

ington  Mining  Co.   (1894),  10  Utah,  386,  N.  Y.  592  ;  Coakley  r.  Chamberlain,  8  Abl). 

37  Pac.  591  ;  Bunnell  r.  Berlin  Iron  Bridge  Pr.  N.  s.  37;  Fort  Staiuvix   Bank  v.  T>eg- 

Co.    (1S95),    66    Conn.    24,    33    All.   533;  gett,  51    N.Y.   552;    Truesdell  c.  Rhodes, 

Knatz  V.  Wise   (1895),   IG   Mont.   555,  41  26  Wis.  215,219,220;   McGonigal  v.  Col- 

Pac.  710;  North   Hudson  Bldg.   &   Loan  ter,  32  Wis.  614 ;  Willard  i-.  lieas,  26  Wis. 

Assn.  f.  Childs  (1893),  86   Wis.  292,   56  540,  544;    Alnutt  v.   Leper,  48   Mo.  319  ; 

N.    W.   870;    Empire   Canal   Co.    v.    Itio  Brown  c.  Woods,  48  Mo.  330;  Rutenberg 

Grande  County   (1895),  21    Colo.  244,  40  v.    Main,    47    Cal.    213,    221;    Aucker    i;. 

Pac.  449;  Harrison  v.  McCormick  (1898),  Adams,  23  Ohio  St.  543,  548-550;  Lamp- 

122    Cal.    651,    55    Pac.    592:    Where    an  kin  i'.  Chisom,  10  Ohio  St.  450.     See  also 

action    is   brought   jointly    against   three  cases  cited,  i'«/ra,  under  §*  291  of  the  text 

partnr-rs,    and    tlio  statute  of   limitations  in  reference  to  the  remedy  by  those  who 


MISJOINDER    OF    DEFENDANTS.  277 

The  rule  being  thus  established  in  the  extreme  case  of  legal 
actions  alleging  a  joint  liability  upon  contract,  it  is  of  course 
equally  true  in  all  other  legal  actions  based  upon  a  liability  which 
at  the  common  law  was  several,  and  in  which  the  misjoinder  of 
some  defendants  would  have  been  no  defence  as  to  those  properly 
sued,  — as,  for  example,  in  actions  for  torts.  A  fortiori  does  the 
same  doctrine  apply  in  all  equitable  actions.  Under  the  former 
system,  the  improper  uniting  of  co-defendants  was  never  a  suffi- 
cient ground  for  preventing  a  decree  against  those  who  were 
properly  made  parties  if  the  suit  was  in  equity.^ 

§  192.  *  291.  How  Question  of  Misjoinder  may  be  raised  by 
Defendants  improperly  joined.  Demurrer  Interposed  by  "Whom. 
"Waiver  herein.  The  situation  of  those  parties  improperly  joined 
as  co-defendants  is,  of  course,  very  different  from  that  just 
described.  The  very  statement  of  the  case  assumes  that  the 
action  is  wrongly  brought  as  against  them;  that,  either  as  dis- 
closed by  the  allegations  of  the  plaintiff's  pleading,  or  as  dis- 
covered by  the  evidence  on  the  trial,  no  cause  of  action  exists 
against  them,  notwithstanding  the  one  which  exists  against  their 
co-defendants.  If,  therefore,  in  such  a  case,  it  appears  on  the 
face  of  tlie  complaint  or  petition  that  one  or  more  persons  have 
been  improperly  made  defendants,  such  persons  may  present  the 
objection  by  a  demurrer,  not  on  the  ground  of  a  "defect"  of 
parties,  but  on  the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's  pleading  does  not 
state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action  against  them.^ 
This  demurrer  must  be  interposed  only  by  those  defendants  who 
are  wrongly  sued,  and  not  hy  all  the  defetidants  jointly^  since,  if 
two  or  more  demur  jointly,  and  as  to  a  portion  of  them  there  is 

are.  improperly  joined.     See  also  Territory  ^  See  N.  Y.  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.  v.  Schuyler, 

V.  Hildebrand,  2  Mout.  426;   White  Oalc  17  N.  Y.  592. 

Dist.  Tp.  V.  Oskaloosa  Dist.  Tp.,  44  Iowa,  2  [^See  Gardner  v.  Samuels  (1897),  116 

512  ;  Littell  v.  Sayre,  7  Hun,  485  ;  Stafford  Cal.  84,  47  Pac.  9.35,  where  a  demurrer  for 

w.  Nutt,  51  Ind.  535;  Murray  w.  Ebright,  misjoinder   was   held    proper,    under   the 

50  id.  362 ;  Erwin  v.  Scotten,  40  id.  389 ;  statute.     But  it  was  said  that  a  demurrer 

Carmien  v.  Whitaker,  36  id.  509  ;  Graham  couched  in  the  words  of  the  statute  wouhl 

V.  Henderson,  35  id,  195;  Crews  v.  Lack-  not  be  sufficient;   "but  a  demurring  party 

land,  67  Mo.  619  ;  Ryan  v.  State  Bank,  10  by  designating  the  defendants  who  were 

Neb.  524 ;    Hubbard  v.  Guriiey,  64  N.  Y.  improperly  joined    with    him,   sufficiently 

457  ;    Blackburn  v.   Sweet,  38  Wis.   578  ;  calls  the  plaintiffs'  attention  to  his  objec- 

Pierson  v.  Fuhrmann  (Colo.  App    1891),  tion   to   the   complaint."      But    see    also 

27  Pac.  1015;  Emry  v.  Parker.   Ill    N.  C.  Plankinton  v.  Hildebrand  (1895),  89  Wis. 

261.     But  see  Curry  v.  Roundtree,  51  Cal.  209,  61  N.  W.  839.] 
181. 


278  CIVIL   RKMKDIES. 

no  cause  for  the  demurrer,  it  must  fail  as  to  all.^  The  safer 
practice  is,  therefore,  for  each  defendant  who  claims  that  he  is 
improperly  joined,  to  demur  separately  and  individually  from 
the  others.  This  particular  ground  of  objection  is  not  waived  by 
a  neglect  to  demur,  as  it  is  expressly  provided  in  all  the  codes 
that  the  defendant  may  at  the  trial  interpose  the  same  objection 
to  the  plaintiff's  recover3%  even  though  he  has  failed  to  allege  it 
on  the  record. 2  If  the  absence  of  a  cause  of  action  does  not 
appear  on  the  face  of  the  plaintiff's  pleading,  the  defence  may 
be  set  up  in  the  separate  answer  or  answers  of  the  parties  who 
rely  upon  it.  Finally,  whatever  be  the  completeness  or  defect  of 
the  allegations  made  by  the  plaintiff  and  of  the  issues  raised  in 
the  answers  of  the  defendants,  if  on  the  trial  the  evidence  fails  to 
establish  a  cause  of  action  against  some  portion  of  the  defendants, 
and  it  thus  appears  that  they  had  been  wrongfully  proceeded 
against  in  the  action,  the  plaintiff  will  be  nonsuited,  or  his  com- 
plaint or  petition  dismissed  as  to  them,  and  his  recovery  will  be 
limited  to  the  others  against  whom  a  cause  of  action  is  made  out. 
The  foregoing  rules  are  sustained  by  the  cases  with  almost  abso- 
lute unanimity.^     These  are  the  more  regular  and  formal  modes 

1  Lowry  i-.  Jackson,  27  S.  C.  318.  Co.  v.  Hall  (1895),  110  Cal.  490,  42  Pac. 

-  QBut  see  Boland  v.  Ross  (1893),  120  962]  ;  Youug  v.  N.  Y.,  etc.  Steamship  Co., 
Mo.  20S,  2.")  S.  W.  524,  where  it  was  held  10  Abb.  Pr.  229;  Mitchell  v.  Bank  of  St. 
that  although  the  petition  for  an  account-  Paul,  7  Minn.  252,  256;  Nichols  v.  Kan- 
ing  stated  no  grounds  for  equitable  relief  dall,  5  Minn.  304;  Seagerr.  Burns,  4  Minn, 
against  the  defendant  M,  yet  inasmuch  as  141;  Lewis  v.  Williams,  3  Minn.  151; 
he  failed  to  avail  himself  of  that  fact  and  Makepeace  v.  Davis,  27  Ind.  352,  355 ; 
did  not  demur  on  the  ground  of  misjoinder,  McGonigal  v.  Colter,  32  Wis.  614;  Web- 
but  answered  to  the  merits  after  other  ster  v.  Tibbitts,  19  Wis.  438;  Truesdell 
defendants  had  answered  and  filed  tlieir  v.  Rhodes,  26  Wis.  215,  219,  220;  Willard 
cro.ss-bills  against  him,  the  court  did  not  v.  Reas,  26  Wis.  540,  544;  Rntenberg  i'. 
lose  jurisdiction  over  him  under  the  cro.ss-  Main,  47  Cal.  213,  221.  See  also  Grulin 
bills  by  dismissing  tiie  complaint  as  to  v.  Stanley,  92  Cal.  83.  See,  however,  per 
him.  He  was  deemed  to  have  waiveil  by  contra,  Wood  r.  Olney,  7  Nev.  109,  which 
his  pleadings  all  questions  as  to  jurisdic-  holds  that,  when  a  joint  demurrer  by  de- 
tiou  and  to  have  voluntarily  submitted  his  fendants  is  good  as  to  some  and  bad  as  to 
rights  to  the  court]  tlie  others,  it  will  not  be  overruled  as  to 

**  QDobbs  V.  Purington  (1902),  136  Cal.  all;    it  will  be  su.stained  as  to  tiiose  who 

70,  68  Pac.  3j3;  Bunce  v.  Pratt  (1893),  56  had  a  good  cause  of  demurrer,  and  over- 

Jlinn.  8,  57    N.  W.    IGO;    Sutherland   v.  ruled  only  as  to  the  other.-;.     In  Missouri, 

IloUiday  ( 1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  90  N.  W.  937  ;  where  a  misjoinder  is  made  a  cause  of  de- 

Kuffatti  V.  Lexington   Mining  Co   (1894),  niurrer,  it  is  held  the  objection  must  be 

10   Utah,  386,  ."57    Pac.   591  ;     Ilassler  r.  set   up  by  those   u-ho  are   thus   improjurly 

llefele  (1898).  151  lii.i.  391,  50  N.  E.  361  ;  joined,  and   not   by   the   others.      If  the 

Currau  c.  Stein  ( 1901),  —  Ky. — ,  60  S.  W.  otlicrs  unite  in  the  demurrer,  it  will    ba 

839;  Lull  V.  Ai.aniosa  Nat.  Bank  (1900),  overruleil  as  to  them.     Brown  v.  Woods. 

J 10  la    537,  81    N.  W.  784;   Bailey  Loan  48  Mo.  a.JO ;  Aluutt  r.  Leper,  43  .Mo.  .H.i. 


MISJOINUEU    OF   DEFENDANTS.  279 

of  raising  the  questions  as  to  misjoinder  by  those  defendants  wlio 
are  thus  wrongfully  made  parties  to  a  suit;  but  there  undoubtedly 
may  be  cases  in  which  the  court  w^ill  proceed  in  a  more  summary 
manner,  and  will  strike  off  the  name  of  a  party  on  his  mere 
motion.  Such  cases  must  of  necessity  be  somewhat  exceptional, 
for,  as  a  general  rule,  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  parties  to 
the  record  will  not  be  determined  on  motion  or  by  any  other 
means  except  a  formal  trial  of  the  issues. 

§  193.  *  292.  Recapitulation  of  Code  Reforms  respecting  Mis- 
joinder of  Defendants.  Criticism.  If  we  SUm  up  the  results 
of  the  preceding  discussion,  the  following  conclusion  may 
be  regarded  as  established  beyond  any  doubt.  In  ascertaining 
the  effects  of  a  misjoinder  of  parties,  the  courts,  with  great 
unanimity,  have  accepted  and  carried  out  in  practice  the  spirit 
and  true  intent  of  the  reform  legislation:  namely,  that  the 
familiar  doctrines  of  equity  should  be  made  controlling  in  all 
kinds  of  actions  legal  and  equitable.  They  have  in  this  instance 
entirely  abandoned  the  technical  common-law  rules,  and  have 
assimilated  all  actions  in  this  respect  to  a  suit  in  equity.  Even 
in  the  case  where  the  common-law  doctrine  of  joint  liability  was 
the  most  rigid,  they  have  with  perfect  ease  abandoned  it,  have 
treated  it  as  though  abrogated  by  the  general  expressions  of  the 
reform  legislation,  and  have  thus  demonstrated  that  the  judicial 
reasoning  by  which  that  ancient  dogma  had  been  supported  was 
in  fact  nothing  but  a  formula  of  words  wdthout  any  real  force 
and  meaning.  They  have  shown  that  in  a  legal  action  upon 
contract,  no  matter  what  may  be  the  allegations  as  to  the  joint 
nature  of  the  liability,  it  is  possible  to  sever  the  judgment  and 
to  permit  a  recovery  against  some  defendants  and  for  the  others, 
and  thus  to  bring  all  cases  legal  and  equitable  within  the  opera- 
tion of  the  familiar  principles  of  equity.  I  dwell  upon  this 
special  instance  of  liberal  construction  because  it  well  illustrates 
the  position  which  I  have  theoretically  maintained  as  to  the 
general  mode  of  interpreting  the  codes.     The  courts  of  the  dif- 

See  also,  as  to  the  effect  of  misjoinder,  Ass'n,  74  N.  C.  117;  State  v.  J.  P.  &  M.  R. 

Nave  V.  Hadley,  74  lud.  155;  Meudenhall  Co,  15  Fla.  201  ;  Mahouey  v.  McLeau,  26 

i\   Wilson,    54    Iowa.   589  ;    Cogswell   v.  Minn.  415.     In  Barnes  v.  Blake,  59  Hun, 

Miirpiiy,  46  id.  44;  White  Oak  Dist.  Tp.  371,  it  was  held  that  a  mi.'ijoinder  of  de- 

V.  Oskaloosa  Dist.  Tp.,  44  id.  512.      On  feudants  was  not  a  cause  for  a  demurrer 

tl;e   general   doctrine    as    to    the    proper  for  want  of  sufficient  facts  In-  tlic  party 

j  linder  of  defendants,  see  Buie  v.  Mech.  imjiroperly  joined. 


280  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

ferent  States  have  found  no  difficulty  in  adopting  and  applying- 
the  complete  doctrine  of  equity  in  this  case ;  there  is  no  greater 
difficulty  in  adopting  and  applying  the  same  to  all  the  provisions- 
of  the  codes  relative  to  parties,  and  to  the  amalgamation  of  equi- 
table and  legal  principles  in  the  one  civil  action  created  by  the 
new  procedure.  If  the  rules  which  control  equitable  tribunals- 
can  be  and  ought  to  be  introduced  into  the  civil  action  in  respect 
to  the  single  feature  of  a  misjoinder  of  defendants,  for  the  same 
reason  they  can  and  ought  to  be  introduced  in  respect  to  all  the 
parties  and  in  respect  to  every  other  external  feature  of  the  judi- 
cial proceeding.  If  the  courts  had  been  consistent  in  this  matter, 
and  had  not  halted  in  their  work  of  liberal  construction,  a  com- 
plete, harmonious,  and  symmetrical  system  would  long  since  have 
been  constructed,  and  the  confusion  and  conflict  in  principle 
which  now  exists  would  have  been  avoided.  Until  this  course 
is  freely  and  systematically  adopted,  until  the  courts  shall  follow 
out  to  its  legitimate  results  in  all  parts  and  elements  of  the  action 
the  equitable  notion  which  is  made  everywhere  so  prominent  in 
the  statute,  we  can  never  expect  to  obtain  all  the  simplicity  and 
clearness,  and  subordination  of  external  form  to  substantial  facts, 
promised  by  the  new  system  of  procedure. 

§  194.  *  293.  Same  respecting  Nonjoinder.  Less  Liberal  Inter- 
pretation here.  Case  of  Nonjoinder  and  Misjoinder  Compared. 
Criticism  and  Recommendation.  Even  in  determining  the  eifects 
of  a  nonjoinder  of  proper  defendants,  the  courts  have  failed 
to  interpret  the  provisions  of  the  codes  with  the  same  free- 
dom which  they  used  in  that  of  misjoinder ;  they  have  hesi- 
tated and  stopped,  when  it  would  have  been  easy  to  have  gone 
forward,  and  to  have  given  the  clauses  their  full  force  and  effect. 
Undoubtedly  the  two  cases  stand  upon  a  somewhat  different 
footing.  When  a  person  is  himself  properly  sued,  it  does  not 
substantially  affect  his  rights  or  liabilities  that  another  person  is 
also  improperly  sued  with  him ;  that  fact  does  not  essentially 
make  his  own  liability  greater  or  less.  But  when  a  person  is 
sued,  he  has,  in  many  instances,  —  certainly  in  all  those  legal 
actions  where  the  lialnlity  is  joint,  and  in  some  equitable  suits 
where  the  rights  and  liabilities  are  complex, — a  right  that  all 
the  others  who  are  also  liable  with  him,  or  against  whom  the 
cause  of  action  exists,  or  who  are  necessary  parties  to  a  complete 
determination  of  the  controversy,  should  be  united  with  him  as 


ACTIONS  AGAINST  OCCUPANTS  OF  LAND.  281 

co-defendants,  and  a  neglect  to  join  them  is  an  error  against 
which  he  should  be  permitted  to  object,  and  from  which  he 
should  be  suffered  to  obtain  a  relief.  The  former  equitable 
procedure,  as  well  as  the  common-law  practice,  recognized  this 
right  of  the  defendant.  But  it  is  a  very  different  thing  to  say- 
that  such  an  error,  when  established,  should  in  any  class  of  cases 
absolutely  defeat  the  action.  The  error  is  not  essentially  fatal. 
This  is  shown  by  the  practice  itself  of  the  courts,  which  treats 
the  objection  as  dilatory,  and  requires  it  to  be  presented  in  a 
certain  technical  manner,  or  else  regards  it  as  waived.  There 
is  then  no  reason  in  the  nature  of  the  proceeding  why  the  equity 
doctrine  should  not  have  been  applied  under  these  circumstances 
to  all  legal  actions,  so  that,  when  an  improper  noyijoinder  is 
finally  established  by  the  decision  of  the  court,  the  action  should 
never  be  defeated  thereby,  but  should  be  retained  by  the  court  in 
order  that  the  plaintiff  might  add  the  necessary  defendants,  and 
then  the  cause  proceed  to  judgment  on  the  merits.  It  is  cer- 
tainly as  practicable  and  as  easy  to  pursue  this  course  with  all 
legal  actions,  as  it  is  with  those  that  are  equitable;  and  the 
codes  expressly  permit,  if  not  require  it,  in  language  which  in 
terms  embraces  every  species  of  suit. 

I  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  the  particular  cases  which  have 
arisen,  and  the  various  specific  rules  as  to  parties  defendant  which 
have  been  established  by  judicial  decision.  This  examination 
will  show  how  the  general  principles  of  interpretation  have  been 
applied  by  the  courts,  and  will  exhibit  the  system  as  a  whole 
which  has  been  constructed  in  respect  to  the  selection  and 
joinder  of  defendants.  The  discussion  will  be  separated  into 
three  general  divisions :  namely,  legal  actions  generally ;  actions 
against  husband  and  wife,  or  either  of  them,  as  affected  by  the 
marriage  relation;  equitable  actions  generally. 

FIRST:   LEGAL  ACTIONS. 

§  195.  *  294.  I.  Actions  against  Owners  or  Occupants  of  Land. 
Limitation  herein.  Distinguished  from  Common-Law  Action  of 
Ejectment.  This  division  does  not  include  actions  for  trespass  or 
other  torts  to  the  land  or  its  possession,  which  will  be  considered 
under  a  subsequent  subdivision  relating  to  torts.  The  actions 
here  intended  must  be  brought  against  joint  owners,  owners  in 
common,   or   occupants.      The   action   to   recover   possession    of 


282  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

land,  and  to  try  the  title  thereto,  is  generally  called  by  lawj-ers 
and  judges  tlie  action  of  ejectment.  Yet  wherever  the  new 
procedure  is  adopted,  it  far  more  nearly  resembles  in  all  of  its 
essential  features  the  ancient  real  actions  which  were  displaced 
in  use  by  "ejectment,"  —  in  its  essential  features,  1  say,  for  of 
course  it  has  none  of  the  technical  peculiarities  which  marked 
those  old  common-law  forms  of  proceeding.  One  fact  is  certainly 
true,  namely,  that  it  does  not  bear  the  slightest  resemblance  to 
the  action  of  "  ejectment "  as  that  was  contrived  by  the  old 
judges  and  lawyers,  and  only  confusion  and  misconception  result 
from  applj'ing  to  it  that  name.  Undoubtedly  the  courts  have 
continued  to  connect  with  it  some  of  the  special  rules  and  doc- 
trines which  belong  to  the  action  of  ejectment;  but  many  of 
them,  I  am  sure,  could  never  have  been  retained  if  the  courts 
had  fully  appreciated  the  completeness  of  the  change  wrought 
by  the  reformed  system  of  procedure  in  abolishing  all  the  forms 
of  le<Tal  actions,  and  had  reflected  that  the  technical  rules  result- 
ing^ alone  from  the  absurd  fictions  which  characterized  ejectment 
have  no  legitimate  connection  with  the  simple  action  to  recover 
possession  of  and  try  the  title  to  land  which  has  been  introduced 
by  the  codes  in  the  place  of  the  former  modes.  As  in  the  "real 
actions,"  the  real  party  in  interest,  and  that  is  the  owner  of  the 
estate  entitling  him  to  possession,  —  Avhatever  be  its  nature,  — 
must  be  the  plaintiff,  and  if  the  object  be  to  establish  a  title,  the 
holder  or  claimant  of  the  adverse  title  must  be  made  the  defend- 
ant, while  in  respect  of  the  claim  to  possession  the  occupant 
must  be  made  a  defendant.  These  are  the  simple  essentials  of 
the  action,  and  they  clearly  have  nothing  in  them  akin  to  "eject- 
ment." The  codes  of  some  States  contain  express  provisions  in 
relation  to  parties  defendant,  and  especially  in  relation  to  the 
union  of  the  landlord  and  tenant  as  co-defendants,^  but  these  are 
rather  inserted  fi-om  an  excess  of  caution,  and  do  not  add  any- 
thing to  the  force  of  the  more  general  clauses. 

§  196.  *  295.  Who  should  be  joined.  Illustrations.  In  an 
action  to  recover  possession  of  an  entire  tract  or  i)arccl  of  land, 
when  the  claim  of  the  plainLilT  lo  the  whole  rests  upon  and  is 

1  Cofle  of  New  York,  §  118  (447,  l.')0.3,  Dakota,  Kcv.  Codes,  1899,  §  .5230;  Smitli 

1.598);    California,    §§   379,    380;    SoiUli  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6078 ;  Montana, 

Carolina,  §   141;    Xott!i   Carolina,  §  61;  §  .'iSl  ;  I.iaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3107  ; 

l^L'tali,    Kc-v.    St,    1898,    §2914;    North  Missouri,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  543.] 


ACTIONS    AGAINST    OCCUPANTS    OF   LAND. 


283 


derived  through  a  single  title,  he  may,  and  unless  their  occupa- 
tion is  distinct,  should  join  all  the  actual  occupants  or  tenants  of 
the  tract,  even  though  they  may  be  in  jjossession  of  separate  and 
distinct  portions  thereof,  and  may  hold,  possess,  and  claim  under 
separate  and  distinct  titles.^  In  addition  to  these  he  may  join 
the  landlord  or  person  holding  the  fee,  or  any  person  claiming 
the  ownership  and  right  of  possession,  and  ynuat  join  such  person 
if  he  desires  to  establish  in  that  action  his  own  ultimate  owner- 
ship against  that  claimant. ^  If  the  entire  tract  is  in  the  posses- 
sion of  two  or  more  persons  who  possess  the  same,  not  in  separate 
portions,  but  jointly  or  in  common  in  undivided  shares,  they 
should  all  be  made  defendants.  If  the  plaintiff,  however,  claims 
separate  portions  of  an  entire  tract  under  distinct  titles,  and  each 
of  these  portions  is  possessed  or  occupied  by  a  different  person 
holding  under  a  separate  right  or  title  from  the  others,  he  cannot 
join  all  these  occupants  in  a  single  action ;  a  suit  must  be  brought 


1  [Lewis  V.  Hiuson  ( 1 902),  64  S.  C.  57 1 , 
43  S.  E.  15,  quoting  tiie  text.  Andrews 
V.  Carlile  (1894),  L'O  Colo.  370,  38  Pac. 
465:  Wiiere  several  defendants  are  sued 
jointly  in  ejectment,  and  each  files  a  sepa- 
rate answer,  a  joint  judgment  may  be 
rendered  against  them  unless  they  de- 
mand separate  trials  and  judgments 
within  a  proper  time. 

In  Kliuker  v.  Schmidt  (1898),  106  la. 
70,  75  N.  W.  672,  plaintiff  alleged  that 
defendant  was  in  wrongful  possession  of  a 
strip  of  land  fourteen  feet  wide  along  the 
westerly  side  of  his  lot.  This,  if  true, 
indicated  tliat  each  lot  owner  in  that  tier 
of  lots  was  fourteen  feet  on  his  neighbor's 
land  to  the  east.  Held,  that  this  did  not 
show  an  interest  in  the  suit  which  would 
warrant  the  other  lot  owners  being  made 
parties  defendant,  on  defendant's  motion. 
There  was  merely  a  possibility  of  contro- 
versies arising  between  the  other  lot 
owners,  and,  besides,  their  defences  might 
not  be  the  same.]  See,  however,  Sutton 
V.  Casseleggi,  77  Mo.  397. 

2  State  V.  Orwig,  34  Iowa,  112,  115. 
As  to  proper  defendants  in  actions  to  re- 
cover possession  of  land,  and  to  try  the 
title  thereto,  see  also  Jackson  v.  Allen,  30 
Ark.  110;  Rollins  v.  Rollins,  76  N.  C. 
264  ;  Colgrove  v.  Koonce,  76  id.  363 ; 
Lytle  r.  Burgin,  83  id.  301  ;  Young  v. 
Greenlee,  82  id.  346 ;  Cagger  r.  Lansing, 


64N.  y.  417;  in  Wisconsin,  see  Gray  v. 
Tyler,  40  Wis.  579 ;  Pier  v.  Fond  du  Lac, 
38  id.  470  (tlie  Wisconsin  statute  provides 
for  an  action  of  ejectment  against  a  person 
not  in  possession ;  this  person  must  be 
one  exercising  some  acts  of  ownersliip 
over  the  land,  "or  claiming  title  tliereto 
or  some  interest  therein ; "  and  the  com- 
plaint must  allege  that  the  defendant 
"  unlawfully  withholds  the  posses.sion  from 
the  plaintiff ; "  Iicid,  that  in  such  an  ac- 
tion the  title  claimed  by  the  defendant 
must  be  one  which,  if  valid,  would  give 
him  a  possessory  right  to  the  jiremises ; 
and  ejectment  will  not  lie  against  one 
not  in  possession  who  only  claims  a  lien) ; 
Wilson  V.  Henry,  40  id.  594;  Piatt  v. 
Jante,  35  id.  629 ;  Barclay  v.  Yeomans, 
27  id.  682  ;  Burchard  v.  Roberts,  70  Wis. 
111.  Under  the  Missouri  statute,  requir- 
ing the  action  to  be  brought  against  the 
person  in  possession,  Shaw  v.  Tracy,  95 
Mo.  531  (possession  of  the  tenant  is  not 
such  possession  of  the  landlord  as  to  en- 
able the  plaintiff  to  recover  against  the 
landlord  as  sole  defendant)  ;  Phillips  v. 
Phillips,  107  Mo.  360  (occupancy  of  or 
residence  upon  the  property  is  not  a  neces- 
sary element  of  po.ssession) ;  Bensicck  v. 
Cook  (Mo.  1892),  19  S.  W.  642;  Callahan 
V.  Davis,  90  Mo.  78;  Charter  Oak  L.  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Cummings,  90  Mo.  267. 


284  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

to  recover  each  portion  against  the  occupant  thereof ;  the  mere 
fact  of  propinquity  would  not  produce  any  community  of  interest. 
The  foregoing  propositions  are  sustained  and  illustrated  in  the 
following  instances.  In  an  action  brought  by  a  widow  to  recover 
dower  (which  had  not  been  assigned)  in  a  city  lot  of  land  and 
block  of  stores,  the  occupant,  holding  under  a  lease  for  one  year, 
of  a  single  floor  of  one  store  standing  on  a  small  portion  of  the 
entire  tract  was  held  to  be  properly  joined  as  a  co-defendant.^ 
A  similar  action  being  brought  to  recover  dower  in  a  tract  which 
the  husband  had  conveyed  during  his  marriage  to  a  single  grantee 
by  one  deed  in  which  his  wife  did  not  join,  and  which  land  had 
by  subsequent  deeds  been  conveyed,  one-half  to  one  separate 
owner,  and  one-half  to  another,  it  w^as  held  that  the  widow, 
being  entitled  to  dower  in  the  whole  tract,  might  join  both  these 
owners  of  the  fee,  who  were  also  the  occupants,  as  defendants  in 
the  same  action. ^  The  rule  is  not  confined  to  proceedings  for 
the  recovery  of  dower.  Where  it  was  alleged  that  one  defendant 
claimed  to  be  owner  in  fee  of  the  whole  premises,  and  that 
the  three  other  defendants  were  his  tenants,  and  that  they  all 
"unjustly  withheld  from  the  plaintiff  the  possession  of  the  said 
premises,"  and  it  appeared  on  the  trial  that  each  of  these  four 
defendants  actually  occupied  a  separate  portion,  it  was  held  that 
all  these  persons  were  properly  united  as  co-defendants  in  the 
action.^  When  the  land  is  in  the  actual  possession  of  a  tenant, 
the  landlord  may  be  joined  with  him  as  a  co-defendant,  inde- 
pendently of  any  express  provision  of  the  code  authorizing  such 
a  course,  if  the  landlord  has  in  any  manner  interfered  to  resist 
the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  has  aided  and  abetted  the  tenant  in  Mb 
resistance,  or  has  asserted  the  right  of  ownership  to  be  in  himself 
as  against  the  plaintiff.* 

1  Ellicott  I'.  Hosier,  7  N.  Y.  201.     This  since   he   is   entitled    to    the    possession, 

was  so  lield   under  the  2   R.  S.  of  New  Bledsoe  v.  Simms,  53  Mo.  305.     See  also 

York,  p.  303,  §§  2  and  4,  and  p.  304,  §§  10  AVilson  v.  Garaghty,  70  Mo.  517 ;   Rust  v. 

and  13,  which  provide  that  ejectment  must  Goff,  94  Mo.  511. 

he  brought   against    the   person  actually  -  Galbreath  v.  Gray,  20  Ind.  290.     It 

in  occupation  ;    citing  Sherwood  v.  Van-  was  lield  that  the  respective  liabilities  of 

denburgh,   2    Hill,   303.      The   defendant  the  two  defendants  could  be  arranged  and 

harl  contended  that  the  action,  being  for  determined  in  the  judgment. 
dower,  must  be  against  the  owner  of  the  '^  Fosgate  i\   Herkimer   Man.   Co.,    12 

freehold,  as  in  the  common  law  action  of  N.  Y.  580.      See  Fisher  v.   Hepburn,  48 

dower.      In    .Missouri,  wiien  an  action  is  N.  Y.  41,  55,  per  Earl  J. 
brouglit  to  recover  lands  claimed  to  be  *  Abeel  v.  Van  Gelder,  36  N.  Y.  513 

owtK'd  in  fee  by  a  wife,  her  husband  is  the  Fosgate  v.   Herkimer    Man.    Co.,   supra 

only  proper  j)arty  to  be  made  defendant,  Fearce    v.  Ferriss    K.\.,    10    N.   Y.    280 


ACTIONS   AGAINST   OCCUPANTS    OF   LAND.  285 

§  197.  *  29G.  Who  should  not  be  joined.  Illustrations.  Per- 
sons, however,  whose  rights  tuiiiiot  he  at  all  affected  by  a  re- 
covery against  the  party  in  actual  possession,  whose  interest  is 
entirely  distinct  from  his,  and  under  or  from  whom  he  does  not 
derive  any  title,  are  neither  necessary  nor  proper  co-defendants 
with  him  in  an  action  brought  to  recover  the  possession  as  against 
his  special  title;  as,  for  example,  the  remainder-man  in  fee  after 
a  life  estate,  when  the  action  is  merely  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
covering possession  during  the  continuance  of  such  life  interest. 
Thus,  in  an  action  against  a  husband,  tenant  by  the  curtesy  in 
actual  possession,  brought,  not  to  establish  an  absolute  title  in 
fee,  but  to  recover  the  possession  during  the  husband's  life,  the 
heirs  of  the  deceased  wife  —  who  are  the  reversioners  in  fee  — 
are  neither  necessary  nor  proper  parties  defendant.^  On  the 
same  principle,  an  action  by  the  grantee  in  a  sheriff's  deed  of 
lands  given  on  an  execution  sale,  the  judgment  debtor  having 
died,  should  be  against  the  latter's  heirs  alone,  and  not  against 
them  and  his  widow ;  her  dower  right  could  not  be  affected  by 
the  recover}',  and  being  as  yet  unassigned,  it  did  not  entitle  her 
to  possession  as  against  the  j^laintiff.^  Lands  having  been  given 
to  a  tenant  for  life,  with  remainder  in  fee  to  another,  the  former 
leased  the  premises  for  a  term  of  years,  with  a  covenant  of  quiet 
enjoyment.  The  life  tenant  died  before  the  expiration  of  the 
term,  and  the  remainder-man  thereupon  entered  and  took  posses- 
sion. The  lessee  brought  an  action  upon  the  broken  covenant 
against  both  the  executors  of  the  life  tenant  and  the  remainder- 

Fosgate  v.  Herkimer  Man.  Co.,  12  Barb,  railroad  company  which  had  acquired  it 

•352.     See  also  Fiuuegan  i'.  Carraher,  47  by  condemnation  proceediug.s,  the  lessee 

N.  Y.  493,  which  was  very  similar  to  Abeel  of  such  land  is  a  neces.sary  party:  Roby 

r.  Van  Gelder,  SM/j/a,  in  all  the  facts.    The  v.  N.  Y.  C.  &  H.  K.  R.  R.  Co.  (1894),  142 

landlord  alone  was  sued.     Court  held  the  N.  Y.  176,  36  N.  E.  1053. 
tenant  was  also  a  proper  and  perhaps  a  The  tenant  in  possession  is   the  only 

necessary  party,  but  objection  to  his  non-  necessary  party  to  an  action  of  ejectment, 

joinder  had  been  waived  by  not  demurring  even  though  he  may  set  up  that  tliere  are 

or    answering.      See,   further,    Clason    r.  tenants  in  common  with  him :  Raymond 

Baldwin,   129  N.  Y.  183;  City  of  Napa  c.  v.  Morrison  (1894),  9   Wash.  156,  37  Pac. 

Howland,  87  Cal.  84.     In  Iowa,  it  is  held  318.     See  also  Danihee  v.  Hyatt  (1897), 

that,  when  the  defendant  is  only  a  tenant,  151  N.  Y.  493;  45  N.  E.  939. 
the  landlord  mai/  be  substituted;  but  this  All  the  occupants  of  land  need  not  be 

is  not  necessary.     If  substituted  or  noti-  joined ;    one   is   sufficient :    Hennessey   v. 

fied,  he  is  bound  by  the  judgment ;  other-  Paulsen  (1895),   147  N.  Y.  255,  41  N.  E. 

wise  he  is  not.     State  v.  Orwig,  34  Iowa,  516.] 
112,  115.  1  Allen  i-.  Ranson,  44  Mo.  263. 

[^Where  an  owner  of  land  brings  an  ^  Cavender  v.  Smith,  8  Iowa,  360. 

action   to   recover    possession    against    a 


286  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

man.  The  action  in  this  form  was  plainl}'  without  any  founda- 
tion; the  remainder-man  was  improperly  joined,  as  he  was  in  no 
manner  liahle  on  the  covenant.^ 

^  198.  *  207.  II.  Actions  against  Ov^ners  or  Possessors  of 
Chattels.  In  Actions  to  recover  Possession  of  Chattels.  Common- 
Law  Rule  not  Changed.  The  actions  whlch  fall  under  this  sub- 
division, and  which  have  any  distinctive  features,  are  very  few 
in  number.  Those  brought  to  recover  damages  for  a  tortious 
act,  trespass,  or  negligence,  committed  by  means  of  a  chattel, 
and  those  brought  to  recover  damages  for  the  conversion  of  a 
chattel,  properly  belong  to  the  subdivision  which  treats  of  actions 
for  torts  in  general.  The  common-law  rules  as  to  parties  de- 
fendant in  an  action  to  recover  possession  of  chattels  have  not 
been  in  an}^  manner  affected  by  the  new  procedure.  Such  action 
must  be  brought  against  the  party  or  parties  in  actual  possession 
of  the  chattel  demanded  by  the  plaintiff.^  If  this  actual  posses- 
sion is  in  one,  he  must  be  the  sole  defendant;  if  in  two  or  more 
jointly,  —  as,  for  example,  in  a  partnership,  —  they  must  all  be 
made  defendants.^  There  is  a  particular  case  in  which  the  action 
may  be  maintained  against  one  in  eoyutriictive  possession,  as  well 
as  against  the  party  in  actual  possession.*  If  the  original  taking 
of  the  goods  was  wrongful,  and  the  wrong-doer  has  subsequently 
parted  with  the  possession  by  assignment,  the  action  will  still  lie 
against  him,  or  it  may  be  prosecuted  against  both  himself  and  the 
assignee  whose  possession  is  actual.^  Possession  by  the  party, 
however,  and  not  the  claim  of  ultimate  ownership,  is  in  general 

1  Coakley  v.  Chamberlain,  8  Abb.  Pr.  8  i    Ch.  PI.  pp.  122,   12.3   (SpringfieM 

N.  K.  .37.     The  complaiut  wa.s  dismissed  as  ed.  1840) ;  Gassner  v.  Marquardt,  76  Wis. 

to  the  remainder-mau,  and  judgment  was  579  ;  Washington    v.  Love,    34   Ark.  93  ; 

rendered    .igainst     the     executors.     The  Harkey  v.  Tillman,   40  Ark.    551  ;    and 

action  was  in   every  respect  remarkable.  Helman  v.  Withers  (Ind.  App.  1892),  30 

Where  a  lessor  assigns  his  term,  the  lessor  N.  K.  5,  citing  numerous  cases  ;  Scott  v. 

may  join  the  lessee  and  the  assignee  in  a  McGraw,  3  Wash.  675;  Willis  v.  De  Witt 

suit    for  the  rent.     Tabue   v.   McAdams,  (S.  Dak.  1892),  52  N.  W.  1090,  and  cases 

8  Hush,  74.  cited. 

-  []"  One  having  custody  of  property  ■•  Nichols  v.  Michaels,   23   N.   Y.  264, 

in   dispute  is  a   proper   defendant  in  re-  270,271.     See  liaughton  r.  Newberry,  69 

plevin":  Kngel  >•.  Dado  (1902),  —  Neb.  N.  C.  456. 

— ,  92  \.  W.  629.      Replevin   sliould  be  ^  Nichols  v.  Michaels,  23    N.  Y.   264, 

brought  against  the  party  in   pos.scssion,  268,  270,  271,  per  .James  and  Seldcn  ,IJ. 

and  wliore  such  .iction  is  brouglit  against  See,  liowever,  Davis  v.   Van  de  Mark.  45 

an  oflicor  acting  under  an  execution,  he  Kan.    130;    Feder  v.  Abrahams,  28  Mo. 

may  be  .>ined   either  as  an   individual  or  Ajip.  454. 
as  an    ofTicer:    Irwin   v.  Walling   (1896), 
4  Okla.   128,  44   Pac.  219.] 


SHir-owxKRS.  287 

tlie  ground  for  making  him  a  defendant.  If  the  possessor  is 
sued,  and  a  third  person  also  sets  up  a  claim  of  title,  the  con- 
llicting  demands  may  be  determined  by  means  of  an  interpleader 
between  the  plaintiff  and  this  claimant,  ordered  by  the  court  at 
the  instance  of  the  defendant,  if  he  in  fact  admits  that  he  himself 
has  no  right  in  and  to  the  goods. ^ 

§  199.  *  298.  Ship-Owners.  The  liability  of  ship-owners  for 
supplies  furnished  or  repairs  made,  or  npon  other  contracts, 
express  or  implied,  in  respect  to  the  vessel  itself,  gives  rise  to 
rules  which  properly  fall  under  this  subdivision.  I  do  not  now 
stop  to  inquire  when,  how,  or  by  whom  the  owners  may  be  bound, 
nor  what  are  the  powers  of  the  master  or  other  agent  in  managing 
the  vessel.  It  is  assumed  that  the  power  exists  and  has  been 
properly  exercised,  and  that  a  liability  has  arisen  for  the  supplies, 
repairs,  or  other  aid  to  the  ship;  and  the  single  question  is.  What 
is  the  extent  of  the  liability,  upon  whom  does  it  rest,  and  against 
whom  should  it  be  enforced?  When  a  liability  has  been  created 
by  the  master  or  other  agent  for  supplies  furnished  to  the  vessel, 
the  part-owners  are  responsible  in  soUdo,  and  should  all  be  joined 
as  defendants ;  the  noyijoinder  of  some  is  a  defence  by  those  sued ;  ^ 
and  the  same  is  true  in  the  case  of  repairs  and  of  all  other  ex- 
penses properly  incurred  in  sailing  her.^  An  action  to  recover 
compensation  in  the  nature  of  salvage  for  services  rendered  in 
saving  and  securing  a  disabled  steamboat  under  circumstances 
entitling  the  plaintiff  to  such  compensation,  was  held  to  be  prop- 
erly brought  against  all  the  persons  and  corporations  who  owned 
interests  in  the  boat,  even  though  their  interests  were  distinct 
and   unequal,    and   even    though   some   of   them    were   separate 

1  See  code  of  New  York,  §  122  (452,  1901,  §  6085  ;  Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2924; 
820)  ;  California,  §  380  ;  Nebraska,  §  48  ;  Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4S42  ;  Wiscou- 
North  Carolina,  §  65;  Nevada,  §  17;  sin,  St.,  1898,  §  2610  ;  Wyoming,  Rev.  St., 
[[Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1.S08;  Arkan-  1899,  §  3490.J 
sas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  St.,  §§  5635-5637;  '^  Sager  i-.  Nichols,  1  Daly,  1. 
Colorado.  §  18;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  ^  gaggg^t  v.  Crowell,  3  Robt.  72.  Lia- 
1902,  §  1019;  Georgia,  Code,  1895,  §4896;  bility  in  solido  means  a  joint  liability, 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3176;  In-  where  all  must  be  proceeded  against,  and 
diana,  Burns'  St.,  §  274  ;  Iowa,  Code,  the  judgment  is  recovered  against  all,  but 
1897.  §  3487  ;  Kansas,  Gen.  St.,  1901,  may  be  fully  enforced  against  either,  and 
§  4474  ;  Kentucky,  §  30  ;  Missouri,  Rev. ,  he  left  to  his  right  of  contribution,  if  anv, 
St.,  1899,  §417:  Montana,  §  588;  North  against  his  fellows.  In  reference  to  the 
Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5240;  Ohio,  general  doctrine  stated  iu  the  te.xt,  con- 
Bates'  St.,  §  5016;  Oklahoma.  St.,  1893,  suit  Smith's  Mercantile  Law,  pp.  237,  2.3S 
§  3915  ;  Oregon,  Hills' Laws,  §  40;  South  (Am.  ed),  and  Abbott  on  Shipping, 
Carolina,  §  143  ;  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  pp.  116-118  (marg.  pag.). 


288  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

insurers  of  her  by  different  policies,  to  whom  an  abandonment 
had  been  made  on  account  of  a  total  loss.  Altliough  their  inter- 
ests and  their  liabilities  were  unequal,  they  might  all  be  sued  in 
a  single  action,  and  a  separate  judgment  could  be  rendered  against 
each  in  proportion  to  his  or  its  liability.^ 

§  200.  *  299.  III.  Actions  upon  Contract  ;  Joint  Liability. 
Common-Law  Bules  Unchanged  in  Legal  Actions.  Exceptions. 
Notwithstanding  the  general  intent  of  the  codes  — ■  which,  I 
think,  is  very  plain  —  to  substitute  the  equitable  in  place  of  the 
legal  doctrines  upon  the  subject  of  joint  liability  and  of  the 
necessary  defendants  in  actions  brought  thereon,  this  intent  has 
not  guided  the  courts  in  the  decision  oi  the  particular  cases  as 
they  have  arisen.  The  overwhelming  weight  of  authority,  in 
passing  upon  the  subordinate  and  practical  questions,  has  deter- 
mined that  no  such  change  has  actually  been  made,  and  that  the 
common-law  rules  are  left  controlling  in  all  legal  actions. ^  The 
only  modification  —  and  it  is  rather  formal  than  real  —  seems  to 
be  in  the  manner  of  raising  the  questions.  In  an  action  against 
joint  debtors,  or  to  enforce  a  joint  liability  arising  out  of  contract, 
all  of  the  joint  debtors  or  joint  contractors  that  are  living  must 
be  united  as  co-defendants ;  ^  and  a  neglect  to  make  such  union 
of  parties,  if  properly  taken  advantage  of,  will  be  fatal  to  the 
action.'*     In  other  words,  the  codes,  in  the  absence  of  such  ex- 

1  Cloon  !-.  City  Jus.  Co.,  1  Handy,  32,  partnership  described  as  the  firm  of  A.  & 
per  Gholson  J.,  Superior  Court  of  Cin-  B.,  and  alleged  to  be  composed  of  the  in- 
cinuati.  dividuals  A.  &  B.  is  not  amendable  so  as 

2  This  general  statement  does  not,  of  to  make  the  action  one  against  a  partner- 
course,  apply  in  those  States  whose  codes  ship  described  as  the  firm  of  C.  &  B.,  and 
expressly  cliange  the  common-law  rules  in  composed  of  the  individuals  C.  &  B." 
respect  to  joint  debtors  and  joint  liability  All  partners  Tnust  be  joined  :  Jones  v. 
upon  contract,  and  expressly  permit  any  Langhorne  (189.'5),  19  Colo.  206,  34  Pac. 
number  to  be  sued,  and  also  the  personal  99";  Cox  u.  Gille  Hardware  Co.  (1899), 
represi-ntatives  of  deceased  joint  debtors  8  Okla.  483,  58  I'ac.  045.  Where  a  joint 
to  be  united  with  the  .survivors,  etc.  See  liability  l)ut  not  a  partnership  is  alleged, 
supra,  §  *  118.  proof  of  the   partnership  is  admissible  to 

3  QHut  where  all  have  not  been  served  sliow  the  joint  liability  :  First  Nat.  Bank 
witli  proce.ss,  the  action  may  proceed  v.  Hattenbach  (1900),  13  S.  D.  365,  83 
against  tliose  served  :  Gyger  v.  Courtney  N.  W.  421.] 

(1900),  59  Neb.   555,  81   N.  W.  437;  Per-  *  [^Montana,    by    statute,   allows    suit 

kins  County  v.  Miller  (1898),  55  Neb.  141,  against  two  or  more  persons  transacting 

75  N.  W.  577 ;  Clark  v.  Commercial  Nat.  business  under  a   common    name,    to   be 

Bank  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  VV.  958.  brought  against   tiiem  in   such   common 

In  Greer  v.    Waxeibaum    (1902),  115  name,  the  summons  to  i)e  served  on  one  or 

Oa.  866,  42  S.  E.  206,  the  court  said  :  "  A  more  of  the    a.ssociates,   §   590.     Similar 

petition   in   an  action   brought   against   a  statute    in     Colorado,     §    14;    California, 


DEFENDANTS    JOINTLY    LIABLE    ON    CONTRACT. 


289 


press  provisions  as  are  found  in  those  of  some  States,  Mia ve  not 
changed  the  nature  of  joint  liability  on  contract,  nor  assimilated 
it  to  a  several  or  joint  and  several  one.^     While  this  doctrine  is 


^  388;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5177; 
Wyoming,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §3485;  Utah, 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2927  ;  Connecticut,  Gen. 
St.,  1902,  §588;  Ohio,  K.  S.,  1900,  §5011.] 

1  QIu  Arkansas  and  Kentucky  the 
statute  is  as  follows  :  "  Where  two  or  more 
persons  are  jointly  bound  by  contract,  the 
action  thereon  may  be  brought  against  all 
or  any  of  them,  at  the  plaintiff's  option." 
Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.  §  5634 ; 
Kentucky,  Code,  1895,  §  27. 

In  Kansas  and  Missouri  the  statute  is 
as  follows :  "  In  all  cases  of  joint  obliga- 
tions and  joint  assumptions  of  co-partners 
or  others,  suits  may  be  brought  and  pros- 
ecuted against  any  one  or  more  of  those 
who  are  so  liable."  Kansas,  Gen.  St., 
1901,  §  1193;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§892. 

The  Iowa  statute  is  somewhat  more 
comprehensive :  "  Where  two  or  more 
persons  are  bound  by  contract  or  by  judg- 
ment, decree  or  statute,  whetlier  jointly 
only,  or  jointly  and  severally,  or  severally 
only,  including  the  parties  to  negotiable 
paper,  common  orders  and  checks,  and 
sureties  on  the  same  or  separate  instru- 
ments, or  by  any  liability  growing  out  of 
the  same,  the  action  thereon  may,  at  the 
plaintiff's  option,  be  brought  against  any 
or  all  of  them."     Code  1897,  §  3465. 

The  North  Carolina  statute  is  as  fol- 
lows :  "  In  all  cases  of  joint  contracts  of 
•co-partners  in  trade  or  others,  suit  may  be 
brought  and  prosecuted  on  the  same 
against  all,  or  any  number  of  the  persons 
making  such  contracts."  Code,  1883,  §  187. 

In  1897  Minnesota  adopted  a  similar 
statute.  Laws  1897,  chap.  303,  reading  as 
follows  :  "  A  joint  or  separate  or  several 
action  may  be  brouglit  against  any  one  or 
more  or  all  of  the  ])arties  liable  upon  such 
joint  obligation,  and  a  joint  or  several 
judgment  niuy  be  entered  against  any  one 
or  more  or  all  of  tiie  parties  liable  upon 
such  joint  obligation  ;  provided,  however, 
tlie  court  may,  upon  application  by  any 
interested  party,  or  upon  its  own  motion, 
require  the  ])Iaintiff  to  bring  in  as  parties 
defendant  all  of  the  parties  jointly  liable 
on  any  such  obligation. ""] 


2  Bridge  v.  Payson,  5  Sandf.  210; 
Wooster  v.  Chamberlain,  28  Barb.  602  ; 
Tinkum  v.  O'Neale,  5  Nev.  93 ;  Keller  r. 
Blasdel,  1  Nev.  491;  Jenks  v.  Opp,  43 
Ind.  108,  110;  Kamm  i'.  Harker,  3  Ore. 
208;  Aylesworth  v.  Brown,  31  Ind.  270; 
Bledsoe  v.  Irvin,  35  Ind.  293;  Hardy  v. 
Blazer,  29  Ind.  226  ;  92  Am.  Dec.  347  ; 
Braxton  v.  State,  25  Ind.  82  ;  Shafer  v. 
Moriarty,  46  Ind.  9,  13.  See  Lane  v. 
Salter,  51  N.  Y.  1.  In  Bledsoe  v.  Irvin, 
the  court  said  that  the  decision  there 
made  did  not  conflict  with  the  doctrine 
of  Goodnight  v.  Goar,  30  Ind.  418,  which 
was  that  "  the  code  seems  to  have  re- 
enacted  the  rules  which  prevailed  in 
equity  as  to  who  must  join  as  plaintiffs 
and  may  be  joined  as  defendants,"  becau.se, 
even  in  equity,  such  parties  (joint  delitors) 
must  all  be  made  defendants,  and  thus 
brought  before  the  court;  citing,  in  sup- 
port of  this  equity  rule,  1  Dan.  Ch.  Frac. 
329  ;  Perry  v.  Turner,  55  Mo.  418.  If  one 
of  two  or  more  joint  debtors  has  been 
discharged  in  bankruptcy,  he  is  still  a 
necessary  defendant,  since  his  defence  is 
personal,  and  must  be  specially  pleaded. 
Jenks  V.  Opp,  43  Ind.  108,  110,  HI.  See 
also,  retaining  the  common-law  rule, 
People  V.  Sloper,  1  Idaho,  158;  Ryan  v. 
State  Bk.,  10  Neb.  524;  Rider  Life  Raft 
Co.  V.  Roach,  97  N.  Y.  378. 

[^Kansas  and  Missouri  have  the  follow- 
ing statute  :  "  All  contracts  which,  by  the 
common  law,  are  joint  only,  shall  be  con- 
strued to  be  joint  and  several."  Kansas, 
Gen.  St,,  1901,  §  1190;  Missouri,  Rev.  St., 
1899,  §  889.  Colorado  has  a  statute 
almo.st  identical,  Mills'  St.,  §  2528,  quoted 
in  note  to  §  *  303.  And  a  recent  Minnesota 
statute,  Laws  1897,  chap.  303,  provides 
that  "  Parties  to  a  joint  obligation  sliall 
be  jointly  and  severally  liable  tliereon  for 
the  full  amount  thereof." 

In  Outcalt  V.  Collier  (1899),  8  Okla. 
473,  58  Pac.  642,  the  court  held  tliat  under 
the  various  sections  of  the  Oklahoma 
statutes,  contracts  wliich  appear  to  be 
joint  must  be  construed  to  be  joint  and 
several.     See  §  *276,  note. 

Held,  in   Davison    v.   Harmon    (189G), 


19 


290 


CIVIL   EEMEDIES. 


generally  accepted  in  the  States  which  have  adopted  the  reform 
system  of  procedure,  in  a  few  of  them,  as  has  been  said,  the 
language  of  the  statute  is  much  more  specific,  and  this  language, 
it  is  held  by  the  courts,  substantially  abolishes  all  joint  debts  and 
contract  liabilities,  and  reduces  them  to  joint  and  several  liabili- 
ties; or,  rather,  it  produces  a  still  greater  effect,  for,  as  judicially 
interpreted,  it  permits  the  creditor  to  sue  one,  all,  or  any  number 
ho  pleases,  of  the  debtors  or  persons  liable  on  the  contract.^ 

v^  201.  *  300.  One  of  two  or  more  Joint  Contractors  Incapacitated. 
Retired  Partners.  If  one  of  two  or  more  joint  contractors  is  in- 
capable of  entering  into  a  valid  agreement,  but  all  are  sued 
jointly  in  one  action,  judgment  may  be  recovered  against  those 
alone  who  are  capable  of  contracting  and  of  binding  themselves 
thereby ;  as,  for  example,  where  a  note  had  been  given  in  a  firm 
name,  and  the  jDartners,  who  were  husband  and  wife,  were  both 


65  Minn.  402,  67  N.  W.  101.5,  that  where 
a  plaintiff  brings  an  action  upua  a  joint 
contract,  and,  upon  default  of  one  of  the 
joint  del>tor.s,  takes  a  judgment  bv  default 
against  him,  such  judgment  is  a  bar  to  a 
subsequent  action  against  the  others.  But 
it  was  held  in  Pfefferkorn  v.  Haywood 
(1896),  65  Minn.  429,  68  N.  W.  68,  that  if 
the  debt  is  in  fact  joint  and  several, 
though  alleged  to  be  joint,  and  judgment 
by  default  is  so  entered,  tlie  court  may 
thereafter  allow  an  amendment  of  the 
complaint  to  conform  it  to  the  facts.] 

'  This  is  the  nece.'isary  effect  of  the 
provision  in  the  code  of  each  State  re- 
ferred to  in  the  text,  and  named  in  note 
last  preceding;  namely,  Kansas,  Kose  v. 
Williams,  5  Kan.  483  ;  .Jefferson  County 
Com'rs  1-.  Swain,  5  Kan.  376  ;  Crane  v. 
Ring,  48  Kan.  58  ;  Whittcnhall  v.  Korber, 
12  Kan.  618;  Alvey  v.  Wilson,  9  Kan. 
401.  405  ;  Silver  v.  Foster,  9  Kan.  56,  59. 
Iowa,  llyerson  v.  Hendrie,  22  Iowa,  480, 
an  action  sustained  against  one  of  the 
])artners  upon  a  firm  note ;  the  opinion  of 
Cole  J.  is  a  very  full  discussion  of  tiie 
doctrine  and  of  the  changes  ninde  by  tiie 
new  system,  —  an  exceedingly  instructive 
opinion,  but  too  long  for  (|uotation.  Ken 
lucky,  Gos.sora  v.  Badgett,  6  Bush,  97  ; 
Nichols  ir.  Burton,  5  Bush,  320.  This  last 
case  holds  thai  a  judgment  against  one 
jiartner  uii  a  firm  debt  extinguishes  the 
demand,  and  is  a  bar  to  any  subsequent 


action  thereon  against  the  other  partners. 
This  result  is  expressly  guarded  against 
by  the  codes  of  certain  other  States. 
Bradford  v.  Toney,  30  Ark.  763 ;  Williams 
V.  Rogers,  14  Bush,  776  (a  judgment  in 
the  suit  against  one  or  more  is  riot  a  bar 
to  an  action  against  the  others,  overruling 
Nichols  r.  Burton) ;  Lingenfelser  r.  Simon, 
49  Ind.  82  (fier  contra,  it  is  a  bar  ;  but  the 
execution  of  a  note  by  one  joint  debtor  is 
not  a  satisfaction  of  the  joint  liability, 
unless  taken  under  an  express  agreement 
that  it  siiould  be  so).  It  is  held  in  Mis- 
souri that  a  judgment  is  not  a  contract 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute,  and 
that  therefore  in  a  suit  upon  a  joint  judg- 
ment all  the  judgment  debtors  must  be 
made  defendants  ;  Sheehan  &  L.  Transp. 
Co.  V.  Sims,  28  Mo.  App.  64;  coH^ra,  in- 
terpreting the  same  statute,  Belleville 
Sav.  Bk.  V.  Winslow,  30  Fed.  Rep.  488. 
It  is  held  in  Colorado  that  the  language 
of  the  statute  in  tiiat  State  (Gen.  Stat. 
§  1834),  "All  joint  oidigations  and  cove- 
nants shall  hereafter  be  taken  and  held  to 
be  joint  and  several  obligations  and  cove- 
nants," does  not  embrace  or  apply  to  oral 
contracts.  Kxchange  Bank  v.  Ford, 
7  Colo.  314;  I^Kellogg  v.  Window  (1897), 
100  la.  552,  69  N.  W.  875  ;  Council  Bluffs 
Bank  v.  Griswold  (1897),  .50  Neb.  753,  70 
N.  W.  376,  construing:  the  Iowa  statute  ; 
IHnstein  c.  .Johnson  (1893),.112  N.  C  253, 
17  S.  E.  155.3 


DEFENDANTS    JOINTLY    LIABLE    ON   CONTRACT.  291 

sued,  judgment  would  be  given  against  the  husband  alone. ^ 
^\'hen  a  contract  is  made  by  a  iirm,  all  the  persons  who  were  then 
members  of  the  partnership  continue  liable  upon  it,  even  though 
some  of  them  may  have  retired  fi'om  the  firm  before  the  contract 
was  broken.  No  arrangement  among  the  partners  tliemselve.s 
can  change  their  liability  to  their  common  creditor,  unless  he  is  a 
party  thereto,  and  in  some  manner  discharges  an  outgoing  mem- 
ber from  his  responsibility.  A  suit,  therefore,  where  there  has 
been  no  such  discharge,  should  be  brought  against  all  the  persons 
who  were  partners  at  the  time  when  the  agreement  was  entered 
into  or  the  indebtedness  was  incurred.^ 

§  202.  *  301.  Case  of  Implied  Contracts.  Illustrations.  The 
rule  which  requires  that  all  joint  debtors  must  be  made  defend- 
ants applies  to  the  cases  wliere  the  contract  is  implied,  as  well  as 
to  those  in  which  it  is  express.  Thus,  when  two  or  more  ad- 
ministrators, or  an  administrator  and  an  administratrix,  have  been 
appointed  over  an  estate,  and  upon  their  retainer  services  are 
rendered  by  a  person  for  their  benefit,  — •  as,  for  example,  by  a 
lawyer  retained  to  conduct  legal  proceedings  affecting  the  estate, 
—  they  are  jointly  liable  to  him  for  his  compensation,  and  should 
be  sued  jointly  in  an  action  to  recover  it;  their  different  and 
even  hostile  interests  in  the  final  distribution  do  not  alter  the 
nature  of  their  liability  upon  the  contract,  express  or  implied, 
made  with  the  person  thus  employed.^  The  case  of  persons 
liable  to  repay  money  which  had  been  paid  by  mistake,  is 
another  familiar  example  of  liability  arising  from  implied  con- 
tract ;  all  the  parties  upon  whom  such  duty  rests  should  be 
joined  in  the  suit  to  recover  the  .money.*  The  members  of  a 
joint-stock  association,  not  being  a  corporation,  are  jointly  liable 
as   partners   for   the  debts   and   contracts    of   such   association.^ 

1  Bramskill   v.  James,   11   N.  Y.   294.  Kentucky,  by  statute,  a  surety  who  has 

See  Groat  v.  I'hillips,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  42,  paid  the  debt  or  a  part  thereof  may  sue 

where  a  wife  who  had  joined  in  a  contract  the  principal  debtor  and  the  co-surety  in 

was  omitted  in  the  action.  one  action,  and  recover  from  the  former 

"  Briggs  V.  Briggs  &  A^ose,  15  N.   Y.  the  whole  amount,  and  from  the  latter  his 

471.     See   also  Bowen  r.  Crow,  16  Neb.  contributory    share.      llobiusou    v.    Jen- 

5.56    (an   action   to   recover  taxes  levied  nings,  7  Bush,  6.30  ;  2  R.  S.  398,  ch.  97,  §  7. 

upon   property   OM'ned    by  a  partnership,  ^  j^So,  in  Thurmond  v.  Cedar  Spring 

which  had  been  dissolved  at  the  time  the  Baptist  Church   (1900),  110  Ga.    816,  .36 

action  was  brought:  all  the  members  of  S.  E.  221,  it  was  held  tliat  tlie  members 

the  late  firm  must  be  joined).  of  an  unincorporated  religious  society  are 

•*  Mygatt  V.  Wilcox,  1  Lans.  55.  liable  as  joint  promisors  on  its  contracts. 

*  Duncan   v.  Berlin,  5   Robt.  457.     In  If  such  society  luis  duly  appointed  trustees 


292  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

Although  the  statute  permits  a  creditor  to  sue  the  president 
or  otlier  managing  officer,  tlie  judgment  thus  obtained  can  onl}' 
be  enforced  out  of  the  common  property.  If  he  desires  to  enforce 
his  chiim  against  the  members  individually,  he  must  unite  all  of 
them  as  defendants,  no  matter  how  numerous,  as  in  an  action 
a'T-ainst  an  ordinary  tirm.^  The  apparent  exception,  which  existed 
at  the  common  law,  to  the  general  rule  requiring  all  joint  debtors 
to  be  sued,  remains  in  full  force  under  the  new  system,  so  that  a 
dormant  partner  need  not  necessarily  be  included  as  a  defendant 
in  an  action  against  tiie  firm,  although  of  course  he  may  be  so 
joined,  if  the  plaintiff  elect.^ 

S  203.  *302.  Survivorship.  In  States  containing  no  Special  Stat- 
utory Provisions  respecting  Joint  Liability,  Common-Law  Rule  Un- 
changed. Practical  Result  herein.  I  am  finally  brought  to  the 
case  where  one  or  more  of  several  joint  debtors  dies.  The  com- 
mon-law rule  had  been  settled  from  the  earliest  period  that  only  the 
survivors  could  be  sued.  Equity  had  modified  this  legal  doctrine, 
and  permitted  an  action  against  the  personal  representatives  of 
the  deceased  debtor  or  contractor.  Has  an}^  change  in  this 
respect  been  introduced  by  the  new  procedure  ?  It  is  now  es- 
tablished by  a  great  preponderance  of  authority,  in  those  States 
whose  codes  do  not  contain  the  special  provisions  concerning 
joint  liability  already  referred  to,^  that  these  rules,  as  they  existed 
immediately  prior  to  the  reform  legislation,  have  not  been  in  any 
manner  modified,  but  remain  in  active  o[)eration  as  a  part  of  the 
present  system.  The  practical  result  is,  upon  the  death  of  one 
or  moi-e  joint  debtors,  obligors,  or  promisors,  a  legal  action,  can 
be  maintained  against  the  survivors  alone,  and  in  such  action 
the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased  cannot  be  made 
defendants  for  any  purpose.  An  equitable  action,  however,  can 
be  maintained   ajjainst   the    administrators   or  executors  of  the 


to   huld   and    manage    its   property,   the  498  ;  Farwell  r.  Davis,  66  Barb.  7,3  ;  Leslie 

trustees  are  the.  only  necessary  parties  in  v.  Wiley,  47  N.  Y.  648.     Compare  Marvin 

an  action  for  money  furnisheil  to  the  use  v.  Wilber,  52  N.  Y.  270.     Even  when  the 

of  the  ehnrcli :   .losey  v.  Union    Loan  &  dormant   partner   is  the  husband  of   the 

Trust  Co.  (1898),  106  (ia.  608,  .32  S.  E.  ostensible  one.     Scott  c  Conway,  .58  N.  Y. 

028.]  619;    Woodbouse  v.   Duncan,   106   N.  Y. 

'   King.sland  /•.  Hraisteil,  2  Lans.  17.  r)27. 

2  North  f.  Hlo.'is,  .30  N.  Y.  .374  :  Cuok-  ■*  See  these  j)rovisions  in  the  codes  of 

ingham  v.  [.lu^her,  2  K<>ves,  4.")4  ;   liiirllint  Missouri.  Kentucky,  Iowa.  Kaiis;is,  Nortii 

'•.   I'ost,  1    Hosw    28;    Brown   r.  Birdsall,  ( 'arolina.  QMiniiesota  and  Arkansas,  a«^e, 

29   Bar!).  .')4')  ;   Arnold   *.   .Morris,  7    Daly,  p.  289,  note  1.] 


DEFENDANTS    JOINTLY    LIABLE    ON    CONTRACT. 


293 


deceased  when,  and  only  when,  either  the  legal  remedy  against' 
the  survivors  has  been  exhausted,  or  such  remedy  would  be 
absolutely  useless.  In  such  equitable  action,  therefore,  the  plain- 
tiff must  either  aver  and  prove  the  recovery  of  a  judgment  and 
the  issue  and  the  return  of  an  execution  thereon  unsatisfied, 
against  the  survivors,  or  else  that  the  survivors  are  utterly 
insolvent.^  This  rule  differs  from  that  prevailing  in  England 
in  a  single  particular. ^     The  English  Court  of  Chancery  permits 


1  [^Dishneau  y.  Newton  (1895),  91  Wis. 
199,  64  N.  W.  879.J  Voorhis  v.  Child's 
Ex.,  17  N.  Y.  3.54;  Richter  v.  Poppen- 
liauseii,  42  N.  Y.  373  ;  Pope  v.  Cole,  55 
N.  Y.  124;  Lane  v.  Doty,  4  Barb.  534; 
Voorhis  v.  Baxter,  I  Ahb.  Pr.  43 ;  Moore- 
liouse  V.  Ballon,  16  Barb.  289;  Bentz  v. 
Thurber,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  645  ;  Maples 
r.  Geller,  1  Nev.  233,  237,  239  ;  Fowler  v. 
Houston,  1  Nev.  469, 472 ;  Kimball  v.  Whit- 
ney, 15  Ind.  280,  283;  Barlow  (•.  Scott's 
Adni.,  12  Iowa,  63  ;  Pecker  v.  Cannon,  1 1 
Iowa,  20;  Marsh  v.  Goodrell,  11  luwa, 
474;  Williams  y.  Scott's  Adm.,  11  Iowa, 
475.  The  last  four  cases  were  all  on  joint 
and  several  notes,  and  it  was  lield  that  tlie 
rule  applied  to  them  as  well  as  to  ohliffa- 
tions  purely  joint.  It  should  be  observed 
that  all  these  Iowa  cases  were  decided 
jirior  to  the  "revision  "  of  the  statutes 
made  in  1860.  County  of  Wapello  r. 
Bigham,  10  Iowa,  39  ;  Childs  r.  Hyde,  10 
Iowa,  294;  People  v.  Jenkins,  17  Cal.  500; 
Humphreys  v.  Crane,  5  Cal.  173;  May 
V.  Han.son,  6  Cal.  642.  But  in  Bank  of 
Stockton  r.  Howland,  42  Cal.  129,  an  ac- 
tion against  the  survivors  and  the  admin- 
istrator of  a  deceased  joint  debtor  was 
held  to  be  properly  brought ;  the  judg- 
ment, however,  should  be  severed,  and 
against  the  survivors  should  be  de  bonis 
jiropriis,  and  against  the  administrator  de 
honis  testatoris.  See  also  Bostwick  v.  Mc- 
Evoy,  62  Cal.  496 ;  Lawrence  v.  Doolan, 
68  Cal.  309.  It  was  decided  in  Parker  r 
Jack.son,  16  Barb.  33,  per  Gridley  J.,  that 
ail  action  could  be  maintained  against 
llie  survivor  and  the  personal  represent- 
ative of  a  deceased  maker  of  a  Joinf  aiid 
s'-iy  nd  note,  without  alleging  or  proving 
til",  in.solvency  of  the  survivor.  For  the 
]iroceedings  when  the  cause  of  action  is 
for  a  tort,  and  survives  upon  the  death  of 
one  of  the  wrongdoers,  see  Bond  v.  Smith, 


6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  239  ;  and  when  the  prom- 
ise is  joint  and  several,  see  Speyers  v. 
Fisk,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.Ct.  197,  and  cases  cited. 
When  an  execution  against  the  survivors 
of  joint  debtors  has  been  returned  unsat- 
isfied, the  action  against  the  personal  rep- 
resentatives of  the  deceased  debtor  will 
lie,  although  it  may  turn  out  that  the 
survivors  were  not  insolvent.  Pope  r. 
Cole,  55  N.  Y.  124,  and  .see  Yates  v.  Hoff- 
man, 5  Hun,  113.  See  also  Livermore 
V.  Bushnell,  5  Hun,  285  (in  an  action 
against  defendants  jointly  liable  on  a 
contract,  if  one  or  more  die  the  action 
does  not  abate  ;  the  death  should  be  sug- 
gested on  the  record,  and  the  action  pro- 
ceed against  the  survivors;  the  personal 
representatives  of  the  deceased  cannot  be 
joined) ;  Cairnes  v.  O'Bleness,  40  Wis. 
469  (same);  Jones  v.  Keep,  23  Wis.  45; 
Masten  v.  Blackwell,  8  Hun,  313;  Lanier 
V.  Irvine,  24  Minn.  116,  pending  an  action 
on  a  joint  and  several  bond,  if  one  of  the 
defendants  dies  it  ma}'  be  continued  against 
the  survivors,  without  joining  the  rep- 
resentatives of  the  deceased  defendant; 
.  Scholey  v.  Halsey,  72  N.  Y.  578 ;  Mat- 
tison  V.  Childs,  5  Colo.  78  (following  the 
common-law  rule)  :  Seaman  v.  Slater,  18 
Fed.  R.  485.  When  the  joint  debtor  who 
dies  is  a  mTe  surety,  his  estate  is  abso- 
lutely discharged  from  all  liability  at  law 
or  in  equity,  —  that  is,  liability  to  the 
creditor.  Wood  v.  Fiske,  63  N.  Y.  245  ; 
Getty  r.  Binsse,  49  id.  385,  and  cases 
cited  ;  Davis  v.  Van  Buren,  72  id.  587, 
588,  589,  and  cases  cited ;  Pickersgill  v. 
Lahens,  15  Wall.  140. 

-  ^The  very  recent  case  of  Potts  v. 
Dounce  (1903),  173  N.  Y.  335,  66  N.  E. 
4,  affirming  Potts  r.  Baldwin,  67  App. 
Div.  434,  states  a  different  rule  in  that 
State  from  the  rule  given  in  the  text.  It 
was   an   action   upon   a  promissory  note. 


294 


CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 


a  suit  ao-ainst  the  personal  representatives  of  tlie  deceased  at 
once,  without  attempting,  much  less  exhausting,  any  remedy 
at  law  against  the  survivor.  In  other  woixis,  the  creditor  lias  his 
option  at  all  times  to  sue  the  survivors  at  law,  or  the  representa- 
tives of  the  deceased  in  equity,  whether  the  survivors  are  solvent 
or  not ;  and  this  doctrine  has  been  adopted  in  several  American 
States.^ 

^  204.  *  303.  States  whose  Codes  contain  Provisions  Changing 
Common-Law  Rule.  Result.  These  doctrines  and  modes  of  pro- 
cedure in  reference  to  the  enforcing  a  joint  demand  when  one 
debtor  dies,  have  not,  however,  been  accepted  in  all  the  States 
which  have  adopted  the  new  system.  In  Indiana  it  is  declared 
to  be  the  true  meaning  and  intent  of  the  provisions  of  the  code 
abolishing  the  distinctions  between  legal  and  equitable  actions, 
and  introducing  the  equitable  principles  concerning  parties,  and 
proN'iding  for  a  severance  in  the  judgment,  that  upon  the  death 
of  one  or  more  joint,  or  joint  and  several  debtors  or  obligors,  an 
action  will  lie  at  once  against  the  survivors  and  the  administra- 
tors or  executors  of  the  deceased.^  In  certiiin  States,  special  pro- 
brought  against  three  surviving  joint 
promisors  and  tiie  executor  of  the  fourth. 
The  question  presented  to  the  court  was 
whether  tiie  executor  of  the  deceased 
maker  was  properly  joined.  Section  758 
of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  as  amended 
in  1877,  provides  that  in  case  of  the  death 
of  one  of  two  or  more  plaintiffs,  or  defend- 
ants, if  the  entire  cause  of  action  survives 
to,  or  against,  the  others,  the  ac-tion  may 
proceed  in  favor  of,  or  against,  the  sur- 
vivors ;  "  but  the  estate  of  a  person  or 
])arty,  jointly  liable  upon  contract  with 
others,  shall  not  be  discharged  by  his 
death,  and  tlie  court  may  make  an  order 
to  bring  in  the  proper  representative  of 
the  decedent,  when  it  is  necessary  so 
to  do  for  the  proper  disposition  of  the 
matter."  The  court,  by  (Jray  J.,  says : 
"  While  this  section,  by  its  place  in  the 
code,  is  applical)le  to  the  case  of  the 
death  of  a  party  pending  tlie  action,  it 
must,  nevertliejess,  be  reganled  as  making 
a  material  alteration  in  the  law  and  as 
imjiosing  a  liability  wiicre  none  existed 
before.  ...  At  common  law,  her  death 
would  have  terminated  her  liability;  but, 
while  no  action  at  law  could  have  been 
brouglit  against  her  estate,  as  she  was  a 


joint  debtor,  equity,  if  an  inability  to 
collect  from  the  survivors  were  sliowii, 
would  have  allowed  a  recovery  against  the 
estate.  Section  758  of  the  code,  now,  by 
continuing  the  liability  of  the  estate  of 
the  deceased,  enables  that  liability  to  be 
enforced  iu  an  actiou  at  law.  It  effects, 
directly,  what,  formerly,  equity  intervened 
to  accomidisli.  But,  while  tlie  legal  rule 
of  liability  has  beeu  changed,  the  rule  of 
procedure  is  not,  and  when  the  personal 
representatives  of  the  deceased  joint  debtor 
are  directly  ])roceeded  against  at  law,  the 
plaintiff  should,  still,  allege  the  in.solvency, 
or  inat)ility  to  ])ay,  of  the  survivors. "^ 

1  Wilkinson  r.  Henderson,  1  My.  &  K. 
582;  Braithwaite  r.  Britain,  1  Keen,  219; 
Brown  r.  Weatherby,  12  Sim.  6,  11.  The 
survivors,  however,  should  be  made  co- 
defendants. 

-  Braxton  v.  The  State,  25  Ind.  82; 
Katon  u.  Burns,  31  Ind.  .T.H).  The  former 
of  tliese  cases  is  an  aide  and  instructixo 
decision;  the  opinion  presents  the  equi- 
table theory  of  interpreting  the  code  in 
a  clear  and  convincing  manner.  Voorliisr. 
Child's  Ex.,  sujuui,  was  expressly  dis- 
approved. In  Klu.ssman  v.  Copeland,  18 
lud.  30G,  the    uniting    the    adiiiinislrator 


DEFENDANTS   JOINTLY   LIABLE   ON   CONTKACT. 


295 


visions  of  the  codes,  or  of  other  statutes,  expressly  authorize  an 
action  to  be  brought  in  the  first  instance  against  the  survivors 
and  the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased  joint  debtor, 
or  even  against  some,  any,  or  one  of  them,  at  the  option  of  the 
plaintiff.^ 


of  a  deceased  joint  debtor  as  a  co-defendant 
with  the  survivor  was  declared  not  to 
be  necessary.  When  a  bond  had  been 
executed  by  a  guardian  and  his  surety, 
and  the  surety  had  died,  tlie  action  on  tiie 
bond  may  be  brouglit  iu  Indiana  against 
the  surviving  principal  and  the  heirs  nf 
the  deceased  obligor,  the  latter  being 
liable  of  course  to  the  extent  of  the  lands 
descended  to  them.  Voris  v.  State,  ex 
re/.  Davis,  47  Ind.  345,  349,  350  ;  and  nn 
action  may  be  maintained  on  an  ad- 
ministrator's bond  against  the  surviving 
principal  —  the  administrator  —  and  tb.e 
executor  of  a  deceased  surety.  Tlie  bond 
was  assumed  to  be  joint,  and  the  judg- 
ment was  against  both  defendants  in  solido 
for  the  full  amount.  Myers  v.  State,  ex 
rel.  McCray,  47  Ind.  293,  297  ;  citing  and 
following  Braxton  l-.  State,  supra,  and 
Owen  V.  State,  25  Ind.  107.  See  also 
Hays  V.  Crutcher,  54  Ind.  260.  The 
courts  of  South  Carolina  have  put  the 
same  interpretation  upon  the  code  pro- 
visions. See  Trinimier  v.  Thomson,  10 
Rich.  L.  164;  Susoug  r.  Vaiden,  10  Rich. 
L.  247  ;  Wiesenfeld  v.  Byrd,  17  S.  C.  106. 
[^The  Indiana  doctrine  was  approved  by 
the  Supreme  Court  of  Wyoming  in  the 
case  of  Chadwick  v.  Hopkins  (1893),  4 
Wyo.  379,  34  Pac.  899.  In  the  course  of 
the  opinion  the  court  says :  "  The  one 
sufficient  reason  for  the  rule  of  the  com- 
mon law,  that  the  surviving  joint  obligor 
and  the  representatives  of  the  estate  of 
the  deceased  could  not  be  joined  as  defend- 
ants in  an  action  at  law,  was  the  inal)ility 
of  a  court  of  law  to  render  separate  and 
different  judgments  in  a  single  action  — 
against  the  survivor  to  be  satisfied  de  bonis 
propriis,  and  against  the  administrators  of 
the  estate  of  the  deceased  to  l)e  satisfied 
from  such  estate  in  due  course  of  adminis- 
tration. From  the  same  reason  it  followed 
that  the  survivor  alone  was  liable  in  an 
action  at  law,  and  that  if  he  were  solvent 
and  the  action  tlius  available  for  the  col- 
lection of  the  debt  the  plaintiff  need  go 


no  further,  and  he  was  not  permitted  to 
do  so.  In  the  code  States  this,  the  only 
reason  for  the  rules  of  the  common  law 
upon  the  subject,  has  entirely  disappeared. 
.  .  .  With  all  due  respect  for  the  o])inions 
of  some  eminent  courts  wliich  seem  to 
liold  differently,  we  are  of  the  opinion 
that  codes  such  as  ours,  doing  away  with 
the  reason  of  the  common-law  rule  under 
consideration  as  to  joinder  of  parties  de- 
fendant, also  furnish,  iu  terms  sufficiently 
clear,  a  new  rule  to  be  followed  in  its 
stead."  Citing  the  text,  and  cases  from 
Ohio,  v'>outh  Carolina,  and  Indiana. J 

1  QThe  statutes  upon  this  subject  are 
as  follows : 

Ohio:  "Where  two  or  more  persons 
shall  be  indebted  in  any  joint  contract,  or 
upon  a  judgment  founded  upon  any  such 
contract,  and  either  of  tliem  shall  die,  his 
estate  shall  be  liable  therefor,  as  if  the 
contract  had  been  joint  and  several,  or  as 
if  tlie  judgment  had  been  against  himself 
alone."     Bates  St.,  §  6102. 

Iowa:  "  When  any  of  those  so  bound 
[jointly]  are  dead,  the  action  may  be 
brought  against  any  or  all  of  the  sur- 
vivors, with  any  or  all  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  decedents,  or  against  any  or 
all  such  representatives."  Code,  1897, 
§  3465. 

Kentucky :  "  If  any  of  the  persons  so 
bound  [jointly]  be  dead,  the  action  may 
be  brought  against  any  or  all  of  the  sur- 
vivors with  the  representatives  of  all  or 
any  of  the  decedents,  or  against  the  latter 
or  any  of  them."     Code,  1895,  §  27. 

ilissouri :  "  In  case  of  the  death  of  one 
or  more  of  the  joint  obligors  or  promisors, 
the  joint  debt  or  contract  sliall  and  may 
survive  against  the  heirs,  executors,  and 
administrators  of  the  deceased  obligor  or 
promisor,  as  well  as  against  the  sur- 
vivors."    Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  890. 

Kansas :  Same  as  Missouri.  Gen.  St., 
1901,  §  1191. 

Indiana:  "When  two  or  more  persons 
shall   be   jointly  liable  on  a  contract  or 


296 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  205,    *  304.    Criticism  of  General  Rule,     Although  the  inter- 
pretation put  upon  the  cotles  in  reference  to  tliis  particular  sub- 


judgment,  and  either  of  them  shall  die, 
his  estate,  executors,  and  administrators 
shall  be  liable  for  the  failure  to  perform 
the  contract  ami  for  the  payment  of  the 
judgment,  to  the  same  extent  and  in  the 
same  maimer  as  if  such  contract  or  judg- 
ment were  joint  and  several."  Burns  St., 
1901,  §  6.36. 

Arlcansas :  "  Where  any  of  the  persons 
so  bound  [jointly]  are  dead,  the  action 
may  be  brought  against  any  or  all  of  the 
survivors,  with  the  representatives  of  all 
or  anv  of  the  decedents."  Sand.  &  Hills' 
Dig.,"§  5634. 

Minnesota :  "  When  two  or  more  persons 
are  indebted  on  any  joint  contract,  or  upon 
a  judgment  founded  on  a  joint  contract, 
and  either  of  them  die,  his  estate  is  liable 
therefor,  and  the  amount  thereof  may  be 
allowed  by  the  probate  court,  as  if  the 
contract  had  been  joint  and  several,  or 
as  if  the  judgment  had  been  against  him 
alone."     St.,  1894,  §  4521. 

iVisconsin :  "  When  two  or  more  per- 
sons shall  be  indebted  ou  any  joint  con- 
tract or  upon  a  judgment  founded  upon 
a  contract,  and  either  of  them  shall  die, 
his  estate  shall  be  liable  tlierefor,  and  the 
claim  may  be  allowed  by  the  court  as  if 
the  contract  had  been  joint  and  several 
or  as  if  the  judgment  had  been  against 
him  alone,  and  the  other  parties  to  such 
joint  contract  may  be  compelled  to  con- 
tribute or  to  pay  the  same  if  they  would 
liave  been  liable  to  do  so  upon  payment 
thereof  by  the  deceased."    St.,  1 898,  §  3848. 

Colorado :  "  All  joint  obligations  and 
covenants  shall  hereafter  be  taken  and 
held  to  be  joint  and  several  obligations 
and  covenants."     Mills  St.,  §  2528. 

New  York  :  "  The  estate  of  a  person  or 
party,  jointly  liable  upon  contract  with 
otliers,  shall  not  i)e  discharged  by  his 
death,  and  the  court  may  make  an  order 
to  bring  in  the  proper  representative  of 
the  decedent,  when  it  is  necessary  so  to  do 
for  the  proper  disposition  of  the  matter." 
Code  ('iv.  Pro.  §  758.  See  Potts  v.  Dounce 
(1903),  173  N.  Y.  335,  O  X.  E.  4.  quoted 
at  length  in  nuto  to  §  ».3()2,  for  a  judicial 
interpretation  of  this  statute. 

South  Dakota:  "  Where  one  of  two  or 


more  plaintiffs,  or  one  of  two  or  more 
defendaats,  in  an  action,  dies,  and  only 
part  of  the  cause  of  action,  or  of  several 
distinct  causes  of  action,  survives  to  or 
against  the  others,  the  action  may  proceed 
without  bringing  in  the  person  who  haa 
succeeded  to  the  rights  of  the  deceased 
party  ;  and  the  judgment  shall  not  affect 
him,  or  his  interest  in  the  subject  of  the 
action.  But  the  court  may  order  such 
successor  of  a  deceased  party,  or  any 
person  who  claims  to  be  such  successor, 
to  be  brought  in  as  a  party,  either  plaintiff 
or  defendant,  whenever  it  appears  proper 
to  do  so,  upon  his  own  application  or 
upon  the  application  of  any  party  to  the- 
actiim,  and,  if  necessary,  that  supple- 
mental pleadings  be  put  in."  Ann.  St., 
1901,  §  6084.] 

Burgoyne  v.  Ohio  L.  Ins.  &  T.  Co., 
.■>  Ohio  St.  586,  587.  This  was  an  action 
against  the  surviving  makers  and  the- 
administrator  of  a  deceased  maker  of  a 
promissory  note.  Ranney  C.  J.,  after 
stating  the  original  common-law  rule,  and 
quoting  a  statute  of  Ohio  (Swann's  R.  S. 
p.  378)  as  f(jllows, —  "  When  two  or  more 
persons  shall  be  indebted  on  a  joint  con- 
tract or  upon  a  judgment  founded  upon 
any  such  contract,  and  either  of  them 
shall  die,  his  estate  shall  be  liable  there- 
for as  if  the  contract  had  been  joint  and 
several,  or  as  if  the  judgment  had  beea 
against  him  alone,"  —  proceeds  (p.  587): 
"  This  statute  effected  an  entire  abroga- 
tion of  the  common-law  principle  to  which 
allusion  has  been  made,  and  left  the  estate 
of  the  joint  debtor  liable  to  every  legal 
remedy  as  fully  as  though  the  contract 
had  been  joint  and  several.  Until  the 
passage  of  the  act  to  establish  a  code  of 
civil  procedure,  it  is  true  his  personal 
representatives  and  the  survivors  could 
not  be  sued  in  the  same  action.  But  by 
the  38th  section  of  that  act  it  is  provided 
that '  ])ersons  severally  liable  on  the  same 
obligation  or  instrument  may  all  or  any 
of  them  be  included  in  the  same  action 
at  the  oj)tion  of  the  plaintiff.'  And  the 
371st  section  allows  a  several  judgment 
to  be  given  against  any  one  of  the  defend- 
ants  as    tlie   nature  of  the  case  mav  re- 


DEFENDANTS    JOINTLY    AND    SEVERALLY    LIABLE.  297 

ject  by  the  courts  of  New  York  and  of  many  other  States  is 
clearly  established  by  an  overwhelming  weight  of  authority,  I 
do  not  hesitate  to  say  that  it  is  as  plainly  opposed  to  the  obvious 
intent,  and  even  to  the  very  letter,  of  the  reform  legislation. 
When  the  statute  has  in  express  terms  abolished  all  distinctions 
between  actions  at  law  and  suits  in  equity,  has  declared  that  in 
all  cases  any  person  may  be  made  a  defendant,  who  has  or  claims 
an  interest  in  the  controvers}^  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  or  who  is  a 
necessary  party  to  a  complete  determination  and  settlement  of  the 
questions  involved,  and  has  finally  authorized  a  several  judgment 
to  be  rendered  in  any  action,  it  is  simpl}"  a  palpable  violation  of 
these  positive  provisions  to  say  that  a  creditor  shall  not  maintain 
a  legal  action  against  the  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased 
joint  debtor,  but  shall  be  driven  to  an  equitable  suit,  and  that 
only  in  a  certain  contingency  ;  it  is  a  useless  sacrifice  to  the  merest 
form.  I  would  not  be  understood  by  this  criticism  as  denying 
the  existence  of  the  rule,  for  it  is  too  well  settled  to  be  doubted. 
If,  however,  the  courts  shall  at  any  time  accept  the  intent  of  the 
legislatures,  as  it  is  plainly  shown  in  their  statutory  work,  and 
shall  adopt  a  general  equitable  theory  of  interpretation,  which 
shall  be  applied  in  all  cases  to  all  actions  without  reservation  or 
exception,  so  that  there  shall  result  one  single  and  uniform  system 
of  procedure,  then  without  doubt  the  rule  that  I  am  criticising 
will  be  abandoned,  and  the  conclusions  reached  by  the  Indiana 
courts  will  be  accepted  in  all  the  States. 

§  206.  *  305.  IV.  Actions  upon  Contract;  Joint  and  Several  Lia- 
bility. No  Change  by  General  Language  in  most  Codes.  Illustrations. 
The  former  doctrine  of  the  common  law  concerning  joint  and  sev- 
eral contracts  and  suits  thereon  has  not  been  affected  by  the  new 
procedure,  except  in  those  few  States,  already  referred  to,^  whose 
codes  or  statutes  permit  the  creditor  in  all  cases  to  sue  all,  or  any, 
or  one  of  the  debtors  or  co-contractors.  The  general  language 
found  in  most  of  the  codes  has  wrought  no  change  in  the  practical 

quire.     In  the  opinion  of  the  court,  tliese  against  each  according  to  the  nature  of 

sections  permit  the  joinder   of  tlie   sur-  their    respective    liabihties."      The    con- 

vivor  or  survivors  and  the  personal   rep-  struction  here  put  upon  the  Ohio  statute 

resentatives    of    the    deceased    obligor    in  is  certainly  far  more  equitable,  and  in  ac- 

the  same  action,  whether  the  contract  is  cordaiice  with  their  intent,  than  that  put 

in  terms  j((int  and  several,  or  is  made  so  ujion   the  code  of  New  York.     See  also 

by  the  90th  section  of  the  administration  Sellon  r.  Braden,  13  Iowa,  365. 
Statute  upon  the  death  of  the  joint  oldi-  ^  Ante,  p.  289,  note, 

gor,  and    authorize  a  separate    jiidgnieiit 


298  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

rules.^  This  proposiuon  is  sustained  b}'  many  of  the  cases  in 
reference  to  joint  liability,  cited  under  the  foregoing  paragraphs  ; 
it  is  also  recognized  or  distinctly  affirmed  in  many  particular  in- 
stances, among  wliich  I  mention  a  few.^  Two  insurance  com- 
panies had  insured  a  building  by  separate  policies,  each  of  which 
contained  the  usual  rebuilding  clause.  Upon  the  occurrence  of  a 
fire,  they  united  in  a  joint  notice  of  their  election  to  rebuild,  and 
partly  completed  the  work  under  such  notice.  Default  being- 
made  by  them,  the  owner  brought  an  action  against  one  of  them 
to  recover  damages  for  the  non-performance  of  the  contract  to 
rebuild.  It  was  held  that  by  the  election  the  companies  had 
turned  their  policies  into  building  contracts,  and  weie  liable  ac- 
cording to  the  terms  thereof,  and  that  the  owner  might  sue  both- 
in  a  joint  action,  or  either  in  a  separate  action  ;  in  other  word.;, 
that  their  liability  was  joint  and  several.^  Premises  were  leased 
with  covenants  against  under-letting,  and  against  using  the  build- 
ing for  certain  purposes.  The  lessee  sub-let  portions  to  different 
under-tenants,  Avho  violated  the  covenants  by  using  them  in  the 
prohibited  manner.  An  action  against  all,  —  the  lessee  and  the 
sul>tenants,  —  to  recover  damages  for  the  breach  of  the  covenants, 
was  held  proper,  although  it  was  said  the  plaintiff  must  have  a 
separate  judgment  against  each  defendant  for  the  special  injury 
and  wrong  done  by  him.  A  separate  action  might  also  have  been 
brought  agaiiLSt  the  original  lessee  and  each  of  the  under-tenants.* 
When  an  ex[»ress  joint  and  several  note  is  made  by  a  firm,  and  is 
signed  by  the  firm  mime,  it  retains  its  joint  and  several  charac- 
ter ;  an  action  may  be  brought  either  against  all  the  })artners,  or 
against  each  or  one  of  them.^  In  certain  States,  as  has  already  been 
mentioned,^  the  express  language  of  the  codes  permits  an  action 

1  [^Certain  statutory  presumptions  exist  1206,   821,  822)   of  the  New  York  odle. 

in  some  States.     See  notes  to  §§  *  27.t,  The  entire  ileci.sion  is  in  closer  hannuny 

*276,  where   the   statutes   of   California,  with  tlie   plain  intent   of  the  coile   than 

Montana,  Oklahoma,  ami  North  ami  South  many  others  whicli  have  been  cited.     See 

Dakota  are  set  out.^  Trai)ae  r.  McAdams,  8  Hush,  74. 

-  QStatc  V.  McD.inalil  (189.5),  Idaho.  40  -^  Snow  v.  Howard,  35   Barb.  5.').     See 

Pac.  .-Jl'i;  Council  Bluffs  Savings  Hank  r.  D'Gonnaii  r.  Lindeke,  20  Minn.  9.3  (a  joint 

Griswold   (1897),  50   Xeb.   7.W,   TO  X.   W.  and    several    bond).     A    covenant    to    in- 

S'C]  deninify    persons   against   liability   on    a 

•''  .Morrell  r.  Irving  F.  Ins.  Co.,  3.3  N  Y.  bond   wherein  they  arc  jointly  and    sev- 

429.  erally    bound,'  is  also   joint   and   several. 

♦  Gillilan  r.  Norton,  0  Kobt.  546.     The  Hughes  v.  Oreg.  Hy.  &  Nav.  Co.,  11  Ore. 

ruling  of  tlie  court  in  respect  toasepar.ate  437. 

judgment   was  ba.sed   u]>ou   §  274  (1205,  «  J/j/e,  p.  280,  note. 


DEFENDANTS    JOINTLY    AND    SEVEItALLY   LIABLE.  299 

against  any  number  of  joint  and  several  debtors  at  the  plaintiff's 
option,  as  well  as  against  any  number  of  joint  debtors.^  '  If 
several  defendants  are  sued  jointly  upon  an  alleged  joint  and 
several  contract,  the  plaintiff  may  sever  in  the  recovery,  and  take 
judgment  against  a  portion  only,  if  the  evidence  shows  sucli  a 
liability  ;  ^  and  when  one  of  two  or  more  persons  jointly  and  sever- 
ally liable  dies,  the  creditor  may  at  once  sue  the  personal  repre- 
sentatives of  the  deceased  in  a  separate  action,  or  may  sue  the 
survivors.^ 

§  207.  *  306.  V.  Actions  upon  Contract;  Several  Liability.  No 
Change  in  Common-Law  Doctrines — Except.  No  change  has  been 
made  in  the  common-law  doctrines  and  rules  concerning  several 
liability  arising  from  contract,  except  that  produced  by  the  pro- 
vision found  in  all  the  codes  in  substance  as  follows.  Persons 
severally  liable  on  the  same  obligation  or  instrument,  including 
the  parties  to  bills  of  exchange,  promissory  notes,  and  negotiable 
bonds,  —  and  in  some  States  sureties,  —  may  all,  or  any  of  tliem, 
be  included  in  the  same  action  at  the  option  of  the  plaintiff. 
This  clause  certainly  effects  a  very  important  change  in  the 
ancient  rule,  in  all  cases  where  the  liability  flows  from  an  instru- 
ment or  contract  in  writing,  in  that  it  permits  a  creditor  to  sue 
all  the  several  promisors,  or  any  number  of  them,  instead  of  re- 
stricting him  to  a  separate  action  against  each.'*  The  effect  of 
this  clause,  and  the  extent  of  the  change  wrought  by  it  will  be 
discussed  at  large  in  Section  VIII.  of  the  present  chapter.  With 
this  exception,  the  common-law  doctrine  is  unaltered.  In  many 
States  it  is  settled  by  a  decided  preponderance  of  authority,  that 
a  principal  debtor  and  a  guarantor  thereof  cannot  be  joined  as 
co-defendants  in  the  same  action.  Even  wlien  the  principal  debt 
is    evidenced  by  a  written  instrument,   and  the  guaranty  is  in- 

1  Rose  V.  Williams,  5  Kau.  483  ;  Jeffer-  2  [^Black  Hills  Bank  v.  Kellogg  (1893), 

son  County  Com'rs  v.  Swain,  5  Kau.  376;  4  S.  D.  312,  56  N.  W.  107  L] 

Kupfer  V.  Sponhorst,  1  Kau.  75  ;  Rose  i-.  ^  gpeyers    v.   Fisk,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 

Madden,]  Kan.  445 ;  Sellou  r.  Bradeu,  13  197;    Parker   r.   Jackson,    16    Barb.   33; 

Iowa,  365;    Ryerson  v.  Hendrie,  22  Iowa,  Mcintosh  v.  En.^ign,  28  N.  Y.  169;  Har- 

480  ;  Clapp  v.  Preston,  15  Wis.  543.     This  rington  v.  Higham,  15  Barb.  524. 

last  case  arose  under  a  provision  identical  *  See   Powell   v.  Powell,   48  Cal.  234. 

with  §  120  (454)  of  the  New  York  code  as  Persons  severally  liable  for  different  items 

to  parties  severally  liable  on  the  same  in-  of  a  general  demand  cannot  be  joiued  as 

fitrument ;  and  see  Powell  v.  Powell,  48  Cal.  defendants  iu  one  action.     Miller  v.  Curry, 

234.    In  Kansas  a  personal  money  judgment  53  Cal.  665. 
against  two  or  more  is  a  joint  and  several 
obligation.    Read  v.  Jeffries,  16  Kan.  534. 


300  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

dorsed  upon  the  same  paper,  the  parties  are  not  "  severally  liable 
on  the  same  obligation  or  instrument,"  and  do  not  fall  within  the 
provision  last  above  quoted.  A  separate  action  must  be  brought 
against  the  principal  debtor  and  against  the  individual  guarantor.^ 
This  doctrine  does  not  prevail  in  all  the  States.  It  is  held  in 
some,  by  very  able  courts,  that  where  the  payee  or  owner  of  a 
promissory  note  transfers  the  same,  and  writes  a  guaranty  upon 
it,  he  may  be  sued  as  a  guarantor,  together  with  the  maker  there- 
of, in  one  action ;  and  the  same  doctrine  has  b'cn  applied  to  a 
similar  transfer  and  guaranty  of  a  contract  to  pay  money  not 
negotiable  in  form.^  In  an  ordinary  action  to  recover  upon  a 
debt  due  by  an  insolvent  corpomtion,  over  which  a  receiver  has 
been  appointed,  he  is  not  a  necessary,  nor  even  proper  co-defend- 
ant when  no  cause  of  action  is  stated,  and  no  relief  is  praj^ed 
against  him.^ 

§  208.  *  307.  VI.  Liability  in  Actions  for  Tort.  Common-Law 
Doctrines  Unchanged.  General  Rule  as  to  Parties  Defendant  herein. 
Illustrations.  The  common-law  doctrines  concerning  the  liability 
of  tort-feasors,  and  as  to  the  joinder  or  separation  of  them  in  ac- 
tions brought  to  recover  damages  for  the  wrong,  are  entirely  un- 
changed by  the  new  SN'stem  of  procedure.  It  is  unnecessary  to 
repeat  these  ancient  rules  ;  that  they  are  still  in  operation  with 
their  full  force  and  effect  is  sufficiently  shown  b}'  the  following 
particular  instances.  In  general,  those  who  have  united  in  the 
commission  of  a  tort  to  the  person  or  to  property,  whether  the 
injury  be  done  by  force  or  be  the  result  of  negligence  or  want  of 
skill,  or  of  fraud  and  deceit,  are  liable  to  the  injured  party  with- 
out any  restriction  or  limit  upon  his  choice  of  defendants  against 
whom  he  may  proceed.     He  may,  at  his  option,  sue  all  the  wrong- 

'  QSims  i".  Clark   (1892),   91    Ga.  302,  that  in  each  one  of  these  cases  the  guar- 

18  S.  E.  158  ]     Le  Roy  r.  Shaw,  2  Dner,  aiitor  was  the  original  ]jayee  or  promisee, 

626;  De  Hidder  r.  Schcrmerhorn.  10  Barh.  and  also  the  assignor;  but  it  must  be  said 

6.38;  Alien  v.  Fosgate,  II    How.  Pr.  218;  that  the  court  does  not  lay  any  stress  upon 

I'halen    i'.    Dingee,  4    K.    D.   Smitli,  .379  ;  tliis  fact  as  a  ground  for  its  decision. 
Honduront  v.  Bladen,  19  Ind.  100;  Virden  »  Arnold  v.  Suff()ll<  Bank,  27  Bar!).  424. 

V.    KlJsworth,    1.5    Ind.    144.      See    Stout  In  an  action  against  two  or  more  as  for 

V.  Noteman,  30  Iowa,  414,  415 ;    Tucker  c.  money  had  and    received,  a  comjjlriint  is 

Shiner.    24    Iowa,    .334.     Also  Graham  v.  domurraldo  which  sliows  that  the   money 

Hingo,    67    Mo.  .324;    Barton  r.  Speis,   5  was  received  otlicrwise  than  jointly;   .al- 

llun,  60  tliough    the     joinder    miglit    have    lioen 

-  Marvin  /•.   Adamson,  11    Iowa,   371  ;  pr()|)er  if  the  action  had  sounded  in  tort: 

Mix  /'.  Kairchild,  12  Iowa,  ^r>\  ;   Tucker  Simmons  r.   Spencer,  9   Fed.   H.   5*^1;   3 

V.    Shiner.    24    Iowa,    .334:     I'eddicord    r.  McCrary.    48.       [|[.<)nstal<>t     i:     Calkins 

Whiltam,  9  Iowa,471.      It  is  to  lie  noticed  (180S),    120  Cal.   (,SS,  53   I'ac.  25!ii.3 


DEFENDANTS    IN    ACTIONS    FOR    TOR'I 


301 


doers  in  a  single  action,  or  may  sue  any  one,  or  may  sue  each 
in  a  separate  action,  or  may  sue  any  number  he  pleases  less  than 
all ;  the  fullest  liberty  is  given  him  in  this  respect.^  The  only 
exceptions  are  those  few  instances  in  which  the  tort  from  its 
very  nature  must  be  a  separate  act  impossible  to  be  committed 
by  two  or  more  jointly .^  A  sheriff  and  his  de[)uty  may  be  sued 
jointly  for   the  trespasses  and  other  wrongful  acts  done  by  the 


'-  QBut  where  a  joint  issue  is  presented 
on  the  pleadings  against  a  number  of 
tort-feasors,  plaintiff  has  no  right  to  any 
other  than  a  joint  recovery,  unless  the 
action  has  failed  as  to  all  but  one  of 
the  defendants,  or  unless  the  joint  issue 
has  been  modified  by  a  severance  in 
the  answers:  Ashkraft  v.  Knoblock  (1896), 
146  Ind.  169,  45  N.  E.  69.  But  see  Ilass- 
ler  V.  Ilefele  (1898),  151  Ind.  391,  50  N.  E. 
361,  where  the  court  says,  quoting  from  au 
earlier  case  :  "  It  was  held  in  terms  that 
this  provision  of  the  code  (Burns'  R.  S.,  § 
579)  applies  to  all  actions  indiscriminately, 
■whether  founded  upon  contract  or  upon 
tort ;  that  it  is  immaterial  whether  the 
complaint  alleges  a  joint  or  a  joint  and 
-several  liability  ;  that  the  right  of  recovery 
is,  in  this  respect,  to  be  regulated  by  the 
proof  and  not  by  the  allegations  of  the 
complaint ;  that,  in  other  words,  every 
complaint  is,  in  the  respect  stated,  to  be 
treated  as  both  joint  and  several  where 
there  are  two  or  more  defendants. "J 

2  Creed  v.  Hartman,  29  N.  Y.  591,  592, 
597 ;  Roberts  v.  Johnson,  58  N.  Y.  613, 
616,  an  action  against  one  partner  only 
where  the  entire  firm  had  been  guilty 
of  negligence ;  Chester  v.  Dickerson,  52 
Barb.  349,  358  ;  Phelps  v.  Wait,  30  N.  Y. 
78,  an  action  against  principal  and  agent 
for  negligence  of  the  agent;  Kasson  v. 
People,  44  Parb,  347  ;  Wood  v.  Luscomb, 
23  Wis.  287,  an  action  against  one  part- 
ner for  negligence  by  the  firm ;  Fay  v. 
Davidson,  13  Minn.  523;  Mandlebaum  v. 
Russell,  4  Nev.  551  ;  McReady  v.  Rogers, 
1  Neb.  124;  Murphy  v.  Wilson,  44  Mo. 
313;  Allred  y.  Bray,  41  Mo.  484;  Brady 
V.  Hall,  14  Ind.  317,  action  for  injury  done 
by  trespassing  animals  which  belonged  to 
several  persons  jointly  ;  Turner  c.  Hitcli- 
cock,  20  Iowa,  310,  a  very  elaborate  and 
instructive  judgment ;  Buckles  v.  Lam- 
bert, 4  Mete.  (Ky.)  330;   Ilubbell  v.  Meigs, 


50  N.  Y.  480,  489;  Mcintosh  v.  Ensign. 
28  N.  Y.  169;  Buliis  v.  Montgomery,  50 
N.  Y.  352.  Where  a  right  of  action  for 
tort  exists  against  several,  and  is  of  sucli 
a  character  tliat  it  survives  upon  the  death 
of  the  wrong-doer,  if  one  of  the  persons 
liable  dies,  the  action  may  be  brought  or 
continued  against  his  personal  representa- 
tives ;  but  it  is  the  settled  rule  in  New 
York  that  the  action  in  such  case  must 
be  divided,  and  one  suit  be  broutj;ht  or 
continued  against  the  survivors,  and  one 
against  the  representatives  of  the  deceased. 
Bond  V.  Smith,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  239; 
4  Hun,  48;  HeinmuUer  v.  Gray,  13  Abl). 
Pr.  N.s.  299  ;  Union  Bank  v.  Mott,  27  N.  Y. 
633  ;  Gardner  v.  Walker,  22  How.  Pr.  405; 
McVean  v.  Scott,  46  Barb.  379.  As  fur- 
ther illustrations;  —  negligence:  Vary  v. 
B.  C.  R.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  42  Iowa,  246  (joint 
employers) ;  Van  Wagenen  v.  Kemp,  7 
Hun,  328,  a  joint  action  allowed  against 
the  owner  of  a  lot  for  a  negligent  excava- 
tion of  the  sidewalk,  and  tiie  city  for 
negligently  suffering  the  same  ;  cf .  infra, 
§  *308  note;  Mitchell  r.  Allen,  25  id. 
543  (a  release  of  one  of  the  persons 
jointly  negligent  releases  all)  ;  Gudger  v. 
Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  21  Fed.  R^  81; 
trespass  :  Wehle  r.  Butler,  61  N.  Y.  245  ; 
Fleming  v.  McDonald,  50  Ind.  278;  fraud  : 
Bond  V.  Smith,  4  Hun,  48  (one  of  the  de- 
fendants dies) ;  Hun  v.  Gary,  82  N.  Y.  65 
(trustees  guilty  of  a  tortious  breach  of 
trust,  a  portion  of  them  may  be  sued  — 
all  need  not  be  joined) ;  nuisance  :  Cobb 
V.  Smith,  38  Wis.  21,  a  mill-dam  caused 
plaintiff's  lands  to  be  overflowed ;  held, 
tlie  persons  who  had  acquired  title  to  the 
land  on  which  the  dam  stands,  and  by 
whose  authority  it  has  been  maintained, 
are  proper  co-defendants ;  Greene  r.  Nnn- 
nemacher,  36  Wis.  50  ;  Lohmiller  v.  Indian 
Water  Co.,  51  id.  683;  Hillmau  v.  New- 
intrton,  57  Cal.  56. 


302 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


latter  in  his  official  capacity;  the  deputy,  because  he  actually 
commits  tlie  tort,  and  tlie  sheriff  because  he  is  the  princi- 
pal.^ A  passenger  in  the  cars  of  one  company  was  injured  by  a 
collision  with  a  train  of  another  compajiy  which  used  the  same 
track.  The  servants  of  both  companies  were  in  fault,  and  as  the 
wrong  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  each  corporation,  an  action 
brought  against  them  jointly  was  sustained.- 


1  Waterbury  v.  Westcrvelt,  9  N.  Y. 
598;  King  v.  Urser,  4  Diier,  431 ;  contra, 
Moultou  r.  Norton,  5  Barb.  286,  296,  per 
Pratt  J.  This  dictum  is  clearly  errone- 
ous. So,  too,  an  executiou  or  an  at- 
tachment creditor,  under  whose  direction 
property  is  tortiously  taiien  by  the  sheriff, 
is  properly  joined  with  the  slieriff  in  an 
a('tion  for  the  trespass :  Elder  i-.  Frevert, 
18  Nev.  446;  Marsh  c.  Backus,  16  Barb. 
483. 

•i  Colegrove  v.  X.  Y.  &  N.  H.  R.  Co., 
20  N.  Y.  492;  Moouey  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  Co  ,  5  Robt.  548. 

QA  railroad  company  and  its  receiver 
may  be  joined  in  an  action  for  tort  to 
recover  damages  caused  by  flooding  plain- 
tiff's land :  St.  Louis,  etc.  U.  II.  Co.  v. 
Trigg  (1897),  63  Ark.  .5  $6,  40  S.  W.  579. 
An  engineer  and  fireman  tiirough  whose 
negligence  plaintiff's  intestate  was  killed, 
may  be  sued  jointly  with  tlie  master,  the 
railroad  corporati<>n :  Winston's  Adm'r 
V.  111.  Cent.  R.  li.  Co.  |190l),  Ky..  05 
S.  W.  13.  A  master  and  servant,  gen- 
erally, may  be  jointly  sued  for  tiie  ser- 
vant's negligence  :  Central  of  Georgia  Ky. 
Co.  V.  Brown  (1901),  113  Ga.  414,  .38  S  E. 
989;  Greenberg  iv  VVhitcomI)  Lumber  Co. 
(1895),  90  Wis.  225.  63  N.  W.  93.  A  fire- 
man injured  in  a  collision  properly  joined 
as  defendants  the  railroad  company,  the 
division  superintendent,  and  the  train  de- 
spatcher  ;  Howe  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
(1902),  .30  Wash.  569,  70  Pac.  1100. 

Where  a  tort  is  committeil  by  the  .soj)- 
arate  liut  concurrent  negligence  of  a  town 
marshal  and  a  board  of  town  trustees, 
suit  may  be  lirought  against  them  jointly, 
together  with  the  bondsmen  on  the  mar- 
hhal'rt  bond:  Doeg  r.  Cook  (1899),  126 
Cal.  213,  58  Pac.  707.  All  who  participate 
in  a  fraud  are  jointly  liable  therefor : 
Spaulding  i>.  North  Milwaukee  Town  Site 
Co.  (1900),  106  Wis.  481,  81   N.  W.  1064  ; 


Austin  r.  Murdock  (1900),  127  N.  C.  454, 
37  S.  E.  478 ;  —  including  those  whose 
gains  or  losses  are  attriliutable  to  the 
fraud  :  Stevens  v.  South  ( )gdeu  Land  Co. 
(1896),  14  Utah,  2.32,  47  Pac.  81. 

It  was  held  in  Page  v.  Citizens  Bank- 
ing Co.  (1900),  111  Ga.  73,  36  S.  E.  418, 
that  an  action  for  malicious  prosecution 
may  he  brouglit  jointly  against  a  partuer- 
sliip,  the  individual  meml)ers  tiiereol".  and 
a  person  not  a  member,  if  such  prosecu- 
tion was  begun  and  carrietl  on  as  a  result 
of  a  conspiracy  among  tliem. 

The  plaintiff  may  sue  any  one  or  more 
of  joint  tort-feasors  as  he  may  elect : 
Coddingtou  v.  Canaday  (1901),  157  Ind. 
243,  61  N.  E.  567  ;  Pugh  v.  Chesapeake 
&  Ohio  Ry.  Co.  (1897),  101  Ky.  77,  39 
S.  W.  695 ;  Dougla.ss  i:  Itailway  Co. 
(1894),  91  la.  94,  58  N.  W.  1070;  lirowu 
c.  City  of  Webster  City  (1902),  115  la. 
511,  88  N.  W.  1070;  Cumberland  Tel. 
Co.  1-.  Ware's  Adm'r  (1903),—  Ky.  — , 
74  S.  W.  289;  Chapiu  i:  Bal)Cock  (1396), 
67  Conn.  255,  .34  Atl.  1039. 

One  joint  wrong  doer  cannot  complain 
that  others  equally  guilty  are  not  joined 
with  him  :  Berksou  v.  Kansas  City  Ry. 
Co.  (1898),  144  Mo.  211,  45  S.  W."lll9; 
Whitman  McNamara  Tobacco  Co.  i-. 
Wurm  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  609  ;  Scott  v. 
Flowers  (1900).  60  Neb.  675,  84  N.  W.  81. 

The  plaintiff  may  dismiss  as  to  some 
at  any  stage  of  the  proceedings,  without 
affecting  the  merits  as  to  the  others : 
Berksou  r.  Kansas  City  Ry.  Co.  (1898), 
H4  Mo.  211,  45  S.  W.  1119;  Melsou  v. 
Thornton  (1901),  113  Ga.  99,  38  S.  E..342. 

It  is  held  in  Coniiecticut,  Nichols  v. 
I'eck  (1898),  70  Conn.  439,  39  Atl.  803, 
that  the  persons  jointly  guilty  of  a  tres- 
pass ijnare  clitiisnm  frer/it  shouM  be  sued 
jointly,  and  if  several  actions  are  institnted 
witlmnt  due  cause  such  actions  should  be 
cousoiidaied.] 


DEFENDANTS  IN  ACTIONS  FOR  TORT. 


303 


§  209.  *  308.  Joint  Liability  must  rest  upon  Community  in  Wrong- 
doing. In  order,  liowever,  that  the  geneial  rule  thus  stated 
should  apply,  and  a  union  of  wrong-doers  in  one  action  should 
be  possible,  there  must  be  some  commmiity  in  the  wrong-doing 
among  the  parties  who  are  to  be  united  as  co-defendants  ;  the  in- 
jury must  in  some  sense  be  their ^om^  work.^  It  is  not  enougli 
that  the  injured  party  has  on  certain  grounds  a  cause  of  action 
against  one,  for  the  physical  tort  done  to  himself  or  liis  property, 
and  has,  on  entirely  different  grounds,  a  cause  of  action  against 
another  for  the  same  physical  tort ;  there  must  be  something 
more  than  the  existence  of  two  separate  causes  of  action  for  the 
same  act  or  default,  to  enable  him  to  join  the  two  parties  liable 
in  the  single  action.     This  principle  is  of  universal  application.^ 


1  ^But  in  the  case  of  a  joint  assault, 
malice  ou  the  part  of  one  will  be  attributed 
to  all,  and  each  will  be  held  liable  for  all 
tlie  damages,  both  actual  and  exemplary: 
Reizeustein  v.  Clark  (1897),  104  la.  287, 
73  N.  W.  ,588.  So  a  master  and  servant  are 
l)oth  liable  for  the  servant's  wilful  tort, 
if  within  the  scope  of  his  employment : 
Gardner  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1903),  6.5 
S.  C.  341,43  S.  E.  816. 

■^  Trowbridge  v.  Forepaugh,  14  Minn. 
133.  F.,  owning  a  lot  in  St.  Paul  abut- 
ting on  a  street,  dug  and  left  open  a  dan- 
gerous hole  in  the  street,  into  which  the 
plaintiff  fell.  He  sues  the  city  and  F. 
jointly,  basing  his  claim  upon  the  above 
acts  of  F.,  and  upon  the  general  duty  of 
the  city  in  respect  of  its  streets.  The 
court  held  that  such  a  joint  action  could 
not  be  maintained.  "  The  liability  of  the 
city  depends  on  a  state  of  facts  not  affect- 
ing its  co-defendant,  and  tlie  converse  is 
equally  true.  Neither  is,  in  fact  nor  in 
law,  chargeable  with,  nor  liable  for,  the 
matter  set  up  as  a  cause  of  action  against 
the  other.  They  did  not  jointly  conduce 
to  the  uijnry."  Contra,  in  Van  Wage- 
nen  v.  Kemp,  7  Hun,  328,  a  similar  case, 
the  joinder  was  alloAved.  See  also  Long 
r.  Swindell,  77  N.  C.  176;  Cogswell  v. 
Murphy,  46  Iowa,  44 ;  Keyes  ?•.  Little 
York  Gold,  etc.  Co.,  53  Cal.  724 ;  Mitchell 
r.  Allen,  25  Hun,  543  (a  release  of  one 
of  several  joint  tort-feasors  releases  all ; 
Cooper  V.  Blair,  14  Oreg.  255 ;  Dahms  v. 
Sears,  13  Oreg.  47  ;  \yi.  K.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
I'.  Haber  (1896),  56  Kan.  694,  44  Pac.  632.] 


^Where  parents  wrongfully  cause  hus- 
band and  wife  to  separate,  they  are  jointly 
liable,  though  each  does  not  participate 
in  all  the  acts  of  the  other :  Price  r. 
Price  (1894),  91  la.  693,  60  N.  W.  202. 
And  in  an  action  by  a  wife  for  damages 
resulting  from  a  particular  intoxication  of 
her  husband,  all  the  parties  who  con- 
tributed to  the  particular  intoxication  may 
be  joined,  although  they  were  conducting 
separate  places  of  business  when  the  liquor 
was  sold  to  the  husband  and  did  not  act 
in  concert :  Faivre  v.  Mandirschied  (1902), 
117  la.  724.  90  N.  W.  76. 

It  was  held  in  City  of  Kansas  City  v. 
File  (1899),  60  Kan.  157,  55  Pac.  877,  that 
a  city  and  an  electric  light  company  are 
jointly  liable  for  injuries  sustained  by 
plaintiff  by  reason  of  a  broken  wire  which 
remained  in  the  street  for  three  Aveeks, 
constituting  a  dangerous  obstruction  to 
travel.  A  dissenting  opinion  was  ren- 
dered citing  the  te.xt,  and  the  case  of 
Trowbridge  v.  Forepaugh  (infra).  See, 
also,  Street  Ry.  Co.  y.  Stone  (1894),  54 
Kan.  83,  37  Pac.  1012,  where  a  city  and 
a  street  railway  were  held  jointly  liable 
for  a  dangerously  constructed  track. 

In  Smith  v.  Day  (1901),  39  Ore.  531, 
65  Pac.  1055,  the  court  said:  "Two  or 
more  tort-feasors  may  be  sued  jointly 
when  they  have  all  concurred  by  joint 
design  or  common  act  or  negligence  to 
produce  the  injury  complained  of ;  but 
where  the  parties  have  acted  separately 
and  independently  of  each  other,  witliout 
concert,  or  hy  common  purpose,  although 


304  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

§  210.  *  309,  Case  of  Joint  Conversion  of  Chattels.  The  general 
doctrine  under  examination  embraces  as  well  the  case  of  a  joint 
conversion  of  chattels,  as  any  other  instance  of  joint  tort  to 
property  or  person.  When  two  or  more  have  united  in  the  act 
which  amounts  to  a  conversion,  or  have  so  interfered  with  the 
chattel  as  to  constitute  a  conversion  within  the  legal , meaning  of 
the  term,  the  owner  or  person  having  the  special  property  may 
sue  all,  or  one,  or  any,  as  in  the  case  of  any  other  tort.^  But 
there  must  be  a  community  in  the  wrong-doing ;  the  wrongful 
act  must  constitute  a  conversion  on  the  part  of  all,  and  in  that 
act  all  must  have  engaged.  When  such  is  the  case,  the  law 
does  not  apportion  the  responsibility,  but  holds  each  liable  for 
the  whole  amount.'  If  there  is  no  such  community,  a  joint  action 
for  the  conversion  will  not  lie,  and  a  fortiori,  it  will  not  lie  when 
the  defendants  have  not  each  been  guilty  of  an  act  which  18  a 
■wrongful  conversion. '^ 

§  211.  *  310.  Case  of  Replevin  and  Detinue.  The  same  general 
doctrine,  under  the  same  limitations,  controls  the  action  of 
replevin,  or  detinue,  —  or  to  recover  possession  of  chattels,  which 
at  the  common  law  was  regarded  as  a  personal  action  based  upon 
the  tortious  act  of  the  defendant,  in  his  wrongful  detention  or 
taking  of  the  goods.  If,  therefore,  there  is  a  joint  wrongful 
taking  or  detention  of  the  goods,  the  action  will  lie  against  the 
wrong-doers  jointly,  although  one  of  them  may  have  parted  with 
his  actual  possession.  Thus,  where  goods  had  been  sold  and 
delivered  to  a  fraudulent  vendee,  so  that  the  vendor  might 
rescind  and  retake  the  chattels,  and  this  vendee  had  afterwards 
assigned   them    to  an   assignee    in   trust   for   creditors,  and  the 

the  injury   may   be   a  common    result  to  them  joint  tort-feasors  and  jointly  liable 

which  the  acts  of  each  contributed,  their  for  the  wrongful  attachments.] 
liability  i.s  not  joint,  and  a  joint  recovery  ^  See  Simmons  c.  Spencer,  9  Fed.  11. 

cannot  be  had."  581  ;  3  McCrary,  48. 

Stuart  V.  Bank  of  Staplehurst  (1899),  -  ([E.s9 1;  (iriffith  (1894),  128  Mo.  ."JO,  30 

:>:  Neb.  569,  78  N.  VV.  298:  "  The  jietition  S.  W.  343:  "The  purcluiser,  with  knowl- 

cliarged  joint  actions  of  the  defendants,  edj^e  of   the   conversion,  is  jointly    liable 

and  the  acts  were  such  as  might  be  done  with  the  wrongful  seller.  ...  It  does  not 

in  combination;    hence   it    w;u*  not   open  matter  that  the  parties  acted  in  good  faith 

to   .ittack    by   demurrer   for  an    iniproper  and  believed  they  had  a  right  to  take  and 

joinder  of  |)artics."  dispose  of  the  property."] 

Miller  >:  Ik-ck  (1899),  108  la.  575,  79  ■'  Manning  c.  Monaghan,  23  N.  Y.  539. 

N.    W.   :J44  :      Whore    two  creditors  with  See  s.  c.  28  N.  Y.  585.    Further  instances  of 

Hf;|)aratc  danns  put  them  in  the  hands  of  joint  conversion  :   Hearty  f.  Klinkiianimcr, 

the  same  attorney,  and  attachments  were  39  Minn.  438.    All  the  wrongdoers  n(tcd  not 

sued    out    on    eacii,  this    does    not    make  be  joined  :   Carroll  v.  Fcthers,  82  Wis.  G7. 


DEFENDANTS  IN  ACTIONS  FOR  TORT.  305 

possession  had  actually  been  transferred  to  such  tmstee,  an 
action  by  the  vendor  to  recover  the  possession  of  the  goods  was 
held  to  be  properly  brought  against  both  jointly,  the  assignee 
not  being  a  purchaser  for  value.^ 

§  212.  *  311.  Common  Carriers.  The  common-law  doctrines  re- 
lating to  suits  against  common  carriers  are  unaltered.  Although 
an  action  may  be  brought  upon  their  contract  express  or  implied 
to  cany  the  goods  safely,  yet  the  ultimate  ground  of  their  liability 
is  their  general  duty,  the  violation  of  which  is  a  tort.  The  usual 
form  of  the  action  under  the  old  system  was  Case,  and  not 
Assumpsit.  The  owner  of  goods  that  have  been  lost  or  damaged 
in  the  carriage  may  therefore  treat  the  default  as  a  tort,  and  sue 
all  or  any  of  the  parties  at  his  election.^ 

I  213.  *  312.  Lessor  and  Lessee.  Principal  and  Agent.  A  joint 
liability  for  an  injury  may  arise  from  the  ownership  and  occupancy 
of  real  property.^  As  an  example,  where  the  owner  of  a  house 
had  constructed  a  coal-hole  in  the  sidewalk  in  such  a  manner  and 
position  as  to  be  dangerous  to  passers,  and  had  leased  the  premises 
to  a  tenant  who  used  the  coal-hole,  and  a  person  passing  on  the 
-sidewalk  had  fallen  into  it  and  been  injured,  both  the  owner  and 
the  tenant  were  held  liable,  and  a  joint  action  against  them  was 
sustained.*     In  general,  the  principal  and  his  agent  may  be  sued 

1  Nichols  V.  Michaels,  2.3  N.  Y.  264.  illustrations :  nuisance :  Cobb  v.  Smith, 
See,  especially,  the  opinions  of  James  J.,  38  Wis.  21  ;  supra,  §  *  .307  (n.)  ;  Greene 
p.  268  et  seq.,  and  of  Selden  J.,  pp.  270,  v.  Nunuemacher,  36  Wis.  50 ;  Lohmiller 
271,  where  the  nature  of  the  action  before  i\  Indian  Water  Co.,  51  id.  683. 

•and  since  the  code  is  discussed  at  length.  [^Waterhouse  v.  Schlitz  Brewing  Co. 

See  also  OH^e,  §* 297.  (1900),    12    S.    D.    397,    81    N.    W.    725: 

2  Mcintosh  V.  Ensign,  28  N.  Y.  169.  A  tenant  is  not  a  necessary  party  in  an 

3  [^Where  the  sole  ground  of  liability  action  against  the  owner  of  a  building  for 
for  a  negligent  injury  is  the  ownership  of  injuries  caused  by  its  collapse,  where  the 
•certain  laud,  the  persons  who  are  joint  complaint  alleges  that  tlie  collapse  oc- 
vowners  should  be  joined :  Printup  v.  curred  because  of  negligent  construction, 
Patton  (1893).  91  Ga.  422,  18  S.  E.  311.  but  did  not  allege  decay  or  want  of  repairs. 
But  in  an  action  by  mandamus  against  a  It  was  hell  in  Atcheson,  Topeka,  etc. 
lessee  of  a  railroad  to  compel  the  restora-  Ry.  Co.  v.  Anderson  (1902),  65  Kan. 
tion  of  a  highway,  the  lessor  is  not  a  202,  69  Pac.  158,  that  the  lessee  could 
necessary  party  :  People  ex  reJ.  v.  Rail-  not  be  sued  without  the  lessor.  The  court 
way  Co.  (1900),  164  N.  Y.  289,  58  N.  E.  said,  in  the  syllabus:  "In  an  action 
138.]  against   a  railroad   company  for  damages 

*  Irvin  V.  Wood,  4  Robt.   138,  5  Robt.  in  laying  a  track  in  a  public  street  and 

482;  s.  c.  on  appeal,  51  N.  Y.  224,  230;  obstructing  the  ingress  and   egress  of  a 

10  Am.  Rep.  603.     But  see  Trowbridge  lot  owner  to   and  from   his   property,  it 

V.  Forepaugh,  14  Minn.  133,  supra,  §*308  appeared  that  the  company  sued  was  not 

{n  )  ;    and     compare    Van    Wagener    r.  the  owner  of  the  track  when  it  was  built, 

Kemp,  7  Hun,  328,  there  cited.     Farther  nor  at  the  time  the  action  was  commenced, 

20 


306  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

jointly  for  an}'  trespass  or  other  wrongful  act  done  by  the  agent 
while  acting  within  the  scope  of  his  employment.  The  agent  is 
personally  responsible,  because  his  employment  will  not  shield 
him  from  the  consequences  of  his  torts,  and  the  principal  is  liable 
upon  the  familiar  doctrine  of  agency.  The  injured  party  may  of 
course  sue  either  separately.^ 

§  214.  *313.  Cases  ■where  Joint  Liability  is  Impossible.  It  has 
already  been  said  that  the  general  doctrine  of  the  joint  and  several 
nature  of  the  liability  springing  from  torts  does  not  obtain  in 
those  cases  where  the  injury  is  essentially  a  several  one,  or  where, 
in  other  words,  from  its  intrinsic  character,  it  can  only  be  com- 
mitted by  one  person.  The  most  imijortant  of  this  class  of  torts 
is  slander.  No  joint  action  for  slander  is  possible ;  but  such  an 
action  can  be  maintained  for  the  publication  of  a  libel,  as  in  the 
very  familiar  and  frequent  instance  of  a  newspaper,  which  con- 
tains defamatory  matter,  being  owned  and  published  by  a  partner- 
ship.2  In  the  same  manner  a  joint  action  to  recover  damages  for 
a  malicious  prosecution,  which  is  an  injury  to  character,  may  be- 
yond doubt  be  brought  against  two  or  more  persons  who  united 
in  promoting  the  judicial  proceeding  complained  of. 

§  215.  *314.  Joint  Tort  may  give  Rise  to  many  Actions,  but  only 
one  Satisfaction.  ^Vltliongli  in  eases  of  joint  torts  t!ie  law  gives 
the  injured  party  a  wide  choice  to  sue  all  the  \\Tong-doers,  or  any 
num])er,  in  a  single  action,  or  to  sue  each  of  them  separately,  thus 
bringing  as  many  actions  as  there  are  persons,  yet  it  does  not  per- 
mit him  thereby  to  multiply  his  damages.     He  can  have  but  one 

Imt   was   a  lessee  only.     Held,  that   the  erly  joined.     Zeller  r.  Martin  (Wis.  1893), 

le.«sur  compauy,  which  laid  the  track,  and  54  N.  W.  3.30.     When  damage  is  caused 

caused   the  obstructi(jn,  was  a  necessary  by  the  negligence  of  a  servant  of  a  firm, 

party. "3  all  or  any  number  of  the  partners   may 

1  Plielps  I'.  Wait,  30  N.  Y.  78;  Wright  be  sued.     Roberts    r.  Johu.son,  58  N.  Y. 

r.  Wilcox,  19  Wend.  343;    32  Am.  Dec-  613,016. 

.')07  ;  Montfort  v.  Hughes,  3  E.  I).  Smith,  -^  Forsyth  c  Kdmiston,  2  Abb.  Pr.  430. 

591,  594  ;  Suydam  v.  Moore,  8  Barb.  358  ;  A  quiere  is  suggesteil,  whether  au  action 

Hewett  V.  Swift,  3    Allen,  420;   Shearer  for  slander  may  not  be  maintained  against 

r.  Kvans,  89  Ind.  400.     An  e.xecution  or  several  persons   it'  the  defamatory  words 

attachment   creditor   under   whose   direc-  are  uttered  in  jiursuance  and  as  the  result 

tion  a  levy  is  unlawfully  made,  held  to  I)e  of  a  conspiracy  among  them.     This,  per- 

properly  joined  witii  tlie  sheriff  in  an  ac-  haps,  may  be  possible, 
lion  for  the  trespa.ss ;  Elder  r.  Frevert,  18  QMouson  v.  Lathrop    (1897),   96  Wis. 

Nev.  446;  Marsh  r.  Backus,  16  Barb.  483;  380,    71    N.   W.    590:  Where   a  libellous 

and  in  an  action  of   false   imprisonment  ttdegram  is  sent,  the  sender  and  the  tele- 

the  sheriff  who  made  the  arrest  and  the  grapli  company  may  be  jointly  liable.] 
judge  who  issued  the  process  were  proji- 


DEFKXDAXTS    IN    ACTION^S   FOR   TORT. 


307 


satisfaction.^  In  short,  he  can  collect  but  one  amount  of  damages 
out  of  the  many  that  may  have  been  awarded  him  in  separate 
actions,  although  he  is  entitled  to  the  costs  in  each  suit.^  If  he 
has  prosecuted  two  or  more  jointly,  and  the  jury  has  assessed  a 
different  sum  as  damages  against  each  defendant,  the  plaintiff 
nuiy  enter  the  judgment  against  all  for  either  of  these  amounts 
which  he  elects,  and  of  course  he  would  naturally  choose  the 
largest.  This  rule  is  based  upon  the  notion  that  the  injury  is  a 
unit,  that  one  award  of  damages  is  a  compensation  for  that  in- 
jury, and  that  the  defendants  are  equally  responsible  as  among 
themselves.  A  satisfaction  of  one  is  therefore  operative  as  to  all. 
Imprisonment  under  a  body  execution  is  regarded  by  the  law  as 
pro  tanto  a  satisfaction ;  ^  and  if  one  such  judgment  debtor,  being 
in  imprisonment,  is  voluntarily  discharged  therefrom  by  the 
creditor,  the  judgment  or  judgments  against  all  the  others  are 
ipso  facto  satisfied,  even  though  rendered  in  separate  actions,  as 
fully  as  though  the  discharge  had  been  by  payment.* 


1  [^Butler  V.  Ashworth  (1895),  110  Cal. 
614,  43  Pac.  386;  Holliiigsworth  v.  How- 
ard (1901),  113  Ga.  1099,  39  S.  E.  465; 
Ashcraft  c  Knoljlock  (1896),  146  Iiul.  169, 
45  N.  E.  69.  Satisfaction  as  to  one  joint 
tort-feasor  is  a  bar  to  au  action  as  to  the 
others:  Dnlauey  v.  Buffum  (1903),  173 
Mo.  1,  73    S.   W.   125] 

2  This  doctrine  is  not  confined  to  cases 
of  tort ;  it  applies  in  all  instances  where 
there  have  been  .separate  suits  or  recov- 
eries against  persons  who  are  jointly  and 
severally  liable  on  the  same  obligation ; 
satisfaction  of  one  is  satisfaction  of  all, 
except  as  to  costs ;  and  if  some  of  the 
actions  are  pending,  payment  of  one  may 
be  pleaded  in  bar  of  such  pending  suits. 
First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Indianapolis  v.  Indi- 
anapolis Piano  Man.  Co.,  45  Ind.  5.  See 
also  Lord  v.  Tiffany,  98  N.  Y.  412.  In  au 
action  for  assault  and  battery  committed 
by  the  defendant  and  one  P.  G.,  the  an- 
swer set  up  that  plaintiff  had  recovered 
judgment  against  P.  G.  for  the  same  tort, 
and  issued  execution  thereon,  whicli  had 
been  levied  on  the  property  of  P.  G. 
Held,  a  good  defence.  The  injured  party 
may  sue  each  or  any  of  several  joint  tres- 
pas.sers  separately,  and  prosecute  each 
action  to  final  judgment,  but  must  then 
elect  against  which  one  he  will  have  exe- 


cution. A  final  judgment  and  execution 
or  an  order  for  execution,  against  one  is 
a  discharge  of  all  the  others.  Fleming 
V.  McDonald,  50  Ind.  278.  The  English 
rule  is  that  final  judgment  alone  without 
any  execution  is  a  discharge  of  all  the 
others.  Brinsmead  v.  Harrison,  L.  R.  7 
C.  P.  547. 

3  Koenig  v.  Steckel,  58  N.  Y.  475. 

4  Kasson  v.  The  People,  44  Barb.  347. 
The  plaintiff  had  obtained  a  judgment 
against  G.  and  one  against  R,  in  a  sepa- 
rate action  against  each  for  a  joint  tres- 
pass. G.  was  taken  on  body  execution, 
and,  while  in  custody,  was  voluntarily  set 
at  liberty  by  the  judgment  creditor.  The 
plaintiff  afterwards  took  the  other  de- 
fendant, R.,  on  a  body  execution  in  his 
action.  R.  applied  to  a  judge  by  Itabeas 
corpus,  and  was  discharged.  The  General 
Term,  on  appeal,  held  this  discharge  regu- 
lar, and  laid  down  the  doctrines  stated  in 
the  text.  See  also  McReady  v.  Rogers, 
1  Neb.  124  ;  Turner  v.  Hitchcock,  20 
Iowa,  310.  The  latter  case  was  very  ex- 
traordinary. The  action  was  for  a  tres- 
pass, and  was  against  si.x  women  and 
their  husbands ;  and  one  Johnson  was  a 
defendant.  The  petition  alleged  that  a 
party  of  women,  of  whom  the  female  de- 
fendants were  a  portion,  made  a  raid  upon 


308 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


^216.  *  315.  VII.  Statutory  Actions  in  the  Settlement  of  Dece- 
dents' Estates.  In  many,  if  not  all  States,  actions  are  autliorized 
by  statute,  in  the  matter  of  settling  the  estates  of  deceased  per- 
sons, which  were  unknown  at  the  common  law,  as,  for  example, 
an  action  by  a  legatee  to  recover  his  legacy.  It  is  not  within  my 
purpose  to  inquire  when  such  actions  may  be  brought,  but  simply 
to  ascertain  what  special  rules,  if  any,  have  been  laid  doAvn  in 
reference  to  the  proper  parties  therein.^  A  statute  of  New  York 
requires  the  heirs  of  an  intestate  who  have  inherited  lands  under 
certain  specified  circumstances,  to  be  sued  jointly  and  not  sepa- 
rately for  a  debt  due  from  the  deceased,  the  land  in  their  hands 
being  regarded  as  a  fund  upon  which  the  debt  is  chargeable  and 
out  of  which  it  is  to  be  paid.  It  has  been  held  that  this  statute 
does  not  make  the  heirs  jointly  liable  as  joint  debtors,  but  that  it 
merel}'  prescribes  a  mode  of  enforcing  the  demand  out  of  assets 
which  have  descended  to  them.^  In  an  action  by  a  residuary 
legatee  against  the  executor  to  recover  the  amount  claimed  to 
have  been  given  by  the  will,  all  persons  interested  in  the  residue 


the  plaintiffs  saloon,  destroying  property 
therein.  The  defendants,  except  Johnson, 
answered,  among  other  defences,  that 
since  the  action  was  l)rought  tlie  plaintiff 
Jiad  released  tiie  defendant  Johnson  ;.  also 
that  one  Almira  C.  was  one  of  the  joint 
trespassers ;  and,  hefore  the  action  was 
brought,  the  plaintiff  and  she  had  inter- 
married, and  were  then  husband  and  wife. 
On  the  trial,  it  was  proved  that  plaintiff 
had  released  Johnson,  but  that  she  had 
taken  no  part  in  the  tres])asses,  and  was 
not  liable  tiierefor.  The  other  defence 
»vas  proved  exactly  as  alleged.  Upon 
these  facts,  the  court  held  that  the  re- 
lease of  Johnson  did  not  discharge  the 
other  defendants,  because  she  was  not 
in  fact  a  joint  trespa.sser.  On  the  second 
defence,  Dillon  J.,  after  stating  tlie  coin- 
inou-law  rules  concerning  joint  tresp;isscrs, 
reached  the  follow! nir  conclusions  :  That 
the  code  had  not  changed  these  former 
rules ;  that  separate  actions  may  be 
<)njught,  separate  verdicts  given,  and 
judgments  rendered,  liut  only  one  satis- 
faction, that  the  release  of  one  joint 
wrong-doer  discharges  all ;  and,  finally, 
that  the  marriuge  of  one  with  the  plain- 
tiff operated  as  a  release  and  discliarge. 
On  this  laHt  point  the  court  were  equally 


divided  ;  but  they  were  agreed  upon  all 
the  other  propositions  of  Judge  Dillon's 
opinion.  The  case,  as  a  whole,  is  very 
instructive,  and  contains  a  full  discussion 
of  the  doctrines  concerning  joint  torts, 
and  a  review  of  all  the  leading  authori- 
ties. See  also  Mitchell  r.  Allen,  25  Hun, 
543  (a  discharge  by  the  plaintiff  of  one 
of  the  persons  jointly  liable  releases  all 
the  others). 

1  |[In  a  proceeding  to  establish  a  lost 
will,  the  legatees,  devisees  and  heirs  at 
law  are  all  necessary  parties  :  In  re  Valen- 
tine's Will  (1896),  93  Wis.  45,  67  N.  W. 
12.  In  a  contest  of  a  will  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  bring  in  all  persons  interested  in 
the  estate,  if  all  the  devisees  are  properly 
brought  in:  Kischman  ('.  Scott  (1901), 
166  Mo.  214,  65  S.  W.  1031.  In  a  suit  to 
set  aside  a  will,  a  judgment  will  be  re- 
versed if  devisees  are  named  wliich  are 
not  made  parties:  Wells  r.  Wells  (1898), 
144  Mo.  198,  45  S.  W.  1095;  — and  the 
executor  is  a  necessary  party,  and  as  such 
lias  a  right  to  defend  the  will :  In  re 
Estate  of  Whetton  (1893),  98  Cal.  203,  32 
Pac.  970.3 

2  New  York  Laws  of  1837,  p.  537,  §  73  ; 
Kellogg  1:.  Olmsted.  6  How.  Pr.  487.  Also 
Selover  v.  Coe,  63  N.  Y.  438. 


ACTIONS   CONCERNING   DECEDENTS'    ESTATES.  309 

must  be  joined  as  co-defendants  with  the  executor,  and  if  a 
legacy  is  charged  upon  lands,  the  devisees  must  also  be  made 
parties.^  When  a  creditor  seeks  to  recover  his  demand  against 
the  estate,  his  suit  should  be  prosecuted  against  the  executor  or 
administrator  alone;  the  widow,  heirs,  legatees,  next  of  kin,  and 
creditors,  are  neither  necessary  nor  proper  parties  defendant. 
This  was  the  universal  rule  under  the  former  system;  and  al- 
though the  code  has  enacted  the  equitable  doctrines  concerning 
parties,  and  has  made  no  exception  in  their  application  to  differ- 
ent actions,  it  has  not  changed  the  procedure  in  this  particular. 
The  administrator  or  executor  represents  the  estate;  is  a  trustee 
for  all  the  parties  who  are  interested  in  its  distribution ;  and  his 
defence  is  their  defence.  He  is  bound  to  interpose  all  necessary 
and  available  answers  to  demands  made  upon  the  estate,  and  the 
law  presumes  that  he  will  faithfully  perform  this  duty.  The 
general  language  of  the  codes  certainly  does  not  require  a  greater 
latitude  in  the  admission  of  parties  defendant  who  are  interested 
in  the  event  of  the  suit  than  was  demanded  by  the  practice  of 
the  equity  courts.  It  has  not  therefore  been  so  construed  as  to 
make  the  widow,  heirs,  legatees,  and  others  necessary  or  proper 
defendants,  although  they  may  seem  to  be  interested  in  the  result 
of  the  controversy. 2  The  same  is  true  even  when  the  testator 
has  bequeathed  all  his  property,  real  and  personal,  to  a  single 
legatee;  the  creditor  must  pursue  his  claim  against  the  executor, 
and  not  against  the  legatee.^  Although,  in  general,  an  action  to 
recover  a  debt  or  demand  due  to  the  estate  must  be  brought  by 
the  administrator   or   executor   alone,  yet  in   some   exceptional 

1  Tonnelle   v.   Hall,    3    Abb.   Pr.  205.  tee   would    be   a    proper,    but   is   not  an 

Such  an  action,  although   it  may  be  au-  essential,  party."] 

thorized  by  statute,  is  in  all  its  features  ^  kelson  v.  Hart,  8  Ind.  293,  295.     See 

equitable  ;    and    the    equity   rules    as   to  also  Stanford  v.  Stanford,  42  Ind.  485,  488, 

parties  must  control  it.     See  Towner  v.  489.     In  an  action  against  the  sureties  on 

Tooley,  38  Barb.  598,  as  to  the  neces.sary  an  administrator's  bond,  he  himself  being 

defendants  in  an  action  upon  an  adminis-  dead,  his  administrator  is  not  a  necessary 

tration  bond  by  lef;atees  whose  legacies  are  defendant,  and    the   next  of   kin    of   tlie    ' 

charged  upon  the  lands  of  the  deceased,  original  decedent  are  not  proper  defeud- 

nilarrell  v.  Warren  (1898),   105  Ga.  476,  ants.     Flack  v.  Dawson,  69  N.  C.  42.     If 

•30  S.  E.  426,  tlie  court  said :  "  When  a  one  of  two  executors  dies,  and  an  action 

legatee  under  a  will  cites  au  administra-  is  brought  against  his  personal  represent- 

tor  de  bonis  non  cum  testxinicnio  unnexo  to  a  ative  to    recover   a   demand    against   the 

settlement,  the  defendant  is  not,  as  a  mat-  original    estate,   the    surviving    executor 

ter  of  right,  entitled  to  have  another,  who  must  be  made  a  co-defendant.    McDowell 

is   the   sole    remaining   legal ee,    made   a  c.  Clark,  68  N.  C  118,  120. 
party  to  the  proceeding.     Such  other  lega-  ^  Perry  v.  Seitz,  2  Duv.  (Ky.)  122. 


310 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


instancps  sncli  suit  may  be  instituted  and  prosecuted  by  a  legatee 
or  distributee,  when  the  administrator  or  executor  is  incapaci- 
tated from  suing.  ^ 

^  217.  *  310.  VIII.  Some  Special  Actions.  In  New  York,  an 
action  against  a  county  sliould  be  brought  against  "The  Board 
of  Supervisoi-s "  of  the  specified  count)',  and  not  against  the 
f^upervisors  individually  or  by  name.^  A  suit  may  be  maintained 
between  two  firms  having  a  common  partner,  he  being  made  a 
defendant,  and  suitable  averments  being  inserted  in  the  com- 
jjlaint  or  petition. ^  Where  a  particular  religious  society  or 
individual  church  is  incorporated,  an  action  to  recover  a  debt  or 
damages  for  the  breach  of  a  contract  due  from  it  must  be  brought 
against  this  corporation,  and  not  against  the  bisliop  or  priest, 
whatever  may  be  the  ecclesiastical  powers  and  authority  of  such 
clerical  officers.*  In  certain  States  the  assignor  of  a  non-nego- 
tiable thing  in  action,  or  where  the  a.ssignment  is  not  expressly 
authorized  by  statute,  is  a  necessary  defendant  in  an  action 
brought  by  the  assignee.^ 


1  See  Fisher  v.  Ilubbell,  1  N.  Y.  Sup. 
Ct.  97;  s.  0.  65  Barb.  74;  7  Lans.  481; 
Lancaster  v.  Gould,  46  Ind.  397  ;  Shove  v. 
Shove,  69  Wis.  425.  QBut  see  Sheppard 
f.  Green  (1896),  48  S.  0.  165,  26  S.  E. 
224,  where  it  was  held  that  the  persoual 
representatives  of  the  deceased,  the  volun- 
tary grantees  and  persons  holding  liens 
executed  by  them  are  all  necessary  par- 
ties in  au  action  to  establish  creditors' 
claims  on  the  a.ssets  of  a  decedent's  estate, 
aud  to  set  aside  certain  conveyances  as 
fraudulent  ]] 

2  Hill  V.  Livingston  Cy.  Sup.,  12  N.  Y. 
52.  See  al.so  Sims  v.  McClure,  52  Ind.  267 
(against  common-school  trustees) ;  Ilawley 
I'.  Fayetteville,  82  N.  0. 22  (against  towns); 
Hamilton  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  40  Wis.  47 
(against  municipal  corporations  for  inten- 
tional trespa.sses)  ;  Wliite  '■.  Miller,  7  Hun, 
427  (again.st  the  "Shakers") ;  La  France 
V.  Krayer,  42  Iowa,  14.3  (in  actions  under 
the  "civil  damage  act"). 

'  Cole  I'.  IJeynolds,  18  N.  Y.  74;  En- 
gliM  t\  Furni.-is,  4  E.  I).  Smith,  587.  See 
al.xo  Ford  v.  Ind.  Dist.  of  Stuart,  46  Iowa, 
294;  Crosby  i-.  'i'imolat  (Minn.  1892), 
52  N.  W.  526.  The  balance  of  account 
between  the  two  firms  may  be  struck,  and 
asHigned  to  a  third   jierson  to  sue   upon 


the  same ;  Beacannon  v.  Liebe,  1 1  Ore. 
44.3.  As  to  actions  between  two  of  sev- 
eral partners  without  joining  the  others, 
see  Wells  v.  Simmonds,  8  Hun,  189,  209; 
A'eudecker  c.  Kohlberg,  81  N.  Y.  296. 

■*  Charboneau  v.  Henni,  24  Wis.  250. 
A  peculiar  case.  The  action  was  against 
a  Roman  Catholic  bishop,  to  recover  the 
cost  of  building  a  church  edifice  belong- 
ing to  a  religious  society. 

5  Harvey  v.  Wilson,  44  Ind.  231,  234; 
Allen  V.  Jerauld,  31  Ind.  372;  Indiana 
&  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  McKernan,  24 
Ind.  62;  Iloldridge  v.  Sweet,  23  Ind.  118; 
French  r.  Turner,  15  Ind.  59;  Gowcr  v. 
Howe,  20  Ind.  396  ;  Breeding  v.  Tobin 
(Ky.  1892),  18  S.  W.  773;  Hood  v.  Cal. 
Wine  Co.,  4  Wash.  88  :  St.  Louis,  I.  M. 
&  S.  Ry.  r.  Camden  Bk.,  47  Ark.  541  ; 
Sykes  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Canton  (S  Dak. 
1S91),  49  N.  W.  1058;  Keller  i-.  Williams, 
49  Ind.  504;  Clough  i'.  Thomas,  53  Ind. 
24 ;  Heed  i\  Garr,  59  Ind.  299  ;  Reed  r. 
Finton,  63  Ind.  288;  Leedy  v.  N.ash,  67 
Ind  311  ;  Gordon  v.  Carter,  79  Ind.  386; 
compare  Riley  v.  Schawacker,  50  Ind.  592  : 
Watson  V.  Conwell  (Ind.  App.,  18.12).  30 
N.  E.  5;  Boudurant  v.  Bladen,  10  Ind. 
100 ;  Nelson  v.  Johus<m,  IS  Ind.  329; 
Ilubbell  V.  Skiles,  16  Ind.  138;  Hopkins 


ACTIONS    AGAINST   HUSBAND   AND   WIFE.  311 

§  218.  *  317.  Joinder  in  Case  of  Substituted  Debtor.  Ill  tlie 
case  of  a  substitution  of  one  party  for  another  as  a  debtor,  — 
that  is,  when,  a  debt  being  due  from  one  person,  another  for  a 
valuable  consideration  assumes  such  indebtedness  and  promises 
to  pay  the  same,  —  it  has  been  decided  in  Indiana  that  the  cred- 
itor may  maintain  an  action  against  the  substituted  debtor,  Imt 
must  join  with  him  the  original  debtor  as  a  co-defendant,  under 
the  general  provision  of  the  code  requiring  or  permitting  all 
persons  to  be  made  defendants  who  are  necessary  parties  to  a 
complete,  determination  and  settlement  of  the  questions  involved. ^ 
In  this  decision  the  court  has  accepted  to  its  full  extent  the 
equitable  theory  of  parties,  and  has  applied  it  unreservedly  to  a 
purely  legal  action ;  for  since  the  creditor  had  surrendered  all 
claim  upon  the  original  debtor,  he  could  recover  no  judgment  in 
the  action  against  such  debtor,  and  the  latter's  presence  could 
only  be  necessary  for  his  own  protection  and  that  of  the  other 
defendant.  It  is  probable  that  this  ruling  would  not  be  followed 
by  those  courts  which  have  partially  or  wholly  confined  the 
operation  of  the  statutory  provisions  in  question  to  equitable 
actions.  When  the  stockholders  of  a  corporation  are  by  statute 
made  personally  responsible  for  an  amount  equal  to  the  amount 
of  stock  held  by  them,  the  liability  is  not  joint,  and  each  must 
be  sued  separately.^ 


SECOND.  ACTIONS  AGAINST  HUSBAND  AND  WIFE  OR  EITHER  OF 
THEM:  PARTIES  DEFENDANT  AS  AFFECTED  BY  THE  MARRIAGE 
RELATION. 

§  219.  *  318.  General  Extent  of  Statutory  Modification  of  Com- 
mon-Law Rules.  No  Change  in  Suits  against  Wife  for  her  Torts, 
Frauds,  and  other  Wrongful  Acts.  Tlie  provisions  of  the  Codes, 
and  of  other  statutes,  in  relation  to  actions  in  which  married 
women  are  parties,  were  quoted  in  full  in  the  last  preceding- 
section,   and    need   not  be  repeated   here.^     There   is  a  marked 

r.  Org.-in,  15  lud.  188;  Perry  v.  Seitz,  2  v.  PLanly,   76   Ind.  272;  McGill  v.  Gunn, 

Duv.  (Ky.)  122;    Lytle  v.  Lytle,  2  Mete.  43  lud.  315. 

(Ky.)    127;    Gill   v.   Johnson's   Adni.,    1  2  Perry  ?■.  Turner,  55  Mo.  418.     But 

Mete.    (Ky.)  649.     See    Shane  v.   Lowry,  see  ante,  %*  299,  note;  /ws^  §  *417. 

48  Ind.  205,   206  ;   Strong  v.  Downing,  34  ^  gg©  supra,  §  152,  where  the  statutory 

Ind  300  ;  Durham  !'.  Bischof,  47  lud.  21 1  ;  provisions  embracing  the  cases   of  ])lain- 

S.  P.  Hardy  v.  Blazer,  29  Ind.  226.  tiffs  and  of  defendants  will  be  found  iu 

1  Hardy  i\  Blazer,  29  Ind.  226  ;    Davis  full. 


312  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

difference  in  the  extent  of  the  alterations  made  in  the  former  law 
by  the  legislation  of  the  various  Stiites.  The  changes  in  New 
York  are  complete  and  radical,  the  wife  being  in  almost  eveiy 
respect  assimilated  to  the  unmarried  woman.  The  example  of 
New  York  is  followed  by  many  States.  In  many  otliers,  how- 
ever, the  modifications  do  not  go  to  any  such  extent,  and  are 
confined  to  the  cases  in  which  married  women  are  sued  or  sue  in 
respect  of  their  separate  property,  and  those  in  wliich  the  action 
is  directly  between  the  husband  and  wife,  leaving  all  others  to 
be  controlled  by  the  prior  law.  We  saw  in  the  preceding  section 
that  in  this  group  of  States  where  a  right  of  action  exists  on 
account  of  a  tort  committed  to  the  person  of  a  married  woman, 
the  common-law  rules  are  unchanged,  and  the  action  must  be 
either  in  the  name  of  the  husband  alone,  or  of  the  husband  and 
wife  jointly;  while  in  New  York,  and  in  the  States  which  have 
copied  its  legislation,  the  wife  is  permitted  to  sue  in  her  own 
name  in  respect  of  any  cause  of  action  accruing  to  herself. 
There  is  even  less  modification  of  the  ancient  doctrines  which 
regulate  the  form  of  suits  against  the  wife  for  her  torts,  frauds, 
and  other  wrongful  acts.^ 

§  220.  *  319.  Result.  The  result  is  that,  in  actions  whicli 
concern  her  separate  property,  the  wife  may  or  must  be  sued 
alone.  In  those  States  which  permit  her  to  enter  into  contracts 
having  reference  to  her  separate  property,  or  connected  with  a 
business  or  trade  which  she  may  carry  on,  suits  upon  such  con- 
tracts may  or  must  be  brought  against  her  individually ;  ^  while 

1  Qln  Taylor  v.  PuUeu  (1899),  152  Mo.  2  Qln  HoUister  v.  Bell  (1900),  107  Wis. 

434,    53    S.    W.     1086,    the    court    said:  198,  83  N.    W.   297,  the  court  said:  "A 

"  While  it  is  true  tliat  one  of  the   sup-  married  woman  ha.s  not  capacity  to  bind 

posed  rea.sons  for  the  rule  which  required  herself  at  law  by  contract,  except  as  regards 

a  husband  to  be  joined  with  his  wife  in  an  her  separate  property  or  business.     It  fol- 

action  for  her  torts  has  ceased  because  he  lows,  as  has  often  been   decided  by  this 

no  longer  acc^uires  her  property  by  virtue  court,  that  a  married  woman's  note,  given 

of  the  marriage  in  tiiis  state,  all  lawyers  solely  for  the  purpose  of  securing  or  pa\-- 

must  admit  that  so  far  no  writer  or  court  iug  the  debt  of  a  third  person,  is  void  at 

has  as  yet  furnished  satisfactorily  all  the  law  and  not  enforceable  in  equity  against 

reasons   which    may    have  influenced  the  her  separate   property  in   the  absence  of 

adoption  of  the  rule  at  common  law,  and  some   ecjuitable   considerations   rendering 

until    they   are    produced,    certainly    the  such  enforcement  under  the  circumstances 

courts  cannot  declare  that  all  tlie  ren.sons  just."     The  signing  of  a  promissory  note 

have  ceaseil  and  thus  abolish  the  rule  by  by  a  married  woman  raises  no  presump- 

judicial   decision."      See   also   Nichols   v.  tion  that  slie  intended  to  charge  her  sepa- 

Nicluds   (1898),   147    Mo.  407,  48    S.  W.  rate   estate:    State   Nat.    Bank  v.  Smith 

947.2  (1898),  53  Neb.  54,  75  N.  W.  51.       See  al.-<o 


ACTIONS    AGAINST    HUSBAND   AND   WIFE.  313 

actions  to  recover  damages  for  personal  torts  committed  Lv  her 
must  be  instituted  against  her  and  her  husband  jointly,  or,  in 
certain  exceptional  cases,  solely  against  the  husband.  These 
propositions,  which  are  the  general  summing  up  of  the  statutory 
2)rovisions,  and  of  the  judicial  interpretation  thereof,  I  shall  now 
illustrate  by  particular  instances  which  will  embrace  all  the 
important  questions  that  arise. 

§  221.  *  320.  The  Settled  Rule.  Tort  Committed  in  Presence  or 
by  Compulsion  of  Husband.  It  is  the  settled  rule  in  the  States 
which  have  adopted  the  second  form  of  statute,^  that,  in  actions 
to  recover  damages  for  all  torts  whether  with  or  without  vio- 
lence, negligences,  frauds,  deceits,  and  other  such  wrongs  done 
by  the  wife  personally,  and  not  done  merely  by,  or  by  the  use  of, 
her  separate  property,  the  common-law  principle  is  unaltered, 
and  the  husband  and  wife  must  be  joined  as  co-defendants.^ 
The  principle  thus  stated  assumes  that  the  wife  acted  voluntarily. 
If,  however,  the  tort  is  committed  by  the  wife  in  the  presence 
and  under  the  compulsion  or  direction  of  lier  husband,  he  alone 
is  liable,  and  should  be  sued  without  making  her  a  co-defendant. 
In  applying  the  latter  rule,  it  is  settled  that  if  the  tort  is  done  by 
the  wife  in  the  presence  of  her  husband,  3,  prima  facie  j^resumption 
is  raised  that  it  was  done  by  his  direction  and  under  his  compul- 
sion. This  presumption  may  be  overcome,  and  if  it  be  shown 
that  she  acted  voluntarily,  although  in  his  presence,  she  must  be 

Gallagher  I'.  Mjelde  (1898),  98  Wis.  509,  the  wife;  Turner  v.  Hitchcock,  20  Iowa, 

74  N.   W.   340,  holding  that   a   married  310,  trespass  on  plaintiffs  premises  and 

woman  without  property  and  not  in  busi-  destroying    personal     property    thereon  ; 

ness  cannot  make  a  binding  contract  to  Musselman   v.    Galligher,   32    Iowa,  383 ; 

repay  money  loaned  to  enable  herself  and  McEIfresh  v.   Kirkendall,  36   Iowa,   224  ; 

husband  to  go  into  business  ]  Luse  v.  Oaks,  36  Iowa,  562,  slander  by  the 

^  [^That  form  which  requires  a  joinder  wife  ;  Curd  v.  Dodds,  6  Bush,  66l,  action 

except   in   actions   concerning   tlie  wife's  for  fraud  of  wife  in  selling  certain  property 

separate  property  and  in  actions  between  of  hers.     Held,  that  she  was  not  liable  for 

husband  and  wife.     See  §  152,  «rt/e.]  a  fraud  in  entering  into  a  contract,  the 

^  QHenley  v.  Wilson  (1902),  137  Cal.  law  of  Kentucky  not  permitting  her  to 

273,70   Pac.  21,  citing  the  text ;]    Andei-  make  a  binding  contract;  the  doctrine  of 

son  (.'.  Hill,  53  Barb.  238,  assault  and  battery  the  text  is  fully  recognized  in  the  opin- 

by  the  wife;  Peak  v.  Lemon,  1  Lans.  295,  ion.    Coolidge  v.   Parris,   8  Ohio  St.   594, 

conversion ;  Tait  v.  Culbertson,  57  Barb.  as,sault    and    battery    by    the    wife.      In 

9,  lil)el   by  the  wife;  Rowing  v.  Manly,  Rowing  v.    Manly,  49  N.   Y.,  Rapiillo  J. 

57  Barb.  479,  483  ;  s.  C.  49  N.  Y.  192,  198,  discusses  the  subject   [^of    the   joinder  of 

fraud  and  forgery  by  the  wife;   Brazil  v.  the  husband  and  wife  under  the  coinmon- 

Moran,  8  Minn   236,  assault  and  battery  law  rule,  as  it  existed  in  New  Y'ork  prior 

by  tlie  wife  ;  Ball  r.  Bennett,  21   Ind.  427,  to  the  recent  legislation.     The  opinion   is 

action  for  setting  fire  to  ])laintiff's  mill  b}^  a  learned  and  exhaustive  one.]     See  also 


314 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


made  a  defendant.     These  common-hnv  rules  liave  not  been  in 
any  respect  changed  by  the  codes. ^ 

J§  222.  *  321.  'Where  Tort  is  committed  by  "Wife  in  the  Use  or 
by  Means  of  her  Separate  Property.  If,  however,  the  tort  is  not 
committed  by  the  wife  personally,  but  is  done  by  means  of  her 
separate  property,  or  in  the  use  thereof,  or  under  color  or  claim 
of  ownership  of  her  separate  property,  the  action  should  be 
brought  against  her  individually,  without  joining  the  husband  as 
co-defendant,  in  all  those  States  whose  statutes  permit  a  married 
Avoman  to  be  sued  alone  in  respect  of  all  matters  which  concern 
her  se^mrate  estate.^  In  other  woi'ds,  actions  whicli  concern  or 
liave  relation  to  her  separate  property  are  not  contined  to  those 
upon  contract  or  those  involving  the  ownership  of  the  property, 
but  extend  to  suits  based  upon  torts  and  wrongs  done  by  means 
or  in  the  use  of  or  claim  to  the  propert}'. 


Clark  1-.  Boyer,  32  Ohio  St.  299  ;  Suuman 
V.  Brewin,  52  Ind.  140  (if  the  husiiaud 
dies  afier  verdict,  the  wife  is  liable  to 
have  judgment  entered  against  lierself 
aloue).  Fitzgerald  i'.  Quann,  109  N.  Y. 
441  ;  33  Hun,  Go2  (slander  by  wife)  ; 
Austin  f.  Bacon,  49  Huu,  386  (same); 
Quilty  r.  Battie,  61  Hun,  164  (harboring 
a  vicious  dog);  Wirt  i-.  Dinan,  44  Mo. 
App.  583  (for  deceit  of  wife).  [|But  see, 
also,  Thomas  r.  Cooksey  (1002),  130  N.  C. 
148,  41  S.  E.  2,  where  a  suit  for  po.<sessiou 
of  personal  property  was  held  properly 
brought  against  the  wife  alone.  Tiie  court 
said  that  if  tlie  fact  tiuit  she  had  ahu.shand 
living  would  protect  her,  "all  tliat  a  mar- 
ried woman  would  liave  to  do  would  be  to 
get  ])0!<session  of  some  one  else's  property, 
and  tiie  owner  would  be  witliout  remedy 
and  helpless.  Heath  i'.  Morgan,  117  N.  C. 
504."  Also,  Pender  v.  Mallett  (1898),  123 
N.  C.  57,  31  S.  E.  331,  where  suit  was 
brougiit  by  a  receiver  again.st  a  wife  to 
wliom  her  husband  liad  conveyed  pro])erty 
i;i  fraud  of  creditor.s,  the  husband  being 
joined  as  a  defendant  ] 

'  Brazil  v.  Moran,  8  Minn.  236  ;  Ball  c. 
Bennett,  21  Ind.  427  ;  Curd  v.  Dodd.s  G 
Busli,  081,  685;  Cassiu  r.  Delaney,  38 
N.  Y.  178,  per  Hunt  C.  .J. :  "  An  offence 
by  lii.-j  direction,  but  not  in  liis  presence, 
does  not  exeinj»t  her  from  lialnlity  ;  nor 
«bjes  liic  presence,  if  unaccomjianied  by  liis 
direction.  Tlie  presence  furnishes  evidence 
and  affords  a  {jresumption  of  liis  direction. 


but  it  is  not  conclusive,  and  the  truth  may 
be  established  by  comjjetent  evidence." 
Flanagan  v.  Tiuen,  53  Barb.  587.  The 
rule  is  settled  in  Missouri,  that  if  husband 
and  wife  both  unite  in  committing  a  tort, 
as,  for  examide,  an  assault  and  battery,  a 
joint  action  against  them  will  not  lie,  but 
the  husband  alone  must  be  sued.  Dailey 
V.  Ilou.ston,  58  Mo.  361,  366,  367  ;  Meegan 
V.  Gunsollis,  19  Mo.  417;  see,  however. 
Flesh  V.  Lindsay  (Mo  Sup.  1893),  21  S.  W. 
907.  But  in  an  action  against  husband 
and  wife  for  tltcir  joint  fraud,  it  was  held 
in  New  York  that  she  would  not  be  liable 
unless  she  actively  participated  in  the 
wrong.  Vanneman  v.  Powers,  56  N.  Y. 
39,  41. 

2  Peak  V.  Lemon,  1  Lans.  295;  Eagle 
V.  Swayze,  2  Daly,  140  ;  Howe  v.  Smith, 
38  How.  Pr.  37,  s.  c.  on  appeal,  45  N.  Y. 
230  ;  Baum  v.  Mullen,  47  N.  Y.  577. 
Action  against  a  married  woman  alone  to 
recover  damages  for  fraud  in  the  sale  of 
land  which  she  owned,  the  husband  acting 
as  her  agent  in  the  sale  and  making  the 
fraudulent  re])rcseutations.  The  fact  that 
her  liusband  acted  as  her  agent  in  the  sale 
did  not  affect  her  liability,  for  he  may  be 
her  agent  the  same  as  any  other  ])ers<)n. 
She  is  liable  for  frauds  committed  by  her 
husband  as  her  agent  in  carrying  on  a 
business  for  her.  Warner  v.  Warren,  46 
N.  Y.  228.  See  also  (,)uiUy  v.  Battie,  135 
N.  Y.  201.  QSee  Pender  ?•.  Mallett  (1898), 
123  N.  C.  57,  31  S.  E.  351. J 


ACTIONS    AGAINST    HUSBAND    AND    WIFE.  315 

§  223.  *  322.  Under  New  York  Statutes.  Under  the  Statutes 
of  New  York,  a  married  .woman  may  be  sued  alone  upon  any 
contract  which  she  has  made  in  a  trade  or  business  carried  on  by 
herself,  or  in  her  name  by  her  agent,  and  the  complaint  should 
be  in  the  ordinary  form  as  though  the  action  was  brought  against 
an  unmarried  woman. ^  She  must  also  be  sued  in  the  same 
manner  upon  any  contract  made  in  relation  to,  or  uj)on  any  lia- 
bility growing  out  of  her  separate  property.  Finally,  if  she 
enters  into  any  contract  and  therein  charges  the  paj'^ment  thereof 
upon  her  separate  property,  she  is  in  like  manner  personally- 
liable,  and  must  be  sued  witliout  making  her  husband  a  co- 
defendant.  The  charge  thus  made  does  not  create  an  equitable 
lien  upon  any  particular  property,  nor  even  a  general  lien  to  be 
enforced  by  an  equitable  action.  It  simply  creates  a  personal 
liability  upon  herself,  to  be  enforced  in  an  ordinary  legal  action, 
and  by  the  recovery  of  any  ordinary  judgment  for  debt  or  dam- 
ages. Such  charge  may  even  be  verbal,  and  when  made  creates 
a  personal  liability  which  may  be  enforced  against  anj^  property 
which  she  may  have  at  the  time,  or  any  which  she  may  after- 
wards acquire.  In  all  these  cases  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  in 
the  complaint  the  special  facts  from  which  such  liability  arises ; 
the  complaint  should  be  in  the  ordinary  form,  and  all  the  special 
facts  relating  to  her  coverture  should  be  averred  in  the  answer. ^ 

1  Hier  i-.  Staples,  51  N.  Y.  136.  She  116;  Perkius  (;.  Perkins,  62  Barb.  531; 
has  not  the  full  power  to  contract ;  the  Baken  v.  Harder,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  440 ; 
contract  must  either  he  made  in  some  Weir  r.  Groat,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  444 ; 
trade  or  business  which  she  carries  on,  or  Blauke  v.  Bryant,  55  N.  Y.  649;  Loomis 
be  for  her  personal  services,  or  have  a  v.  Ruck,  56  N.  Y.  462  ;  Corn  Exch.  Ins. 
connection  with  her  separate  property.  Co.  v.  Babcock,  42  N.  Y.  613;  Yale  v. 
See  the  following  cases:  Manchester  v.  Dederer,  18  N.  Y.  265,  22  N.  Y.  450,  which 
Sahler,  47  Barb.  155;  Smith  v.  Allen,  1  is  superseded  by  subsequent  decisions; 
Lans.  101  ;  Hart  v.  Young,  1  Lans.  417;  Owen  i'.  Cawley,  36  N.  Y.  600;  Carpenter 
Lennox  v.  Eldred,  1  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  140;  v.  O'Dougherty,  50  N.  Y.  660;  Garret.son 
Shorter  v.  Nelson,  4  Lans.  114;  Hallock  v.  Seaman,  54  N.  Y.  652;  Newell  v.  Rob- 
V.  De  Munu,  2  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  350 ;  Bodiue  arts,  54  N.  Y.  677  ;  Fowler  v.  Seaman,  40 
V.  Killeen,  53  N.  Y.  93  ;  Adams  v.  Honness,  N.  Y.  592  ;  Quassaic  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Waddell, 
62  Barb.  326.  3  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  680  ;  Miller  v.  Hunt,  3 

2  These  ])ropositions  are  the  final  results  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  762  ;  Kelty  v.  Long,  4  N.  Y. 
at  which  the  New  York  courts  have  ar-  Sup.  Ct.  183;  Bogert  v.  Gulick,  65  Barb, 
rived  through  a  long  and  progressive  322 ;  Warner  v.  Warren,  46  N.  Y.  228 : 
series  of  decisions.  Maxou  v.  Scott,  55  Manhattan  Brass  &  M.  Co.  v.  Thomp.son, 
N.  Y.  247  ;  Hier  v.  Staples,  51  N.  Y.  136  ;  58  N.  Y.  80.  —  Contracts  between  tlie  wife 
Hinckley  v.  Smith,  51  N.  Y.  21  ;  Frecking  and  husband  ;  see  also  anie,  §  *240,  and 
V.  Rolland,  53  N.  Y.  422,  426  ;  Smith  v.  notes.  Slie  may  become  his  credit.ir,  and 
Dunning,  61  N.  Y.  249  ;  Fo.ster  v.  Conger,  maintain  an  action  to  recover  tlie  debt: 
61  Barb.  145, 147;  Ainsley  r.  Mead,3Lans.  Woodworth    v.  Sweet,  44  Barb.   268,   51 


316 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


^  224.  *  325.  Wife  as  Party  in  Actions  concerning  the  Home- 
stead. Under  the  stiitutes  of  many  States  respecting  liomesteads, 
it  is  the  established  rule  that  the  wife  has  such  a  vested  interest 
in  the  homestead  that  she  is  always  a  proper,  and  generally  a 
necessar}',  party  defendant  with  her  husband  in  all  actions  which 
may  affect  the  title  thereto,  or  the  right  to  the  possession  thereof. 
At  all  events,  her  interest  will  not  be  cut  off  unless  she  is  made 
a  party.  Even  when  the  husband  himself  brings  an  action  in 
order  to  enjoin  a  sale  of  the  homestead,  or  seeking  in  any  other 
way  to  protect  his  right,  the  defendants,  for  their  own  security^ 
may,  and  perhaps  should,  require  the  wife  to  be  brought  in  as  a 
co-plaintiff.^ 

§  225.  *  328.  Defence  by  Wife  when  both  are  sued  together. 
The  codes  of  several  States  contain  a  provision  that,  "  if  the  hus- 
band and  wife  be  sued  together,  she  may  defend  for  her  own 
right,  and  if  the  husband  neglect  to  defend,  she  may  defend  for 


N.  Y.  8 ;  McCartney  v.  Welch,  44  Barb. 
27 1 ;  Savage  v.  O'Neil,  44  N.  Y.  298 ;  Jay- 
cox  r.  Caldwell,  51  N.  Y.  395.  If  the  hus- 
bami  ffires  a  note  to  his  wife  during  the 
marriage,  no  action  can  be  maintained  on 
it  by  her  against  him  or  his  representa- 
tives after  his  death,  simply  because  there 
is  no  consideration :  Whitaker  i\  Whita- 
ker,  52  X.  Y.  368 ;  but  if  there  is  a  con- 
sideration for  the  note,  or  if  it  is  given  by 
him  in  contemplation  of  marriage,  she  can 
enforce  it  by  suit :  Wright  i\  Wright, 
54  N.  Y.  437  ;'  Banfield  i-.  Rumsey,  4  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  322.  The  following  are  the  most 
important  among  the  recent  N.  Y.  decis- 
ions :  William.son  ;•.  Dodge,  5  Hun,  479  ; 
Covert  V.  Hughes,  8  id.  305  (a  married 
woman  is  liable  for  the  price  of  goods 
bought  by  her  as  agent  of  her  husband 
which  were  necessary  for  and  were  used 
for  the  support  of  herself  and  her  chil- 
dren. Laws  of  1860,  ch.  90,  §  1);  Goss- 
man  v.  Cruger,  7  id.  60;  Hill  v.  Rosselle, 
G  id.  631  ;  McVey  v.  Cantrell,  6  id.  528 ; 
70  N.  Y.  295;  Conlin  v.  Cantrell,  64  N.  Y. 
217  (tiie  liability  of  a  married  woman  who 
ha.s  a  separate  estate,  and  iier  intention  to 
charge  such  estate,  may  be  inferred  from 
the  circumstances  of  the  contract;  it  is 
not  necessary  that  there  should  be  a 
t<jj<;ci(ic  agreement  to  charge  her  separate 
cHtate) ;  Smith    v.   Dunning,    Gl    i<l.   249; 


Cushman  v.  Henry,  75  id.  103;  Tiemeyer 
V.  Turnginst,  85  id.  516  (very  important 
case ;  she  is  liable  on  any  contract  of 
purchase  although  she  had  no  separate 
property  at  the  time  she  entered  into  the 
contract) ;  Woolsey  v.  Brown,  74  id.  82 
(liable  as  a  surety) ;  Nash  v.  Mitchell,  71 
id.  199.  In  California,  under  the  Civil 
Code,  the  liability  of  a  married  woman  on 
her  contracts  is  substantially  the  same  as 
in  New  York  and  Iowa,  except  that  her 
husband  must  be  joined  as  a  co-defendant 
in  suits  upon  them.  See  Wood  v.  Orford, 
52  Cal.  412;  Varry  v.  Kelly,  52  id.  334; 
Marlow  v.  Barlew,  53  id.  456 ;  Tobin  v. 
Galvin,  49  id.  34. 

QThe  present  New  York  statute  reads 
as  follows  :  "  A  husband  who  acquires 
property  of  his  wife  by  ante-nuptial  con- 
tract or  otherwise,  is  liable  for  her  debts 
contracted  before  marriage,  but  only  to 
the  extent  of  the  property  so  acquired." 
Gen.  Laws,  Ch.  48,  §  24.] 

1  Chase  V.  Abbott,  20  Iowa,  154,  160. 
See  also  Burnap  ;•.  Cook,  16  Iowa,  149, 
1.53,  158,  per  Dillon  J.;  Larson  i-.  Rey- 
nolds, 13  Iowa,  579  ;  Revalk  v.  Kraemer, 
8  Cal.  66,  72  ;  Marks  v.  Mar.sh,  9  Cal.  96 ; 
Moss  V.  Warner,  10  Cal.  296;  Sargent  v. 
Wilson,  5  Cal.  504 ;  De  Uprey  v.  De 
Uprey,  27  Cal.  329,  332  ;  Watts  v.  Gal- 
lagher (Cal.,  Dec.  13,  1892),  31  Pac.  626. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    EQUITABLK    ACTIONS.  317 

his  right  also. "  The  former  clause  of  this  section  at  least  applies 
only  to  equitable  suits  in  which  separate  rights  of  the  wife  are 
involved,  as,  for  example,  those  relating  to  her  separate  property ; 
it  has  no  application  to  ordinary  legal  actions  in  which  both  are 
sued  jointly,  and  over  which  the  husband  has  still,  as  under  the 
former  practice,  the  entire  control.^  It  was  a  settled  rule  of  the 
equity  procedure  that,  in  an  action  against  husband  and  wife, 
not  affecting  her  separate  estate  and  seeking  no  relief  against  her 
property,  service  of  process  upon  the  husband  was  a  good  and 
sufficient  service  upon  the  wife,  and  he  could  appear  on  her 
behalf,  so  that  she  would  be  bound  by  the  decree  made  upon 
such  service  and  appearance.  This  rule,  it  is  said  in  some  cases, 
still  subsists  under  like  circumstances.  Of  course,  if  the  wife's 
separate  property  is  involved,  or  if  any  relief  is  demanded  against 
her  directly,  she  must  be  personally  served,  and  has  a  right  to 
appear  independently  of  her  husband.  This  right,  although 
expressly  secured  by  statute  in  some  States,  exists  independently 
of  any  such  statutory  permission. ^ 

THIRD:   EQUITABLE   ACTIONS. 

§  226.  *  329.  I.  General  Principles.  Distinction  between  Neces- 
sary and  Proper  Parties.  In  all  equitable  actions,  a  broad  and 
most  important  distinction  must  be  made  between  two  classes  of 
parties  defendant;  namely,  (1)  those  who  are  " necessary, "  and 
{2)  those  who  are  "proper."  Necessary  parties,  when  the  term 
is  accurately  used,  are  those  without  whom  no  decree  at  all  can 
be  effectively  made  determining  the  principal  issues  in  the  cause. 

1  Coolidge  V.  Parris,  8  Ohio  St.  ,594;  Franklin,  15  Ohio  St.  485;  s.  c.  16  Ohio 
Wolf  V.  Banning,  3  Minn.  202.  See  also  St.  193.  This  case  was  similar  in  all  its 
Holliday  v.  Brown,  33  Neb.  657  (rehearing  features  to  Foote  v.  Lathrop,  supra.  Both 
denied,  March  16,  1892,  51  N.  W.  839).  were  parties,  but  service  was  made  on  the 
Such  legal  actions  as  those  for  torts  done  husband  alone.  Held,  that  the  wife  was 
by  the  wife,  or  debts  due  by  her  dum  uot  concluded,  and  her  dower  right  was 
sola,  and  others,  in  which  the  law  still  not  cut  off.  The  cases  are  diametrically 
requires   both    spouses    to    be    made    de-  opposed  to  each  otiier. 

fendants,  are  not  affected  by  the  statutory  ^As  to  Communit//  Properti/ :   The  wife 

provision.  is  a  proper  party  defendant  in  an  action 

2  Foote  V.  Lathrop,  53  Barb.  183;  La-  against  the  husband  on  a  note  executed 
throp  V.  Heacock,  4  Laus.  1.  This  was  a  by  himself  alone,  in  order  to  determine 
foreclosure  suit,  the  mortgage  being  upon  whether  the  judgment  can  be  executed  a-s 
lands  of  the  husband,  so  that  the  wife's  one  for  a  community  debt :  Clark  v.  El- 
only  possible  interest  was  to  protect  her  tinge  (1902),  29  Wash.  215,  69  Pac.  736; 
inchoate  right  of  dower.  Wolf  r.  Banning,  McDonough  v.  Craig  (1894),  10  Wash. 
3   Minn.   202,   204.     Contra.  McArthur  i'.  239,  38  Pac.  1034.] 


318  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

Proper  parties  are  those  Avithout  whom  a  substantial  decree  may 
he  made,  but  not  a  decree  which  sliall  completely  settle  all  the 
questions  which  may  be  involved  in  the  controversy,  and  con- 
clude the  rights  of  all  the  persons  who  have  any  interest  in  the 
subject-matter  of  the  litigation. ^  Confusion  has  frequently  arisen 
from  a  neglect  by  text-writers,  and  even  judges,  to  observe  this 
plain  distinction.  Parties  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as  necessary 
when  they  are  merely  proper.  Thus,  because  a  decree  cannot  be 
rendered  which  shall  determine  the  rights  of  certain  classes  of 
individuals  without  making  tliem  defendants  in  the  action,  they 
are  not  unfrequently  called  necessary  parties ;  or,  in  other  words, 
because  they  must  be  joined  as  defendants  in  a  particular  suit, 
in  order  that  the  judgment  therein  may  bind  tlieni^  they  are 
denominated  "necessary"  parties  absolutely.  Such  persons  are 
"necessary"  sub  modo  —  that  is,  they  must  be  brought  in  if  it 
is  expected  to  conclude  them  by  the  decree;  but  to  call  them 
"  necessary  "  absolutely  is  to  ignore  the  familiar  and  fundamental 
distinction  between  the  two  classes  of  parties  which  has  just  been 
mentioned.  This  inaccurate  use  of  language  would  make  every 
person  a  necessary  party  who  should  actually  be  joined  as  a  co- 
defendant  in  an  equitable  action. 

§  227.  *  330.  Distinction  betw^een  Necessary  and  Proper  Parties 
Illustrated.  Practical  Test.  I  will  illustrate  these  positions  by 
a  familiar  example.  In  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  the 
owner  of  the  land  covered  by  it  is  a  necessary  defendant,  because 
without  his  presence  no  decree  can  be  made  for  the  sale  of  the 
land;  in  other  words,  no  effective  decree  at  all,  and  the  suit 
would  be  an  empty  show  of  litigation.  The  holders  of  subse- 
quent mortgages,  judgments,  and  other  liens  upon  the  same  land 
are  not  necessary  parties  in  order  to  the  rendition  of  an  effective 
judgment,  because  the  land  can  be  sold  without  their  presence 
and  without  cutting  off  their  liens.  If,  however,  the  plaintiff 
desires  to  settle  all  the  questions  involved  in  one  controversy, 
and  to  determine  the  rights  of  all  the  persons  who  have  any 
interest  in  the  land,  he  must  bring  in  all  these  holders  of  subse- 
quent liens,  so  that  a  judgment  may  be  given  which  shall  fore- 

1  [Reiser  v.  Gigricli  (1S94),  59  Minn.  — ,  93  N.   W.  813,  quoting  California  v. 

.•568,01  N.  W.  30,  <|uotinp:  the  text;  Uudil  Sontliern  Tae.   Ry.  Co.,   157   IT.  S.   229; 

V.  Fosseen  (1900),  S2  Minn.  41,  84  N.  W.  Steinliacii  (•.   Prudential   Ins.   Co.  (1902), 

496;   Kircher  c.  I'eder.son  (1903),  117  Wi.s.  172  N.  Y.  471,  05  N.  E.  281. J 


DEFENDANTS    IN    EQUITABLE    ACTIONS.  319 

close  their  rights.  To  accomplish  this  end,  these  persons  must 
be  made  defendants;  and  in  that  respect  they  are  necessary 
parties  —  that  is,  necessary  in  order  to  attain  the  particular  result 
desired.  They  are  not,  however,  necessary  to  the  decision  of  the 
main  issues  involved  in  the  suit  and  to  the  granting  of  a  decree. 
If  we  use  language  accurately,  we  shall  call  them  2)roper  parties, 
and  shall  thus  distinguish  them  from  the  other  class,  without 
whom  the  judicial  machinery  cannot  be  put  in  motion.  Every 
person  who'  is  rightly  joined  as  a  defendant  in  an  equitable 
action,  is,  in  a  certain  broad  sense,  a  necessary  party,  because  his 
presence  is  necessary,  to  accomplish  some  particular  end,  and  to 
make  the  judgment  more  complete  than  it  otherwise  would  have 
been ;  but  to  use  the  term  in  this  broad  sense  is  to  lose  all  the 
benefits  of  an  accurate  classification  and  of  practical  rules  de- 
pending on  such  classification.  To  sum  up:  Necessar}?^  parties 
defendant  are  those  without  whom  no  decree  at  all  can  be  ren- 
dered ;  proper  parties  defendant  are  those  whose  presence  renders 
the  decree  more  effectual;  and  all  the  proper  parties  are  those  by 
whose  presence  the  decree  becomes  a  complete  determination  of 
all  the  questions  which  can  arise,  and  of  all  the  rights  which  are 
connected  with  the  subject-matter  of  the  controversy.  A  prac- 
tical test  will  at  once  fix  the  class  into  which  any  given  persons 
interested  in  an  equitable  litigation  must  fall.  If  the  person  is  a 
necessary  defendant,  a  demurrer  for  defect  of  parties  on  account 
of  his  nonjoinder  will  be  sustained;  and  conversely,  if  the  de- 
murrer will  be  sustained,  the  person  is  a  necessary  party.  If  the 
given  person  is  merely  a  proper  party,  such  a  demurrer  will  not 
be  sustained  on  account  of  his  nonjoinder,  although  the  court 
may  undoubtedly,  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  order  him  to 
be  brought  in. 

§  228.  *  331.  Equity  Doctrine  herein.  Statutory  Provision. 
The  principal  provision  quoted  at  the  commencement  of  the 
present  section,  and  which  is  the  same  in  all  the  codes  of  pro- 
cedure, is  a  general  and  concise  statement  of  the  doctrine  which 
had  long  prevailed  in  courts  of  equity  in  relation  to  the  joinder 
of  defendants.  As  the  language  of  this  provision  is  permissive 
—  any  person  may  be  made  a  defendant,  not  must  be  —  it  was 
evidently  intended  to  embrace  "proper"  as  well  as  "necessary" 
parties  within  its  requirement.  The  doctrine  of  equity,  ex- 
pressed in  its  most  general  form,  is,  that  all  persons  materially 


320  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

interested,  either  legally  or  beneficially,  in  the  subject-matter  of 
the  suit,  should  be  made  parties  to  it,  either  as  plaintiffs  or  as 
defendants,  so  that  there  may  be  a  complete  decree  which  shall 
bind  them  all.^  Those  whose  interests  are  adverse  to  the  claims 
set  up  by  the  plaintiff,  and  who  would  therefore  naturally  resist 
such  claims,  should  be  brought  into  the  action  as  defendants. 
On  the  other  hand,  those  whose  interests  are  concurrent  with 
the  interests  of  the  principal  plaintiff"  who  actually  institutes  and 
prosecutes  the  suit,  should  primarily  be  joined  with  him  as 
co-plaintiffs.  But,  as  has  already  been  shown  in  the  preceding 
section,  equity  procedure  is  not  strenuous  in  respect  to  this  ac- 
curate division,  and  often  permits  individuals  of  the  latter  class 
to  be  made  defendants,  being  satisfied  if  they  are  before  the 
court  so  as  to  be  bound  by  the  decree.  The  persons  who  are 
interested  in  resisting  the  demands  of  the  actual  plaintiff,  and 
who  must  therefore  be  defendants  in  the  action,  are  separated, 
according  to  the  nature  of  their  interests  and  of  their  relations 
with  each  other,  into  two  classes,  —  those  immediately  inter- 
ested, and  those  consequentially  interested.  When  an  individ- 
ual is  in  the  enjoyment  of  the  subject-matter,  or  has  a  right, 
interest,  or  estate  in  it,   either  in  possession   or  in  expectancy, 

1  See  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §§  72,  76  a.  It  The  following  are  illustrations  of  de- 
has  been  suggested  that  this  general  doc-  fendanti*  properly  joined  :  Miles  i'.  Du  Bey 
trine  should  be  stated  as  follows:  All  (1894),  15  Mont.  340,  39  Pac.  313  (all  per- 
persons  materially  interested  in  the  object  sons  diverting  water  from  a  water  course) ; 
of  the  suit  should  be  made  parties.  See  Brown  v.  Canal  &  Reservoir  Co.  (1899), 
Calvert  on  Parties,  pp.  1-11;  Story,  Eq.  26  Colo.  66,  56  Pac.  183  (ditch  company 
Pi.  §§  76  6,  76  c.  and   persons    claiming   right   to   prorate 

^Paine  v.  Foster  (1900),  9  Okla.  213,  53  water,  in  an  action  to  restrain  pro-rating) ; 
Pac.  109:  The  syllabus  by  the  court  reads,  West  Point  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Ditch  Co. 
"Courts  of  equity  '  delight  to  do  justice,  (1900),  21  Utah,  229,  61  Pac.  16  (all  per- 
and  nut  by  halves;'  and  it  is  a  general  sons  obstructing  flow  of  water  in  ditch); 
rule  in  equity  that  all  persons  materially  United  Coal  Co.  v.  Canon  City  Coal  Co. 
interested,  either  legally  or  beneficially,  in  (1897),  24  Colo.  116,  48  Pac.  1045  (a  min- 
the  subject-matter  of  a  suit,  are  required  to  ing  company  and  its  agent  where  one  or 
be  made  parties,  either  plaintiff  or  defend-  the  other  or  both  were  taking  coal  from 
ant,  however  numerous  they  may  be,  so  plaintiff's  mines) ;  Siever  v.  Union  Pac. 
that  there  may  be  a  complete  decree,  whicli  R.  R.  Co.  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W. 
should  bind  them  all."  743  (employer  and  creditor  of  employee  in 
In  Abbott  V.  Caches  (1899),  20  Wash,  suit  by  employee  to  restrain  vexatious 
517,  50  I'ac.  28,  the  court  quoted  as  fol-  attempts  to  garni.shee  exempt  wages)  ; 
lows  fruui  High  on  Injunctions:  "The  State  ex  rel.  v.  Mctschan  (1896),  32  Ore. 
true  test,  however,  in  all  cases  would  .seem  372,  46  Pac.  791  (the  holder  of  a  county 
to  be  to  make  such  parties  defendant  as  warrant  in  a  suit  to  enjoin  its  pay- 
are  necessary  to  a  proper  solution  of  the  ment).] 
<|uestion«  at  issue." 


.   DEFENDANTS    IN   FORECLOSURE    SUITS.  321 

which  is  lial)le  to  be  defeated  or  diminished  by  the  plaintiff's 
success,  he  has  an  immediate  and  direct  interest  in  resisting  the 
phiintiff's  demand,  and  is,  in  general,  a  necessary  defendant. 
The  interest  here  spoken  of  need  not  be  personal  and  beneficial ; 
it  includes  any  estate  or  right  in  the  subject-matter,  legal  or 
equitable,  whether  beneficial  to  the  holder  thereof  or  not.^ 
Numerous  illustrations  of  this  fundamental  doctrine  are  given  in 
the  succeeding  portions  of  this  section. 

§  229.  *  332.  Persons  consequentially  Interested.  If  a  person 
not  thus  immediately  interested  is,  nevertheless,  so  related  to 
the  subject-matter  and  to  the  principal  defendant  that,  upon  the 
plaintiff's  success,  he  will  be  liable  to  be  proceeded  against  by 
such  defendant,  and  to  be  compelled  to  make  compensation,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  for  the  loss,  he  is  consequentially  interested  in 
the  subject  of  the  action,  and  is  also,  in  general,  a  necessary, 
or  at  least  a  proper,  co-defendant.  Equity  requires  this  class  of 
persons  to  be  joined  as  defendants,  not  because  they  will  be 
directly  affected  by  the  decree  when  rendered,  but  because,  if 
the  plaintiff  succeeds  against  the  principal  defendant,  the  latter 
will  then  have  the  right  to  call  upon  them  to  reimburse  him, 
wholly  or  partially,  or  to  do  some  other  act  which  shall,  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  case,  restore  or  tend  to  restore  him  to 
his  former  position  before  the  recovery  against  him.  To  avoid 
a  multiplicity  of  actions,  such  persons  should,  in  general,  be 
brought  into  the  suit  in  the  first  instance,  so  that  their  secondary 
or  consequential  liabilities  may  be  determined  and  adjusted 
together  with  the  main  issues  in  the  one  decree. ^  I  shall  now 
apply  these  very  general  statements  of  doctrine  to  the  classes  of 
cases  which  most  frequently  arise  in  actual  practice. 

§  230.  *  333.  II.  Actions  to  foreclose  Mortgages.  Introductory. 
Statutory  Distribution  of  Parties.  The  first  claSS  or  group  of  equi- 
table actions  which  I  shall  take  up,  both  because  it  is  the  most 

1  1  Dan.  Ch.  PI.  (4th  Am.  ed.)  p.  246.  2  j  paQ.  ch.  PI.  (4th  Am.  ed.)  p.  282. 

On  the  general  doctrine   concerning  de-  See  also  Story  Eq.  PI.  §§  159,  162,  169, 

fendauts    in    equity,   and    necessary   and  169  o,  172,  173,  176 ;  Greenwood  i\  Atkiu- 

proper  parties,  see  Douglas  Cy.  Sup.   v.  sou,  5   Sim.  419;    Wilkinson   v.  Fowkes, 

Walbridge,  .38  Wis.   179,  citing  Williams  9  Hare,  19.3;  Knight  i'.  Knight,  .3  P.  Wms. 

V.  Bankhead,   19  Wall.  563  ;  Janes  v.  Wil-  333 ;  Crosljy's  Heir.s  I'.Wickliffe,  7  li.  Mou. 

liams,  31  Ark.  175;  Hamill  r.  Thomp.sou,  120;   Wiser  v.  Bhichly,  1  Johns.  Ch.  437; 

3  Col.  518,  523  ;  State  v.  Jacksonville,  P.  New  Eng.  Com'l  Bk.   v.  Newport  Steam 

&  M.  R.  Co.,  15  Fla.  201 ;  Satterthwaite  Factory,  6  11.  I.  154. 
V.  Beaufort  Cy.  Com'rs,  76  N.  C.  153. 

21 


322  CIVIL   REMEDJES. 

familiar  and  because  it  illustrates  very  clearly  the  general  doc- 
trine, is  that  of  suits  to  foreclose  mortgages.  The  statute  dis- 
tributes the  persons  who  may  be  proper  or  necessary  parties 
defendant  into  two  divisions,  those  "who  have  or  claim  an 
interest  in  the  controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,"  and  those 
"  who  are  necessary  parties  to  a  complete  determination  or  settle- 
ment of  the  questions  involved  therein."  It  is  plain  that  the 
latter  division  is  the  more  comprehensive,  and  in  fact  includes 
the  former.  Every  person  "  who  has  or  claims  an  interest  in  the 
controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff"  is  evidently  "a  necessary 
party  to  a  complete  determination  of  the  questions  involved 
therein;"  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  equall}'  evident  that 
there  may  be  persons  "  who  are  necessary  parties  to  a  complete 
determination  of  the  questions  involved,  but  who  do  not  have 
nor  claim  any  interest  in  the  controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff." 
A  single  example  will  illustrate  this  position.  The  codes  of 
several  States  require  the  assignor  of  a  thing  in  action  to  be 
made  a  co-defendant  "to  answer  to  the  assignment"  in  a  suit 
brought  by  the  assignee.  Of  the  two  defendants,  when  this  is 
done,  the  debtor  alone  has  an  interest  in  the  controversy  adverse 
to  the  plaintiff.  The  assignor  has  no  such  interest;  he  is  not 
liable  for  the  debt;  his  interest  in  the  result  is  rather  in  accord 
with  than  in  opposition  to  the  plaintiff.  He  is,  however,  a 
necessary  party  to  a  complete  determination  and  settlement  of 
the  questions  involved  in  the  suit.  One  of  these  questions  is, 
whether  the  cause  of  action  was  in  fact  assigned  to  the  plaintiff ; 
and  it  is  important  to  the  rights  of  the  debtor  that  this  question 
be  for  ever  settled  in  the  single  action.  In  the  absence  of  any 
positive  requirement  of  the  statute,  the  assignor  would  not  be  a 
necessary  defendant,  because  a  judgment  could  be  rendered 
against  the  debtor  without  the  presence  of  the  assignor.  This 
example  well  illustrates  my  statement  above,  that  one  may  be  a 
party  necessary  to  the  settlement  of  all  the  questions  involved  in 
tlie  suit,  and  at  the  same  time  neither  have  nor  claim  any  interest 
adverse  to  the  plaintiff.  This  evident  distinction  will  aid  us 
in  discriminating  between  the  necessary  and  the  proper  parties 
defendant  in  any  given  equital)le  action,  for,  as  a  general  propo- 
sition, all  those  persons  who  have  or  claim  an  interest  in  the 
controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff  are  '"''necessary'''  defendants, 
if   by  "interest  adverse"  is  intended    an  interest   opposeij   to    a 


DEFENDANTS   IX    FORECLOSURE   SUITS.  323 

recovery  of  judgment  hy  the,  ijlaintiff ;  while  those  who,  in  con- 
tradistinction to  the  former,  are  merely  "necessary  parties  to  a 
complete  determination  of  the  questions  involved,"  are,  in  the 
main,  "jsro^gr"  defendants. 

§  231.  *  834.  Object  of  the  Judgment  in  Foreclosure.  Necessary 
and  Proper  Parties  herein.  These  principles  Jiiay  now  be  applied 
to  the  class  of  actions  under  immediate  discussion,  —  those 
brought  to  foreclose  mortgages.  Those  persons  who  own  or 
have  an  estate  in  the  land  to  be  sold  under  the  decree,  and  those 
who,  in  the  original  creation  of  the  debt,  or  by  any  subsequent 
assumption  of  it,  are  debtors  to  the  mortgagee,  and  therefore 
liable  to  a  personal  judgment  for  a  deficiency,  have  an  interest  in 
the  controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  and  are  beyond  doubt 
necessary  parties,  if  the  plaintiff  desires  to  obtain  all  the  relief 
which  the  law  affords  him,  namely,  of  sale  and  personal  judgment 
for  deficienc}^  If,  however,  the  plaintiff  will  be  satisfied  with 
a  partial  relief,  and  simply  asks  a  decree  for  a  sale  without  any 
personal  judgment  for  a  deficiency,  the  debtor,  unless  he  is  also 
owner  of  the  land  in  whole  or  in  part,  is  not  a  necessary  defend- 
ant. The  decree  and  sale  must  of  course  divest  all  ownership 
and  titles  to  the  land  or  any  part  thereof,  or  else  there  would  be 
no  sale  but  simply  the  show  of  one.  But  in  order  that  the  land 
may  produce  its  full  value,  the  decree  and  sale  must  go  further 
than  this,  and  must  cut  off  all  subsequent  liens  and  incumbrances, 
and  inchoate  interests  which  are  not  titles  but  merely  the  seeds 
of  titles.  There  is  thus  a  threefold  object  of  the  judgment:  (1} 
To  divest  the  title  of  the  present  owner,  and  transfer  the  owner- 
ship to  the  purchaser.  This  is  essential,  and  all  persons  who 
have  any  such  title  are  necessary  parties,  for  without  them  the 
whole  action  would  be  a  nullity.^  (2)  To  cut  off  all  liens  and 
inchoate  interests,  so  that  the  land  can  be  sold  at  a  greater  ad- 
vantage. This  is  of  course  not  absolutely  essential,  for  a  sale  can 
be  effected  without  it.  The  holders  of  such  liens  and  inchoate 
interests  are  proper  parties.  (3)  To  obtain  a  decree  for  any  defi- 
ciency which  may  arise  after  the  sale,  against  those  jjersons  who 
are  liable  for  the  mortgage  debt.  All  such  debtors  are  necessary 
parties  if  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  obtain  this  particular  relief;  biit 

1  [3"  Any  one  who  has  the  right  to  pay  v.  Hotel  Ass'n  of  Omaha  (1901),  63  Neb. 

the  debt  and  redeem  is  a  necessary  party  181,  88  N.  W.  17.5,  citing  Denney  i-.  Cole, 

to  the  foreclosure  proceedings,  and  a  dc-  22  Wash.  .372,  61  Pac.  SS.] 
cree  in  his  absence  is  nugatory  :  "  Brown 


324  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

he  may  waive  this  relief  and  content  himself  with  the  sale  and 
the  proceeds  thereof,  in  which  case  these  mere  debtors  would  not 
be  necessary  defendants.  The  foregoing  principles  have  been 
adopted  by  all  the  courts.  The  doctrine  is  universally  estab- 
lished that  in  the  equitable  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  by  a 
sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  all  persons  who  own  the  land 
or  anv  part  thereof,  all  who  have  any  interest  therein  vested  or 
contingent,  perfected  or  inchoate,  subsequent  to  the  giving  of 
the  mortgage,  all  who  are  owners  or  holders  of  an}^  subsequent 
liens  or  incumbrances  thereon,  and  finally  all  who  are  personally 
liable  for  the  debt  secured  by  the  mortgage,  may  generally  be 
united  as  defendants;  and  must  be  made  defendants  if  the 
plaintiff  seeks  to  obtain  a  decree  affording  him  all  the  relief 
which  the  court  can  grant.  As  titles,  interests,  and  liens  prior 
and  paramount  to  the  mortgage  are  in  no  way  affected  by  it 
or  by  the  decree  of  foreclosure  and  the  sale  thereunder,  the 
owners  and  holders  thereof  are  neither  necessary  nor  proper 
parties.^ 

§  232.  *  335.  Variations  in  Practical  Rules  Due  to  Differences  in 
Local  Law  as  to  Nature  of  Interests  in  Land.  While  this  general 
statement  of  the  doctrine  is  universally  accepted,  there  are  some 
points  of  difference  in  its  practical  application.  These  differences 
will  be  found,  upon  careful  examination,  to  arise,  not  from  any 
doubt  as  to  tl>e  general  principle  itself,  but  from  a  certain  want 
of  uniformity  in  the  local  law  of  the  various  States  in  respect  to 
the  nature  of  liens  and  incumbrances  upon  the  land,  and  in 
respect  to  the  nature  of  inchoate  or  contingent  interests  in  the 
land.  Thus,  if  in  one  State  a  judgment,  when  docketed,  be- 
comes a  lien  upon  the  lands  of  the  debtor,  and  in  another  such  a 
judgment  is  not  a  lien,  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  owner  of  the 
mortgaged  premises  would  plainly  be  a  proper  part}'-  defendant 
in  the  tirst-named  State,  and  as  plainly  not  a  proper  party  in  the 
second.  The  most  important  difference  in  the  local  law  defining 
and  regulating  the  nature  of  interests  in  the  land,  relates  to  the 
inchoate  dower  of  the  wives  of  mortgfaofors  and  of  other  subse- 
(juent  owners,  and  especially  where  the  mortgage  is  given  for 
purchase-money  so  as  to  take  precedence  of  the  dower  right  of 
the  mortgagor's  wife.  In  some  States  where  dower  is  carefully 
protected,  the  wives  of  the  mortgagors  and  of  other  subsequent 

1  QBut  see  note  to  §  *.342/] 


DEFENDANTS    IN    FORECLOSURE    SUITS.  325 

owners  of  the  land  are  in  all  cases  regarded  as  liaving  a  positive 
interest  in  the  equity  of  redemption,  even  though  they  joined  in 
the  execution  of  the  mortgage,  or  even  though  the  lien  of  the 
mortgage  be  prior  to  their  dower  right;  and  they  are  therefore, 
under  all  possible  circumstances,  necessary  defendants  if  the 
plaintiff  wishes  to  cut  off  their  rights  of  redemption.  In  other 
States,  the  wives,  under  some  circumstances  at  least,  are  not 
regarded  as  having  any  real  interest  in  the  land,  nor  any  right  of 
redemption,  and  they  need  not  therefore  be  made  defendants  for 
any  purpose.  This  example  is  a  sufficient  illustration,  and  shows 
that  any  difference  in  the  practical  rules  laid  down  by  various 
courts  arises  from  a  variation  in  the  law  defining  the  nature  of 
interests  in  the  land ;  what  constitutes  an  interest  in  one  State 
may  not  do  so  in  another. 

^  233.  *  336.  Mortgagor  and  his  Grantee  as  Parties.  I  paSS 
from  this  broad  statement  of  the  general  principle  to  a  more 
careful  discussion  of  the  rules,  with  an  analysis  of  some  leading 
cases.  The  doctrine  which  I  have  thus  stated  is  approved  and 
applied  under  various  circumstances,  and  to  different  classes  of 
persons  having  different  interests  and  liens  in  the  cases  cited  in 
the    foot-note.  1       When    the    mortgagor   remains    owner   of   the 

1  [[The  author's  original  note  has  heen  wife  join  in  mortgage  on  wife's  property  : 
classitied  and  condensed  as  follows  :  Owner  Wolf  r.  Banning,  3  Minn.  133.  Trustee 
of  laud:  Lenox  v.  Heed,  12  Kan.  223;  and  beneficiary ;  Mavrich  y.  Grier,  3  Nev. 
Green  i\  Dixon,  9  Wis.  532  (containing  a  52.  Wife  of  grantee  of  mortgaged  prera- 
full  discussion  of  subject  of  parties) ;  Sum-  ises  :  Watt  v.  Alvord,  25  Ind.  533 ;  Kay  v. 
uer  y.  Coleman,  20  Ind.  486  (holding  that  Wliittaker,  44  N.  Y.  565.  Third  party 
owner  of  land  subject  to  mortgage  is  interested  in  mortgage  debt :  Johnson  v. 
proper  but  not  necessary  party)  ;  Semple  Britton,  23  Ind.  105.  Assignor  of  instru- 
r.  Lee,  13  la.  304  (same  doctrine) ;  Daven-  meut  secured  by  mortgage:  Holdridge  u. 
port  y.  Turpin,  43  Cal.  597.  Grantee  of  Sweet,  23  Ind.  118;  Gower  v.  Howe,  20 
jiart  of  mortgaged  premises:  Douglass  y.  Ind.  396.  These  cases  fell  within  a  special 
Bishop,  27  la.  214.  Judgment  creditor  of  provision  of  the  Indiana  code.  Rankin  v. 
mortgagor :  Union  Bank  of  Masillon  v.  Major,  9  la.  297  ;  Sands  v.  Wood,  1  la. 
Bell,  14  O.  St.  200;  Gaines  v.  Walker,  16  263.  Prior  mortgagee:  Standish  v.  Dow, 
Ind.  361;  Morris  v.  Wheeler,  45  N.  Y.  21  la.  363.  Occupant  of  mortgaged  prem- 
708  :  "This  is  certainly  a  most  extraordi-  ises:  Suiter  v.  Turner,  10  la.  517.  Heirs 
nary  decision;  it  is  in  direct  conflict  with  of  deceased  mortgagor  :  Muir  v.  Gibson,  8 
other  decisions  made  by  the  same  court,  Ind.  187;  Leggett  c  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co., 
and  is  an  utter  confounding  of  all  distinc-  64  Barb.  23.  Person  claiming  title  ad- 
tious  between  necessary  and  proper  par-  verse  to  mortgagor :  Brundage  v.  Domes- 
ties.  The  decision  is  so  clearly  erroneous  tic,  etc.  Soc,  60  Barb.  204.  Wife,  where 
that  it  can  only  be  regarded  as  an  ina'd-  husband  and  wife  join  in  mortgage  (not 
vertence."  Verdin  v.  Slocum,  71  N.  Y.  necessary)  :  Thornton  v.  Pigg,  24  Mo. 
345.  Obligor  on  mortgage  debt  other  249  ;  Powell  v.  Ross,  4  Cal.  197  (neces- 
than  mortgagor:  Nichols  v.  Randall,  5  sary) :  Chombersw.  Nicholson,  30  Ind.  349; 
Minn.  240,     Husband,  where  husband  and  McArthur  v.  Franklin,  15  0.  St.  485,  s.  c. 


326 


CIVIL    IlEMKDIKS. 


premises,  he  is  of  course,  on  every  account,  a  necessary  defend- 
ant. ^  If,  liovt'ever,  he  has  conveyed  away  the  entire  hind  hy  an 
absolute  deed  of  conveyance,  the  grantee,  who  is  the  owner  at 
the  time  of  commencing  tlie  suit,  is  a  necessary  party  defendant, 
even  though  his  deed  has  not  been  put  upon  record,  because 
without  his  presence  the  decree  for  a  sale,  which  is  the  essential 
primary  remedy  granted  by  the  action,  cannot  be  made.^  In  a 
few  cases,  however,  such  parties  have  been  spoken  of  as  projyer 


16  id.  19.3.  Wife,  where  she  did  not  join 
with  her  liushand  in  mortgage  :  Fletcher 
V.  Holmes,  32  Ind.  497  ;  Moouey  v.  Maas, 
22  la.  380;  Merchants'  Bank  v.  Thomp- 
son, .55  N.  Y.  7.  Personal  representative 
of  deceased  mortgaj^or :  Miles  r.  Smith, 
22  Mo.  .502 ;  Darlington  v.  Effey,  13  la. 
177;  Belloc  r.  Rogers,  9  Cal.  123  ;  Schadt 
V.  Hep])e,  45  Cal.  433 ;  Huston  v.  String- 
ham,  21  la.  36.  Mortgagor  after  convey- 
ance of  equity  of  redemption  :  Burkham 
V.  Beaver,  17  Ind.  367  ;  Johnson  r.  Monell, 

13  la.  300;  Mnrray  v.  Catlett,  4  Greene 
(la.)  108;  Stevens  v.  Campbell,  21  Ind. 
471  ;  Daly  v.  Burchell,  13  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 
264;  Williams  v.  Meeker,  29  la.  292. 
Junior  mortgagee:  Procter  v.  Baker,  15 
Ind.  178;  Newcomb  v.  Dewey,  27  la.  381  ; 
Ansoi}  V.  Anson,  20  la.  55  ;  Knowles  v. 
Rabliu,  20  la.  101  ;  Chase  v.  Abbott,  20 
la.  1.54 ;  Street  v.  Beal,  16  la.  C83  ;  Hein- 
street  v.  Winnie,  10  la.  430;  Crow  v. 
Vance,  4  la.  434  ;  Veach  i'.  Schaup,  3  la. 
194;  Hayward  r.  Stearns,  39  Cal.  58. 
As.signee  of  mortgage  as  collateral  secu- 
rity :  Sinison  v.  Satterlee,  64  N.  Y.  657. 
Joint  obli'zors  with  mortgagor :  Fond  du 
Lac  Harrow  Co.  v.  Haskins,  51  Wis.  135. 
Citing  also,   Hall  v.  Nelson,  23  Barb.  88, 

14  How.  Pr.  32;  Peto  i;.  Hammond,  29 
Beav.  91  ;  Maule  v.  Duko  of  Beaufort,  1 
Russ.  349;  Drury  v.  Clark,  16  How.  Pr. 
424  ;  Denton  v.  Nanny,  8  Barb.  624 ;  Mills 
V.  Van  Voorhie.s,  20  N.  Y.  415  ;  Delaplaine 
V.  Lewis,  19  Wis.  476;  Bigelow  i-.  Bush, 
6  Paige,  343  ;  Shaw  v.  Iloadley,  8  Blackf. 
165;  Van  Nest  v.  Latson,  19  Barb.  604; 
Cord  V.  Hirsch,  17  Wis.  403;  Riddick  u. 
Walsh,  15  Mo.  538;  Martin  /;.  Noble,  29 
Ind.  216;  French  v.  Turner,  15  Ind.  59 ; 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Casad,  15  la.  524;  Parrott  v. 
Hughw,  10  la.  459;  Bates  v.  Ruddick,  2 
la  42'):   Harworxi   r    .Marye,  8  Cal.  580; 


Carpenter  v.  Williamson,  25  Cal.  161 ; 
Patou  V.  Murray,  6  Paige,  474 ;  Church  v. 
Smith,  39  Wis.  492 ;  De  Forest  v.  Holum, 
38  Wis.  516.] 

1  Q  Where  mortgaged  premises  are  sub- 
sequently subjected  to  an  easement  ijy  the 
public,  and  damages  therefor  are  awarded 
to  the  owners  of  such  premises,  the  owner.s 
are  pro])er  if  not  necessary  parties  to  an 
action  by  the  mortgagees  to  have  the  liens 
of  their  mortgages  adjudged  to  be  liens 
upon  the  money  awarded  as  damages : 
Lumbermen's  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cit_v  of  St.  Paul 
(1899),  77  Minn.  410,  80  N.  W.  357. 

Carey-Lombard  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bier- 
bauer  (1899),  76  Minn.  434,  79  N.  W.  541  : 
Where  a  person  has  an  equitable  interest 
in  a  building  subject  to  lien,  such  in- 
terest may  be  proceeded  against  and  the 
lien  enforced  without  joining  the  legal 
owner  of  the  land  on  whicii  tlie  building 
stands.] 

'^  Hall  V.  Nelson,  23  Barb.  88  ;  14  How. 
Pr.  32 ;  Cord  v.  Hirsch,  17  Wis.  403  ;  John- 
ston V.  Donvan,  106  N.  Y.  269.  See,  how- 
ever, Shippcn  r.  Kimball,  47  Kan.  173,  to 
the  effect  that  a  grantee  wliose  deed  has 
not  been  put  on  record  is  not  a  necessary 
party  to  tiie  foreclosure,  so  as  to  render 
tlie  proceedings  ineffectual  to  convey  a 
title. 

QGoodwin  r.  Tyrrell  (1903),  Ariz.,  71 
Pac.  906  ;  Armstrong  v.  Hufty  (1901),  156 
Ind.  606,  55  N.  E.  443  ;  Hopkins  r.  Warner 
(1895),  109  Cal.  133,  41  Pac.  868;  Osborn 
V.  Logus  (1895),  28  Ore.  306,  42  Pac.  997  ; 
Brown  v.  Hotel  Ass'n  of  Omaha  (1901), 
63  Neb.  181,  88  N.  W.  175. 

But  it  is  not  necessary  to  join  the  trus- 
tees in  a  deed  of  trust,  in  a  suit  to  fore- 
close the  same  :  Sidney  Steven.s  Implement 
Co.  V.  Improvement  Co.  (1899),  20  Utah, 
267,  58  Pac.  843.] 


DEFENDANTS    IN    FORECLOSURE    SUITS.  327 

defendants  merely.^  This  latter  view  is,  in  my  opinion,  clearly 
incorrect,  since  it  leads  to  the  inevitable  conclusion  that  there 
may  be  an  action  without  any  necessary  defendant.  If,  how- 
ever, the  mortgagor  has  conveyed  away  only  a  portion  of  the 
premises  and  remains  owner  of  the  residue,  the  grantee  of  the 
part  so  conveyed  is  not  a  necessary  defendant.  The  suit  against 
the  mortgagor  alone  is  not  a  nullity;  there  is  a  title  in  him  for 
the  decree  of  sale  to  act  upon;  but  the  rights  of  the  grantee 
would  be  unaffected.^  It  follows  as  an  evident  corollary  from 
the  proposition  just  stated,  that  the  mortgagor  who  has  conveyed 
away  the  whole  of  the  mortgaged  premises  is  no  longer  a  neces- 
sary party  defendant  in  a  foreclosure  action,  that  is,  he  is  not 
indispensable  to  the  rendition  of  a  simple  judgment  of  sale,  if  no 
decree  for  a  deficiency  is  asked.  ^  He  is,  however,  an  eminently 
proper  party;  and  if  the  plaintiff  wishes  a  personal  judgment  for 
any  deficiency  which  may  arise  upon  the  sale,  he,  or  his  personal 
representative  if  he  is  dead,  is  a  necessary  party,  and  may  defend 
the  action,  and  defeat  the  same  by  any  competent  defence  which 
he  may  establish.*  The  decisions  do  not  make  any  distinction 
between  the  case  in  which  the  mortgagor  has  simply  conveyed 
the  land  incumbered  by  the  mortgage,  and  that  in  which  the 
grantee  has  assumed  to  pay  the  mortgage  debt,  and  in  fact  there 
is  and  can  be  no  such  distinction.  Whatever  arrangement  the 
mortgagor  may  make  with  his  grantee,  he  cannot  by  his  own  act 
free  himself  from  his  liability  to  the  holder  of  the  mortgage ;  he 

1  Sumner    v.    Coleman,    20   Ind.    486;  471;    Biirkliam   v.    Beaver,    17    Ind.  367; 

Semple  v.  Lee,  13  Iowa,  304.     In  the  last  Huston  v.  Stringham,  21  Iowa,  36  ;  Johu- 

■case,  the   mortgagor   and  the   owner    to  son  v.  Monell,   13   Iowa,  300;  Semple  v. 

whom  the  land  had  been  conveyed  were  Lee,   13    Iowa,  304 ;    Murray   v.    Catlett, 

both  joined,  and  the  court  said  the  owner  4   Greene    (la.),    108  ;    Belloc  v.   Rogers, 

was  a  ;»-o/>«' party,  and  the  mortgagor  was  9  Cal.  123;  Williams  v.  Meeker,  29  Iowa, 

not  a  necessa/vy  one.     [^The  same  doctrine  292,  294;  Story,  Eq.  PI.  §  197.     See  also 

was  announced  iu  Talbot  v.  Roe   (1903),  Ayres  v.  Wiswall,  112  U.  S.  187;  Daugh- 

171  Mo.  421,  71  S.  W.  682,  the  court  say-  erty  v.  Deardorf,  107  Ind.  527;  Bennett 

ing  that  the  only  result  of  not  joining  the  v.  Mattingly   (Ind.   1887),   10  N.  E.  299; 

grantee  was  to  leave  her  right  to  redeem  Keister  v.  Myers,  115  Ind.  312;  West  v. 

still  open.]  Miller,  125  Ind.  70  ;  Jolinson  v.  Foster,  68 

-  Douglass  V.    Bishop,    27   Iowa,   214,  Iowa,    140;     Watts    v.    Creighton  (Iowa, 

216.     There  is  certainly  a  plain  distinc-  1892),  52  N.  W.  12;  Miner  v.  Smith,  53 

tion  between  this  case  and  the  one  where  Vt.  551  ;  Tutwiler  v.  Dunlap,  71  Ala.  126; 

the  entire  premises  are  conveyed  by  tlie  Butler  v.  Williams,  27  S.  C.  221  ;  QHop- 

mortgagor.    Watts  )a  Julian,  122  Ind.  124.  kins  v.  Warner  (1895),  109  Cal.  133,  41 

3  Drury  v.   Clark,  16    How.  Pr.  424;  Pac.    868;    Weir   v.   Rathbun   (1895),    12 

Delaplaine   v.   Lewis,    19   Wis    476,   and  Wash.  84,  40  Pac.  625] 

cases  cited  ;  Stevens  v.  Camnbell,  21  Ind.  *  See  cases  cited  in  last  note. 


328  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

Avill  therefore  remain  liable,  either  as  principal  debtor  or  as  surety 
for  the  grantee  who  has  assumed  the  payment,  and  will  continue 
subject  to  a  judgment  for  a  deficiency.^ 

vj  234.  *  337.  Successive  Grantees  of  Mortgaged  Premises  as 
Parties.  Administrator  and  Heirs  of  Mortgagor.  The  same  prin- 
ciple is  of  universal  application,  and  embraces  all  successive 
grantees  of  the  premises  who  have  made  themselves  personally 
liable  for  the  mortgage  debt.  Thus,  if  the  mortgagor  conveys 
the  premises  to  A.,  who  takes  them  simply  burdened  by  the  lien, 
but  does  not  assume  and  agree  to  pay  the  debt,  and  A.  after- 
wards conveys  in  the  same  manner  to  B.,  who  again  conveys  to 
C.  who  is  the  owner  when  the  foreclosure  is  commenced,  A.  and 
B.  are  plainly  neither  necessary  nor  proper  parties;  they  have 
retained  no  interest  in  the  land,  and  were  never  personally  re- 
sponsible for  the  debt.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  in  this  series  of 
conveyances.  A.,  B.,  and  C.  had  each  in  turn  assumed  and 
agreed  to  pay  the  mortgage  debt,  C.  would  be  the  necessary  de- 
fendant in  any  action  to  foreclose,  because  he  is  the  owner  of  the 
land.  The  mortgagor.  A.,  and  B.  would  be  proper  defendants, 
because  tiiey  are  personally  liable  for  the  debt.  The  mortgagor's 
liability  was  created  by  the  original  instrument,  bond,  note,  or 
otherwise,  and  he  did  not  become  freed,  therefrom  because  others 
also  assumed  it.  A.'s  and  B.'s  liability  was  created  by  their 
voluntary  assumption,  and  having  been  once  incurred,  it  could 
not  be  thrown  off  without  the  consent  of  the  creditor.  If  the 
plaintiff  therefore  demands  a  judgment  for  deficiency,  and  desires 
to  make  his  security  as  complete  as  possible,  he  may  join  the 
mortgagor  and  A.  and  B.  as  co-defendants  in  the  suit  to  fore- 
close.^    If   the  mortgagor  has  conveyed  his  entire  interest  and 


'  See  same  cases  last  citeil.     QIii  Plan-  in  several   cases,  after  the  repeal  of  the 

kinton  v.  Hildebraiid  (1895),  89  Wis.  20'>,  statute,  that  the  legal  cause  of  action  on 

CI    N.  \V.  8.')9,  the  court  said  :  "  In    the  the  note  or  bond  could  not  properly  be 

aiisence  of   some  statute  extendinj^  tlicir  joined   with   the   equitable   one    to    fore- 

p  jwer,    courts   of   equity,   in    foreclosure  close   the   mortgage,   unless    both  causes 

cases,  have  invariably  left  the  complainant  of  action  affected  all  the   p.arties  to  the 

to  his  remerly  at  law  for  tlie  jiart  of  the  action"] 

mortirage  ilebt  not  satisfied  by  the  fore-  -  See  same  causes  last  cited.     See  also 

closure  and  .s;ile.     Statutory  provisions  of  Logan   v.  Smith,  70  Ind    597  ;  Scarry  v. 

the  character  referred  to  were  adopted  in  Eldridge,  63  id.  44.      QJohns   c.  Wilson 

Wisconsin  during  its  territorial  existence,  (IS'JS),    Ariz.   53    Pac.    583;    Hopkins  v. 

and  continued  in  force  until,  by  the  ado))-  Warner  (1895),  109  Cal.  133,  41  Pac.  868. 

tion  of  tlie  code,  they  were  repealed.    The  One  who  becomes  liable  by  endorsement 

result  wxs  tiiat  it  was  held  by  this  court,  on  note  of  mortg.\gor  may  also  be  joined 


DEFENDANTS    IN    FOKECLOSUKE   SUITS. 


::2a 


afterwards  dies,  1  is  administrator  or  executor  must  be  joined  as 
a  defendant  if  a  judgment  for  deficiency  is  prayed,  and  may  be 
admitted  to  contest  the  validity  of  the  mortgage  and  of  the  debt 
it  is  given  to  secure.^  It  is  even  said  by  some  courts  that  the 
personal  representative  of  the  deceased  mortgagor  is  a  necessary 
party  defendant  with  the  heirs  and  widow. ^  When  the  mort- 
gagor dies  intestate  owning  the  land,  or  when  any  subsequent 
owner  thus  dies,  his  heirs  are  indispensable  parties ;  and  if  the 
objection  to  their  nonjoinder  has  not  been  taken,  the  court  will 
of  its  own  motion  order  them  to  be  brought  in  as  defendants. 
No  effectual  decree  of  sale  can  be  made  without  them.^ 


in  foreclosure  suit :  Meehan  r.  Bank 
(1895),  44  Neb.  213,  62  N.  W.  490.  A.s 
to  the  grantee  being  subject  to  an  action 
at  law  while  a  separate  suit  in  etjuity  is 
ijrosecuted  to  foreclose  the  mortgage,  see 
(iarneau  v.  Kendall  (1901),  61  Neb.  396, 
8o  N.  W.  291  ;  Meehan  v.  Bank  (1895), 
44  Neb.  213,  62  N.  W.  490.] 

1  Huston  V.  Stringham,  21  Iowa,  36  ; 
Darlington  v.  Effey,  13  Iowa,  177. 

^  [ivelsey  v.  Welch  (189C),  8  S.  D.  255, 
66  N.  W.  390;  Simon  v.  Sabb  (1899),  56 
S.  C.  38,  33  S.  E.  799,  where  it  is  held  that 
under  the  act  of  1894,  making  it  necessary 
to  recover  judgment  for  a  specific  sum 
against  tlie  mortgagor's  estate  before  the 
mortgaged  property  can  be  sold,  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  a  deceased  mort- 
gagor is  a  necessary  party.]]  Miles  r. 
Smitli,  22  Mo.  502.  If  the  plaintiff  seeks 
a  ])ersoiial  judgment  for  a  deficiency,  the 
personal  representative  of  a  deceased  mort- 
gagor is  of  course  a  necessary  defendant ; 
but  if  tiie  plaintiff  demands  no  such  judg- 
ment, and  is  contented  with  the  security 
of  the  land  alone,  it  seems,  the  personal 
representative  is  not  a  necessary  party. 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  196,  200;  Buncombe 
V.  Haiisley,  3  P.  Wms.  3.33  in.)  ;  Fell  v. 
Brown,  2  Bro.  C.  C.  276;  Bradshaw  i'- 
Outram,  13  Ves.  234.  See  also  Stanley 
V.  Mather,  31  Fed.  Rep.  860  ;  Van  Schaack 
V.  Saunders,  32  Hun,  515  ;  Munn  v.  Mar.'^h, 
38  N.  J.  Eq.  410;  Eraser  r.  Bean,  96  N.  C. 
327  ;  Levering  v.  King,  97  Ind.  130;  Hodg- 
don  V.  Heidman,  66  Iowa,  645  ;  Hill  v. 
Townley,  45  Minn.  167  ;  Renshaw  v.  Tay- 
lor, 7  Ore.  315.  But  even  if  the  c(mi- 
plaint  prays  for  judgment  for  a  deficiency, 
the  personal  representatives  are  not  neces- 


sary iu  the  sense  that  their  omission  will 
render  tlie  complaint  demurrable  ;  for  the 
prayer  is  not  part  of  the  complaint :  so 
held  in  Butler  v.  Williams,  27  S.  C.  221. 
[]A  devisee  and  those  claiming  under  him 
are  necessary  parties,  as  well  as  the  heirs  : 
Chadbourn  i\  Johnston  (1896),  119  N.  C. 
282,  25  S.  E.  705.J 

3  Muir  1-.  Gibson,  8  Ind.  187  ;  Story's 
Eq.  PI.  §  196.  In  North  Carolina,  when 
the  mortgagee  dies,  his  heirs  are,  in  gen- 
eral, necessary  parties  plaintiff  or  defend- 
ant ;  but  there  are  exceptions,  as  where 
the  mortiragee  had  assigned,  and  died  in- 
solvent, leaving  non-resident  heirs.  Ethe- 
ridge  v.  Veruoy,  71  N.  C.  184,  186,  187. 
See  also  Retishaw  v.  Taylor,  7  Ore.  315 
(heirs  necessary  with  the  administrator) ; 
Zoger  V.  Ruster,  51  Wis.  32  (heirs  neces- 
sary) ;  Hill  V.  Townley,  45  Minn.  167 
(same)  ;  Pillow  v.  Sentelle,  39  Ark.  61 
(same)  ;  De  Forest  v.  Holum,  38  AVis.  516 
(devisee  of  deceased  vendee  in  foreclosure 
of  tlie  vendor's  lien)  ;  llibernia  Sav.  & 
Loan  Soc.  v.  Herbert,  53  Cal.  375  (mort- 
gagor conveyed  to  a  grantee  and  died,  i:o 
judgment  for  a  deficiency  being  asked, 
his  administrator  is  not  a  necessary  de- 
fendant). In  Harsh  v.  Griffin,  72  Iowa, 
608,  it  was  held  that  tlie  failure  to  join 
the  heirs  does  not  render  the  foreclosure 
sale  wholly  void  ;  their  only  right  is  to 
redeem.  Under  the  statutes  of  Missouri 
and  of  California  the  personal  represent- 
ative is  the  only  necessary  defendant ; 
Tierney  v.  Spiva,  97  Mo.  98 ;  Hall  v.  Klep- 
zig,  99"Mo.  83;  Bayly  v.  Muehe,  65  Cal. 
345.  [^It  is  not  necessary  to  join  the  heirs 
of  a  deceased  mortgagor  :  Dickey  v.  Gib- 
sou    (1898),    121    Cal.'   276,    .53    I'ac.   704. 


330  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  235.  *  338.  Personal  Representative  of  Owner  of  Mortgaged 
Premises  Necessary  Party  in  California.  Judgment  Creditors  of  Mort- 
gagor. Assignor  of  Secured  Debt.  Ill  California,  the  personal  repre- 
sentative of  a  deceased  person  sncceeds  at  once  to  all  lands  as 
well  as  personal  property ;  the  title  vests  in  him  for  purposes  of 
administration ;  and  if  an  owner  of  mortgaged  land  dies,  his  ex- 
ecutor or  administrator  is  therefore  an  indispensable  party  defend- 
ant.^ A  mortgagor  having  conveyed  the  land  to  assignees  in 
trust  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  judgment  creditors  whose  judg- 
ments were  recovered  subsequent  to  such  assignment,  and  which 
were  therefore  not  direct  liens  on  tlie  land,  were  held  to  be  proper 
parties  defendant  in  an  action  brought  to  foreclose  the  mortgage 
against  the  mortgagor  and  the  trustees.  These  trustees  having 
suffered  a  default,  the  judgment  creditors  were  permitted  to  in- 
tervene and  to  contest  the  validity  of  the  mortgage  and  of  the 
debt  which  it  secured  by  setting  up  usury .2  The  general  proposi- 
tion was  announced  by  the  court,  that  the  cestuis  que  trustent  are 
proper  defendants  as  well  as  the  trustees.  When  a  mortgage  was 
given  to  secure  a  note  payable  to  the  order  of  the  mortgagee,  and 
the  latter  indorsed  and  transferred  the  note  and  assigned  the 
mortgage,  the  assignee  cannot  maintain  an  action  against  the 
mo)'tgagor  and  maker  of  the  note,  and  the  indorser  of  the  note 
(the  mortgagee),  to  foreclose  the  mortgage  and  to  ol)tain  judg- 
ment asrainst  both  for  either  the  whole  amount  of  the  note  or  for 
the  deficiency.  A  legal  action  may  be  brought  against  both  on 
the  note,  but  a  foreclosure  must  be  against  the  mortgagor  alone.^ 
This  last  rule  is  exactly  otherwise  in  Minnesota  by  virtue  of  an 
express  statute.  If  the  mortgage  debt  is  secured  by  the  obliga- 
tion of  any  person  other  than  the  mortgagor,  he  may  be  joined  as 
a  defendant  in  the  foreclosure  suit,  and  a  judgment  for  deficiency 
may  be  rendered  against  him  alone,  or  jointly  with  the  mortgagor, 
as  the  case  may  be.* 

The   heirs  and   devisees    of    a    deceased  ment  will  result  prejudicially  to  the  estate, 

mortn;a<?or  are  necessary  parties  :  Wall  v.  a  necessary  party.] 

McMillan  (189.'j),  44  S.  C.  402,  22  S.  E.  -  Union  Hank  of  Masillon  v.  Bell,  14 

424.]  Ohio  St.  200.     |[But  see   Sidney  Stevens 

'  Harwood  v.  Marve,  8  Cal.  580.     It  is  Implement  Co.  c.  Improvement  Co.  (1899), 

held  that  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  mort-  20  Utaii  267,  58  Pac.  843,  where  it  was 

gagor  ar<?  not  necessary  parties.     Bayly  held  tiiat  the  trustees  of  a  deed  of  trust 

V.  Mueliu,  G5  Cal.  .'545.     [|Sec   Kelsey  c.  were  not  ueces.sary  ])arties  in  an  action  to 

Welch  (1890),  8  S.  I).  255,  66  N.  W.  390,  foreclose  the  same.] 
where  tlie  heirs  were  lield  proper  parties,  ■''  Sand.*  v.  Wood,  1  luwa,  26.1. 

and    the   aiministrator,  wliere   the  judg-  ■*  Nichols  v.  Kandall,  5  Minn.  304,  308. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    FOKECLOSURE    SUITS.  331 

§  236.  *  339.  Special  Statutes  Making  Assignor  of  a  Thing  in 
Action  a  Necessary  Party-  The  special  provisions  ill  the  codcs  of 
some  States  requiring  the  assignor  of  a  thing  in  action  to  be  made 
a  defendant  under  certain  circumstances  in  a  suit  by  the  assignee, 
affects  the  general  doctrine  as  to  parties  in  forech)Sure  actions  in 
those  States.  These  provisions,  it  will  be  remembered,  require 
the  assignor  to  be  made  a  party  "  when  the  thing  in  action  is  not 
assignable  by  indorsement,"  or  when  it  is  not  a  negotiable  instru- 
ment, or  when  the  assignment  is  not  expressly  authorized  by 
statute  so  as  to  transfer  the  legal  title  to  the  assignee.  It  has 
been  held  in  States  where  these  provisions  are  in  force,  that  if  a 
mortgage  is  given  to  secure  a  negotiable  note,  and  this  note  is 
transferred  in  the  usual  manner  by  indorsement,  although  there 
is  no  written  assignment  of  the  mortgage,  the  assignor  need  not 
be  made  a  defendant.  The  transfer  of  the  note  by  indorsement 
carries  v^ath  it  the  title  to  the  mortgage,  and  the  assignee  thus 
becomes  legal  owner  of  both  by  a  form  and  mode  of  transfer 
which  permits  the  action  to  be  brought  mthout  the  assignor  as 
a  party  defendant.^  On  the  otlier  hand,  if  the  mortgage  alone  is 
assigned  by  a  written  transfer,  while  the  evidence  of  the  debt,  for 
example  a  bond,  is  merely  transferred  by  delivery,  the  assignor, 
who  might  be  the  mortgagee,  is  a  necessary  defendant  under  the 
provision  above  referred  to.^  This  decision  would  undoubtedly 
embrace  all  cases  where  the  instrument  which  is  the  principal  evi- 
dence of  debt,  whether  bond  or  negotiable  note,  unless  the  latter 
be  payable  to  bearer,  is  transferred  by  delivery  merely.  If  a  note, 
secured  by  mortgage  is  payable  to  bearer,  so  that  the  legal  title 
will  pass  by  mere  delivery,  it  would  seem  the  assignor  need  not  be 
made  a  defendant.  Such  a  note  being  negotiable,  the  case  falls 
directly  within  the  language  of  the  provision  as  it  is  found  in 
several  codes. 

§  237.  *  840.  "Where  Holder  of  less  than  all  of  a  Series  of  Notes 
Secured  by  same  Mortgage  brings  Foreclosure  Suit.  When  a  mort- 
gage is  given  to  secure  a  series  of  notes  made  by  the  mortgagor, 

'■  Gower  (,".  Howe,  20  lud.  396.     Mort-  closed  by  the  assignee  without  making  the 

gagees   who   have   assigned    their   entire  assignor  a  party,  the  latter  may  redeem 

interest  are  not  necessary  parties.     Pullen  upon  payment  of  his  debt.     Re  Gilbert's 

V.  Heron  Min.  Co.,  71  N.  C.  567  ;  Smythe  Est.,  104  N.  Y.  200.     QSee  Styers  v.  Als- 

V  Brown,  25  S.  C.  89.     It  is  held  in  New  paugh  (1896),  118  N.  C.  631,  24  S.  E.422.] 
York  that  where  the  mortgage  has  been  -  Holdridge   v.    Sweet,    23    Ind.    118; 

assigned  by  the  mortgagee  as  collateral  French  v.  Turner,  15  Ind.  59.     See  Kittle 

security   for   his   own    debt,  and   is   fore-  v.  Van  Dyck,  1  Saudf.  Ch.  76. 


332  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

having  different  periods  of  time  to  run,  as,  for  example,  one,  two 
and  three  years,  the  proceeds  of  the  Land  when  sold  upon  fore- 
closure are  to  be  applied  to  the  payment  of  these  notes  in  the 
order  in  which  they  fall  due ;  that  is,  the  one  which  first  falls  due 
is  to  be  paid  in  full,  and  the  surplus,  if  any,  goes  to  the  payment 
of  the  second,  and  so  on.  If  the  mortgagee  assigns  one  or  more 
of  such  notes,  and  retains  the  others,  or  if  the  notes  are  separately 
assigned  to  different  persons,  the  holders  cannot  unite  as  co- 
plaintiffs  in  an  action  to  foreclose,  because  the  debt  has  been 
severed  and  their  interests  are  separate  and  distinct.  Either 
holder,  however,  may  bring  an  action  to  foreclose,  and  may  make 
the  other  holder  (or  holders)  defendant,  and  such  defendant  can 
set  up  his  rights  in  his  answer.  The  facts  being  thus  presented, 
the  decree  can  adjust  the  various  interests  and  equities  of  the 
different  holders,  and  apportion  the  proceeds  according  to  the 
priorities.     The  foregoing  rules  are  established  in  lowa.^ 

§  238.  *  341.  Occupant  of  Premises  as  Party.  Averments  of  Peti- 
tion as  to  each  Person  Made  Defendant.  An  occupant  of  the  land, 
that  is,  a  person  in  possession  without  alleging  the  title  to  be  in 
Idmself,  is  not  a  necessary  party;  his  rights,  however,  whatever 
they  may  be,  will  not  be  affected  by  the  decree  in  a  suit  to  which 
he  was  not  made  a  defendant.^  The  complaint  or  petition  must 
allege,  in  respect  of  every  person  made  a  defendant,  that  he  has 
or  claims  some  interest  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  or  that  he  is  a 

1  Kankin  v.  Major,  9  Iowa,  297.  It  was  uot  raised.  In  the  recent  case,  how- 
must  he  confessed  this  is  a  sacrifice  of  ever,  of  Guthrie  v.  Treat  (190:i),  —  Neb. 
suhstance  to  form.  If  the  assignee  may  — ,  92  N.  W.  595,  iu  au  ehil)orate  and  well 
have  affirmative  relief  as  a  defendant,  it  rea-soned  opinion  in  which  the  rule  in  Ran- 
is difficult  to  see  any  substantial  reason  kin  v.  Major  (siijira),  aud  the  similar  ca.^e 
why  he  should  not  l)e  permitted  to  join  of  Swenson  i,-.  Plow  Co.,  14  Kau.  387,  is 
as  plaintiff  in  the  first  instance.  For  a  thoroughly  discussed,  the  court  holds  that 
statement  of  the  varying  rules  on  the  sub-  under  the  facts  of  this  case  a  joinder  is 
ject  of  mortgages  to  secure  several  notes,  proper.  The  Iowa  and  Kansas  rule  is 
see  .'{  I'om.  Eq.  Jur.  §§  1200-120.3.  See  explained  on  tjie  iiasis  of  the  different 
also  Johnston  v.  McDuffee,  83  Cal.  30;  methods  of  procedure  in  foreclosure  in 
Studcbaker  Bros.  Man.  Co.  c.  McCargur,  those  States.  But  in  Bacon  v.  O'Keefe 
20  Neb.  500.  (1896),  13  Wash.  6.55,  43  Pac.  886,  that 
\_h  was  held  in  the  following  Ne-  court  held  that  a  joinder  was  not  only 
bra-ska  cases  that  the  holders  of  the  proper  but  necessary,  ami  refused  to  Ssanc- 
different  notes  .secured  by  the  mortgage  tion  the  rnle  in  Burnett  v.  Hoffman 
might  maintain  separate  actions  of  fore-  {.supra). "2 

closure:   Todd  r.  Cremer  (1893),  36  Neb.  -  Suiter  v.  Turner,  10  Iowa,  517.     See 

430,  54  N.  W.  674;    Burnett  v.  Hoffman  liichardson  v.  Iladsall,  106  111.  476.     That 

(1894),  40  Neb.  569,  58  N.  W.  1134;  Sloan  he  is  a  proper  party,  see  Buyter  r.  Keid, 

V.  Thoma«  (1899),  58  Neb.  713,  79  N.  W.  121   N.  Y.  498  (motion  for  rehearing  de- 

728,  but  the  question  of  the  right  to  join  nied,  Oct.  14,  1890,  25  N.  K.  377). 


DEFENDANTS    IN    FORECLOSURE    SUITS.  333 

necessary  party  to  a  complete  settlement  of  the  questions  involved 
in  the  controversy.  A  clofendant  concerning  whom  no  sueli  aver- 
ment is  made  may  demur  for  want  of  sufficient  facts. ^  Parties 
remotely  and  contingently  interested  in  the  result,  although  lia\'- 
ing  no  estate  in  or  lien  on  the  land,  may  be  proper  defendants  in 
order  to  protect  their  rights  and  to  effect  the  settlement  of  the 
questions.^ 

^  239.  *3-12.  Subsequent  and  Prior  Incumbrancers  as  Parties. 
Husband  in  Case  of  Mortgage  on  Wife's  Land.  It  is  a  rule  univer- 
sally established  that  all  subsequent  incumbrancers,  who  are 
holders  of  general  or  specific  liens  on  the  land,  whether  mort- 
gagees, judgment  creditors,  or  whatever  be  the  nature  of  the  lien 
if  it  can  be  enforced  against  the  land,  are  not  necessary  parties  in 
the  sense  that  their  presence  is  indispensable  to  the  rendition  of  a 
decree  of  sale  ;  but  they  are  necessary  parties  defendant  to  the 
recovery  of  a  judgment  which  shall  give  to  the  purchaser  there- 
under a  title  free  from  their  liens  and  incumbrances.  If  they  are 
not  joined  as  defendants,  their  rights  are  unaffected ;  their  liens 
remain  undisturbed  and  continue  upon  the  land  while  in  the 
hands  of  the  purchaser ;  and  they  retain  the  right  of  redemption 
from  the  holder  of  the  mortgage  before  the  sale,  and  from  the 
purchaser  after  the  sale.^     It  is  not,  in  general,  considered  that 

1  Martin  v.  Noble,  29  lud.  216.     It  is  288,   293;  Newcomb  v.  Dewey,  27  Iowa, 

not  necessaiy  to  allege  auy  particular  in-  381  ;  Auson  v.  Anson,  20  Iowa,  55  ;  Ten 

terest.     A  general  averment,  as  stated  in  Eyck  ;■.  Casad,  15  Iowa,  524  ;  Knowles  v. 

tlie  text,  is  sufficient  in  respect  to  all  the  Kahlin,  20  Iowa,  101  ;    Chase  c.  Abbott, 

defendants,  except  those  against  whom  a  20  Iowa,  154;  Street  v.  Beal,  16  Iowa,  68; 

personal  judgment  is  asked,  and  those  who  Ileimstreet    v.    Winnie,    10    Iowa,    430; 

are  owners  of  the  land.     See  Anthony  v.  Veacli  v.  Schaup,  3  Iowa,  194 ;    Bates  v. 

Nye,  30  Cal.  401 ;  Sichler  y.  Look,  93  Cal.  Ruddick,     2     Iowa,     423;    Hayward     v. 

600  r  Carpenter  v.  Ingalls  (S.  Dak.  1892),  Stearns,  39  Cal.  58,  60;  Green  v.  Dixon, 

51   N.  W.  948.     [McKibben  v.  Worthing-  9  Wis.  532 ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  193  ;  Haines 

ton's  Ex'r  (1898),  103  Ky.  356,  45  S.  W.  v.    Beach,    3    Johns.  Ch.  459;    Draper  v. 

233;  Commonwealth  v.  Robinson  (1895),  Lord  Clarendon,  2  Veru.  518;  Lomax  v. 

96  Ky.  5.53,  29  S.  W.  306.]  Hide,  2  ^'ern.  186;  Godfrey  v.  Chadwell, 

'^  See,  as  illustrations,  Johnson  v.  Brit-  2  Vern.  601 ;  Morret  v.  Westerne,  2  A^ern. 

ton,  23  Ind.  105;   Parrott  v.  Hughes,  10  663;  Rolleston  i;.  Morton,  1  Dr.  &  W.  171  ; 

Iowa,  459.     Such  persons  are  not,  how-  Besser   v.   Hawthorne,  3   Ore.   129;  Par- 

ever,    necessary    parties :    United    States  dee  v.  Steward,  37  Hun,  259  ;  Douthit  r. 

Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Roche,  116   N.  Y-  Hipp,  23  S.  C.  205;  Hensley  v.  Whiffin, 

120,  130.  54  Iowa,  555  ;  Stanbrough  v.  Daniels,  77 

3  Kay  r.  Whittaker,  44  N.  Y.  565.  572  ;  Iowa,    561;    Williams   v.   Brownlee,    101 

Bloomer  v.  Sturges,  58  N.  Y.  168;  Rath-  Mo.  309;  De  Lashmutt  v.    Sellwood,   10 

bone  V.  Hooney,  58  N.  Y.  463  ;  Gaines  r.  Ore.  319;  Johnson  v.  Hosford  (lud.,  1887), 

Walker,   16  Ind.  361 ;    Proctor  r.  Baker,  10  N.  E.  407.      See,  however,  per  contra, 

15  lud.  178;  Wright  v.  Howell,  35  Iowa,  Morris   v.    Wheeler,   45    N.    Y.    708,  — a 


334 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


prior  incumbrancers  are  even  proper  defendants,  for  as  their  liens 
are  paramount  to  the  mortgage,  they  cannot  be  in  any  manner 
affected  by  the  action  or  the  decree  therein. ^  It  is  said  in  Iowa, 
however,  tliat  they  are  proper  parties.^  If  a  mortgage  is  given 
by  a  liusband  and  wife  on  hinds  whicli  are  her  separate  estate,  he 
is  a  necessary  co-defendant  with  his  wife,  except  in  the  very  few 
States  whose  statutes  expressly  exclude  him  in  actions  having 
reference  to  the  wife's  separate  propert}'.  If  he  united  with  the 
wife  in  the  note,  bond,  or  other  obligation  secured  by  the  mort- 


clearly  erroneous  decision.  The  holder 
of  an  interest  in  the  laud  not  adverse  or 
paramount  to  the  mortgage,  but  also  not 
subject  to  it,  may  be  made  a  party  de- 
fendant. Brown  v.  Volkenning,  64  X.  Y. 
76,  84.  As  to  the  proper  relief  against 
persons  holding  subsequent  interests,  see 
Heath  v.  Silverthoru  Lead  Miu.  Co,  39 
Wis.  146.  Q)sborn  v.  Logus  (1895),  28 
Ore.  306,  42  Pac.  997  ;  Gammon  v.  John- 
son (1900),  126  N.  C.  64,  3.5  S.  E.  18.5; 
Williams  v.  Kerr  (1893),  113  N.  C.  306, 
18  S.  E.  501.  In  Gaines  v.  Childers  (1901), 
38  Ore.  200,  63  Pac.  487,  the  court  said : 
"  If  encumbrancers  are  not  made  parties 
to  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  lien,  they  are,  of 
course,  in  no  respect  bound  by  the  decree 
or  proceeding  thereunder;  but  the  decree 
itself  is  valid,  and  vests  in  the  purcliaser 
the  legal  title  to  tiie  premises,  and  the 
right,  in  a  proper  proceeding,  to  compel 
such  lien  creditors  to  redeem." 

A  purcha.'ser  at  a  sheriff's  sale,  where 
land  is  sold  under  the  execution  of  a  judg- 
ment junior  in  lieu  to  a  mortgage  thereon, 
and  who  seeks  to  refer  for  the  security  of 
his  title  to  a  judgment  senior  to  such 
mortgage,  is  a  proper  party  to  the  fore- 
closure of  the  mortgage :  Baura  f.  Tran- 
tham  (1895).  45  S.  C.  291,  23  S.  C.  54.] 

1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  193;  Rose  v.  Page, 
2  Sim.  471  ;  Delabere  i'.  Norwood,  3 
Swanst.    144    (n.) ;  Wakeman   i;.   Grover, 

4  Paige,  23  ;  Parker  v.  Fuller,  1  Russ.  & 
My.  656 ;  Hagan  v.  Walker,  14  How. 
U.  S.  37 ;  Ricliards  v.  Cooper,  5  Beav. 
304  ;  Arnold  v.  Bainbrigge,  2  De  G.,  F.  & 
J.  92;  Aud.^ley  v.  Horn,  26  Beav.  195; 
1  De  G.,  F.  &  J.  226;  Person  f.  Merrick, 

5  Wis.  231  ;  Wright  ?>.  Bandy.  11  Ind.398; 
Rathbone  r.  H«.oney,  58  N.  Y.  463;  Je- 
rome V.  .McCarier,  94  U.  S.  734  ;   Wabafh, 


St.  L.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  V.  Central  Trust  Co.  of 
N.  Y.,  22  Fed.  Rep.  138.  As  to  whether 
they  are  proper  though  not  necessary 
defendants,  see  Warren  v.  Burtou,  9  S.  C. 
197  ;  Baas  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  39 
Wis.  296 ;  Emigrant  L  Sav.  Bk".  v.  Gold- 
man, 75  X.  Y.  127  ;  Lockman  v.  Reilly,  95 
N.  Y.  64  ;  Hinsou  v.  Adrian,  86  X.  C".  61 ; 
Harwell  v.  Lehman,  72  Ala.  344  ;  Foster 
V.  Johnson  &  Trowbridge,  44  Minn.  290; 
First  Xat.  Bk.  of  Salem  r.  Salem  Capital 
Flour  Mills  Co.,  31  Fed.  Rep.  580. 

£iiee,  on  the  contrary,  Van  Loben  Sels 
V.  Bunnell  (1901),  131  Cal.  489,  63  Pac. 
773,  where  the  court  said :  "  There  is  no 
doubt  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to 
adjudicate  the  claims  of  a  prior  encum- 
brancer if  made  a  party.  Such  encum- 
brancers are  not  necessary  parties,  but 
they  are  always  proper  parties,  and  it  is 
good  practice  to  join  them  for  the  purpose 
of  li(iuidating  their  claims.  Whenever  a 
prior  encumbrancer  is  made  a  party,  it  is 
his  right  to  file  a  cross-complaint  to  fore- 
close his  lien."  To  the  same  effect  see  also 
Gammon  i'.  Johnson  (1900),  126  X.  C.  64, 
35  S.  E.  185;  Jacobi  v.  Mickle  (1894), 
144  X.  Y.  237,  39  X.  E.  66,  where  a  prior 
encumbrancer  was  made  a  party  and 
suffered  default,  and  was  held  to  be  barred 
thereby  from  foreclosing  his  mortgage. 
Prior  encumbrancers  may  be  made  parties 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  the  amount 
and  rank  of  their  liens :  Missouri,  etc. 
Trust  Co.  V.  Richardson  (1899),  57  Neb. 
617,  78  X.  W.  273.  Held  proper  but  not 
necessary  parties :  Globe  Loan  &  Trust 
Co.  i".  Eiler  (1901),  61  Xeb.  226,  85  X.  W. 
48.] 

-  Standish  r.  Dow,  21  Iowa,  363  ;  H&im- 
street  v.  Wiuuie,  10  Iowa,  430. 


DEFENDANTS   IN   FORECLOSURE   SUITS.  335 

gage,  he  is  a  proper  defendant  in  Minnesota,  for  the  further 
reason  that  a  judgment  for  deficiency  may  be  rendered  against 
him  in  the  action.^ 

§  240.  *343.  Joinder  of  Wife  of  Mortgagor.  In  regard  tO  the 
necessity  or  propriety  of  joining  the  wife  of  the  mortgagor,  or  of 
any  subsequent  owner  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  there  is  some 
conflict  among  the  decisions.  The  solution  of  this  question 
depends  mainly  upon  the  law  of  the  State  regulating  the  wife's 
right  of  dower.2  In  most  of  the  States  the  common-law  doctrines 
as  to  dower  prevail  without  substantial  alteration.  In  some, 
however,  they  have  been  entirely  abrogated,  or  at  least  radically 
changed.  As  at  the  common  law,  the  wife's  inchoate  dower  right 
attached  to  all  lands  owned  in  fee  by  the  husband  during  the 
marriage,  any  mortgage,  except  for  purchase-money,  given  by  the 
luisband,  in  which  the  wife  does  not  join,  is  subject  to  her  dower 
right.  When  such  a  mortgage  —  not  for  purchase-money  —  is 
executed  by  the  husband  alone,  a  foreclosure  thereof  by  an  action 
in  which  she  is  even  made  a  party  defendant  does  not  affect  her 
rights  ;  she  can  assert  her  claim  to  dower  in  the  land  after  her 
husband's  death  without  redemption;  the  decree  as  to  her  is  a 
mere  nullity.^  If  the  wife  unites  with  her  husband  in  executing 
the  mortgage,  her  dower  right  becomes  subject  to  the  mortgage 
lien ;  in  other  words,  she  is  entitled  to  dower  in  the  equity  of  re- 
demption. This  entitles  her  to  redeem  upon  the  same  principle 
that  any  other  junior  incumbrancer  is  thus  entitled.  In  all  those 
States  where  the  common-law  doctrines  as  to  dower  have  not 
been  abrogated,  the  wife  of  the  mortgagor,  who  has  united  in 
executing  the  mortgage,  though  not  an  absolutely  necessary 
party,  must  be  made  a  defendant  in  order  to  cut  off  her  right 
of  redemption.  If  not  a  party  to  the  foreclosure  suit,  she  may 
come  in  and  redeem  f]-om  the  purchaser.^     The  same  is,  of  course, 

1  Wolf  V.  Banning,  3  Miun.  202,  204.  *  McArthur  v.  Franklin,  15  Ohio  St. 

Qn  Padley  v.  Neill  (1896),  134  Mo.  364,  485;  16  id.  193;  Chambers  v.  Nicholson, 

3.5    S.    W.    997,   a    wife    commenced    an  30  Ind.  349 ;  Chase  v.  Abbott,  20  Iowa, 

action  to  cancel  a  mortgage  on  her  prop-  154  ;  Anthony  ),-.  Nye,  30  Cal.  401 ;  Mills 

erty,  and  a  foreclosure  was  allowed  on  a  r.  Van  Voorhies,  20  N.  Y.  412.     For  the 

cross  bill  without  joining  her  husband.]  peculiar  law  of  North  Carolina,  see  Creecy 

^  []But   where   a   wife   renounces    her  i-.  Pearce,  69  X.  C.  67  ;  Etheridge  v.  Ver- 

dower  right,  she  is  not  a  necessary  party  :  noy,    71  N.  C.  184,   185-187  ;   Nimrock  v. 

Miller  v.  Bank   (1897),  49   S.  C.'427,  27  Scanlin,  87  N.  C.  119.     Wife  is  a  neces- 

S.  C.  514.]  sary   defendant  in    Wisconsin  :  Foster  v. 

®  Moomey  v.  Maas,  22  Iowa,  380 ;  Mer-  Hickox,  38  Wis.  408,  overruling  Cary  v. 

chants'  Bank  v.  Thomson,  55  N.  Y.  7,  11.  Wheeler,  14  id.  281.     In  Alabama,  she  is 


336  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

true  of  any  owner  to  whom  the  land  or  a  part  thereof  has  been 
conveyed,  subject  to  the  mortgage,  and  who  remains  owner  at  the 
time  of  commencing  the  action  to  foreclose.^  It  is  not  necessary 
to  set  out  the  wife's  interest  in  detail  in  the  plaintiff's  pleading  ; 
it  is  sufficient  to  aver  in  the  usual  general  formula  that  she  has  or 
claims  an  interest  in  the  land  adverse  to  the  plaintiff.^  A  con- 
trary rule  prevails  in  a  few  States,  in  which  it  is  held  that  the 
wife,  under  the  circumstances  mentioned,  need  not  be  made  a 
defendant.^  This  ruling  must  be  based  upon  the  local  law  of 
dower  radically  different  from  the  common  law. 

§  241.  *  344.  Joinder  of  Wife  of  Mortgagor  in  Foreclosure  of  Pur- 
chase-Money Mortgage.  There  is  a  marked  conflict  in  the  deci- 
sions defining  the  wife's  right  under  a  purchase-money  mortgage. 
One  theory  holds  that  the  legal  position  of  a  wife  whose  husband 
has  executed  a  purchase-money  mortgage  in  which  she  did  not 
unite  is  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  a  wife  who  has  united  with 
her  husband  in  executing  a  mortgage  not  given  for  purchase- 
money.  The  lien  of  the  mortgage  is,  of  course,  paramount  to 
the  dower  interest,  but  she  still  has  a  right  of  redemption,  and, 
in  order  to  cut  this  off,  she  must  be  made  a  defendant  in  the 
foreclosure  action.*  The  same  rule  also  applies  to  the  wife  of 
the  person  to  whom  the  land  or  a  part  of  it  has  been  conveyed, 
subject  to  a  purchase-money  mortgage,  and  who  is  owner  at  the 
time  of  the  foreclosure.*  The  other  theory  denies  that  the  wife 
whose  husband  executes  a  purchase-money  mortgage  in  which  she 
does  not  join  has  any  interest  in  the  land,  or  any  right  of  re- 
demption. According  to  this  view,  she  need  not  be  made  a 
defendant  in  the  action  to  foreclose,  and  is  cut  off  by  decree  and 
sale,  although  omitted  as  a  party. ^     When  a  trustee  of  a  married 

not  a  necessary  party,  though  she  claims  Ross,  4  Cal.  197.     This  last  case  cannot  be 

an  equity  in  the  land  on  tlie  ground  that  reconciled  with  Anthony   r.  Nye,   supra. 

her  funds  were  used  in  paying  the  pur-  Qln    Morgan   v.    Wicklifle  (1903),  —  Ky. 

chase-money:  Flowers  r.  Barker,  79  Ala.  — ,  72  S.  W.  1122,  under  Ky.  St.,  §  2i;J5, 

445.     [^Wife  is  a  proper,  if  not  a  neces-  restricting  the  wife's  dower  right,  it  was 

sary,  party :  Ilausmann  Bro.s.  MTg  Co.  v.  held  that  the  wife  was  not  a   nece.s.sary 

Kempfert  (1896),  9.3  Wis.  587,67  N.  W.  party  to  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  in 

1136.     So  is  the  widow,  who  joined  in  the  which  siie  liad  joined. J 

mortgage:  Chadbourn  v.  Johnston  (1890),  *  Mills  v.  Van  Voorhies,  20  N.  Y.  412. 

119  N.  C.  282,  25  S.  E.  705.]  Also  in  Fo.ster  v.  Ilickox,  38  Wis.  408. 

1  Watt    V.    Alvord,    25    lud.    533,    and  ^  Fletcher  v.  Holmes,  32  lud.  497,  per 

caaes  last  cited.  Elliott  J. ;  Etheridge  j\  Vernoy,  71  N.  C. 

'•^  Anthony  I'.  Nye,  30  Cal.  401.  184-186.     QSce   also,  Schaefer   v.   I'urvi- 

»  Thornton  v.  Pigg.  24  Mo.  249 ;  Rid-  ance  (1903),  — -  lud.  — ,  66  N.  E.  154.]     • 
dick    1-.    Walsh,    15    Mo.    538;    Powell  i-. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    FOKECLOSUKE   SUITS.  337 

woman  purchased  lands  in  trust  for  her,  and  gave  a  purchase- 
money  mortgage  therefor,  it  was  held,  in  Nevada,  that  the  wife 
and  her  husband  were  both  necessary  defendants  in  an  action 
brought  to  foreclose  the  mortgage.^ 

§  242.  *  345.  Parties  in  Foreclosure  of  Mortgage  upon  Homestead. 
Adverse  Claimant  as  Party.  Other  Cases.  Under  the  law  of  Cali- 
fornia in  respect  to  homesteads,  it  is  held  that  the  husband  and 
wife  must  both  join  in  a  mortgage  of  the  homestead  in  order  that 
it  should  have  any  validity  as  against  either;  and  of  course  the 
wife  is  a  necessary  defendant  in  an  action  to  foreclose  such  a 
mortgage  in  which  she  has  joined. ^  In  an  action  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage,  a  person  who  sets  up  a  claim  to  the  land  adverse  and 
paramount  to  the  title  of  the  mortgagor,  and  who  therefore  denies 
the  efficacy  of  the  mortgage  lien,  cannot  properly  be  joined  as  a 
co-defendant  by  the  plaintiff. ^  Such  an  adverse  claim  to  the 
land  in  opposition  to  the  mortgage  cannot  be  tried  in  the  equi- 
table action  to  foreclose.  So  far  as  mere  legal  rights  are 
concerned  in  such  an  action,  the  only  proper  parties  are  the 
mortgagor  and  the  mortgagee,  and  those  who  have  acquired 
rights  under  them  subsequent  to  the  mortgage.  The  mortgagee 
or  holder  of  the  mortgage  cannot  make  one  who  claims  prior  and 
adversely  to  the  title  of  the  mortgagor  a  defendant  for  the  pur- 
pose of  trying  the  validity  of  his  adverse  claim. ^     In  Iowa,   a 

1  Ma^Tich  V.  Grier,  3  Nev.  52.  And  whose  homestead  rights  are  not  subject  to 
■when  mortgaged  land  is  conveyed  in  trust,  a  mortgage,  are  not  proper  parties  to  its 
or  vested  in  trustees,  the  cestuis  que  trustent  foreclosure :  Hoppe  v.  Fountain  (1894),  104 
are  necessary  defendants  in  a  suit  to  fore-  Cal.  94,  .37  Pac.  894.] 

close.     Clark  v.  Keyburu,   8  Wall.   318;  '^  QSo  held  in  Joslin  y.  Williams  (1901), 

Faithful  V.  Hunt,  3  Anst.  751  ;  Calverley  61  Neb.  859,  86  N.  W\  473.] 
V.  rhelp,  6  Mad.  229 ;  Osbourn  v.  Fallows,  *  Eagle  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Lent,  6  Paige, 

1  Rus.  &  M.  741  ;  Newton  w.  Earl  Egmont,  637,  per    Walwortli    Chan.;    Corning    v. 

A  Sim.  574,  584,  5  Sim.  130,   135;  Coles  Smith,  6  N.  Y.  82;  Palmer  v.  Yager,  20 

V  Forrest,  10  Beav.  552,  557  ;  Goldsmid  v.  Wis.  91,  103,  per  Dixon  C.  J. ;  Pelton  v. 

Stonehewer,  9  Hare  A  pp.  38;  Story's  Eq.  Farmin,  18  Wis.  222.     See  also  Roberts  u. 

PI.  §§  206,  207 ;  United  States  Trust  Co.  Wood,  38  Wis.  60  ;  Crogan  r.  Spence,  53 

of  N.  Y.  V.  Roche,   116  N.  Y.  120,  1.30;  Cal.  15;  Houghton  v.  Allen,  75  Cal.  102; 

Kirkpatrick  V.  Corning,  38  N.  J.  Eq.  234.  McComb   v.  Spangler,  71    Cal.  418,   423; 

2  Revalk  v.  Kraemer,  8  Cal.  66  ;  Marks  Farmers'  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  San  Diego 
V.  Marsh,  9  Cal.  96 ;  Moss  v.  Warner,  10  vStreet-Car  Co.,  40  Fed.  Rep.  105;  but 
Cal.  296  ;  Sargent  v.  Wilson,  5  Cal.  504.  may  try  the  validity  of  a  claim  which  is 
See  also  Mabury  v.  Ruiz,  58  Cal.  11;  not  thus  adverse  and  paramount,  and  maj 
Hefner  v.  Urton,  71  Cal.  479.  [^Held  in  make  the  holder  thereof  a  defendant : 
Spalti  y.  Blumer  (1894),  56  Minn.  523,  58  Brown  v.  Volkenning,  64  N.  Y.  76,  84; 
N.  W.  1 56,  that  a  decree  of  foreclosure.  Baas  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  39  Wis. 
where  the  wife  is  not  a  party,  will  not  296  ;  Lyon  v.  Powell,  78  Ala.  351. 
affect  her  homestead  interest.     Children 


338  CIVIL    KKMEDIES. 

trust  deed  of  land  or  of  chattels  intended  as  security  for  a  debt 
is  by  statute  regarded  as  a  mortgage,  and  may  be  foreclosed  by 
action  in  the  same  manner  as  a  mortgage.^  A  subsequent  in- 
cumbrancer, as,  for  example,  a  mortgagee,  who  has  not  been 
made  a  party  to  the  foreclosure  of  a  prior  mortgage,  may  redeem 
the  land  from  the  sale,  and,  in  his  action  to  compel  the  redemp- 
tion, he  should  make  the  mortgagor  and  his  prior  mortgagee,  and 
the  purchaser  at  the  sale  and  his  grantees,  if  any,  tlie  parties 
defendant. 2  The  grantee  of  the  purchaser  is  an  indispensable 
defendant  in  such  an  action ;  and  if  his  omission  is  properly 
objected  to  by  the  actual  defendant,   the  action  must  fail.^ 

§  243.  *  340.  III.  Parties  in  Creditors'  Actions  :  and  Actions  by 
or  on  Behalf  of  Creditors  to  set  aside  Fraudulent  Transfers  by  their 
Debtors.  General  Remarks.  It  is  not  within  the  SCOpe  of  this 
work  to  inquire  into  the  nature  of  creditors'  suits,  nor  to  discuss 
the  question  when  and  under  what  circumstances  they  may  be 
maintained.  My  only  present  concern  is  with  respect  to  the 
proper  selection  of  parties  defendant,  whenever  the  actions  them- 
selves may  be  properl}^  brought.  The  general  purpose  of  a 
creditor's  suit  proper  is  to  reach,  at  the  instance  of  a  judgment 
creditor  whose  legal  remedies  of  judgment  and  executifm  thereon 
have  been  exhausted,  the  assets  of  the  judgment  debtor,  which, 
either  by  reason  of  their  intrinsic  nature,  or  by  reason  of  their 
transfer  alleged  to  have  been  fraudulent  as  agiiinst  tlie  creditor, 
are  or  have  been  placed  beyond  the  reach  of  an  execiition  at  law, 

1  Darlington  v.  Effey,  1.3  Iowa,  177.  It  was  held  in  Swenney  v.  Hill  (1902), 
Trust  deeds  appear  to  be  used  in  place  of  6,5  Kan.  826,  70  Pac.  868,  that  "  if  promis- 
murtgages  in  several  other  of  the  AVestern  sory  notes  be  given  to  one  f)ei\son,  and  a 
States.  mortgage  securing  them  is   given  to  an- 

2  Anson  v.  Anson,  20  Iowa,  55 ;  Knowles  other,  who  by  tlie  terms  of  the  latter  instru- 
V.  Rablin,  20  Iowa,  101  ;  Street  j;.  Keal,  16  ment  is  given  active  powers  and  authority 
Iowa,  68  ;  Rurnap  !•.  Cook,  16  Iowa,  149.  over  the  subjects  of  the  mortgage  relation. 
So,  too,  where  the  prior  mortgagee  seeks  the  mortgagee  is  a  necessary  party  to  a 
a  second  time  to  foreclose  his  mortgage  suit  bruuglit  by  the  payee  of  the  notes  to 
against  a  subsequent  mortgagee  who  was  foreclose  the  mortgage."  (Syllabus  by 
not  made  a  party  to  the  first  foreclosure  the  court.) 

suit,  all  tlie  jjurchasers  at  the  first  fore-  ]Vht'?-('  the  Mortfjagee  Dies..   An  action 

closure  sale  are  neces.sary  parties :  Moulton  for  possession  and  foreclosure  brought  by 

r.  Cornish,  61  Hun,  4.38.  a  mortgagee    against   a   mortgagor    and 

*  Winslow  I'.  Clark,  47  X.  Y.  221,  263;  others,  cannot  be  continued  by  the  mort- 

citing  Dias  i-.  Merle,  4  Paige,  259.     And  gagee's  executfir  when  tlie  mortgagee  dies 

in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  foreclosure  sale  pending  the  suit,  without  joining  the  mort- 

for  fraud,  the  purchaser  is  a  necessary  de-  gagee's  heirs  as  parties:  Hughes  v.  Gay 

fendant :  Wibson  r.  Bell,  17  Minn.  61^  64.  (1903),  132  N.  C.  50,  43  S.  E.  539.] 

^  Where  }f(jrlg<i<jpe  is  not  Payee  of  Debt. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    CREDITORS'    SUITS.  339 

and  which  are  therefore  denominated  equitable  assets.  Certain 
species  of  property,  as,  for  example,  things  in  action,  although 
in  the  ownership  of  the  debtor,  cannot  be  seized  on  execution. 
The  distinctive  feature  of  the  action,  however,  is  to  reach  land, 
and  sometimes  chattels,  which  the  debtor,  having  owned  by  a 
legal  title,  has  transferred  to  some  grantee  or  assignee  in  fraud 
of  his  creditors ;  or  to  reach  such  land,  and  sometimes  personal 
property,  the  legal  title  to  which  stands,  and  always  has  stood, 
in  other  parties,  while  by  reason  of  alleged  facts  the  equitable 
ownership,  at  least  so  far  as  the  creditors  are  concerned,  is  held 
by  the  debtor  himself,  and  the  property  is  thus,  as  is  alleged, 
liable  to  be  taken  and  applied  to  the  discharge  of  the  creditor's 
demands.  Under  what  circumstances  a  transfer  of  property  is 
fraudulent  as  against  the  creditors,  or  the  equitable  ownership  is 
held  by  the  debtor  while  the  legal  title  is  vested  in  another, 
it  is  not  now  the  place  to  inquire.  Assuming  that  such  cir- 
cumstances exist,  and  that  when  they  exist  an  action  may  be 
maintained  by  the  judgment  creditor  whose  legal  remedies  are 
exhausted,  to  reach  the  property  an^  have  it  applied  in  some 
manner  to  the  payment  of  his  demands,  it  may  be  asked.  Who 
should  be  made  parties  defendant  in  such  an  action?  The 
answer  to  this  question  is  plain,  and  the  rule  has  been  well 
established,  depending  as  it  does  upon  the  most  evident  prin- 
ciples of  equity  jurisprudence.  The  creditor's  suit,  properly 
so  called,  and  which  has  been  thus  described  in  general  terms, 
should  not  be  confounded  with  actions  that  creditors  may  some- 
times bring,  based  upon  the  law  of  trusts  and  the  right  of  a  cestui 
que  trust  to  compel  the  performance  of  his  duty  by  a  trustee. 

§  244.  *  347.  Parties  Defendant  in  Action  by  Judgment  Creditor 
to  reach  Equitable  Assets ;  and  to  reach  Property  fraudulently  Trans- 
ferred. In  an  action  by  a  judgment  creditor  to  reach  the  equi- 
table assets  of  the  debtor  in  his  own  hands,  or  to  reach  property 
which  has  been  transferred  to  other  persons,  or  property  which  is 
held  by  other  persons  under  such  a  state  of  facts  that  the  equi- 
table ownership  is  vested  in  the  debtor,  the  judgment  debtor  is 
himself  an  indispensable  party  defendant,  and  the  suit  cannot  be 
carried  to  final  judgment  without  him.  In  some  cases,  as  when 
the  property  has  been  assigned  at  different  times  to  different 
assignees,  or  is  held  by  different  legal  owners,  who  are  all  made 
co-defendants,  he  is  the  very  link  which  unites  them  all  together. 


340 


CIVIL    KKMEDIES. 


the  common  centre  to  which  they  are  all  connected,  and  it  is 
because  he  is  a  party  defendant  that  they  can  all  be  joined  in  one 
action  as  co-defendants.  ^  Even  if  the  objection  to  his  nonjoinder 
be  not  taken  by  the  actual  defendants,  the  court  will  on  its  own 
motion  order  him  to  be  brought  in.^  If  the  judgment  debtor 
himself  is  dead,  his  administrator  or  executor  is  an  indispensable 


1  [^Sheppard  v.  Green  (1896),  48  S.  C. 
165,  26  S.  E.  224;  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Slmler  (1897),  15-3  N.  Y.  16.3,  47  N.  E.  262, 
in  which  the  court  said  :  "  The  authorities 
are  decisive  in  affirming  the  general  rule 
that,  in  a  creditor's  action  brought  to  im- 
peach and  set  aside  a  general  assignment 
by  a  debtor  of  his  property  for  the  benefit 
of  creditors,  the  court  will  not  proceed  to 
judgment  in  the  absence  of  the  debtor  as 
a  party  defendant,  unless  by  death  or  other 
circumstance  his  joinder,  as  a  defendant, 
is  wholly  impracticable.  It  has  been  held 
in  some  cases  that  in  a  suit  hronght  by  a 
creditor  against  a  fraudulent  alienee  of  tlie 
debtor,  to  set  aside  a  specific  transfer  for 
fraud,  where  the  conveyance  was  absolute 
and  transferred  as  between  the  parties  an 
indefeasil)le  title  or  interest,  the  fraudulent 
vendor  is  not  a  nece.s.sar3'  party.  (Butling- 
ton  V.  Harvey,  95  U.  S.  103  ;  Campbell  v. 
Jones,  25  Minn.  155;  Potter  v.  Phillips, 
44  la.  .357 ;  .«ee,  also.  Fox  v.  Moyer,  54 
N.  Y.  130).  But  the  relaxation  of  the  rule 
has  never,  so  far  as  we  can  discover,  been 
extended  to  the  ca.sc  of  an  assignment  in 
trust  for  the  benefit  of  creditors."  See 
also  Williamson  v.  Selden  (1893),  53  Minn. 
73,  54  N.  W.  1055  ;  Beviiis  v.  Eisman 
(1900),  Ky.,  56  W.  W.  410;  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Gibson  ( 1 903),  —  Neb.,  —  94  N.  W. 
965.]  Lawrence  t>.  Bank  of  the  Rei)ublic, 
N.  Y.  320 ;  vShaver  v.  Braiuard,  29  Barb. 
25;  Wallace  v.  Eaton,  5  How.  Pr.  99; 
Logan  V.  Hale,  42  Cal.  645  ;  Allison  v. 
Weller,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  291  ;  Vanderpoel 
u.  Van  Valkenburgii,  6  N.  Y.  190;  Gay- 
lords  V.  Kelshaw,  1  Wall.  81  ;  Miller  v. 
Hall,  70  N.  Y.  250;  llubbell  r.  Mercliants' 
Bk.  of  Syracuse,  42  Hun,  200 ;  Hickox  >: 
Elliott,  10  Sawy.  415;  8.  C.  22  Fe<l.  Bep. 
13,  20;  Coffey  v.  Norwood,  81  Ala.  512; 
Pottery.  Phillips,  44  Iowa,  353;  Blanc  i'. 
Paymiister  Min.  Co.,  95  Cal.  524;  Wil- 
liam.son  i-.  Selden  (.Minn.  1893),  54  N.  W. 
1055;  Dunn  i-.  Wolf,  81  Iowa,  688;  Wea- 
ver f.  Cressman,  21    Neb.  075;    Taylor  r. 


Webl),  54  Miss.  36.  Where  the  creditor 
seeks  to  establish  his  debt,  as  well  as  to 
subject  the  property  fraudulently  conveyed 
to  the  payment  thereof,  the  debtor  must, 
of  course,  be  made  a  party :  Chadbourne 
V.  Coe  (C.  C.  A).  51  Fed.  Kep.  479.  As 
illustrations  of  various  actions  by  credi- 
tors, see  Boone  Co.  v.  Keck,  31  Ark.  387  ; 
Holland  v.  Drake,  29  Ohio  St.  441  ;  Eraser 
V.  Charleston,  13  S.  C.  533  ;  Potter  v.  Phil- 
lips, 44  Iowa,  353;  Green  v.  Walkill  Nat. 
Bank,  7  Hun;  63;  Dewey  v.  Moyer,  9  id. 
473  ;  Haines  r.  Hollister,  64  N.  Y.  1  ;  Scott 
r.  Indiauap.  Wagon   Works,   48  Ind.  75. 

[^See  Glover  v.  Hargadiue-McKittrick 
Dry  Goods  Co.  (1901),  62  Neb.483,87  N.  W. 
170,  where  the  court  said  :  "  The  vendor  in 
a  conveyance  alleged  and  proved  to  have 
been  fraudulently  made  and  to  be  for  tliat 
re.ason  void  as  against  creditors  is  always 
a  ])roper  but  not  in  all  cases  a  necessary 
party  to  an  action  by  the  latter  to  set  the 
instrument  or  transaction  aside.  If  he  has 
reserved  or  retained  no  title  or  interest  in 
or  lien  upon  the  property,  but  has  parted 
with  it  both  absolutely  and  comjiletely,  he 
has  no  rights  to  be  affected  by  the  result 
of  the  litigation  and  his  presence  m.ay  be 
dispensed  with."     (Syllabus  by  the  court.) 

In  Gores  v.  Field  "(1901),  109  Wis.  40S, 
84  N.  W.  867,  creditors  brought  an  action 
against  the  directors  and  officers  of  an  in- 
solvent bank,  which  had  made  a  general 
assignment,  to  recover  losses  sustained  by 
their  mismanagement,  and  it  was  held  that 
the  corj)oration,  being  in  fact  defunct,  was 
not  a  necessary  party.  But  in  Keady  v. 
Smith  (1902).  i70  Mo.  163.  70  S.  W.  434, 
in  a  somewhat  similar  action,  in  which, 
however,  the  corporation  was  still  a  going 
concern,  the  corporation  was  ludd  a  neces- 
sary ]jarty.] 

2  Shaver  v.  Braiuard,  29  Barb.  25.  It 
was  said  that  .a  decree  without  his  pres- 
ence is  im])ossible.  ^First  Nat.  Bank  >•. 
Shuler  (1897),  153  N.  Y.  163,  47  N.  E. 
262.2 


DEFENDANTS   IN    CREDITORS'   SUITS.  341 

defendant;  ^  ;ind  if  the  objection  be  taken  for  the  first  time  in  the 
appellate  court,  the  cause  will  be  remanded  in  order  that  he  may 
be  added  as  a  defendant.^  When,  however,  the  debtor  convej'ed 
his  land  to  A.  for  the  purpose  of  a  second  conveyance  to  his  own 
wife  in  fraud  of  his  creditors,  which  second  conveyance  was 
made,  and  the  debtor  afterwards  died,  it  was  held  that  his  heirs 
were  neither  necessary  nor  proper  parties  to  the  creditor's  action 
brought  to  set  aside  these  conveyances.  "The  conveyance  of 
their  ancestor,  though  fraudulent,  concludes  them,  and  effectually 
cuts  off  all  their  interest  in  the  pro2:)erty."^ 

§  245.  *  348.  Assignee  of  Judgment  Debtor  a  Necessary  Party. 
"Where  Legal  Title  is  in  Third  Person  and  Equitable  Ovsmership  in  Debtor. 
If  the  object  of  the  action  be  to  reach  property  which  has  been 
assigned  by  the  debtor,  the  assignee  is  a  necessary  party  defend- 
ant, even  if  he  be  a  non-resident  of  the  State ;  *  and  on  the  same 
principle,  if  the  plaintiff  seek  to  reach  property  of  which  the 
legal  title  is  in  a  third  person,  but  the  equitable  ownership  of 
which  is  alleged  to  be  in  the  debtor,  such  holder  of  the  legal  title 
must  be  a  defendant.^  When  the  debtor  conveyed  land  to  a 
third  person  with  the  purpose  that  such  person  should  at  once 
convey  the  same  to  the  debtor's  wife,  which  second  conveyance 
was  forthwith  made,  it  was  held,  in  an  action  against  the  debtor 
and  his  wife  to  reach  the  land  in  her  hands,  that  the  first  grantee 
was  a  necessary  party  defendant.^     A  debtor  fraudulently  con- 

1  Alexander  i».  Quigley,  2  Duvall,  300;  real  property,  the  wife  is  not  a  proper 
Postlewaite  v.  Howes,  3  Iowa,  365  ;  Coates  party  in  an  action  by  creditors  to  set  aside 
V.  Day,  9  Mo.  315;  [jPrentiss  v.  Bowden  the  conveyance,  but  the  wife  of  a  fraud- 
(1895),  145  N.  Y.  342,  40  N.  E.  13  ;  Shep-  ulent  grantee  isa  proper  party  :  Tatum  v. 
pard  V.  Green  (1896),  48  S.  C.  165,  26  S.  E.  Roberts  (1894),  59  Minn.  52,  60  N.  W.  848. 
224;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Shuler  (1897),  See  also  Stevenson  y.  Matteson  (1893),  13 
153  N.  Y.  163,  47  N.  E.  262.     In  the  last  Mont.  108,  32  Pac.  291. 

case  the  wife  of  the  debtor  was  one  of  the  Where  an  action  is  brought  by  a 
alleged  fraudulent  vendees,  and  she  be-  creditor  to  set  aside  a  fraudulent  confes- 
came  his  executrix  upon  his  death  pend-  sion  of  judgment  by  the  debtor  in  favor 
ing  the  suit.  She  was  already  a  party  in  of  H.,  and  a  conveyance  of  land  to  H. 
her  individual  capacity,  and  was  not  made  under  execution  sale,  the  administrator 
a  party  in  her  representative  capacity,  and  heir  at  law  of  H.  are  necessary  par- 
Held  that  she  was  not  bound  as  executrix  ties  :  Sloan  v.  Hunter  (1899),  56  S.  C.385, 
and  the  judgment  could  not  be  sustained.]  34  S.  E.  658.     If  the  grantee  be  dead,  his 

2  Postlewaite  v.  Howes,  3  Iowa,  365.  heirs   are   necessary    parties  :    Bevins    v. 

3  Harlin   v.   Stevenson,  30  Iowa,  371,  Eisman  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W.  410.3 
375.  *  Ogle  V.  Clough,  2  Duv.  145. 

*  Gray  v.  Schenck,  4  N.  Y.  460.  [[Where  «  Bennett  v.  McGuire,  5  Lans.  183,  188. 

a  husband  and  wife  jointly  execute  a  The  necessity  of  making  this  grantee  a 
fraudulent   conveyance  of  the  husband's     defendant  is  not  apparent.     It  is  true,  his 


342  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

veyed  hind  to  A.,  and  took  back  a  purchase-money  mortgage 
whicli  he  assigned  to  B.  In  an  action  to  set  aside  the  convey- 
ance, or  to  reach  the  mortgage,  it  was  held  that  the  debtor  and 
both  A.  and  B.  were  proper  and  necessary  parties  defendant.^ 

^5  246.  *  849.  Assignees  of  Separate  Parcels  of  Property  should  be 
joined.  Reason  herein.  When  the  action  is  brought  for  either  of 
these  objects,  if  the  debtor  has  at  different  times  assigned,  in 
alleged  fraud  of  his  creditors,  different  parcels  of  his  property  to 
different  assignees,  or  if  different  parcels  of  property  are  held  by 
dift'erent  persons  in  alleged  fraud  of  the  debtor's  creditors,  so 
that  the  equitable  ownership  is  claimed  to  be  vested  in  him,  all 
of  these  assignees,  or  all  of  these  holders  of  tlie  legal  title,  may 
be  joined  with  the  debtor  as  co-defendants  in  one  action. ^  The 
reason  given  for  this  rule  permitting  separate  assignees  or  holders 
of  the  legal  title  to  be  joined,  although  they  take  by  different 
conveyances  and  at  different  times,  is,  "that  the}'  ail  have  a 
common  interest  centering  in  the  point  at  issue  in  the  cause ;  so 
that,  while  the  title  to  one  piece  of  property  is  in  one  defendant, 
and  the  title  to  some  other  distinct  piece  is  in  another  defendant, 
yet  these  various  titles  Avere  taken  and  are  now  held  for  a  com- 
mon purpose,  and  to  accomplish  the  same  fraudulent  end.  All 
are  privy  to  have  been  concerned  in  acts  tending  to  the  same 
illegal  result.  The  matters  are  not  distinct,  but  are  in  truth  all 
connected  with  the  same  fraudulent  transaction  in  which  all  the 
defendants  have  })articipated.^ 

§  247.  *  350.  Other  Cases.  Trustees  of  an  Express  Trust.  Inno- 
cent Third  Parties.  In  an  action  brought  by  or  on  behalf  of  a 
judgment  creditor,  to  reach  a  fund  in  the  hands  of  an  express 
trustee  for  the  debtor,  such  debtor  is  a  necessary  defendant,  and 

deed  is  sought  to  l)e  set  aside,  but  lie  has  Reed  (•.  Stryker,   12  Abb.  Pr.  47  ;    Jacot 

no  iiitere.st   wliatever    in  the  result;    all  v.   Boyle,   18  How.  Pr.    106;    Hamliu    v. 

title  luw  passed  out  of  him,  and  he  cannot  Wright,  23  Wis.  491  ;   Winslow  v.  Dous- 

be  affected  by  the  judgment.     See  Spicer  man,  18  Wis.  456;    North  v.  Brad  way,  9 

V.  Hunter,  14  Abb.  Pr.  4.  Minn.  18.'i. 

1  Foster    v.   Townshend,    12   Abb.   Pr.  ■'  Winslow  v.  Dousman,  18  Wi.s.  4,i6, 

N.  8.  469.     When  a  debtor  had  conveyed  462,  per  Cole  J.;   Hamlin  v.  Wright,  2.'? 

laud   in  fraud   of  his   creditors,  and   the  Wis.  491,  494;  Briiikcrhoff  v.    Brown,  6 

grantee  had  executed  a  mortgage  thereon,  Johns.  Ch.  R.  139,  l.")?  ;  Fellows  c.  Fellows, 

llie   mortgagee  was   held  a  necessary  de-  4  Cow.  682;  Boyd  v.   Hoyt,  5  Paige,  65; 

fendant  in  a  creditor's  suit  to  set  a.'iide  the  N.  Y.  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.  r.  Schuyler,  1 7  N.  Y. 

conveyance.     Copis  i-.   Middleton,  2  Mad  592  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  285,  2S6  :  Di\   v. 

410  Briggs,  9   Paige,  595;   Sizer  v.  Miller,  9 

^  Morton    r.   Weil,    11    Abb.    Pr.   421;  Paige,  605. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    ADMINISTRATION    SUITS.  343 

should  be  joined  with  the  trustee;  he  is  the  person  directly 
iuterested  in  the  fund,  and  the  one  to  be  directly  affected  by  the 
judgment.  1  When  a  creditor's  suit  was  brought  to  reach  prop- 
erty fraudulently  transferred  by  the  debtor,  and  the  alleged 
fraudulent  transfer  was  consummated  through  the  means  of  a 
third  person,  who  in  good  faith  received  a  conveyance  of  the 
property  in  trust  for  the  alleged  fraudulent  grantee,  and  who 
subsequently  conveyed  the  same  to  such  grantee  in  accordance 
with  the  trust,  such  third  person  was  held  not  to  be  a  proper 
defendant;  there  was  simply  no  cause  of  action  against  him, 
because  he  was  free  from  any  fraudulent  intent.  ^ 

§  248.  *  351.  IV.  Actions  Relating  to  the  Estates  of  Deceased  Per- 
sons. The  "administration  suit  "  in  chancery,  by  means  of  which 
the  estates  of  deceased  persons  are  usually  settled  in  England,  is 
uncommon,  if  not  entirely  unknown,  in  the  United  States.  The 
actions  which  will  fall  under  the  above  heading  are  almost  en- 
tirely special  cases,  depending  upon  special  circumstances:  suits- 
by  judgment  creditors  to  reach  the  property  of  deceased  debtors, 
or  of  beneficiaries  to  reach  trust  property  lield  by  deceased 
trustees,  or  of  heirs  or  next  of  kin,  or  legatees,  to  set  aside  the 
fraudulent  transactions  of  administrators  and  executors,  and  the 
like.  It  is  almost  impossible,  therefore,  to  collect  these  various 
cases  into  any  well-defined  groups;  each  must  stand  upon  its  own 
facts,  and  will  illustrate  as  far  as  possible  the  broad  generalities 
of  the  equitable  doctrine  as  to  parties.^ 

1  Vanderpoel  v.  Van  Valkenburgh,  6  son  of  creating  preferences,  the  ci-editors 
N.  Y.  190.  alleged   to   have   been   preferred  are   not 

2  Spicer  v.  Hunter,  14  Alib.  Pr.  4;  necessary  parties:  Bradley  y.  Bailey  (189.5), 
Bartlett  v.  Drew,  57  N.  Y.  587,  589.  95  la.  745,  64  N.  W.  758.  But  wliere  one 
For  a  peculiar  case  of  misjoinder  of  de-  creditor  seeks  to  be  placed  aliead  of  prior 
fendants  in  a  creditor's  action,  see  Gale  v.  creditors  such  prior  creditors  must  be 
Battin,  16  Minn.  148,  150.  made  parties:   State  ex  rel.  v.    Hickman 

Q  Receiver  as  Party.  Held  in  Daisy  (1899),  150  Mo.  626,  51  S.  W.  680.] 
Roller  Mills  v.  Ward  (1897),  6  N.  D.  317,  ^  For  various  examples  of  such  actions 
70  N.  W.  271,  that  where  judgment  credi-  see  Littell  v.  Sayre,  7  Hun,  485;  Skid- 
tors  brought  suit  merely  to  set  aside  con-  more  v.  Collier,  8  id.  50 ;  Selover  v.  Coe, 
veyauces  of  real  estate  as  fraudulent,  and  63  N.  Y.  438  ;  Janes  i'.  Williams,  31  Ark. 
asked  for  no  accounting  for  rents  and  175 ;  Williams  v.  Ewing,  31  id.  229 ; 
profits,  a  receiver  of  the  rent.s  and  profits  Whitsett  r.  Kershaw,  4  Col.  419  ;  Wall  v. 
appointed  after  the  conveyances  were  made  Fairley,  77  N.  C.  105  ;  Harris  v.  Bryant, 
is  not  a  necessary  party.  83  id.  568  ;  Conolly  v.  Wells,  33  Fed.  Kep. 

Other    Creditors    as    Parties.      In    an  205  (in  an  action  against  executors  for  an 

action  between  certain  creiiitors  and  the  accounting,  all  must  be  joined,  including 

general   assignee,  raising  the  issue  as  to  one  who  was  outside  tlie  jurisdiction   of 

the  general  assignment  being  void  by  rea-  the  court)  ;   Howth  i\  Owens,  29  Fed.  Hop. 


344  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  249.    *352.    Illustrations.     A  testator  left  real  and  personal 
property  in  fee  to  A.,  but  if  she  should  die  without  issue,  $10,000 
of  it  were  given  over  to  B.     The  original  executor  of  this  will 
died  leaving  the  trust  fund  mingled  with  his  own  property,  and 
the  whole  passed  to  his  executor,  C.     A.  died  without  issue,  and 
B.  brought  an  action  to  recover  the  legacy  of  $10,000,  making  C, 
the  then  executor  of   the  original  executor,  the  defendant.     It 
was  held  by  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  New  York,  that  C.  was  a 
necessary  party,  but  that  the  administrator  of  A.    was  also  a 
necessary  defendant  without  whom  the  issues  in  the  cause  could 
not  be  decided.^    "  He  [this  administrator]  is  a  trustee  of  the  next 
of  kin  of  A.,  and  they  are  interested  in  the  fund  after  satisfying 
all  charges  upon  it,  and  have  a  right  to  be  heard  upon  any  claim 
which  tends  to   take  it  away  for   the    benefit  of  another   or  to 
reduce  it."^     In  an  action  brought  by  one  executor  against  his 
co-executor  for  an  account,  —  the  ground  of  the  proceeding  being 
the  breach  of  his  trust  by  the  latter,  and  the  misuse  of  funds 
belonging  to  the  estate, —  the  legatees,  next  of  kin,  and  creditors 
of  the  deceased  are  not  necessary  defendants  unless  the  account- 
ing is  to  be  final ;  if  it  is  made  the  final  accounting  and  settle- 
ment of  the  trust,  then  all  these  persons  must  be  brought  in  as 
defendants.^     The  administrator,  in  violation  of  his  trust,  fraudu- 
lently conveyed  lands  of  the  estate  to  a  person  who  was  a  partici- 
pant in  the  fraud.     This  grantee  died  intestate.     The  children 
—  the  only  heirs  and  next  of  kin  —  of  the  deceased  original  owner 
brought  an  action  against  the  administrator  and  the  heirs  of  the 
grantee,  to  set  aside  the  fraudulent  transfer,  to  compel  a  re-con- 
veyance of  the  land,  and  for  an  accounting  by  the  administrator. 
This  action  was  held  proper;  the  heirs  of  the  grantee  were  held 
to    be    necessary   defendants,    and    properly    united    with    the 

722  (representative  of  deceased  executor  this  [wliere  creditors  of  tlie  testator  are 

rnuBt   be   joined).     For  a  full  discussion  claiming    contract    liens    upon    ))roperty 

of  the  jurisdiction  of  erjuity  over  admin-  which  is  charf,'ed  by  the  will  with  tlie  pay- 

istration  suits  in  tliis  country,  see  3  Pom.  ment   of   debts   generally],    with  no  one 

Eq.  Jur.  §§  1152-1154,  and  extended  note  representing  them  and  their  debts  a  charge 

to  §  1154.  upon  the  realty,  they,  or  some  of  them, 

QIu  Payne  v.  .Johnson's  Ex'ors  (ISO.T),  were   necessary  ])arties  to  the  action  en- 

95  Ky.  17.5,  24  S.  W.  238,  the  court  .said  forcing  this  lien. "3 

that  "  while  all  creditors  are  not  necessary  ^  Auburn  Tlieol.  Sem.  Trs.  i-.  Kellogg, 

parties  to  an  action  by  an  administrator  IG  N.  Y.  83.  ' 
for  the  settlement  of  an  e-^tate,  still  thoy  -  Iliid.,  p.  00,  per  Dcnio  J. 

are  entitled  to  be  iieard  ;  and  inaca-selike  ^  Wuud  v.  Brown.  .'54  X.  V.  337. 


DEFENDANTS   IN    ADMINISTRATION    SUITS.  345 

administrator.^  And  when  in  a  similar  case  the  fraudulent 
administrator  had  at  different  times  conveyed  portions  of  the 
land  to  different  grantees,  an  action  by  tlie  heirs  of  the  deceased 
owner  against  the  administrator  and  all  of  these  grantees,  was 
sustained.  "If  there  is  a  common  point  of  litigation,  the 
decision  of  which  affects  the  whole  number  of  defendants,  and 
will  settle  the  rights  of  all,  they  may  ail  be  joined  in  the  same 
proceeding.  "2 

§  250.  *  353.  When  Administrator  ia  not  a  Necessary  Party. 
Illustration.  An  administrator  is  not  a  necessary  party  defend- 
ant unless  some  claim  is  made  against  the  estate  which  he  would 
have  the  right  to  resist,  or  unless  the  judgment  would  be  in  some 
manner  prejudicial  to  the  estate;^  a  fortiori^  he  is  not  a  necessary 
defendant  when  the  immediate  object  of  the  action  is  to  increase 
the  amount  of  assets  available  to  the  payment  of  the  debts  of  the 
deceased,  even  though  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  proceeding 
may  be  the  benefit  of  the  creditor  who  prosecutes  it.  Thus, 
where  the  deceased  in  his  lifetime  had  received  an  absolute  deed 
of  lands,  which  he  did  not  put  upon  record,  and  had  subsequently 
with  a  fraudulent  intent  destroyed  this  deed,  and  procured  the 
grantor  therein  to  execute  another  conveyance  of  the  same  land 
without  consideration  to  a  third  person  who  took  the  same  with 
full  knowledge  and  collusively  and  put  the  same  upon  record,  a 
judgment  creditor  of  the  deceased,  whose  judgment  was  recov- 
ered while  the  deceased  held  the  deed  to  himself,  brought  an 
action  against  the  second  grantee  and  the  heirs  and  widow  of  the 
deceased,  seeking  to  set  aside  the  second  deed,  and  to  establish 

1  Bassett  v.  Warner,  2.3  Wis.  673.  474,  70  Pac.  455,  where  the  court  says  :  "  It 
This  case  is  plainly  the  same  in  principle  is,  in  effect,  a  suit  to  determine  a  contro- 
as  the  suit  by  a  judgment  creditor  against  versy  between  the  different  heirs  as  to 
a  fraudulent  debtor  and  his  grantee.  their  respective  riglits  of  inheritance,  and 

2  Bowers  v.  Keesecher,  9  Iowa,  422,  in  such  a  controversy  it  is  well  settled 
424  ;  citing  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  284,  534  ;  that  the  administrator  has  no  interest,  but 
Bugbee  v.  Sargent,  23  Me.  271  ;  Kayner  is  a  mere  officer  of  the  court,  holding  the 
I'.  Julian,  Dickens,  677  ;  Brinkerhoff  v.  estate  as  a  stake  holder."  See  also  Hall 
Brown,  6  Johns.  Ch.  R.  152;  Varick  v.  v.  Bank  (1898),  145  Mo.  418,  46  S.  W. 
Smith,  5  Paige,  160.  1000,  where  it  was  held  that  an  adminis- 

^  QSee   McCabe  v.  Healy   (1902),  138  trator  cannot  bring  a  suit  in  equity  to  set 

Cal.  81,  70  Pac.  1008,  where  it  was  held  aside   a  fraudulent    conveyance    of   land 

that  the  administrator  had  no  concern  or  made  by  the  deceased  unless  an  order  i* 

interest   in  a  suit  between   the   plaintiff  first    obtained    from    the    probate    court 

who  claims  under  a  contract  to  make  a  directing  him  to  take  possession  of   the 

will  and  tlie  heirs  of  the  decedent.     And  land  for  the  payment  of  debts.]] 
also  //(  re  Healv's  Estate  (1902),  1-37  Cal. 


"4(1  CIVIL    RKMEDIES. 

the  original  title  of  the  judgment  debtor,  and  to  enforce  the 
lien  of  his  own  judgment  upon  the  land;  this  action  was  held 
to  have  been  properly  brought  against  the  defendants  named. 
The  administrator  of  the  deceased  was  held  not  to  be  a  neces- 
sary party  defendant,  because  the  proceeding  was  really  for  the 
benefit  of  the  estate,  and  he  could  make  no  opposition  if  he  were 
present.^ 

§  251.  *  354.  "When  Legatees  and  Next  of  Kin  are  neither  Neces- 
sary nor  Proper  Parties.  In  actions  by  creditors  against  executors 
or  administrators  to  recover  debts  alleged  to  be  due  from  the 
deceased,  or  by  the  owners  of  the  property  to  recover  assets 
which  had  been  in  the  possession  of  the  deceased  and  apparently 
belong  to  his  estate  in  the  hands  of  his  personal  representatives, 
the  legatees  or  next  of  kin  are  not  necessary  nor  even  proper 
parties  defendant. ^  The  executors  or  administrators  represent 
the  estate.  They  can  bring  all  suits  to  recover  property  in 
the  hands  of  third  persons  alleged  to  belong  to  the  estate,  with- 
out joining  the  legatees  or  distributees  as  co-plaintiffs,  ^  and  on 
the  same  principle  they  can  defend  all  actions  brought  against 
themselves,  involving  the  ownership  of  property  in  their  own 
hands,  or  the  indebtedness  of  the  estate,  without  the  presence  of 
legatees  and  next  of  kin  as  co-defendants.  Thus  in  an  action 
against  executors  to  reach  certain  moneys  and  securities  in  their 
possession  as  apparent  assets,  but  which  it  Avas  claimed  had 
been  held  by  the  testator  in  trust  for  the  plaintiff  and  actually 
belonged  to  him,  the  legatees  were  held  not  to  be  necessary  de- 
fendants.* And  in  an  ordinary  suit  to  recover  a  debt  due  from 
the  deceased,  brought  against  the  administrator,  the  widow,  and 
the  next  of  kin,  it  was  held  that  all  these  defendants,  except  the 
administrator,  were  improperly  joined;  he  represents  them,  and 
his  defence  is  their  defence.^ 


1  Cornell   v.    Radway,    22    Wis.    260,  2  [^Byrcl  v.  Byrd  (1895),  117  N.  C.  .523, 

26.5,  per   liixon   C.  J.     It   was  said  that  2.3  S.  E.  324.] 

the    administrator    or    executor     might  ^  QlJnt  where  a. «uit  was  brought  by  the 

bring   the   suit;    but   this   authority   did  heirs  of  a  devi.see  under  a  will  to  recover 

not  ^  take    away   the   right   of   the    cred-  property  mi.sdirected  by  the  life  tenant, 

itor.      Wis.    R.    S.,  ch.     100,    §§    16-18.  the  administrator   was  held  a   necessary 

But   see  per  contra,  as   to   the   necei»sity  party:    Burford  v.  Aldridge  (1901),    165 

of     the     personal     representative    being  Mo.  419,  63  S.  W.  109.] 

made   a   party   in   such    actions,    1    Dan.  *  King  c.  Lawrence.  14  Wis.  238. 

Ch.  I'l.  (4th  Am.  ed.),  p.  200,  and  cases  '  Nelson  r.  Hart,  8  Ind.  293.    That  the 

cited.  personal    representatives     are    the    only 


DEFENDANTS    IX    ADMINISTRATION    SUITS. 


347 


§  252.  *  355.  When  a  Dififerent  Rule  applies.  A  different  rule, 
however,  prevails  in  an  action  by  u  distributee  against  the  ad- 
ministrator, legatee  against  the  executor,  or  beneficiary  against 
the  trustee,  when  the  right  asserted,  if  it  exists  at  all,  is  also 
held  by  all  the  other  parties  similarly  situated  with  the  one  who 
sues,  and  the  decision  would  in  fact  determine  all  their  rights. 
In  such  a  case,  in  order  that  the  trustee  may  not  be  subjected  to 
a  multiplicity  of  suits,  when  the  whole  controversy  could  be  de- 
cided in  one,  the  equitable  doctrine  primarily  requires  that  all  the 
distributees,  legatees,  or  beneficiaries  should  unite  as  plaintiffs ; 
but  if  any  refuse  to  join,  they  should  be  made  defendants.^  The 
statutes  of  several  States  permit  an  equitable  action  to  be  brought 
by  the  heirs  of  the  testator  to  set  aside  a  will  of  lands  for  any 
cause  which  can  invalidate  it.  In  such  a  suit  the  devisees  under 
the  will  are  indispensable  defendants. ^  In  fact,  the  executor  can 
hardly  be  called  a  necessary  party,  for  he  takes  no  interest  in  the 
land.  Conversely,  in  an  action  to  reach  the  land  of  a  deceased 
intestate,  his  heirs  are  indispensable  defendants,  without  whom 


proper  defendants  in  such  actions,  see 
Story's  Eq,  PI.  §§  10+,  140  ;  Anon.,  1  Vern. 
261 ;  Lawsou  v.  Barker,  1  Bro.  C.  C.  303 ; 
Brown  v.  Dowthwaite,  1  Mad.  446 ;  Jones 
V.  How,  7  Hare,  267  ;  Haycock  v.  Hay- 
cock, 2  Ch.  Cas.  124 ;  Jennings  v.  Paterson, 
15  Beav.  28;  Micklethwait  v.  Winstanley, 
13  W.  R.  210;  Pritchard  v.  Hicks,  1 
Paige,  270;  Wiser  v.  Blachly,  1  Johns. 
Ch.  437  ;  Davison  v.  Rake,  45  N.  J.  Eq. 
767.  In  general,  all  the  personal  rep- 
resentatives must  be  joined.  Offey  ?'. 
Jenney,  3  Ch.  Rep.  92 ;  Hanip  v.  Robin- 
son, 3  De  G.,  J.  &  S.  97  ;  CouoIIy  v. 
Wells,  33  Fed.  Rep.  205  ;  Howth  v.  Owens, 
29  Fed.  Rep.  722.  But  if  an  executor  has 
not  proved,  he  need  not  be  joined.  Strick- 
land r.  Strickland,  12  Sim.  463;  Dyson  v. 
Morris,  1  Hare,  413 ;  Farrell  v.  Smith,  2 
B.  &  B.  337  ;  Clegg  v.  Rowland,  L.  R.  3 
Eq.  368.  And,  in  an  action  by  a  creditor 
against  the  heirs  and  devisees  of  his  de- 
ceased debtor,  to  make  his  claim  out  of 
the  land  of  the  decea.sed  in  their  hands, 
tiie  joinder  of  such  heirs  and  devi.sees  was 
held  proper,  since  the  judgment  could 
provide  for  the  order  of  their  liabilities. 
Rockwell  V.  Geery,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  687  ; 
Schermerhorn  v.  Barhydt,    9  Paige,   28; 


Houston  V.  Levy's  Ex.,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  6 , 
Read  v.  Patterson,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  211; 
Dandridge  v.  Washington's  Ex.,  2  Pet. 
370 ;  Deegau  v.  Capner,  44  N.  J.  Eq. 
339. 

1  Dillon  V.  Bates,  39  Mo.  292.  [^Hill  v. 
Dade  (1900),  68  Ark.  409,  .59  S.  W.  39: 
Where  a  suit  is  brought  by  heirs  to  deter- 
mine whether  an  executrix  iiad  power 
under  a  will  to  sell  the  fee  of  tlie  ancestor's 
land,  all  persons  holding  portions  of  said 
land  through  conveyances  from  the  ex- 
ecutrix are  ])roper  parties.  See  also  Reiser 
V.  Gigrich  (1894),  59  Minn.  368,  61  N.  W. 
30,  where  the  action  was  brought  by  the 
administrator  against  parties  connected 
with  a  fund  belonging  to  the  estate.] 

2  Eddie  v.  Parke's  Ex.,  31  Mo.  513. 
The  action  was  brought  against  the  ex- 
ecutors alone.  See  Morse  v.  Morse,  42 
Ind.  365  ;  infra,  §  *379,  note.  [^In  Fogle 
V.  St.  Michael  Church  (1896),  48  S.  C.  86, 
26  S.  E.  99,  it  was  held  that  neither  the 
executor  nor  heir  at  law  was  a  necessary 
party  in  an  action  to  enforce  a  contract  to 
dispose  of  property  by  will,  when  the 
executor  has  turned  over  the  entire  assets 
to  the  devisee.] 


348 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


no  decree  can  be  made,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  admia- 
istrator  could  be  a  necessary  party.  ^ 

i^  253.  *  35G.  V.  Trusts.  Actions  to  enforce  Performance  of  Ex- 
press Trusts.  Trustees  and  Survivors  Necessary  Parties.  It  is  a 
universal  and  elementary  rule  that,  in  an  action  to  enforce  the 
performance  of  an  express  trust,  the  trustee  is  an  indispensable 
defendant.  This  doctrine  was  applied  in  a  case  where  a  debtor 
had  transferred  personal  property  to  a  trustee  upon  trust  to  sell 
the  same,  and  out  of  the  proceeds  to  pay  the  demands  of  the 
creditor.  The  directions  of  the  trust  not  having  been  complied 
with,  the  creditor  brought  an  action  against  the  debtor  alone  to 
foreclose  the  trust  deed  and  for  a  sale  of  the  goods.  The  trustee 
was  held  to  be  a  necessary  defendant. ^  Where  there  were  origi- 
nally two  or  more  trustees,  and  one  or  more  have  died,  in  an 
action  by  the  beneficiary  to  enforce  the  trust,  and  especially  if  a 
violation  thereof  is  alleged  against  all  the  trustees,  the  survivors 
and  the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased  not  only  may 


1  Muir  V.  Gibson,  8  Ind.  187,  190. 
That  the  adniinistrator  is  a  proper  party 
in  Buch  au  action,  see  Lowry  v.  Jackson, 
27  S.  C.  318.  See  Silsbee  v.  Smith,  60 
Barb.  372.  In  an  action  for  an  account 
of  personal  estate  which  came  into  the 
hands  of  a  deceased  administrator  or  ex- 
ecutor, his  personal  representatives  are 
necessary  defendants.  As  to  the  neces- 
sary parties  in  an  action  to  construe  a 
will,  see  McKethan  o.  Ray,  71  N.  C.  165, 
1 70.      ' 

2  Tucker  v.  Silver,  9  Iowa,  261,  per 
Wright  C.  J.  After  stating  the  rule  as 
laid  down  in  the  text,  the  court  declares 
that  it  has  not  been  changed  by  tlie  new 
procedure.  See  also  McKinley  v.  Irvine, 
13  Ala.  681  ;  Cassiday  v.  McDaniel,  8 
B.  Mon.  519;  Morrow  v.  Lawrence,  7 
Wis.  574;  Jones  v.  Jones,  3  Atk.  110. 
And,  in  general,  all  the  trustees  must  he 
joined.  Coppard  v.  Allen,  2  De  G.,  J.  & 
S.  173;  Howth  v.  Owens,  29  Fed.  Rep. 
722.  But  a  trustee  who  has  never  acted, 
and  has  relea.sed  all  his  interest  to  his 
co-trustee,  need  not  be  made  a  party. 
Richanlson  v.  Hulbert,  1  Aust.  65.  When 
a  trustee  has  assigned  his  interest  in  the 
trust  estate,  in  general  both  lie  and  the 
assignee  should  be  defendants.  Story's 
Efj.  I'l   §  209 ;  Bailey  i-.  luglce,  2  Paige, 


278.  But  if  he  has  assigned  his  entire 
interest  absolutely,  the  assignee  alone 
should  be  sued,  unless  the  assignment 
was  a  breach  of  trust.  Story's  Eq.  PI. 
§§211,  213.  214;  Munch  v.  Cockerell,  8 
Sim.  219.  As  examples  of  this  general 
rule,  when  a  demand  is  to  be  enforced 
against  idiots  or  lunatics,  their  commit- 
tees or  guardians  must  be  sued,  the  luna- 
tics or  idiots  themselves  being  proper 
but  not  necessary  parties.  Beach  v. 
Bradley,  8  Paige,  146.  And  in  suits  re- 
lating to  the  property  of  insolvents  or 
bankrupts,  their  assignees  are  nece.ssary 
defendants.  Storm  r.  Davenport,  1  Sandf. 
Ch.  135 ;  Movan  v.  Hays,  1  Johns. 
Ch.  339;  Sells  i'.  IIubbell,"2  Johns.  Ch. 
394;  Botts  V.  Patton,  10  B.  Mon.  452. 
And  the  assignees  are  the  only  necessary 
defendants ;  neither  the  insolvents  or 
bankrupts,  nor  the  creditors,  need  be 
joined  with  them.  Collett  v.  Wollaston, 
3  Bro.  C.  C.  228 ;  Lloyd  v.  Lander,  5 
Mad.  282,  288;  Sells  v.  Ilubbell,  2  Johns. 
Cli.  394 ;  Sj)ringer  v.  Vanderpool,  4  Edw. 
Ch.  362  ;  Wakcman  r.  Grover,  4  Paige, 
23;  Dias  i;.  Bouchaud,  10  Paige,  445 
I^Rumsey  v.  People's  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  l.")4 
Mo.  215,  55  S.  W.  615.  And  when  a 
trustee  wrongfully  conveyed  trust  pro]icrty, 
the  grantee  was  held  a  necessary  ]p:iity  to 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS    INVOLVING   TRUSTS. 


349 


be  united  as  co-defendants,^  but  they  must  be  so  joined,  or  else 
no  decree  enforcing  the  trust  can  be  made.^ 

§  254.  *  357.  Joining  Beneficiaries.  Distinction  bet'ween  Actions 
in  Opposition  to,  and  in  Furtherance  of,  the  Trust.  There  is  a  broad 
distinction  between  the  case  of  an  action  brought  in  opposition 
to  the  trust,  to  set  aside  the  deed  or  other  instrument  by  which 
it  was  created,  and  to  procure  it  to  be  dechired  a  nullity,  and 
that  of  an  action  brought  in  furtherance  of  the  trust,  to  enforce 
its  provisions,  to  establish  it  as  valid,  or  to  procure  it  to  be 
wound  up  and  settled.  In  the  first  case,  the  suit  may  be  main- 
tained without  the  presence  of  the  beneficiaries,  since  the  trustees 
represent  them  all  and  defend  for  them.  In  the  second,  all  the 
beneficiaries  must  be  joined,  if  not  as  plaintiffs,  then  as  defend- 
ants, so  that  the  whole  matter  may  be  adjusted  in  one  proceed- 
ing, and  a  multiplicity  of  suits  avoided.^  The  reason  of  this 
distinction  is  obvious.  It  is,  that  any  one  person  interested  in 
opposition  to  the  trust  has  a  right  to  test  the  validity  thereof, 
and    his    voluntary  action    cannot  be    controlled  by  the  will   of 


a  suit  to  enforce  the  trust  against  the 
property:  Bridge  Co.  v.  Fowler  (1895), 
55  Kau'  17,  39  Pac.  727.] 

1  Sortore  v.  Scott,  6  Lans.  271,  276. 
It  was  held  that  the  rule  forbidding  such 
union  of  parties  in  a  legal  action  against 
joint  debtors  had  no  application  to  such 
an  equitable  suit.  See  also  Petrie  v. 
Petrie,  7  Lans.  90;  King  v.  Talbot,  40 
N.  Y.  76.  See  also  Hazard  v.  Duraut,  19 
Fed.  Rep.  471. 

^  Sherman  v.  Parish,  53  N.  Y.  483,  490. 
Action  by  a  sole  beneficiary  against  a 
trustee  for  an  alleged  breach  of  the  trust. 
There  had  been  other  trustees  who  were 
dead,  and  their  personal  representatives 
were  not  made  defendants.  Folger  J. 
said :  "  It  is  the  principle  of  courts  of 
equity,  in  cases  of  breach  of  trust,  when 
no  general  rule  or  order  of  the  court  in- 
terferes, and  when  the  facts  of  the  case 
call  for  a  contribution  or  recovery  over, 
that  all  persons  who  should  be  before 
tlie  court  to  enable  it  to  make  complete 
and  final  judgment  are  necessary  ])arties 
to  the  action.  Nor  has  our  mode  of  pro- 
cedure abrogated  the  rule."  Ho  cites  Hill 
on  Trustees,  520,  521  ;  Perry  on  Trusts, 
§§  875,  876,  877  ;  Lewin  on  Trusts,  845  ; 
Munch  V.  Cockerell,  8  Sim.  219;  Perry  v. 


Knott,  4  Beav.  179;  Shipton  r.  Rawlins, 
4  Hare,  619  ;  Cunningham  v.  Pell,  5  Paige, 
607;  New  York  code,  §  118.  The  court 
add  the  following  very  important  rule  : 
That,  on  timely  objection  to  the  want  of 
necessary  parties,  if  the  plaintiff  does  not 
bring  them  in,  the  complaint  must  be 
dismissed,  hut  not  absolutelij ;  the  dismissal 
should  be  without  prejudice.  The  com- 
plaint, however,  should  not  even  be  thus  dis- 
missed if  the  cause  can  be  made  to  stand  over 
on  terms,  in  order  to  enable  the  plaintiff  Xo 
brinq  in  the  7iecessnri:/  parties.  This  ruling  is 
in  e.xact  conformity  with  the  plain  intent 
of  the  codes,  and  with  the  views  expressed 
by  me  iu  the  text  in  a  former  paragraph. 
See  also  Haines  v.  Hollister,  64  N.  Y.  1  ; 
Howth  V.  Owens,  29  Fed.  Rep.  722.  Au 
heir  at  law  is  a  proper,  though  not  a 
necessary,  ])arty  to  a  suit  against  the 
legal  representative  of  his  ancestor  to  re- 
cover loss  sustained  by  a  breach  of  trust 
of  the  ancestor  as  executor.  McCartin  v. 
Traphagen's  Adm.,  43  N.  J.  Eq.  323. 

8  [^But  in  an  action  by  trustees,  brought 
in  furtherance  of  their  duty  as  such,  in 
respect  to  the  trust  property,  the  bene- 
ficiaries are  not  nece.ssary  parties  :  Roberts 
I'.  New  York  Elevated  R.  R.  Co.  (1898), 
155  N.  Y.  31,  4y  N.  E.  262.  J 


350  CIVIL   REMEDIES 

others,  while  the  trustees  themselves  are  sufficient  to  represent 
and  defend  all  the  interests  of  those  who  claim  under  the  trust.  ^ 
But  when  the  trust  is  assented  to,  and  the  purpose  is  simply  to 
carry  out  its  provisions,  all  the  beneficiaries  are  alike  interested 
in  tiiat  object  and  in  reaching  that  same  result,  and  it  is  just  to 
the  trustee  that  the  controversy  should  be  ended  in  one  proceed- 
ing. As  illustrations  of  this  principle:  In  an  action  brought  to 
set  aside  a  trust  deed  made  by  a  railroad  company  to  a  trustee 
for  the  benefit  of  bondholders,  and  to  restrain  a  sale  of  the  road 
thereunder,  the  beneficiaries  under  the  trust  were  declared  not  to 
be  necessary  or  even  proper  parties,  and  the  application  of  one  of 
them  —  a  bondholder  —  to  be  admitted  as  a  defendant  was  denied, 
although  he  alleged  that  the  trustee  intended  to  make  no  defence, 
and  was  actually  colluding  with  tlie  plaintiff  and  the  company.^ 
On  the  same  principle,  wliere  a  testator  had  devised  all  his  lands 
to  his  executors  with  power  to  sell  and  distribute  the  proceeds 
among  his  heirs,  an  action  by  a  third  person  claiming  to  own  part 
of  these  lands,  denying  that  they  belonged  to  the  testator,  and 
seeking  to  reach  them  or  their  j)roceeds  in  the  hands  of  the  ex- 
ecutors, was  held  to  ba  properly  brought  against  the  executors 
alone  without  joining  the  heirs  of  the  deceased  as  defendants. 
The  suit  in  effect  sought  to  set  aside  the  trust  pro  tanto  between 
the  executors  and  the  heirs. ^     In  like  manner,  an  action  by  one 

1  QThe  trustee  is  a  necessary  party  in  150;  Dewey  v.  Mover,  9  id.  473;  Moore 

a  suit  to  set  aside  the  deed  of  trust :  Mark-  v'.    Hegemar,    6    id.    290  ;    Benjamin    v. 

well  V.  Markwell  (1900),  l.")7  Mo.  .326,  57  Loughborough,  31   Ark.  210;    The  Trus- 

8.  W.  1078.     But  it  wa-s  held  in  Ilohin.son  tees    v.   Gleason,    15   Fla.   38-t;    Hill    v. 

V.   Kind  (1896),  23   Nev.   330,  47  Pac.  1,  Duraud,    50  Wis.  354.      For   further   in- 

that  the  beneficiaries  were  also  neces.sary  stances  of  actions  brouglit  in  opposition 

parties  in  a  suit  by  one  of  them  to  revoke  to  the  trust,  to  which  the  beneficiaries  are 

the  trust.]  not   necessary   parties,   see  Vetterlein   v. 

'^  QF.  G.  Oxley  Stave  Co.  v.  Butler  Barnes,  124  U.  S.  169;  Uedin  v.  Bran- 
County  (1804),  121  Mo.  614,26  8.  W.  367  :  han,43  Minn.  283  ;  Watkins  v.  Bryant,  91 
"  If  the  trustees  were  made  parties  and  Cal.  492  ;  Ward  v.  Waterman,  85  Cal. 
notified,  tliat  was  sufficient.  This  is  un-  488.  The  trustee  is  a  necessary  party  : 
doubtedly  the  rule  in  trusts  of  this  cliar-  McArthur  v.  Scott,  113  U.  S.  340. 
acter.  Whatever  binds  the  trustee  in  ^  Paul  i-.  Fulton,  25  Mo.  156.  See  also 
proceedings  to  enforce  tlie  trust,  liinds  llidenour  ?'.  Wherritt,  30  Ind.  4S5.  QWo- 
tiie  bondholders,  and  whatever  forecloses  men's  Cliristian  Ass'n  v.  Kausiis  City 
the  trustee,  in  the  absence  of  fraud  or  bad  (1898),  147  Mo.  103,  48  S.  W.  960:  In  an 
faith,  forecloses  them  "  See  alsoBuinsey  action  to  have  effectuated  and  carried  out 
V.  Peoples'  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  154  Mo.  215,  a  charitable  trust  cstabli.slied  by  a  will,  the 
55  S.  W.  615.]  Winslow  y.  Minn.  &  Pac.  heirs  of  the  testatrix  are  not  necessary 
K.  Co.,  4  Minn.  313,  316.  As  to  when  the  parties.  See  al.so  Lacklami  v.  Walker 
cp.s^/(x  f/i(f  f;«,s7e«;  are  or  are  not  necessary  (1899).  151  Mo.  210,  52  S.  W.  414.  In 
defendants,  see  Vcrdin  c.  Slocuni,  9  Ilun,  Newman  r.  Newman  (1899),  152  Mo.  398, 


DEFENDANTS    TN    SUITS    INVOLVING    Ti;UST,-<.  '6ol 

or  more  creditors  against  tlie  debtor  and  liis  assignee  in  trnst  for 
all  the  "creditors,  to  set  aside  the  assignment  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  or  for  any  other  reason,  is  properly  brought  without 
joining  all  or  any  of  the  other  creditors,  who  are  the  beneficiaries, 
either  as  defendants  or  as  jjlaintiffs.^ 

§  255.  *  358.  Same  Subject.  On  the  other  hand,  if  an  action 
is  brought  based  upon  the  assignment  or  other  deed  as  a  valid 
transaction,  seeking  to  enforce  the  trust,  to  obtain  an  account- 
ing, to  procure  a  final  settlement,  or  for  any  other  similar  relief 
which  recognizes  and  adopts  the  trust,  and  which,  when  obtained, 
would  alike  beneficially  affect  all  the  persons  similarly  situated, 
all  the  creditors  or  other  cestuis  que  trustent  must  either  unite  as 
plaintiffs,  or,  if  the  suit  is  instituted  by  one  or  by  some,  the 
others  must  be  joined  as  defendants.  The  court  will  not  permit 
the  same  question  to  be  litigated  in  separate  suits  at  the  instance 
of  each  person  who  has  a  demand  identical  in  its  nature  with 
that  held  by  all  the  others. ^  An  action  by  distributees  against 
their  administrator,  or  by  any  beneficiaries  against  their  trustee, 
to  open  an  account  once  settled,  on  the  ground  of  an  alleged 
fraud,  and  for  a  new  accounting  and  distribution  of  the  shares 

54  S.  W.  19,  real  estate  was  conveyed  to  a  ants  in  the  action  to  recover  it.     Einmert 

trustee,  his  heirs  and  as.signs.     After  his  v.  De  Long,  12   Kan.  67,  83.     Except  in 

death  the  cestui  que  trust  brought  suit  to  the  cases  of  administrators  and  executors, 

vest   the    title   in  a  new  trustee,   on  the  and  of  assignees  for  the  benefit  of  cred- 

ground   that   the   trustee   in  his  lifetime  itors,  the  general  rule  is  tliat  in  all  actions 

had  illegally  conveyed  the  same.     It  was  against  trustees  based  upon  tlie  existence 

held  that  the  heirs  of   the  trustee  were  of  the  trust,  the  benejliciaries  also  must 

necessary  parties,  although  the  trustee  by  be  made  parties.     Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  192, 

will    had    conveyed    all    his    property    to  193,  207  ;  Helm  ii.  Hardin,  2  B.  Mou.  232  ; 

another  as  trustee,  since  the  title  on  the  Clemens  v.  Elder,  9  Iowa,  272  ;  Van  Doreu 

trustee's  death  descends  to  his  heirs.]  d.  Robinson,  1*6  N.  J.  Eq.  2.56.     See  al.so 

1  Bank   of  Briti.sh   North  America  v.  Brokaw  i;.  Brokaw's  Ex.,  41  N.  J.  Eq.  215  ; 

Suydam,   6    How.    Pr.   379 ;    Hancock  v.  Biron  v.  Scott,  80  Wis.  206.     If,  however, 

Wooten,  107  N.  C.  9.     See,  however,  Hud-  the  cestuis  que  trustent  are  very  numerous, 

son    V.    Eisenmayer   Milling,  &c.  Co.,  79  the  rule  is  sometimes  relaxed,  or  a  por- 

Tex.   401 .      See   also    Mitchell   v.    Bank  tion  of  them  only  are  brought  in  as  repre- 

of  St.  Paul,  7  Minn.  252,  which  was  an  sentatives  for  the  whole  number.     Story's 

action  by  a  stockholder  to  set  aside  pro-  Ec].  PI.  §§  118,  150  ;   Holland  v.  Baker,  3 

ceedings  of  the  officers,  and  particularly  Hare,  68  ;  Harrison  v.  Stewardson,  2  Hare, 

an  assignment  in  t^-ust  for  creditors  ;  also,  530.     In  Fitzgibbon  v.  Barry,  78  Va.  755, 

French  v.  Gifford,  30  Iowa,  148,  159.  a  cestui  que  trust,  whose  interest  was  future 

~  Bank  of  British  North  America  v.  and  very  uncertain  and  contingent,  was 
Suydam,  6  How.  Pr.  379;  Garner  v.  held  an  unnecessary  party  to  a  suit  to  sub- 
Wright,  24  How.  Pr.  144,  28  id.  92.  stitute  a  new  trustee.  [^See,  also,  Howe 
Generally,  when  a  demand  is  payable  i;.  Gregg  (1897),  52  S.  C.  88,  29  S.  E.  394  ; 
out  of  a  trust  fund,  the  trustees  and  the  Cook  v.  Basom  (1901),  164  Mo.  594,  65 
beneficiaries    must    be   joined    as    defend-  S.  VV.  227.]] 


352  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

claimed  to  be  due,  is  plainly  controlled  by  the  same  rule.  It  is 
entirely  analogous  to  the  suit  above  mentioned  by  creditors  to 
procure  an  accounting  from  their  assignee;  it  adopts  and  seeks 
to  carry  out  the  trust.  All  the  distributees  or  beneficiaries  must 
therefore  be  made  parties,  if  not  as  plaintiffs,  then  as  defendants.^ 
§  256.  *  359.  Implied  Trustee  Necessary  Party  in  Actions  to 
reach  Property  Impressed  with  Implied  Trust  or  to  enforce  a  Lien 
thereon.  Examples.  In  actions  to  reach  property  impressed  with 
an  implied  trust,  or  to  enforce  a  lien  thereon,  the  person  in  whom 
the  legal  title  is  vested,  and  who  is  an  implied  trustee,  is,  of 
course,  a  necessary  defendant.  Some  examples  will  illustrate 
this  rule.  A  husband  purchased  land  with  his  own  funds,  but 
procured  the  deed  to  be  made  to  his  wife;  he  afterwards  em- 
ployed a  person  to  erect  a  dwelling-house  upon  the  land,  who 
obtained  a  mechanic's  lien  on  the  premises  for  the  price  of  his 
labor  and  materials.  An  action  to  enforce  the  lien  was  held  to 
be  properly  Ijrought  against  the  wife  and  the  husband;  the  legal 
title  was  held  by  her  in  trust  for  her  husband,  as  this  title  was 
to  be  divested  by  the  judgment  which  was  based  upon  a  demand 
against  the  cestui  que  trust,  both  were  necessary  parties. ^  Land 
was  purchased  by  a  husband,  but  by  arrangement  was  conveyed 
to  his  wife,  the  sale  and  conveyance  being  procured,  as  was 
alleged,  by  the  fraudulent  representations  of  both.  The  grantor, 
alleging  the  fraud  and  the  non-payment  of  the  price,  brought  an 
action  against  the  husband  and  wife  to  establish  his  debt  and  to 

1  Dillon  V.  Bates,  .39  Mo.  292.  Thi.s  Knott,  4  Beav.  179,  181  ;  Shiptoii  i'.  Raw- 
rule  is  general.  Whenever  au  action  is  lins,  4  Hare,  619.  And  in  an  action  by 
brous^ht  for  an  accounting  and  settlement  one  trustee  against  a  co-trustee  for  a 
of  a  trust  estate,  all  persons  interested  in  breach  of  the  trust,  all  the  beneficiaries 
the  estate  must  be  parties.  Devaynes  v.  who  have  concurred  in  such  breacii  are 
Robinson,  24  Beav.  86 ;  Coppard  v.  Alien,  necessary  defendants.  Jesse  v.  Bennett, 
2  I)e  G.,  J.  &  S.  1";}  ;  Hall  c.  Au.stin,  2  6  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  609 ;  Williams  v.  Allen, 
Coll.  570 ;  Biggs  v.  Penn,  4  Hare,  469 ;  29  Beav.  292 ;  Roberts  v.  Tunstall,  4 
Chancellor   v.    Morecraft,   11   Beav.   262;  Hare,  2.57,  261. 

Penny  v.  Penny,  9  Hare,  39.  If  several  -  Lindley  v.  Cross,  31  Ind.  106.  [^Xa- 
trustees  have  been  guilty  of  a  breach  of  tional  German-American  Bank  >•.  I.aw- 
trust,  all  must  [may]  be  joined  in  a  suit  rcnce  (1899),  77  Minn.  282,  79  N.  W.  1016  : 
by  the  cestui  que  trust  brought  to  obtain  In  an  action  by  a  judgment  creditor  of 
relief  against  such  broach.  The  liability  the  husband  to  enforce  a  resulting  trust 
of  the  ilefaulting  trustees  in  such  a  case  is  against  the  land  of  the  wife  for  the  pay- 
joint  and  several.  See  2  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.  nient  of  the  judgment,  on  the  ground  that 
§  1081,  ami  numerous  cases  cited  ;  Stock-  the  consideration  for  the  grant  to  the  wife 
ton  ('.  Anderson,  40  N.  J.  Eq.  486  ;  Walker  was  paid  by  the  husband,  the  husband  is  a 
V.  Symonds,  3  Swanst.  7.") ;  Munch  r.  proper  though  not  a  necessary  party.] 
Cockerell,    8    Sim.    219,    231  ;    Perry    v. 


DEFENDANTS   IN    SUITS    INVOLVING   TRUSTS.  353 

enforce  a  lien  for  the  same  upon  the  land.  Pending  the  suit  the 
wife  died,  and  her  heirs  were  substituted  as  defendants  in  her 
place.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa,  conceding  that  the  heirs 
were  necessary  parties,  held  that  the  wife's  administrator  was  a 
proper  and,  under  certain  aspects  of  the  case,  a  necessary  defend- 
ant, and  ordered  him  to  be  brought  in.  If  the  action  was  simply 
to  recover  a  pecuniary  demand  from  the  defendant,  he  was  clearly 
a  necessary  party ;  but  if  it  was  only  to  establish  a  specific  lien, 
he  was  only  a  proper  party.  ^  A  railroad  company  having  placed 
certain  of  its  bonds  in  the  hands  of  a  trustee  upon  trust  to  pay 
therefrom  a  debt  due  to  a  certain  creditor  of  the  company,  and 
the  trustee  having,  in  violation  of  his  duty,  surrendered  up  the 
bonds  to  the  company,  and  permitted  them  to  be  cancelled, 
whereby  the  security  was  utterly  lost,  it  was  held,  in  an  action 
by  the  creditor  against  the  trustee  for  a  breach  of  his  trust,  that 
the  railroad  company  was  not  a  necessary  defendant.^  The 
owner  of  bonds  and  other  securities  deposited  them  with  his 
agent  for  a  specific  purpose.  The  agent,  in  violation  of  his 
fiduciary  capacity,  disposed  of  them  to  divers  persons  at  different 
times  and  in  different  amounts.  The  owner  brought  an  action 
against  the  agent  and  all  the  transferees  for  the  purpose  of  set- 
ting aside  the  sales  and  reaching  his  property  or  its  proceeds.  It 
was  held  that  this  common  action  was  improperly  brought ;  that 
there  was  no  community"  of  interest  among  the  defendants ;  and 
that  a  separate  suit  should  have  been  instituted  against  the  agent 
and  each  assignee.^ 


1  Parshall  v.  Moody,  2-t  Iowa,  314  Pac.  393.     In  an  action  against  an  incom- 

2  Ridenour  r.  Wherritt,  30  Ind.  485.  petent  person,  the  guardian  is  neither  a 
■^  Le.xington  &  B.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Good-  necessary  nor  proper  party  :  Redmond  v. 

man,   5   Abb.    Pr.    493,   per   Peabody   J.  Peterson  (1894),  102  Cal.  59.5,  36  Pac.  923. 

This  decision,   as  it   seems  to  me,  is  in  See  also  Leavitt  y.  Bell  (1898),  55  Neb.  57, 

direct  conflict  with  the  well-settled  priu-  75  N.  W.  524. 

ciple  which  has  been  stated  in  the  text,  Administrators  and  Executors :  An  ad- 
and  which  is  fully  sustained  by  the  au-  miuistrator  cannot  be  sued  in  the  same 
thorities.  action  in  his  individual  and  in  his  repre- 
[^Guardians :  "  The  administrator  of  a  sentative  capacity,  nor  can  a  complaint 
guardian  is  a  necessary  party  to  a  suit  in-  against  him  as  a  representative  be  amended 
volviug  an  account  of  the  guardiauship  "  :  so  as  to  constitute  an  action  against  him 
Brassell  v.  Silva  (1897),  50  S.  C.  181,  27  as  an  individual :  Sterrett  w.  Barker  (1897), 
S.  E.  622.  In  a  proceeding  to  .determine  119  Cal.  492,  51  Pac.  695.  In  an  action 
whether  certain  additional  credits  should  against  executors  o?fi  .so>(  fo?-^,  the  complaint 
be  allowed  to  a  removed  guardian,  the  sliould  be  against  them  as  executors  gen- 
guardian  is  not  a  necessary  party:  Wil-  erally :  First  Nat  Bank  )-.  Lewis  (1895),  12 
son's  Guardianship  (1902),  40  Ore.  353,  68  Utah,  84,  41  Pac.  712.] 


354 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  257.  *  3(50.  VI.  Actions  against  Corporations  and  Stockholders 
and  between  Partners.  Introductory.  Actions  to  wind  Up  the 
affiiir.s  of  corporations,  and  tlio.se  permitted  by  creditors  against 
stockholders  to  enforce  a  personal  liability  of  the  latter,  depend 
so  entirely  upon  special  statutory  provisions,  and  these  are  so 
different  in  different  States,  that  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down 
concerning  them  which  shall  be  a  part  of  the  common  procedure. 
In  fact,  the  subject  does  not  strictly  belong  to  a  treatise  upon  the 
principles  of  the  codes.  I  have  collected  some  cases,  however, 
which  indicate  the  tendencies  of  the  courts  in  the  various  States. ^ 

§  258.  *  361.  Receivers."  Creditors.  Directors.  An  insurance 
company  became  insolvent,  and  a  receiver  was  appointed  to  wind 
up  its  affairs.  While  it  was  in  an  insolvent  condition,  the  direc- 
tors had  declared  dividends  which  had  been  paid  to  stockholders. 
Certain  creditors  brought  separate  actions  against  individual 
stockholders  to  recover  back  the  dividends  so  paid  and  received, 
which  actions  were  pending.  In  this  condition  of  affairs  the 
receiver  instituted  a  suit  against  all  the  stockholders  to  compel  a 
repayment  of  all  the  illegal  dividends,  and  made  the  above-men- 


1  As  examples,  see  Chase  v.  Vauder- 
bilt,  62  N.  Y.  307 ;  Osgood  v.  Maguire,  61 
id.  524;  Westcott  v.  Fargo,  61  id.  542; 
Hackley  v.  Draper,  60  id.  88;  Hun  v. 
Gary,  82  id.  65 ;  People  v.  Albany  &  Vt. 
R.  Co.,  77  id.  2.32 ;  Watkins  v.  Wilcox,  4 
Hun,  220;  Pierce  v.  Milwaukee  Constr. 
Co.,  38  Wis.  233 

2  [l_Actions  hy  and  aguhixt  Receivers: 
A  corporation  which  has  passed  into  a  re- 
ceiver's hands  is  no  longer  capable  of  suing 
or  being  sued,  and  should  not  be  joined 
with  the  receiver  :  Idaho  Gold  Reduction 
Co.  V.  Croghan  (1899),  6  Idaho,  471,  56 
Pac.  164;  Ueland  v.  Haugan  (1897),  70 
Minn.  349,  73  X.  W.  169.  A  receiver  ap- 
pointed in  another  State  has  a  right  to 
maintain  an  action  in  tiie  courts  of  Ken- 
tucky :  Hallam  i-.  Ashfonl  (1902),  Ky.,  70 
S.  W.  197.  A  receiver  is  a  stranger  to  all 
proceedings  instituted  before  his  appoint- 
ment, and  remains  a  stranger  until  made 
a  party  by  the  court,  and  the  action  may 
legally  proceed  to  judgment  without  his 
being  made  a  party :  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  r.  IloUaday  (1895),  131  Mo.  440,  .33 
S.  W.  49.  A  receiver,  being  an  officer  of 
the  court  appointing  him,  cannot  be  sued 


in  any  other  court  without  the  consent  of 
the  appointing  court :  Smith  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1899),  151  Mo.  391,  52  S.  W. 
378.  A  personal  tax  assessed  against  the 
corporation  cannot  be  collected  in  an  action 
against  the  receiver  personally,  instituted 
under  G.  S.  1894,  §  1569:  State  v.  Red 
River,  etc.  Co.  (1897),  69  Minn.  131,  72 
N.  W.  60.  A  receiver,  in  onler  to  main- 
tain an  action,  must  allege  facts  showiiii,' 
his  appointment,  by  what  jurisdiction  he 
was  appointed,  and  enough  of  the  proceed- 
ings to  show  that  his  appointment  was 
legal,  and  tlie  allegations  must  be  made 
with  suflicient  certainty  to  admit  of  being 
traversed :  Rhorer  v.  Middlesboro  Co. 
(1898),  103  Ky.  146,  44  S.  W.  448. 

"  The  failure  of  a  party  to  obtain  leave 
of  the  court  to  sue  a  receiver  appointed  by 
it,  does  not  affect  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court  in  which  the  suit  is  brought,  ^o  hear 
and  determine  the  matter.  The  require- 
ment is  for  the  protection  of  the  receiver, 
and  if  be  makes  no  objection  to  the  suit 
being  brought  without  leave,  it  is  difficult 
to  perceive  why  anyone  else  should  be 
jicrmitted  to  do  so "  :  Tobias  v.  Tobias 
(1894),  51  O.  St.  519,  38  N.  IC.  317.] 


DEFENDANTS   IN   SUITS   AGAINST   CORPORATIONS.  355 

tioned  creditors  defendants,  asking-  against  them  an  injunction 
to  restrain  the  further  prosecution  of  their  actions.  It  was  held 
by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  that  the  receiver  could  main- 
tain such  an  action;  that  the  creditors  could  not;  that  all  tlie 
stockholders  were  properly  sued  together ;  -  and  tliat  the  creditors 
were  properly  joined  so  as  to  restrain  their  proceedings  and  avoid 
a  circuity  of  action,  and  settle  the  whole  in  one  controversy. ^  A 
stockholder,  suing  on  behalf  of  all  the  others,  instituted  an  action 
against  a  railroad  company  to  compel  the  declaration  of  a  divi- 
dend, alleging  that  funds  were  in  its  hands  sufficient  and  appro- 
priate for  that  purpose.  The  action  was  dismissed  because,  if 
sustainable  at  all,  it  should  have  been  against  the  directors,  who 
were  the  managing  trustees,  and  whose  duty  it  was  to  declare  a 
dividend,  if  any  such  duty  existed. ^ 

§  259.  *  362.  Judgment  Creditors.  Stockholders.  In  a  Suit  by 
judgment  creditors  of  a  corporation  (on  behalf  of  all  others  who 
should  come  in)  against  the  stockholders,  who  were  made  liable 
by  statute  for  the  debts  of  the  company  in  specified  contingencies, 
certain  other  judgment  creditors  were  united  as  defendants. 
Upon  a  general  demurrer  interposed  by  them,  they  were  deter- 
mined to  be  neither  necessary  nor  proper  defendants.  They 
should  have  been  joined  as  plaintiffs,  if  at  all ;  but  this  was  not 
necessary,  and  the  comj^laint  contained  no  allegation  that  they 
had  refused  to  unite  in  that  manner.*  In  Ohio,  under  statutes 
making  stockholders  liable  to  judgment  creditors  when  the  ordi- 
nary legal  remedies  against  the  corporation  have  been  exhausted, 
it  has  been  held  that  all  the  stockholders  must  be  united  as 
defendants,   and  proceeded  against  in  a  single  action.^ 

1  [[All  properly  sued  together  in  action  ^  Karnes  r.  Rochester  &  G.  Val.  R. 
to  enforce  -stock  liability,  even  when  resi-  Co.,  4  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  107.  per  T.  A.  John- 
dent  in  different  counties :  Gainey  v.  Gil-  son  J.  [[In  an  action  to  compel  a  cor- 
son  (1897),  149  Ind.  58,  48  N.  E.  6.33.  poration  to  deliver  shares  of  stock,  the 
Co«i/a,  in  Kell  V.  Lund  (1896),  99  la.  153,  directors  are  proper  but  not  necessary 
68  N.  W.  593.  Held  in  Waller  v.  Hamer  parties  :  Wells  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  Canal 
(1902),  65  Kan.  168,  69  Pac.  185,  that  all  Co.  (1895),  90  Wis.  442,  64  N.  W.  69.] 
who  were  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  ■*  Young  v.  N.  Y.  &  Liv.  S.  S.  Co.,  10 
court  must  be  brought  in.  See  also  Ryan  v.  Abb.  Pr.  229,  per  Hogeboom  J. 
Jacques  (1894),  10-3  Cal.  280,  37  Pac.  186.]  °  Umsted  v.  Buskirk,  17  Ohio  St.  113. 

2  Osgood  V.  Laytin,  5  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  1  ;  Contra,  Thompson  v.  Lake,  19  Nev.  103, 
[[Van  Pelt  v.  Gardner  (1898),  54  Neb.  115 ;  Hatch  r.  Dana,  101  U.  S.  210;  Baines 
701,  75  N.  W.  874;  Gianella  v.  Bigelow  y.  Babcock  (Cal.,  Sept.  1891),  27  Pac.  R. 
(1897),  96  Wis.  185,  71  N.  W.  Ill  ;  Smith  674.  That  the  corporation  is  not  a  neces- 
V.  Dickinson  (1898),  100  Wis.  574,  76  sary  party  to  such  an  action,  see  J^lour 
N.  W.  766.]  City  Nat."  Bk.   v.   Wechselberg,   45   Ped. 


356  CIVIL   EEMKDIES. 

^  260.  *  363.  Corporation,  Officers,  and  Assignee.  All  action  by 
Stockholders  of  a  bank  against  the  president  and  other  officers, 
the  corporation  itself,  and  an  assignee,  alleging  fraud  and  viola- 
tion of  duty  by  the  officei-s,  misajDplication  of  funds  terminating 
in  a  fraudulent  assignment,  and  praying  that  the  assignment 
might  be  set  aside,  the  officers  removed,  a  receiver  appointed, 
and  the  bank  wound  up,  was  sustained  in  Minnesota  as  being 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  an  equity  court,  and  was  declared  to  be 
brought  against  the  proper  parties.^  In  a  similar  action,  based 
upon  the  same  facts,  and  asking  for  a  removal  of  the  officers,  the 
appointment  of  a  receiver  to  take  charge  of  the  assets,  and  for  an 
election  under  the  direction  of  the  court,  the  corporation  was 
held  to  be  a  necessary  party  defendant  as  well  as  the  officers 
implicated. 2 

^  261.  *  364.  Assignor  of  Stock.  Rule  in  Indiana.  In  New^  York. 
The  holder  of  stock  in  a  corporation  assigned  it  to  a  creditor  as 
collateral  security  for  the  debt,  and  this  creditor  in  turn  assigned 
or  pledged  the  security  to  a  third  person.  The  latter  having 
commenced  an  action  to  enforce  his  right  of  property  against  the 

){ep.  547 ;    Sleeper  v.  •Goodwin,  67   Wis.  necessary  party,    when    insolvent,    in   an 

577,  586;    Nolan  v.  Hazen,  44  Min.  478.  action    by   a   receiver   to   recover   money 

In  a  bill  by  creditors  of  a  corporation  to  belonging    to    tlie    corporation    from    a 

enforce  the  liability  of  a  stockholder  for  third  party :  Nealis  v.  Am.  Tube  &  Iron 

his  unpaid  subscription,  the  corporation,  Co.  (1896),   150  N.  Y.  42,  44  N.  E.  944. 

if  it  still  exists,  is  a  necessary  party :  Pat-  The  corporation  is  an  indispensable  party 

terson  v.  Lynde,  112    111.  196.     [|A11  the  defendant  in  a  suit  to  marshal  its  assets: 

stockholders  and  all  the  creditors  must  be  Steele   Lumber   Co.    i'.   Laurens    Lumber 

made  parties:  Van  Pelt  i-.  Gardner  (1898),  Co.  (1896),  98  Ga.  329,  24  8.  E.  755. 
54  Neb.  701,  75  N.  W.  874  ;  Gianella  v.  In  an  action  by  stockholders  against  the 

Bigelow  (1897),  96  Wis.  185,  71   N.  W.  directorsof  a  corporation  for  an  accounting 

111;    Gainey  i-'.    Gilson    (1897),   149  Ind.  for  moneys  received  from  an  improper  sale 

58,  48  N.  E.  633  (even  wliere  they  reside  of  stock,  where  one  of  the  defendants  dies 

in   different   counties),  but   see   contrary  *  pending  the  suit,  his  administrator  may 

rule  in  Kell  v.  Lund  (1896),  99  la.  153,  68  be  substituted  without  giving   rise   to   a 

N.  W.  593,  where  it   is   held   that  each  misjoinder:  Morgan  v.   King   (1900),  27 

stockholder  is  entitled  to  a  sejiarate  action  Colo.  539,  63  Pac.  41 6. J 
in  the  county  of  his  residence.]  -  French  v.  Gifford,  30  Iowa,  148,  159. 

1  Mitchell  V.  Bank  of   St.  Paul,  7  Min.  See  also  Wickersham   v.   Crittenden,   93 

252.     [jThe  corporation  is  not  a  necessary  Cal.  17,33;  Swan  Land  &  Cattle  Co.  v. 

party  in  a  suit  by  the  receiver  of  a  corpora-  Frank,  39  Fed.  liep.  456.     Qln  J.  K.  Orr 

tion   against  the  stockholders   to  recover  Co.  v.  Kimbrough  (1896),  99  Ga.  143,  25 

the  amouut  of  their  liability  for  the  debts  S.  E.  204,  the  court  said  :  "  Although  an 

of  the  corporation :  Moore  i*.  Hipley  (1898),  equitable  petition  may  mention  the  name 

106  Ga.  556,  32  S.  E.  647.     Corporation  of  a  corporation  and  contain  a  prayer  for 

not  a  necessary  party  in  a  suit  by  corpo-  certain  relief  against  it,  such  corporation 

ration  creditors   to  enforce  unpaid   stock  is  not  a  party  to  the  petition  wherp  there 

cub<criptions:  Van  Pelt  i\  Gardner  (1898),  is  no  prayer  for  process  as  to  it. "3 
5t  Neb.  701,  75  N.  W.  874.     Nor  is  it  a 


DEFENDANTS   IN    SUITS   AGAINST   CORrOKATIONS.  357 

corporation  alone,  it  was  decided,  in  Indiana,  that  both  of  the 
assignors  were  necessary  defendants  under  the  special  provisions 
of  the  code  of  that  State,  which  require  the  assignors  of  things  in 
action  not  negotiable  to  be  made  parties  in  a  suit  by  the  assignee.^ 
But  in  New  York,  where  the  debtor,  defendant  in  an  action  by 
an  assignee  of  the  demand,  was  entitled  to  an  accounting  with 
the  assignor  in  respect  of  the  claim  sued  upon,  in  order  to  ascer- 
tain in  fact  whether  any  such  claim  existed,  and  applied  for  an 
order  bringing  him  in  as  a  defendant  for  that  purpose,  it  was 
held  that  such  assignor  was  neither  a  necessary  nor  a  proper 
party,  and  could  not  be  brought  in.^  The  courts  of  New  York 
seem  to  have  established  the  rule  under  the  code  for  that  State, 
that  an  assignor  of  a  thing  in  action  is  never  a  proper,  much  less 
a  necessar}^  defendant  in  an  action  by  the  assignee,  even  when 
the  plaintiff's  contention  depends  upon  the  legal  relations  and 
liabilities  existing  between  the  defendant — ^the  debtor  —  and  the 
assignor.  This  doctrine  is  entirely  contrary  to  that  which  pre- 
vails in  many  of  the  States,  and  which  is  sanctioned  by  their 
codes  and  approved  by  their  courts ;  and  it  seems  to  be  equally 
opposed  to  the  former  doctrine  of.  equity,  which  permitted,  if  it 
did  not  require,  the  presence  of  the  assignor  in  all  cases  where 
the  assignment  did  not  convey  a  legal  title,  and  especially  where 
an  accounting  or  other  settlement  of  matters  in  dispute  between 
the  assignor  and  the  defendant  was  necessary  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  amount  of  the  plaintiff's  demand.^ 

§  262.  *  365.  Accounting  by  one  Partner  against  another*  and 
by  Surviving  Partner.  In  an  action  virtually  of  accounting  by  one 
partner  against  another  to  recover  the  plaintiff's  share  of  the 
assets  or  profits,  and,  a  fortiori,  when  the  action  is  confessedly 
one  for  accounting,  all  the  partners  must  be  defendants.^  This 
special  rule  assumes  that  there  has  been  no  settlement,  no  bal- 
ance ascertained  and  agreed  upon,  so  that  a  simple  action  at  law 

1  Ind.  &  lU.  Cent.  R.  Co.  r.  McKernan,  3  Story's   Eq.     PI.  §  153,   and   notes; 

24  Ind.  62.  I    Dan.  Ch.  PI.  (4th  Am.  ed.),  pp.  197- 

^  AUenr.  Smith,  16  N.Y.  415.    See  also  199,  and  notes;  Miller  v.  Bear,  3  Paige, 

Andrews  v.  Gillespie,  47  N.  Y.  487,  which  467,  468;  Whitney  v.  McKinney,  7  Johns, 

holds  that   the  mortgagee  who  assigned  Ch.  144;  Trecothick  v.  Austin,  4  Mason, 

the  mortgage  is  not  a  proper  defendant  41-44. 

in  an  action  to  foreclose,  even  though  the  *  ^See  §  *  104,  and  cases  cited  in  the 

defence  pleaded  by  the  mortgagor  is  that  notes  to  that  section.] 
of  mistake  in  drawing  the  mortgage,  and  ^  Duck  v.  Abbott,  24  Ind.   349  ;    Set- 

pr.ays  the  relief  of  reformation.  tembre  v.  Putnam,  30  Cal.  490. 


358  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

could  be  maintained  therefor  by  one  partner  against  another,  but 
the  situation  is  such  that  an  action  for  an  accounting  is  the  only- 
relief  given  by  the  law.  In  such  equitable  action  all  the  part- 
ner are  necessary  parties.  A  partnership,  being  engaged  in  the 
business  of  buying  and  selling  lands,  for  i)urposes  of  convenience 
had  all  the  titles  taken  in  the  name  of  one  member  of  the  firm. 
He  died,  ])eing  at  the  time  thus  the  apparent  owner  of  lands 
which  Avere  actually  firm  property.  An  action  by  the  survivor 
for  an  account  and  settlement  was  properly  brought  against  the 
heirs,  widow,  and  administrator  of  the  deceased;  these  persons 
were  all  held  to  be  necessary  parties.^ 

§  263.  *  3(36.  VII.  Actions  for  Specific  Performance.  Conflict  of 
Opinion  herein.  It  is  the  established  rule  of  equity  procedure 
that,  in  the  ordinary  and  direct  action  to  compel  the  specific 
performance  of  a  contract  for  the  sale  of  lands,  the  parties  to  the 
contract  themselves,  or  the  persons  who  have  become  substituted 
in  their  place,  as  the  heirs, ^  and  under  certain  circumstances  the 
executors  or  administrators,  are  the  only  proper  parties  plaintiff 
or  defendant.  A  suit  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  this  special 
relief  cannot  be  combined  with  a  cause  of  action  for  relief  against 
other  persons  claiming  an  interest  in  the  same  land;  in  other 
words,  this  action  cannot  be  made  to  determine  the  titles  of 
other  claimants,  nor  to  foreclose  the  liens  of  subsequent  incum- 
brancers.^    This   well-settled  rule  has,  however,  been  departed 

1  Gray  v.  Palmer,  9  Cal.  616.     But  the  8  Taskcl  r.  Small,  3  My.  &  Cr.  63,  68, 

heirs  of  a  devisee  of  the  deceased,  it  has  per    Lord    Cotteuham,   Cliau. ;    Mole    v. 

been    held,    are    not    nece.ssary   parties:  Smith,  Jacob,  490,  494,  per  Lord  Eldon, 

Van  Aken  v.  Clarke,  82  Iowa,  2.56.     j^Iii  Chan. ;  Wood  v.  White,  4  My.  &  Cr.  470; 

an   action   against  a  rreceiver. of  a  part-  Kobertson   v.   Gr.  Western    Ry.   Co.,    10 

ner-ship   on   a   contract  made  by  him  as  Sim.  314;    Fagan  v.  Barnes,  14  Fla.  .53, 

receiver,  the  surviving  partner  is  not  a  .57 ;    Knott   v.    Stephens,    3    Oreg.    269 ; 

necessary  party  :  Painter  v.  Painter  (1902),  Monlton    i".    Chafee,    22    Fed.    Kep.   26; 

138  Cal.  231,  71  Pac.  90.     And  where  one  Ashley    v.    Little    Kock    (Ark.    1892),    19 

partner   institutes    proceedings   for  a  re-  S.  W.  1058;  Washburn  &  M.  Man.  Co.  r. 

ceiver  of    partnership   assets   to   prevent  Chicago   G.   W.  F.  Co.,  109  111.  71.     In 

another  jiartner  from  wasting  them,  firm  Ta.sker  i-.  Small,  mortgagees  of  the  land 

creditors  are  not  necessary  parties:  Allen  were  held  to  be  ini])roper  defendants.     In 

"    Couley  (1898),  53  S.  C.  414,  31   S.  K.  another  case,  a  tenant  of  the  vendor  in  pos- 

034.]  session  was  declared  an  improper  party. 

-  [[It  was   held    in    Salinger  v.  Gunn  All   persons    interested    iu    the    subject- 

(1895),  61   Ark.  414,  33  S.  W.  959,  that  matter   of   the   action   as   holders  of  the 

in  a  suit  by  the  vendee  of  land  for  specific  legal  or  equitable  titles  to  the  premises  in 

performance  of  the  contract  of  sale,  the  question  were    declared    to    be   necessary 

heirs  of  the  deceased  vendor  are  necessary  ])arties,  plaintiff  or  defendant,  in  McCotter 

partie.<.3  r.  Lawrence,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  392,  395. 


IN    SUITS    FOR   A    SPECIFIC    PERFORMANCE.  359 

from  by  some  State  courts.  Thus,  in  a  case  decided  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota,  a  contract  to  convey  land  had 
been  given,  and  the  vendee  had  gone  into  possession.  Subse- 
quently to  the  execution  of  the  agreement  and  the  change  of 
possession,  certain  persons  had  recovered  judgments  against  the 
vendor,  which  they  claimed  to  be  liens  upon  the  land.  These 
judgment  creditors  were  held  to  be  proper  defendants  in  the  suit 
for  a  specific  performance  brought  by  the  vendee  for  the  purpose 
of  cutting  off  their  rights  of  redemption,  it  being  assumed  that 
their  liens  were  subordinate  to  the  vendee's  rights.^  And  it  was 
held  in  a  recent  case  in  California  that,  in  an  action  to  compel 
the  specific  performance  of  such  a  contract,  —  the  land  being  an 
undivided  share  of  a  specific  tract,  —  all  persons  subject  to  the 
vendee's  equities,  and  holding  adversely  to  him,  must  be  made 
defendants.  2 

§  264.  *  367.  Holder  of  Adverse  Claim.  Personal  Representative 
of  Deceased  Vendor.  Heirs.  New  York  and  lo-wa  Cases.  In  a 
somewhat  peculiar  case  recentl}'  decided  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
New  York,  a  person  holding  a  subsequent  and  adverse  claim  to 
the  plaintiff  was  declared  to  be  a  necessary  defendant  to  a  com- 
plete determination  of  the  issues.  The  action  being  brought  to 
procure  the  specific  performance  of  a  land  contract  made  between 
the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  the  complaint  alleged  that  the  de- 
fendant had  made  a  subsequent  contract  to  convey  the  same  land 
to  F.,  and  prayed  an  injunction  restraining  defendant  from  making 
a  conveyance  to  F.  Upon  this  allegation  and  prayer  for  relief, 
it  was  held  that  such  subsequent  vendee  was  a  necessary  party. ^ 

1  Seager  v.  Burns,  4  Minn.   141,  14.5,  ^  Fullerton  v.  McCurdy,  4  Lans.  1-32. 

per  Emmet  J.     The  judge  made  no  sug-  "When   A.   agrees   to   convey  to  B.,   and 

gestion  of  a  doubt  wliether  these  creditors  afterwards  conveys  to  C,  who  has  notice 

were  proper  parties.     The  whole  discus-  of  tlie  prior   contract,  C.  is  a  necessary 

sion   turned   upon   the   question   whetlier  defendant   in   an  action    by   the   original 

the  general  allegation  of  the  plaintiff,  that  vendee  to  compel  a  specific  performance, 

they    "claimed    an    interest,''    etc.,    was  Stone  i'.  Buckner,  12  Sm.  &  M.  73 ;  Dailv 

enough.     They  were  likened  by  the  court  ?>.  Litchfield,  10  Mich.  29;  Spence  v.  Hogg, 

to  junior  incumbrancers  in   a   mortgage  I  Coll.  225;  Atchison,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co. 

foreclosure.     None  of  the  authorities  last  v.   Benton,  42    Kan.  698.     One  to  whom 

cited  were  mentioned.  the  vendor  had  assigned  the  contract  as 

■^  Agard  v.  Valencia,  39  Cal.  292.    This  collateral  security  was  held  to  be  a  proper 

case  is  somewhat  peculiar,  and  the  facts  defendant  in  Butler  v.  Gage  (Colo.  Sup. 

are  exceedingly  complicated.      The  deci-  1889),  23  Tac.  R.  462.     [^See  also  Water 

sion  certainly  seems  to  conflict  with  the  Supply  Co.  v.  Root  (1895),  56  Kan.  187, 

general    rule    as    established    by   equity  42  Pac.  715,  where  the  court  in  the  svlhv- 

courts,  and  as  stated  in  the  text.  bus   said  :  "  Where  A.   makes  a   written 


360  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

Where  the  vendor  has  died,  and  the  vendee  brought  his  action 
acainst  the  sole  heir  at  hiw  of  the  deceased,  but  conceded  in 
his  complaint  that  the  entire  purchase-money  had  not  been 
paid,  and  averred  a  tender  and  a  readiness  to  pay,  the  adminis- 
trators of  the  vendor  were  held  to  be  necessary  defendants  in 
New  York.^  It  would  appear  from  the  reasoning  of  this  case 
that  its  decision  is  confined  to  the  single  case  in  which  the  vendor 
has  died  before  the  purchase-money  has  been  entirely  paid,  and 
in  which  the  same  remains  unpaid  up  to  the  time  of  commencing 
the  action.  If  the  purchase  price  has  been  paid  in  full,  either  to 
the  vendor  during  his  lifetime,  or  to  his  administrators  after  his 
death,  then  his  heire  would  seem  to  be,  in  general,  the  only 
necessary  parties  defendant,  his  personal  representatives  not  then 
having  any  interest  in  the  controversy. ^  In  the  face  of  a  statute 
providing  that  an  action  for  a  specific  performance  of  a  land 
contract  may  be  brought  against  the  executor  or  administrator  of 
a  deceased  vendor,  and  that  other  parties  are  not  necessary,  but 
may  at  the  discretion  of  the  court  be  brought  in,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Iowa  has  held  that  such  personal  representatives  are  not 
necessary,  but  only  proper  parties;  that  in  the  absence  of  the 
statute  the  heirs  of  the  vendor  are  the  only  proper  or  possible 
parties ;  and  that,  the  language  of  the  statute  being  permissive, 
it  will  not  be  construed  to  make  the  administrators  or  executors 
necessary  defendants.  ^ 

contract  for  a  sale  of  real  property  to  B.,  Champeinownc,   9    Price,   130.     See  also 

wliicli  is  forthwith  placed  on  record,  and  Lowry  v.  Jackson,  27  S.  C.  .318;  Sawyer 

afterwards   conveys   tlie   property  to  C,  v.  Baker,  66  Ala.  292 ;  Houston  v.  Black- 

who  buvs  with  constructive  notice  of  the  man,  66  Ala  5.59  ;  Coffey  r.  Norwood,  81 

rights  of  B.,  under  his  contract,  AcW,  that  Ala.    512;     Walters    r.  Walters,  132  111. 

an  action  to  compel  a  conveyance  of  the  467.     If  the  vendor  sues  the  heirs  alone 

lei^al  title,  after  full  perf<jrmance  of  his  of  the  deceased  vendee,  the  latter  can  in- 

part  of  the  contract  hy  B.,  may  be  main-  sist  upon  the  administrators  being  brought 

taiued  against  C,  and  that  A.  is  not  an  in.     Story's  Eq",  PI.  §  177;  Cock  i'.  Evans, 

iudispensable  party  to  the  action. "J  9  Yerg.  287.     The  vendor  and  the  vendee 

1  Potter  V.  Ellice,  48  N.  Y.  321,  323.  having  botii  died,  the  heirs  and  widow 
See  also  Tiiompson  v.  Smith,  63  N.  Y.  of  the  latter  brought  a  suit  against  the 
301  ;  Rain  v.  Koper,  15  Fla.  121  ;  Butler  devisees  of  the  vendor  to  wliom  tiie  laud 
j;.  Gage  (Colo.  Sup.  1889),  23  Pac.  R.  462.  had  been  devised,  and    the  parties  were 

2  All  tiie  lieirs  of  a  deceased  vendor  are  all  held  to  l)e  proper,  in  Peters  u.  Jones, 
necessary  defendants  in  the  action.  House  35  Iowa,  512,  518;  see  ca.ses  cited  by 
i:  Dexter,  9  Midi.  246;  Duncan  n.  Wick-  Miller  J.  at  page  518.  When  the  oldigor 
liffe,  4  Scam.  452.  See  also  Rogers  v.  in  a  title  bond  has  died,  his  heirs  at  law 
Wolfe,  104  Mo.  1.  are  necessary  parties  to  a  suit  by  iiis  per- 

•*  Judil  V.  Moseley,  30  Iowa,  423,  427;  sonal  rei)resentatives  to  subject  the  laud 
Story's  E(|.  PI.  §§  160,  177;  Champion  r.  to  tiie  ])ayment  of  the  purchase-money: 
Bruwn,  6   Joims.    Ch.  402;    Townsend  v.      Gruljb  r.  L.okabill,  100  N.  C.  267- 


DEFKNDANTS    IN    SUITS    TO    QUIKT    TITLE.  361 

§  265.  *  368.  Prior  Mortgagee.  Agent  of  Vendor.  Person  Mak- 
ing Redemption.  Ill  an  action  against  the  vendor  to  compel  the 
specific  performance  of  his  contract,  the  pLaintiff  united  with  him 
as  co-defendants  the  holders  of  two  prior  mortgages  embracing 
the  land  agreed  to  be  conveyed,  which  had  been  given  by  the 
vendor,  alleging  in  his  complaint  that  the  vendor  had  agreed  to 
pay  off  and  remove  these  mortgages,  and  that  they  included  other 
lands  in  addition  to  that  claimed  by  the  plaintiff,  which  were 
sufficient  to  satisfy  the  demand  secured  thereby,  and  praying 
that  the  mortgagees  might  be  compelled  to  sell  such  otlier  lands 
first.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  however,  held  that  these 
mortgagees  could  not  be  joined  as  co-defendants  in  the  action. ^ 
When  in  the  contract  for  the  sale  and  conveyance  of  land  the 
vendor  appointed  a  certain  person  as  his  agent  to  make  and 
deliver  a  deed  in  his  name  to  the  vendee,  and  directed  the  agent 
to  execute  and  deliver  the  same,  and  neither  the  vendor  nor  the 
agent  complied  with  the  terms  of  the  agreement,  an  action 
brought  against  the  vendor  and  the  agent  as  co-defendants  was 
held  to  be  improper,  and  the  agent  was  declared  not  to  be  a 
proper  party  in  any  aspect  of  the  case,  since  he  had  no  interest 
in  the  controversy  adverse  to  the  plaintiff. ^  Land  had  been  sold 
at  execution  sale,  and  afterwards  redeemed  in  alleged  compliance 
with  the  statute  which  prescribes  the  manner  of  redemption. 
The  purchaser,  denying  the  validity  of  the  redemption,  brought 
an  action  against  the  sheriff  alone  to  compel  an  execution  and 
delivery  of  the  deed,  and  this  action  was  held  insufficient;  it 
should  have  embraced  the  person  who  made  the  redemption,  and 
who  claimed  to  hold  the  land  by  virtue  thereof,  as  a  co-defendant 
with  the  sheriff.'^ 

§  266.  *  369.  VIII.  Actions  to  quiet  Title.  Scope  of  Statute 
herein  in  "Western  States.  Multiform  Use  of.  The  nature  of  the 
action  to  quiet  title  is  such  that  it  is  impossible  to  lay  down  any 
but  the  most  general  rule  in  relation  to  its  parties    defendant. 

1  Chapman  >•.  West,  17  N.  Y.  125.  joined  witli  B.  in  tlie  action,  primarily  as 

2  Dahoney  v.  Hall,  20  Ind.  264.  a  plaintiff;  but  if  not,  then  as  a  defendant ; 

3  Crosby  r.  Davis,  9  Iowa,  98.  Wiiero  but  if  the  agreement  between  B.  and  C.  is 
the  vendee  sub-contracts,  there  is  a  dis-  that  B.  will  convey  the  land  to  C,  then 
tinction  depending  upon  the  nature  of  the  B.  is  the  onlv  necessary  partv  in  the  ac- 
sub-contract.  If  A.  agrees  to  convey  to  tion  against  A.  Alexander  v.  Cana.  1 
B.,  and  the  latter  in  turn  agrees  with  C.  De  G.  &  Sm.  415;  Chadwick  r.  Maden, 

that  the  conveyance  shall  he  made  by  A.  9  Hare,  188;  B v.  Walford,  4  Russ. 

directly  to  him, —  C, — then  C.  must  be  372. 


362  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

The  very  object  of  the  proceeding  assumes  that  there  are  other 
claimants  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  setting  up  titles  and  interests 
in  the  land  or  otlier  subject-matter  hostile  to  his.  Of  course  all 
these  adverse  claimants  are  proper  parties  defendant,  and  if  the 
decree  is  to  accomplish  its  full  effect  of  putting  all  litigation  to 
rest,  they  are  necessary  defendants. ^  Originally,  and  independ\ 
ent  of  statute,  this  particular  jurisdiction  of  equity  was  onhi 
invoked  when  either  many  persons  asserted  titles  adverse  to  that 
of  the  plaintiff,  or  when  one  person  repeatedly  asserted  his  single) 
title  by  a  succession  of  legal  actions,  all  of  which  had  failed,  anq 
in  either  case  the  object  of  the  suit  was  to  settle  the  whole  ootJ- 
troversy  in  one  proceeding.  The  action  has,  however,  been  A 
greatly  extended  by  statute,  especially  in  the  Western  States, 
and  is  there  an  ordinary  means  of  trying  a  disputed  title  between y 
two  opposite  claimants.  The  general  scope  of  these  statutes  i^ 
as  follows :  The_plajjitiff  must  be  in  possesion  claiming  an^tate 
in  the  lands. ^  The  adverse  claimant  or  claimants  must  be  ouFbf 
po^essiSri",'  and  must  assert  a  hostile  title  or  interest.  In  this 
conditiou  the  possessor  of  the  land,  without  waiting  for  any  pro- 
ceeding, legal  or  equitable,  to  be  instituted  against  him,  may  take 
the  initiative,  and,  by  commencing  an  equitable  action,  may 
compel  his  adversaries  to  come  into  court,  assert  their  titles,  and 
have  the  controversy  put  to  rest  in  a  single  judgment.  It  is 
plain,  therefore,  that  this  statutory  suit  is  the  converse  of  the 
legal  action  of  ejectment.  The  action  to  quiet  title  is  not,  how- 
ever, confined  to  the  ownership  of  lands;  its  use  is  multiform;  it 
may  be  invoked  to  determine  conflicting  rights  over  personal 
property,  and  even  rights  growing  out  of  contract  where  a  multi- 
plicity of  actions  depending  upon  the  same  questions  will  thereby 
be  avoided.  I  shall  now  give  some  il'lustrations  of  the  action  and 
of  its  different  forms.     It  will  be  seen  that  each  case  must  stand 

1  ^Browning  v.  Smith  (1894),  139  Ind.  liad  delivered  possessiou    to  tlie  grantee, 

280,  37  X.  E.  540:  In  a  suit  for  quieting  under  an  agreement  that  a  portion  of  the 

title  t<j  land,  the  omission  of  the  holder  purcjiase  price  should  he  de))osited  with  a 

of  an  erpiity  of  re(leni))tion  as  party  de-  third  jiarty  to  he  ])aid  over^after  a  cloud 

fendant  does  not  prevent  the  decree  from  on  the  title  should  he  removed,  has  suffi- 

ojicrating  to  bar  and  foreclose  those  who  cient   interest   tq   maintain    an    action   to 

were  made  parties.]  quiet  title.    See,  also,  ]\ruczinski  ?\  Neuen- 

-  ^Sco,    however.    Slyer    v.    Sprague  dorf  (1898),  99  Wii^:  264,  74  N.  W.  974, 

(1896),  GJ  Minn.  414,  6.5  N.  W.  6,')9,  where  where  one  not  in   possession  was  allowerl 

a    grantor    who   had   conveyed    land    hy  to  maintain  an  action  to  remove  a  cloud 

warranty  deed  with    full    covenants,   and  from  his  title.] 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS   TO    QUIET   TITLE.  363 

mainly  upon  its  own  circumstances  under  the  guidance  of  tlie 
general  principle  which  requires  all  persons  whose  rights  and 
interests  could  be  affected  by  the  decree  to  be  made  parties. 

§  267.  *  370.  Illustrations  of  Action  and  its  Forms.  The  officers 
of  a  railroad  company,  in  violation  of  their  duty  and  of  the 
charter,  and  with  a  fraudulent  intent,  issued  large  amounts  of 
spurious  stock  of  the  corporation,  which  had  all  the  appearance 
on  the  face  of  being  genuine.  These  issues  had  been  made  at 
different  times,  and  to  various  persons,  and  the  stock  was  actu- 
ally held  by  three  hundred  and  twenty-six  separate  owners,  who 
had  bought  it  in  the  course  of  business  supposing  it  to  be  genuine. 
Most  of  these  holders  had  commenced  suits  against  the  company 
to  compel  it  to  recognize  the  stock  as  valid  in  their  hands. 
Under  these  circumstances  the  corporation  began  an  action 
against  all  these  three  hundred  and  twenty-six  persons  as  de- 
fendants, to  procure  the  stock  to  be  declared  spurious,  to  enjoin 
the  suits  then  pending,  and  to  determine  the  controversy  at  one 
blow.  The  suit  was  sustained  as  a  bill  of  peace  and  to  quiet 
title,  and  the  defendants  were  held  to  have  been  properly  united 
in  the  one  proceeding ;  their  stock  was  tainted  (if  at  all)  by  a 
common  vice,  and  the  same  fundamental  question  disposed  of 
all  their  claims. ^  On  the  same  principle,  the  receiver  of  an 
insolvent  insurance  company  was  permitted  to  unite  all  the  judg- 
ment creditors  of  the  corporation  who  were  separately  suing  the 
stockholders  on  their  personal  liability,  and  to  enjoin  their  actions 
in  order  that  the  liability  of  all  the  stockholders  might  be  enforced 
by  himself  in  the  same  action. - 

§  268.  *  371.  Same  Subject.  In  an  action  to  quiet  title  to 
lands  by  correcting  mistakes  in  deeds  thereof,  all  persons  having 
any  interest  in  the  land,  or  having  an}^  interests  which  could  be 
affected   by  the   relief  demanded,    must  be    brought   before  the 

1  N.  Y.  &  N.  H.  R.  Co.  V.  Schuyler,  17  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  120,  130  e(  seq. ;  London 

N.  Y.  592.     The  final  result  was,  that  the  v.  Perkins,  4  Bro.  P.  C.  158 ;  Hardcastle  v. 

court  pronounced  the  stock  valid  as  against  Smithsou,  -3  Atk.  2-45  ;  Adair  v.  New  River 

the  company,  and  each  defendant  obtained  Co.,  1 1  Ves.  429  ;  Newton  v.  Earl  of  Eg- 

a  separate  judgment  against  the  plaintiff,  mont,  5  Sim.  130;  Harrison  ;;.  Steward- 

s.  <;.  34  N.  Y.  30.    Bills  of  peace  are  some-  son,  2    Hare,    530;    Holland  v.   Baker,  3 

times  permitted  to  be  bronght  against  a  Hare,  68.     See  also  Supervisors  v.  Deyoe, 

part  only  of  those  claiming  adversely  to  77  N.  Y.  219.  ' 

the  plaintiff  when  their  number  is  very  -  Osgood  v.  Laytiu,  5  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  I 

large  ;  but  in  all  such  cases  the  right  must  (Ct.  of  App.). 
be    s:eneral    anions:   all    these   claimants. 


364  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

court  as  defendants.^  When  the  land  has  passed  through  several 
owners  by  a  succession  of  conveyances,  all  the  series  of  grantors, 
or  their  heirs  if  they  themselves  are  dead,  are  necessary  defend- 
ants.^  In  another  case  involving  the  same  principle,  a  sale  had 
been  made  under  a  power  of  sale  contained  in  a  mortgage  of  land, 
and  a  deed  of  the  land  executed  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  mortgagee 
to  the  purchaser.  In  the  description  of  the  premises  contained 
in  this  mortgage  there  was  an  important  mistake,  which  was 
repeated  in  the  deed  to  the  purchaser  who  took  the  conveyance 
in  ignorance  thereof.  On  discovery  of  this  error  he  brought  an 
action  to  reform  the  mortgage  and  his  deed  by  correcting  the 
mistake,  and  made  the  mortgagor  the  only  defendant.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  held  upon  these  facts  the  mortgagee 
was  a  necessary  defendant,  and  must  be  brought  in  before  any 
judgment  could  be  rendered.^ 

§  269.  *  372.  Case  in  New  York.  The  general  rule  governing 
actions  to  quiet  and  determine  title  to  lands  brought  b}^  the  one 
in  possession  against  the  persons  who  set  up  adverse  claims  was 
clearly  and  accurately  stated  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals 
in  a  recent  case.  The  proceeding  was  instituted  under  a  statute 
which  corresponds  in  its  important  features  with  the  description 
of  that  class  of  enactments  given  in  a  preceding  paragraph 
(§  *  369).  The  party  in  possession  had  united  all  the  adverse 
claimants  as  defendants  in  his  suit,  and  this  was  objected  to  as  a 
misjoinder.  The  court  stated  the  doctrine  in  the  following  man- 
ner: "  It  is  claimed  on  the  part  of  the  respondents  that  the  jilain- 
tiff  could  not  unite  all  the  claimants  as  defendants  in  the  action. 
I  cannot  doubt  that  this  claim  is  entirely  unfounded.  Here  are 
twenty-four  persons  claiming  title  to  this  real  estate.     They  all 

^  [^Iii  IIiiiiiiilia],etc.  K.  R.  Co.  w.  Nortoiii  Jle.  507.     As  to  necessary  or  proper  de- 

(1900),  154  Mo.  142,  55  S.  W.  220,  it  was  fendants  in  actions  to  correct  mistakes  in 

sou<^ht  to  quiet  title  Ijy  liaving  a  deed  set  instriunents,  see    Newman   v.   Home   Ins. 

aside  wliich  wa.s  executed  by  a  third  party.  Co.,  20  Minn.  422,  424 ;  Durliam  r.  Hisdioff, 

Held   that   tlie   grantor    and    grantee   of  47  Ind.  211.     Also  Bush  r.  Hicks,  GO  N.  Y. 

fraudulent  deed  were  necessary  parties.]  298;  Mills  i*.  IJuttrick,  4  Col.  123;  Steven- 

^  Flanders  v.    McClanahan,   24    Iowa,  son  v.  I'olk,  71  Iowa,  278;    Coggswell  v. 

486.     See  this  case  for  a  very  elaborate  Griffith  (Neb.  1888),  .30  N.  W.  Hc]).  538; 

discussion  of  the  doctrine  stated  in  the  Roberts  v.  Chanilierlaiu,  .30  Kan.  677. 
text;    but   see    Thomas    v.   Kennedy,  24  '■'  Haley  v.   Bairley,  37  Mo.  363.     The 

Iowa,  397;  and  see  Beckwith  v.  Darges,  court  finally  lield  that  the  purchaser  could 

18  Iowa,  303.     In  an  action  to  refurm  a  not  maintain  such  an  action  at  all;  that 

deed,  both  the  grantor  and  the  grantee  are  he  was  not  in  such  ])rivity  with  the  mort- 

nece?sary  parties.     Pierce  v.  Faunce,  47  gagnr  as  to  ontiile  him  to  the  relief. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS   FOR    PAKTITION.  365 

denied  the  plaintiff's  right  upon  the  same  ground,  and  chiimed 
title  from  the  same  source,  and  therefore  had  the  same  defence 
to  the  action.  It  cannot  be  that  under  the  Revised  Statutes  it 
would  have  been  necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  have  instituted  in 
such  a  case  tv/enty-four  special  proceedings.  Under  the  Revised 
Statutes  these  defendants,  if  they  had  all  been  in  possession  of 
this  real  estate,  claiming  the  same  title  which  they  set  up  as  de- 
fendants in  this  action,  could  all  have  been  united  as  defendants 
in  an  action  of  ejectment ;  and  they  could,  if  they  had  chosen  to 
do  so,  all  have  united  in  an  action  of  ejectment  against  the  plaintiff. 
Hence  there  was  no  error  in  the  joinder  of  these  defendants."  ^ 

§  270.  *  373.  IX.  Actions  for  Partition.  Their  General  Purpose. 
General  Creditors.  Holders  of  Liens  on  Entire  Tract.  The  action  of 
partition  has  been  made  the  object  of  so  many  special  and  vary- 
ing statutory  regulations  in  the  different  States,  that  it  cannot 
properly  be  said  to  fall  within  the  domain  of  the  general  procedure 
as  the  same  is  established  by  the  codes.  I  shall  only  attempt, 
therefore,  to  point  out  its  general  features  relating  to  parties  de- 
fendant, and  such  as  are  common  to  all  or  several  of  the  States  in 
which  the  reformed  system  prevails.  The  primary  object  of  the 
action  is  to  divide  the  land  according  to  their  respective  interests 
among  the  co-owners.  The  proceeding  may  be  instituted  by  any 
co-owner,  and  all  the  other  co-owners  are  of  course  necessary  de- 
fendants, and  they  are  in  such  case  the  only  necessary  or  even 
proper  defendants,  for  the  rights  of  no  otlier  classes  of  persons 
could  be  affected  by  the  decree  making  the  division.^     General 

1  Fisher  v.  Hepburn,  48  N.  Y.  41,  55,  the  defendants  claimed  and  exercised  their 
per  Earl  J.  Goldsmith  v.  Gilliland,  24  Tights  and  interests  severally  and  sepa- 
Fed.  Rep.  154;  Kiucaid  v.  McGowan,  88  rately,  each  to  a  distinct  part  of  the  shore. 
Ky.  91 ;  Ellis  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  77  The  question  of  misjoinder  of  parties  de- 
Wis.  114;  Keens  v.  Gaslin,  24  Neb.  310;  fendant  was  presented  by  demurrer  and 
Johnson  v.  Robinson,  20  Minn.  170;  answer.  The  joinder  of  the  several  de- 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  144,  198;  Sutton  v.  fendants  was  proper.  They  severally 
Stone,  2  Atk.  101  ;  Reynoldson  w.  Perkins,  claimed  riglits  affecting  plaintiff's  right 
Arnb.  564;  Mead  v.  Mitchell,  17  N.  Y.  appurtenant  to  liis  land,  and  their  claim, 
210,  214,  215;  Clemens  o.  Clemens,  37  thougli  under  different  patents,  was  from 
N.  Y.  59.  I^Heckman  v.  Swett  (1893),  99  the  same  source,  and  tlie  injury  to  the 
Cal.  303,  33  Pac.  1099,  was  an  action  to  plaintiff,  as  well  as  their  defence  to  the 
quiet  title  to  a  fishing  privilege.  The  action,  depended  as  to  each  upon  the  same 
plaintiff  was  tlie  owner  of  certain  lands  facts.  Pom.  Rem.  &  Rem.  Rights,  §* 372  ; 
on  the  north  side  of  the  Eel  river,  and  Fisher  v.  Hepburn,  48  N.  Y.  41-55.''] 
the  defendants  each  severally  owned  cer-  '-^  C^nly  a  joint  tenant  or  a  tenant  in 
tain  lauds  on  tlie  south  side  of  the  same  common  can  maintain  an  action  for  tlie 
river,  opposite  the  plaintiff's  lands.  The  partition  of  real  estate  :  Phillips  v.  Dorris 
courtsavs:  "  The  court  further  found  that  (1898),  56  Neb.  293,  76  N.  W.  555.     An 


366  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

creditors  of  any  co-owner,  or  of  any  prior  owner  of  the  whole 
tract  of  land,  —  as,  for  example,  the  deceased  ancestor  of  the 
present  co-owners,  —  or  of  any  prior  owner  of  part  of  the  land, 
not  liaving  obtained  judgment,  and  not  therefore  holding  any 
lien  upon  the  premises  or  a  part  of  them,  would  not  be  proper 
defendants  for  any  purpose,  any  more  than  the  general  creditors 
of  a  jiiortgagor  in  the  case  of  a  foreclosure.  The  holders  of  liens 
upon  the  entire  tract  to  be  divi.ded,  such  as  judgment  creditors  of 
tlie  former  owner,  or  the  holders  of  mortgages  given  by  a  former 
owner,  would  not  be  necessary  defendants,  nor  would  they  be 
even  proper  paities  to  the  action.  Their  liens  would  be  utterly 
unaffected  by  the  decree  and  subsequent  division  in  pursuance 
^'hereof.  As  their  judgments  or  mortgages  were  incumbrances 
upon  ti.o  whole  land  prior  to  the  titles  of  the  present  co-owners, 
tlie  division  u£  the  real  estate  among  these  co-owners  would  leave 
the  same  liens  undisicirbed  and  effectual  upon  the  same  premises 
in  their  full  force  and  effect.  The  transaction  would  be  the  same 
in  substance  as  the  conveyance  .by  a  mortgagor  of  the  mortgaged 
premises  to  a  grantee  who  takes  tlicMi  subject  to  the  existing  lien. 
Such  incumbrancers  are  therefore,  acco.i-tlin<T  to  the  doctrines  of 
equity,  not  even  proper  parties  defendai.-t,  when  the  action  is 
simply  for  a  division  of  the  soil. 

§  271.  *  374.  Holders  of  Liens  on  Undivided  Shares.  The  caSG 
of  those  who  hold  liens  upon  the  undivided  shares  of  individual 
co-owners,  may  appear  at  first  view  to  be  somewhat  d\ifferent  from 
the  one  last  described,  but  it  really  falls  within  the  same^  principle. 
As  long  as  the  co-owner's  share  remains  undivided,  thc^  incum- 
brance upon  it  is  equally  vague ;  that  is,  it  is  not  a  lien  upion  any 
specific  and  determined  part  of  the  whole  common  tract,  but  "upon 
an  undivided  and  undistino^uished  fraction  of  it.  As  the  sincrle 
co-owner  himself  cannot  say  of  any  particular  spot  of  the  territory 
ill  ([uestion,  "  This  is  mine,  I  am  entitled  to  the  exclusive  poss€>ts- 
sion  of  this,"  so  his  judgment  creditor  or  mortgagee  cannot  sa\y 
of  any  particvdar  lot,  "  I  liave  a  lien  upon  this,  and  can  enforco 
that  lien  by  selling  this  specific  portion."  The  sole  effect  of  the 
decree  and  the  decision  in  execution- tliereof  is  to  allot  a  certain 
specified  and  determined  piece  of  land  to  the  eo-OAvner  in  place 
of  his  former  undefined  share,  and  to  transfer  the  lien-holder's 

aiimiiii.strator  of  a  deceased  joint  tenant  Thruckmorton  r.  I'ence  (189.3),  121  Mo. 
is  nut  a  jmjjfcr  party  to  a  piiLliion  suit:      oO,  2.'>  S.  W.  843.] 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS    FOR    PARTITION.  367 

incumbrance  to  this  specified  and  determined  portion  of  tlie 
soil.  The  incumbrance  itself  is  neither  increased  nor  diminished 
in  amount;  it  is  merely  changed  from  its  floating  to  a  fixed 
character.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  the  incumbrancer  thus 
described  has  no  real  legal  or  equitable  interest  in  the  parti- 
tion suit  when  the  same  is  instituted  and  carried  on  to  its  end  for 
the  mere  purpose  of  dividuig  the  land  among  the  co-owners.  His 
rights  are  unaffected;  his  lien  undisturbed.  The  only  apparent 
interest  which  he  has,  or  can  possibly  have,  is  not  in  the  action 
itself,  nor  even  in  the  judgment  ordering  a  partition,  but  in  the 
execution  of  that  judgment.  It  may  be  said  that  he  has  an  in- 
terest to  see  that  the  division  is  properly  made,  so  that  the  co- 
owner  on  whose  share  he  has  the  lien  will  receive  a  fair  allotment, 
and  that  thus  the  value  of  his  own  security  will  be  preserved.  He 
has  such  an  interest  undoubtedly,  but  it  is  not  a  legal  one ;  nor 
does  it  commence  until  the  cause  is  decided  and  the  judgment 
rendered.  Moreover,  the  actual  division  is  'made  by  officers  of  the 
court,  —  the  sheriff,  or  commissioners  appointed  in  the  case,  —  and 
they  act  under  the  direction  and  control  of  the  court  itself.  As 
in  the  case  of  all  other  administrative  official  acts  the  law  presumes 
that  they  will  be  rightly  done,  it  does  not  require  a  person  to  be 
made  a  party  to  the  action  in  order  that  he  may  be  in  a  position 
to  protect  himself  against  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  officers  who 
are  appointed  to  carry  a  judgment  of  the  court  into  effect.  Per- 
sons are  made  parties  in  order  that  they  may  have  an  opportunity 
of  presenting  their  rights  and  claims  to  the  judge  before  he  makes 
his  decree,  to  the  end  that  they  may  be  considered  and  passed 
upon  and  established  by  the  judgment  itself.  When  that  judg- 
ment can  in  no  possible  manner  affect  his  rights,  he  is  not  even 
a  proper  party  to  the  suit.  I  have  thus  stated  the  principles  of 
equity  unmodified  by  statute  which  govern  the  action  of  partition 
when  the  same  is  brought  for  an  actual  division  of  the  land.  The 
statutory  provisions  in  relation  to  the  action  may  have  altered 
these  rules  in  some  particulars;  but  I  have  only  designed  to 
present  the  equity  doctrine  pure  and  simple  with  the  reasons 
therefor;  so  that  local  changes,  wherever  tliey  have  been  made, 
will  be  the  more  readily  understood  and  their  effect  appreciated.^ 

1  Prior  \o  any  contrary  statute,  tlie  tract,  are  not  proper  parties.  Harwood 
rule  was  well  settled  that  incumbrancers  v.  Kirby,  1  Paige,  469,  471  ;  Sebring  v. 
on  the  undivided  shares,  or  on  the  whole     Mersereau,  Hopli.  501,  503;  s.  c.  on  app. 


3ti8  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  272.  *  375.  Different  Rule  where  Object  of  Suit  is  to  sell  Land 
and  divide  Proceeds.  Tliere  is  another  aspect,  however,  of  the 
partition  suit  which  places  it  in  very  different  relations  to  the 
holders  of  liens  and  incumbrancers  either  upon  the  whole  land 
paramount  to  the  titles  of  the  co-owners,  or  upon  the  undivided 
shares  of  the  co-owners  themselves.  Its  object  is  sometimes  to 
sell  the  whole  land,  and  to  divide  the  proceeds,  and  not  to  divide 
the  land  itself.  When  this  is  the  nature  of  the  judgment,  it  is 
plain  that  the  riglits  and  interests  of  the  lien-holders  must  be 
adjusted  and  determined  in  tlie  one  action,  and  especially  so  when 
the  land  is  to  be  sold  free  from  all  incumbrance,  so  that  the  lien 
of  all  the  mortgages  and  judgments  will  be  transferred  from  the 
real  estate  to  the  fund  which  is  the  proceeds  thereof,  and  they 
will  be  paid  off  and  satisfied  therefrom.  There  is  then  a  neces- 
sary antagonism  between  the  co-owners  and  all  classes  and  species 
of  incumbrancers  upon  their  undivided  shares.  Their  rights  are 
clashing  ;  they  are  opposing  claimants  of  the  same  fund ;  the  in- 
terests of  all  are  to  be  finally  established  and  satisfied  at  the 
one  judicial  proceeding.  It  is  evident,  therefore,  upon  the  most 
familiar  principles  of  equity  jurisprudence  in  its  relation  to  par- 
ties, that  in  the  a:>pect  of  the  action  now  described,  all  the  holders 
of  liens  and  incumbrances  upon  the  undivided  shares  of  individual 
co-owners,  created  subsequent  to  the  inception  of  their  titles,  are 
not  only  proper  but  necessary  defendants  in  order  that  a  decree 
should  be  made  determining  all  these  conflicting  rights  and 
claims,  while  the  holders  of  prior  liens,  if  not  necessary,  are  at 

9  Cow.  .344,  34.') ;  Wotten  v.  Copoland,  7  sary  defendant  unless  a  sale  of  the  land  is 

Johns.  Ch.  140,  141;  Agar  r.  Fairfax,  17  to   be   made.     Tanner  t;.  Niles,    1    Barb. 

Ves.  542,  544 ;    Baring  v.  Nash,  1  Ves.  &  560.     It  is  held  in  New  York  that,  iude- 

B.  551.     All  the  tenants  in  common,  or  pendent  of  statute,  subsequent  contingent 

owners    of     undivided    shares,    niu.^t    be  remainder-men,  or  persons  holding  under 

]iarties    either    plaintiffs    or  defendants,  executory   devises,    who    may    hereafter 

Buriians  v.    Burhans,    2    Barb.    Cli.  398  ;  come  into  being,  are  bound  by  a  decree  in 

Teal  V.  Woodworth,  3  Paige.  470.     When  partition  made  by  a  court  of  equity,  when 

a  tenant   in   common    has    assigned    his  the,  ])resent  owners  of  a  vested  estate  of 

share  for  the  benefit  of  Iiis  creditors,  such  inlieritance  in   the  land  have  been  made 

creditors   are   not    proper    parties.      Van  parties.     Mead  v.  Mitchell,  17  N.  Y.  210, 

Arsdale  v.  Drake,  2  Barb.  599.     A  widow  214,  215  ;  Clemens  v.  Clemens,  37  N.  Y.  59. 

entitled  to  dower  in  an  undivided  share  is  [Hidd  in  Chalmers  v.  Trent  (1894),  11  Utah 

a  necessary  party.     Wilkinson  v.  Parish,  8S,  39  Pac.  488,  that  the  holder  of  a  lien 

3  Paige,  653  ;  Green   v.  Putnam,  1   Barb.  n|)on  a  joint  tenant's  share  was  a  necessary 

500;  Gregory  v.  Gregory,  69  N.   C  522,  ])arty  to  a  suit  for  partition,  and  that  such 

526.      But   a   widow   who   is   entitled   to  necessary  party  might  be  brought  in   by 

dower  in   the  whole  tract  is  not  a  neces-  cross-hill.] 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS   FOIi    PARTITION. 


369 


least  proper  parties  for  a  complete  adjudication.^  It  may  some- 
times be  impossible  at  the  commencement  of  the  action  to  deter- 
mine whether  the  judgment  will  be  given  for  a  simple  partition 
of  the  land  itself,  or  for  a  sale  of  the  land  and  a  division  of  the 
proceeds  after  satisfying  the  incumbrances,  and  therefore  tlie 
classes  of  persons  described  may  be  joinfid  as  defendants  from 
motives  of  precaution.  The  results  thus  reached  from  an  analysis 
of  the  action  itself  with  its  peculiar  relief,  and  the  application 
thereto  of  familiar  equity  doctrines,  have,  however,  been  largely 
modified  in  many  States  by  statutory  reo-ulations.- 


1  It  is  held  in  Indiana,  that  all  persons 
interested  should  be  made  parties,  and 
that  lien-holders  ou  undivided  shares  may 
be  joined.  Milligan  v.  Poole,  3.5  Ind.  64, 
68.  In  Missouri,  all  the  co-owners,  in- 
cluding infants  hy  their  curator,  may  unite 
in  the  proceeding  as  plaintiffs,  so  that  it 
will  be  entirely  ex  parte.  Larned  v.  Ren- 
shaw,  37  Mo.  458 ;  Waugh  v.  Blumeu- 
thal,  28  Mo.  462.  Where  a  deed  of  trust 
covered  a  portion  of  the  land,  the  trustee 
and  cestui  que  trust  were  held  to  have  been 
properly  made  defendants  in  order  to  bind 
their  interest,  altliough  no  relief  was  asked 
against  them.  Reiuhardt  ;;.  Weudeck,  40 
Mo.  577  ;  Harbison  v.  Sauford,  90  Mo.  477. 
Such  a  deed  of  trust  is  equivalent  to  a 
mortgage,  so  that  these  defendants  were, 
in  fact,  incumbrancers.  As  to  the  parties 
in  Ohio,  see  Tabler  v.  Wiseman,  2  Ohio  St. 
207  ;  Williams  r.  Van  Tuyl,  2  Ohio  St. 
336.  In  New  York,  it  is  said  that  all  in- 
cumbrancers should  be  brought  in  as  par- 
ties in  order  that  the  land  may  be  sold  free. 
Bogardus  v.  Parker,  7  How.  Pr.  305. 

-  [|Most  of  the  States  have  special  stat- 
utes respecting  parties  to  suits  for  parti- 
tion. The  following  brief  synopsis  of 
these  statutes  will  indicate  tiieir  general 
scope  and  effect. 

A7-izona  :  Any  owner  or  claimant  of  real 
estate  or  any  interest  therein,  or  a  part 
owner  of  personalty,  may  compel  a  parti- 
tion.    Rev.  St.,  1901,  §§"3492-3515. 

Arkansas:  Every  person  having  an  in- 
terest in  the  premises,  including  tenants 
for  years,  for  life,  by  curtesy,  or  in  dower, 
those  entitled  to  the  reversion,  remainder, 
or  inheritance,  and  all  who,  upon  any  con- 
tingency, may  become  entitled  to  any  bene- 
ficial interest  in  the  premises,  vrhether  in 


possession    or   otherwi.se,   shall    be   made 
parties.     Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.  §§  5415-5417. 

California :  "  The  summons  must  be  di- 
rected to  all  the  joint  tenants  and  tenants 
in  common,  and  all  persons  having  any 
interest  in,  or  any  liens  of  record  by  mort- 
gage, judgment,  or  otherwise  upon  the 
property,  or  upon  any  particular  j)ortion 
thereof ;  and  generally  to  all  persons  un- 
known who  have  or  claim  any  interest  in 
the  property."     Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  756. 

Colorado  :  Same  as  in  Arkansas.  Code 
1883,  Chap.  XXIV.  §§  2,  3. 

Idaho :  Same  as  in  California.  Code 
Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3398. 

Indiana  :  Any  person  holding  lands  as 
joint  tenant  or  tenant  in  common,  whether 
in  his  own  right  or  as  executor  or  trustee, 
may  compel  partition,  and  trustees,  ad- 
ministrators, and  executors,  may  be  made 
parties  to  answer  as  to  any  interest  they 
may  have  in  the  property.  Burns'  St., 
1901,  §  1200. 

loiva :  Persons  having  apparent  or  con- 
tingent interests  in  the  property  may  be 
made  parties.  Creditors  having  general 
specific  liens  upon  the  entire  property, 
may  be  made  parties,  and  those  holding 
liens  upon  one  or  more  of  the  undivided 
interests  shall  be  made  parties.  Code, 
1897,  §§  4243,  4244,  4250. 

Kansas :  "  Creditors  having  a  specific 
or  general  lien  upon  all  or  any  portion  of 
the  property  may  be  made  parties."  Gen. 
St.,  1901,  §  510.3. 

Kentucki/ :  "  All  persons  interested  iu 
tlie  property  who  have  not  united  in  the 
petition  shall  be  summoned."    Code,  §  499. 

Minnesota  :  "  The  summons  shall  be 
•iddressed  by  name  to  all  the  owners  and 
lien-holders  who  are  known,  and  generally 


24 


370 


CIVIL    KEMEDIF.S. 


5  273.  *  37''.  Joinder  of  Wife  of  Tenant  in  Common.  Administra- 
tor of  Deceased  Tenant  in  Common  In  New  York.  Jii  New  York, 
when  the  action  for  a  partition  i.^  brought  bv  one  tenant  in  com- 
mon in  fee,  his  wife  is  a  necessary  party,  but  ratlier  a.'j  a  defendant 
than  as  a  plaintiff.  Her  inchoate  right  of  dower  is  entitled  to 
protection.^     If   one  tenant  in  common  dies,  so  that  his  estate 


to  all  persons  unknown,  havinf^  or  claim- 
ing an  interest  in  the  property."  St., 
1894,  §  5771. 

Missouri:  "  Every  person  having  any 
interest  in  snch  premises,  wliether  in  pos- 
session or  otherwise,  shall  be  made  a  ])arty 
to  such  petition."     Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  4376. 

Montana  :  "  Every  person  having  an 
undivided  share,  in  possession  or  otherwise 
in  tlie  property,  as  tenant  in  fee,  for  life, 
or  for  years  ;  every  person  entitled  to  the 
reversion,  remainder  or  inheritance  of  an 
undivided  share,  after  the  determination 
of  the  particular  estate  therein  ;  every  per- 
son who,  by  any  contingency,  contained  in 
a  devise,  or  grant,  or  otherwise,  is  or  may 
become  entitled  to  a  beneficial  interest  in 
an  undivided  share  tliereof ;  every  person 
having  an  inchoate  riglit  of  dower  in  the 
property  or  any  part  thereof,  whicii  has 
not  been  admeasured,  must  be  a  party  to 
an  action  for  partition.  But  no  person 
other  than  a  joint  tenant  or  a  tenant  in 
common  of  tlie  property,  shall  be  a  plaintiff 
in  the  action."  "  The  plaintiff  may,  at  his 
election,  make  a  tenant  in  dower,  for  life, 
or  for  years,  of  the  entire  property,  or  a 
creditor  or  other  person,  having  a  lien  or 
■  interest,  which  attaches  to  the  entire  prop- 
erty, a  defendant  in  the  action."  Also  a 
section  identical  with  tlie  California  stat- 
ute given  above.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §§  1.342, 
1.34.3,  1.347. 

Nebraska:  "All  tenants  in  common, 
or  joint  tenants  of  any  estate  in  land  may 
be  comj)elled  to  make  or  suffer  partition 
of  such  estate  or  estates."  "  Creditors 
having  a  specific  or  general  lien  upon  all 
or  any  portion  of  the  property  may  or 
may  not  be  made  parties,  at  the  option  of 
tiie' plaintiff."  Comp.  St.  1901,  §§6.323, 
6325. 

Xi  ratio  :  .'^ameas  in  California.  Comp. 
Laws,  1900.  §  .3365. 

New  y^ork :  Has  the  same  jirovisiuns 
quoted  above  from  Montana,  with  others 


too  long  to  be  set  out  here.  Code  Civ. 
Pro.,  §§  1538,  1539. 

North  Dakota :  Same  as  California. 
Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5799. 

0/iio :  Eacli  tenant  in  common,  copar- 
cener, or  otlier  interested  person,  shall  be 
named  as  defendant  in  the  petition.  Bates' 
St.,  §  5756. 

Oklahoma  :  "  Creditors  having  a  specific 
or  general  lien  upon  all  or  any  j>ortion  of 
the  property,  may  be  made  parties."  St , 
1893,  §  4513. 

Oregon :  "  The  plaintiff  may,  at  his 
election,  make  a  tenant  in  dower  by  the 
curtesy  for  life  or  for  years  of  the  entire 
))roperty  or  auy  part  thereof,  or  creditors 
having  a  lien  upon  the  property  or  any 
portion  thereof,  other  than  by  judgment 
or  decree,  defendants  in  the  suit."  Hill's 
Laws,  §  425. 

South  Dakota :  Same  as  California. 
Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6597. 

Utah  :  Same  as  California.  Rev.  St , 
1898,  §  3.')26. 

Washinf/ton :  "  The  plaintiff  may,  at 
his  option,  make  creditors  having  a  lien 
upon  the  property,  or  any  portion  thereof, 
otiier  than  by  a  judgment  or  decree,  de- 
fendants in  the  suit."     Bal.  Codes.  §  5559. 

Wisconsin:  "  Every  person  having  au 
interest,  as  aforesaid  [enumerating  sub- 
stantially the  same  parties  as  in  the  Mon- 
tana statute],  whether  in  possession  or 
otherwise,  and  every  person  entitled  to 
dower  in  such  premi.ses,  if  the  same  has 
not  been  ail  measured,  may  be  made  a 
party  to  such  action  "  "  The  plaintiff 
need  not,  in  the  first  instance,  but  may,  at 
his  election,  make  any  creditor  having  a 
lien  upon  ttic  premises  or  any  part  thereof, 
or  any  undivided  interest  or  estate  therein 
a  defendant."     St.  1898,  §§  3102,  3103. 

W liominq :  Same  as  Ohio.  Hev.  St., 
1S99,  §  40S.3.] 

1  Rosekrans  v.  Wliite,  7  Ia\\\<.  4H6. 
[^But  it  was  lield  in  Haggerty  »•.  Wagner, 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS    FOR    I'AIiTITION. 


'1. 


descends  to  his  heirs,  if  other  of  the  co-owners  were  indebted  to 
him  for  rents  and  profits  of  the  hind,  his  administrator  should  ])r 
joined  as  a  party  defendant  with  his  heirs,  since  the  sum  due  for 
these  rents  and  profits,  and  which  would  be  ascertained  by  an 
accounting  and  determined  by  the  decree,  would  go  to  his  per- 
sonal estate  in  the  hands  of  the  administrator,  and  not  to  hisheirs.^ 
§  274.  *  377.  In  Indiana  and  California.  In  Indiana,  the  widow 
takes  an  undivided  portion  of  the  husband's  land  in  fee,  as  his 
statutory  heir.  In  an  action  of  partition,  brought  by  the  widow 
against  the  other  heirs  of  her  deceased  husband  in  that  State,  his 
creditors,  it  is  held,  cannot  be  made  defendants  for  any  purpose.^ 
Under,  the  California  homestead  laws,  the  wife  is  a  necessary  co- 
defendant  with  her  husband  in  the  partition  of  lands  which  they 
claim  or  she  claims  to  be  a  homestead.^  The  general  rule  is  laid 
down  in  that  State  that  "  all  persons  having  or  claiming  any 
interest  in  the  land  are  not  only  proper  but  necessary  parties  to  ;i 
suit  for  partition."  * 


(1897),  148  Ind.  625,  48  N.  E.  366,  that 
the  wife  of  a  tenant  in  common  is  not  a 
necessary  party.  And  in  Cochran  v. 
Thomas  (1895)'  131  Mo.  258,  33  S.  W. 
6,  the  husband  of  a  co-tenant  was  held 
not  to  be  a  necessary  party,  under  G.  S., 
1865,  chap.  152.  Same-  rule  stated  in 
Estes  V.  Nell  (1897),  140  Mo.  6.39,  41  S.  W. 
940.  In  Chalmers  v.  Trent  (1894),  11 
L'tah,  88,  39  Pac.  488,  the  wife  of  a  co- 
tenant  was  held  a  necessary  party  ] 

1  Scott  V.  Guernsey,  60  Barb.  163, 
181;  s.  c.  on  app.  48  N.  Y.  106.  \J.n 
Budde  V.  Rebenack  (1896),  137  Mo.  179, 
38  S.  W.  910,  it  was  held  that  in  an  action 
for  partition  of  lauds  devi.sed  to  minors, 
brought  before  the  settlement  of  the 
estate,  the  executor  is  a  proper  party  de- 
fendant. In  such  a  proceeding  against 
infants,  it  was  held  in  Bogart  v.  Bogart 
(1896),  138  Mo.  419,  40  S.  W.  91,  they 
must  be  represented  by  a  legal  guardian 
and  curator,  otherwise  tlie  purchaser  at 
the  sale  under  the  decree  obtains  no  title 
as  to  them.] 

■^  Gregory  v.  Iligli,  29  Ind.  527.  The 
court  said  :  "  Any  decree  of  partition  be- 
tween the  widow  and  heirs  could  not  con- 
clude the  rights  of  the  creditors  against 
the  estate  of  the  deceased  ;  nor  could 
creditors   prove   their   claims   in   such    a 


proceeding  to  which  the  administrator 
was  not  a  party." 

8  De  Uprey  v.  De  Uprey,  27  Cal.  329. 

*  Ibid.  p.  332,  per  Sanderson  J.  See 
Gates  V.  Salmon,  35  Cal.  576. 

pn  Hiles  v.  Rule  (1893),  121  Mo.  248, 
25  S.  W.  959,  the  court  said:  "No  judg- 
ment in  partition  should  be  made  when  it 
appears  that  the  parties,  wlio  are  not  be- 
fore the  court,  have  an  existing  vested  in- 
terest in  the  subject-matter  of  the  suit. 
In  such  case  the  parties  interested  sliould 
be  brought  iu,  or  partition  should  be 
denied."  And  it  was  held  that  the  general 
rule  that  defect  of  parties,  appearing  on 
the  face  of  the  petition  and  not  objected 
to  by  demurrer,  is  waived,  does  not  apply 
to  partition  suits.  So,  iu  Lilly  v.  Menke 
(1894),  126  Mo.  190,  28  S.  W."643,  it  was 
held  that  a  petition  in  partition  which  dis- 
closes the  interests  of  persons  not  made 
parties  does  not  state  a  cause  of  action. 

In  Campbell  v.  Stokes  (1894),  142  N.  Y. 
23,  36  N.  E.  811,  it  was  held  that  in  an 
action  of  partition  among  a  testator's 
children,  they  taking  as  life  tenants, 
grandchildren  living  at  the  time  of  the 
suit  were  necessary  parties,  since  they 
were  presumptively  entitled  to  possession 
on  the  death  of  the  life  tenant.  Becker  v. 
Stroeher  (1902),   167  Mo.  306,  66  S.  W. 


372  CIVIL    KKMEDIES. 

5  275.  *  378.  X.  Actions  for  Various  Miscellaneous  Objects.  Part- 
nership Matters  and  Accounting.  .Vu  action  by  one  partner  against 
another  for  a  dissolution  and  a  winding  up  of  the  concern,  partly 
based  on  the  ground  of  a  fraudulent  transfer  of  firm  property 
by  the  defendant  partner  to  a  third  person,  may  properly  include 
this  assignee  as  a  co-defendant,  since  the  sale  may  be  declared 
void,  and  he  may  be  ordered  to  account.^  When  two  of  three 
partners  —  or  any  part  of  tlie  entire  firm  —  entered  into  a  con- 
tract with  a  third  person,  by  which  they  transferred,  or  agreed  to 
transfer,  to  him  a  certain  share  of  their  interest  in  the  concern  — 
a  mine  —  and  a  like  share  of  the  profits  made  by  their  interest,  an 
action  by  such  assignee  to  determine  his  rights,  and  to  obtain  his 
share  in  the  profits,  would  be  properly  brought  against  the  two 
contracting  parties  alone ;  the  other  members  would  not  be 
necessary  defendants.  But  if  the  action  is  to  wind  up  the  con- 
cern, to  dissolve  the  firm,  and  to  sever  the  interests  of  the  re- 
spective members,  all  the  partners  are  indispensable  parties  ;  if 
the  action  is  instituted  by  one,  or  by  his  assignee,  all  the  others 
must  be  joined  as  defendants.^  And,  as  a  general  proposition,  in 
an  action  to  compel  an  accounting  growing  out  of  any  transac- 
tions or  relations,  all  persons  interested  in  obtaining  the  account, 
or  in  the  result  thereof,  are  necessary  parties,  and  should  be  made 
defendants,  if  not  plaintiffs.^ 

108.3:  "Where  a  deed  of  trust  is  executed  to  contribute  towards  satisfying  the  plain- 
after  a  partition  suit  has  been  instituted,  tiff's  claim,  should  be  joined.  Story's 
the  beneficiary  and  trustee,  while  they  Eq.  PI.  §  169;  Madox  v.  Jackson,  3  Atk. 
may  be  made  parties  to  the  partition  if  406  ;  Bland  v.  Winter,  1  Sim.  &  S.  246 ; 
they  so  desire,  are  not  necessary  parties.]  Jackson  v.  Rawlins,  2  Vern.  195  ;  Ferrer  v. 

1  Webb  V.  Helion,  .3  Uobt.  025;  Wade  Barrett,  4  Jones  Eq.  455;  Hart  v.  Coffee, 
V.  Rusher,  4  Bosw.  537.  4  Jones  Eq.  321  ;  Dunham  v.  Ramsey,  37 

2  Settembre  v.  Putnam,  -30  Cal.  490.  N.  J.  Eq.  388.  When  a  debt  is  joint,  all 
See  Blood  v.  Fairbanks,  48  Cal.  171,  174,  the  joint  debtors  must  be  made  defeud- 
175;  and  Skidmore  i-.  Collin.s,  8  Hun, .50.  ants;  a.s,  for  example,  if  the  suit  is  to 
Where  a  bill  is  filed  against  one  partner  enforce  a  demand  against  a  firm,  all  tlie 
to  set  aside  partnership  transactions,  and  partners  must  be  joined;  and  if  the  action 
vacate  a  conveyance  of  real  estate,  assets  is  brought  against  the  personal  roprescnt- 
of  the  partnershij),  but  lield  in  the  name  ativcs  of  a  deceased  partner,  tlie  survivors 
of  one  of  the  partners  for  the  benefit  of  must  also  be  co-defendants.  Story's  Eq. 
the  firm,  and  for  an  account,  all  the  part-  PI.  §§  166-168;  Pienson  v.  Robinson,  3 
uers  are  necessary  parties.  Bell  r.  Dono-  Swanst.  139  (n.) ;  Sdiolefield  v.  Heafield, 
hoe,  8  Sawyer,  435  ;  s.  c.  17  Fed.  Rep.  710.  7  Sim.  067  ;  Hills  ;•.  McRae,  9  Hare,  297  ; 

3  Petrie  v.  Pctrie,  7  Lans.  90,95.  The  Butts  r.  Genung,  5  Paige,  254.  Re  Mc- 
gcneral  doctrine  is.  that  all  persons  inter-  R.ae,  25  Ch.  I)  16  ;  7?^  IIo.lg.s<n),31  Ch.  D. 
ented  in  re.si.sting  the  jdaintiff's  demands  177;  AV  Barnard,  32  Ch.  D.  447.  Seenl.xo 
must  be  made  dofenilants.  As  an  exam-  Eirtell  >•.  Savrc.  7  Hun,  485;  Sonthal  r. 
pie,  all  yaiit  debtor.!,  a;id  all  persons  liable  Shields,  81  N.  C.  28  ;  Getty  c.  Develin,  70 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS    FOR    A   RESCISSION.  373 

§  276.  *  370.  Rescission  and  Cancellation.  In  actions  to  obtain 
this  remedy,  each  case  must  to  a  great  extent  stand  upon  its  own 
circumstances.  Tliere  is  one  general  principle  which  is  generally 
applicable,  and  whicli  regulates  the  selection  of  parties  in  all 
causes  of  this  nature,  whatever  be  the  particular  facts  upon  which 
each  depends.  It  is  the  simple  but  comprehensive  rule  that  all 
persons  whose  rights,  interests,  or  relations  with  or  through  the 
subject-matter  of  the  suit,  would  be  affected  by  the  cancellation 
or  rescission,  should  be  brought  before  the  court  as  defendajits,  so 
that  they  can  be  heard  in  their  own  behalf.  This  general  principle 
is  assumed  or  expressly  announced  by  all  the  decided  cases,  and 
those  which  are  quoted  are  intended  simply  as  illustrations.^ 

§  277.  *  380.  Same  Subject.  —  In  an  action  to  set  aside  an 
award,  even  for  the  misconduct  of  the  arbitrators,  the  arbitrators 
themselves  cannot  properly  be  made  defendants,  as  they  have  no 
interest  in  the  subject-matter,  nor  are  they  legally  affected  by  the 
relief  if  granted.^  For  the  same  reason,  a  sheriff  is  neither  a 
necessary  nor  a  proper  defendant  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  deed 
of  land  given  by  him  upon  a  sale  under  an  execution  against  the 
plaintiff.^  The  owner  of  land  who  had  been  induced  to  sell  by 
the  fraud  and  collusion  of  his  own  agent,  and  of  the  purchaser, 
conveyed  the  entire  tract  to  such  purchaser,  who  took  the  ap- 
parent ownership  in  fee  of  the  whole  ;  but,  in  fact,  by  a  secret 
arrangement  between  himself  and  the  vendor's  agent,  the  latter 
was  entitled  to  one  half  of  the  land  so  sold  and  conveyed,  and 
actually  advanced  to  that  end  one  half  of  the  purchase  price. 
An  action  by  the  grantor  to  set  aside  this  conveyance  was  held 
to  be  properly  brought  against  the  ostensible  purchaser  of  the 
whole,  who  took  the  deed  in  his  own  name,  and  the  agent 
jointly,  because  the  latter  was  in  reality  one  of  the  purchasers, 
and  his  equitable  interest  would  be  affected  by  the  decree  of 
cancellation.'^ 

N.  Y.  509  ;    Fnlkerson  ;•.  Davenport,  70  '^  Knowlton  v.  Mickles,  29  Barb.  465. 

Mo.  541  (equitable  set-off).  3  Draper   v.  Van    Horn,    15  In  J.   155. 

1  Morse  v.  IMorse,  42  Ind.   365;    Ziin-  See,  however,  Colorado  Man.  Co.  v.  Mc- 

merman  r.  Schoeufeldt,  6  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  Donald,  15  Colo.  516,  to  the  effect  that  it 

142.     See  also  Sanders  v.  Yonkers  Vill.,  is  a  matter  for  the  discretion  of  the  trial 

63  N.  Y.  489,  493 ;  Hammond  r.  Peunock,  court  whether  the  sheriff  in  such  a  case 

61   id.   145  ;  Potter  v.  Phillips,  44  Iowa,  should  be  made  a  party.     See  also  Gilbert 

353  ;    Watkins    v.    Wilcox,  4    Hun,   220  ;  v.  James,  86  N.  C.  244*. 
Hill    V.   Lewis,   45    Kan.   162;    Dailey  v.  *  Roy  I).  Ilaviland,  12  Ind.  364 

Kinsler  (Neb.),  47  N.  W.  1045. 


374  CIVIL   llEMEDIES. 

§  278.  *  381.  Same  Subject.  —  In  an  action  against  a  trustee  to 
cancel  a'  mortgage  given  to  him  as  such,  or  to  set  aside  a  deed 
to  liim  absolute  on  the  face,  which  it  was  alleged  was  in  fact  a 
mortgage,  all  tlie  persons  interested  in  the  mortgage  debt  and 
the  security  thereof,  and  particularly  the  beneficiaries  for  whose 
benefit  the  trustee  held  the  security,  are  necessary  parties  defend- 
ant, and  their  absence  would  be  fatal  to  the  recovery  of  the  relief 
demanded.^  When  the  lands  of  a  deceased  testator  or  intestate 
have  been  sold  in  pursuance  of  an  order  of  the  surrogate,  on  the 
application  of  the  administrator  or  executor,  for  the  alleged  pur- 
pose of  paying  the  debts  of  the  deceased,  an  action  to  set  aside 
such  sale  must  be  brought  not  only  against  the  persons  to  wliom 
the  land  was  sold,  and  the  present  owners  thereof,  but  also  against 
the  personal  representatives  of  the  deceased,  so  that  the  question 
whether  there  were  debts  of  such  a  nature  and  extent  as  to  ren- 
der the  sale  necessary  may  be  determined.^  Bonds  having  been 
issued  in  tlie  name  of  a  town  in  aid  of  a  railroad  under  color  of 
legal  authority,  and  the  town  subsequently  bringing  an  action 
to  set  aside  the  entire  proceedings  on  the  ground  of  illegality  and 
to  procure  the  bonds  to  be  delivered  up  and  cancelled,  all  the 
holders  of  such  bonds,  it  was  held,  could  be  united  as  defendants 
therein,  so  that  their  rights  could  be  determined  in  one  proceed- 
ing ;  it  was  not  considered  requisite  to  such  joinder  that  any 
common  interest  in  respect  to  their  ownership  of  the  securities 
should  exist  among  the  defendants ;  it  was  enough  that  their 
rights  as  hoklers  all  depended  upon  the  one  question  involved 
in  the  suit.^  If  a  judgment  has  been  recovered  against  two  or 
more  joinths  and  one  of  them  afterwards  institutes  an  action 
to  set  aside  such  judgment  or  to  restrain  its  enforcement  on  the 
ground  of  want  of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  which  rendered  it,  or 
on  the  ground  of  fraud,  his  co-judgment-debtors  must  be  made 
parties  to  the  proceeding,  either  as  plaintiffs,  or,  upon  their 
refusal  to  join,  as  defendants  ;  their  presence  before  the  court 
is  necessary  to  any  adjudication  upon  the  merits.* 

1  Clemon.s  v.  Elder,  9  Iowa,  272,  275.  ^  Venice  v.  Breed,  fi.'j  Bail).  .597. 

2  SiLsbee  v.  Smith,  GO  Barb.  372.  In  *  Gates  v.  Lane,  44  Cal.  .•}92.  (^AIl  the 
sach  an  action  all  persons  who  participated  partie.<i  to  a  judgment  should  he  made 
ia  the  fraudulent  transaction,  and  who  parties  to  the  proceeding  to  annul  it :  Day 
claim  a  present  interest  in  the  property  v.  Goodwin  (1898),  104  la.  .374,  7.3  N.  W. 
affected  hy  it,  should  he  made  defendants.  804. 

Howse  V.  Moody,  14  Fla.  59,  03,  64.  Land  was  conveyed  to  two  sons  of  the 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS   FOR   ENFORCEMENT    OF   LIENS. 


37; 


§279.  *  382.  Enforcement  of  Liens. — In  an  action  by  a  sub-con- 
tractor  or  materialman  to  enforce  the  mechanic's  lien  given 
by  statute,  it  is  proper  to  make  the  contractor  a  party  defendant 
as  well  as  the  owner  of  the  building,  so  that  all  the  claims  may  be 
adjusted  in  one  suit.^  It  is  decided,  in  California,  that  when  the 
building  or  other  premises  upon  which  the  labor  was  performed 
is  owned  l)y  a  partnership,  all  the  members  of  the  firm  are  neces- 
sary defendants  in  an  action  to  enforce  a  mechanic's  lien,  even 
though  the  plaintiff  was  employed  by  one  of  the  partners  alone 


grautor  in  cousideration  of  their  agreement 
to  support  their  mother  during  her  natural 
life,  boon  afterwards  the  grautor  died, 
tlie  sous  failed  to  Iceep  tiieir  contract,  and 
the  mother,  together  with  the  children 
of  tiie  grautor  other  thau  the  grantees, 
brought  suit  for  rescission  of  the  contract. 
Held  that  the  heirs  of  the  grantor  were 
proper  parties :  Lane  v.  Lane  (1899),  106 
Ky.  530,  50  S.  W.  857. 

Reformation.  Grigshy  r.  Barton  County 
<1962),  169  Mo.  221,  69  S.  W.  296:  All 
persons  who  will  be  affected  by  the  refor- 
mation of  an  instrument  should  be  made 
parties.  See  also  Horner  v.  Bramwell 
(1896),  2.3  Colo.  238,  47  Pac.  462.  If  a 
party  necessary  to  tlie  suit  is  not  brought 
in,  the  case  will  be  dismissed  on  motion  at 
the  close  of  the  evidence  :  Steinbach  v. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.  (1902),  172  N.  Y.  471, 
65  N.  E.  281.] 

1  Carney  v.  La  Crosse  &  M.  R.  Co.,  15 
Wis.  503  :  Lewis  v.  William.s,  3  Minn.  151  ; 
Lookout  Lumber  Co.  ;;.  Mansion  Hotel  & 
B.  Ry.  Co.,  109  N.  C.  568  ;  Davis  v.  John 
Mouat  Lumber  Co.  (Colo.  App.  1892),  31 
Pac.  R.  187  ;  Northwestern  Cement,  etc. 
Co.  V.  Norwegian-Dan.  Ev.  L.  A.  Sem.,  43 
Miun.  449.  Compare  Hubbard  v.  Moore, 
132  Ind.  178  ;  Green  v.  Clifford,  94  Cal. 
49.  But  it  is  held  in  Missouri  tliat  the 
sub-contractor  need  not  bring  in  all  of 
several  joint  contractors  ;  the  statute  re- 
quiring the  "  original  contractor  "  to  be 
made  a  defendant  is  satisfied  if  one  of 
them  is  joined.  Putnam  v.  Ross,  55  Mo. 
116;  Steinmann  v.  Strimple,  29  Mo.  App. 
478  ;  Horstkotte  v.  Menier,  50  Mo.  158, 
does  not  conflict  with  this  decision,  since 
it  merely  holds  that  the  original  contractor 
must  be  a  defendant. 

[^Contractor  is  proper  but  not  necessary 


party  in  suit  by  materialman  :  Wood  v. 
Uakiand,  etc.  Transit  Co.  (1895),  107  Cal. 
500,  40  Pac.  806.  Contractor  is  necessary 
party  in  suit  by  sub-contractor :  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  ;•.  Davidson  (1895),  21  Colo. 
93,  39  Pac.  1095  ;  cfharles  v.  Mallack  Lum- 
ber Co.  (1896),  22  Colo.  283,  43  Pac.  548  ; 
H.  B.  C.  Co.  V.  N.  Y.  C,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1895),  145  N.  Y.  390,  40  N.  E.  86.  Con- 
tractor is  not  necessary  party  in  suit  by 
materialman  :  Bethune  v.  Cleveland,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1899),  149  Mo.  587,  51  S.  W. 
465.  (contractor  is  a  necessary  party  in 
suit  by  materialman  :  Castleberry  v.  John- 
stem  (1893),  92  Ga.  499,  17  s"  E.  772. 
The  person  with  whom  the  plaintiff  con- 
tracted is  a  necessary  party  :  Gilliam  v. 
Black  (1895),  16  Mont.  217,  40  Pac.  303. 
The  persou  to  whom  the  premises  are  sold 
during  tlie  life  of  the  lien  is  a  necessary 
party:  Pickens  v.  Polk  (1894),  42  Neb. 
267,  60  N.  W.  566. 

In  Blanshard  v.  Schwartz  (1898),  7 
Okla.  23,  54  Pac.  303,  the  court,  quoting 
with  approval  the  case  of  Johnson  v. 
Keeler,  46  Kan.  304,  said  :  "  In  an  action 
to  foreclose  a  mechanic's  lien,  all  lien 
holders  and  encumbrancers  should  be  made 
parties,  and  a  lien  liolder  who  is  not  made 
a  party  in  the  first  instance  is  entitled, 
upon  application,  to  come  in  at  any  time 
before  final  judgment,  and,  by  answer  in 
the  nature  of  a  cross  petition,  set  forth  his 
claim  of  lien,  and  ask  to  have  the  same 
foreclosed." 

An  attorney  who  has  a  lien  on  the  judg- 
ment recovered  for  liis  client,  wlio  secures 
an  affirmation  of  the  judgment  on  appeal, 
may  ])roperly  make  the  sureties  on  the 
appeal  bond  parties  to  a  suit  to  enforce 
the  lien  :  Coombe  v.  Knox  (1903),  28 
Mont.  202,  72  Pac.  64 1.] 


376  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

was  ignorant  of  the  other  co-owners,  and  had  filed  his  notice  of 
lien  only  against  the  one  employing  him.^  It  may  be  stated  as  a 
general  rule,  that  in  all  actions  to  enforce  a  lien,  the  person  in 
whose  adveree  possession  the  property  subject  thereto  is  held,  is 
a  necessary  defendant,  or  otherwise  the  decree  would  virtually 
be  a  nullity .2 

§  280.  *  383.  Same  Subject.  —  A  contract  for  the  sale  of  lands 
being  pledged  or  assigned  by  the  vendee  as  collateral  security  for 
the  payment  of  a  debt,  and  the  creditor — the  pledgee,  or  assignee 
—  bringing  an  action  to  foreclose  the  right  of  redem^Jtion,  and  to 
sell  the  security,  and  to  apply  the  proceeds  in  payment  of  his  own 
demand,  the  vendor  in  the  contract  is  held  not  to  be  a  necessary 
party  defendant  in  such  suit.^  The  same  rule  must  apply  to  all 
kinds  and  forms  of  securities  and  things  in  action  which  are 
pledged  or  assigned  for  the  purpose  of  collateral  security,  such 
as  bonds,  notes,  certificates  of  stock,  and  the  like.  The  obligor 
on  the  bond,  the  maker  of  the  note,  the  corporation  which  issued 
the  stock  certificate,  cannot  be  a  necessary  defendant  in  an  action 
to  foreclose  and  sell. 

§  281.  *  384.  Same  Subject.  A  mortgage  was  foreclosed  in  a 
summary  manner  prescribed  by  statute  in  Iowa,  and  the  premises 
were  conveyed  to  A.,  the  mortgagee.  He  afterward  assigned  the 
mortgage  and  the  note  secured  by  it  to  B.,  and  entered  into  a 
written  agreement  to  convey  to  him  the  land.  B.  subsequently 
brought  an  action  to  foreclose  the  same  mortgage  against  the 
mortgagor,  and  the  subsequent  incumbrancers,  and  also  made  A. 
a  defendant,  setting  up  the  former  summary  proceedings  and  A.'s 

1  McDonald  v.  Backus,  45  Cal.  262.  Carolina,  in  order  to  cut  off  her  inchoate 

2  Wingard  v.  Banning,  39  Cal.  543.  A  dower  right.  Bunting  v.  Foy,  G6  N.  C. 
junior  incuinhraucer  shoukl  Ije  made  a  de-  193.  See  also  Win.'ilow  i-.  Urqnliart,  39 
fendant,  or  his  right  of  redemption  will  Wis.  260;  Church  r.  Smitii,  39  id.  492; 
not  be  cut  off.  Evan.s  v.  Tripp,  35  Iowa,  DeForest  v.  ilolnm,  38  id.  408;  Boorman 
371.  When  tlie  original  owner  of  tlie  i\  Wisconsin,  etc.  Co.,  36  id.  207  ;  Rice  v. 
premises  on  wliich  the  lien  exists  has  con-  Hall,  41  id.  453  ;  Crawfordsville  r.  Barr, 
veyed  all  his  interest  hy  deed,  he  is  no  65  lud.  367  :  Chapman  r.  Callalian,  66 
longer  a  necessary  defendant  if  no  personal  Mo.  299;  Th<j7n])son  ;•.  Smith,  63  N.  V. 
judgment  is  asked  ;  the  suit  must  be  against  .301.  ^It  was  lield  in  National  Bank  of 
the  grantee.  McCormick  v.  Lawton,  3  Deposit  v.  Rogers  (1901),  166  N.  V.  380, 
Xeb.  449,  451.  In  an  action  by  the  vendor  59  N.  E.  922,  that  where  a  bank  brought 
in  a  land  contract  against  the  vendee  to  an  action  to  enforce  a  lien  ujion  property 
foreclose  the  latter's  rights,  and  to  sell  his  assigned  by  the  pledgor  to  an  assignee  for 
interf-it  in  the  land  for  tlie  balance  of  the  the  benefit  of  creditors,  the  assignor,  while 
jmrcliase- price  unpaid,  the  vendee's  wife  a  proper,  i.'i  not  a  neces.sary  party.] 
must   lie   made  a  co-defendant,  in   North  •*  \'auglin  t>.  Cusliing,  23  Ind.  184. 


DEFENDANTS    IN    SUITS   FOR   A   CONTRIBUTION.  377 

agreement  to  convey,  averring  that  such  proceedings  were  invalid 
and  worked  no  change  in  the  rights  of  the  parties,  and  also 
alleging  that  there  was  a  mistake  in  the  description  of  the  land 
contained  in  the  contract  made  by  A.,  and  praying  that  such  mis- 
take might  be  corrected,  that  A.  might  be  ordered  to  convey  the 
proper  premises,  and  that  the  title  might  be  quieted,  or,  if  the 
former  proceedings  should  be  held  invalid,  that  the  usual  decree 
of  foreclosure  of  the  mortgage  might  be  rendered  and  the  land 
sold  thereunder.  This  action  was  held  by  tlie  Supreme  Court  of 
Iowa  to  be  properly  brought ;  there  was  no  improper  joinder  of 
defendants  or  of  causes  of  action.^ 

§  282.  *  385.  Contribution.  It  is  a  general  rule  of  the  equitable 
procedure  that,  in  an  action  to  enforce  an  obligation  to  contribute 
and  to  recover  the  amounts  due  from  contributors,  all  the  persons 
liable  to  make  contribution  should  be  joined  as  defendants,  in 
order  that  their  respective  amounts  may  all  be  adjusted  in  a 
single  suit.  On  the  other  hand,  when  several  parties  are  en- 
titled to  a  share  from  a  common  source,  and  the  claims  have  not 
been  adjusted  and  made  specific  and  personal,  but  they  all  de- 
pend upon  the  same  facts  and  involve  the  same  questions,  all  the 
claimants  should  unite  in  the  action,  or  at  least  should  be  brought 
before  the  court  as  defendants,  if  they  are  not  joined  as  plaintiffs.^ 

§  283.  *386.  Actions  by  Taxpayers.  In  many  States  taxpayers 
and  freeholders  are  permitted  to  maintain  actions  to  set  aside  pro- 
ceedings by  local  authorities,  and  to  restrain  the  enforcement  and 
collection  of  the  tax  which  is  the  result  of  such  proceedings,  on 
the  ground  of  their  illegality.  In  such  actions  not  only  the 
officials  themselves  whose  proceedings  are  sought  to  be  set  aside, 
and  the  administrative  officers  whose  function  it  is  to  enforce  the 
tax,  must  be  made  defendants,  but  also  all  other  persons  whose 

1  Thatcher  v.  Ilaun,  12  Iowa,  303.  rule  is  that  all  the  co-sureties  must  be 
This  was,  in  fact,  a  suit  to  reform  a  cou-  made  defendants,  and  the  personal  repre- 
tract  for  the  conveyance  of  land,  and  to  sentatives  of  any  that  are  dead,  and  also 
com])el  a  specific;  performance  as  reformed,  the  principal  debtor.  Story's  Eq.  PI. 
or,  in  the  alternative,  for  the  foreclosure  §  169  a;  Ferrer  f.  Barrett,  4  Jones  Eq. 
of  a  mortgage.  If  the  relief  was  ])roper,  455;  Haywood  v.  Ovey,  6  Mad.  113; 
the  parties  defendant  were  clearly  so.  Moore  v.  Moberly,  7  B.  Mon.  299 ;  Tres- 

2  Carr  1-.  Waldron,  44  Mo.  393  ;  Story's  cott  v.  Smyth,  1  McCord  Ch.  301.  See 
Eq.  ri.  §  169  ;  Madox  r.  Jackson,  3  Atk.  also  McDearman  v.  McClure,  31  Ark. 
406 ;  Bland  v.  Winter,  1  S.  &  S.  246 ;  559  (between  co-tenants)  ;  Rosenthal  v. 
Jackson  I'.  Rawlins,  2  Vera.  195 ;  Hart  r.  Sutton,  31  Ohio  St.  406  (between  co- 
Coffee,  4  Jones  Eq.  321.     In  an  action  by  sureties). 

a   .surety   for    contribution,    the    general 


378  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

rights  or  interests  may  be  adversely  affected  by  a  decree  granting 
the  relief  demanded  by  the  plaintiifs.  For  example,  in  such  a  suit 
brought  to  set  aside  the  proceedings  of  certain  municipal  au- 
thorities, and  to  restrain  the  levy  and  collection  of  a  special  tax 
im^Hised  l)v  them  for  the  purpose  of  paying  certain  illegal  judg- 
ments held  by  different  judgment  creditors,  all  these  judgment 
creditors  were  declared  to  be  necessarily  joined  as  defendants ; 
the}'  had  a  common  interest  among  them  all,  centring  in  the  point 
at  issue  in  the  cause. ^ 

§  284.  *  387.  Actions  to  Redeem  In  an  action  by  a  mortgagor 
or  person  holding  under  him  to  redeem,  all  those,  in  general, 
should  be  made  defendants  whose  interest  will  be  affected  by  the 
decree.  If  the  mortgagee  is  living,  he  is,  of  course,  an  indis- 
pensable defendant ;  and  if  he  is  dead,  his  personal  representatives, 
according  to  the  theory  of  mortgages  which  prevails  in  this 
country .2  As  a  general  rule,  all  persons  who  are  interested  in 
the  mortgage-money  or  debt  secured  by  the  mortgage  must  be 
joined.^  Thus,  if  the  mortgage  is  held  by  a  trustee,  the  cestui 
que  t?-ust  should  be  a  co-defendant.'^  If  the  mortgagee  has  ab- 
solutely assigned  all  his  interest  in  the  mortgage,  he  is  no  longer 
a  necessary  party  in  the  suit  to  redeem,  but  the  assignee  takes  his 
place  :  and  if  there  are  several  successive  assignments  of  such  a 
character,  the  last  assignee  is  the  only  necessary  defendant.^     But 

1  ([Ander.soa   v.  Orient   Fire  Ins.  Co.  ^  [Wood  v.   Holland  (189.3),   57    Ark. 

(1893),  88  la.  579,  55  N.  W.  348 ;  Wabaska  198,  21  S.  W.  223.] 

Electric  Co.  v.  City  of  Wymore  (1900),  60  ^  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  188  ;  Palmer  v.  Earl 

Xeb.  199,  82  N.  W.  626;  McCaim  v.  City  of  Carlisle,  1   Sim.  &  S.  423;  Osbourn  v. 

of  Louisville  (1901),  —  Ky.  — ,  63  S.  W.  Fallows,  1  Kus.  &  M.  741 ;  McCall  v.  Yard, 

446;  Comiiiunweakli   v.  Scott  (1901),  112  1    Stockt.  358;    Large  v.  Van  Doreu,  14 

Ky.  252,  65  S.  W.  596.     Tbe  St;ite,  liuw-  N.  J.  Eq.  208. 

ever,  is  not  a  proper  party  plaintiff  in  an  *  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  192,  208  ;  Drew  v. 

action  a<2;ainst  a  county  auditor  to  recover  Harman,  5  Price,  319  ;    but  .';ec  Swift  i*. 

money  belonging  to  the  county  wrongfully  State  Lumi)er  Co.,  71  Wis.  476.      Where 

received  by  him,  where  the  county  com-  tiie  mortgagee  had  assigned  the  mortgage 

missioners  refuse  to  sue  ;    nor  can  it  be  in  trust  for  his  family,  it  was  held  that,  in 

made  sufh    by  joining  ta.xpayers  as  re-  an  action  to  redeem,  the  mortgagee,  the 

lators  :  State  y.  Casper  (1903),  —  Ind. — ,  trustee,   and    the    beneficiaries   were    all 

67  N.  K.  185.]     Newcomb  v.  Hortou,  18  necessary  defendants.     Wetherell  v.  Col- 

Wi«.  566,  570,  per  Cole  J.,  citing  Hrinker-  lins,  3  Mad.  255. 

hoff  V.  Brown,  6  Johns.  Cii.  139;  Fellows  ^  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §   189  ;    Chaml)ers  r. 

V.  Fellows,  4  Cow.  682;    Story's   Eq.   PI.  Goldwin,  9    \'es.  269;    Hill  i;.  Adams,  2 

§§  285  el  seq.     See  also  Wilson  v.  Mineral  Atk.  39  ;  Whitney  r.  McKinney,  7  Johns. 

Point,  39  Wis.  160;   Watkins  v.  Mihvau-  Ch.  144;  Williams  v.  Smith,  49  Me.  564; 

kee,  52  id.  98 ;  Bettinger  r.  Bell,  65   Ind.  Beals   v    Col)b,   51    Me.   348;    Bryant    r. 

445  ;   Hayes  v.  Hill,  1  7  Kans.  360  ;  (Jraliam  Erskine,  55  Me.  153,  158.     See  also  Swift 

r.  Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  436.  c.  State  Lumber  Co.,  71  Wis.  476. 


ONE  SUING  ON  BEHALF  OF  OTHERS.  6  id 

wliere  the  mortgagee  has  made  only  a  partial  assignment,  and 
retains  any  interest  in  the  mortgage  or  in  the  debt  secured  by  it, 
he  must  be  joined  with  the  assignee  as  a  co-defendant.'  When 
the  suit  is  brought,  not  by  the  mortgagor,  but  by  a  subsequent 
mortgagee  or  other  incumbrancer,  to  redeem  from  a  prior  mort- 
gage, all  the  owners  of  the  equity  of  redemption  are  necessary 
co-defendants  with  the  holder  of  such  prior  mortgage.^  If  the 
mortgagor  conveys  his  entire  estate  in  the  land,  he  need  not  be 
made  a  party  in  an  action  to  redeem  by  his  grantee."*  Persons 
having  partial  interests  in  the  equity  of  redemption,  or  subsequent 
liens  or  incumbrances  upon  it  or  upon  a  portion  of  it,  may 
redeem ;  but  in  such  case  they  must  bring  in  all  other  parties 
who  are  interested  in  the  land ;  such  other  persons  are  necessary 
parties  to  the  action  either  as  plaintiffs  or  defendants,  in  order 
that  all  the  rights  and  claims  may  be  determined  in  one  decree.* 

SECTION   SEVENTH. 

WHEN  ONE  PERSON  MAY  SUE  OR  BE  SUED  ON  BEHALF  OF  ALL 
THE  PERSONS  INTERESTED. 

§  285.  *  388.  Statutory  Provision.  In  immediate  connection 
with  the  general  topics  treated  in  the  preceding  two  sections, 
there  are  certain  special  subjects  which,  though  subordinate,  are 
sufficiently  important  to  require  a  separate  notice,  and  they  will 
therefore  be  considered  in  the  present  and  the  following  two 
sections.^     The  first  of  these  involves  an  answer  to  the  questions, 

1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  191;  Hobart  v.  ton  v.  Lothrop,  46  Me.  297;  Bailey  v. 
Abbott,  2  P.  Wms.  643.  Myrick,   36    Me.    50;    [Crais;    v.    Miller 

2  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  186,  191  ;  Palk  v.  (1893),  41  S.  C.  37,  19  S.  e'.  192,  citiug 
Cliuton,  12  Ves.  48;  Lord  Cholmondeley  the  text.] 

V.  Lord  Clinton,  2  Jac.  &  W.  134;  Smith  ■*  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  IB."),  186;   Henley 

V.  Moore,  49  Ark.  100  (chattel  mortgage)  ;  v.  Stone,  3  Beav.  3.5.5  ;  Chappell  ;;.  Pee.-*, 

Hunt  V.  Rooney,  77  Wis.  258.     As  to  the  1  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  393;   Fell  v.  Brown,  2 

necessary  defendants  in  an  action  for  re-  Bro.  C.  C.  278  ;  Palk  v.  Lord  Clinton,  12 

demption  by  a  subsequent  incumbrancer  Ves.    58,  59  ;   Farmer   v.   Curtis,  2   Sim. 

when  the  prior  mortgage  has  been  fore-  466  ;    |^Dunn   r.   Dewey  (1898),  75  Minn. 

closed  without  making  him  a  party,  see  153,  77  N.  W.  793.] 

Anson  v.  Anson,  20  Iowa,  55  ;  Knowles  r.  ^  Qrhe  close  connection  of   the  statu- 

Rablin,  20  Iowa,  101  ;  Street  v.  Beal,   16  tory  provision  under  discussion  with  the 

Iowa,  68;  Burnap  i'.  Cook,  16  Iowa,  149;  provision  requiring  the  joinder  of  parties 

Winslow   V.   Clark,   47    N.  Y.   261,   263;  when  united  in   interest,  wlien  the  New 

Dias  v.  Merle,  4  Paige,  259 ;  Bloomer  v.  York  Code  was  adopted,  is  shown  by  tlu- 

Sturges,  58  N.  Y.  168.  frfllowing  quotation  from  Tobin  v.  Port- 

3  Williams  v.  Smith,  49  Me.  564 ;  Hil-  land  Mills  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore.  269,  68  Pac. 


380 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


When  may  one  person  sue  as  the  representative  of  others  who, 
although  not  named,  are  regarded  as  virtual  co-plaintiffs  in  the 
action?  and,  When  may  one  person  in  like  manner  be  sued  as 
tlie  representative  of  others  who  are  regarded  as  co-defendants? 
The  statutory  provision  permitting  this  method  of  bringing  the 
parties  before  the  court  is  as  follows:  "When  the  question  is 
one  of  a  common  or  general  interest  of  many  persons,  or  when 
the  parties  are  very  numerous  and  it  may  be  impracticable  to 
bring  them  all  before  the  court,  one  or  more  may  sue  or  defend 
for  the  benefit  of  the  whole."  ^ 


§286. 


589. 


Author's  Analysis  of  Language  of  Statute.  Two 
Distinct  Cases.  Essential  Elements  of  each  Case.  Following  the 
course  which  has  generally  been  adopted  thus  far,  I  shall  first 
examine  this  provision  of  the  codes  by  an  independent  analysis 
of  its  language,  and  shall  then  state  the  interpretation  which 
has  been  put  upon  it  by  the  courts.  It  is  very  evident  that  it 
describes  two  distinct  and  separate  cases  in  which  a  plaintiff  or 
defendant  may  be  clothed  with  the  representative  character  de- 


743  :  "  In  McKenzie  v.  L'Amoureux,  1 1 
Barb,  516,  Mr.  Justice  Harris,  comment- 
iug  upon  the  exceptions  spoken  of  by 
Judge  Story,  and  explaining  the  adoption 
of  the  section  of  tlie  code  adverted  to, 
says :  '  So  far  was  the  legislature  from  in- 
tending any  change  in  the  rule  on  this 
subject,  that,  in  making  the  great  changes 
contemplated  by  the  adoption  of  the  code, 
it  was  careful  to  preserve  this  convenient 
practice  of  the  Court  of  Chancery.  The 
code  commissioners  had  reported  a  section, 
copied  substantially  from  one  of  the  rules 
of  tiie  Supreme  Conrt  of  the  United  States, 
providing  that  those  wiio  are  united  in 
iiit<;rest  must  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  or  de- 
fendants, except  that,  if  the  consent  of 
any  one  wlio  should  have  been  joined  as 
jilaintiff  cannot  be  obtained,  he  may  be 
made  a  defendant,  the  reason  thereof 
being  stated  in  the  complaint.  This,  too, 
was  the  jiractice  in  tiie  Court  of  Chancery. 
The  legislature  adopted  the  provision 
tlms  reported,  but  added  to  tlie  section  as 
follows  :  And  when  the  question  is  one  of 
common  or  general^interest  of  many  per- 
sons ;  or  wlien  tiie  parties  are  very  numer- 
ous and  it  may  be  impracticable  to  bring 
tliem  all  before  the  court,  one  or  more 
mav  sue  or  defend  for  the  benefit  of  tlie 


whole:  Code,  §  119.  This  was  also  in 
acordance  with  the  tiien  existing  practice 
of  tiie  courts  of  equity.  The  legislature 
seems  to  have  apprehended  that  by  adopt- 
ing the  rule  reported  by  the  commissioners 
it  might  be  understood  to  have  rejected 
the  kindred  rules  embraced  in  the  latter 
clause  of  the  section.  To  prevent  this 
misapprehension  the  latter  clause  was 
added,  thus  retaining  in  the  new  practice 
the  same  rules  by  which  to  determine 
whether  the  proper  parties  were  before 
the  court  which  then  prevailed  in  the 
Court  of  Chancery.'  "J 

1  New  York,  §  119  (448);  California, 
§  .382  ;  Kansas,  §  .38  ;  Iowa,  §  2.549  ;  Ken- 
tucky, §37  ;  South  Carolina,  §  142  ;  Ore- 
gon, §381  ;  Nevada,  §  14  ;  Nebraska,  §  43  ; 
North  Carolina.    §  62 ;    j^Ftah,    Kev.   St., 

1898,  §  2917  ;    North  Dakota,  Kev.  Codes, 

1899,  §5232;  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St., 
1901,  §6079;  Arizona,  Kev.  St.,  1901, 
§1313;  Montana,  §584;  Idaho,  Code 
Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3170;  Colorado,  §12; 
Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  270  ;  Wiscon- 
sin. St.,  1898,  §  2604  ;  <  »klahoma,  St.,  189.3, 
§3910;  Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4834; 
Wyoming,  Hev.  St.,  1899.  §3482  ;  Arkan- 
sas, Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5632  ;  Connecti- 
cut, Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  619  ;  Nebraska,  §  43.3 


ONE  SUING  OX  BEHALF  OF  OTHERS.  381 

scribed,  and  may  thus  stand  in  the  pkice  of  others  whose  rights 
and  interests  are  determined  together  with  his  own.^  These  two 
cases  depend  upon  distinct  and  separate  facts  and  circumstances, 
and  are  as  follows :  (1)  Tliere  must  be  a  "  question  of  common  or 
general  interest"  to  wiavi^  persons  involved  in  the  action.  The 
two  essential  elements  of  this  case  are,  the  question  of  common 
or  general  interest  to  be  determined,  and  the  many  persons  who 
have  this  common  or  general  interest  in  the  matter  at  issue. 
The  "  many  persons  "  in  this  case  is  opposed  to  the  very  numerous 
parties  in  the  other,  and  is  doubtless  satisfied  by  a  number  actu- 
ally less.  It  is  certainly  not  necessary,  in  order  to  fulfil  its 
requirements,  that  there  should  be  any  impractleahility  of  bring- 
ing all  the  persons  having  the  common  or  general  interest  before 
the  court.  (2)  The  second  case  depends  entirely  ujDon  the 
number  of  the  persons  who  should,  according  to  the  ordinary 
rule,  be  made  plaintiffs  or  defendants.  The  single  essential 
element  is  the  impracticability  of  bringing  all  the  parties  before 
the  court  on  account  of  their  great  number.  The  language  does 
not  in  terms  require  an}^  question  of  common  or  general  interest 
to  this  great  number,  but  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  an  action 
in  Avhich  a  very  large  number  of  persons  should  be  capable  of 
joining  as  plaintiffs  —  so  large  that  it  would  be  impracticable  to 
bring  them  all  actually  before  the  court  —  unless  the  question  to 
be  determined  was  one  of  common  or  general  interest  to  them 
all.^     It  inevitably  follows,  therefore,  from  the  customary  nature 

1  [^See  Hawardeni'.  The  Youghiogheuy  sons."     See  also  Tobiu  v.  Portland  Mills 

&  Lehigh   Coal  Co.  (1901),  111  Wis.  545,  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore.  2G9,  68  Pac.  743,  quot- 

87  N.  VV.  474,  in  which  the  court  said  :  "  It  ing  the  text. J 

is  to  be  noted  that  there  are  two  cases  -  [^The  language  of  tlie  courts,  respec- 

named  in  the  statutes  referred  to  in  which  tively,  in  the  cases  of  Tobin  v.  Portland 

one  may  sue  for  all,  viz.  :    (1)  When  the  Mills  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore.  2G9,  68  Pac.  743, 

question  is  one  of  common  or  general  in-  and  George  v.  Benjamin  (1898),  100  Wis. 

terest  of  many  persons,  and  (2)  when  the  622,  76  N.  W.  619,  suggests,  but  does  not 

parties  are  very  numerous,  and  it  is  im-  settle,  the  question,  whether  the  statutory 

practicable  to  bring  them  all  before  the  provision  can  be  invoked  when  the  interest 

court.     The  latter  class  was  under  consid-  is  joint.     In  tlie  former  case  the  court,  iu 

eration  in  the  cases  of  George  v.  Benjamin,  referring  to  the  latter  clause  of  the  section, 

100  "Wis.  622,  and   Hodges  v.  Nalty.  104  said:  It  "  in  effect  enacts  tlie  third  excep- 

Wis.  464;    hence  what  is  said   in   those  tion  to  th«  rule  in  equity,  in  respect  to  the 

ca.ses  as  to  the  number  of  persons  which  necessity  of  making  all  persons  immedi- 

will  be  deemed  '  very  numerous,' is  inap-  ately     interested    in     the    subject-matter 

plicable   here,   because    this    ca.se    comes  parties,  omitting  therefrom,  however,  the 

under   the   first   sul)division,   wliich    onlv  words,  '  and  although  they  have,  or  may 

requires   the   presence   of  a   question    of  have,  separate,    distinct    interests.'     This 

common  or  general  interest  of  many  per-  omission  cannot  mean  tliat  tlie  legislative 


3S2  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

of  litigations,  that  these  two  cases  described  by  the  statute  are  in 
practice  constantly  united ;  they  constantly  run  into  each  other. 
In  fact,  it  seldom  if  ever  happens  that  a  suit  arises  which  falls 
strictly  within  the  terms  of  the  second  case,  and  not  within  those 
of  the  first.^ 

§  287.  *  390.  Necessary  Allegations  herein.  Wlienever  these 
provisions  are  invoked,  in  order  that  a  plaintiff  may  he  entitled 
to  sue  or  a  defendant  to  be  sued  in  the  representative  character 
described,  the  facts  showing  that  the  requirements  of  either  case 
have  been  complied  with  must  not  only  exist,  but  must  be  alleged 
bv  the  plaintiff  as  the  very  ground  and  reason  for  adopting  the 
peculiar  form  of  action  permitted  by  the  statute.  The  complaint 
or  petition  must  show  either  that  many  persons  have  a  common 
or  general  interest  in  the  questions  involved  in  the  action,  or  else 
that  the  number  of  persons  who  would  be  joined  as  plaintiffs  or 
defendants,  if  the  ordinary  rule  was  applied,  is  so  very  great 
that  it  is  impracticable  to  make  them  all  victual  parties.  Unless 
the  pleading  contains  these  averments,  the  action  must  be  re- 
garded as  though  brought  by  the  single  plaintiff  or  against  the 
single  defendant  named. '-^     It  should  be  carefullv  observed  that 

.nssemlily  intended  thereby  to  limit  the  own  name  if  he  was  before  the  court." 
tliiril  exception  to  cases  in  vvliicli  the  very  The  court  tiieu  proceeds  to  show  that,  iu 
numerous  parties  mentioned  had  a  joint  accordance  with  the  common  law  rules 
and  indivisible  interest  in  the  subject-  as  stated  by  Dicey  and  Chitty,  "  the  fact 
matter  of  the  suit,  for  to  give  the  statute  that  all  the  parties  to  the  contract  are 
such  construction  would  render  tlie  statute  united  in  interest  affords  a  suflScieut  rea- 
superfluous,  as  the  preceding  clause  of  the  son  for  holding  that  they  are  necessary 
section  extends  the  second  exception  to  parties  to  the  action."  And  finally  con- 
that  very  class  of  parties,  but  limits  it  to  a  eludes  the  discussion  of  tiiis  question  by 
less  number."  It  seems  to  be  assumed  by  saying  :  "  So  in  whatever  view  we  consider 
tiie  court,  in  this  language,  that  tlie  statute  the  c:ise  we  are  unable  to  see  how  the 
applies  to  the  case  of  a  joint  and  indivis-  plaintiff  can  maintain  the  action  alone." 
ible  interest  in  the  subject-matter  <>f  the  Bearing  in  mind  the  facts  of  tlie  two  cases, 
suit.  Turning  to  the  language  of  the  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  tlie  language  of 
court  in  George  v.   Benjamin,  we  find  it  the  courts. J 

reads  as  follows  :  "  It  requires  but  a  mere  i  QSee  Ilawarden  r.  The  Youghiogheny 

inspection  of  the  complaint  to  show  that  &  Lehigh  Coal  Co.,  .fMyjcfl,  for  a  case  where 

the  claim  that  tlie  question  involved  in  this  the  two   do  not   "run  into  each  other." 

action  is  '  one  of  a  common  or  general  in-  Hodges  v.  Nalty  (1899),  104  Wis.  464,  80 

tcrest  to  many  jiersous '  is  not  justified  by  N.  \V.  726.] 

the  L'lcts  alleged.     It  shows  positively  and  ■^  j^Castle  c  Madi.son  (1902),  113  Wis. 

definitely  that  <tll  are  united  in   interest.  346,   89  N.    W.    156.      In    this    ca.se   the 

...  It  seems  too  ])lain  for  argument  that  court  said  :  "  It  is  argued  that  it  is  im- 

the  complaint  fails  to  state  any  fact  which  practicaide  to  bring   iu  all   the   riparian 

shows  that  the  parties  to  this  contract  have  owners,  au<l  that   all  interests  are    repre- 

a  common  or  general  interest  which  would  seuted  in  the  suit  as  it  is     This  contention 

enable  each  to  maintain  an  action  in  his  cannot  be  sustained.     It  is  not  shown  that 


ONE  SUING  ON  BEHALF  OF  OTHERS.  383 

this  provision  does  not  create  any  new  rights  of  action,  nor 
enhirge  any  of  those  now  existing.  The  suit  cannot  be  sustained 
by  one  as  the  representative  of  the  many  others  who  really  sue 
in  his  name,  unless  it  could  have  been  maintained  if  all  these 
many  others  had  been  regularly  joined  as  co-plaintiffs,  or  unless 
it  could  liave  been  maintained  by  each  of  them  suing  separately 
and  for  himself.  The  statutory  provision  is  simply  a  matter  of 
convenience,  a  rule  of  form,  a  means  of  enabling  many  persons 
to  have  their  rights  determined  without  their  actual  appearance 
in  court  as  litigant  parties. 

§  288.  *  391.  Judicial  Interpretation  of  Statute.  Order  Pursued 
in  Examination  of  Decided  Cases.  Passing  to  the  judicial  interpre- 
tation of  the  clause,  I  shall  ascertain,  from  an  examination  of 
the  decided  cases,  (1)  when  one  person  may  sue  or  be  sued  in  a 
representative  capacity ;  and  (2)  the  purpose  and  object  of  such 
form  of  action,  and  especially  its  effects  upon  the  rights  and 
duties  of  the  other  persons  who  are  represented  in  and  by  the 
actual  party. ^  The  conclusions  reached  in  the  preceding  para- 
graphs as  to  the  meaning  of  the  provision,  and  the  two  distinct 
cases  mentioned  in  it,  are  fully  sustained  by  the  authorities. 
The  construction  of  this  section  of  the  codes  has  been  established 
by  the  courts,  and  the  rule  is  settled  as  already  stated,  that, 
where  the  question  to  be  decided  is  one  of  "  common  or  general 
interest "  to  a  number  of  persons,  the  action  may  be  brought  by 
or  against  one  or  all  the  others,  even  though  the  parties  are  not 
so  numerous  that  it  would  be  impracticable  to  join  them  all  as 
actual  plaintiffs  or  defendants ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  when  the 
parties  are  so  very  numerous  that  it  is  impracticable  to  bring 
them  all  into  court,  one  may  sue  or  be  sued  for  all  the  others, 

it  is  impracticable  to  bring  all  the  owners  those  thus  represented,  the  court  may  so 

into  the  suit.     We  shall  not  assume  that  determine  when  the  merits  of  the  answer 

it  is  because  they  are  numerous.    Furtlier,  in  abatement  are  considered."     The  num- 

the  owners  who  have  been  let  in  are  not  ber  of  owners  referred  to  was  2.56.     See 

here  in  a  representative  capacity.      The  Tobiu  i-.  Portland  Mills  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore. 

order  making  them  parties  allows  them  in  269,  68  Pac.  74.3. ] 

on  their  own  behalf  alone,  and  not  on  be-  ^   [^In    McCann    r.    City    of   Louisville 

half  of  any  other  riparian  owner.    If  it  be  (1901),  — Ky.  — ,  63  S.  W.  446,  the  court 

shown  that  there  is  difficulty  in  making  .«aid  :  "  The  purpose  of  the  section  is  to 

the  numerous  owners   defendants,   "  and  avoid  a  multiplicity  of  suits,  and  settle  the 

the  court  believes  that  some  may  be  pro-  rights  of  all  parties  having  a  common  or 

ceeded  against  as  representatives  of  a  class  general  interest  in  one  suit."     See,  how- 

under  the  statute,  so  that  the  litigation  as  ever.  Northwestern  Loan  Co.    v.  Muggli 

carried  on  will  end  the  controversy  as  to  (1895),  8  S.  D.  160,  65  N.  W.  442.] 


384 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


even  though  they  have  no  common  or  general  interest  in  the 
questions  at  issue ;  ^  and  the  necessary  facts  to  bring  the  case 
within  one  or  the  other  of  these  conditions  must  be  averred. ^ 

^  289.  *  392.  Statute  re-enacts  Equity  Rule.  Must  be  some 
Connection  between  Parties  Represented  in  both  Cases.  Test.  This 
.section  of  the  codes  is  a  re-enactment  of  a  rule  ^vllich  had  pre- 
vailed in  equity,  and  is  to  receive  a  construction  which  will  make 
it  identical  with  the  pre-existing  doctrine.^     Although  the  case 


1  ^IcKenzie  v.  L'Amourcux,  11  Barb. 
516.  See  also  Towner  v.  Tooley,  38  Barb. 
598,  607. 

2  Bardstown  &  L.  R.  Co.  i:  IMetcalf, 
4  Mete.  (Ky.)  199,  204. 

3  [[George  v.  Beujainin  (1898),  100 
Wis.  622,  76  N.  W.  619.  In  thi.s  case 
thirty-one  persons  by  -written  agreement 
formed  a  syndicate  to  purchase,  manage, 
and  sell  a  tract  of  land,  and  each  agreed 
to  contribnte  a  certain  sum  at  once,  and 
to  ]jay  from  time  to  time  such  sums  as 
should  be  needed  for  payments.  One  of 
the  number  was  made  trustee,  and  a  trust 
in  favor  of  each  was  declared  to  the  extent 
of  a  oue-thirty-first  interest  in  the  land. 
The  suit  was  brouglit  by  the  trustee  in 
belialf  of  liimself  and  associates  against 
one  of  the  parties  to  said  agreement  to 
recover  S4,900,  claimed  to  be  due  on  the 
agreement.  Plaiutiif,  to  su})port  his  right 
to  bring  the  action  in  his  own  name  alone, 
relied  upon  the  jjrovisions  of  tlie  statute 
under  discussion  in  the  text.  The  court 
said :  "  He  seeks  to  sustain  his  riglit  to 
maintain  this  action  on  the  two  grounds 
mentioned  in  the  statute, — that  the  ()ue.s- 
tion  involved  is  one  of  common  and  gen- 
eral interest  of  many  persons,  and  that 
the  parties  are  very  nnmerons,  and  it  is 
impracticable  to  bi'ing  them  all  before  the 
court.  As  stated  in  Day  v.  Buckingham, 
87  Wis.  215,  and  repeated  in  Frederick  r. 
Douglas  Co.,  96  Wis.  411,  this  statute  has 
been  construed  as  merely  re-enacting  the 
rules  which  j)revailed  in  equity,  and  which 
otherwi.se  might  have  been  held  to  be 
abolished  by  the  code.  So,  also,  it  has 
been  lield  that  when  the  question  is  one 
of  common  or  general  interest,  the  action 
may  be  brought  by  one  or  more  for  the 
benefit  of  all  who  have  such  common  or 
general  interest,  without  siiowing  that  the 
parties   are    even    numerous,   or    that    it 


would  be  im])racti cable  to  bring  them  all 
before  the  court.  ...  It  re(iuires  hut  a 
mere  inspection  of  the  complaint  to  show 
that  tiie  claim  that  the  question  involved 
in  this  action  is  '  one  of  common  or  gen- 
eral interest  to  many  persons '  is  not  justi- 
fied by  the  facts  alleged.  On  the  contrary, 
the  complaint  shows  that  the  <|uestion  in- 
volved firises  out  of  contract,  personal  to 
each  one  of  the  subscribers  to  it.  It 
shows  positively  and  definitely  that  all 
are  united  in  interest.  Each  subscriber 
to  the  contract  agrees  with  every  other 
subscriber  that  he  will  '  pay  such  sum  or 
sums  as  shall  be  needed  for  future  pay- 
ments on  said  i)roperty,  as  the  same  are 
demanded  and  required  by  the  parties  in 
interest  herein.'  ...  It  would  seem  too 
plain  for  argument  that  the  complaint 
fails  to  state  any  fact  wliich  shows  tliat 
the  parties  to  this  contract  have  a  common 
or  general  interest  which  would  enable 
eacli  to  maintain  an  action  in  his  own 
name  if  he  was  before  the  court."  In 
Ilodgcs  V.  Kalty  104  Wis.  464,  80  N.  W. 
726,  the  court,  after  fjuoting  statutory 
provisions  under  di.scussion,  made  refer- 
ence to  George  i\  Benjamin  as  follows : 
"  Tin's  sectio7i  was  recently  considered  in 
the  case  of  an  action  to  enforce  payment 
of  a  subscription  to  a  business  enterprise 
(George  r.  Benjamin,  100  Wis.  622),  and 
it  was  held  tliat  the  com])laint  did  not 
show  a  common  or  general  interest  in  all 
the  subscribers,  and  that  the  number  of 
sub.scribers,  wiiich  was  thirty-one  in  that 
case,  was  not  so  large  as  to  be  called  very 
numerous  and  render  it  impracticable  to 
bring  them  all  before  the  court;  hence  it 
was  held  that  all  must  join  in  that  case. 
That  case  rules  the  present  case  upon  the 
first  branch  of  the  section,  .  .  ."  I'latt  v. 
Colvin  (1893),  .50  O.  St.  703,  36  N.  E  73.'}. 
For  a  very  interesting   arid    recent   case, 


ONE    SUING   ON    BEHALF    OF   OTHERS.  o85 

secondly  mentioned  omits  the  element  of  a  "  common  or  general 
interest,"  and  speaks  only  of  the  very  great  number  as  the  sole 
ground  for  permitting  one  to  sue  or  to  be  sued  for  all  the  others, 
yet  even  in  this  case  there  must  be  some  connection  between  the 
parties  who  are  to  be  represented,  according  to  the  familiar  prin- 
ciples of  equity  procedure.  The  right  which  the  suit  is  brought 
to  assert  must  in  some  manner  or  degree  belong  to  all  who  are 
represented  by  the  actual  plaintiff;  and  all  the  persons  who  are 
represented  by  the  actual  defendant  must  have  some  interest 
adverse  to  the  demand  for  relief  set  up  by  the  action.  The  par- 
ties thus  represented  by  the  plaintiff  or  defendant  may  not  be  in 
privity  with  each  other,  but  there  must  be  some  bond  of  connec- 
tion which  unites  them  all  with  the  questions  at  issue  in  the 
action.  The  test  would  be  to  suppose  an  action  in  which  all  the 
numerous  persons  were  actually  made  plaintiffs  or  defendants, 
and  if  it  could  be  maintained  in  that  form,  then  one  might  sue 
or  be  sued  on  behalf  of  the  others ;  but  if  such  an  actual  joinder 
would  be  improper,  then  the  suit  by  or  against  one  as  a  represen- 
tative would  be  improper,  notwithstanding  the  permission  con- 
tained in  this  section  of  the  statute.^ 

§  290.  *  398.  Applicable  both  to  Legal  and  Equitable  Actions. 
Number  of  Parties  in  Second  Case.  The  provision  applies  both  to 
legal  and  to  equitable  actions,  since  no  restriction  or  limitation 
is  contained  in  its  language ;  but  when  the  second  case  is  relied 
upon,  the  parties  must  be  so  numerous  that  it  is  really  impracti- 
cable to  make  them  all  actual  plaintiffs  or  defendants ;  and  it  has 

see  Commonwealth  v.  Scott  (1901),  112  Ky.  Vesey,  444  ;  1  Turner  &  Euss.  297  ;  2  Sim. 

252,  6.5  S.  W.  596,  where  the  court,  after  369  ;   1  Dan.  Ch.  PI.  pp.  2-35,  237  ;  Story'.s 

a  review   of   the    eiuiry    practice,   says:  Eq.  PI.  §§  99-103  ;  and  legatees  or  next  of 

"Section  25  of  Civil  Code  of  Practice  of  kin,  1  Dan.  Ch.  PI.  p.  238;  Story's  Eq. 

this   State,   which   is   substantially   a   re-  PI.  §§  104-106;  Brown  r.  Ricketts,  3  Johns, 

enactment   of   section   37    of   the   former  Ch.  553 ;  Fish   r.   Howland,   1  Paige,  20, 

Code,  recognizes  and  codifies  this  equita-  23  ;  Hallett  v.  Ilallett,  2  Paige,  18-20,  21. 

hie  practice.     It  is  this:  'If  the  question  For  further  illustrations  in  ca.'^es  of  volun- 

involve  a  common  or  general  interest  of  tary  associations  and  the  like,  see  Story's 

many  persons,  or  if  the  parties  be  numer-  Eq.    PI.    §§   107-115  6;    1    Dan.    Ch.    PI. 

ous  and  it  is  impracticable  to  bring  all  of  pp.  238,  239.     The  same  principle  applies, 

them  before  the  court  within  a  reasonable  under    similar  circum.^tances,  to  defend- 

time,  one  or  more  may  sue  or  defend  for  ants.     1  Dan.  CIi.  PI.  pp.  272,  273  ;  Story's 

the  benefit  of  all.'"     Tobin  v.  Portland  Eq.  PI.  §§  116  etseq.;  Wood  y.  Dummer, 

Mills  Co.  (1902), 41  Ore.  269,  68  Pac.  743.]  3   Mason,  315-319,  321,  322;  Gorman  v. 

1  Reid  I'.  The  Evergreens,  21  How.  Pr.  Russell,  14  Cal.  531  ;  Cullen  v.  Duke  of 

319.  321,  per   Emmott  J.  citing   Story's  Queensberry,   1    Bro.   C.  C.  101;    1  Bro. 

Eq.  PL  §  123  ;  Adair  v.  New  River  Co.,"ll  P.  C.  396. 


386  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

been  held  that  the  number  thirty-five  was  not  sufficiently  great.* 
When  one  sued  on  behalf  of  an  association  by  its  name,  upon  a 
promissory  note,  and  alleged  in  his  complaint  that  it  was  unin- 
corporated, and  that  its  members  were  very  numerous,  the  mere 
facts  thus  alleged  were  held  to  be  insufficient.^  Undoubtedly  in 
such  a  case  the  plaintiff:  should  sue  on  behalf  of  the  persons  who 
compose  the  society,  and  not  on  behalf  of  the  society  itself. 
Indeed,  this  point  has  been  directly  decided.  It  is  held  that,  in 
case  of  such  a  society  whose  members  are  too  numerous  to  bring 
them  all  before  the  court,  the  plaintiff  must  make  one  of  them  a 
defendant  as  a  representative  of  the  others,  and  not  make  the 
association  a  defendant.^ 

§  291.  *  394.  Particular  Instances.  The  following  are  some 
particular  instances  in  which  these  principles  have  been  applied, 
and  in  which  it  has  been  held  that  the  action  might  be  maintained 
by  one  or  more  for  the  benefit  of  the  others.  One  creditor  may 
sue  on  behalf  of  all  the  other  creditors  in  an  action  to  enforce  the 
terms  of  an  assignment  in  trust  for  the  benefit  of  creditors,  to 
obtain  an  accounting  and  settlement  from  the  assignee  and  other 
like  relief;  also,  in  an  action  to  set  aside  such  an  assignment  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  illegal  and  void;  and  also  one  judgment 
creditor  may  sue  on  behalf  of  all  other  similar  creditors  in  an 
action  to  reach  the  equitable  assets,  and  to  set  aside  the  fraudu- 
lent transfers  of  the  debtor.  In  all  these  classes  of  cases  the 
creditors  have  a  common  interest  in  the  questions  to  be  deter- 
mined by  the  controversy.^     When  a  mortgage  had  been  given 

1  Kirk  V.  Young,  2  Abb.  Pr.  453,  per  in  allowing  one  or  more  to  sue  for  all." 
Gierke  J.  at  S.  T.  Undoubtedly,  a  num-  This  was  a  case  in  which  ten  subscribers 
ber  much  less  than  thirty-five  would  be  brought  an  action  for  the  benefit  of  all 
sufficient  when  a  "  common  interest "  is  subscribers  who  had  paid  their  subscrip- 
set  up.  In  an  action  by  creditors  it  was  tions  against  a  subscriber  who  had  refused 
held,  by  a  very  able  English  judge,  that  to  pay  his  subscri|)ti(Hi.  See  also  George 
twenty  was  too  small  anumber  Harrison  v. Benjamin  (1898),  100  Wis.  622,  76  N.  W. 
V.  Stewardson,2  Hare,  5.S0.  QSee  Hodges  619,  holding  that  thirty-one  "was  not  so 
T.  Nalty  (1899),  104  Wis.  464,  80  N.  W.  large  as  to  be  called  very  numerous  and 
726,  from  which  we  quote  as  follows  :  render  it  impracticable  to  bring  them  all 
"Seventy-five  persons  is  surely  a  very  before  the  court."  Tobin  <;.  Portland  Mills 
large  and  unwieldy  number  of  persons  to  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore.  269,  68  Pac.  743.] 
j<jiii  in  an  action  where  it  is  practicable  for  2  Habicht  v.  Pemberton,  4  Sandf.  657. 
a  few  to  settle  the  controversy  for  the  ^  Keller  i'.  Tracy,  11  Iowa,  530;  Stew- 
benefit  of  all.  A  line  mu.st  be  drawn  art  v.  Erie  &  W.  Transp.  Co.,  17  Minn, 
somewhere,  and,  while  it  may  be  difficult  372,  398. 

to  draw  it  at  any  precise  number,  we  hold  ^  Greene    v.  Breck,  10   Abb.  Pr.    42; 

that  seventy-five  is  a  sufficient  number,  in  Hrooks  v.  Peck,  38  Barb.  519.     See  Story's 

a  case  like  the  present,  to  justify  the  court  Eq.  PI.  §§  99-103;  1  Dan.  Cli.  PI.  (4th 


ONE    SUING   ON    BKHALF    OF   OTHERS.  387 

by  a  railroad  company  to  a  trustee  in  order  to  secure  bondholders, 
and  he  desired  to  obtain  directions  of  the  court  in  respect  to  the 
payment  of  coupons,  and  brought  an  action  for  that  purpose,  and 
alleged  in  his  complaint  that  the  holders  of  the  coupons  were 
very  numerous,  so  that  it  was  impracticable  to  bring  them  all 
before  the  court,  it  was  held  proper,  and  within  the  provision  of 
the  code,  to  make  a  few  of  these  persons  defendants  as  the  repre- 
sentatives of  all  the  others,  with  suitable  averments  showing  the 
reasons  for  such  a  form  of  action.^  Conversely,  a  suit  can  be 
maintained  by  one  on  behalf  of  all  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  when 
the  number  of  mortgagees,  or  of  bondholders,  is  large.  It  would 
be  hardly  necessary  in  such  a  case  that  the  number  of  persons 
should  be  so  great  as  to  make  it  impracticable  to  bring  them  all 
in;  they  have  a  common  interest  in  the  questions  at  issue. ^  The 
provision  also  applies  to  actions  by  distributees  for  their  shares, 
and  by  legatees  brought  to  settle  the  estate  and  to  recover  their 
legacies;^  and  to  actions  by  heirs  to  set  aside  a  deed  or  will  of 
their  ancestors.*  In  both  these  cases  there  is  a  common  interest 
among  the  claimants. 

§  292.  *  395.  Same  Subject.  An  action  by  members  or  share- 
holders of  an  unincorporated  association  for  a  dissolution,  wind- 
ing up,  and  division,  or  for  other  like  relief,  plainly  falls  within 

Am.  ed.),  pp.  235,  237.  See  also  Libby  v.  -  Blair  v.  Shelby  Cy.  Agr.  Soc,  28  Ind. 
Norris,  142  Mass.  246;  Sears  v.  Hardy,  175.  Action  on  behalf  of  one  hundred 
120  Mass.  524;  Mason  v.  Pomeroy,  151  and  thirty-eight  mortgagees.  Bardstown 
Mass.  164.  Twenty  creditors  were  held  &  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Metcalf,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  199. 
to  be  too  small  a  number  in  Harrison  v.  See  also  Carpenter  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  Ky. 
Stewardson,  2  Hare,  530.  [^Williams  v.  Co.,  35  Ohio  St.  307  ;  Chicago,  etc.  Land 
Meloy  (1897),  97  Wis.  561,  73  N.  VV.  40;  Co.  v.  Peck,  112  111.  408. 
Harper  v.  Carroll  (1895),  62  Minn.  152,  ^  McKenzie  v.  L'Amoureux,  11  Barb. 
64  N.  W.  145;  Corey  v.  Sherman  (1895),  516;  Towner  v.  Tooley,  38  Barb.  598.  In 
96  la.  114,  64  N.  W.  828;  Herrick  v.  the  first  of  these  cases  the  number  of 
Wardwell  (1898),  58  O.  St.  294,  50  N.  E.  persons  represented  by  the  plaintiff  was 
903.]  three.  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  104.  105  ;  1  Dan. 
1  Coe  V.  Beckwith,  10  Abb.  Pr.  296.  Ch.  PI.  (4th  Am.  ed.),  p  238;  Hallett  r. 
See  P.eid  v.  The  Evergreens,  21  How.  Pr.  Hallett,  2  Paige,  18-20.  21  ;  Fish  i\  How- 
319.  I^In  Gorley  v.  City  of  Louisville  land,  1  Paige,  20,  23 ;  Brown  r.  Ricketts, 
(1901),  — Ky.—,  65  S.  W.  844,  it  was  3  Johns.  Ch.  5.53.  See  also  Hills  r.  Put- 
held  that  where  a  large  number  of  police-  nam,  152  Mass.  123  (bill  for  iu.structions 
men  have  claims  against  the  city  for  com-  as  to  the  disposition  of  an  estate  not  dc- 
pensation  during  the  time  they  were  fective  for  want  of  parties,  if  the  numer- 
illegally  suspended,  several  may  sue  for  ous  claimants  are  fully  represented  by 
the  benefit  of  all,  and  that  the  aggregate  those  having  similar  interests)  ;  Hills  v. 
amount  would  determine  the  jurisdiction,  Barnard,  152  Mass.  67. 
and  not  the  amount  claimed  by  each  one  ''  Hcndrix  v.  Money,  1  Bush  (Ky.), 
of  the  parties.]  306. 


388  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

the  statutory  provision,  and  may  be  brought  by  one  of  tlie 
associates  in  a  representative  capacity.  In  some  instances  the 
proceeding  would  plainly  fall  within  the  first  subdivision,  since 
there  would  be  a  common  interest  among  all  the  members  or 
shareholders;  in  other  instances,  it  might,  perhaps,  fall  within 
the  second,  and  be  based  upon  numbers  alone. ^  The  question, 
whether  one  taxpayer  or  freeholder  can  sue  for  the  benefit  of 
others  similarly  situated,  to  restrain  or  set  aside  the  acts  of  local 
officials  done  under  color  of  authority,  can  only  be  properly  con- 
sidered and  determined  by  those  courts  which  hold  that  such 
actions  are  proper  in  their  general  form.  Wherever  this  par- 
ticular kind  of  action  is  condemned  in  toto,  the  decision  of  tlie 
particular  point  now  referred  to  must,  of  coarse,  be  entirely 
extra-judicial.  In  the  States  which  permit  such  suits  by  a  tax- 
payer or  freeholder  generally,  there  is  some  conflict  of  opinion  in 
respect  to  the  question  whether  one  can  sue  on  behalf  of  others 
similarly  situated  with  himself.  It  has  been  held  in  Wisconsin 
that  an  action  cannot  be  maintained  by  one  taxpayer  as  a  repre- 
sentative of  all  others  in  a  local  district,  to  prevent  the  enforce- 
ment of  an  alleged  illegal  tax  which  would  be  a  lien  upon  real 
estate,  on  the  ground  that  the  lands  owned  by  the  individual 
taxpayers,  and  affected  by  the  tax,  are  distinct  and  separate  par- 
cels, and  there  is  no  common  interest  among  the  owners  thereof. 
The  conclusion  was  that  each  taxpayer  must  sue  separately.^ 

§  293.  * -30(3.  Nature  of  such  Action.  What  Essential  on  Part  of 
those  not  Named  in  order  to  become  Parties.  I  pass  now  to  con- 
sider the  nature  of  an  action  brought  by  one  on  behalf  of  others, 
and  its  effects  upon  the  riglits  and  duties  of  those  who  are  repre- 
sented by  the  actual  plaintiffs.  The  persons  not  named  in  such 
cases  are  not  parties  to  the  suit  unless  they  afterwards  elect  to 
come  in  and  claim    as  sucli,   and   bear   their   proportion  of   the 

1  Warth  V.  Radde,  18    Ahb.  Pr.  396;  Perry  y.  Whitaker,  71  N.C.477;  [McCaiui 

Gorman    v.   Russell,    14   Cal.    531;    Von  v.  cfty  of  Louisville  (1901),  —  Ky. —,  63 

Schmidt  v.  Iluutinj^tou,  I  Cal.  55;  Stew-  S.  W.  446  ;  Commonwealth  r.  Scott  (1901), 

art  f.  Erie  &  W.  Transp.  Co.,  17  Minn.  112  Ky.  252,  65  S.  W.  596.     In  thiscase  one 

.■{72,398  ;  Cockhurn  r.  Thomjison,  16  Ves.  of  many  taxp'iyers  of  an  iJlef^al  tax  sued 

321  ;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  107-115  b ;  1  Dan.  to  recover,  for  the  benefit  of  all,  the  taxes 

Ch.  V\.  (4th   Am.  ed.),  pp.  238,  239;  At-  .so  paid.     The  action  was  sn.stained   not- 

lanta    Real    Estate   Co.  v.    Atlanta   Nat.  with.^tanding   the   i)arty    in    whose   name 

Bank,  75  Ga.  40  ;  Dousman  v.  Wisconsin,  .suit  was  l)ron;;lit  was  anon-resident  of  the 

etc.  Co.,  40  Wis.  418  ;  Chester  f.  Halliard,  county.     See,  however.   Stiles  v.  City  of 

36  N.  J.  Ecj.  313.  Guthrie  (1895),  3  Okla.  26,  41  Pac.  383.] 

■^  Newcomb   v.  Ilorton,  18   Wis.    566; 


ONE    SUING   ON    BEHALF   OF    OTHERS.  389 

expenses.  It  is  optional  with  them  whether  they  will  become 
parties  or  not,  and  until  they  so  elect  they  are,  in  the  language 
of  tlie  books,  "in  a  sense  deemed  to  be  before  the  court."  ^  They 
are  so  far  before  the  court,  that  if  they  neglect,  after  a  reasonable 
notice  to  them  for  that  purpose,  to  come  in  under  the  judgment 
and  establish  their  claims,  the  court  will  protect  the  defendants 
and  parties  named  from  any  furtlier  litigation  in  respect  of  the 
same  fund  or  other  subject-matter,  especially  so  far  as  such  liti- 
gation may  tend  to  disturb  the  rights  of  the  parties  as  fixed  by 
the  judgment.  A  person  who  elects  to  come  in  and  make  him- 
self a  party  must  apply  for  an  order  making  him  such,  and  upon 
the  granting  the  order  he  is  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a  party. ^ 

§  294.  *  397.  Equity  Rule.  Rule  in  Kentucky.  This  rule, 
which  is  merely  the  doctrine  and  practice  of  equity  applied  to 
cases  arising  under  the  statutory  provision,  has  not  been  ac- 
quiesced in  by  all  the  courts.  In  Kentucky,  where  the  chancery 
has  always  existed  as  a  separate  tribunal,  and  where  even  under 
the  code  there  is  a  nominal  distinction  kept  up  between  legal 
and  equitable  actions,  it  is  held  that  the  assent  of  those  who  are 
not  actual  parties,  but  who  have  a  common  interest  with  their 
representative,  will  be  presumed  unless  they  show  their  dis- 
approval by  some  act  indicating  the  dissent.^  This  is  in  direct 
conflict  with  the  rule  first  stated.  According  to  the  one,  the 
persons  who  are  represented  must  do  some  affirmative  act  of 
approval  and  adoption,  and  regularly  this  act  should  be  an 
application  to  the  court,  and  the  obtaining  an  order  declaring 
them  to  be  in  all  respects  j)arties ;  according  to  the  other,  these 
persons  must  do  some  act  of  disaffirmance  and  rejection,  but 
what  particular  act  is  not  disclosed. 

§  295.  *  398.  Question  whether  One  has  made  himself  a  Party 
may  present  itself  in  Two  Aspects.  The  question  whether  any 
spocitied  person  among  the  number  of  those  represented  had 
made  himself  or  was  a  party  to  the  suit,  may  present  itself  in 

1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  99  ;  Adair  v.  New  Iron  &  Steel  Co.,  46  Fed.  Rep.  33G.     Cred- 

River  Co.,  11  Ves.  444.  itors  who  refuse  to  join  are  postponed  to 

-  Stevens  v.  Brooks,  22  Wis.  695,  703,  thu.se  creditors  who  do  come  in  under  the 

704,  per  Dixon  C.  .J.;  Hallett  v.  Hallett, 2  general  creditors'  bill.      Bank  of  Rome  v. 

Paige,    18,  per  Walworth    Ch. ;    Good  v.  liaselton,  15  Lea  (Tenu.),  216.     See  also 

Blewit,  19  Ves.  336,  339,  per  Lord  Kldon ;  Bilmyer  v.  Sherman,  23  W.  Va.  656. 
Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  99  ;  Barker  v.  Walters,  ^  Flint  v.  Spurr,  17  B.  Mon.  499,  513. 

8  Beav.  92  ;  Belmont  Xail  Co.  v.  Columbia 


390  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

two  very  different  aspects,  and  its  answer  may  be  necessary  for 
two  very  different  purposes. ^  In  the  first  place,  tlie  question 
may  be,  wlietber  this  individual,  as  against  the  defendants  in 
the  action,  and  perhaps  as  against  those  who  were  the  original 
plaintiffs,  or  who  had  made  themselves  such,  is  entitled  to  the 
immediate  benefits  of  the  recovery,  to  a  share  in  the  relief 
granted  by  the  court  in  its  decree.  It  is  evident  that,  under 
this  aspect  of  the  matter,  a  slight  affirmative  act  of  assent  and 
adoption  may  be  sufficient  if  the  person  is  then  willing  and  does 
contribute  his  share  to  the  expenses  of  the  litigation.  The 
nature  of  the  cause  of  action  may  be  such  that,  if  the  relief  is 
granted  at  all,  it  will  necessarily  enure  to  the  benefit  of  all  who 
may  be  situated  in  the  same  position  as  the  actual  plaintiff. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  cause  of  action  may  be  such  that  a  sepa- 
rate application  will  be  necessary  to  bring  each  person  within  the 
operation  of  the  judgment,  although  the  decision  made  in  one 
case  may  control  that  in  all  others :  as,  for  example,  in  a  cred- 
itors' suit  to  set  aside  fraudulent  transfers  of  the  debtor's  land, 
and  let  in  the  liens  of  the  plaintiffs'  judgments,  a  separate  action 
of  the  court  is  necessary  in  the  case  of  each  judgment  creditor, 
in  order  that  he  may  reap  the  benefit  of  the  general  decision 
pronouncing  the  debtor's  transfer  to  be  void. 


1  [[To  the  point  tliat  one  cannot  be  wheat  deposited  at  Black's  warehouse  at 
made  a  party  plaintiff  against  his  consent,  Halsey,  could,  if  they  so  desired,  have  ex- 
see  Tobin  V.  Portland  Mills  Co.  (1902),  41  pressed  their  assent  to  be  joined  as  plain- 
Ore.  269,  68  Pac.  74."J,  the  court  saying :  tiffs,  thereby  demonstrating  the  practica- 
"A  person  materially  interested  in  the  l)ility  of  bringing  them  all  before  the  court, 
subject-matter  of  a  suit  may,  against  his  If  tlie  depositors  had  not  been  interrogated 
will,  be  made  a  party  defendant,  but  we  in  respect  to  their  willingness  to  pay  their 
know  of  no  rule  whereby  he  can,  witliout  part  of  the  expenses,  the  law  would  prob- 
his  consent,  be  joined  as  plaintiff.  The  ably  have  presumed  that,  as  they  were 
desire  of  a  person  to  be  joined  as  a  j)arty  anxious  to  secure  their  share  of  the  grain 
plaintiff  is  indicated  ijy  a  willingness  to  alleged  to  have  l)een  shipped  to  the  de- 
bear  his  siiare  of  the  expenses  of  tiie  trial  fendants  they  were  also  willing  to  contrib- 
and  while  3.5  of  tlie  depositors  were  ute  tlieir  part  of  the  expenses  incurred 
anxious  to  participate  in  tlie  profits  of  the  in  recovering  it,  or  its  value  ;  but  their 
suit  if  any  were  realized,  .'i^  of  them,  testimony  dispels  such  ])rcsumptioii,  if  it 
tacitly,  at  least,  expressed  their  unwilling-  could  ever  have  been  invoked."  But  see 
ncss  so  to  contribute,  therein-  manifesting  Mct.'anni'.  City  of  Louisville  (1901),  — Ky. 
their  dissent  to  being  joined  as  plaintiffs,  — ,  G3  S.  W.  446,  in  wliicii  it  is  held  that, 
notwithstanding  which  a  decree  is  given  under  the  facts  therein  stated,  parties 
in  their  favor,  thus  in  effect  making  them  may  be  made  plaintiff  against  their  con- 
parties  against  their  will.  Besides  this,  tlie  sent.  In  tliis  case  the  statutory  provision 
101  depositors,  liaving  made  voluntary  under  dicussion  was  invoked.] 
affidavits  of  their  respective  claims   for 


ONE  SUING  ON  BEHALF  OF  OTHKKS.  391 

§296.  *  309.  Same  Subject.  Ill  tlie  second  place,  the  ques- 
tion may  be  whether  tlie  specified  individual  who  is  one  of  those 
represented  by  the  actual  plaintiff,  is  concluded  and  bound  by 
the  judgment  rendered  in  tlie  action.  This  question  will  gener- 
ally arise  at  a  subsequent  time,  and  in  another  action  brought  by 
or  against  the  individual,  and  involving  the  same  issues  as  those 
embraced  in  the  former  controversy.^  Is  this  person  bound  by 
the  former  judgment  ?  Of  course  he  is  not  bound  unless  he  was 
practically  a  party  to  the  proceeding;  the  plainest  principles  of 
common  justice  refuse  to  hold  a  man  concluded  if  he  has  not  had 
"a  day  in  court."  When  the  matter  is  presented  in  this  aspect, 
the  strict  rule  of  the  equity  courts  first  above  stated  must  be 
controlling.  If  the  subsequent  proceeding  is  a  hostile  one 
against  the  person,  the  former  adjudication  cannot  be  relied 
upon  as  an  estoppel  or  as  conclusive,  unless  he  had  affirmatively 
taken  the  steps  which  made  him  an  actual  party  by  adopting  the 
suit  with  all  its  burdens  and  benefits,  or  unless,  after  having  had 
notice,  and  an  opportunity  of  coming  in  and  making  himself 
such  a  party,  he  had  refused  or  neglected  to  do  so.  If,  however, 
this  subsequent  proceeding  is  on  behalf  of  the  person,  set  in 
motion  by  him,  the  same  doctrine  must  apply;  he  cannot  under 
exactly  the  same  circumstances  claim  and  receive  the  benefits  of 
the  former  litigation,  but  disclaim  and  be  freed  from  its  burdens 
and  disabilities. 

§  297.  *  400.  Conclusion  of  Author  from  Discussion.  The  con- 
clusion to  which  I  arrive  from  the  foregoing  discussion  may  be 
summed  up  as  follows:  There  may  be  a  marked  difference  in 
the  manner  of  enforcing  the  rule,  or  even  in  the  rule  itself, 
depending  upon  the  position  of  the  litigation,  and  the  situation 
of  the  person  who  invokes  its  aid  or  against  whom  it  is  invoked. 
If  the  prior  suit  is  still  pending,  and  the  purpose  of  the  claimant 
who  belongs  to  the  class  of  persons  represented  by  the  actual 
plaintiff  or  defendant,  be  to  take  a  practical  part  in  the  contro- 
vers}',  or  to  share  the  benefit  of  the  judgment  which  has  been  or 
may  be  rendered,  his  mere  act  of  making  the  claim,  coupled  with 
a  willingness  to  bear  his  share  of  the  expenses,  will  be  of  itself  a 
sufficiently  positive  and  affirmative  act  to  make  him  a  party  to 
the  proceeding  and  entitle  him  to  his  personal  relief.  Even  in 
this  case,  however,  the  action  may  be  of  such  a  nature  and  the 

1  Stevens  v.  Brooks,  22  Wis.  695. 


392  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

juclo-ment  of  such  a  character,  that  a  separate  order  or  adjudi- 
cation of  the  court  will  be  necessary  in  order  to  determine  the 
particular  rights  under  the  general  decree  of  each  party,  and  to 
award  to  him  his  special  portion  of  the  general  relief.  The  case 
already  mentioned  of  the  different  judgment  creditors  interested 
in  the  result  of  an  ordinary  creditors'  suit,  is  a  sufficiently  illus- 
trative example.  If,  however,  the  prior  suit  has  been  termi- 
nated, and  the  question  arises  in  a  subsequent  controversy,  and 
involves  the  conclusive  effect  of  the  former  adjudication  upon 
the  class  of  persons  represented  by  the  actual  parties,  in  order 
that  such  judgment  should  be  conclusive  upon  any  particular 
person  of  the  class  either  in  his  favor  or  against  him,  there  must 
have  been  the  previous  formal  act  on  his  part  of  applying  to  the 
court,  and  an  order  thereon  making  him  a  party  to  the  action,  so 
that  his  name  should  have  appeared  in  some  manner  upon  the 
record ;  or  it  must  be  shown  that  he  had  notice  of  the  proceed- 
ings, and  an  opportunity  to  unite  in  them  of  which  he  neglected 
or  refused  to  avail  himself.  These  views  and  conclusions  recon- 
cile the  decisions  which  at  first  sight  appear  to  be  conflicting, 
and  they  present  a  practical  and  harmonious  rule  of  procedure.^ 

S  293.  *  401.  Necessary  Averments  of  Complaint  or  Petition.  It 
has  already  been  stated  that  the  complaint  or  petition  should 
contain  averments  which  bring  the  action  within  one  or  the  other 
of  the  cases  mentioned  in  the  section  of  the  codes.  The  allega- 
tions showing  the  existence  of  a  common  or  general  interest  in 
the  questions  at  issue  in  the  one  case,  or  the  impracticability,  on 
account  of  numbers,  of  bringing  all  the  persons  before  the  court 
in  the  other,  should  be  positive  and  specific,  so  that,  if  denied, 
an  issue  may  be  raised  upon  thera.^  It  is  not  necessary,  hoAv- 
ever,  that  the  persons  who,  it  is  alleged,  have  the  common  or 
general  interest,  or  who,  it  is  said,  are  so  numerous  that  they 
cannot  all  be  brought  before  the  court,  should  be  named,  nor  be 
described  with  particularity ;  nor  is  it  necessary  that  they  should 
be  an  association  or  special  class,  or  be  described  as  such.'^     The 

1  See  on  this  subject,  Story's  Eq.  PI.  2  Paige,  18,  19;  Bilmvcr  v.  Sherman,  23 

§§  99,  196 ;  David  v.  Frowd,  1   Myl.  &  K.  W.  Va.  050  ;  Glide  v.  i)\v_vcr,  83  Cal.  477, 

200;  Gillespie  v.  Alexander,  3  Kuss.  130  ;  487.     See  David  v.  Frowd,  1  .M.  &  K.  200; 

Farrell  v.  Smith,  2  Ball  &  B.  337;  Cock-  Thompson  r.  Huftakcr,  19  Nev.  291. 

burn  y. 'i'hoTnp.son,  10  Yes.  327;  Good  v.  -  [Castle  v.  Madison  (1902),  113  Wis. 

Ble wit,  19  Yes.  330, 339;  Leigh  v.Tliomas,  340,    89   N.    AY.    1.50;    Hodges    v.   Nalty 

2  Ye.s.  312,  313;  Hendricks  v.  Pohiiisun,  (1899),  104  Wis.  404,  80  N.  W.  726.] 

2  Johns.  Gil.  283,  290;  Ilallctt  v.  Ilallctt,  ^  Sourse  v.  Marshall,  23  Iiul.  194. 


PERSONS    SEVKKALLY    LIABLE    OX    THE    SAME    INSTIIUMENT.       393 

general  averment  descriptive  of  the  persons  as  a  wliole  is  enough ; 
and  the  question  whether  any  particular  individual  is  included 
within  it  will  arise,  and  must  be  decided  upon  his  application  to 
be  admitted  as  a  participant  in  the  suit  while  in  progress,  or  in 
the  relief  after  judgment.  If  any  opposition  is  made  to  his  a])- 
plication,  the  matter  will  be  sent  to  a  master  or  referee  to  hear 
and  report,  and  upon  his  report  the  court  will  make  the  proper 
order  admitting  or  rejecting  the  applicant.^ 


SECTION  EIGHTH. 
PERSONS   SEVERALLY   LIABLE    UrON   THE    SAME    INSTRUMENT. 

§  299.  *  402.  Reasons  for  Separate  Treatment.  Two  Classes  of 
Statutory  Provisions.  The  subject-niatter  of  this  section  has  al- 
ready been  treated  in  a  general  manner  in  the  discussions  relating 
to  joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several  liabilities,  and  to  actions 
thereon,  and  to  the  changes  wrought  in  the  common-law  rules  regu- 
lating the  same,  which  are  contained  in  the  sixth  section  of  this 
chapter.  It  is  of  so  great  importance,  however,  and  the  statutory 
provisions  have  made  so  sweeping  an  alteration  in  the  ancient 
law,  and  withal  there  is  so  marked  a  difference  in  the  special 
legislation  of  the  State  codes  upon  this  particular  topic,  that  the 
subject  demands  an  independent  and  thorough  examination. 
The  statutory  provisions  themselves  must  be  separated  into  two 
classes.  The  first  class,  which  is  found  in  most  of  the  codes, 
embraces  special  rules  relating  only  to  persons  severally  liable 
upon  the  same  instrument,  and  the  language  which  embodies  the 
enactment  is  substantially  alike  in  all  the  statutes  which  contain 
the  provision  at  all.  The  second  class,  which  is  found  in  a  por- 
tion only  of  the  codes,  is  much  more  sweeping  and  radical  in  its 
changes ;  it  embraces  rules  relating  to  joint,  joint  and  several, 
and  several  liabilities  arising  upon  all  contracts ;  while  the  lan- 
guage used  by  the  legislatures  is  not  the  same  in  an}'-  two  of  the 
codes. 

§  300.  *  403.  Quotation  of  Statutory  Provisions.  I  quote  these 
two  classes  of  provisions  separately.  —  First  class.  "  Persons 
severally  liable  upon  the  same  obligation  or  instrument,  including 

1  Steveus  v.  Brooks,  22  Wis.  695. 


394  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

the  parties  to  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,  may  all  or 
any  of  them  be  included  in  the  same  action  at  the  option  of  the 
plaintiff."  ^  In  Kentucky  the  section  is  somewhat  varied,  and 
reads  as  follows :  "  Persons  severally  liable  upon  the  same  con- 
tract, and  parties  to  bills  of  exchange,  to  promissory  notes  placed 
upon  the  footing  of  bills  of  exchange,  or  to  common  orders  and 
checks,  and  sureties  on  the  same  or  separate  instruments,  may  all 
or  any  of  them,  or  the  representatives  of  such  as  may  have  died, 
be  included  in  the  same  action  at  the  plaintiff"s  option."  ^  —  Sec- 
ond class.  The  Missouri  code  contains  the  following:  "Every 
person  who  shall  have  a  cause  of  action  against  several  persons, 
including  parties  to  bills  of  exchange  and  promissory  notes,  and 
who  shall  be  entitled  by  law  to  one  satisfaction  therefor,  may 
bring  suit  thereon  jointly  against  all  or  as  many  of  the  persons 
liable  as  he  may  think  proper,  and  he  may,  at  his  option,  join  any 
executor  or  administrator  or  other  person  liable  in  a  representa- 
tive character,  with  others  originally  liable."  ^  According  to  the 
last  revision  of  the  California  code,  "  All  persons  holding  as  tenants 
in  common,  joint  tenants,  or  coparceners,  or  any  number  less  than 
all,  may  jointly  or  severally  commence  or  defend  any  civil  action  or 
proceeding  for  the  enforcement  or  protection  of  the  rights  of  such 
party."  *  A  section  is  found  in  the  Nevada  code  nearly  the  same 
as  the  foregoing  in  most  respects,  but  with  one  very  marked  dif- 
ference: "  Tenants  in  common,  joint  tenants,  or  copartners,  or  any 
number  less  than  all,  may  jointly  or  severally  bring  or  defend,  or 
continue  the  prosecution  or  defence  of  any  action  for  the  enforce- 
ment of  the   rights   of  such  person  or  persons."  *     The  changes 

1  New  York,  §  120  (454) ;  Kansas,  §  39  ;  2  [^Kentucky,  §  26  ;  Arkansas,  Sand.  & 
Oregon,  §  36  ;  Nevada,  §  15 ;  South  Caru-  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5633.] 
liua,  §  143;  California,  §  383;  Minnesota,  3  (^Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  545.] 
§  35 ;  Nebraska,  §  44  ;  Oiiio,  §  38  ;  North  ♦  California,  code  of  1872,  §  384 ;  ori- 
Caroliua,  §  63;  QUtah,  Hev.  St.,  1898,  ginally  statute  of  1857,  p.  62. 
§  2918;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  »  Nevada,  §  14.  This  section  is  plainly 
§  5233,  in  somewiiat  different  form;  copied  from  the  California  statute  of  1857. 
South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6080,  The  change  from  "  coparceners  "  to  "co- 
same  form  as  in  North  Dakota;  Arizona,  partners"  is  remarkable.  The  use  of  the 
Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1306,  in  somewhat  differ-  word  "coparceners"  was  natural,  per- 
ent  form;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  ij  3911  ;  haps,  though  doubtless  entirely  unneces- 
Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4836  ;  Montana,  sary  in  the  earlier  enactments,  for  certainly 
§  585;  Llalio,  Code  Civ.  Proc,  1901,  no  estate  in  "  coparcenary "  e.xi.sts  in  C.ali- 
§3171;  Wyr.ming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3483,  furnia.  The  word  used  in  the  Nevatla 
in  somewhat  different  form ;  Cohjrado,  code,  unless  treated  as  a  mistake,  pro- 
§  13;  Indiana,  Buhls'  St.,  1901,  §271;  duces  a  most  violent  and  exceptional 
WLscousin,  St..  1898,  §  2609.]  change  in  the  prior  law.     The  language 


PEKSOXS    SEVERALLY   LIABLK   ON    THE    SAME    INSTRUMENT. 


595 


in  the  common  law  made  by  the  Iowa  and  Kentucky  codes  are 
radical  and  complete.  In  the  former :  "  When  two  or  more  per- 
sons are  bound  by  contract  or  by  judgment,  decree,  or  statute, 
whether  jointly  only,  or  jointly  and  severally,  or  severally  only, 
including  the  parties  to  negotiable  paper,  common  orders,  and 
checks,  and  sureties  on  the  same  or  separate  instruments,  or  by 
any  liability  growing  out  of  the  same,  the  action  thereon  may,  at 
the  plaintiff's  option,  be  brought  against  aiiy,  or  all  of  them. 
When  any  of  those  so  bound  are  dead,  the  action  may  be  brought 
against  any  or  all  of  the  survivors,  with  any  or  all  of  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  decedents,  or  against  any  or  all  of  such  repre- 
sentatives. An  action  or  judgment  against  any  one  or  more  of 
several  persons  jointly  bound  shall  not  be  a  bar  to  proceedings 
against  the  others."  ^  The  corresponding  section  of  the  Kentucky 
code  differs  from  this  verbally  rather  than  substantially :  "  If  two 
or  more  persons  be  jointly  bound  by  contract,  the  action  thereon 
may  be  brought  against  all  or  any  of  them  at  the  plaintiff's  option. 
If  any  of  the  persons  so  bound  be  dead,  the  action  may  be  brought 


is  not  broad  enough  to  cover  all  joint  lia- 
bilities arising  from  contract ;  the  single 
case  of  partnership  liability  is  excepted. 
QSee  ante,  p.  198,  note  2,  for  other  statutes 
of  the  same  character.^ 

1  Qlowa,  Code.  1897  §  3465.  Lull  v. 
Anamosa  Nat.  Bank  (1900),  110  la.  5.37,  81 
N.  W.  784  :  "  If  plaiutitf  maintains  his  ac- 
tion against  one  of  several  defendants,  he 
may  have  judgment  against  that  one,  and 
the  other  defendants  may  have  judgment 
against  plaintiff  for  costs.  The  rule  is 
alike  applicable  to  actions  ex  contractu  and 
ex  delicto."  Kellogg  v.  Window  (1897), 
100  la.  552,  69  N.  W.  875.  In  Curran  v. 
Steiu  (1901),  —  Ky.  — ,  60  S.  W.  839, the 
court  say :  "  In  Gasson  v.  Badgett, 
6  Bush,  97,  it  was  held  that  in  an  action 
against  two  upon  an  alleged  joint  con- 
tract no  judgment  could  be  rendered 
against  one  upon  proof  that  the  contract 
was  made  with  him  alone.  But  after  this 
decision  was  rendered  by  the  act  of  1888 
the  following  amendment  was  made  to 
section  131  of  the  Code  of  Practice:  'In 
an  action  on  a  contract  alleged  to  have 
been  made  by  several  defendants,  in  the 
event  the  evidence  shall  show  the  contract 
to  have  been  made  witli  less  than  all  those 
defendants  bv  whom  it  is  alleged  to  have 


been  made,  this  shall  not  be  deemed 
either  a  variance  or  failure  of  proof,  but 
judgment  may  be  rendered  against  the 
party  or  parties  shown  to  be  bound  and  in 
favor  of  those  shown  not  to  be  bound.' " 
See  also  Council  Bluffs  Savings  Bank  v. 
Griswold  (1897),  50  Neb.  753,  70  N.  W. 
376,  in  wliich  the  court  construing  the 
Iowa  statute  quoted  in  the  text  said : 
"  The  evident  purpose  of  tlie  statute  above 
quoted  is  to  abolish  tlie  joint  liability  of 
persons  bound  by  contract,  judgment,  or 
statute,  and  to  authorize  the  prosecution 
of  actions  against  any  or  all  of  the  parties 
so  liable,  at  the  election  of  the  plaintiff," 
and  see  further  Schowalter  v.  Beard 
(1900),  lOOkla.  454,  63  Pac.  687,  as  fol- 
lows ;  "  Another  defence  urged  is  that  the 
obligation  is  joint,  and  that  all  the  ob- 
ligors should  be  made  parties  defendant. 
We  think  sec.  851,  page  219  Oklahoma 
Statutes  of  1893,  settles  this  proposition, 
as  all  the  obligors  on  tliis  agreement  were 
parties  who  received  some  benefit,  and  the 
statute  above  cited  makes  all  such  con- 
tracts, presumably,  joint  and  several,  and 
the  proof  8hov.-s  that  all  these  defendants 
were  owners  of,  or  parties  interested  in 
lot  18,  on  which  the  wall  was  partly 
erected. "J 


396  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

against  any  or  all  of  the  survivors,  A\ith  tlie  representatives  of  all 
or  any  of  the  decedents,  or  against  the  latter  or  any  of  them.  If 
all  the  persons  so  bound  be  dead,  the  action  may  be  brought 
against  the  representatives  of  all  or  of  any  of  them.  An  action 
or  judgment  against  any  one  or  more  of  several  persons  jointly 
bound  shall  not  be  a  bar  to  proceedings  against  the  others."  ^ 
Substantially,  the  same  change  in  the  common  law  is  made  b)' 
the  North  Carolina  code.^ 

§  301.  *  404.  Two  Classes  of  Statutory  Provisions  Compared  and 
Distinguished.  These  two  classes  of  legislative  enactments  must 
be  examined  separately.  The  provisions  of  the  first  class  relate 
solely  to  persons  severally,  as  opposed  to  those  jointly  or  jointly 
and  severally  liable.  The  term  "  severally  liable  "  has  long  had 
a  well-known  technical  meaning  in  the  law,  and  is  plainly  used 
with  that  meaning  in  this  connection.  The  modification  of  the 
former  rules  made  by  tliis  section  is  therefore  quite  restricted. 
Again,  this  several  liability  must  arise  from  the  fact  that  the 
persons  are  all  parties  to  one  single  instrument,  except  that,  in  a 
few  States,  sureties  upon  separate  instruments  are  also  included. 
This  latter  clause  is  probably  intended  to  cover  the  case,  which 
is  not  infrequent,  of  two  or  more  official  or  other  bonds  given  on 
behalf  of  the  same  principal  and  to  the  same  obligee,  and  in- 
tended to  secure  the  same  object,  the  rights  and  obligations  of 
the  sureties  thence  arising  being  the  same  as  if  they  had  all 
executed  a  single  undertaking.^  In  the  third  place,  there  is  no 
limit  upon  the  kind  of  contract  from  which  this  several  liability 
may  arise,  provided  it  is  in  writing.  The  broad  language  of  the 
clause  includes  any  and  every  species  of  written  contract."*  The 
instances  given  of  bills,  notes,  checks,  orders,  etc.,  are  illustra- 
tions merely,  and  do  not  restrict  the  operation  of  the  section  to 
themselves.  The  result  is,  that  the  provision  as  a  whole  has  the 
same  force  and  effect  in  all  the  States  of  whose  codes  it  forms  a 
part,  with  the  single  exception,  already  noticed,  in  reference  to 
sureties  upon  separate  instruments.     Fourthly,  no  change  is  made 

1  QKentuckj,  Codes,  1895,  §  27.]  QSee  ante,  p.  289,  note  1,  for  similar 

-  Code  of  North  Carolina,  §  63  a.     "  In  statutes   in   Arkansas,   Kansas,  Missouri, 

all  cases  of  joint  contract  of  co-partners  in  and  Minnesota  ] 

trade,  or  others,  suits  may  he  brouf^ht  and  -^  See  Towcll  v.  Powell,  48  Cnl.  234. 

prosecuted  on  the  same  against  all  or  any  *  Tlie    clause    does    not    enihrace    qr 

number  of  the  persons  making  sucli  con-  apply  to  oral  contracts  :  Excliange  Bauk 

tract."     See  Merwin  v.  liallard,  65  N.  C.  i-.  Ford,  7  Colo.  .'iU. 

168. 


PERSONS    SEVERALLY   LL\BLE    ON   THE    SAME    INSTRUMENT.      397 

in  the  prior  rules  of  law  which  define  the  nature  of  "  several 
liability."  The  contracts  from  which  such  a  liability  arises,  and 
the  cases  in  which  it  exists,  are  left  as  the  codes  found  them. 
Finally  the  only  change  made  by  the  section  is,  that  while  the 
common  law  required  a  separate  action  by  the  creditor  against 
each  one  of  the  persons  thus  severally  liable,  he  is  now  per- 
mitted at  his  option  to  sue  all,  one,  or  any  of  them.^  How  far 
the  provision  permits  the  joinder  of  the  personal  representatives 
of  deceased  parties  with  any  or  all  of  the  survivors  as  co-defend- 
ants must  be  a  matter  for  judicial  construction ;  that  found  in 
the  Kentucky  code  removes  all  possible  doubt  by  expressly 
authorizing  such  a  proceeding.  The  second  class  of  provisions 
goes  to  the  root  of  the  matter,  and  practically  destroys  all  dis- 
tinction between  joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several  liabilities, 
in  respect  of  actions  against  the  original  parties,  and  of  those 
against  the  survivors  and  the  representatives  of  such  as  have 
died.  These  enactments  are  so  express,  so  full,  and  so  plain  in 
their  language,  that  they  leave  very  little  room  for  forensic 
exposition  or  judicial  interpretation. 

§  302.  *  405.  Turning-Point  of  Decisions  herein.  Illustrations. 
From  this  analysis  of  the  language  I  proceed  to  the  judicial  in- 
terpretation which  has  been  put  upon  it.  Most  of  the  conclusions 
contained  in  the  foregoing  paragraph  result  so  plainly  from  the 
express  terms  of  the  statute,  that  no  doubt  can  be  entertained  of 
their  correctness,  and  no  necessity  can  arise  for  judicial  construc- 
tion. It  will  be  found,  therefore,  that  the  decisions  based  upon 
this  section  have  generally  turned,  not  upon  any  question  as  to 
its  meaning,  but  upon  points  of  the  former  law.  Nearly  all  of 
these  cases  will  be  seen,  when  we  get  at  the  ratio  decidendi,  to 
have  determined  either  that  the  parties  were  or  were  not  severally 
liable,  or  that  they  were  or  were  not  liable  upon  the  same  instru- 
ment. These  points,  I  say,  are  preliminary  only,  and  do  not 
belong  to  any  exposition  of  the  statutory  provision  itself ;  they 
simply  settle  the  question  whether  or  not  the  particular  case  falls 

1  QRuffatti  V.  Lexiugton  Mining   Co.  is  no  ground  of  complaint  on  the  part  of 

(1894),  10  Utah,  386,  37  Pac.  591.     "In  tlie  mining  company,  if  it,   in   fact,  was 

suit  upon  a  contract,  where  the  evidence  bound  by  the  contract,  that  the  plaintiff 

warrants  it,    we   think   it   is    universally  saw  fit  to  sue  some  one  else  who  was  not 

held  that  a  recovery  may  be  had  against  bound,  in  connection  with  it,  to  recover 

one  or  the  other,  or  both,  of  the  defend-  damages  for  a  breach."] 
auts,  who  are  sued  upon  the  contract.     It 


398  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

■within  its  terms.  The  decisions  to  be  cited  will  illustrate  this 
statement,  and  show  its  correctness.  In  a  leading  case,  giving  a 
construction  to  the  section,  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  said  : 
"  It  relates  to  several,  and  not  to  joint  liabilities.  The  latter  did 
not  require  the  aid  of  a  special  provision.  It  relates  in  terms  to 
cases  where  a  plurality  of  persons  contract  several  obligations 
on  the  same  instrument."  ^  The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin 
has  expressed  itself  to  the  same  effect.  "  The  language  of  this 
statute  is  very  clear  and  positive,  and  no  doubt  can  exist  as  to  its 
meaning.  It  has  changed  the  rule  of  the  common  law  with 
respect  to  the  actions  which  it  mentions.  No  demurrer  can  now 
be  sustained  for  the  nonjoinder  or  misjoinder  of  parties  defendant 
where  a  part  only  of  the  persons  severally  liable  are  included  in 
the  action,  and  the  rest  omitted,  and  that  fc>ct  appears  on  the  face 
of  the  complaint."  '^ 

§  303.  *  406.  Forms  of  Contract  included  in  Statute.  Illustrations. 
Form  of  Judgment.  The  terms  of  the  statute  are  so  broad  and 
unrestricted,  that  they  include  every  kind  and  form  of  written 
contract  upon  which  the  parties  thereto  are  made  severally  liable.^ 
It  is  not  necessary  that  they  .should  be  bound  for  the  same  identical 
demand  or  debt,  nor  that  each  should  be  responsible  for  the  aggre- 
gate amount  of  all  their  several  liabilities.  In  other  words,  it  is 
not  neces.sary  that  the  judgment  sliould  be  a  joint  one  for  the 
same  single  debt,  nor  even  a  separate  judgment  against  each  for 
that  one  sum,  nor,  as  it  would  seem,  a  separate  judgment  against 
each  for  the  same  sum.  If  a  contract  should  be  made  by  a  num- 
ber of  promisors,  by  which  each  bound  himself  in  an  amount 
different  from  that  of  all  the  others,  the  liability  Avould  plainl}'' 
be  several,  and  the  agreement  itself  would  be  embraced  within 
the  terms  of  the  section.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Kentucky  has 
used  the  following  language  in  reference  to  such  a  contract. 
"  In  this  case  there  is  but  one  contract,  and  it  is  the  same  con- 
tract between  the  same  parties,  but  several  as  to  its  obligation. 

1  Carman  v.  I'la-ss,  2.3  X.  Y.  280,  287,  .several  liability,  and  not  a  joint  liability 

j)er  Denio  .1.  with  the  otiicr  subscril)ers,  and  hence  isio 

-  Decker  v.  Trilling.  24  Wis.  610,  612,  be  enforced  in  an  action  .at  law  against 

])er   Dixon    C.  J.      (^Hut    see    Hodges  v.  him  alone. "] 

Xalty  (1899),  104  Wis.  464,  80  N.  W.  726,  "  [[.Main  r.  Johnson    (189.3),  7   Wash, 

in  which  the  court,  speaking  of  the  liabil-  .321,  .35   I'ac.  07  ;  Kodini  v.  Lytle  (1896), 

ity  incurred  by  the  subscribers  to  a  fund  17   Mont.  448,  43   I'ac.  501  ;  Loustalot  v. 

for  the  construction  of  a   church,   said:  Calkins    (1898),    120   Cal.- 688,    53    Pac. 

"  Tlie   liability   of    each    subscriber  is   a  258. 3 


PERSONS    SEVERALLY    LIABLE    ON    THE    SAME    INSTRUMENT.       399 

And  neither  the  hmguage  nor  the  presumed  objeet  of  the  section 
can  be  constructively  restricted  to  a  several  contract  binding 
each  separate  obligor  for  the  whole  amount  of  their  aggregate 
liabilities.  The  letter  of  the  section  certainly  authorizes  no  such 
restriction;  and  the  policy  of  avoiding  a  vexatious  multiplicity  of 
actions  for  the  breach  of  the  same  contract,  would  apply  equally 
to  every  contract  made  at  one  and  the  same  time  by  the  same 
parties  severally  liable  upon  it."  ^  Upon  this  doctrine  a  joint 
action  was  sustained  against  twenty-seven  persons  who  had  exe- 
cuted the  following  undertaking :  "  We  the  undersigned  agree 
to  become  bound  to  A.  as  sureties  for  B.,  each  for  the  sum  of 
8100,  for  any  goods  he  may  buy  of  said  A.,  each  of  us  to  be 
bound  for  $100  and  no  more,  it  being  the  true  intent  and  mean- 
ing that  each  incurs  for  himself  a  separate  liability  for  $100."  ^ 
Although  such  an  action 'is  brought  against  all  the  debtors,  and 
thus  appears  to  be  joint,  the  judgment  of  course  is  not  joint  but 
separate,  that  is,  against  each  for  the  amount  of  his  own  liability. 
It  could  certainly  make  no  difference  in  -the  principle  if  the  par- 
ties to  such  an  agreement  each  undertook  a  different  amount  of 
liability  instead  of  all  incurring  the  same.  These  views  have 
been  approved,  and  it  has  been  expressly  held  that  when  persons 
are  bound  for  separate  sums  by  the  same  instrument,  and  are 
sued  jointly,  a  separate  judgment  should  be  entered  against  each 
for  the  amount  of  his  individual  indebtedness.^  The  case  thus 
resembles  the  ordinary  contract  of  subscription,  which  in  accord- 
ance with  the  principle  of  the  decisions  above  quoted  would 
clearly  be  embraced  within  this  section.* 

§  304.  *  407.  Form  of  Judgment  Continued.  Discussion  by  Wis- 
consin Supreme  Court.  The  question  has  been  raised  whether  in 
an  action,  under  this  provision  of  the  codes,  against  all  or  some 
of  the  persons  thus  severally  liable  upon  the  same  instrument,  a 
joint  judgment  against  the  defendants  can  ever  be  proper,  and 
whether  the  final  determination  of  the  court  should  not  be  in  the 
form  of  a  separate  judgment  against  each  for  his  individual  liabil- 
ity.^    It  has  been  said  that  the  statute  permitting  debtors  sever- 

1  Wilder.  Haycraft,  2  Duvall,  309,  311,  "  The    case  of   an   action  against  the 

per  Robertson  J.  makers  and  indorsers  of  a  note  or  bill  is 

^  Ibid.  special.     A  suit  against  them  resulting  in 

3  People  V.  Edwards,  9  CaL  286.  a  joint  judgment  for  the  amount  due,  is 

*  [^But  see  Hodges  v.  Nalty  (1899),  104  ])ermitted  by  express  statutes  passed  long 

Wis.  464,  80  X    W.  726.]]  jjrior  to  tiie  new  procCkiure. 


400  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

ally  liable  to  be  sued  jointly,  and  the  joint  action  brought  in 
accordance  therewith,  do  not  make  them  jointly  liable  ;  and  it  can 
make  no  possible  difference  in  the  apphcation  of  this  principle, 
whether  each  person  is  severally  bound  on  the  contract  for  the 
same  or  for  a  different  sum.^  An  action  against  the  maker,  and 
the  personal  representatives  of  a  deceased  indorser  of  a  promissory 
note  has  been  sustained  under  this  section,  but  it  was  held  that  a 
joint  judgment  against  them  could  not  be  rendered.  This  ruling 
was  placed  upon  the  ground  that  the  judgment  agiiinst  one  must  be 
de  bonis  propriis,  and  against  the  other  de  bonis  testatoris.^  The 
whole  subject  has  been  ably  and  exliaustively  treated  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  and  I  shall  quote  their  discussion 
and  conclusions.  The  action  was  upon  a  joint  and  several  prom- 
issory note,  the  plaintiff  electing  to  treat  it  as  several,  and  pro- 
ceeding to  sue  two  only  of  the  five  makers.  He  had  obtained  a 
joint  judgment  for  the  amount  of  the  note  against  both,  and  each 
was  of  course  liable  for  that  entire  amount.  The  court  say: 
"  Another  objection  is  to  the  form  of  the  judgment.  The  judg- 
ment is  a  joint  one  against  both  of  the  defendants,  instead  of 
being  several  against  each.  It  is  urged  that  this  is  erroneous. 
It  is  contended  that  the  option  given  to  the  plaintiff  to  include  in 
the  action  all  or  any  of  the  persons  thus  severally  liable,  is  to 
enable  him  to  accomplish  in  one  action  what  by  the  former  prac- 
tice required  several  actions,  —  that  is,  to  enforce  in  the  action 
the  several  liability  of  each  defendant  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
a  separate  suit  had  been  brought  against  him.  But  for  its  being 
obviated  by  a  provision  of  the  statute  to  which  I  shall  presently 
refer,  this  objection  would  be  fatal  to  the  judgment.  The  form 
of  the  judgment  is  not  directed  by  the  statute  authorizing  per- 
sons thus  severally  liable  to  be  included  in  the  action.  The 
second  subdivision  of  §  11  of  chapter  124  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  Wisconsin  ^  has  no  relation  to  the  question,  because,  as  held  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals  in  Pruyn  v.  Black,"*  the  words  there  used, 
'•  defendants  severally  liable,"  mean  defendants  liable  separately 
from  the  defendants  not  served,  though  joi)itly  as  respects  each 

1  Kelsey  v.  Bradljury,  21  Barb.  531  ;  ^  Tliis  section  provides  for  taking 
Parker  v.  Jackson,  16  Barb.  3.3.  judgment  against  some  of  tlie  defendants 

2  Eaton  i;.  Alger,  47  N.  Y.  345;  2  "  .severally  liable  "  in  an  action,  when  the 
Keyes,  41  ;  Churchill  r.  Trapp,  3  Al)b.  otliers  liave  not  been  servc'l.  It  i.-<  the 
Pr.  306.     See  also  Burgoyne  v.  U.  L.  Ins.  same  as  [^§  2884,  St.,  1898.] 

&  Tr.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St.  586.  ••   I'ruvii  c.  Black,  21  N.  V.  .300. 


PERSONS    SEVERALLY   LIABLE    ON   THE    SAME    INSTRUMENT.      401 

other.  And  the  provisions  of  §  20  of  chap.  132  of  the  Revised 
Statutes  of  Wisconsin  ^  do  not  affect  it,  for  the  reason  that  the 
judgment  tliere  authorized  against  one  or  more  of  several  defend- 
ants is  only  when  a  several  judgment  may  be  proper.  It  seems 
to  me  to  be  left  therefore  for  the  courts  to  determine  according 
to  the  general  principles  of  the  law  governing  the  subject  what 
the  form  of  the  judgment  shall  be ;  and,  acting  upon  these  prin- 
ciples, it  seems  very  clear  to  me  that  the  judgment  should  follow 
the  nature  oi  the  claim  establislied  ;  and  if  that  is  separate  and 
several  as  against  each  defendant,  then  the  judgment  should  be 
so."  ^  The  judgment  in  this  case  was  not,  however,  reversed, 
since  another  section  of  the  Wisconsin  code  requires  the  court  to 
disregard  any  error  which  does  not  affect  the  substantial  rights  of 
the  parties. 

§  305.  *  408.  Joint  and  Several  Liability  may  be  treated  by  Prom- 
isee or  Obligee  as  Several  under  Statute  herein.  — Although  persons 
jointly  and  severally  liable  on  a  contract  are  not  mentioned  in 
this  section  of  .the  codes,  it  is  within  the  option  of  the  promisee 
or  obligee  in  such  an  agreement  to  treat  it  as  several,  and  by  his 
act  to  render  it  so  to  all  intents  and  purposes.  A  joint  and  sev- 
eral contract  has  been  held,  therefore,  to  fall  within  the  scope  and 
operation  of  the  provision ;  and  the  creditor,  in  pursuance  of  its 
permission,  has  the  election  to  sue  each  of  the  debtors  singly,  or 

1  This  section  is  the  general  provision  force  in  this  State,  for  the  reason  that  the 

rel.atiug  to  judgments,   permitting  judg-  question  is  regulated  by  our  code  of  civil 

ment  to  be  rendered  for  some  of  the  de-  procedure.'  "     And  it  is  said  tlie  statute 

fendants,    and   against  the  others,  under  provides :    "  Though    all   the   defendants 

certain  circumstances;   it   corresponds  to  have  been  summoned,  the  judgment  may 

[^§  2883,  St.,  1898.3  be  rendered  against  any  of  them  severally, 

-  Decker  v.  Trilling,  24  Wis.  610,  613,  when   the  plaintiff   would   be  entitled  to 

per  Dixon  C.  J.     [|In  Haasler  v.  Hefele  judgment  against  such  defendants  if  the 

(1898),  151  Ind.  391,  50  N.  E.  361,  it  was  action  had  been  against  them  severally." 

objected  that  since   the   cause  of   action  See  Bunnell   v.  Berlin   Iron   Bridge   Co. 

alleged    was   joint   a  separate  judgment  (1895),  66  Conn.  24,  33  Atl.  533,  in  which 

against  each  of  the   two  defendants  for  the  court  say :    "  Independently  however 

one-half  the  amount  of   plaintiff's  claim  of  such  autliority,  we  think  the  provisions 

was  erroneous.     In  answer  to  this  objec-  of  the  Practice  Act  for  including  in  one 

tion  the  court  said :  "  If  any  one  should  action  parties  defendant  liaving  separate 

complain  of  this  it  would  seem  to  be  the  and  even  antagonistic  interests,  and  for 

appellee,' who   was    not   given   the   joint  authorizing  tlie  court  by  orders  for  sepa- 

judgment  for  which  she  had  asked  in  her  rate  trials  and  otherwise  to  protect  their 

complaint.     In  answer  to  a  similar  objec-  differing  interests,  clearly  implies  the  pos- 

tion,  it  was  said  by  this  court  in  Loui.sville,  sibility  of  a  'final  judgment'  as  to  one 

etc.  11.  W.  Co.  V.  Treadway,  143  Ind.  689 :  party,  altliough  the   action   continues  in 

'  The   authorities   cited    by    appellant   in  court  for  the  disposition  of  the  rights  of 

support  of  the  rule  asserted  can  have  no  other  parties. "J 

26 


402 


CIVIL  rf:mediks. 


to  sue  all,  or  to  sue  an}^  number  of  them.^  The  question  might 
arise,  whether,  if  he  elected  to  sue  all,  the  contract  would  be 
reo-arded  as  joint  in  accordance  with  the  former  practice,  or 
whether  by  virtue  of  this  statutory  enactment  it  would  be  taken 
as  several.  I  am  not  aware  that  this  question,  which  perhaps  has 
little  practical  importance,  has  been  passed  upon  by  the  courts. 

^  306.  *  409.  Case  of  Guarantor  and  Principal  Debtor.  Weight  of 
Authority.  Rule  in  Iowa.  — It  has  been  decided  in  many  cases,  and 
undoubtedly  the  weight  of  authority  sustains  this  ruling,  that  a 
guarantor  and  the  principal  debtor  cannot  be  sued  together  in 
one  action ;  even  though  the  guaranty  be  written  upon  the  same 
paper  with  the  agreement  which  it  undertakes  to  secure.  It  is 
said  that  the  principal  debt  and  the  collateral  undertaking  do  not 
constitute  one  instrument,  and  the  parties  therefore  do  not  come 
within  the  language  of  the  statute.^     A  diiferent  rule,  however, 


1  Decker  v.  Trilliug,  24  AVis.  610,  612; 
Clapp  V.  Preston,  15  Wis.  .543  ;  Burgoyiie 
V.  O.  L.  Ins.  &  Tr.  Co.,  5  Ohio  St.  586 ; 
People  V.  Edwards,  9  Cal.  286;  People  v. 
Love,  25  Cal.  520,  526.  Action  on  a  joint 
and  several  bond.  The  court  held  it  gov- 
erned by  the  statute  as  though  several. 
It  lias  been  said,  therefore,  that  this  pro- 
vi.<ion  has  in  effect  destroyed  joint  and 
several  liability  arising  on  single  express 
written  contract.  Hepj)e  v.  .Johnson,  73 
Cal.  265;  Steffes  v.  Lemke,  40  Minn.  27. 

2  Le  Roy  v.  Shaw,  2  Duer,  626;  l)e 
Ridder  v.  Schermerhorn,  10  Barb.  638; 
Allen  V.  Fosgate,  11  How.  Pr.  218;  Phalen 
V.  Dingee,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  379;  Carman 
r.  Plass,  23  N.  Y.  286,  287,  per  Denio  .J. ; 
H-mdurant  v.  Bladen,  19  Ind.  160;  Virden 
r.  Ellsworth,  15  Ind.  144.  See  also  Burton 
V.  Speis,  5  Hun,  60;  Graham  v.  Ringo,  67 
Mo.  324;  Tyler  v.  Tualatin  Academy,  14 
Ore.  485.  For  a  lonn  of  contract  under 
which  the  guarantor  man  be  sued  jointly 
with  the  principal  debtor,  see  Decker  v. 
Gaylord,  8  Hun,  110,  a  case  analogous  to 
Carman  v.  Plass,  <:ited  in  the  following 
note.  ([Loustalot  v.  Calkins  (1898),  120 
Cal.  688.  .53  Pac.  258.  In  this  case  Calkins 
had  indorsed  note  sued  upon  before  de- 
livery and  under  .section  3117  of  the  Civil 
Code  of  that  State  thereby  became  liable 
as  an  indorser.  One  Libcn  and  A.  C. 
Calkins,  the  makers,  and  .J.  W.  Calkins 
•were  joined  us  defendants      .J.  W.  Calkins 


demurred  because  of  a  "  misjoinder  of 
parties  defendant  in  that  .1.  W.  Calkins, 
an  alleged  and  supposed  guarantor,  is 
joined  with  the  principal  jiromisors."  A 
joint  and  several  judgment  was  rendered 
against  the  defendants.  For  reversal  upon 
appeal  one  of  the  two  grounds  relied  upon 
was  "the  demurrer  of  J.  W.  Calkins  to 
the  complaint  should  have  been  sus- 
tained." The  court  said:  "  In  speaking  as 
to  parties  who  may  be  joined  as  defend- 
ants, the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  section 
383,  declares :  '  Persons  severally  liable 
upon  tlie  same  obligation  or  instrument, 
including  the  parties  to  bills  of  exchange 
and  j)romissory  notes  and  sureties  on  the 
same  or  separate  instruments,  may  all 
or  any  of  them  be  included  in  the  same 
action,  at  the  option  of  the  plaintiff.'  By 
a  liberal  construction  of  tliis  provision  it 
may  be  fairly  said  that  an  indorser,  such 
as  the  defendant  Calkins,  is  a  party  to  tlie 
promissory  note.  .  .  . 

"  The  object  of  this  section  of  the  Law  is 
directed  solely  to  the  avoidance  of  a  multi- 
plicity of  actions.  And  we  see  no  sub- 
stantial objection  to  the  ajiplicatiou  of  the 
rule  to  a  case  like  the  one  at  bar.  Upon 
an  examination  of  the  authorities  from 
other  States  having  statutcjry  pr(jvi.sions 
substantially  similar  to  the  one  found  in 
our  code,  we  find  those  authorities  pre- 
ponderating to  the  effect  that  a  guarantor 
and  the  maker  of  a  promissory  note  may 


PERSONS    SEVERALLY   LIABLE    ON    THE    SAME    INSTRUMENT.      403 

prevails  in  Iowa,  and  it  is  there  held  in  a  series  of  cases,  that  the 
guarantoi-  and  the  principal  debtor  may  be  sued  in  one  action, 
since  they  are  liable  for  the  same  debt,  and  are,  within  the  mean- 
ing of  the  section,  bound  upon  the  same  instrument.^ 

§307.  *  410.  When  Liability  arises  from  same  Instrument.  —  A 
surety  or  guarantor  may  be  joined  as  a  co-defendant  with  his 
principal  if  the  contract  be  in  such  a  form  and  of  such  a  nature 
that  his  liability  ar'ises  from  the  same  instriniient.  A  lease  made 
between  the  lessor  of  the  first  part,  and  the  lessee  A.  of  the 
second  part,  and  B.  of  the  third  part,  contained  the  usual  clauses 
of  demise  to  A.  and  covenants  on  his  part  to  pay  rent,  etc.,  and 
also  a  covenant,  on  the  part  of  B.,  whereby  "  he  did,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  premises  and  of  the  sum  of  one  dollar,  guar- 
antee unto  the  lessor  the  payment  of  the  aforesaid  rent,  and  the 
faithful  performance  of  the  covenants  in  said  lease  contained." 
The  instrument  was  signed  and  sealed  by  all  the  parties.  The 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  lessor  might,  by  vir- 
tue of  the  section  under  consideration,  maintain  an  action  against 
A.  and  B.  to  recover  a  sum  due  for  rent.  The  case  was  distin- 
guished from  the  others  cited  above,  in  reference  to  ordinary 
guaranties,  since  the  parties  to  this  lease  were  made  liable  by  the 
same  instrument.'"^     I  cannot  refrain  from  expressing  the  opinion 

not  be  joined   as   parties  defendant;  but  ground  of  improperly  uniting  two  causes 

that  question   is  not   directly  before   us,  of  action. 3 

and  we  pass  it  by  for  tliat  reason.     In  this  ^  Tucker  ;'.  Shiner,  24  Iowa,  334  ;  Mix 

State  from  its  earliest  judicial  history  the  v.    Fairchild,    12    Iowa,   331  ;     Marvin    v. 

makers  and  indorsers  of  negotiable  prom-  Adamson,    11    Iowa,   371;'  Peddicord    ?•. 

issory  notes   have  been  joined  as  parties  Whittam,  9  Iowa,  471. 
defendant,  and  no  question  as  to  the  cor-  ^  Carman  v.  Plass,  23  N.  Y.  286,  287. 

rectness   of  the   practice    has   ever  been  Where  an  administrator  in  the  course  of 

suggested.     For  this  reason  alone  we  feel  his  administration  gave  two   bonds  with 

constrained  to  give  the  statute  a  construe-  different  sureties,  but  the  umlertaking  and 

tion   it   has   tacitly   borne  for    so    many  the  liabilities   of  the   sureties    being   the 

years.  .  .  .  Tlie    demurrer   was   properly  same  in  each,  it  was  held,  in  California, 

overruled."  that  all  the  sureties  on  both  bonds  coulil 

See    also   Gilmore   v.    Skookum    Box  be  sued  in  one  action  under  the  special 

Factory  (1899),   20  Wash.  703,  56    Pac.  provision  of  the  code  in  that  State.     Pow- 

934.  where   it  was  held  that  under  Bal.  ell   v.   Powell,  48   Cal.   234;    QStoner   v. 

Code,  §  4836,  providing  that  persons  sev-  Keith    County    (1896),   48    Neb.    279,    67 

erally  liable  upon   the   same  promi.ssory  N.  W.  311.     "It  is  further  claimed  that 

note  may  all,  or  any  of  them,  be  included  there  was  a  misjoinder  of  parties ;    that 

in  the  same  action,  a  complaint  declaring  the  sureties  on  the  first  bond  should  not 

against  the  maker  of  a  note  on  his  written  have    joined    in    an    action    with    those 

undertaking,   and    also    against    another  who  signed  the  second.     Under  the  view 

party   on   a  verbal   promise   to    pay  the  that  the  default  of  the  treasurer  occurred 

same    note,    is    not    demurrable   on   the  after  the  execution  of  tiie   second  bond, 


404  CIVIL   KEMEDIKS. 

that  this  is  a  distinction  without  a  difference.  Believing  that 
the  decision  of  the  court  was  right,  it  is  impossible  to  discrim- 
inate the  cases  of  ordinary  guaranties  from  it  by  any  valid  and 
substantial  reasons.  By  permitting  parties  to  a  contract  resem- 
bling this  lease  to  be  joined  in  a  single  action,  and  refusing  to 
admit  the  same  form  of  suit  against  a  principal  debtor  and  his 
guarantor,  whose  undertaking  is  perhaps  indorsed  upon  the  same 
writing,  the  courts  in  fact  make  the  nature  of  their  obligation  to 
depend  upon  the  position  of  the  written  matter  on  the  paper,  and 
not  upon  the  terms  and  nature  of  their  agreements.  The  rules 
of  procedure,  as  established  by  the  reformed  system,  were  never 
designed  to  be  controlled  by  such  considerations.  The  judicial 
decisions  which  illustrate  the  second  class  of  provisions  quoted 
at  the  commencement  of  this  section  have  already  been  cited  and 
discussed  in  section  sixth,  and  need  not  be  repeated  here. 


SECTION  NINTH. 
BRINGING  IN  NEW   PARTIES:   INTERVENING. 

§  308.  *  411.  Two  Types  of  Code  Provisions  herein.  As  the 
equitable  theory  of  parties  was  adopted  in  the  new  procedure,  we 
should  naturally  expect  some  provision  for  changing  them,  either 
by  addition  or  diminution.  In  accordance  with  this  expectation, 
the  codes  all  contain  sections  prescribing  rules  more  or  less  elab- 
orate and  explicit  for  tlie  guidance  of  the  courts  in  this  respect. 
They  follow  two  different  types.  The  one  is  the  mere  statement 
in  a  statutory  form  of  the  doctrine  as  to  bringing  in  new  parties 
which  had  long  prevailed  in  courts  of  equity,  and  to  it  is  atlded  a 
provision  which  permits  a  summary  interpleader  to  be  ordered  by 
the  court,  upon  motion,  in  certain  specified  cases,  thus  avoiding 
the  delay  and  trouble  of  a  fonnal  interpleader  suit.  The  New 
York  code  adopted  this  type,  and  it  has  been  followed,  sometimes 
with  slight  variations,  but  often  with  literal  exactpess,  by  most  of 
the  State  codes  and  practice  acts.  The  other  type  is  entirely  dif- 
ferent. It  discards  entirely  all  the  ancient  notions;  it  goes  far 
beyond  the  concessions  made  by  the  equity  courts;    it  creates, 

the  sureties  on  both  bonds  were  properly     prin(i]);il  to  faitlifuUy  jicrfonn  the  duties 
joined  as  parties  defendants.     They  were     of  liis  oflke."3 
each  and  all  liable  for  the  failure  of  the 


BUINGING   IN    NEW    PAUTIES.  405 

under  the  title  "Intervention,"  or  ''Intervening,"  a  new  division 
of  the  procedure.  The  fundamental  notion  is,  that  the  person 
ultimately  and  really  interested  in  the  result  of  a  litigation  —  the 
person  who  will  be  entitled  to  the  linal  benefit  of  the  recovery  — 
may  at  any  time,  at  any  stage,  intervene  and  be  made  a  party,  so 
that  the  whole  possible  controversy  shall  be  ended  in  one  action 
and  by  a  single  judgment.  The  States  v/hicli  have  adopted  this 
type  to  its  fullest  extent  are  Iowa  and  California,  and  their  ex- 
ample has  been  followed  in  a  number  of  others. 

§309.  *412.  Statutory  Provisions  of  First  Form.  The  provisions 
which  follow  the  first  form,  as  thus  described,  are  all  represented 
by  the  sections  contained  in  the  New  York  code :  "  The  court 
may  determine  any  controversy  between  the  parties  before  it, 
where  it  can  be  done  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  of  others, 
or  by  saving  their  rights ;  but  where  a  complete  determination 
of  the  controversy  cannot  be  had  without  the  presence  of  other 
parties,  the  court  must  cause  them  to  be  brought  in. 

"  And  when  in  an  action  for  the  recovery  of  real  or  personal 
property  a  person  not  a  party  to  the  action,  but  having  an  interest 
in  the  subject  thereof,  makes  application  to  the  court  to  be  made  a 
party,  it  may  order  him  to  be  brought  in  by  the  proper  amendment. 

"A  defendant  against  whom  an  action  is  pending  upon  a  con- 
tract, or  for  specific  real  or  personal  property,  may,  at  any  time 
before  answer,  upon  affidavit  that  a  person  not  a  party  to  the 
action,  and  without  collusion  with  him,  makes  against  him  a  de- 
mand for  the  same  debt  or  property,  upon  due  notice  to  such 
person  and  the  adverse  party,  apply  to  the  court  for  an  order  to 
substitute  such  person  in  his  place,  and  discharge  him  from 
liability  to  either  party,  on  his  depositing  in  the  court  the  amount 
of  the  debt,  or  delivering  the  property  or  its  value  to  such  person 
as  the  court  may  direct;  and  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion, 
make  the  order."  ^ 

1  [^The  present  New  York  statute  reads  a  person,  not  a  party  to  the  action,  has  au 

as  follows :   Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  4.52  :  "  The  interest  in  the  subject  thereof,  or  in  real 

court  may  determine  the  controversy,  as  property,  tlie  title  to  which  may  in  any 

between   the   parties   before  it,  where  it  niauuer  be  affected  by  the  judgment,  or 

can  do  so  without  prejudice  to  the  rights  in  real  property  for  injury  to  which  the 

of  others,  or  by  saving  their  rights ;  but  complaint  demands  relief,  and  makes  ap- 

where   a  complete   determination  of  tiie  plication  to  tlie  court  to  be  made  a  party, 

controversy   cannot   be   had  without   the  it  must  direct  him  to  be  brought  in  by  tlie 

presence  of  other  parties,  the  court  must  proper    amendment."      Code    Civ.   Pro., 

direct  them  to  be  brouglit  in.     And  where  §820:  "A   defendant  against   whom  an 


406 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  310.  *  41  o.  Statutory  Provision  of  Second  Form.  The  Second 
form  of  the  statutory  provisiou  creating  and  regulating  the  subject 
of  "Intervention"  is  as  follows:  "Any  person  who  has  an  in- 
terest in  the  matter  in  litigation,  in  the  success  of  either  of  the 
parties  to  the  action,  or  against  both,  may  become  a  party  to  an 
action  between  other  persons,  either  by  joining  the  plaintiff  in 
claiming  what  is  sought  by  the  petition,  or  by  uniting  with  the 
defendant  in  resisting  the  claim  of  the  plaintiff,  or  by  demanding 
anything  adversely  to  both  the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  either 
before  or  after  issue  has  been  joined  in  the  cause,  and  before  the 
trial  commences.  The  court  shall  determine  upon  the  inter- 
vention at  the  same  time  that  the  action  is  decided,  and  the 
iutervenor  has  no  right  to  delay ;  and  if  the  claim  of  the  inter- 
venor  is  not  sustained,  he  shall  pay  all  costs  of  the  intervention. 
The  intervention  shall  be  by  petition,  which  must  set  forth  the 
facts    on   which   it   rests ;    and   all   the    pleadings   therein   shall 


action  to  recover  upou  a  contract,  or  an 
action  of  ejectment,  or  an  action  to  recover 
a  chattel,  is  pending,  may,  at  any  time  be- 
fore answer,  npon  proof,  by  affidavit,  that  a 
person,  not  a  party  to  the  action,  makes  a 
demand  against  bim  for  the  same  debt  or 
property,  without  collusion  with  him,  ap- 
ply to  the  court,  upon  notice  to  that  person 
and  the  adverse  party,  for  an  order  to 
substitute  t!iat  person  in  his  place,  and  to 
discharge  him  from  liability  to  either,  on 
his  paying  ijito  court  tlie  amount  of  the 
debt,  or  delivering  the  possession  of  the 
property,  or  its  value,  to  such  person  as 
the  court  directs ;  or  upon  it  appearing 
that  the  defendant  disputes,  in  whole  or  in 
]iart.  the  liability  as  asserted  against  him 
by  different  claimants,  or  that  he  has 
some  interest  in  the  suljject-matter  of  the 
co.itroversy  which  he  desires  to  assert,  his 
applii-atioa  may  be  for  an  order  joining 
the  other  claimant  or  claimants  as  co-de- 
fendants with  him  in  the  action.  The 
court  may,  in  its  discretion,  make  such 
order,  upon  such  terms  as  to  costs  and 
payments  into  court  of  the  amount  of 
the  debt,  or  part  thereof,  or  delivery 
of  the  po.ssossioii  of  tlie  property,  or  its 
value  or  part  thereof,  as  may  be  just, 
and  tlierenpon  the  entire  controversy  may 
1)6  determiiK'd  in  tlie  action."]  Ohio. 
§§   40-4.T;    California,   §§  386,   389;    Ne- 


bra.ska,  §§  46-48;  North  Carolina,  §  65; 
Nevada,  §  17;  ^Arizona,  ,Kev.  St.,  1901, 
§  1308;  Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig., 
§§  ."jCSj-.^es: ;  Colorado,  §§  16-18;  Con- 
necticut, Gen.  St.,  1902,  §§  621,  1019: 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §§  317.5, 
3176,  3178;  Indiana,  Burns'  St,  §§  273, 
274;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §§  3466,  3487; 
Kan.sas,  Gen.  St.,  1901,  §§4469-4471  ;  Ken- 
tucky, Code,  1895,  §§  28,  29;  Missouri, 
Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  543 ;  Montana,  §§  588, 
591;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
§§  5238,  5240  ;  Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  §§  501.-5, 
5014,  5016;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §§391.3- 
3915;  Oregon,  Hill's  Laws,  §§  40,  41; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  143;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §§  6085,  6087; 
Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §§  2924,  2926; 
Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §§  4840,  4842; 
Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2610;  Wyoming, 
Rev.  St.,  1899,  §§  3487,  .3488,  3490.] 
Several  of  these  sections  differ  somewhat 
from  the  language  of  the  New  York  code 
quoted  in  the  text,  but  the  differences  are 
not  material ;  they  relate  entirely  to  details 
of  ))ractice,  and  do  not  enlarge  nor  restrict 
the  power  conferred  upon  the  courts. 
See  People  v.  Albany  &  Vt.  R.  Co.,  77  N.  V. 
232;  Chapman  r.  Forbes,  123  N.  Y.  532, 
.539;  Ladd  r.  Stevenson,  112  N.  Y.  325; 
Johnston  v.  Donvan,  106  N.  Y.  267. 


BRINGING    IN    NEW    I'AUTIES. 


407 


be  governed  by  the  same  principles  and  rules  as  obtain  in  other 
pleadings."  ^ 

§  311.  *  414.  Three  Transactions  herein.  First  of  said  Transac- 
tions. Moving  Party.  Tlxe  several  clauses  thus  quoted  at  large 
relate  to  and  establish  three  entirely  different  transactions  in  the 
conduct  of  an  action.  Not  a  little  confusion  has  arisen  from  a 
neglect  to  keep  these  three  subjects  separate  ;  the  requisites  of 
the  one  have  been  confounded  with  those  of  another,  and  thus 
mistakes  have  followed  which  a  little  care  in  examining  the  statute 
would  have  obviated.  The  three  transactions  referred  to  are  the 
following:  The  first  is  provided  for  in  all  the  codes,  and  is  the 
brief  enactment  of  a  familiar  rule  in  equity.  It  is  the  bringing 
in  additional  parties  by  the  court  when  a  complete  determination 
of  the  controversy  cannot  be  had  without  their  presence.  This 
act  plainly  contemplates  the  fiict  that  there  are  already  parties 
before  the  court,  defendants  against  whom  the  plaintiff  has  a 
cause  of  action,  and  is  entitled  to  some  relief.  The  enlarmnsf 
the  number  of  parties,  under  such  circumstances,  is  clearly  not 
the  same  thing  as  the  commencing  a  new  action  because  the 
plaintiff  has  failed  to  make  out  any  cause  of  action  against  those 


1  Code  of  Iowa  [;i897,  §§  3594-3596], 
slightly  changed  in  phraseology  from  the 
former  revisions  of  the  statutes ;  Califor- 
nia, Code  of  1872,  §  387  :  "  Any  person 
may,  before  the  trial,  intervene  in  an  action 
or  proceeding,  who  has  an  interest  in  the 
matter  in  litigation,  in  the  success  of  either 
of  the  parties,  or  an  interest  a;^ainst  botli. 
An  intervention  takes  place  when  a  third 
person  is  permitted  to  become  a  party  to 
an  actiou  or  proceeding  between  other 
persons,  either  by  joining  the  plaintiff  in 
claiming  what  is  sought  by  tlie  complaint, 
or  by  uniting  with  the  defendant  in  resist- 
ing the  claims  of  the  plaintiff,  or  by  de- 
manding anything  adversely  to  both  the 
plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  and  is  made 
by  complaint  setting  fortli  the  grounds 
upon  which  the  intervention  rests,  filed 
by  leave  of  the  court,  and  served  upon 
the  parties  to  the  action  or  proceeding 
who  have  not  appeared,  and  upon  the  at- 
torneys of  the  parties  who  have  appeared, 
who  may  answer  or  demur  to  it  as  if  it 
were  an  original  complaint."  Tliis  provi- 
sion is  somewhat  changed  from  the  origi- 
nal f<irin  in  the  statutes  of  18.54,  ch.  84, 


§§  71-74.  It  is  substantially  the  same  as 
that  in  Iowa,  except  that  tlie  intervenor 
must  obtain  leave  of  the  court  to  file  his 
complaint,  while  in  Iowa  lie  files  his  pe- 
tition as  a  matter  of  course  at  his  own 
election. 

QThe  provisions  of  the  Calforuia  statute 
respecting  intervention  are  found  in  sub- 
stantially similar  form  in  Idaho,  Code  Civ. 
Pro.,  1901, 4)  3177  ;  Montana,  §589  ;  North 
Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5239;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6086;  Utali, 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2925;  Washington, 
Bal.  Code,  §  4846;  Colorado,  §§  22-24. 
The  provisions  of  the  Iowa  statute  are 
found  in  substantially  similar  iorm  in  Min- 
nesota, Gen.  St.,  1894,  §  5273;  Nebraska, 
Comp.  St.,  1901,  §§  5638-5640;  Nevada, 
Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3694.  The  Arizona 
statute  reads  as  follows :  "  Any  person  who 
has  an  interest  in  the  sul)ject-matter  of  tlie 
suit  which  can  be  affected  by  the  judg- 
ment, may,  on  leave  of  the  court  or  judge, 
intervene  in  such  suit  or  proceeding  at  anv 
time  before  the  trial."  Rev.  St.,  1901 
§  1278.3 


408  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

whom  he  has  already  sued.  By  whose  desire  or  on  whose  motion 
the  additional  parties  shall  be  brought  in,  the  section  does  not 
specify,  but  the  terms  are  broad  enough  to  include  every  case. 
In  the  majority  of  instances  the  plaintiff  doubtless  applies  for  the 
additional  parties.  Cases  may  and  do  arise  in  which  the  defend- 
ant, deeming  it  necessary  to  protect  his  own  interests,  makes  the 
application.  Finally,  the  court  may,  on  its  own  motion,  order  in 
the  persons  whose  presence  it  regards  proper  to  a  complete  de- 
termination of  the  issues. 

§312.  *  415.  Second  of  said  Transactions.  Scope  of  Statutory  Pro- 
vision herein.  Moving  Party.  Tlie  second  of  these  transactions,  in 
the  progress  of  an  action,  is  the  bringing  in  and  making  a  party 
to  the  suit  a  third  person  upon  his  own  application,  —  or,  in  the 
very  aj)propriate  language  of  certain  codes,  the  Intervening  of  a 
third  person.  In  respect  to  this  proceeding  there  is  the  marked 
difference  between  the  two  types  of  statutory  provisions  abeady 
spoken  of.  Most  of  the  codes,  following  that  of  New  York,  have 
legislated  upon  the  subject  with  great  caution,  and  have  merely 
given  a  certain  extension  to  the  familiar  common-law  practice  of 
permitting  a  landlord  to  come  in  and  defend  an  action  of  eject- 
ment in  the  place  of  his  tenant.  The  provision  itself  is  Very 
brief,  and  by  its  terms  is  confined  to  actions  for  the  recovery  of 
real  or  personal  property.  Beyond  a  doubt  it  embraces  all  equita- 
ble actions  in  which  the  remedy  is  the  recovery  of  real  or  personal 
property,  and  is  not  restricted  to  the  legal  actions  which  cor- 
respond to  the  ancient  ejectment  and  replevin.  This  short  and 
simple  clause  is  the  only  one  which  authorizes  a  third  person  to 
be  made  a  party  upon  his  own  motion. 

§  313.  *  416.  Intervention  in  Iowa  and  California.  Origin  of. 
Passing  to  the  codes  of  Iowa  and  California,  we  see  that  Inter- 
vening rises  at  once  into  a  proceeding  of  great  importance.  It 
may  be  resorted  to  in  any  and  all  actions,  and  at  every  stage  in 
the  action  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  trial.  Tlie  inter- 
venor  may  have  an  interest  witli  tlie  j^laintiff,  or  with  the  defend- 
ant, or  one  special  to  himself  and  adver.se  to  both  of  the  original 
parties.  He  does  not  ask  the  privilege  of  intervening,  and  obtain 
that  privilege  by  an  order;  he  intervenes  as  a  matter  of  right,  by 
filing  and  serving  his  petition  in  the  same  manner  as  though  he 
was  commencing  an  ordinary  action,  and  his  rights  are  passed 
upon  and  disposed  of,  together  wilh  those  of  the  plaintiff  and 


BKINGING    IN    NEW    PARTIES.  409 

defendant,  at  the  trial. ^  It  is  plain  that  this  is  a  judicial  pro- 
ceeding utterly  unknown  before  in  our  ordinary  courts,  entirely 
unlike  anything  which  had  been  customary  in  the  common  law  or 
equity  tribunals  of  England  or  the  United  States.  Indeed,  it  was 
confessedly  borrowed  from  the  procedure  established  by  the  code 
of  Louisiana. 

§  314.  *417.  Third  of  said  Transactions.  Interpleader.  How- 
Distinguished  from  other  of  said  Transactions.  The  third  judicial 
transaction  is  the  act  of  a  defendant  in  procuring  anotiier  person, 
not  a  party  to  the  suit,  to  be  substituted  in  place  of  himself  as 
the  party  defendant,  and  himself  to  be  thereby  discharged  from 
all  liability  in  respect  of  the  cause  of  action,  —  a  special  remedy 
long  known  in  another  form  as  an  Interpleader.  It  should  be 
carefully  distinguished  from  each  of  the  two  former  proceedings. 
Unlike  the  second,  the  stranger  does  not  come  in  on  his  own 
motion ;  unlike  the  first,  the  application  can  only  be  made  by  a 
defendant.  It  is  confined  in  its  operation  to  three  kinds  of 
actions:  those  brought  to  recover  money  on  a  contract,  either 
debt  or  damages,  those  brought  to  recover  specific  real  property, 
and  those  brought  to  recover  specific  personal  property.  It  is  a 
substitute,  by  means  of  the  summary  mode  of  a  motion  and  an 
order  made  thereon,  for  the  ancient  equitable  action  called  the 
Bill  of  Interpleader.  The  consideration  of  this  subject  does  not 
legitimately  fall  within  the  purposes  of  the  present  work;  it 
does  not  involve  the  question  who  are  and  who  are  not  proper 

^  [|But  see  East  Riverside   Irrigation  those  whom  he  desires  to  make  defend- 

District  v.  Holcorab  (1899),  126  Cal.  315,  ants,   and   that   new    parties   brought  in 

58  Pac.  817.     In  this   case  third  parties  against  his  will  cannot  be  allowed  to  set 

had  been  brought  in  and  made  defendants  up  against  him  defences  and  affirmative 

at  the  request  of  the  original  defendant  causes  of  action  which  the  original  defeud- 

and  against  the  objection  of  the  plaintiff,  ant   could  not  have  set  up ;    and  this  is 

These  third  parties  "  set  up  new  matters  especially  so  where  the  granting  of  the 

and  causes  of  action  not  involved  in  the  relief  sought   by  the   original   complaint 

original  suit  —  not  defences  to  the  action,  would    not    have    prejudiced    the    other 

and  not  available  at  all  to  the  original  causes   of   action  wliich   the  new  parties 

defendant,"  and  their  right  so  to  do  was  seek  to  liave  adjudicated.     Peculiar   cir- 

one  of  the  questions  passed  upon  by  the  cumstances  may  make  exceptions  to  the 

Supreme  Court.     Among  other  things  the  rule,  but  tlie  general  principle  is  as  above 

Court  said  :  "  The  principles  which  govern  stated."     See  also  Clay  County  Laud  Co. 

are,    however,   to   a   great    extent    those  v.   Alcox   (1902),  P8   Minn.    4,  92  N.  W. 

wliich  a])ply  to  interventions  and  counter-  464.     See  Yaiuiieter  v.  Fidelity  Trust  Co. 

claims  and  the  bringing  in  of  new  parties  (1899),  107  Ky.  lOS,  53  S.  W.  10,  in  which 

and  those  which  would  apply  to  cros.s-bills  Horn  v.  Volcano  Water  Co.,  13  Cal.  62,  is 

under  the  old  equity  practice.     The  gen-  quoted  and  approved.] 
eral  rule   is,  that   a   plaintiff   may  select 


410 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


parties,  and  there  is  no  possible  reason  for  its  being  discussed  in 
this  connection  except  that  the  statutory  provision  which  regu- 
lates it  is  immediately  associated  with  other  clauses  which  do 
relate  to  parties.^  The  two  other  judicial  proceedings  will  now 
be  examined  with  the  aid  of  such  judicial  decisions  as  have 
explained  their  scope  and  effect. 

^  315.  *418.  I.  Bringing  in  Additional  Parties.  When  the  Court 
must  act.  The  issues  between  the  original  parties  are  to  be 
determined,  if  that  can  be  done  without  prejudice  to  the  rights 
of  others,  or  by  saving  the  rights  of  others;  if  this  be  possible, 
the  cause  should  be  adjudicated  as  it  was  presented  for  decision. ^ 


1  QSee  the  folluwing  receut  cases  re- 
specting Interpleader :  Hirsch  v.  ISIayer 
(1901),  165  N.  Y.  236,  .59  N.  E.  89;  E.  G. 
L.  Co.  V.  McKeige  (1893),  139  N.  Y.  237, 
34  X.  E.  898;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Beebe 
(1900),  62  0.  St.  41,  56  N.  E.  485;  John- 
ston v.  Oliver  (1894),  51  O.  St.  6,  36  N.  E. 
458 ;  Brownwell  &  Wright  Car  Co.  i-. 
Barnard  (1897),  139  Mo.  142,  40  S.  W. 
762  ;  Scott-Force  Hat  Co.  v.  Hombs  (1894), 
127  Mo.  392,  30  S.  W.  183;  Roselle  v. 
Farmers'  Bank  (1893),  119  Mo.  84,  24 
S.  W.  744 ;  McFadden  v.  Swinerton 
(1900),  36  Ore.  336,  59  Pac.  816;  North 
Pacific  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lang  (1895),  28 
Ore.  246,  42  Pac.  799 ;  Austin  v.  March 
(1902),  86  Minn.  232,  90  N.  W.  384  ;  John 
R  Davis  Lumber  Co.  r.  The  First  National 
Bank  of  Milwaukee  (1894),  87  Wis.  435, 
58  N.  W.  743;  Jaques  v.  Dawes  (1902), 
_  ^Qh.  — ,  92  N.  W.  570 ;  Hartford  Life 
&  Annuity  Ins.  Co.  v.  Cumming.s  (1897), 
50  Neb.  236,  69  N.  W.  782 ;  Daulton  r. 
Stuart  (1902),  30  Wash.  562,  70  Pac. 
1096;  Walker  r.  Bamberger  (1898),  17 
Utah,  239,  54  Pac.  108;  Hockaday  v. 
Drye  (1898),  7  Okla.  288,  54  Pac.  495J 

■^  Qln  Clay  County  Land  Co.  i-.  Alcox 
(1902),  88  Minn.  4,  92  N.  W.  464,  plain- 
tiff commenced  an  action  against  Alcox 
for  the  restitution  of  its  offices  and  to 
restrain  him  from  using  them.  "  The  an- 
swer denied  the  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint and  alleged  that  the  appellant 
commenced  the  action  in  the  name  of  the 
land  company  without  authority  for  hi.s 
own  benefit.  It  then  alleged  that  the  re- 
spondent and  appellant  were  copartners 
under  the  firm  name  of  the  Clay  County 
Land  Company,  fur  the  purpose  of  buying 


and  selling  real  estate ;  that  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  business  resulted  in  a  profit  of 
$7,500,  one  half  of  which  belonged  to  the 
respondent,  but  that  the  appellant  had  re- 
tained the  whole  thereof,  and  refused  to 
account  for  ancr  pay  over  the  same.  The 
answer  prayeti  that  the  appellant  be  made 
a  party  to  the  action,  that  a  receiver  be 
appointed  for  the  co-partnership  business, 
and  that  an  accounting  be  had  b_v  the 
court,  or  under  its  direction."  Alcox  pro- 
cured an  order  from  the  court  "  on  appel- 
lant to  show  cause  why  he  should  not  be 
made  a  party  plaintiff  to  the  action  and 
reply  to  the  respondent's  answer  therein." 
Appellant  moved  to  dismiss  the  order  on 
the  ground  that  he  was  a  resident  of  an- 
other county  and  that  the  court  was  with- 
out jurisdiction  to  make  him  a  party 
plaintiff.  The  trial  court  denied  this  mo- 
tion of  dismissal  and  made  an  order  re- 
quiring appellant  to  reply  to  the  "  answer 
of  the  respondent  within  twenty  days,  and 
in  default  of  such  reply,  that  judgment 
for  the  relief  demanded  iu  the  answer  be 
rendered  against  him  as  if  he  had  l)een 
made  a  party  to  the  action  in  the  first  in- 
stance." The  only  question  considered  by 
the  Supreme  Court  in  reversing  the  case 
was  "  wiiether  the  trial  court  erred  in 
making  its  order  comjielliug  the  appellant 
to  appear  as  a  plaintiff  in  the  action  and 
reply  to  the  respondent's  answer  under 
penalty  of  having  judgment  entered 
against  him  for  the  relief  demanded  iu 
the  answer."  In  disposing  of  the  ques- 
tion the  court  said  :  "  It  is  not  a  question 
of  jurisdiction  of  the  court  to  make  the 
order,  as  counsel  seem  to  treat  it,  but 
whether  it  was  error  to  make  it  in  view  of 


BIUNLIING    IN    NEW    PARTIES. 


411 


If  a  complete  determination  of  the  controversy  cannot  be  had 
without  the  presence  of  other  parties,  the  court  must  cause  them 
to  be  brought  in.  The  force  and  effect  of  the  whole  provision 
depend  upon  the  interpretation  given  to  the  clause,  "  when  a 
complete  determination  of  the  controvers}-  cannot  be  had  without 
the  presence  of  other  parties."  To  use  the  language  of  an  emi- 
nent judge  which  has  been  repeatedly  approved  by  other  courts 
in  different  States,  this  clearly  means,  "  When  there  are  other 
persons,  not  parties,  whose  rights  must  be  ascertained  and  settled 
before  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the  suit  can  be  determined. 
Doubtless  there  are  many  other  cases  in  which  a  defendant  may 
require  other  parties  to  be  brought  in,  so  that  the  judgment  of 
the  court  in  the  action  may  protect  him  against  the  claims  of 
such  other  parties;    but  this    is   his  own  privilege  and  he  may 


the  facts  of  tliis  particular  case.  We  are  of 
the  opiniou  that  it  was,  aud  that  the  error 
was  one  which  deprived  the  appellant 
of  his  legal  right  to  have  any  transitory 
action  which  the  respondent  might  bring 
against  him  tried  in  the  district  court 
of  the  county  in  which  he  resided,  unless 
the  place  of  trial  was  changed  by  tlie  court 
for  cause.  .  .  .  The  statute  now  provides 
that  whenever  the  plaintiff  or  defendant, 
or  in  case  of  counterclaim,  or  a  demand 
for  affirmative  relief,  in  any  action  shall 
discover  that  any  party  ought,  in  order  to 
a  full  determination  of  such  action,  to 
have  been  made  a  party  plaintiff  or  de- 
fendant therein,  the  court,  if  satisfied  that 
such  is  the  case,  shall  make  its  order 
bringing  in  such  new  party,  and  require 
liim  to  answer  the  complaint,  or  reply  to 
the  answer,  as  the  case  may  be.  That  is, 
it  is  only  when  the  bringing  in  of  other 
parties  is  necessary  to  a  full  determi- 
nation of  the  controversy  between  the 
original  parties  tendered  by  the  complaint, 
answer,  or  counterclaim  that  the  court 
can  compel  them  to  come  into  the  action 
as  parties  plaintiffs  or  defendants.  Now, 
the  defendant's  so-called  counterclaim  in 
this  action  tenders  no  issue  between  the 
original  parties  to  the  action  for  a  full 
determination  of  which  it  is  necessary  that 
appellant  should  be  made  a  party  plaintiff. 
It  is  simply  an  allegation  of  a  cause  of 
action  wholly  distinct  from  the  cause  of 
action  alleged  in  the  complaint,  aud  with 
which   the    plaintiff    has    no   connection. 


We  have  here  a  case  where  the  defendant 
denied  all  of  the  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint, aud  alleged  that  the  appellant 
commenced  the  action  in  the  name  of  the 
land  company  without  authority.  This 
did  not  make  it  necessary  to  bring  in  the 
appellant  as  a  party  in  order  to  secure  a 
full  determination  of  the  controversy  be- 
tween the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant,  for, 
if  his  answer  was  true,  he  was  entitled  to 
a  judgment  against  the  plaintiff  on  the 
merits.  But  the  respondent,  conceiving 
that  he  had  an  independent  cause  of  action 
against  the  appellant,  alleges  it  in  his 
answer,  and  makes  it  the  basis  of  tlie 
order  compelling  the  appellant  to  reply  to 
the  answer  and  litigate  the  action  with 
him  in  the  county  of  Clay  In  this  way 
the  original  action  is  converted  into  one 
by  the  respondent  against  tlie  a|i])ellant, 
the  former  being  in  fact  tlie  plaintiff  and 
the  latter  defendant,  whereby  the  appel- 
lant is  deprived  of  his  legal  right  to  a  trial 
thereof  in  the  county  where  he  resides. 
It  needs  no  argument  to  support  the  con- 
clusion that  the  statute  authorizes  nothing 
of  the  kind,  and  that  there  has  been  a 
miscarriage  of  justice  in  this  ciise.  We 
therefore  hold  tliat  the  order  of  the  district 
court  making  the  appellant  a  party  and 
requiring  him  to  reply  to  the  answer  was 
reversible  error,  and  that  the  action  should 
have  lieen  dismissed  as  to  him."  See  to 
the  same  effect  East  Riverside  Irrigation 
District  v.  Holcomb  (1899),  126  Cal.  315, 
58  Pac.  817.] 


412  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

waive  it."^  The  distinction  between  the  two  conditions  here 
spoken  of  is  plain.  In  the  first,  the  rights  of  the  parties  to  the 
record  are  so  bound  up  with  those  of  others,  that  they  cannot  be 
ascertained  and  fixed  without  at  the  same  time  ascertaining  and 
fixing  the  rights  of  the  others  also,  and  to  do  this,  these  others 
must  of  course  be  before  the  court.  In  the  second,  the  issues 
between  the  parties  to  the  record  can  be  decided,  but  the  rela- 
tions of  the  defendant  towards  third  persons  are  of  such  a  nature 
that  they  will  be  affected  by  the  decision,  and  it  would  be  better 
and  safer  for  him  if  these  persons  should  be  brought  in  so  that 
his  relations  might  be  defined  and  protected  in  the  single  judg- 
ment. Such  a  proceeding  is  not,  however,  absolutely  necessary 
to  the  determination  of  the  controversy,  and  the  defendant  may 
waive  his  claim  to  the  additional  parties ;  it  is,  in  fact,  a  privi- 
lege, not  an  absolute  necessity.  The  circumstances  and  relations 
to  which  I  allude  were  aptly  described  and  the  rule  concerning 
them  accurately  stated  by  another  judge:  "There  are  cases  in 
which  it  is  proper  and  necessary  to  make  a  jierson  defendant 
upon  the  ground  of  avoiding  a  multiplicity  of  suits.  His  rights 
may  not  be  directly  affected  by  the  decree,  but  it  may  occur  that 
if  the  plaintiff  succeeds,  the  defendant  will  thereby  acquire  the 
right  to  call  upon  the  party  omitted  or  not  joined,  either  to  re- 
imburse him  or  reinstate  him  in  the  position  lost  by  the  plaintiff's 
success.  And  if  so,  the  person  consequently  liable  to  be  thus 
affected  should  be  before  the  court  that  his  liability  may  be 
adjudicated  by  one  proceeding. "^ 

§  316.  *  419.  Same  Subject.  If  the  case  comes  within  the 
first  described  condition,  that  is,  if  there  are  other  persons,  not 
parties,  whose  rights  must  be  ascertained  and  settled  before  the 
rights  of   the  parties  to  the  suit   can  be   determined,  then  the 

1  McMahon  r.  Allen,  12  How.  Pr.  39,  358;  Judy  v.  Farmers'  &  Traders'  Bank, 
45,  jjer  Woodruff  J. ;  affirmed,  3  Abb.  Pr.  70  Mo.  407  ;  Southal  v.  Shields,  81  N.  C. 
89;  approved,  Chapman  v.  Forbes,  123  28;  Isler  r.  Koonce,  83  id.  55 ;  Hodges  r. 
N.  Y.  532,  538.  Jvimball,  49   Iowa,  577  ;  Prouty   r.   Lake 

2  Camp  (•.  McGillicuddy,  10  Iowa,  201,  Shore  &  M.  S.  U.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  272; 
per  Wright  C  J.,  citing  1  Dan.  Ch.  I'r.  Dows  r.  Kidder,  84  id.  121;  New  York 
329;  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §  173;  Wiser  v.  Milk  Pan  Co.  v.  Remington  Works,  25 
IJlachly,  1  Johns.  Ch.  4^7.  See  akso  Hun,  475  ;  Abbott  v.  .lewett,  25  id.  603  ; 
Forepaugh  v.  Appold,  17  B.  IMon.  632;  Delancy  v.  Murphy,  24  id.  503;  Dubber.-? 
Baas  r.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ky.  Co..  39  r.  Goux,  51  Cal.  153;  Rol)in.son  i-.  Glea- 
Wis.  296  ;  Oro  Fino,  &c.  Min.  Co.  v.  Cul-  son,  53  id.  38;  Pfister  /•.  Wade,  56  id.  43  ; 
len,  1    Idaho,    113  ;  Clark  v.  Stanton,  24  Derham  v.  Lee,  87  N.  Y.  599. 

Minn.  232;  Penfield  v.    Wheeler,   27  id. 


BRINGING   IN    NEW    I'AUTIES. 


4i: 


statute  is  peremptory;  the  court  must  cause  such  persons  to  be 
brought  in;  it  is  not  a  matter  of  discretion,  but  of  absolute  judi- 
cial duty.-^  The  enforcement  of  this  duty  does  not  rest  entirely 
upon  the  j^a-rties  to  the  record.  If  they  should  neglect  to  raise 
the  question,  and  to  apply  for  the  proper  order,  the  court,  upon 
its  own  motion,  will  supply  the  omission,  and  will  either  directly 
bring  in  the  new  i)arties  or  remand  the  cause  in  order  that  the 
plaintiff  may  bring  them  in.^  The  fact  that  the  necessary  party 
is  a  non-resident  of  the  State  does  not  change  the  rule ;  he  must 
still  be  brought  in.^  The  addition  of  the  necessary  party  may  be 
made  at  any  stage  of  the  cause.*  The  action  of  the  court  may 
consist  in  requiring  necessary  defendants  to  be  served  with  pro- 
cess, who  had  been  named  on  the  record,  but  not  brought  in  by 
actual  service  or  appearance. ° 

§  317.  *  420.  Same  Subject.  Limitations  herein.  This  per- 
emptory duty  does  not  arise  unless  the  conditions  of  the  statute 
are  fully  met,  and  the  court  will  not  order  in  new  parties  de- 
fendant, against  the  will  of  the  plaintiff,  unless  they  are  actu- 
ally necessary  in  the  sense  already  defined.^     Thus,  in  an  action 


1  Davis  V.  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.,  2  Duer, 
663  ;  3  Duer,  119  ;  Shaver  v.  Brainard,  29 
Barb.  2.t  ;  Sturtevaut  v.  Brewer,  9  Abb. 
Pr.  414;  Mitchell  v.  O'Neale,  4  Nev.  504; 
Jones  c.  Vautress,  23  Ind.  533;  Johnson 
t'.  Chandler,  15  B.  Mon.  584,  589  ;  John- 
ston 1-.  Neville,  68  N.  C.  177  ;  Whitted  v. 
Nash,  66  N.  C.  590 ;  [^Eureka  v.  Gates, 
'(1898),  120  Cal.  54,  52  Pac.  125.  In  this 
case  the  court  said :  "  The  rule  is  not 
questioned  that,  under  our  practice,  when 
new  parties  are  necessary  for  the  deter- 
mination of  the  issues  raised  by  a  cross 
complaint  they  may  and  should  be  brought 
in."  See  also  Chalmers  v.  Trent  (1894), 
11  Utah,  88,  39  Pac.  488.  For  valuable 
and  interesting  case  in  this  connection 
see  Steinbach  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  (1902), 
172  N.  Y.  471,  65  N.  E.  281.  See  also 
dissenting  opinion  in  this  case.  Hannegan 
V.  Roth  (1896),  12  Wash.  695,  44  Pac.  256. 
In  Emerson  v.  Schwindt  (1900),  108  Wis. 
167,  84  N.  W.  186,  the  court  said:  "  But 
the  statute  also  provides  that,  '  when  a 
complete  determination  of  the  controversy 
cannot  be  had  without  the  presence  of 
other  parties  .  .  .  the  court  shall  order 
them  to  be  brought  in,'  sec.  2610.     This 


language  seems  to  be  mandatory."  See 
also  Wheeler  v.  Lack  (1900),  37  Ore.  238, 
61  Pac.  849,  in  which  the  text  is  freely 
quoted.  For  an  interesting  case  quoting 
the  text  see  Robinson  v.  Kind  (1896),  23 
Nev.  330,  47  Pac.  1  ;  Wilkius  v.  Lee 
(1894),  42  S.  C.  31,  19  S.  E.  1016.] 

2  Jones  V.  Vantress,  23  Ind.  533 ; 
Mitchell  V.  O'Nenle,  4  Nev.  504 ;  Young 
V.  Garlington,  31  S.  C.  290. 

^  Sturtevaut  v.  Brewer,  9  Abb.  414; 
s.  c.  on  app.,  4  Bosw.  628. 

*  Attorney-General  r.  Mayor,  etc.  of 
N.  Y.,  3  Duer,  119;  [^National  Savings 
Bank  i:  Cable  (1900),  73  Conn.  568,  48 
Atl.  428.] 

5  Powell  I-.  Fincli,  5  Duer,  666.  [|For 
valuable  discussion  respecting  the  proper 
practice  when  an  order  has  been  made  al- 
lowing additional  persons  to  be  made 
parties  to  a  cause,  see  White  '.-.  Johnson 
(1895),  27  Ore.  282,  40  Pac.  511.] 

'^  [^Nortliwestern  Telephone  Co.  r.  Rail- 
way Co.  (1900),  9  N.  D.  339,  83  N.  W.  215. 
See  Bauer  v.  Dewey  (1901),  166  N.  Y. 
402,  60  N.  E.  30,  in  which  it  is  said  the 
court  has  no  authority  under  section  452 
of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  to  compel 


414  CIVIL  eemedip:s. 

ao^ainst  the  indorsers  of  a  note,  the  pLaintiff  will  not  l)e  compelled 
to  bring  in  the  maker  as  a  co-defendant.^  Xor  is  a  new  party  to 
be  ordered  in  merely  for  the  purpose  of  settling  matters  between 
him  and  the  defendant  in  which  the  plaintiff  has  no  interest. ^ 
The  statute  Avill  not  permit  the  plaintiff  to  add  a  new  defendant 
without  whose  presence  he  could  have  no  recover//  sinca  he  would 
have  no  cause  of  action.  Such  a  proceeding  would  in  effect  be 
the  commencing  a  new  action,  and  the  statutory  provision  as- 
sumes that  in  the  pending  action  a  right  to  obtain  a  recovery  is 
set  up  as  against  the  original  defendants. ^  The  plaintiff  cannot 
be  allowed,  under  the  color  of  bringing  in  additional  parties,  to 
commence  a  tiew  action  when  he  would  have  failed  entirely  in  the 
former  one  because  he  had  not  set  up  a  good  cause  of  action. 

8  318.  *  421.  Examples  and  Illustrations.  Pleadings.  Rule  in 
Indiana  in  Reference  to  Assignors.  I  aeld  a  few  examples  of  cases 
wliere  parties  have  been  brought  in ;  they  are  designed  merely  as 
illustrations.  Additional  parties  have  been  ordered  in,  in  an 
action  for  the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  executed  by 
three  when  two  only  Avere  at  first  made  defendants;*  in  an  action 
for  an  accounting  between  two  of  a  larger  number  of  tenants  in 
common  of  a  mine,  the  complete  adjustment  of  the  account  re- 
(piiring  that  all  the  others  should  be  added  ;^  in  a  similar  action 
for  an  accounting  between  partners  in  a  mining  venture,  and  for 
a  winding  up  of  the  concern;^  in  an  action  upon  a  promissory 
note  given  for  the  purchase  price  of  land  in  which  the  vendor 
and  holder  of  the  note  sought  to  enforce  his  lien,  the  heirs  of  the 
deceased  vendee,  to  wliom  the  land  had  descended,  were  made 

the  plaintiff  in  an  action  in  which  a  money  holding  that  the  section  of  the  code  (§  452, 
judgment  only  is  sought  and  in  which  the  C.  C.  P.)  referred  to  parties  in  what,  un- 
title to  no  real,  specific  or  tangible  per-  der  the  oki  practice,  would  have  been 
sonal  property  is  involved,  to  bring  in  suits  in  equity,  aud  that  it  was  never 
as  a  defendant  a  third  party  on  his  own  intended  to  make  it  incumbent  upon  a 
application]  plaintiff  in  an  action  at  law  to  sue  any 

^  Sawyer  r.  Chambers,  11  Abb.  Pr.  110.  otlier  than  the  parties  he  .should  choose; 

2  Frear   ;•.    Bryan,    12    Ind.   .34.3,   345.  citing    Webster    v.    Bond.    9    Hun,   437; 

See  Carr  r.  Collins,  27  Ind.  306;  Fagan  Peoples.  Albany  &  Vt.  R.  Co.,  15  Hun, 

r.   Barnes,  14  Fla.  53,   56,  58;    Pecic    r.  126. 

Ward,  3  Duer,  647  :  Fischer  r.   Holmes,  ^  McMahon  v.  Allen,  18  How.  Pr.  39; 

123  Ind.  525  ;  Pollard  r.  Lathrop,  12  Colo,  affirmed,  3  Abb.  Pr.  89. 
171;  White's  Bk  of  Buffalo   r.  Farthing,  *  Powell   v.  Finch,  5  Duer,  666.     See 

101    N.  Y.  344,  348;  Chapman  v.  Forbes,  Johnston  »•.  Neville,  68  N.  C.  177. 
123  N.  Y.  532.     It  is  said  in  this  last  case  »  Mitchell  r.  O'Xealo,  4  Xev.  504. 

(p.   .538)   that  the   decisions  of   tlie    New  ^  Settembre  v.  Putnam,  -30  Cal.  490. 

York  courts  have  been  fpiite  uniform  in 


BRINGING    I.\    NEW    PARTIES.  415 

defendants;^  in  proceedings  in  aid  of  an  execntion  the  judgment 
debtor  is  a  necessary  party,  and  will  be  brouglit  in.^  Under  the 
requirements  of  the  Indiana  code  in  reference  to  assignors  of 
tilings  in  action  when  transferred  without  indorsement,  if  the 
assignor  dies,  the  assignee  must  make  liis  personal  representative 
a  defendant  in  the  action,  or  must  show  that  there  is  none.^ 
After  new  parties  have  been  brought  in,  the  pleadings  must  be 
made  to  show  that  they  are  proper.  When  new  defendants  have 
been  added  on  the  application  of  the  plaintiff,  but  the  complaint, 
which  stated  no  cause  of  action  against  them  originally,  had  not 
been  amended  so  as  to  supply  this  defect,  it  must  be  dismissed 
as  against  such  defendants  at  the  trial,  and  judgment  thereon 
rendered  in  their  favor.^ 

§  319.  *  422.  Author's  Suggestions  herein.  I  cannot  paSS  from 
this  subject  without  adding  certain  remarks  which  are  suggested 
by  it,  and  which  concern  the  practical  administration  of  justice. 
The  clause  of  the  codes  under  examination  is  expressed  in  the 
most  general  terms,  containing  no  exception  nor  limitation. 
Whenever  a  necessary  party  has  been  omitted  by  the  pleader,  the 
court  has  the  power  in  any  stage  of  the  cause  to  remedy  the 
defect  by  ordering  him  to  be  brought  in,  and  the  case  to  stand 
over  until  that  is  done.^  It  is  almost  universally  the  fact  that 
an  objection  for  the  nonjoinder  of  parties  is  really  technical,  that 
is,  it  does  not  go  to  the  entire  merits  of  the  controversy.  A 
cause  of  action  is  generally  set  forth  against  those,  or  in  favor  of 
those,  who  are  actually  made  parties ;  and  the  only  error  consists, 
not  in  stating  the  cause  of  action  incorrectly,  but  in  omitting 
some  of  the  persons  who  are  or  rather  may  he  beneficially  or 
injuriously  affected  by  it.  If  it  be  the  true  purpose  and  design 
of  courts  to  administer  justice  between  litigants,  and  to  ascertain 
and  enforce  their  rights  and  obligations,  then  it  would  seem  to 
be  the  primary  duty  of  the  judges  to  decide  every  cause  as  far 

1  Jones  I'.  Vantress.  23  Ind.  53,3.  defendant  to  make  liis  answer  more  defi- 

2  Wall  V.  Whisler,  14  Ind.  228.  nite  and  certain   by  alleging  the  name  of 

3  St.   John   r.    Hardwick,  11    Ind.  2.51.      such  third  party  was  sustained.] 

See  Darty.  McQuilty,  6  Ind.  391  ;  Bray  !•.  •*  Smith  v.  \Veage,  21  Wis.  440.     See 

Black,  57  Ind.  417.     \\\\  Kyes  r.  Wilcox  also  Blakely  v.  Frazier,  20  S.  C.  144. 
(1900),  13  S.  D.  228,  83  N.  W.  93,  the  al-  &  QMiUs  y    Callahan  (1900),  126  N.   C. 

legations  of  the  answer  disclosed  that  the  750,  36    S.   E.    164:  l^obson   i-.   Southern 

presence  of  a  third  party  was  necessary  to  IJy.  Co.  ( 1901 ),  129  X.  C.  289,  40  S.  E.  42  ; 

a  complete  determination  of  the  contro-  Finch  v.  Gregg  (1900),  126  N.  C.  176,  35 

ver.'^y.     The  plaintiff's  motion  to  require  S.  E.  251.] 


416  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

as  possible  upon  the  merits,  and  not  upon  some  technical  point 
which  puts  no  question  at  rest,  but  simply  renders  it  necessary 
to  commence  a  new  suit.  Most  emphatically  does  this  seem  to 
be  their  duty  when  the  statute  has  provided  a  mode  for  accom- 
plishing this  result,  and  has  even  required  in  peremptory  terms 
that  this  mode  shall  be  pursued.  AVhenever  the  objection  that 
there  is  a  defect  of  necessary  or  proper  parties  is  raised,  it  is 
always  possible  for  the  court  in  a  summary  manner  to  order  them 
in,  and  to  retain  the  cause  for  tliat  purpose,  and  to  decide  the 
issues  upon  the  merits,  when  the  required  addition  has  Ijeen 
effected.  Not  only  is  this  course  possil)le,  but  it  is  actually 
enjoined  upon  the  courts  by  the.  codes.  And  yet  this  most  bene- 
ficial provision  of  the  statutes  is  to  a  great  extent  a  dead  letter. 
I  believe  there  is  hardly  another  section  of  the  codes  so  well 
calculated,  if  it  were  observed  in  its  spirit  and  letter,  to  prevent 
the  success  of  mere  technicalities  and  to  promote  justice  among 
suitors  by  procuring  the  decision  of  causes  upon  their  merits. 
In  marked  contrast  with  the  judicial  practice  which  prevails  to 
so  great  an  extent  in  the  States  which  have  adopted  the  reformed 
American  procedure,  is  a  provision  of  the  new  system  of  practice 
recently  approved  by  the  British  Parliament,  which  declares  that 
under  no  circumstances  sliall  an  action  be  dismissed,  and  the 
plaintiff  turned  out  of  court,  because  he  has  committed  an  error 
in  the  selection  of  parties,  either  by  uniting  too  many  or  too 
few,  but  that  in  every  instance  the  court  shall  make  the  proper 
amendment,  and  by  striking  out  or  bringing  in,  shall  shape  the 
action  into  a  proper  form  and  condition  for  a  decision  of  its 
issues  upon  the  merits.^  Although  our  codes  do  not  contain 
such  a  provision  in  express  terms,  they  do  contain  all  that  is 
necessary  for  the  adoption  and  enforcement  of  the  same  general 
rule  of  procedure  by  the  courts.  The  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals  has  recently  made  a  decision  which  is  in  close  agreement 
with  the  foregoing  views.  It  holds  that  if  the  plaintiff  does  not. 
bring  in  tlie  necessary  parties  after  an  objection  properly  made, 
the  complaint  may,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  be  dismissed, 
but  without  prejudice  to  a  new  action.  An  unqualified  judg- 
ment of  dismissal  in  such  a  case  is  erroneous.  But  the  com- 
plaint should  not  be  dismissed  even  without  prejudice,  and  the 
plaintiff  thus  put  to  a  new  action,  when  the  same  end  can  be 

1  Supreme  Court  of  JiKiitature  Act ;  Schedule,  §  9. 


INTERVENTION.  417 

reached  by  allowing  the  cause  to  stand  over  in  order  that  the 
plaintiff  may  add  the  necessar}'  j)artie.s.i 

^320.  *  423.  II.  Intervention.  Need  not  be  Necessary  Party. 
Discretion  of  Court.  Time  of  Application.  I  proceed  first  to 
examine  tlie  force  and  effect  of  that  provision  which  is  found  in 
most  of  the  codes.  In  order  that  a  iierson  may  avail  himself  of 
the  permission  given  by  it,  and  may  make  himself  a  party  to  an 
action,  he  need  not  be  a  necessary  party.^  The  granting  of  such 
an  application  lies  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and  it  should 
not  be  permitted  if  the  applicant  is  already  a  plaintiff  in  another 
suit  in.  which  he  may  obtain  all  the  relief  he  asks.^  The  appli- 
cation must  be  made  before  judgment,  if  made  at  all.^ 

§  321.  *  424.  statutory  Provision  Limited.  Illustrations.  The 
occasions  on  which  a  third  person  may  intervene  in  a  pending 
action  are  very  few.  The  scope  of  the  provision  is  exceedingly 
limited;  it  has  been  said  that  its  operation  is  confined  to  those 
cases  in  which  a  bill  of  interpleader  would  have  been  permitted, 
under  the  former  practice,  to  accomplish  the  same  end.^  It  is 
certain  that  the  right  to  intervene  can  only  be  exercised  in 
actions  for  the  recovery  of  real  or  personal  property.  ^     It  does 

1  Sherman  r.  Parish,  53  N.  Y.  48.3,490,  3  gcheidt    v.    Sturgis,    10   Bosw.    606. 

491.    QSee  the  importaut  case  of  Steiubach  That  tlie  grautiug  of  the  application  is 

V.  Prudential  Ins.   Co.  (1902),   172  N.  Y.  di.scretionary,  see  Colgrove  i\  Koonce,  76 

471,  65  N.  E.  281,  the  facts  of  which  are  N.  C.363.     QMcNamara  r.  Crystal  Mining 

set  out  in  note  to  §  *287.     In  this  case  the  Co.  (1900),  23  Wash.  26,  62  Pac.  81.] 
court  said  :  "  The  personal  representatives  *  Carswell  v.  Neville,  12  How.  Pr.  445  ; 

of  Fehrman  were  necessary  parties,  and  Meadows  v.  Goff   (Ky.    1890),   14  S.   W. 

tlie  court  should  have  dismissed  the  com-  IJep.  535  ;  Chapman  v.  Forbes,  123  N.  Y. 

plaint  unless  within  a  reasonable  time  they  532,  540.     [^Safely  i\  Caldwell  (1895),  17 

were  brought  in,  not  necessarily  for  the  Mont.  184,  42  Pac.  766;  Dupont  v.  Amos 

protection  of  the  defendant  as  it  had  neg-  (1896),  97  la.  484,  66  N.  W.  774 ;  Keehn  v. 

lected  its  rights,  but  for  their  own  protec-  Keehn  (1902),  115  la.  467,  88  N.  W.  957  ; 

tion,  as  well   as  the  seemly  and  orderly  Owens  v.  Colgan  (1893),  97  Cal.  454,  32 

administration  of  justice."     See,  however,  Pac.  519;  Clarke  r.  Baird  (1893),  98  Cal. 

the   vigorous   dissenting  opinion   in    this  642,  33  Pac.  756 ;  Hibernia   Savings   and 

case  by  Haight  J.  concurred  in  by  O'Brien  Loan  Society  i'.  Churchill  (1900),  128  Cal. 

and    Martin   JJ.      In   Hannegan  v.  Roth  633,    61     Pac.    278;    McConniff    v.    Van 

(1896),    12   Wash.   695,   44   Pac.   256,  the  Dusen  (1898),  57  Neb.  49,  77  N.  W.  348; 

court  said  :  "  While  a  court  will  not  pro-  Deere  v.  Eagle  Mfg.  Co.  (1896),  49  Neb. 

ceed  to  final  judgment  in  the  absence  of  385,  68  N.  W.  504.] 

a  necessary  party,  it  will  not  dismiss  the  ^  Hornby  !>.  Gordon,  9  Bosw.  656.    The 

action  on   account  of  the    nonjoinder   of  following  cases  are  illustrations  of  such 

such  party,  but  will  retain  it  until  all  ne-  intervention  :    Sims  v.   Goethe,  82    N.  C. 

cessary  parties  are  brought  in,  after  which  268 ;  Peck  v.  Parchin,  52  Iowa,  46 ;  Peo- 

it  will  proceed  to  judgment  on  the  merits."  pie  i'.  Albany  &  Vt.  Tl.  Co.,  77  N.  Y.  232  ; 

Citing  §  *292  and  *  293  of  the  text.]  Conant  v.  Frary,  49  Ind.  530. 

'■2  Carter  v.  Mills,  30  Mo.  432.  6  Kelsey  v.  Murray,  28  How.  Pr.  24:;; 

27 


418 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


not  exist,  therefore,  in  an  action  to  recover  money;  as,  for 
example,  in  a  suit  for  wharfage,  persons  claiming  to  be  owners 
of  the  wharf  were  not  permitted  to  intervene;^  nor  in  an  action 
in  the  nature  of  a  creditor's  suit,  to  reach  a  surplus  of  money  in 
a  certain  person's  hands  ;2  nor  in  an  action  to  dissolve  a  partner- 
ship, and  for  an  accounting;^  nor  in  any  action  on  contract  for 
the  recovery  of  debt  or  damages.'*  In  an  action  to  recover  pos- 
session of  goods,  on  account  of  the  vendee's  fraud,  third  persons, 
claiming  to  have  purchased  them  from  him,  cannot  intervene.^ 


18  Abb.  Pr.  294;  Tallman  i:  Ildllister, 
9  How.  Pr.  508 ;  Judd  v.  Young,  7  How. 
Pr.  79. 

1  Kelsey  v.  Murrny,  18  Abb.  Pr.  294. 

-  Tallman  ;•.  Hollister,  9  How.  Pr.  508. 

3  Daytou  v.  Wilkes,  5  liosw.  655. 

•*  .Judd  V.  Young,  7  How.  Pr.  79. 

5  Hornby  i".  Gordon,  9  Bosw.  656. 
QFor  additional  cas6s  in  which  interven- 
tion was  not  permitted,  see  the  following: 
Murray  v.  Polglase  (1899),  23  Mont.  401, 
59  Pac.  4.39  (by  one  who  had  not  filed 
adverse  claim  under  the  statute  to  mining 
claim,  though  he  claimed  an  interest  in 
tlie  premises  adverse  to  both  plaintiff  and 
(iefendant) ;  Dietrich  v.  Steam  Dredge 
(1894),  14  Mont.  261,  36  Pac.  81  (by  a 
stranger  to  a  suit  commenced,  and  who 
had  not  obtained  leave  of  court  or  made 
any  showing  by  complaint,  but  who  upon 
his  own  motion  appeared  and  demurred  to 
the  complaint) ;  Denver  Power  &  Irriga- 
tion Co.  V.  Denver,  etc.  Co.  (1902),  — 
Col.  — ,  69  Pac.  568  (by  a  party  who  had 
no  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  dis- 
])ute  between  litigants)  ;  Ball  v.  Cedar 
Valley  Creamery  Co.  (1896),  98  la.  184, 
67  N.  W.  232  (by  one  claiming  an  interest 
in  property  about  to  be  sold  under  an 
execution  issued  upon  a  judgment) ;  Bank 
of  Commerce  v.  Timbrell  (1900),  113  Iowa, 
713,  84  N.  W.  519  (by  one  to  whom  an 
ab.solute  a.ssigninent  liad  been  made;  he 
must  be  .substituted  a.s  plaintiff) :  Hoppe 
/•.  Fountain  (1894),  104  Cal.  94,37  Pac.  894 
(by  parties  holding  title  not  subject  to  a 
mortgage  in  an  action  brouglit  to  foreclose 
the  mortgage) ;  Goodrich  v.  Williamson 
(1901),  10  Okla.  588,  63  Pac.  974  (by  a 
general  creditor  of  a  husband  claiming 
that  the  promissory  note  sued  upon  was 
executed    by   the    wife    in    fraud   of   the 


creditors   of  the    husband   of   whom    the 
intervenor  was  one,  the  latter  asking  that 
the  proceeds  of  the  note  be  awarded  to 
it);  Bray  v.  Booker  (1897),  6  N.  D.  526, 
72  N.  \V.  933  (by  a  bank,  who  was   the 
creditor  of  the  vendor,  in  a  suit   by  the 
vendor   against  the  vendee   to  enforce  a 
vendor's    lien   for   the    unpaid    jjurchase 
price,  the  vendee  having  agreed  to  ])ay  a 
portion  of  the  purcliase  price  to  the  bank) ; 
McXaniara  v.  Crystal  .Mining  Co.  (1900), 
23    Wash.    26,    62    Pac.    81;    Dickson    v. 
Dows  (1902),  11  N.  D.  404,  92  N.  W.  798  ; 
Churchill  v.  Stephenson  (1896),  14  Wash. 
620,  45  Pac.  28  (by  a  mere   general   or 
contract  creditor  in  an  action  against  an 
administrator    for    the    recovery   of   real 
e.state) ;  Haines  i'.  Stewart  (1902),  —  Neb. 
— ,    91    N.  W.  539   (by  one    who    merely 
claims  to  be  the  owner  of  attached  prop- 
erty for  the  purpose  of  liaving  his  owner- 
ship determined  in  the  attachment  suit)  ; 
Omaha  S.    R.   Co.    v.   Beeson   (1893),  36 
Xeb.  361,  .54  N.  W.  557  (must  have  some 
interest  in  the  subject  of  controversy.     A 
mere  contingent  liability  to  answer  over 
to  tlie  defendant,  without  any  privity  with 
the  plaintiff,  is  not  sufficient) ;  Staidey  v. 
Foote  et  al.  (1900),  9  Wyo.  335,  63  Pac. 
940  (by  a  claimant   to  money  garnished, 
or  property  attached  in  an  action  between 
other  parties,  for  the  purpose  of  having 
his  rights  thereto  determined);  Urlan  ?•. 
Weeth  (1902).  —  Neb.  — ,  89  N.  W.  427 
(by  one  alleging  that  he  was  the  son  of 
the  mortgagor,  in  a  mortgage  foreclosure 
suit,  that  the  premises  mortgaged  consti- 
tuted a   homestead,  that   tlie    mortgagor 
was  dead  and  the  intervenor  was  si-izfd  in 
his  own  right  of  the  real  estate  described 
in  his  petition,  and  asking  tliat  his  interest 
in   the   homestead   be   determined.      The 


IXTERVENTIOX.  419 

Tliis  ruling,  however,  is  not  based  upon  the  nature  of  the 
suit  itself,  but  upon  the  absence  of  any  rights  in  the  proposed 
iiitervenors. 

§  322.  *  425.  Additional  Illustrations.  The  following  are  some 
instances  in  which  an  intervention  has  been  permitted.  In  an 
action  for  the  partition  of  lands,  any  person  having  an  interest 
in  the  land  may  intervene;  but  when  the  partition  is  among  the 
heirs  and  devisees  of  a  deceased  owner,  a  judgment  creditor  of 
such  decedent  has  no  such  interest  nor  right.  ^  In  an  action  to 
recover  land,  a  landlord  may  intervene  when  his  tenant  only  has 
been  made  a  defendant;^  and  in  an  action  to  recover  the  posses- 
sion of  goods  taken  on  execution,  the  execution  creditor  may 
intervene.^  In  a  suit  to  compel  the  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  to  convey  land  against  the  vendor  alone,  a  third  person 
alleging  title  in  himself  to  the  same  land  from  the  same  vendor, 
prior  and  paragiount  to  that  of  the  plaintiff,  was  allowed  to 
intervene  and  to  defend.  It  was  said  that  the  intervenor  need 
not  be  a  necessary  party,  but  should  be  permitted  to  come  in  if 
the  judgment  as  between  the  original  parties  would  cast  a  cloud 
upon  liis  own  title. ^  Under  the  former  practice,  no  intervention 
was  ever  permitted  in  actions  at  law,  except  that  in  ejectment  the 
landlord  might  make  himself  a  defendant  in  place  of  his  tenant.  ^ 

court  said :  "  The  matters  set  up  in  tlie  -  Godfrey  v.  Townseiid,  8  How.  Pr.  398. 
petition  for  intervention  of  Herman  Riihl  3  Conlclin  v.  Bishop,  3  Duer,  646.  In- 
are  not  determined  or  in  any  way  affected  tervention  in  attachment  proceedings  bv  a 
liy  the  decree  in  this  case.  They  were  person  claiming  an  interest  in  the  prop- 
not  nece.ssary  to  a  proper  determination  of  erty  :  Blair  v.  Puryear,  87  N.  C.  101. 
the  matters  presented  in  the  issues  herein,  ^  Carter  v.  Mills,  30  Mo.  432.  In  Sum- 
aiid  the  motion  to  strike  the  petition  of  mers  r.  Hutson,48  Ind.  228,  a  third  person 
intervention  from  the  files  was  correctly  was  permitted  to  intervene  in  an  action 
sustained ;  "  Moline,  Milburn  &  Stoddard  upon  a  promissory  note,  to  make  himself 
Co.  V.  Hamilton  (1898),  56  Neb.  132,76  a  defendant,  to  set  up  in  his  answer  facts 
N.  VV.  455  (by  atliird  person  who  filed  a  showing  that  he  was  the  real  party  in 
l)etition  of  intervention  in  a  replevin  case,  interest,  and  the  equitable  owner  of  tiie 
in  effect  nothing  but  a  general  denial,  the  note,  and  the  one  solely  entitled  to  its  pro- 
court  said :  "  The  first  requisite  of  an  in-  ceeds,  and  to  recover  thereon  as  against 
tervention  is  tliat  the  intervenor  show  tliat  the  maker,  who  was  the  original  defend- 
he  claims  an  interest  in  the  subject-matter  ant.  This  is  certainly  identical  with  the 
of  the  litigation  ") ;  Bohart  r.  Buckingham  .system  which  prevails  in  Iowa  and  Cali- 
(1901),  62  Kan.  658,  64  Pac.  627;  Gam-  fornia.  This  intervention  was  permitted 
mage  v.  Powell  (1897),  101  Ga,  540,  28  under  the  general  provision  of  §  18,  that 
S.  E.  969.]  "  any  person  may  be  made  a  defendant 
1  Waring  v.  Waring,  3  Abb.  Pr.  246.  who  has  an  interest  in  the  controversy 
See  Baker  v.  Riley,  16  Ind.  479,  which  adverse  to  the  plaintiff." 
holds  that  a  person  claiming  title  to  the  ^  Hornby  v.  Gordon,  9  Eosw.  656  ; 
whole  land  should  not  be  permitted  to  Godfrey  ;;.  Townseud,  8  How.  Pr.  398. 
intervene  in  a  partition  suit.                                QMooney  v.  N.  Y.  EI.  R.  Co.  (1900) 


420 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§   323.     *426.      The    Iowa   and  California    System    of   Intervening. 
Illustrative  Examples.     The    peculiarities  of  this  proceeding,  the 

163  N.  Y.  242,  57  N.  E.  496,  was  an  action  ways  in  which  it  is  conipeteiit  for  the 
by  a  property  owner  against  a  railroad  to  court  of  original  jurisdiction  to  bring  in 
restrain  its  operation,  by  injunction,  and  new  ])artics,  and  the  particular  course  that 
for  damages.  Pending  the  action  j)lain-  it  may  decide  to  adopt  generally  presents 
tiff  conveyed  the  premises  to  one  Cohen,  a  question  of  choice  or  discretion  not  open 
Avho  in  turn  conveyed  to  one  Scalliou.  In  to  discussion  in  this  court.  The  facts 
plaintiff's  deed  to  Cohen  the  former  "  re-  which  rendered  the  presence  of  the  new 
served  the  easements  of  light,  air,  and  ac-  parties  necessary  in  order  to  permit  a 
cess  as  taken  and  used  by  the  defendants,  final  adjudication  of  the  controversy  were 
and  all  the  claims  for  damages  for  such  patent  and  undisputed.  They  were  evi- 
taking  and  use,  both  as  to  tlie  fee  and  deuced  by  the  two  conveyances  made  sub- 
rental value,  past,  present  and  future;"  setjuont  to  the  commencement  of  the 
and  in  Cohen's  deetl  to  Scallion  the  same  action,  and  the  defendants  were  permit- 
reservations  were  made.  At  the  trial  dc-  ted  by  the  court  to  raise  any  question 
feudants  moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint  growing  out  of  tiiese  new  facts  that  they 


on  the  ground  that  phiintiff  was  not  then 
the  owner  of  the  fee  or  of  any  part  thereof, 
or  entitled  to  any  relief  by  injunction. 
The  court  reserving  its  decision  upon  this 
motion,  an  adjournment  was  moved  on  be- 
half of  the  defendants  until  all  tlie  parties 
in  interest  were  properly  ])efore  the  court 
"  by  an  application  on  the  part  of  the 
jilaiutiff  for  leave  to  serve  a  supiilemeiital 


could  rai.-^e  in  any  form  or  in  any  manner. 
The  original  plaintiff,  by  his  counsel,  sug- 
gested one  method  of  bringing  in  the  new 
parties,  wliile  the  defendants'  counsel  sug- 
gested another  method.  The  defendants' 
metliod  was  to  put  the  plaintiff  to  his 
application  at  a  Special  Term  to  amend  the 
process  and  the  pleadings  and  to  serve  a 
supplemental  complaint  with  the  right  to 


summons  and  com])laint,  bringing  in  his     the   defendants  to  serve  a  snpplenivntal 


grantees  as  parties  plaintiff,  with  leave  to 
the  defendants  to  answer  the  su})plemental 
complaint."  The  court  not  passing  upon 
this  motion  at  the  time,  tiiereupon  Cohen 
and  Scallion  requested  to  be  made  parties 
plaintiffs  and  consented  to  submit  their 
rights  to  the  court.  This  request  was 
granted,  and  an  order  made  that  the 
pleadings  and  proceedings  be  amended 
accordingly.  The  defendants  were  "  al- 
lowed on  the  trial  to  make  any  defence 
that  they  may  be  advised,  with  the  same 
force  and  effect  as  if  a  supplemental  com- 
plaint and  answer  had  been  made  and 
served,"  and  for  that  purpose  "  tiie  cause 
was  postponed  for  two  weeks."  The  trial 
court  awarded  a  money  judgment  to 
Mooney,  and  also  to  Cohen  and  Scallion, 
each  in  a  different  amount;  and  also 
awarded  an  injunction  to  be  operative 
upon  certain  conditions  nameil.  The  Ap- 
pellate Division  reversed  the  judgment. 
The  ()uestion  presented  by  the  record  in 


answer.  The  learned  trial  judge  doubt- 
less had  the  power  to  compel  the  plaintiff 
to  resort  to  that  method,  dilatory  as  it 
was,  but  he  decided  to  make  them  parties 
on  their  own  application  and  to  let  the 
cause  proceed  as  if  everything  had  been 
done  that  the  defendants'  counsel  askeil. 
The  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  for 
the  defendants  is  that  the  judge  bad  no 
power  to  do  that.  In  this  we  think  he  is  mis- 
taken. By  the  provisions  of  the  Code  ex- 
tensive powers  in  this  respect  are  conferred 
upon  the  court  of  original  jurisdiction." 
The  court  after  quoting  the  provisions 
of  the  statute  continued  as  follows :  "  lu 
view  of  these  broad  provisions  of  the 
statute,  it  cannot  be  said  that  the  trial 
court  was  without  power  to  bring  iu,  as 
parties  plaintiff,  tho.se  persons  who  had 
become  interested  in  the  realty  during  the 
pendency  of  the  suit.  The  manner  iu 
which  the  i)Owor  was  exercised  is  a  ques- 
tion of  discretion  and  not  of  law.     The 


the  Court  of  Appeals  was  the  power  of  court  had  the  power  to  order  and  direct 

the  trial  ju<ige,  at  the  trial,  to  bring  in  that  the  grantees  of  the  jiremises,  ])cnding 

Cohen  and  Scallion  as  parties.     In  rcvers-  tlie    action,    should    be    made    parties   by 

ing  the  case  the  Court  of  Appeals,  among  amendment  of  the  pleading  or  oilier xisi'  as 

other   things,   iaid :  "  There   are  various  the  case  requires.  .  .  .  The  only  ([uestiou 


INTERVENTION. 


421 


extent  of  its  innovations  upon  all  prior  methods,  antl  its  useful- 
ness in  procuring  controversies  to  be  decided  on  their  merits  in  a 


is  whether  a  court  of  equity  may,  upon  the 
trial,  admit  new  parties  to  the  record  when 
thi^y  ask  to  be  heard  and  when  their 
presence  is  necessary  for  a  complete  de- 
termination of  the  controversy.  When 
all  the  parties  are  before  tlte  court,  as  in 
this  case,  we  entertain  no  doubt  with 
respect  to  the  power  to  order  the  amend- 
ment in  the  manner  and  upon  the  con- 
ditions that  it  did.  It  was  an  exercise  of 
discretion  by  the  trial  judge  in  furtiier- 
ance  of  justice,  and  no  rule  of  practice  or 
]irinciple  of  law  was  violated.  We  think 
tliere  was  power  in  the  court  to  order  the 
amendment  as  it  did,  and  hence  the  order 
appealed  from  sliould  be  reversed  and  the 
judgment  of  the  Special  Term  affirmed 
with  costs." 

See  also  the  following  cases  in  which 
intervention  was  allowed:  Majors  v. 
Taussig  (1894),  20  Colo.  44,  36  Pac.  816 
(by  stockholders  to  defend  an  action  upon 
a  note  fraudulently  executed  by  the  offi- 
cers, the  company  refusing  to  defend)  ; 
Wood  y.  Denver  City  Water  Co.  (1894), 
20  Colo.  253,  38  Pac.  739  (by  residents 
supplied  by  one  water  company,  in  action 
brought  by  another  company  to  enjoin  the 
furmer  and  claiming  an  exclusive  privilege 
to  supply  wnter  to  the  inhabitants  of  the 
town);  Maddox  v.  Teague  (1896),  18 
:\Iont.  593,  47  Pac.  209  (by  joint  mort- 
gagee in  an  action  against  a  sheriff  on  his 
official  bond  by  the  other  mortgagee  for 
failure  to  pay  over  the  proceeds  of  a  sale 
of  the  mortgaged  property  in  satisfaction 
(jf  his  claim,  which  was  alone  sufficient  to 
exhaust  the  ])enalty  of  the  bond) ;  Dunn 
'.-.  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  11  S.  D.  305,  77 
N.  W.  Ill  (by  payee  named  in  a  certifi- 
cate of  deposit  and  claiming  owuei-shij) 
thereof  in  an  action  thereon  by  the  holder, 
who  was  alleged  to  have  obtained  it 
through  fraud) ;  Cooper  v.  Mohler  (1898), 
104  Iowa,  301,  73  N.  W.  828  (by  a  third 
parly,  the  owner  of  one  of  the  notes 
secured  by  a  mortgage-  which  plaintiff  is 
seeking  to  foreclose,  he  having  an  interest 
in  determining  the  priorities  of  the  various 
claims  secured  by  the  mortgage)  ;  A.  E. 
Johnson  Co.  i:  White  (1899),  78  Minn.  48, 
80  N.  W.  838  (by  one  partner  where  the 
otiier   partner  was  sued  upon  notes  exe- 


cuted by  him  alone  and  the  two  partners 
joined  in  intervention  coinjjlaint  alleging 
the  partnership,  that  the  notes  were  given 
for  partnership  debt  and  setting  up  coun- 
ter-claims against  plaintiff  to  them  as 
partners)  ;  Ex  parte  Kenmore  Shoe  Co. 
(1897),  50  S.  C.  140,  27  S.  E.  682  (by  a 
party  seeking  to  establish  an  eifuitalde 
lien  over  the  fund  sought  to  be  distributed 
in  the  principal  case)  ;  McKldowncy  v. 
Madden  (1899),  124  Cal.  108,  h<o  Pac.783 
(by  a  subsequent  attaching  creditor  who 
has  levied  upon  property  levied  upon  in  a 
prior  action  to  defeat  the  lien  of  the  prior 
levy);  Hice  v.  Dorriau  (1893),  57  Ark. 
541,  22  S.W.  213  (by  an  attaching  cred- 
itor, in  a  prior  attachment,  to  show  that 
the  prior  order  of  attachment  was  wrong- 
fully issued) ;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Mack 
(1902),  26  Nev.  85,  69  Pac.  862  (where  a. 
corporation,  of  which  the  district  judge 
was  a  stockholder,  brought  mandamus  to 
compel  him  to  ])ass  upon  a  claim  against 
an  insolvent  estate,  another  claimant  has 
sufficient  interest  to  intervene  by  asking 
that  he  be  compelled  to  call  another 
judge);  Muhlenberg  ?•.  Tacoma  (1901), 
25  Wash.  36,  64  Pac.  925  (by  the  re- 
ceiver of  an  insolvent  bank  in  an  action 
by  the  trustee  of  a  pledgee  of  such  bank, 
instituted  for  the  purpose  of  establishing 
the  validity  of  certain  city  warrants,  etc.) ; 
Gund  V.  Parke  (1896),  1*5  Wash.  393,  46 
Pac.  408  (by  a  wife  for  the  purpose  of 
having  any  judgment  that  may  be  ren- 
dered against  her  husband  adjudged  not 
a  community  debt  and  that  it  should 
not  be  satisfied  out  of  the  community 
property,  in  an  action  on  the  husband's 
promissory  note)  ;  Pitman  r.  Ireland 
(1902),  64" Neb.  675,  90  N.  W.  540  (by  a 
mortgagor  who  has  conveyed  lands  by 
an  unconditional  deed  of  general  war- 
ranty for  the  purpose  of  pleading  usury 
in  an  action  to  foreclose  the  mortgage) ; 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Holmes  (1900),  60  Neb.  39, 
82  N.  W.  109  (by  tlie  shareholders  of  a 
corporation  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
their  own  interests,  where  the  officers  of 
the  corporation  fail  and  refuse  to  pro- 
tect and  conserve  the  corporate  property ) ; 
to  the  same  effect  is  Fitzwater  v.  Bank 
(1901),  62  Kan.  163,61  Pac.  684  ;  McCou- 


422 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


single  action,  will  be  best  shown  by  detailing  the  facts  of  one  or 


niff  1-.  Van  Dusen  (1898),  57  Neb.  49,  77 
N.  W.  348  (by  a  person  claiming  owner- 
ship of  i)roperty  in  litigation).  "  That  any 
person  who  can  by  proper  averments  show 
that  he  Ikis  an  interest  in  the  matter  in 
litigation  may,  without  leve  of  court,  be- 
come a  party  to  the  suit  and  obtain  an 
adjudication  of  his  claim,"  see  the  two 
following  cases :  Spalding  v.  Murphy 
(1901),  63  Neb.  401,  88  N.  W.  489; 
Greenwood  r.  Ingersoll  (1901),  61  Neb. 
785,  86  N.  W.  476  (by  a  chattel  mort- 
gagee in  proceedings  in  garnishment 
instituted  by  judgment  creditors  of  mort- 
gagor to  appropriate  the  proceeds  of  the 
mortgaged  property  to  the  payment  of  the 
judgments) ;  Deere  v.  Eagle  Mfg.  Co. 
(1896),  49  Neb.  385,  68  N.  W.  504  (by  a 
second  attaching  creditor  to  have  his  lieu 
adjudged  superior  to  that  of  plaintiff)  ; 
Joshua  Hendy,  etc.  Works  v.  Dillon 
(1901),  135  Cal.  9,  66  Pac.  960  (by  a  third 
party  claiming  ownership  of  the  property 
sought  to  be  recovered  in  an  action  of  re- 
plevin, said  tliird  party's  title  being 
pleaded  in  the  answer  of  the  defendant, 
who  averred  his  willingness  to  surrender 
the  property  to  the  owner,  and  the  third 
party  himself  alleging  "  tliat  he  was  the 
owner  of  the  said  property  and  entitled  to 
the  exclusive  possession  thereof,"  and 
asking  judgment  awarding  him  the  posses- 
sion of  the  same) ;  German  Savings  Bank 
I'.  Citizens  Nat.  Bank  (1897),  101  Iowa, 
530,  70  N.  W.  769 ;  Smith  v.  City  of  St. 
Paul  (1896),  65  Minn.  295,  68  N.  \V.  32. 

We  quote  from  the  opinion  of  the  court 
in  the  case  last  above  cited  as  follows  : 
"  The  city  of  St.  Paul  had  taken  by  con- 
demnation proceedings  a  tract  of  land  for 
the  purpose  of  opening  a  street,  the  com- 
pensation or  damages  awarded  being  one 
gross  sum  for  the  entire  tract.  Tlie  plain- 
tiff brought  tliis  action  against  the  city  to 
recover  the  amount  of  the  award,  alleging 
that  she  was  tlie  owner  of  tiie  entire  tract. 
The  St.  Paul  Trust  Co.  and  Mrs.  Sache 
interposed  'com])laints  in  intervention,' 
alleging  that  they  respectively  owned  cer- 
tain portions  of  tlie  tract,  and  hence  were 
severally  entitled  to  a  part  of  the  awani. 
To  these  complaints  the  plaintiff  demurred 
on  the  ground  that  the  facts  stated  did  not 
constitute  a  ground  of  intervention.     Tliis 


appeal  is  from  an  order  overruling  the 
demurrers. 

"  The  contention  of  the  plaintiff  is  that 
these  parties  had  no  right  to  intervene, 
under  G.  S.  1894.  §  5273,  for  the  reason 
that  they  '  wouhl  neitlier  gain  nor  lose  by 
the  direct  legal  operation  and  effect  of  the 
judgment;'  that  any  interest  they  might 
have  in  tlie  property,  or  any  claim  they 
might  have  against  the  city,  would  be 
wholly  unaffected  by  the  result  of  a  suit 
between  tlie  city  and  the  plaintiff.  Lewis 
V.  llarwood,  28*  Minn.  428,  10  N.  W.  586. 
If  the  action  had  been  brought  by  plaintiff 
to  recover  an  ordinary  debt  alleged  to  be 
due  her  from  the  city,  or  if  the  intervenors 
had  to  rely  exclusively  upon  the  statute 
for  their  right  to  come  into  the  action, 
the  plaintiff's  contention  migiit  be  diffi- 
cult to  answer.  But  compulsory  inter- 
pleading and  voluntary  intervention  in  an 
action  originally  between  other  parties 
were  always  known  and  recognized  as 
ancillary  remedies  by  means  of  whicli 
courts  were  enabled  more  conveniently 
and  perfectly  to  adjudicate  upon  the  ulti- 
mate rights  of  the  parties  in  the  subject- 
matter  involved  in  the  litigation,  and  thus 
award  full  and  final  relief  in  the  further 
judicial  proceedings  to  which  these  reme- 
dies were  auxiliary.  It  is  not  to  be  sup- 
posed that  the  statute  in  relation  to 
interpleader  and  intervention  was  intended 
to  abolish  those  ancillary  remedies  in  cases 
where  they  were  previously  authorized, 
and  to  limit  them  exclusively  to  cases 
falling  strictly  within  the  terras  of  the 
statute. 

"  Condemnation  proceedings  under  the 
city  charter  are  in  rem  against  the  land. 
The  award  becomes  a  fund  standing  in 
the  place  of  the  land,  and  whoever  (jwns 
the  land  is  entitled  to  the  award.  If  the 
award  is  ])aid  over  to  one  as  owner  who 
is  not  the  true  owner,  he  will  be  liable  to 
the  true  owner  in  an  action  for  money  had 
and  received.  Hence,  if  the  whole  of  the 
award  should  be  paid  over  to  the  plaintiff, 
and  the  fact  should  be  that  she  was  not 
entitled  to  the  whole  of  it,  but  that  the 
intervenors  were  severally  entitled  to  a 
part  of  it,  they  could  maintain  actions 
against  her  to  recover  their  shares.  The 
fact    that   tliev  iniglit,  at   their  election, 


INTEKVENTION. 


42: 


two  cases  in  which  it  has  been  resorted  to.'     An  action  in  tlie 
usual  form  was  brouglit  by  A.,  the  payee  of  two  promissory  notes 


have  a  remedy  agaiust  the  city  would  uot 
deprive  them  of  this  right  of  action.  If 
this  is  so,  why  may  they  not  intervene  in 
this  action,  in  order  to  have  the  award 
apportioned,  and  to  recover  their  share  1 
Why  shoukl  they  have  to  wait  until  tlie 
money  was  paid  over  to  the  plaintiff,  and 
then  sue  her  1  Where  the  duty  is  de- 
volved on  the  court  or  other  tribunal 
before  which  the  condemnation  proceed- 
ings were  had,  to  distribute  or  apportion 
the  award  among  those  entitled  to  it,  there 
is  no  question  of  the  right  of  any  claimant 
to  appear  and  assert  his  right  to  it,  or  of 
the  court  or  other  tribunal  to  require  any 
such  claimant  to  appear  and  establish  his 
claim.  .  .  .  Doubtless  the  city  might,  in 
a  proper  case,  require  the  plaintiff  and 
other  claimants  to  interplead  ;  but  if  it 
appeared  that  a  third  party  claimed  a 
portion  of  the  award,  the  court  would,  in 
our  opinion,  have  the  power  to  require 
such  person  to  be  brought  in  as  a  party 
to  the  action,  in  order  that  there  might 
be  a  full  and  final  adjudication  of  the 
rights  of  all  parties  in  the  fund ;  and,  if 
such  a  person  can  be  thus  brought  in, 
there  is  no  reason  why  he  may  not  be 
allowed  to  come  in  voluntarily." 

Citizens'  Nat  Bank  v.  City  Nat.  Bank 
(1900),  111  Iowa,  211,  82  N.  W.  464; 
Valley  Bank  r.  Wolf  (1897),  101  Iowa, 
51,  69  N.  W.  11.31;  Enger  v.  Lofland 
(1896),  100  Iowa,  303,  69  N.  W.  526; 
Palmer  v.  Bank  of  Zunibrota  (1896),  65 
Minn.  90,  67  X.  W.  893.] 

1  [;Dennis  v.  Kolm  (1901),  131  Cal.  91, 
63  Pac.  141.  We  quote  from  this  case  as 
follows :  "  This  action  was  brought  to 
recover  for  goods,  wares,  and  merchan- 
dise, alleged  to  have  been  sold  to  the 
defendants  as  copartners  under  the  firm 
name  of  '  Kolm  Bros.'  One  Perkins  had 
in  his  hands  about  eight  hundred  and 
seventy  dollars,  which  plaintiff  claimed 
to  be  the  money  of  H.  Kolm,  who  was 
alleged  to  be  one  of  the  partners.  Plain- 
tiff had  the  eight  hundred  and  seventy 
dollars  attached  in  this  action  as  the 
property  of  H.  Kolm.  Bertha  Kolm,  a 
sister,  filed  a  complaint  in  intervention  in 
which  she  denied  that  the  money  so  at- 
tached was  the  property  of  H.  Kolm  or  of 


'  Kolm  Bros.,'  and  alleged  that  the  same 
was  her  property,  and  asked  that  she  bo 
adjudged  to  l)e  the  owner  thereof.  A 
demurrer  was  interposed  by  plaintiff  to 
the  complaint  in  intervention,  overruled, 
and  plaintiff  filed  an  answer  to  said  com- 
plaint. The  respondent  II.  Kolm  filed  an 
answer  to  the  complaint  of  plaintiff,  in 
which,  among  other  things,  he  denied  that 
he  ever  was,  at  any  time,  a  meml)er  of  the 
firm  of  '  Kolm  Bros.,'  or  that  he  was  in 
any  way  indebted  to  the  plaintiff.  The 
case  was  tried  before  a  jury,  and  verdicts 
rendered  for  the  respondent  H.  Kolm  and 
tlie  interveuor  Bertha  Kolm.  Upon  these 
verdicts  judgment  was  entered.  The  ap- 
peal is  from  the  judgment  and  an  order 
denying  plaintiff's  motion  for  a  new  trial. 
It  is  claimed  that  the  court  erred  in  over- 
ruling the  demurrer  to  the  complaint  in 
intervention,  for  the  reason  that  the  said 
complaint  does  uot  state  facts  showing 
that  the  interveuor  has  any  interest  in 
the  matter  in  controversy,  or  that  the 
decision  would  in  any  way  affect  her 
rights.  It  is  provided  in  the  Code  of 
Civil  Procedure,  section  387  ;  '  Any  person 
may,  before  the  trial,  intervene  in  an 
action  or  proceeding,  who  has  an  interest 
in  the  matter  in  litigation,  in  the  success 
of  either  of  the  parties,  or  an  interest 
against  both.'  In  this  case  the  interveuor 
claimed  the  money  in  the  hands  of  Perkins, 
as  the  proceeds  of  a  note  and  mortgage 
that  had  been  assigned  to  her  by  respond- 
ent H.  Kolm.  She  alleged  that  '  Kolm 
Bros.'  were  at  no  time  the  owners  of  said 
note  or  mortgage  or  of  the  money  in  the 
hands  of  Perkins,  but  that  she  was  the 
owner  of  the  same.  If  she  could  show 
that  H.  Kolm  was  not  one  of  the  copart- 
ners of  the  firm  of  '  Kolm  Bros.,'  then  he 
was  uot  indebted  to  plaintiff.  If  plaintiff 
was  not  a  creditor  of  II.  Kolm  at  any 
time,  then  he  could  not  attack  the  transfer 
of  the  note  and  mortgage  made  by  Kolm 
to  the  interveuor.  We  think  the  inter- 
veuor had  such  interest  as  would  entitle 
her  to  intervene  under  the  statute.  It 
was  said  by  this  court  in  Coffey  v.  Green- 
field, 55  Cal.  382,  in  speaking  of  the  inter- 
est which  entitles  a  party  to  intervene : 
'  And  the  Code  does  not  at tcnnpt  to  specify 


424 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


made  by  B.,  in  which  B.  made  no  defence.  At  this  stage  of  the 
cause  C.  filed  a  petition  of  intervention,  alleging  the  following 
facts:  Before  the  giving  of  these  notes,  B.  was  indebted  in  the 
amount  thereof  to  one  D.,  and  was  not  indebted  at  all  to  the 
plaintiff ;  that  the  plaintiff  A.  caused  B.  to  execute  and  deliver 
to  him  these  notes,  and  the  consideration  thereof  was  B.'s  said  in- 
debtedness to  D.  ;  that  A.  had  no  authority  to  take  tliese  notes  in 
his  own  name,  but  they  should  have  been  given  in  the  name  of 
D. ;  that  D.  is  dead,  and  the  intervenor  C.  is  bis  administrator; 
that  the  notes  belong  really  to  the  estate  of  D.,  and  the  plaintiff 
has  no  interest  in  them,  except  that  the  legal  title  is  in  him.  The 
petition  prayed  that  the  intervenor  might  become  a  party  plain- 
tiff, and  that  judgment  might  be  rendered  in  his  favor  as  admin- 
istrator for  the  amount  of  the  notes  against  B.,  the  niidcer  thereof. 
To  this  petition  the  original  plaintiff  A.  demurred,  and  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Iowa  held  that  the  case  was  a  proper  one, 
within  the  system  established  in  that  State,  for  an  intervention, 
and  that  upon  the  facts  alleged  in  the  petition  the  intervenor 
was  entitled  to  judgment. ^     In  another  case.  A.,  claiming  to  be 


wlmt  or  how  great  this  interest  shall  be,  in 
order  to  give  a  right  to  intervene.  Any 
interest  is  sufficient.  The  fact  tiiat  the 
intervenor  may  or  may  not  protect  liis 
interest  in  some  other  way  is  not  material. 
If  lie  "  has  an  interest  iu  the  matter  in 
litigation  or  in  the  success  of  either  of  the 
parties"  he  has  a  right  to  intervene.' 
The  provisions  of  our  statute  are  taken 
from  tiie  Code  Procedure  of  Louisiana, 
and  the  practice  iu  that  State  is  to  allow 
a  party  to  intervene  whose  property  has 
been  seized  or  att.acked  in  the  suit. 
(Pomeroy  in  Keniedies  and  Remedial 
Rights,  sec.  427  ;  Field  v.  Harrison,  20 
La.  Ann.  411  ;  Yale  i:  Hoopes,  16  La. 
Ann.  31 1  ;  Letchford  v.  Jacobs,  17  La.  Ann. 
79)."  Tiie  section  cited  from  Remedies 
and  Remedial  Rights  appears  in  Code 
Remedies  as  §  *429.] 

1  Taylor  v.  Adair,  22  Iowa,  279.  [The 
following  quotation  from  Taylor  r.  Adair 
appeared  as  §  427  ia  the  text  of  the  last 
edition :  "  To  tlie  lawyer  not  thoroughly 
conversant  with  the  sweeping  and  radical 
changes  in  procedure  and  practice  made  by 
the  Revision,  the  y>r<)position  that  such  an 
intervention  as  that  sought  in  tlie  present 


instance  is  allowaV)le,  would  be  not  a  little 
startling.  ...  A  design  to  avoid  needless 
multiplicity  of  actions  is  everywhere  ap- 
parent iu  the  present  system  of  procedure. 
Consonant  with  the  other  provisions  of 
this  system  are  those  governing  and  regu- 
lating the  rights  of  tliird  parties  to  inter- 
vene in  a  pending  action.  Applying  the 
section  of  the  code  (§  2683)  to  the  case  iu 
hand,  we  first  inquire  wliether  C,  as  the 
administrator  of  I).,  has  'an  interest  in 
the  matter  in  litigation.'  What  was  tlie 
matter  in  litigation  ?  Clearly  tlie  debt 
wiiich  B.  owed.  We  say  the  debt  rather 
than  the  note,  for  the  debt  is  the  substance 
of  whicli  the  note  is  simply  a  memorandum 
or  visildc  evidence.  Now  this  debt  is  al- 
leged, and  on  tlie  record  admitted,  to  be 
OAving  by  B.  to  1)  .and  not  to  the  plaintiff. 
If  1).  or  his  administratcu-  had  possession 
of  the  notes,  though  they  are  made  pay- 
able to  the  plaintiff  A.,  he  might,  on  show- 
ing Iiis  ownership,  sue  tliercon  in  his  own 
name.  So,  altiiough  the  i)laintiff  A.  might 
sue  in  his  own  name  on  the  notes,  they 
being  made  payable  to  him,  yet  if  they 
were  in  reality  tlie  propert}'  of  T>.,  tlio 
maker  niitrht  avail  himself  of  anv  defence 


INTERVENTION. 


425 


assignee  of  a  note  and  mortgage  executed  to  1j.  as  the  payee 
and  mortgagee,  commenced  an  ordinary  action  for  a  foreclosure. 
Thereupon  C.  filed  a  petition  of  intervention  as  administrator  of 
B.,  the  mortgagee,  in  which  he  denied  that  the  note  and  mortgage 
had  ever  been  assigned  to  A.,  denied  that  the  latter  had  any 
interest  or  right  therein,  and  averred  that  they  were  assets  of  tlie 
estate  of  his  intestate  B.,  and  prayed  for  judgment  in  his  own 
favor  of  foreclosure  and  sale  against  the  mortgagor  and  other 
defendants.  Upon  a  demurrer  to  this  petition,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  California  held  that  the  intervention  was  entirely  within 
the  intent  and  the  letter  of  the  statute,  and  that  the  intcrvenor 
should  have  judgment.^     Again,  in  an  action  commenced  to  fore- 


he  mi^ht  have  against  D.  These  consid- 
erations are  advanced  to  ilhistrate  how 
thoiougiily  the  laW  penetrates  beyond 
names  and  forms  and  externals  into  the 
very  substance  and  kernel.  Now,  if  the 
plaintiff  succeeds,  he  recovers  that  which, 
on  the  assumption  of  tlie  truth  of  the  pe- 
tition of  intervention,  belonged  to  another ; 
that  wliich  D.  or  his  representative  may 
sue  him  for  and  compel  him  to  pay.  He 
m.ay  be  insolvent.  He  may,  if  he  re- 
cover the  judgment,  assign  it.  Why 
should  the  real  owner  of  the  del)t  not 
have  the  privilege  of  coming  into  court, 
and,  on  establishing  as  against  the  plain- 
tiff the  right  to  the  debt,  directly  re- 
cover it  in  his  own  name  1  This  avoids 
niuliiplicity  of  actions,  consequent  delay, 
and  augmented  costs.  It  may,  as  above 
suggested,  be  the ,  only  protection  against 
the  insolvency  or  fraud  of  the  plaintiff. 
We  are  not  prepared  to  admit  the  truth 
of  the  proposition  advanced  in  support  of 
the  demurrer,  that  the  interest  of  D.  is  of 
such  a  nature  that  it  could  be  asserted 
only  in  a  court  of  equity.  Nor  are  we 
prepared  to  admit  the  further  proposition 
that  in  a  legal  action  an  intervenor's  in- 
terest in  the  matter  in  litigation  must  be 
a  legal  interest,  to  entitle  him  to  the  benefit 
of  the  statute.  We  conclude  by  announc- 
ing it  as  the  opinion  of  the  court  that  this 
is  a  case  in  which  the  applicant  has  shown 
that  he  has  '  an  interest  in  the  matter  in 
litigation  against  both  parties,'  —  a  case 
in  which  he  demands  something  adversely 
to  both  plaintiff  and  defendant.  This 
interest  is  adverse  to  the  plaintiff,  as  he 


claims  against  him  tlie  amoimt  of  the  note 
and  debt.  His  interest  is  adverse  to  the  de- 
fendant, since  he  claims  to  recover  against 
him  a  judgment  for  the  amount  of  the 
note."3  See  Summers  v.  Ilutson,  48  Ind. 
228. 

1  Stich  V.  Dickinson,  .38  Cal.  60S.  {The 
following  quotation  from  Stich  v.  Dickin- 
son appeared  as  §  428  in  the  text  of  the 
last  edition:  "The  intervention  in  this 
case  comes  within  the  last  category  of 
either  [that  is,  where  his  interest  is  ad- 
verse to  both  of  the  original  parties]. 
The  intervenor  certainly  lias  no  inter- 
est in  common  either  with  the  plaintiff 
or  the  defendant ;  but  we  think  he  has 
an  interest  in  the  matter  in  litigation 
adverse  to  both  within  the  meaning  of  the 
section  referred  to.  He  has  an  interest 
against  the  pretension  of  the  plaintiff 
to  be  owner  of  the  note  and  mortgage, 
and  to  have  a  decree  of  foreclosure  for 
his  benefit,  and  against  the  defenilant.,  for 
the  collection  of  the  debt.  The  sul)jpct- 
matter  of  the  litigation  is  the  note  and 
mortgage,  and  the  right  of  the  plaintiff 
to  have  a  decree  of  foreclosure  and  sale. 
The  intervenor  claims  as  against  the  plain- 
tiff that  he  and  not  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
to  the  decree  of  foreclosure ;  and  as  against 
the  defendant,  that  the  mortgage  debt  is 
due  and  unpaid,  and  that  he  is  entitled  to 
a  foreclosure.  In  this  case  the  intervenor 
claims  tlie  demand  in  suit,  viz.  the  note 
and  mortgage,  and  we  can  perceive  no 
reason  founded  on  the  policy  of  the  law 
which  should  preclude  the  settlement  of 
the  whole  controversy  in  one  action."] 


426 


CIVIL    KF.MEDIE3. 


close  a  mortgage  given  (together  with  a  note)  by  a  corporation 
which  had  become  insolvent,  certain  judgment  creditors  of  the 
company  intervened,  alleging  fraud  in  the  execution  of  the  note 
and  mortgage  by  the  defendant,  and  that  they  were  void  as 
against  its  creditors;  and  praying  that  they  might  be  adjudged 
void,  and  the  action  to  foreclose  be  dismissed.  The  intervention 
of  these  judgment  creditors  was  sustained,  but  it  was  hold,  at  the 
same  time,  that  simple  contract  creditors  had  no  foundation  for 
an  intervention,  since  they  could  not  dispute  the  mortgage.^ 


1  Horn  r.  Volcano  Water  Co.,  13  Cal. 
62.  []Tlie  following  quotation  from  Horn 
V.  Volcano  Water  Co.  appeared  as  §  429 
in  the  text  of  the  last  edition:  "The 
petition  of  the  creditor  K.  docs  not  disclose 
any  right  on  his  i)art  to  intervene ;  it  shows 
that  he  was  a  sim])le  contract  creditor, 
holding  obligations  against  the  company, 
but  it  does  not  show  that  any  portion  of 
them  are  secured  by  any  lien  on  the  mort- 
gaged premises.  His  intervention  is  only 
an  attempt  of  one  credit(jr  to  prevent  an- 
other creditor  from  obtaining  judgment 
against  the  common  debtor,  —  a  proceed- 
ing which  can  find  no  support  either  in 
principle  or  authority.  The  interest  men- 
tioned in  the  statute  which  entitles  a  per- 
son to  intervene  in  a  suit  between  other 
parties,  7nust  be  in  the  matter  in  litigation, 
and  of  such  a  direct  and  immediate  charac- 
ter that  the  intervener  will  either  r/nin  or  lose 
by  the  direct  legal  operation  and  effect  of  the 
judgment.  The  provisions  of  our  statute 
are  taken  substantially  from  the  Code  of 
Procedure  of  Louisiana,  which  declares 
that '  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  intervene, 
it  is  enough  to  have  an  interest  in  the 
.success  of  either  of  the  parties  to  the 
suit ; '  and  the  Supreme  Court  of  that 
State,  in  passing  upon  the  term  '  interest,' 
thus  used,  held  this  language:  'This  we 
8U|)pose  must  be  a  direct  interest  by  which 
tlie  intervening  ])arty  is  to  obtain  imme- 
diate gain  or  suffer  loss  by  the  judgment 
which  may  be  rendered  between  the  origi- 
nal parties;  otherwi.^ie  the  strange  anomaly 
would  be  introduced  into  our  jurisiiruileiicc 
of  suffering  an  accumulation  of  suits  in 
all  instances  where  doubts  might  be  cnter- 
tainc<l  or  enter  into  the  imagination  of 
subsequfnt  jdaintiffs,  that  a  defendant 
against  whom  a  previous  action  was  under 


prosecution  might  not  have  property  suffi- 
cient to  discharge  all  his  debts.  For  as 
tlie  first  judgment  ol)tained  might  give 
a  preference  to  the  person  who  siiould  ob- 
tain it,  all  subsequent  suitors  down  to  t  he 
last  would  have  an  indirect  interest  in  de- 
feating the  action  of  the  first.'  To  author- 
ize au  intervention,  therefore,  the  interest 
must  be  that  created  by  a  claim  to  the 
demand  or  some  part  thereof  in  suit,  or  a 
claim  to  or  lien  upon  the  jiropcrty  or  some 
part  thereof  which  is  the  subject  of  litiga- 
tion. No  such  claim  or  lien  is  asserted  in 
the  petition  of  R.,  and  his  right  to  inter- 
vene in  consequence  thereof  fails.  The 
petition  of  S.  and  others  stands  u|)on  a 
different  footing.  It  shows  that  they  were 
judgment  creditors  having  liens  by  their 
several  judgments  upon  the  mortgaged 
premises  at  the  time  of  the  institution  of 
the  suit.  As  sucii,  they  were  sul)scquent 
incumbrancers  and  necessary  parties  to  a 
complete  adjustment  of  all  tlie  interests  in 
the  mortgaged  premises,  though  not  indis- 
pensable parties  to  a  decree  determining 
the  rights  of  the  other  parties  as  between 
themselves.  For  such  adju.stinent  the 
court  would  have  been  justified  in  ordering 
tiiem  to  be  broujrht  in,  either  upon  their 
own  ])etition,  as  in  the  present  ca.se,  or  by 
au  amendment  to  the  com])laint."[] 

See  also  Lewis  i\  Harwood,  28  Minn. 
428;  Yetzer  v.  Young  (S.  1).  1892),  52 
N.  VV.  Rep.  1054;  McClurgr.  State  lliiid- 
ery  Co.  (S.  1).  1892),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  428  ; 
Gale  V.  Shillock  (Dak.,  Oct.  1886).  30 
N.  \V.  Rep.  138;  Smith  r.  Gale,  12  Supr. 
Ct.  Rep.  G74  ;  Limberg  v.  Higginbotham, 
11  Colo.  316;  Curtis  r.  Latiirop,  12  Colo. 
169  ;  Daniels  c.  Clark,  38  Iowa,  556  ;  Cot- 
tle V.  Cole,  20  Iowa,  481. 


INTEllVENTION.  427 

§  324.  *430.  Author's  Statement  of  the  Doctrine.  The  doc- 
trine stated  by  Mr.  Justice  Field  [in  Home  v.  Volcano  Water 
Co.]  is  clearly  the  correct  interpretation  of  the  provisions  con- 
tained in  the  California  and  the  Iowa  codes,  and  the  opinion  of  Mr. 
Justice  Dillon  [in  Taylor  v.  Adair]  is  in  complete  harmony  with 
it.  The  cases  cited  above  all  fall  within  this  doctrine.  In  each 
the  intervenors  had  a  direct  interest,  either  in  prosecuting  the 
action  and  obtaining  the  benefit  of  the  recovery,  or  in  defending 
the  action  and  entirely  defeating  the  i-ecovery.  If  the  intervenor 
claims  to  be  the  only  one  entitled  to  the  relief,  if  he  asserts  that 
the  ultimate  cause  of  action  is  vested  in  him  and  not  in  the 
original  plaintiff,  then  his  interest  is  adverse  to  both  of  the 
parties.  The  doctrine  may  be  expressed  in  the  following  man- 
ner :  The  intervenor's  interest  must  be  such,  that  if  the  original 
action  had  never  been  commenced,  and  he  had  first  brought  it  as 
the  sole  plaintiff,  he  would  have  been  entitled  to  recover  in  his 
own  name  to  the  extent  at  least  of  a  part  of  the  relief  sought;  or 
if  the  action  had  first  been  brought  against  him  as  the  defendant, 
he  would  have  been  able  to  defeat  the  recovery  in  part  at  least. 
His  interest  may  be  either  legal  or  equitable.  If  equitable,  it 
must  be  of  such  a  character  as  would  be  the  foundation  for  a 
recovery  or  for  a  defence,  as  the  case  might  be,  in  an  independent 
action  in  which  he  was  an  original  party.  As  the  new  system 
permits  legal  and  equitable  causes  of  action  or  defences  to  be 
united  by  those  who  are  made  the  parties  to  an  ordinary  suit,  for 
the  same  reason  either  or  both  may  be  relied  upon  by  an  inter- 
venor. In  short,  the  same  rules  govern  his  rights  which  govern 
those  who  originally  sue  or  defend.^  The  proceeding  by  inter- 
vention is  not  an  anomalous  one,  differing  from  other  judicial 
controversies,  after  it  has  been  once  commenced.  It  is,  in  fact, 
the  grafting  of  one  action  upon  another,  and  the  tr34ng  of  the 
combined  issues  at  one  trial,  and  the  determining  them  by  one 
judgment.  In  this  aspect  of  the  proceeding  it  is  both  plain  and 
reasonable  that  the  intervenor  should  not  be  required  to  appl}' 
for  permission  to  come  in.     He  brings  himself  into  court,  and 

1  I^See  Wall  v.  Mines  (1900),  130  Cal.  the  iutervention,  and  snch  defendant  then 

'27,  62  Pac.  386,  in  which  the  court  say  :  has  all  the  rights  to  plead  given  tlie  dc- 

"  The    intervention    may    be    adverse    to  fendants  in  an  ordinary  action,  and  may 

botli  plaintiff   and   defendant.     Where  it  file  a  cross  complaint  to  the  intervention 

is  adverse  to  either,  such  party  becomes  under  sec.  442."] 
defendant,  and  the  intervenor  plaintiff  in 


428  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

becomes  a  litigant  party  by  filing  and  serving  his  petition,  which 
is  answered  by  the  adversary  parties  —  plaintiff  or  defendant,  or 
both  —  in  the  same  manner  as  though  it  was  the  pleading  of  a 
plaintiff :  the  issues  are  thus  framed,  —  issues  upon  the  plaintiff's 
petition  and  the  intervenor's  petition,  —  and  tlie  trial  of  the 
whole  is  had  at  one  hearing.  If  the  intervenor  fails  on  this 
trial,  a  judgment  for  costs  is  of  course  rendered  against  him ;  if 
he  succeeds,  a  judgment  is  given  in  his  favor  according  to  the 
facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case.-^ 

§  325.  *431.  Concluding  Remarks.  This  is  certainly  a  great 
innovation  upon  the  procedure  which  has  liitherto  prevailed  in 
courts  of  law  and  of  equity.  It  is,  however,  a  method  based 
upon  the  very  principles  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the  en- 
tire reformed  American  system.  The  onlj-  possible  objection  is 
the  multiplication  of  issues  to  be  decided  in  the  one  cause,  and 
the  confusion  alleged  to  result  therefrom.  This  objection  is  not 
real:  it  is  the  stock  argument  which  was  constantly  urged  in 
favor  of  retaining  the  common-law  system  of  special  pleading, 
and  was  repudiated  when  the  codes  were  adopted  by  the  Ameri- 
can States,  and  has  been  at  last  utterly  repudiated  in  England. 
Complicated  issues  of  fact  are  daily  tried  by  juries,  and  compli- 
cated equities  are  easily  adjusted  by  courts.     The    description 

1  Poehlmann  r.  Kennedy,  48  Cal.  201 ;  Cal.  3  ;    Loughborough    v.    McNevin,   74 

Brooks  1-.  Hager,  5  Cal.  281,  282;  Sargent  Cal.  250;  Kobinson  t--.  Crescent  City  Mill, 

V.  Wilson,  .5  Cal.  504,  507;  Moss  v.  War-  &c.  Co.,  9.3  Cal.  316  ;  Kansas  &  C.  P.  Ry. 

uer,  10  Cal.  296,  297  ;  People  v.  Talmage,  Co.  v.  Fitzgerald,  .33  Neb.  137  ;  Welborn 

6    Cal.    256,    258;    County   of    Yuba    (•.  f.  Eskey,  25  Xeb.  193;  McClurg  ;;.  State 

Adams  &  Co.,  7  Cal.  35;"  Davis   v.   Ep-  Bindery  Co.  (S.  D.  1892),  53  N.  W.  428; 

pinger,  18  Cal.  378,  380;  Dixey  v.  Pol-  Gale  ?\  Shillock  (Dak.,  Oct.  1886),  30  N. 

lock,  8  Cal.    570;   Speyer  v.   Ihmels,   21  W.  138;  Smith  v.  Gale,  12  Supr.  Ct.  Kep. 

Cal.  280,  287  ;  Coghill  v.  Marks,  29  Cal.  674;  Yetzer  v.  Young  (S.  D.  1892),  52  N. 

673.     Contra  to  the.se  case.s,  see  the  well-  W.  10.54  ;  Dunham  f.  Greenbauni,  50  Iowa, 

considered  opinion  of  Clark  .1.  in   Lewis  303  ;  Lewis    v.  Harwood,  28    Minn.  428  ; 

V.    Harwood,    28    Minn.    428.      Dutil    r.  Teachout  v.  Des  Moines  B.  G.  S.  Uy.  Co., 

Pacheco,    21     Cal.   438,    442;    Coster    v.  75  Iowa,  722 ;  Van  Gorden  r.  Orinsby,  55 

Brown,    23    Cal.     142,    143;     Gradwohl  Iowa,    657;    Goctzman    v.    Whitaker,    81 

V.    Harris,   29  Cal.    150,    154;  People    ?;.  Iowa,    527.      Further    illustrations:    Des 

Se-xton,   37    Cal.   532,    534  ;   Joliet    Iron,  Moines   Ins.  Co.    v.  Lent,  75  Iowa,  522 ; 

&c.  Co.  i;.  Chicago    C.  &  W.  K.  Co.,  51  Wohlwend  v.  Case  Threshing-Mach.  Co., 

Iowa,  300;  Switz  t'.  Bl.ick,  45   Iowa,  597 ;  42    Minn.    500;    Dennis    r.    Spencer,   45 

Ingle  r.  Jones,  43  Iowa,  286  ;  Harwood  y.  Minn.   250;    Pence    v.    Sweeney    (Idaho, 

QuiMl)y,  44  Iowa,  385  ;  Henry  v.  Cass  Cy.  1891),  28  Pac.  Rep.  413  ;  Curtis  r.  Lathmp, 

Mill,  &c.  Co.,  42  id.  33  ;  (^olmrn  r.  Smart,  12  Colo.  109;  Liml)erg  i-.  Higginbothani, 

53   Cal.  742;  Rosecrans  i;.  Ellsworth,   52  11   Colo.  316;  Bennett    v.   Wliitcomb,  25 

Cal.  509;  Porter   v.   Garrissino,  51    Cal.  Minn.  148;  Thompsou  d.  Huron  Lumber 

559.     See  also  Martin   v.  Thompson,   63  Co.,  4  Wa.sh.  600. 


INTERVENTION.  429 

wliich  I  have  here  given  of  the  enlarged  power  of  intervention 
admitted  by  the  codes  of  California  and  of  Iowa  may,  by  intro- 
ducing its  methods  to  the  profession  of  other  States,  procure  its 
general  adoption  wherever  the  new  procedure  is  established. 
Courts  and  legislatures  of  the  several  States  may  well  borrow 
the  improvements  which  have  been  made  in  other  common- 
wealths ;  and  thus,  by  a  comparison  of  methods,  the  common 
system  may  become  perfected  and  unified.^ 

1  See  ante,  §  *413,  and  note. 


•ioO  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


CHAPTER   THIRD. 

THE  AFFIRMATIVE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  THE  ACTION:  THE 
FORMAL  STATEMENT  OF  THE  CAl'SE  OF  ACTION  BY  THE 
PLAINTIFF. 

SECTION   FIRST. 

THE    STATUTORY   PROVISIONS. 

§  326.  *  432.  Introduction.  I  here  collect  all  the  provisions  of 
the  various  codes  which  relate  in  a  general  manner  to  the  plain- 
tiff's complaint  or  petition,  and  wliich  contain  the  rules  applicable 
to  the  theory  of  plciuling  as  a  whole :  those  which  prescribe  the 
mode  of  alleging  certiiiu  particular  classes  of  facts,  or  regulate 
the  joinder  of  causes  of  action,  or  define  the  nature  and  uses  of 
the  reply,  will  be  quoted  in  subsequent  portions  of  the  chapter, 
in  immediate  connection  with  the  several  subjects  to  A\hich  they 
refer.  The  important  clauses  which  announce  the  fundamental 
and  essential  principles  and  doctrines  of  the  reformed  system  in 
regard  to  all  pleadings,  and  whicli  determine  the  form  and  sub- 
stance of  the  one  by  which  the  plaintiff  sets  forth  the  grounds  of 
liis  claim  for  judicial  relief,  are  nearly  the  same  in  the  different 
State  codes.  With  the  few  variations  in  the  language,  which  will 
be  pointed  out,  there  is  no  substantial  difference ;  and  the  system 
of  pleading,  as  found  in  the  statute,  is  absolutely  the  same  wher- 
ever the  reform  prevails.  The  following  are  all  the  provisions 
which  it  is  necessary  to  quote  in  order  to  exliibit  the  simple  and 
natural  metliods  introduced  b}'-  the  new  procedure. 

§  327.  *  433.  statutory  Provisions  as  to  Complaint.  *'  All  the 
forms  of  pleading  heretofore  existing  are  abolished;  and  hereafter 
the  forms  of  pleading  in  civil  actions  in  courts  of  record,  and  the 
rules  by  which  the  sufhciency  of  the  pleadings  is  to  be  deter- 
mined, are  those  prescribed  l)y  this  act."  ^     "  Tlie  first  pleading 

'  Kansas,  §  8o  ;  Nebraska,  §  90;  North  and  pleadin;;.  all  common  counts,  general 

Carolina,  §  91.     The  corresponding  pro-  issues,  and  all  fiction.s,  arc  abolished ;  and 

vision  of  the  Iowa  code  is  more  detailed :  hereafter  the  forms  of   ))leading  in  civil 

"  §  2644.     All   technical  forms   of  action  actions,  and  the  rules  by  which  their  suffi- 


PROVISIONS    IN   RELATION    TO    PLEADING. 


431 


on  the  part  of  the  phxintiff  is  the  complaint."  ^    "  The  only  plead- 


ciency  is  to  be  determined,  are  those  pre- 
scribed in  this  code." 

{^Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5710. 

California,  §  42,  reading  as  follows  • 
"  The  forms  of  pleadings  in  civil  actions, 
and  the  rules  by  which  the  sufficiency  of 
the  pleadings  is  to  be  determined,  are 
those  prescribed  in  this  code." 

Colorado,  §  47,  reading  as  follows : 
"  The  mode  of  pleading  in  civil  actions,  and 
the  rules  by  which  tlie  sufficiency  of  the 
pleadings  shall  be  determined,  shall  be  as 
prescribed  in  this  act,  and  not  otherwise." 

Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  607,  read- 
ing as  follows  :  "  There  shall  be  but  one 
form  of  civil  action,  and  the  pleadings 
therein  shall  be  as  follows." 

Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3201, 
same  as  California,  supra. 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  3.39,  read- 
ing as  follows  :  "  All  the  distinct  forms  of 
pleading  heretofore  existing,  inconsistent 
with  the  provisions  of  this  act,  are  hereby 
abolished ;  and  hereafter  the  forms  of 
pleadings  in  civil  actions  in  courts  of  rec- 
ord, and  the  rules  by  which  the  sufficiency 
of  the  pleadings  is  to  be  determined,  are 
modified  as  prescribed  by  this  act." 

Kentuckij,  Code,  189.5,  §  88,  reading  as 
follows:  "The  forms  of  pleadings,  and 
the  rules  by  which  their  sufficiency  is  to 
be  determined,  are  those  prescribed  by 
this  code." 

Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5228.  reading  as 
follows:  "The  forms  of  proceedings  in 
civil  actions,  and  the  rules  by  which  the 
sufficiency  of  pleadings  is  to  be  deter- 
mined, shall  be  regulated  by  statute." 

Missouri,  Eev.  St.,  1899,  §  591,  reading 
as  follows:  "The  forms  of  pleading  in 
civil  actions  in  courts  of  record,  anil  the 
rules  by  which  the  sufficieuc}'  of  the  plead- 
ings are  [.s(V]  to  be  determined,  are,  except 
as  otherwise  specially  provided  by  law, 
prescribed  by  this  article." 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  661,  reading  as 
follows :  "  The  forms  of  pleading  in  civil 
actions,  and  the  rules  by  which  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  pleadings  are  \si<-\  to  be  de- 
termined, are  those  prescribed  in  this  code." 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3132, 
reading  as  follows :  "  All  the  forms  of 
pleadings  in  civil  actions,  and  the  rules  by 
which    the   sufficiency   of    the   pleadings 


shall  be  determined,  shall  be   those  pre- 
scribed in  this  act." 

New  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  518,  read- 
ing as  follows :  "  This  chapter  prescribes 
the  form  of  pleadings  in  an  action,  and 
the  rules  by  which  the  sufficiency  thereof 
is  determined,  except  where  special  pro- 
vision is  otherwise  made  by  law." 

North  Carolina,  §  91,  same  as  California, 
supra. 

North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5265. 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5054,  reading  as 
follows  :  "  The  forms  of  pleading  in  civil 
actions  in  courts  of  record,  and  the  rules 
by  which  their  sufficiency  shall  be  de- 
termined, are  those  prescribed  in  this 
chapter." 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3963,  reading  as 
follows:  "The  rules  of  pleading  hereto- 
fore existing  in  civil  actions  are  abolished  ; 
and  hereafter,  the  forms  of  pleadings  in 
civil  actions  in  courts  of  record,  and  the 
rules  by  which  their  sufficiency  may  be 
determined,  are  those  prescribed  by  this 
code." 

Oregon,  Plill's  Laws,  §  63,  containing 
the  words  "  in  actions  at  law  "  after  the 
word  existing  in  the  form  given  in  the 
text. 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  161, 
reading  as  follows :  "  There  siiall  be  no 
other  forms  of  pleading  in  civil  actions  in 
courts  of  record  in  this  State,  and  no  other 
rules  by  which  the  sufficiency  of  the 
pleadings  is  to  be  determined,  than  those 
prescribed  hy  this  code  of  procedure." 

South  Dakota,  Ann.  ^t.,  1901,  §  6111. 

Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2957,  same  as 
California,  supra. 

Washington,  Bal.  code,  §  4903,  substan- 
tially same  as  Indiana,  su/ira. 

Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2644,  reading 
as  follows  :*  "  The  forms  of  pleading  in 
civil  actions  in  courts  of  record,  and  the 
rules  by  which  the  sufficiency  of  the  plead- 
ings are  [sic]  determined  are  those  pre- 
scribed by  this  chapter." 

Wr/oming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3530,  same 
as  Ohio,  siipira. 

1  New  York,  §  141  (478) ;  California, 
§  425 ;  Oregon.  §  64;  North  Carolina,  §  92. 

[[Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5715  ; 
Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  607  ;  Idaho, 
Code  Civ.   Pro.,    1901,  §  3203;    Indiana, 


432 


CIVIL   IIE.MEDIES. 


ings  allowed  are,  1,  the  petition  by  the  plaintiff;  2,  the  answer  or 
demurrer  by  the  defendant;  3,  tlie  demurrer  or  reply  by  the 
plaintiff ;  4,  the  demurrer  to  the  reply  by  the  defendant."  ^    "  The 


I'iurns'  St.,  1901,  §  341  ;  Minnesota,  St., 
1894,  §  5230;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§  592  ;  Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  670;  North 
i)akota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §5266;  Ohio, 
Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5057  ;  South  Carolina, 
Code,  1893,  §  162;  South  Dakota,  Ann. 
St.,  1901,  §  6112  ;  Washington,  Bal.  Code, 
§  4905  ;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2645  : 
Wvoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3533.] 

1  Kausa.s,  §  86  ;  Nebraska,  §  91. 

\;^Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1275,  reading 
as  follows :  "  The  pleadings  in  all  civil 
suits  in  courts  of  record  shall  be  by  corn- 
plaint  and  answer." 

Ar/cansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5711, 
allowing  (1)  complaint,  (2)  demurrer  or 
answer  by  defendant,  (3)  demurrer  or  re- 
ply by  plaintiff. 

California,  §  422,  allowing,  on  part  of 
plaintiff,  (1)  complaint,  (2)  demurrer  to 
answer,  and  on  part  of  defendant,  (1) 
demurrer  to  compbiint,  (2)  answer,  to 
which  were  added  by  the  conimi.ssiouers' 
amendment  of  1901,  on  the  part  of  plain- 
tiff, (3)  demurrer  to  cro.ss-coniplaint,  (4) 
answer  to  cross-com])laint,  and  on  part  of 
defendant,  (3)  cro.ss-complaint,  (4)  demur- 
rer to  answer  to  cross-complaint.  But  see 
Lewis  V.  Dunn  (1901),  134  Cal.  291,  as  to 
unconstitutionality  of  this  amendment. 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  48. 

Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3202, 
allowing,  on  part  of  plaintiff,  (1)  com- 
plaint, (2)  demurrer  to  answer,  and  on 
part  of  defendant,  (1)  demurrer  to  com- 
plaint, (2)  answer. 

/Hc/fflHa,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  340,  allow- 
ing (I)  complaint  by  plaintiff,  (2)  demurrer 
and  answer  by  defendant,  (3)  demurrer  and 
reply  by  plaintiff. 

Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3557,  allowing 
(1)  petition  of  plaintiff,  (2)  motion,  de- 
murrer or  answer  of  defendant,  (3)  mo- 
tion, demurrer  or  reply  of  plaintiff,  (4) 
motion  or  demurrer  of  defendant. 

Kentucky,  Code,  1895,  §  89,  allowing 
"(1)  petitions,  answers  and  replies,  and 
such  additional  pleadings,  by  way  of  re- 
joinder and  rebutter,  .as  may  be  necessary 
to  form  a  material  issue  of  fact,  (2)  de- 
murrers." 


Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5229,  substan- 
tially the  same  as  Indiana,  supra. 

Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §§  592,  596, 
607. 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  662. 

Nevada,  Comp.  Law.s.  1900,  §  3133, 
allowing,  on  part  of  plaintiff,  complaint 
and  demurrer  to  answer,  and  on  part  of 
defendant,  demurrer  and  answer. 

Neu!  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §§  478,487, 
493,  514,  supra. 

North  Carolina,  §§  92,  94,  105,  107, 
allowing  complaint,  demurrer  and  reply 
on  part  of  plaintiff,  and  answer  and  de- 
murrer on  ])art  of  defendant. 

North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
§§  5266,  5267,  5277.  5279. 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5055,  providing 
that  the  answer  may  be  styled  a  cros.s-peti- 
tion  when  affirmative  relief  is  demanded. 

Oklahoma.  St.,  1893,  §  3964. 

Oregon,  Hill's  Laws,  §  64,  allowing  on 
the  j)art  of  the  plaintiff,  (1)  complaint, 
(2)  demurrer,  or  (3)  reply;  and  on  part 
of  the  defendant,  (I)  demurrer,  or  (2) 
answer. 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §§  162,  164, 
174,  176. 

South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §§  6112, 
6114,  6124,  6126. 

Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2958. 

Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4904. 

Wisronsin,  St.,  1898,  §§  2645,  2648, 
2661,  2663. 

Wyomint),  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3532,  allow- 
ing (1)  petition,  (2)  demurrer,  (3)  answer, 
wliich,  when  affirmative  relief  is  demanded 
therein,  may  be  styled  cross-petition, 
(4)  reply. 

Supplemental  Plrodings. 

But  supplemental  ])leadings  may  be 
filed  alleging  facts  occurring  after  the  fil- 
ing of  the  original  pleadings,  in  aid  of  the 
original  pleadings :  Ellis  v.  City  of  Indian- 
apolis (1897),  148  Ind.  70,  47N.  E.  218; 
Swedish  Am.  Nat.  Bank  v.  Dickinson  Co. 
(1896).  6  N.  D.  222,  69  N.  W.  455;  B.irker 
V.  Pri/.er  (1897),  150  Ind.  4,  48  N.  E.  4; 
Kirhy  .■.  Muench  (1900),  12  S.  D.  616,82 
N.  W.  93 ;  Zalesky  v.  Home  Ins.  Co. 
(1897),  102  la.  613,  71  N.  W.  .566:  Foote 


rKOVISIOXS    IN    RELATION   TO   PLEADING. 


433 


complaint  shall  contain,  1,  the  title  of  the  cause  specifying  the 
name  of  the  court  in  which  the  action  is  brought,  the  name  of  the 
county  in  which  tlie  plaintiff  desires  the  trial  to  be  had,  and 
the  names  of  the  parties  to  the  action,  —  plaintiff  and  defendant ; 
2,  a  plain  and  concise  statement  of  the  facts  constituting  a  cause 
of  action  without  unnecessary  repetition;  3,  a  demand  of  the 
relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  supposes  himself  entitled.  If  a  re- 
covery of  money  be  demanded,  tlie  amount  thereof  shall  be 
stated."  1     "  The  defendant  may  demur  to  tlie  complaint  when  it 

V.  Burlington  Gaslight  Co.  (1897),  103  la. 
576,  72  N.  W.  755;  Christie  v.  Iowa  Life 
Ins.  Co,  (1900),  111  la.  177,  82  N.  W.  499  ; 
Lathrop  v.  Deariug  (1894),  59  Minn.  234, 
61  N.  W.  24;  Malmsteu  v.  Berryhill 
(1895),  63  Minu.  1,  65  N.  W.  88;  Guptill 
V.  City  of  Red  Wing  (1899),  76  Minn.  129, 
78  N."  W.  970;  Bomar  ;.•.  Means  (1896), 
47  S.  C.  190,  25  S.  E.  60;  Wade  v.  Gould 
(1899),  8  Okla.  690,  59  Pac.  11  ;  Childs  v. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1893),  117  Mo. 
414,  23  S.  W.  373;  Barnard  v.  Gantz 
(1893),  140  N.  Y.  249,35  N.E.  430;  Bank 
of  Chadron  v.  Anderson  (1895),  6  Wyo. 
518,  48  Pac.  197;  Williams  i\  Eikenbary 
(1893),  36  Neb.  478,  54  N.  W.  852  ;  Chap- 
man V.  Jones  (1897),  149  Ind.  434,  47  N.  E. 
1065. 

But  if  a  party  has  no  cause  of  action  at 
the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the 
action,  he  cannot  maintain  it  by  means  of 
a  supplemental  complaint :  Hill  v.  Den 
(1898),  121  Cal.  42,  53  Pac.  642;  Gordon 
V.  City  of  San  Diego  (1895),  108  Cal.  264, 
41  Pac.  301 . 

Permission  to  file  supplemental  plead- 
ings is  within  the  discretion  of  the  court : 
Jacob  V.  Lorenz  (1893),  98  Cal.  332,  33 
Pac.  119;  Allen  v.  City  of  Davenport 
(1901),  115  la.  20,  87  N.'W.  743  ;  Schou- 
weiler  v.  Hough  (1895),  7  S.  D.  163,  63 
N.  W.  776 ;  Fitzgerald's  Estate  v.  Union 
Bank  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  90  N.  W.  994. 

A  supplemental  complaint,  without  an 
original  complaint  upon  which  to  stand, 
cannot  be  the  foundation  of  an  action : 
Ellis  V.  City  of  Indianapolis  (1897),  148 
Ind.  70,  47  N.  E.  218. 

"  It  seems  to  us  that  '  a  plea  since  the 
last  continuance'  is  not  what  would 
strictly  be  termed  an  amendment,  but 
more  in  the  nature  of  a  supplemental 
pleading  —  something     more     than    was 


pleaded  before.  Such  pleas  nmst  be  made 
by  leave  of  court,  that  is,  they  must  have 
the  sanction  of  the  court,  and  the  oppos- 
ing j)arty  must  have  an  opportunity  to  be 
heard.  This  is  and  should  be  so  whether 
it  is  a  matter  of  discretion  with  tlic  court 
or  a  right  the  party  has  to  insist  on  its 
being  filed  as  a  matter  of  law.  ...  To 
entitle  the  defendant  as  a  matter  of  law 
to  file  such  a  plea,  it  must  ap])ear  from 
the  petition  that  the  facts  stated,  if  true, 
would  be  a  good  defence  and  a  bar  to  the 
plaintiff's  action.  .  .  .  But  if  the  petition 
does  not  set  forth  facts  which,  if  true, 
would  be  a  bar  to  ])laintiff's  recovery,  then 
the  court  is  not  bound  to  allow  the  plea 
to  be  filed:"  Balk  v.  Harris  (1902),  130 
N.  C.  381,  41  S.  E.  940.] 

1  Kauisas,  §  87  (petition)  ;  Nebraska, 
§  92  (petition) ;  Oregon,  §  65  (complaint)  ; 
North  Carolina,  §  93  (complaint).  In  Ohio, 
Kansas,  and  Nebraska,  the  second  subdi- 
vision reads,  "  A  statement  of  the  facts 
constituting,  etc.,  in  ordinary  and  conci.se 
language." 

{^Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1289,  read- 
ing as  follows  :  "  The  complaint  shall  set 
forth  clearly  the  names  of  the  parties,  a 
concise  statement  of  the  cause  of  action, 
without  any  distinction  between  suits  at 
law  and  in  equity,  and  shall  also  state  the 
nature  of  the  relief  which  he  demands." 

Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5715, 
reading  as  follows  :  "  The  complaint  must 
contain:  (1)  The  style  of  the  court  in 
wliich  the  action  is  brought ;  (2)  The 
style  of  the  action,  consisting  of  the  names 
of  all  the  parties  thereto,  distinguishing 
them  as  plaintiffs  and  defendants,  followed 
by  the  words  'complaint  at  law,'  if  the 
proceedings  are  at  law,  and  by  the  words 
'  complaint  in  equity,'  if  the  proceedings 
are  ecjuitable;  (3)  A  statement  in  ordi- 


28 


434 


CIVIL    llEMKDIES. 


shall  appear  on  the  face  thereof,  either,  1,  that  the  court  has  no 
jurisdiction  of  the  person  of  the  defendant  or  the  subject  of  the 
action ;  or,  2,  that  the  plaintiff  lias  not  legal  capacity  to  sue ; 
or,  3,  tliat  there  is  another  action  pending  between  the  same 
parties  for  the  same  cause ;  or,  4,  that  there  is  a  defect  of  parties 
plaintiff  or  defendant;  or,  5,  that  several  causes  of  action  have 
been  improperly  united;  or,  6,  that  the  complaint  does  not 
state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action."  ^    "  When 


n.iry  and  concise  laii^juage,  witlioiit  repeti- 
tion, of  the  facts  cunstitutinj^  the  phiiutiff's 
cause  of  action;  (4)  A  demand  of  tlie 
relief  to  which  the  phiiniitf  considers  him- 
self entitled." 

California,  §  426  (complaint),  substan- 
tially as  set  out  in  tiie  text. 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  49  (complaint). 

Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  614  (com- 
plaint), reading  aS  follows  :  "  All  pleadings 
shall  contain  a  plain  and  concise  statement 
of  the  material  facts  on  which  the  pleader 
relies,  but  not  of  the  evidence  by  which 
they  are  proved,  such  statement  being 
divided  into  paragraphs  numbered  cou- 
secuiively,  each  containing,  as  nearly  as 
may  be,  a  separate  allegation." 

'/c/«^o.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3204  (com- 
])laint),  substantially  as  set  out  in  the  text. 

Indiana,  Burns' St.,  1901,  §341  (com- 
plaint), the  second  subdivision  reading, 
"A  statement  of  tiie  facts  constituting  the 
cause  of  action,  in  plain  and  concise  lan- 
guage, without  repetition,  and  in  such 
manner  as  to  enable  a  person  of  common 
understanding  to  know  what  is  intended." 

Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3.i59  (petition), 
sulistantially  identical  with  the  jirovisions 
in  Arkansas. 

Kentucky,  Code,  189.5,  §  90,  reading  as 
follows :  "  The  petition  must  state  facts 
which  constitute  a  cause  of  action  in  favor 
of  the  plaintiff  against  the  defendant,  and 
must  demand  the  specific  relief  to  whicli 
tl>e  plaintiff  considers  himself  entitled ; 
and  may  contain  a  general  prayer  for  any 
other  relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  may 
apj)ear  to  be  entitled." 

Minnesola,  St  ,  1894,  §  5231  (complaint). 

Missouri,  Hev.  St.,  1899,  §  .592  (petition). 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  S  671  (complaint). 

Nerndn,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3134 
(complaint). 

Ntw  York,  Code  Civ.  I'ro.,  §  481  (com- 


plaint), the  second  clause  quoted  under  (3) 
in  the  te.Kt  being  absent. 

North  Carolina,  §  93  (complaint),  add- 
ing to  subdivision  2  the  words,  "and  each 
material  allegation  shall  be  distinctly 
numbered."] 

North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5266 
(complaint). 

0/i''o,  Bates'  St.,  1903  (petition),  §  5056, 
5057,  reading  as  follows :  §  5056  :  "  Every 
pleading  mu.st  contain  the  name  of  the 
court  and  the  county  in  which  the  action 
is  brought,  and  t!ie  names  of  the  parties, 
followed  liy  the  name  of  t!ie  plcailing." 
§  5  57  :  "  'ihe  first  pleading  shall  be  the 
petition  by  the  plaiutilf",  which  must  con- 
tain :  (1)  A  statement  of  the  facts  consti- 
tuting the  cause  of  action  in  ordinary  and 
concise  language.  (2)  A  demand  for  the 
relief  to  which  the  plaintiff  supposes  him- 
self entitled.  If  the  recovery  of  money  is 
demanded,  the  amount  shall  be  stated ; 
and  if  interest  is  claimed,  the  time  for 
which  interest  is  to  be  computed  shall  also 
be  stated." 

Oklahoma,  St  ,  1893,  §  3965,  adding  to 
the  first  subdivision  as  given  in  the  text, 
the  words,  "  followed  by  the  word  '  jieti- 
tion.' " 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  163  (com- 
plaint), omitting  the  second  clause  quoted 
under  (3)  in  the  text. 

Utali,  Rev.  St.,  1 898,  §  2960  (complaint). 

Washinyton,  Bal.  Code,  §  4906  (com- 
plaint). 

HV.scohs/h,  St.,  1898,  §  2646  (complaint). 

W'yominy,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  3533,  add- 
ing tiie  same  words  as  in  the  Oklahoma 
statute,  supra. 

1  Kansas,  §  89  ;  Nebraska,  §  94 ;  Cali- 
fornia, §  430  (adding,  "  7,  that  the 
complaint  is  ambiguous,  unintelligible, 
or  uncertain  ")  ;  North  Carolina,  §  95.  In 
Iowa,  the  first  four  sn1)divisions  of  §  2048 


PROVI-^IONS    IN    liKL.VTKlN   TO    PLEADING. 


435 


an}^  of  the  matters  eniinierated  do  not  appear  upon  the  face  of 
the  complaint,  the  objection  may  be  taken  by  answer.  If  no  sucli 
objection  be  taken  either  by  demurrer  or  answer,  the  defendant 
shall  be  deemed  to  have  waived  the  same,  excepting  only  the 
objection  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  and  the  objection  that 
the  complaint  does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause 
of  action."  ^ 


are  the  same  as  those  given  in  the  text, 
and  the  section  then  proceeds  :  "  or,  5,  that 
the  facts  stated  in  the  petition  do  not  en- 
title the  plaintiff  to  the  relief  demanded; 
or,  6,  that  the  petition  on  the  face  tliereof 
shows  that  the  claim  is  harred  by  the  stat- 
ute of  limitations  ;  or  fails  to  show  it  to  be 
in  writing  when  it  should  be  so  evidenced  ; 
or,  if  founded  on  an  account  or  writing  as 
evidence  of  indebtedness,  and  neither  such 
account  or  writing,  or  a  copy  thereof,  is 
incorporated  with,  or  attached  to,  such 
])leading,  or  a  sufficient  reason  stated  for 
nut  doing  so." 

\^Arizo)ia,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1351,  adding 
'•  (7).  'J'hat  the  caitse  of  action  is  barred 
Ijy  limitation." 

Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5717, 

omitting  the  fifth  gi-ound  given  in  the  text. 

California,  §  430,   the    commissioners' 

amendment  of   1901  adding  to  subdivision 

5  the  words,  "  or  not  separately  stated." 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  50,  adding  the 
words  "  or  misjoinder "  after  the  word 
"  defect "  in  subdivision  4,  and  adding  "  7, 
that  the  complaint  is  ambiguous,  unintel- 
ligible and  uncertain." 

Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  320G, 
identical  with  the  provisions  of  the  Colo- 
rado Code. 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  342. 
Kenturkij,  Coile,  1895,  §  92,  adding  the 
words   "  in   this    State "   after  the  word 
"  pending  "  in  subdivision  3,  and  omitting 
subdivision  5. 

Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5232. 
Missouri,  Rev.  St.  1899,  §  598,  adding 
the  words  "  in  this  state "  at  the  end  of 
sul)division  3,  and  adding  "  7,  that  a  party 
plaintiff  or  defendant  is  not  a  necessary 
party  to  a  com])lete  determination  of  the 
action." 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  G80,  identical 
with  the  provisions  in  Colorado. 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3135, 
identical  with  the  provisions  in  Colorado. 


New  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  488,  omit- 
ting from  subdivision  1  the  words  "  or  the 
sui)ject  of  the  action,"  and  making  that  a 
separate  ground  in  subdivision  2,  adding 
two  subdivisions  in  place  of  subdivision  4, 
as  follows  :  "  5.  That  there  is  a  misjoinder 
of   parties  plaintiti".      6.  That   there  is  a 
defect  of  jjarties,  plaintiff  or  defendant." 
North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5268. 
Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  .5061,  substan- 
tially the  same  as  New  York,  except  that 
ground  5  reads   "  That  there   is   a   mi.s- 
joinder  of  parties  plaintiff  or  defendant," 
and   adding  "8.  Tliat  separate  causes  of 
action  against  several  defendants  are   im- 
properly joined.     9.  That  the  action  was 
not  brought  within  the  time  limited. for 
the  commencement  of  such  actious." 
Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3967. 
Oregon,  Hill's  Laws,  §   67,  adding,  "  7. 
That  the  action  has  not  been  commenced 
within  the  time  limited  by  this  Code." 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  165. 
South  Dakota,  Ann.   St.,  1901,  §   6115. 
Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §   2962,  identical 
with  the  Colorado  statute. 

Washington,  BaI.  Code,  §  4907,  adding, 
"  7.  That  the  .action  has  not  been  com- 
menced within  the  time  limited  by  law." 

\Visco7isin,  St.,  1898,  §  2649,  identical 
with  the  statute  of  Washington. 

W Homing,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3.535, 
a<lding  two  subdivisions  in  place  of  sub- 
division 4,  as  follows  :  "4.  That  there  is  a 
misjoinder  of  parties  plaintiff.  5.  That 
there  is  a  defect  of  parties,  plaintiff  or 
defendant,"  and  adding  another  subdi- 
vision, as  follows :  "  7.  Tliat  separate 
causes  of  action  agaiii.st  several  defend- 
ants are  improperly  joined." 

1  New  York,  §§  147  (498),  148  (499); 
Kansas,  §  91  ;  Nebraska,  §  96  ;  California, 
§§  433,  434;  Oregon,  §§69,  70;  North 
Carolina,  §§  98,  99.  The  Iowa  Code, 
§  2650,  after  the  same  pi-ovisioii  as  that  in 
the  text,  adds,  "If  the  facts  stated  by  the 


436 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


^  328.  *  434.  Statutory  Provisions  Applicable  to  all  Pleadings. 
The  foregoing  provisions  describe  the  complaint  or  petition :  tlie 
following  clauses — some  of  which,  however,  are  not  found  in  all 
the  codes  —  comprise  the  general  rules  applicable  to  all  pleadings, 
which  regulate  their  form  and  contents,  and  determine  their  suf- 
ficiency, —  the  general  principles,  in  short,  which  characterize  the 
system  of  pleading  provided  for  by  the  reformed  procedure :  "  In 
the  construction  of  a  pleading  for  the  purpose  of  determining  its 
effect,  its  allegations  shall  be  liberally  construed  with  a  view  to 
substantial  justice  between  the  parties."  ^  "  If  irrelevant  or  re- 
dundant matter  be  inserted  in  a  pleading,  it  may  be  struck  out  an 


petitiou  do  not  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  any 
relief  wiiatever,  advantage  may  be  taken 
of  it  by  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment 
before  judgment  is  entered." 

[^Arizona,  Kev.  St.,  1901,  §  135.3. 
Arlcansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's   Dig.,  §  5720, 
adding  the  words  "  over  the  subject  of  the 
action  "  after  the  word  "court." 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §§  54,  55. 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,   1901,  §§  3209, 
3210. 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  346,  adding 
the  words  "  over  the  subject  of  the  action  " 
after  the  word  "  court,"  and  adding  the 
following  clause:  "Provided,  however, 
That  the  objection  that  the  action  was 
brought  in  the  wrong  county,  if  not  taken 
by  answer  or  demurrer,  shall  be  deemed 
to  have  been  waived." 

Kentucky,  Code,  1895,  §§  92,  93,  add- 
ing the  words  "  of  the  subject  of  the 
action  "  after  the  word  ''  court,"  and  pro- 
viding that  a  neglect  to  raise  the  questions 
seasonably  subjects  the  party  to  the  pay- 
ment of  costs. 

Minnesota,  St.  1894,  §§  5234,  5235. 

Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  602,  adding 
the  words  "  over  the  subject-matter  of  the 
action  "  after  the  word  "  court." 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §§  684,  685. 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §§  3139, 
3140. 

A^ortA  Z>afco<a, Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §§  5271, 
5272. 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5063. 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3969. 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §§  168, 
169. 

South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §§  6118, 
6119. 


Utah,  Kev.  St.,  1898,  §§  2966,  2967. 

Washiwiton,  Bal.  Code,  §§  4909,  4911, 
in  slightly  different  form. 

Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §§  2653,  2654. 

Wyoming,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  3537.] 

1  New  York,  §  159  (519)  ;  Kansas, 
§  115  ;  Nebraska,  §  121  ;  California,  §  452  ; 
Oregon,  §  83;  North  Can^lina,  §  119. 

^Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5754. 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  77. 

Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3223. 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  379,  adding 
the  following:  "but  when  the  allegations 
of  a  pleading  are  so  indefinite  or  uncertain 
that  the  precise  nature  of  the  charge  or 
defence  is  not  apparent,  the  court  may 
require  the  pleading  to  be  made  definite 
and  certain  by  amendment." 

loiva.  Code,  1897,  §  3446,  reading  as 
follows :  "  The  rule  of  the  common  law, 
that  statutes  in  derogation  thereof  are  to 
be  strictly  construed,  has  no  application 
to  this  code.  Its  provisions  and  all  pro- 
ceedings under  it  shall  Ije  liberally  con- 
strued with  a  view  to  promote  its  objects 
and  assist  the  parties  in  obtaining  ju.stice." 

Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5247. 

Missouri,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  629. 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  740. 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3165. 

N^orth  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5283. 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5096. 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3993, 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  180. 

South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6130. 

Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2986. 
Washini/ton,  Bal.  Code,  §  4931. 
Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2668. 
Wi/ominy,  Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  3670.] 


PROVISIONS    IN    RELATION    TO    PLEADING. 


437 


motion  of  any  person  aggiieved  thereby ;  and  when  the  allega- 
tions of  a  pleading  are  so  indefinite  and  uncertain  that  the  precise 
nature  of  the  charge  or  defence  is  not  apparent,  the  court  may 
require  the  plea'ding  to  be  made  definite  and  certain  by  amend- 
ment." ^  "  All  fictions  in  pleading  are  abolished."  '-^  "  A  material 
allegation  in  a  pleading  is  one  essential  to  the  claim  or  defence, 


1  Kansas,  §  110;  Kebraska,  §  125; 
California,  §  453  (altered  verbally) ;  Ore- 
gon, §  84  ;  North  Carolina,  §  120. 

[^Arkcinsas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig'.,  §  5755, 
containing  first  clause  only. 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  60,  containing 
the  provisions  quoted  in  the  text,  together 
with  considerable  other  matter. 

Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3224, 
reading  as  follows :  "  Sham  and  irrelevant 
answers  .and  irrelevant  and  redundant 
matter  inserted  in  a  pleading,  may  be 
stricken  out,  upon  such  terms  as  the  court 
may,  in  its  discretion,  impose." 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  385,  read- 
ing in  part  as  follows :  "  All  surplusage, 
tautology,  and  irrelevant  matter  shall  be 
set  aside  and  struck  out  of  any  pleading, 
when  pointed  out  by  tlie  party  aggrieved," 
and  also  §  379,  quoted  on  page  436,  supra. 

Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3618,  almost  iden- 
tical with  the  Idaho  statute,  quoted  supra, 
and  also  §  3630,  very  similar  to  the  second 
clause  quoted  in  the  te.xt. 

Keniuckfj,  Code,  1895,  §  121,  reading 
as  follows :  "  Irrelevant  or  redundant 
matter  in  a  pleading  shall  be  stricken 
out,  upon  or  without  motion,  at  the  cost 
of  the  party  whose  pleading  contains  it." 

Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5248,  slightly 
varied  from  the  form  given  in  the  text. 

Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  612,  slightly 
varied  from  the  form  given  in  the  text. 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  742,  almost 
identical  with  tlie  Idaho  statute. 

Nebrcisha,  Code,  1901,  §  125,  slightly 
varied  from  the  form  given  in  the  text. 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3152, 
reading  as  follows :  "  If  irrelevant  or 
redundant  matter  be  inserted  in  a  pleading, 
it  may  be  stricken  out  by  the  court,  on 
motion  of  any  person  aggrieved  thereby." 

Neiv  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §§  545,  546, 
substantially  similar  to  the  statute  quoted 
in  the  text,  but  somewhat  more  specific. 

North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,.1899,  §  5284. 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §§  5087,    5088, 


sub.stantially  similar  to  the  statute  quoted 
ill  the  text,  l)ut  somewhat  more  specific. 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3997. 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  181. 

South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6131. 

Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2987,  very 
similar  to  the  Idaho  statute. 

Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4932,  adding 
to  the  statute  given  in  the  text  "  or  may 
dismiss  the  same." 

Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2683,  substan- 
tially similar  to  the  statute  given  in  the 
text,  but  somewhat  more  specific. 

Wijominf;,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §§  3561,  3562, 
identical  with  the  Ohio  statute.] 

-  Kansas,  §  116. 

\^Idalio,  Con.st.,  Art.  5,  sec.  1,  providing 
that  "  Feigned  issues  are  prohibited." 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  381. 

Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3557. 

Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  610,  provid- 
ing that  "  No  allegation  shall  be  made  iu 
a  pleading  which  the  law  does  not  re- 
quire to  be  proved,  and  only  the  substan- 
tial facts  necessary  to  constitute  the  cause 
of  action  or  defence  shall  be  stated." 

Nebraska,  Code,  1901,  §  4,  identical 
with  Ohio  statute. 

North  Carolina,  §  15,  providing  that 
"  Feigned  issues  are  abolished."] 

North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5183, 
]iroviding  that  "  Feigned  issues  are  abol- 
ished." 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §4973,  providing 
that  "  There  can  be  no  feigned  issue." 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  3884,  identical 
with  Ohio  statute. 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893.  §  92,  pro- 
viding that  "  Feigned  issues  shall  not  be 
allowed." 

South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6032, 
identical  with  the  North  Dakota  statute. 

Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2841,  stating 
that  "  Feigned  issues  have  been  abolished." 

Wi/omin;/,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3445,  iden- 
tical with  Ohio  statute. 


43  S 


CIVIL    REMKDIE3. 


which,  could  not  be  struck  from  the  pleading  without  leaving  it 
insufficient.  Neither  presumptions  of  law  nor  matters  of  which 
judicial  notice  is  taken  need  be  stated  in  the  pleading,'"  ^  The  fol- 
lowing special  provision,  which  is  found  only  in  a  portion  of  the 
codes,  and  is  not  impliedly  contained  in  the  general  principles 
common  to  them  all,  is  quoted  because  of  its  practical  impor- 
tance as  a  rule  of  procedure  in  those  States  whose  legislation  has 
adopted  it :  "  If  the  action,  counter-claim,  or  set-off  be  founded 
on  an  account,  or  on  a  note,  bill,  or  other  written  instrument,  as 
evidence  of  indebtedness,  a  copy  thereof  must  be  attached  to  and 
filed  with  the  pleading.  If  not  so  attached  and  filed,  the  reason 
thereof  must  be  shown  in  the  pleading."  ^ 


1  Kansas,  §§  129,  130;  Nebraska, 
§§  135, 136  ;  California,  §  463  (first  clause 
only)  ;  Oregon,  §  93  (tlie  first  clause 
oulv). 

'[^Arkansfis,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig., 
§§  5762,  5751. 

Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  72,  first  clause 
only. 

'Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3234, 
first  clause  only. 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  377,  last 
clause  only. 

Kentucky,  Code,  1895,  §  127,  providing 
that  "  A  material  allegation  is  one  which 
is  necessary  for  the  statement  or  support 
of  a  cause  of  action  or  defence,"  and 
§  119,  providing  that  "neither  the  evi- 
dence I'elied  on  by  a  party,  nor  presump- 
tions of  law,  nor  facts  of  which  jurlicial 
notice  is  taken,  excepting  private  statutes, 
shall  be  stated  in  a  pleading." 

Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  631,  second 
clause  only. 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  756,  first 
clause  only. 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3161, 
first  clause  only. 

Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §§  5082,  5083. 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §§  4007,  4008. 

Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2997,  first 
clause  only. 

Washington,  Bal.  Code,  §  4944. 

Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §§  .•»56, 
3557.J 

•^  Kan8a.s,  §  118  ;  Nebraska,  §  124. 

[^Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Ilin's  Dig.,  §5752, 
with  slightly  different  wording. 

Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  365,  read- 


ing in  part  as  follows :  "  When  any 
pleading  is  fountled  upon  a  written  instru- 
ment or  on  account,  the  original,  or  a 
cop3'  thereof,  must  be  filed  with  the  jjlead- 
ing.  .  .  .  Such  copy  of  a  written  iu.'^tru- 
ment,  when  not  copied  in  the  pleadings, 
shall  be  taken  as  part  of  the  record." 

Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3561,  giving  as  one 
ground  for  demurrer,  "  if  founded  on  an 
account  or  writing  as  evidence  of  indebted- 
ness, that  neither  such  writing  or  account 
or  copy  thereof  is  incorporated  into  or 
attached  to  the  pleailing,  or  a  sufficient 
reason  stated  for  not  doing  so." 

Kansas,  Code,  1901,  §  118,  adding  the 
following  clause,  "  But  if  the  action,  coun- 
ter-claim or  set-off  be  founded  upon  a 
series  of  written  instruments  executed  by 
the  same  person,  it  shall  be  sufficient  to 
attacli  and  file  a  copy  of  one  only,  and  in 
succeeding  causes  of  action  or  defences 
to  set  forth  in  general  terms  descriptions 
of  the  several  instruments  respectively." 

Kentucki/,  Code,  1895,  §  120,  identical 
with  the  Arkansas  statute. 

Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  630,  allowing 
a  copy  of  an  account  to  be  attached,  at 
jileailer's  oj)tion,  in  lieu  of  setting  forth 
the  items  in  the  pleading. 

Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  747,  reading  as 
follows:  "Where  a  cause  of  action,  de- 
fence or  counter-claim  is  founded  upon 
an  instrument  for  the  payment  of  money 
only,  the  party  may  set  forth  a  copy  of 
the  instrument,  and  state  that  tiicre  is 
due  him  thereon,  from  the  adverse  party, 
a  specified  sum,  which  he  clain\s.  Such 
an  allegation  is  ecjuivalcut  to  setting  fortli 


PROVISIONS    IN    RELATION    TO    l'Li;AI»ING, 


439 


§  329.  *  435.  Statutory  Provisions  Respecting  Ameudmeut. 
Ample  provision  is  made  for  the  amendment  of  pleadings,  either 
at  the  trial  itself,  or  at  any  other  time  in  the  progress  of  the 
cause.  The  following  sections  are  contained  in  all  the  codes, 
with  some  unimportant  verbal  variations  in  a  few  of  them :  "  No 
variance  between  the  allegation  in  a  pleading  and  the  proof  shall 
be  deemed  material,  unless  it  have  actually  misled  the  adverse 
party  to  his  prejudice  in  maintaining  his  action  or  defence  upo-n 
the  merits.  Wlienever  it  sliall  be  alleged  that  a  party  has  been 
so  misled,  that  fact  shall  be  proved  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
court,  and  in  what  respect  he  has  been  misled  ;  and  thereupon 
the  court  may  order  the  pleading  to  be  amended  upon  such  terms 


the  instrument  according  to  its  legal 
effect." 

New  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  534,  iden- 
tical with  Montana  statute. 

Ohio,  Bate.s'  St.,  1903,  §  5085,  substan- 
tially the  same  as  the  provision  quoted  iu 
the  text,  and  §  5086,  reading  as  follows : 
■"  In  an  action,  countei-claim,  or  set-off, 
founded  upon  an  account,  or  upon  an  in- 
strument for  the  unconditional  payment 
of  money  only,  it  shall  be  sufficient  for  a 
party  to  set  forth  a  copy  of  the  account  or 
instrument,  with  all  credits  and  the  in- 
dorsements thereon,  and  to  state  that  there 
is  due  to  him,  on  such  account  or  instru- 
ment, from  the  adverse  party,  a  specified 
sum,  wliicli  he  claims,  with  interest ;  and 
when  others  than  the  makers  of  a  promis- 
sory note,  or  the  acceptors  of  a  bill  of 
exchange,  are  parties,  it  shall  be  necessary 
to  state  the  facts  which  fix  their  liability." 

Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  4001,  reading  in 
part  as  follows :  "  In  an  action,  counter- 
claim or  set-off,  founded  upon  an  account, 
promissory  note,  bill  of  exchange  or  other 
instrument,  for  the  unconditional  pay- 
ment of  money  only,  it  shall  be  sufficient 
for  a  party  to  give  a  copy  of  the  account 
or  instrument,  with  all  credits,  and  the 
indorsements  thereon,  and  to  state  that 
tliere  is  due  him,  on  such  account  or  in- 
strument, from  the  adverse  party,  a  speci- 
fied sum,  which  he  claims,  with  interest." 

Oregon,  Hill's  Laws,  §  83,  allowing  the 
pleader  to  set  out  tlie  items  of  an  account 
in  the  pleading,  or  to  file  a  copy  thereof, 
at  his  option. 

Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2G75,  reading  as 


follows  :  "  In  an  action,  defence  or  coun- 
ter-claim founded  upon  an  instrument  for 
the  payment  of  money  only,  it  shall  be 
sufficient  for  the  party  to  give  a  copy  of 
the  instrument,  and  to  state  that  there  is 
due  to  him  tiiereou,  from  the  adverse 
party,  a  specified  sum  which  he  claims." 

[Vi/ominr/,  Ttev.  St.,  1899,  §  3559. 

In  the  following  States  the  pleader  may 
deliver  a  copy  of  an  account  to  the  adverse 
party  within  a  designated  period,  in  lieu 
of  setting  out  the  items  in  his  pleading : 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3225; 
Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3151  ; 
North  Dakota,  Kev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5282  ; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  179;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6129;  Utah, 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2988;  Arizona,  Rev.  St., 
1901,  §  1287.] 

For  illustrations,  see  Evans  v.  Cler- 
mont, etc.  Co.,  51  Ind.  160;  Excelsior  Dr. 
Co.  V.  Brown,  38  id.  384 ;  Etchison  Ditch- 
ing Ass'n  V.  Busenback,  39  id.  362 ;  Dob- 
son  V.  Duckpond  D.  Ass'n,  42  id.  312; 
Alspaugh  V.  Ben  Franklin  Dr.  Ass'n,  51 
id.  271  ;  Montgomery  v.  Gorrell,  51  id. 
309  ;  Brown  v.  State,' 44  id.  222  ;  Mitchell 
r.  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  51  id.  396;  Ilinkle  (;.  Mar- 
gerum,  50  id.  240;  Sanford  v.  Wood,  49 
id.  165  ;  Jagers  v.  Jagers,  49  id.  428  ;  Hays 
V.  Miller,  12  id.  187;  Tyler  v.  Kent,  52 
id.  583  ;  Calvin  v.  Woolen,  66  id.  464 
(neglect  to  file  is  cured  by  verdict)  ;  Ohio 
&  Miss.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Nickles.s,  71  id.  271  ; 
Surginer  v.  Paddock,  31  Ark.  528 ;  Han- 
nibal &  St.  Jos.  R.  Co.  V.  Kuudsou,  62 
Mo.  569.  , 


440 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


as  shall  be  just."  ^  "  When  the  variance  is  not  material,  as  pro- 
vided in  the  last  section,  the  court  may  direct  tlie  fact  to  be  found 
according  to  the  evidence,  or  may  order  an  immediate  amend- 
ment without  costs."  2  "  Where,  however,  the  allegation  of  the 
cause  of  action  or  defence  to  which  tlie  proof  is  directed  is  un- 
proved, not  in  some  particular,  or  particulars,  but  in  its  entire 
scope  and  meaning,  it  shall  not  be  deemed  a  case  of  variance 
within  the  last  two  sections,  but  a  failure  of  proof.*' ^  An}^  plead- 
ing may  be  amended  once  by  the  party  filing  or  serving  it,  as  a 
matter  of  course,  and  without  costs,  and  without  prejudice  to 
proceedings  already  had:  such  amendment  must  be  made  within 
specified  times,  which  differ  in  the  various  codes ;  but  will  not  be 
permitted  if  it  appear  to  be  merely  for   purposes  of  delay.*     In 


1  New  York,  §  169  (539)  ;  Kansas, 
§  133 ;  Nebraska,  §  138  ;  California,  §  469  ; 
Oregon,  §  94;  Nortli  Carolina,  §  128. 

[Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5764; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3237;  In- 
diana, Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  394;  Iowa,  Code, 
1897,  §  3597;  Kentucky,  Code,  1895, 
§129;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5262;  Mis- 
souri, Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  655;  Montana, 
Code,  1895,  §  770;  North  Dakota,  Rev. 
Codes,  1899,  §  5293;  Ohio,  Bates'  St., 
§  5294;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  4011; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  190;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6140;  Utah, 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  3001;  Washington,  Bal. 
Code,  §  4949  ;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898, 
§  2669;  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3736; 
Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  78,  in  a  different 
form.] 

2  New  York,  §  170  (540);  Kansas, 
§  134  ;  Nehnvska,  §  139 ;  California,  §  470 ; 
Oregon,  §  95;   North  Carolina,  §  129. 

[Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5765; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3238  ;  In- 
diana, Burns'  St.,  1901 ,  §  395  ;  Iowa,  Code, 
1897,  §  3598 ;  Kentucky,  Code,  1895, 
§  130;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5263  ;  Mis- 
souri, Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  656 ;  Montana, 
Code,  1895,  §  771  ;  North  Dakota,  Rev. 
Codes,  1899,  §  5294;  Ohio,  Bates'  St., 
§.5295;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  4012; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  191  ;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §6141 ;  Utah,  Rev. 
St.,  1898,  §  .3002  ;  Washington,  Bal.  Code, 
§  49.50;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2670; 
Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3737. j 

2  New    York,    §    171    (541);    Kansas, 


§  135  ;  Nebraska,  §  140  ;  California,  §  471  ; 
Oregon,  §  96 ;  North  Carolina,  §  130. 

[Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5766  ; 
Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3239;  In- 
diana, Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  396;  Iowa, 
Code,  1897,  §  3599  ;  Kentucky,  Code,  1895, 
§  131  ;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894,  §  5264  ;  Mon- 
tana, Code,  1895,  §  772;  North  Dakota, 
Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5295;  Ohio,  Bates' 
St.,  §  5296  ;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  4013  ; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  192;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6142;  Utah, 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  3003;  Washington,  Bal. 
Code,  §  4951  ;  Wiscon.-in.  St.,  1898,  §  2671  ; 
Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3738.] 

"*  New  York,  §  172  (542,  543,  497); 
Kansas,  §  136;  Nebra.ska,  §  141 ;  Califor- 
nia, §  472  ;  Oregon,  §  97  ;  North  Carolina, 
§  131. 

[Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1288  ;  Ar- 
kansas, Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5767 ;  Colo- 
rado, Code,  1890,  §  73;  Connecticut,  Gen. 
St.,  1902,  §  639;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro., 
1901,  §  3240;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901, 
§397;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3560;  Ken- 
tucky, Code,  1895,  §  132;  Minnesota,  St., 
1894,  §  5265;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§661;  Montana,Code,  1895,  §773;  Nevada, 
Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3162  ;  North  Dakota, 
Rev.  Code.s,  1899,  §  5296;  Ohio,  Bates' 
St.,  §  5111 ;  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  4014; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  193;  South 
Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6143;  Utah, 
Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  3004;  Wisconsin,  St., 
1898,  §  2685;  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§  3585.] 

These  provisions  are  substantially  the 


PROVISIONS    IN    RELATION   TO   PLEADING. 


441 


addition  to  this  privilege  of  voluntary  amendment  accorded  to  the 
parties,  the  court  itself  may,  on  motion,  amend  a  pleading,  or  per- 
mit it  -to  be  amended,  at  any  stage  of  the  cause,  before  and  in 
most  of  the  States,  after  the  judgment,  on  such  terms  as  may  be 
proper.  This  authority  is  conferred  in  very  broad  terms,  with  the 
limitation,  however,  that  the  cause  of  action  or  defence  shall  not 
be  substantially  changed.  ^  Finally,  all  the  codes  contain  the  fol- 
lowing most  righteous  provision,  which,  as  appears  by  their  re- 
ported decisions,  is  treated  by  the  courts  of  some  States  as  though 
it  were  a  legislative  command  binding  upon  them :  "  The  court 
shall,  in  every  stage  of  an  action,  disregard  any  error  or  defect  in 
the  pleadings  or  proceedings  which  shall  not  affect  the  substantial 
rights  of  the  adverse  party,  and  no  judgment  shall  be  reversed  or 
affected  by  reason  of  such  error  or  defect."  '^ 


same,  except  in  respect  to  the  time  within 
which  the  amendment  can  be  made;  they 
all  permit  one  such  amendment  by  the 
party  of  his  own  pleading,  as  a  matter  of 
course. 

1  New  York,  §  173  (723);  California, 
§473;  North  Carolina,  §  132. 

[^Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  1288,  at 
any  stage  of  the  action ;  Arkansas,  Sand. 
&  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5769,  at  any  time  ;  Colo- 
rado, Code,  1890,  §  7.5,  without  limitation 
as  to  time;  Connecticut,  Gen.  St.,  1902, 
§  639, — at  any  time,  §  645, —after  de- 
fault before  final  judgment,  §  646,  — from 
contract  to  tort,  and  vice  versa,  §  647,  — 
from  equitable  to  legal  cause,  and  vice 
versa;  Idaho,'  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901, 
§  3241,  without  limitation  as  to  time  ;  In- 
diana, Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  399,  at  any 
time;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3600,  at  any 
time;  Kansas,  Code,  1901,  §  139,  before  or 
after  judgment;  Kentucky,  Code,  1895, 
§  134,  at  any  time;  Minnesota,  St.,  1894, 
§  5266,  before  or  after  judgment ;  Mis- 
souri, Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  657,  at  any  time 
before  final  judgment,  §  660,  —  after  final 
judgment;  Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  774, 
without  limitation  as  to  time ;  Nebraska, 
Code,  1901,  §  144,  either  before  or  after 
judgment ;  Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900, 
§  3163,  without  limitation  as  to  time ; 
North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5297, 
before  or  after  judgment ;  Ohio,  Bates' 
St.,  §  5114,  before  or  after  judgment; 
Oklahoma,  St.,  1893,  §  4017,  before  or  af- 


ter judgment ;  Oregon,  Hill's  Laws,  §  101, 
at  any  time  before  trial,  §  102,  —  allowing 
court  to  enlarge  time  limited  by  code ; 
South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §  194,  before 
or  after  judgment ;  SoutJi  Dakota,  Ann. 
St.,  1901,  §  6144,  before  or  after  judg- 
ment; Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  3005. 
without  limitation  as  to  time;  Washing- 
ton, Bal.  Code,  §  4953,  without  limitation 
as  to  time;  Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§3588,  before  or  after  judgment;  Wis- 
consin, St.,  1 898,  §  2830,  at  any  stage  of 
the  action,  before  or  after  judgment.] 

The  following  is  the  clause  as  found  in 
all  the  codes  substantially,  and  exactly  in 
most  of  thera.  The  court  ma}'  at  any 
time  "amend  any  pleading  or  proceeding 
by  adding  or  striking  out  the  name  of  any 
party ;  or  by  correcting  a  mistake  in  the 
name  of  any  party,  or  a  mistake  in  any 
other  re.spect ;  or  by  inserting  allegations 
material  to  the  case  ;  or,  when  the  amend- 
ment does  not  substantially  change  the 
claim  or  defence,  by  conforming  tlie  plead- 
ing or  proceeding  to  the  facts  proved." 

■2  Nebraska,  §  145  ;  Kansas,  §  140  ;  Ore- 
gon, §  104  ;  North  Carolina,  §  135. 

[^Arizona,  Rev.  St.,  lOOl,  §  1293;  Ar- 
kansas, Sand.  &  Hill's  St.,  §  5772  ;  Cali- 
fornia, §  475,  somewhat  more  specific ; 
Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §  78;  Idaho,  Code 
Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3243;  Indiana,  Burns' 
St.,  1901 ,  §  401  ;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3601 ; 
Kentucky,  Code,  1895,  §  134;  Minnesota, 
St.,    1894,   §    52G9;    jNIissouri,    Rev.    St., 


442  CIVIL  kemedils. 

N^  330.  *  43G.  Order  of  Proposed  Treatment.  Ill  the  important 
discussions  based  upon  tlie  foregoing  statutory  provisions,  which 
will  form  the  substance  of  the  present  chapter,  the  natural  and 
scientific  order  of  treatment  would  undoubtedly  lead  me  lirst  to 
develop  the  general  and  essential  principles  upon  which  the  whole 
reformed  theory  of  pleading  is  Ijased,  and  afterwards  to  apply 
these  principles  in  determining  the  rules  that  regulate  the  matter" 
and  form  of  the  plaintiff's  complaint  or  petition.  Scientific  method 
must,  however,  be  sometimes  abandoned  from  considerations  of 
convenience  and  expediency ;  and  such  a  course  seems  to  be 
proper  in  this  instance.  In  attempting  to  obtain  a  correct  notion 
of  the  essential  principles  and  doctrines  of  the  new  system,  it  will 
be  necessary  to  fix  the  meaning  of  certain  terms  and  phrases  used 
in  all  the  codes;  and  it  so  happens,  from  tlie  course  of  judicial 
decisions  involving  the  question,  that  tliese  veiy  terms  and  phrases 
can  be  most  advantageously  examined,  and  most  easil}^  interpreted, 
in  connection  with  the  particular  subject  of  "  The  Joinder  of 
Causes  of  Action."  The  entire  discussion  wdll,  tlierefore,  be  ren- 
dered simpler,  and  useless  repetition  will  lie  avoided,  by  adopting 
the  arrangement  thus  suggested.  In  pursuing  this  plan,  the 
subject-matter  of  the  chapter  will  be  separated  into  the  following 
general  di%dsions  :  (1)  The  joinder  of  different  causes  of  action  in 
one  proceeding ;  (2)  the  essential  principles  w^iich  lie  at  the 
foundation  of  the  reformed  system  of  pleading  ;  (3)  the  general 
doctrines  and  practical  rules  deduced  from  these  principles,  wliich 
determine  and  regulate  both  the  external  form  and  the  substance 
of  the  plaintiff's  complaint  or  petition. 

1899,  §  659  ;  Montana,  Code,  189."),  §  778;  to  the  reply,  and  to  the  joinder  of  causes 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §  3166  ;  New  of  action,  are  given  hereafter.     In  a  few  of 

York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  721,  enumerating  the  codes,  especially  in  tho.se  of  Iowa,  lu- 

twelve  classes  of  defects  whicli  shall  not  diana,   and    Missouri,    there    are   certain 

effect  tlic  judgment ;  Nortli  Dakota,  Rev.  special  clauses  prescribing  wliat  may  be 

Codes,   1899,  §   5'iOO;    Ohio,    Bates'    St.,  jiroved  under  the  answer  of  denial,  and 

§   5115;    Oklahoma,    St.,    189.3,    §   4018;  what  must  !>e  pleaded  as  new  matter,  or 

South  Carolina,  Code,  1893,  §197;  South  referring  to  some  mere  points  of  detail: 

Dakota,  Ann.   St.,    1901,  §  6147  ;    Utah,  as  these  clauses  are  all  embraced  by  im- 

Itev.  St.,  1898,  §  3008;  Washington,  Kal.  j)licatiou  in  the  more  general   provisions 

Code,  §  4957  ;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §2829;  common  to  all  the  codes,  and  thus  make 

Wyoming,  Rev.  St.,  1899.  §  3589.]  no  change  in  the  law  of  the  States  where 

The  foregoing  are  all  the  general  provi-  they  are  found,  they  are  surplusage,  and  1 

Bions  relating  to  the  plaintiff's  pleading,  have  not  quoted  them.     Strunk  v.  Smith, 

or  to  the  theory  of  pleading  as  a  whole:  36  Wis.  631. 
those  relating  to  the  defendant's  pleading, 


JOINDElt    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  443 

SECTION  SECOND. 

JOINDER   OF   CAUSES   OF   ACTION. 

§  331.  *  437.  Subdivisions  for  Discussion  herein.  The  discus- 
sion of  tliis  important  subject  will  be  sepai'ated  into  the  following 
subdivisions  :  I.  The  statutory  provisions  found  in  the  various 
State  codes.  II.  The  forms  and  modes  in  which  a  misjoinder 
may  occur,  and  the  manner  in  which  it  must  be  objected  to  and 
corrected.  III.  The  legal  import  of  the  term  "  cause  of  action," 
and  the  case  discussed  in  which  only  a  single  cause  of  action  is 
stated,  although  several  different  remedies,  or  kinds  of  relief,  are 
demanded.  IV.  The  legal  import  of  the  term  "  transaction ; " 
discussion  of  the  case  of  "causes  of  action  arising  out  of  the 
same  transaction,  or  transactions  connected  with  the  same  subject 
of  action."  V.  Instances  in  which  the  proper  joinder  of  causes  of 
action  is  connected  with  the  proper  joinder  of  defendants  ;  discus- 
sion of  the  provision  that  all  the  causes  of  action  must  affect  all 
of  the  parties.  VI.  Instances  in  which  all  the  causes  of  action 
are  against  the  single  defendant,  or  against  all  the  defendants 
alike ;  and  the  only  question  is,  whether  the  case  falls  within  any 
one  of  the  several  specified  classes,  except  the  first  which  em- 
braces those  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  etc.  These  sub- 
divisions, I  think,  entirely  exhaust  the  particular  subject-matter 
to  which  this  section  is  devoted. 

I.    Tlie  Statutory  Provisions. 

§  332.  *  438.  Language  of  the  Codes  herein.  The  provision, 
which  is  found  substantially  the  same  —  with  very  sliglit  modifi- 
cations, if  any  —  in  most  of  the  codes,  is  as  follows  :  "  The  plain- 
tiff may  unite  in  the  same  complaint  several  causes  of  action, 
whether  they  be  such  as  have  heretofore  been  denominated  legal 
or  equitable,  or  both,^  when  they  all  arise  out  of,  1.  The  same 
transaction,  or  transactions  connected  with  the  same  subject  of 

1  [^Preferred  Accident  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stone  175,  87  N.  W.  1067;  Swihart  v.  Harles.s 

(1899),  61  Kan.  48,  .58  Pac.  986  ;   Haskell  (1896),  93  Wi.s.  211,67  N.  W.  413  ;  Blakely 

Co.  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Santa  Fe  (1893),  51  v.  Smock  (1897),  96  Wi.s.  611,  71  N.  W. 

Kan.  39,  32  Pac.  624.      But  see   Pietsch  1052;  Lane  v.  Dowfl  (1903),  172  Mo.  167, 

V.  Krause  (1903),  116  Wis.  344,  93  N.  W.  72  S.  W.  632;   Plankiuton  v.  Ilildcbraud 

9;    Reeg    v.    Adams     (1902),     113    Wis.  (1895),  89  Wis.  209,  61  N.  W.  839.3 


444 


CIVIL    REMEDIES, 


action ;  2.  Contract,  express  or  implied  ;  or,  3.  Injurie.-;,  Avith  or 
AWthout  force,  to  person  and  property,  or  either ;  or,  4.  Injuries 
to  character  ;  or,  5.  Claims  to  recover  real  property,  with  or  with- 
out damages  for  the  withholding  thereof,  and  the  rents  and  profits 
of  the  same;  or,  6.  Claims  to  recover  personal  property,  with 
or  without  damages  for  the  withliolding  thereof;  or,  7.  Claims 
against  a  trustee,  by  virtue  of  a  contract,  or  by  operation  of  law.i 
"  But  the  causes  of  action  so  united  must  all  belong  to  one  of 
these  classes,  and,  except  in  actions  for  the  foreclosure  of  mort- 
gages, must  affect  all  the  parties  to  tlie  action,  and  not  require 
different  places  of  trial,  and  must  be  separately  stated.^ 


1  QBosworth  V.  Allen  (1901),  168  N.  Y. 
157,  61  N.  E.  l&'i.  "The  cause  of  action 
to  set  asitle  the  contract  may  properly  be 
united  with  the  cause  of  action  to  coin])el 
an  accountiug  for  the  injurious  results  of 
the  arrangement  of  which  it  is  a  part, 
since  both  causes  of  action  were  founded 
upon  claims  against  trustees,  arising  by 
operation  of  law. "J 

-  QState  V.  Krause  (1897),  58  Kan.  651, 
50  Pac.  882  (cause  of  action  on  one  bond 
of  county  treasurer  cannot  be  joined  with 
cause  of  action  on  another  bond  where 
.sureties  are  different) ;  Barry  v.  Wach- 
osky  (1899),  57  Neb.  5.34,  77  N.  W.  1080. 
Tlie  facts  in  this  case  were  as  follows: 
James  M.  Barry,  J.  M.  Brannan,  and 
C.  D.  Ryan  made  their  non-negotiable 
promissory  note,  and  delivered  the  same 
to  D.  F.  Clarke,  who  was  payee  of  the 
same.  The  latter,  before  maturity  of  the 
note,  seems  to  have  sold  and  delivered  it 
to  the  plaintiff,  and  before  doing  so 
"  wrote  his  name  across  the  back  of  the 
note,  and  over  that  he  recited  in  writing 
that  lie  guaranteed  the  payment  of  the 
note."  Wachosky  brouglit  suit  on  the 
note  making  Barry,  Brannan,  Ryan,  and 
Clarke  defendants.  In  the  opinion  the 
court,  among  other  things,  said  :  "  In  tlie 
case  at  bar  Clarke  did  write  over  his 
signature  on  this  note  a  guaranty  of  pay- 
ment, and  by  so  doing  he  became  liable  to 
Wachosky  a.s  a  guarantor  of  this  note. 
But  thi;  makers  of  the  note  were  not 
parties  to  this  contract  of  guaranty.  .  .  . 
Wachosky  has,  perhaps,  two  causes  of 
action.  One  cause  of  action  is  on  the 
note   and    against    the    makers    thereof. 


The  other  cause  of  action  is  against  Clarke 
on  his  guaranty  of  payment.  These 
two  causes  of  action  cannot  be  united,  for 
the  obvious  reason  tliat  each  one  does 
not  s^ffect  all  the  parties  to  the  action." 
Plankinton  r.  Hildebrand  (1895),  89  Wis. 
209,  61  N.  W.  839;  Gunder.son  v.  Thomas 
(1894),  87  Wis.  406,  58  N.  W.  7.50; 
A.  T.  &  S.  F.  Rid.  Co.  V.  Commr's  of 
Sumner  Co.  (1893),  51  Kan.  617,  33  Pac. 
31 2  ;  Draper  r.  Brown  (1902),  115  Wis.  361, 
91  N.  W.  1001  ;  Stewart  v.  Rusengren 
( 1902),  —  Xeb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  586  ;  Hughes 
v.  Ilunner  (1895),  91  Wis.  116,  64  N.  W. 
887;  Blakely  v.  Smock  (1897),  96  Wis. 
611,  71  N.  W.  1052;  Egaard  v.  Dahlke 
(1901),  109  Wis.  366,  85  N.  W.  369; 
Hilton  V.  Hilton's  Adm'r  (1901),  — Ky. 
— ,  62  S.  W.  6  ;  Clayton  v.  City  of  Hen- 
derson (1898),  103  Ky.  228,  44  S.  W.  667; 
Thelin  v.  Stewart  (1893),  100  Cal.  372,  34 
Pac.  861  ;  Jamison  v.  CuUigan  (1899),  151 
Mo.  410,  52  S.  W.  224 ;  Kruczinski  i-.  Neu- 
endorf, 99  Wis.  264,  74  N.  W.  974 ;  Ander- 
son r.  Scandia  Bank  (1893),  53  Minn.  191, 
54  N.  W.  10G2;  Carrier  v.  Bern.stein 
(1898),  104  la.  572,  73  N.  W.  1076;  Mc- 
Donald V.  Second  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  106 
la.  517,  76  N.  W.  1011  (where  the  mis- 
joinder resulted  from  tlie  causes  of  action 
i)eing  triable  in  different  counties) ;  Mor- 
ton V.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  (1902),  1-30 
N.  C.  299,  41  S.  E.  484;  I'lankinton  ?•. 
Hildebrand  (189.5),  89  Wis.  209,  61  N.  W. 
839;  Budde  v.  Rcbcnack  (1896).  137  Mo. 
179,  38  S.  W.  910;  Kstep  r.  Hamnions 
(1898),  104  Ky.  144,46  S.  W.  715;  Ilawar- 
deu  V.  The  Yonghioglieny  &  Leliigh  Coal 
Co.  (1901),  111  Wis.  545^  87  N.  W.  472.^ 


JOINDER   OF    CAUSi:s    OF    ACTION. 


445 


"  In  actions  to  foreclose  mortgages,  the  court  shall  have  power 
to  adjudge  and  direct  payment  by  the  mortgagor  of  any  residue 
of  the  mortgage  debt  that  may  remain  unsatisfied  after  a  sale  of 
the  mortgaged  premises,  in  cases  in  which  the  mortgagor  shall  be 
personally  liable  for  the  debt  secured  by  such  niortgage  ;  and  if 
the  mortgage  debt  be  secured  by  the  covenant,  or  obligation, 
of  any  person  other  than  tlie  mortgagor,  the  plaintiff  may  make 
such  person  a  party  to  the  action,  and  the  court  may  adjudge 
paj-ment  of  the  residue  of  such  debt  remaining  unsatisfied  after  a 
sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  against  such  other  person,  and 
may  enforce  such  judgment  as  in  other  cases."  ^ 


1  ^Arizona.  "  Only  such  causes  of  action 
may  he  joiued  as  are  capable  of  the  same 
character  of  relief.  Actions  ex  contractu 
shall  not  be  joiued  with  actions  ex  delicto. 
In  actions  ex  delicto  there  shall  not  be 
joined  actions  to  recover  for  injuries  to 
the  ])erson,  to  property,  or  to  character ; 
but  they  shall  be  sued  for  separately." 
Kev.  St.",  1901,  §  1291. 

Arkansas.  "  Several  causes  of  action 
may  be  united  in  the  same  complaint, 
where  each  affects  all  the  parties  to  the 
action,  may  be  brought  iu  the  same 
county,  be  prosecuted  by  the  same  kind  of 
proceedings,  and  all  belong  to  one  of  the 
following  classes:  (1)  Claims  arising  out 
of  contract,  express  or  implied  ;  (2)  Claims 
for  the  recovery  of  specific  real  property, 
and  the  rents,  profits,  and  damages  for 
■withholding  the  same  ;  (3)  Claims  for  the 
recovery  of  specific  per.sonal  property,  and 
damages  for  the  taking  or  withholding 
the  same;  (4)  Claimsfor  partition  of  real  or 
personal  property,  or  both;  (5)  Claims  aris- 
ing from  injuries  to  character;  (6)  Claims 
arising  from  injuries  to  person  and  prop- 
erty ;  (7)  Claims  against  a  trustee  by 
virtue  of  a  contract  or  by  operation  of 
law."     Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5703. 

California.  "  The  plaintiff  may  unite 
several  causes  of  actiou  in  the  same  com- 
plamt,  where  they  all  arise  out  of:  [( 1 )  A 
single  act  committed  by  the  defendant,  or 
several  such  acts  constituting  but  a  single 
transaction].  (I)  [2]  Contracts,  express 
or  implied;  (2)  [3]  Claims  to  recover  spe- 
cific real  property,  with  or  without  dam- 
ages for  the  withholding  thereof,  or  for 
waste  committed  thereon,  and  the  rents 
and  profits  of  the  same;  (3)  [4]  Claims 


to  recover  specific  personal  property,  with 
or  without  damages  for  the  witliliolding 
thereof;  (4)  [.ij  Claims  against  a  trustee 
by  virtue  of  a  contract  or  by  operation  of 
law;  (5)  [6]  Injuries  to  character ;  (6)  [7] 
Injuries  to  person;  (7)  [8]  Injuries  to 
property.  Tlie  causes  of  action  so  united 
must  all  [,  e.xcept  in  the  cases  mentioned 
in  subdivision  one,]  belong  to  one  only  of 
these  classes,  and  must  affect  all  the  par- 
ties to  the  actiou,  and  not  require  different 
places  of  trial,  and  must  be  separately 
stated  ;  but  an  action  for  malicious  arrest 
and  prosecution,  or  either  of  them,  may 
be  united  with  an  action  for  either  an 
injury  to  character  or  to  the  person." 
The  portions  inclosed  in  brackets  are 
the  portions  added  by  the  Commissioners' 
Amendment  of  1901.  See  Lewis  v.  Dunne 
(1901),  134  Cal.  291,  sustaining  technical 
objections  to  the  constitutionality  of  the 
amended  code.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  427. 
The  paragraph  of  the  text  relative  to 
foreclosure  suits  is  found  in  different  form 
in  §  726. 

Colorado.  "  The  plaintiff  may  unite 
several  causes  of  actiou  in  the  same  com- 
plaint, when  they  all  arise  out  of  any  one 
of  the  following  named  classes :  Provided, 
They  affect  all  of  the  same  parties,  both 
plaintiff  and  defendant,  and  affect  them 
iu  the  same  character  and  capacity ;  and 
provided,  they  do  not  recpiire  different 
places  of  trial,  to  wit :  Class  First  —  Ac- 
tions to  recover  specific  real  property, 
whether  the  same  be  claimed  by  virtue  of 
superiority  of  title  or  by  superiority  of 
possessory  right,  or  on  account  of  unlaw- 
ful detainer  or  forciljle  entry ;  and  with 
such  claims  may   be    united  any  and  all 


446 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


§  333.  *  439.  Features  Common  to  many  Codes.  States  in 
which  these  Features  are  wanting.  The  scheme  contained  in  all 
these  codes  is  marked  by  certain  common  features,  which  should 


claim.s  for  damages,  for  rents  in  arrear, 
for  profits  during  any  unlawful  occupa- 
tion thereof,  and  for  any  waste  committed 
thereon.  Provided,  That  all  such  claims 
arise  from  the  same  property  for  the  re- 
covery of  which  the  suit  is  brought. 
Class  Second  —  Action  to  recover  specific 
l)ersonal  property  with  which  may  be  joined 
any  and  all  claims  for  damages  for  the 
uulawfiJ  detention  of  the  same,  or  for  the 
forcible  taking  of  the  same,  including,  in 
proper  cases,  claims  for  exemplary  dam- 
ages, and  in  case  the  property  cannot  be 
recovered  in  specie,  damages  for  the  un- 
lawful conversion  thereof.  Class  Third 
—  All  actions  sounding  only  iu  damages, 
whether  the  same  be  for  breach  of  con- 
trace,  sealed  or  parol,  express  or  implied, 
or  for  injuries  to  property,  person  or  char- 
acter, or  for  any  two  or  more  of  these 
causes,  and  in  all  cases  it  shall  be  neces- 
sarv  to  state  separately  in  the  complaint 
the  different  causes  for  which  the  action  is 
brought,  and  in  all  cases  equitable  relief 
may  be  granted."  §  70.  For  provisions 
relative  to  foreclosure  suits,  see  §  252. 

Connecticut.  "  In  every  civil  action  not 
brought  before  a  justice  of  the  peace,  the 
plaintiff  may  include  in  his  complaint 
botii  legal  and  equitable  rights  and  causes 
of  action,  and  demand  both  legal  and 
e(iuitable  remedies ;  but  wiiere  several 
causes  of  action  are  united  in  the  same 
complaint  tiiey  must  all  be  brought  to  re- 
cover either  (1)  upon  contract,  express  or 
implied  ;  or  (2)  for  injuries,  with  or  without 
force,  to  person  and  property,  or  either, 
including  a  conversion  of  property  to  de- 
fendant's use;  or  (3)  for  injuries  to  char- 
acter ;  or  (4)  upon  claims  to  recover  real 
property,  with  or  without  damages  for  the 
withholding  thereof,  and  the  rents  and 
profits  of  tiie  same;  or  (5)  upon  claims  to 
recover  personal  property  specifically,  with 
or  without  damages  for  the  withholding 
thereof;  or  (6)  claims  arising  by  virtue  of 
a  contract  or  by  operation  of  law,  in  favor 
of  or  against  a  party,  in  some  representa- 
tive or  fiduciary  capacity;  or  (7)  upon 
claims,  whether  in  contract,  or  tort,  or 
both,  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction 


or  transactions  connected  with  the  same 
subject  of  action.  The  several  causes  of 
action  so  united  must  all  belong  to  one  of 
these  classes,  and,  e.\cept  in  actions  for 
the  Ibreclosure  of  mortgages  or  liens,  must 
affect  all  the  parties  to  tiie  action,  and  not 
require  different  places  of  trial,  and  must 
be  separately  stated  ;  and  in  all  cases 
where  several  causes  of  action  are  joined 
in  tlie  same  complaint,  or  as  matter  of 
counter-claim  or  set-off,  in  the  answer,  if 
it  appear  to  the  court  that  they  cannot  all 
be  conveniently  heard  together,  the  court 
may  order  separate  trials  of  any  such 
causes  of  action,  or  may  direct  that  any 
one  or  more  of  them  be  expunged  from 
the  complaint  or  answer."  Gcu.  St.,  1902, 
§  613. 

Georcjia.  "  All  claims  arising  ex  con- 
tractu between  the  same  parties  may  be 
joined  in  the  same  action,  and  all  claims 
arising  ex  delicto  may  in  like  manner  be 
joined.  The  defendant  may  akso  set  up, 
as  a  defence,  all  claims  against  the  jilain- 
tiff  uf  a  similar  nature  with  the  plaintiff's 
demand."     Code,  1895,  §  4944. 

Idalto.  Identical  with  the  provisions 
of  the  California  Code  without  the  por- 
tions added  by  the  Commissioners'  Amend- 
ment of  1901.'  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §3205. 
For  provisions  relative  to  foreclosure  suits 
see  §3.'33l. 

Indiana.  "  The  plaintiff  m.ay  unite 
several  causes  of  action  in  the  same  com- 
plaint, when  they  are  included  in  either  of 
the  f(jllowing  classes :  First.  Money  de- 
mands on  contract.  Second.  Injuries  to 
property.  Third.  Injuries  to  person  or 
character.  Fourth.  Claims  to  recover  the 
possession  of  personal  property,  with  or 
without  damages  for  the  withholding 
thereof,  and  for  injuries  to  the  property 
withheld.  Fifth.  Claims  to  recover  the 
posae.^sion  of  real  property,  with  or  with- 
out damages,  rents  and  profits  for  the 
withholding  thereof,  and  for  wa-ste  or 
damage  done  to  the  land ;  to  make  parti- 
tion of  and  to  determine  and  quiet  the 
title  to  real  ])roperty.  Sirth.  Claims  to 
enforce  the  specific  performance  of  con- 
tracts, and  to  avoid  contracts   for  fraud 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION. 


447 


be  noticed ;  namely,  the  express  provision  for  the  uniting  of  legal 
and  equituble  causes  of  action,  and  the  exceedingly  general  and 


or  mistakes.  Seventh.  Claims  to  fore- 
close mortgages ;  to  enforce  or  discharge 
specific  lieus ;  to  recover  persoual  juiig- 
ment  upon  the  debt  secured  by  such  mort- 
gage or  lien ;  to  subject  to  sale  real 
property  upon  demauds  agaiust  decedents' 
estates,  when  such  property  has  passed  to 
heirs,  devisees,  or  their  assigns ;  to  mar- 
siial  assets  ;  and  to  substitute  one  person 
to  the  rights  of  another ;  and  all  otlier 
causes  of  action  arising  out  of  a  contract 
or  a  duty,  and  not  falling  within  either  of 
the  foregoing  classes.  But  causes  of  ac- 
tion so  joined  must  affect  all  tlie  parties  to 
the  action,  and  not  require  different  places 
of  trial,  and  must  be  separately  stated  and 
numbered."     Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  279. 

loira.  "  Causes  of  action  of  whatever 
kind,  where  eacii  may  be  prosecuted  by 
the  same  kind  of  proceedings,  if  held  by 
the  same  party,  and  against  the  same 
party,  in  the  same  rights,  and  if  action 
on  all  may  be  brought  and  tried  in  that 
county,  may  be  joined  in  the  same  peti- 
tion ;  but  the  court  may  direct  all  or  any 
portion  of  the  issues  joined  to  be  tried 
separately,  and  may  determine  the  order 
thereof,"     Code,  1897,  §  35-15. 

Kansas.  The  enumeration  of  classes 
is  identical  with  that  given  in  the  text, 
followed  by  this  clause  :  "  But  the  causes 
of  action  so  uniteii  must  all  belong  to  one 
of  these  classes,  and  must  affect  all  the 
parties  to  the  action,  except  in  actions  to 
enforce  mortgages  or  otlier  liens."  Code, 
§  8.3,  Gen.  St.,  1901,  §4517. 

Kentucky.  Identical,  with  very  slight 
verbal  changes,  with  the  Arkansas  statute, 
exclusive  of  subdivision  7.  Code,  1895, 
§83. 

Minnesota.  Identical  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  text,  except  that,  in  the  second 
paragraph,  the  words  "  except  in  actions 
for  the  foreclosure  of  mortgages  "  are 
omitted.  St.,  1894,  §  5260.  Third  para- 
graph wanting. 

Missouri.  The  enumeration  of  classes 
is  identical  with  that  given  in  the  text 
except  the  seventh  class,  which  is  as  fol- 
lows :  "  Claims  bj'  or  against  a  party  in 
some  representative  or  fiduciary  capacity, 
by  virtue  of  a  contract  or  by  operation  of 


law,"  followed  by  this  clau.se:  "But  the 
causes  of  action  so  united  must  all  belong 
to  one  of  these  cla.sses,  and  must  affect  all 
the  parties  to  the  action,  and  not  require 
different  places  of  trial,  and  must  be  sepa- 
rately stated,  with  the  relief  sought  for 
each  cause  of  action,  in  such  manner  that 
they  may  be  intelligibly  distinguished.' 
Kev.  St.,  1899,  §  593. 

Montana.  Identical  with  the  provi- 
sions of  the  California  Code  without  the 
portions  added  by  the  Commissioners' 
Amendment  of  1901,  except  that  the  .sec- 
ond paragraph  reads  as  follows  :  "  The 
causes  of  action  so  united  must  all  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  complaint  to  belong," 
etc.,  the  remainder  being  identical  with 
the  California  provision.  Code,  1895, 
§672. 

Nebraska.  The  enumeration  of  classes 
is  identical  with  tliat  given  in  the  text, 
except  that  the  order  of  classes  5  and  6 
is  reversed,  the  enumeration  being  fol- 
lowed by  this  clause  :  "  The  causes  of  at;- 
tion  so  united,  must  affect  all  the  parties 
to  the  action,  and  not  require  different 
places  of  trial."     Code,  1901,  §§  87,  88. 

Nerada.  Identical  with  the  provisions 
of  the  California  Code,  without  the  por- 
tions added  by  the  Commissioners'  Amend- 
ment of  1901,  with  very  slight  verbal 
changes.     Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §3159. 

New  York.  "  The  plaintiff  may  unite, 
in  the  same  complaint,  two  or  more  causes 
of  action,  whether  they  are  such  as  were 
furmerly  denominated  legal  or  etjuitable, 
or  both,  where  they  are  brought  to  recover 
as  follows  :  ( 1 )  Upon  contract,  express  or 
implied ;  (2)  For  personal  injuries,  ex- 
cept libel,  slander,  criminal  conversation, 
or  seduction;  (3)  For  libel  or  slander; 
(4)  For  injuries  to  real  property;  (5) 
Keal  property,  in  ejectment,  with  or  with- 
out damages  for  the  withholding  thereof ; 

(6)  For    injuries    to    personal    property; 

(7)  Chattels,  with  or  without  damages 
for  the  taking  or  detention  thereof ;  (8) 
Upon  claims  against  a  trustee,  by  virtue 
of  a  contract,  or  by  operation  of  law ;  (9) 
Upon  claims  arising  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action, or  transactions  connected  with  the 
same  subject  of  action,  and  not  included 


448 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


vague  clause  permitting  the  union  of  causes  of  action  arising  out 
of  the  same  transaction,  or  transactions  connected  with  the  same 


witliiu  oue  of  the  foregoiug  subdivisions 
of  tills  section;  (10)  For  penalties  in- 
curred under  the  fisheries,  game  and  forest 
laws.  But  it  must  appear,  upon  the  face 
of  tlie  complaint,  that  all  the  causes  of  ac- 
tion, so  united,  belong  to  one  of  the  fore- 
going subdivisions  of  this  section  ;  tliat 
they  are  consistent  with  each  other;  and, 
except  as  otlierwise  ])rpscril)ed  by  lavr, 
that  they  affect  all  the  parties  to  the  ac- 
tion ;  and  it  must  appear  upon  the  face  of 
the  complaint,  that  they  do  not  require 
different  places  of  trial."  Code  Civ.  Pro., 
§  484,  as  amended  Laws,  1877,  c.  416,  and 
Laws,  1900,  c.  590. 

North  Carolina.  Identical  with  tlie 
provisions  given  in  the  text.     §  126. 

North  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
visions given  in  the  text,  except  that  tlie 
words  "or  waste  committed  tliereon"  are 
added  to  the  fifth  subdivision.  Rev.  Codes, 
1899,  §5291. 

Ohio.  "  The  plaintiff  may  unite  several 
causes  of  action  in  the  same  ))etition, 
whether  they  are  such  as  have  heretofore 
been  denominated  legal  or  eiiuitable,  or 
both,  when  they  are  included  in  either  of 
the  following  cla.^ses  :  ( 1 )  The  same  trans- 
action ;  (2)  Transactions  connected  with 
the  same  subject  of  action  ;  (3)  Contracts, 
e.xpress  or  implied;  (4)  Injuries  to  person 
and  property,  or  to  either  ;  (5)  Injuries  to 
character;  (6)  Claims  to  recover  tlie  pos- 
session of  personal  property,  with  or  with- 
out damages  for  the  withholding  tliereof ; 
(7)  Claims  to  recover  real  property,  with 
or  without  damages  for  the  withholding 
thereof,  tlie  rents  and  jn-ofits  of  the  same, 
and  the  partition  thereof;  (&)  Claims  to 
foreclose  a  mortgage  given  to  secure  the 
payment  of  money  or  to  enforce  a  specific 
lien  for  money,  and  to  recover  a  personal 
judgment  for  the  debt  secured  by  such 
mortgage  or  lien  ;  (9)  Claims  against  a 
trustee,  by  virtue  of  a  contract,  or  by 
operation  of  law."    Bates'  St.,  1 90.3,  §  5058. 

Oklahoma.  The  enumeration  of  classes 
is  identical  with  that  of  the  text,  except 
that  the  order  of  classes  5  and  6  is 
reversed,  and  the  enumeration  is  followed 
by  this  clause  :  "  But  the  causes  of  action 
80  united  must  all  l)elong  to  one  of  these 
cl.isses,  and  mu.st  affect  all  tlie  jiartics  to 


tlie  action,  except  in  actions  to  enforce 
mortgages  or  other  liens."  St.,  1893, 
§3961. 

Oregon.  "The  i)laiutiff  may  unite  sev- 
eral cau.ses  of  action  in  the  same  complaint 
wlien  they  all  arise  out  of  —  ( 1 )  Contract, 
express  or  implied  ;  (2)  Injuries,  with  or 
without  force,  to  the  person;  (3)  Injuries, 
with  or  witiiout  force,  to  property  ;  (4) 
Injuries  to  character;  (5)  Claims  to 
recover  real  property,  with  or  witiiout 
damages  for  tiie  witliholdiiig  thereof;  (6) 
Claims  to  recover  personal  property,  with 
or  without  damages  for  the  withholding 
thereof;  (7)  Claims  against  a  trustee,  by 
virtue  of  a  contract  or  by  operation  of 
law.  But  the  causes  of  action  so  united 
must  all  belong  to  one  only  of  the.se 
classes,  and  must  affect  all  the  parties  to 
the  action,  and  not  require  different  places 
of  trial,  and  must  be  separately  stated." 
Hill's  Laws,  §  93. 

South  Carolina.  Identical  in  all  re- 
spects with  all  three  paragraphs  given  in 
the  text.     Code,  1893,  §  188. 

South  Dakota.  Identical  in  all  re- 
spects with  the  three  paragraphs  given 
in  the  text,  except  that  to  class  5  are 
added  the  words  "  or  for  waste  committed 
thereon."     Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6138. 

Utah.  Identical  with  the  first  two 
paragraphs  of  the  text,  except  that  to 
class  5  are  added  the  words  "or  waste 
committed  tliereon."  Paragraph  three  of 
text,  respecting  mortgage  foreclosures,  is 
wanting.     Rev.  St.,  1898,  §2961. 

Washington.  The  enumeration  of 
classes  is  identical  with  the  statute  of 
Oregon,  and  is  followed  by  this  clause, 
"  But  the  causes  of  action  so  united  must 
affect  all  the  parties  to  the  action,  and  not 
require  different  places  of  trial,  and  must 
be  separately  stated."     Bal.  Code,  §  4942. 

Wisconsin.  Identical  with  the  first 
two  paragraj)lis  of  the  te.xt,  except  that 
the  words,  "  except  in  actions  for  the 
foreclosure  of  mortgages,"  are  omitteil 
from  the  second  paragraph.  St.,  1898, 
§  2647. 

Wyoming.  The  enumeration  of  classes 
is  identical  with  that  of  the  text,  except 
that  the  order  of  classes  5  and  6  is 
reversed,  the  enumeration  being  followed 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  449 

subject  of  action.  In  a  few  States  these  peculiar  features  are 
wanting ;  while  the  other  classes  of  causes  of  action  which  may- 
be joined  are  substantially  the  same  as  provided  in  the  arrange- 
ment already  given.  This  is  the  case  in  Kentucky,  in  Oregon, 
and  in  California.^  It  should  be  remembered  that  in  Kentucky 
and  in  Oregon  [also  in  Iowa  and  Arkansas]  a  slight  distinction 
between  legal  and  equitable  proceedings  is  preserved ;  and  this 
fact,  doubtless,  accounts  for  the  form  of  the  pi'o vision  in  the  codes 
of  those  States.  No  such  distinction  remains  in  California,  and, 
as  has  been  seen  in  a  former  chapter,  legal  and  equitable  causes 
of  action  may  be  united,  according  to  the  established  procedure  in 
that  State,  notwithstanding  the  omission  in  the  clause  expressly 
regulating  such  joinder. 

§  334.  *  440.  Departures  from  Original  Type.  In  other  States, 
the  original  type  set  forth  in  the  New  York  code  has  been  widely 
departed  from.  Thus,  in  Indiana,  an  attempt  is  made  to  enumer- 
ate and  arrange  the  particular  classes  of  equitable  as  well  as  legal 
causes  of  action  which  may  be  joined.  In  Iowa  the  departure 
from  the  common  type  and  the  changes  of  the  common  law  are 
much  wider,  and  more  radical.  The  code  of  that  State,  as  do  the 
codes  of  Kentucky  and  of  Oregon,  retains  some  slight  separation 
between  legal  and  equitable  actions,  but  permits  all  possible 
actions  that  are  legal,  or  all  that  are  equitable,  to  be  united  in  one 
petition.  The  only  requirement  in  reference  to  their  nature  is, 
that  all  causes  of  action  so  united  must  be  in  the  same  kind  of 
proceedings ;  that  is,  all  legal,  or  all  equitable. 

§  335.  *441.  Scope  and  Meaning  of  Statutory  Provisions. 
Difficulties  of  Interpretation.  These  various  statutory  provisions 
will  be  examined,  and  the  judicial  interpretation  put  upon  them 
will  be  ascertained,  in  a  subsequent  portion  of  the  present  section. 
Their  general  scope  and  meaning,  however,  are  very  plain.  Ex- 
cepting in  Iowa,  a  plaintiff  may  unite  different  causes  of  action  in 
the  one  complaint  or  petition,  under  the  following  restrictions : 
They  must  affect  all  the  parties ;  they  must  all  be  triable  in  the 
same  county ;  and  they  must  all  belong  to  one  of  the  various 
specified  classes.     The  result  is,  that  all  the  causes  of  action  so 

l)y  this  section,  "  The  causes  of  action  so     mortgage    foreclosures   in  some   respects 
united  must  not  require  different  places  of     similar  to  tliat  given  ia   the   text.     llev. 
trial,  and,   except  as  otherwise  provided,     St.,  1899,  §§  3493,  3494,  3495. ;] 
must  affect  all  the  parties  to  the  action."  ^  [^Lanib  u.  Harbaugh  (1895),  105  Cal. 

Following    this   is   a    section   relative   to     680,  39  Pac.  56. J 

29 


450  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

united  must  be  either  upon  contract,  or  for  injuries  to  person  or 
property,  and  tlie  like,  unless  they  all  arise  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action, or  transactions  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action. 
This  latter  exception  does  not,  as  has  been  seen,  prevail  in  a  few 
of  the  States ;  but,  where  it  does  prevail,  the  most  incongruous 
and  dissimilar  causes  of  action  may  be  joined,  if  they  arise  out 
of  the  same  transaction,  or  transactions  connected  with  the  same 
subject  of  the  action,  within  the  meaning  of  that  phrase.^  It  is 
evident  that  very  little  difficulty  can  arise  in  interpreting  and 
applying  most  of  the  classes.  The  real  doubts  and  uncertainties 
grow  out  of  (1)  the  confounding  the  reliefs  demanded  by  the 
plaintiff  with  the  cause  of  action  upon  which  such  demand  is 
based ;  and  thi.s  confusion  is  more  apt  to  exist  in  equity  causes, 
and  especially  in  those  where  legal  relief  is  prayed  for  as  well  as 
equitable ;  (2)  the  clause  permitting  the  joinder  of  causes  of 
action  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  etc.  "  Transaction  " 
has  had  no  technical  legal  meaning,  and  is  a  word  of  very  vague 
import  at  best;  but  this  vagueness  is  largely  increased  b}^  the 
additional  clause  which  permits  causes  of  action  arising  out  of 
transactions  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action  to  be 
united.  These  are  the  two  chief,  and  almost  only,  sources  of 
doubt  in  the  practical  construction  of  the  passage  in  question. 
The  first  one  —  the  liability  of  confounding  the  reliefs  demanded 
with  the  causes  of  action  —  may,  of  course,  be  avoided  by  the 
exercise  of  care  and  discrimination:  the  second  is  much  more 
embarrassing,  and  it  is  hardly  possible  that  all  doubt  should  ever 
be  removed  from  the  legal  meaning  of  the  language. 

II.    The  Forms  and  Modes  in  ivJdch  a  Misjoinder  may  occur,  and 
the  Manner  in  lohich  it  must  he  objected  to  and  corrected. 

§  336.  *  442.  Separate  Statement  of  Different  Causes  of  Action. 
All  of  the  codes  require  that  the  different  causes  of  action 
should  be  separately  stated.  In  other  words,  each  must  be  set 
forth    in  a  separate  and   distinct  division  of   the   complaint  or 

1  ^Pollock    r.    Association    (1896),  48  further   sum   for   maliciously    instituting^ 

S.   C  6.'),  2.5  S.  E.  977,  (jnoting  the  text,  the  injunction  proceeding  for  the  purpose 

Willey  t).  Nichols  (1898),  18  Wash.  528,  .52  of   hara.ssing    and    injuring    plaintiffs    is 

Pac.  237,  to   the   effect   that  "an   action  demurrable  on  the  ground  of  misjoinder 

against  the  principal  and  sureties  upon  an  of  actions,  one  being  based  on  contract, 

injunction    bond   for   the  penalty  therein  the  other  on  tort."] 
named   and   against    the    princij)al    in  a 


JOIXDEK    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTIOX.  45  L 

potiiion,  in  sncli  a  manner  that  each  of  these  divisions  might, 
if  taken  alone,  be  the  substance  of  an  independent  action.  In 
fact,  the  whole  proceeding  is  the  combining  of  several  actions  into 
one.  At  the  common  law,  these  separate  divisions  of  the  declara- 
tion were  termed  "  counts ;  "  and  that  word  is  still  used  by  t€xt- 
writers  and  judges,  although,  with  one  or  two  exceptions,  it  is 
not  authorized  by  the  codes ;  and  it  tends  to  produce  confusion 
and  misapprehension,  since  the  common-law  "count"  was  sub- 
stantially a  very  different  thing  from  the  "  cause  of  action  "  of 
the  new  procedure.  In  one  or  two  States,  the  term  "  paragraph  " 
is  used  to  designate  these  primary  divisions.  The  difificulty  in  the 
use  of  this  term  is  that  it  is  now  very  generally  used  in  England, 
and  in  most  of  the  States  where  the  reformed  system  prevails,  to 
designate  the  short  sub-divisions,  or  allegp.tions,  of  facts  into  which 
each  cause  of  action  is  separated,  according  to  a  mode  of  plead- 
ing which  has  become  very  common.  Tlie  term  "  cause  of  action" 
is  perhaps  as  proper  as  any  which  can  be  used  for  the  purpose. 
That  such  a  separation  should  be  made,  and  that  each  distinct 
cause  of  action  should  be  stated  in  a  single  and  independent  divi- 
sion, so  that  the  defendant  may  answer  or  demur  to  it  without 
any  confusion  with  otliers,  is  plainly  indispensable  to  an  orderly 
system  of  pleading,  and  is  expressly  required  by  all  the  codes ;  ^ 
and  in  some  of  the  States  the  courts  have  strictly  enforced  the 
requirement,  and  liave  thereby  done  much  to  prevent  the  formal 
presentations  of  the  issues  to  be  tried  from  falling  into  that  con- 
fused and  bungling  condition  which  exists  to  so  great  an  extent 
in  certain  of  the  States. 

§  337.  *  443.  How  Question  of  Misjoinder  of  Causes  of  Action 
is  raised.  Effect  of  Sustaining  Demurrer  upon  this  Ground. 
The  special  provisions  respecting  the  manner  of  raising  an 
objection  to  a  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  and  the  effect  there- 
of, are  as  follows :  In  all  the  codes  but  two,  it  is  prescribed 
that  the  defendant  may  demur  to  the  complaint,  or  petition,  if  it 
shall  appear  on  the  face  thereof  that  several  causes  of  action  have 
been  improperly  united ;  that,  if  the  error  does  not  so  appear,  the 
objection  may  be  taken  by  the  answer;  and  that,  if  not  taken 
in  either  of  these  modes,  it  is  waived.^     The  sustaining  of  a  de- 

1  I^Maisenbacker  v.  Society  Concordia  are  identical  with  those  which  regulate 
(1899),  71  Conn.  369,  42  Atl.  67.3  t'le   method   of  objecting  to  a  defect  of 

2  See  these  provisions,  collected  in  the  parties ;  and  tlic  decisions  already  cited 
text  or  notes,  sicpra,  §  *43.3.     These  rules  (§§  *206,  *207,  *287),  of  course,  apply  to 


•452 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


raurrer  upon  this  ground  is  not  fatal  to  the  action  in  all  the 
States.  Several  codes  contain  the  very  just  provision,  that, 
when  such  a  demurrer  is  sustained,  the  court  may  simply  order 
the  action  to  be  divided  into  as  many  as  may  be  necessary  for  the 
proper  hearing  and  determination  of  the  causes  of  action  set  forth 
in  the  original  pleading.^  The  plaintiff  is  thus  not  thrown  out 
of  court  in  respect  of  any  of  the  causes  of  action  alleged  by  liim ; 
he  is  merely  required  to  separate  the  single  cause  into  the  number 
of  independent  suits  which  he  should  have  originally  brought.^ 

§  338.  *  444.  ESect  of  Misjoinder  iu  soma  States.  In  one  or 
two  States  a  misjoinder  is  attended  with  even  less  serious  con- 
sequences than  this,  the  sole  object  of  the  statutorj^  provision  on 
the  subject  being  to  secure  a  trial  of  each  cause  of  action  before 
the  proper  tribunal.  In  Iowa  there  can  be  no  misjoinder,  prop- 
erly so  called,  except  by  uniting  a  legal  and  an  equitable  cause  of 
action.  Still,  if  two  legal  causes  are  so  utterly  incongruous  as  to 
prevent  a  trial  of  them  together,  the  court  may  order  them  to  be 
tried  separately.  The  clauses  of  the  Iowa  code  are  found  in  the 
foot-note.^     The  provisions  of  the  Kentucky  code,  in  reference  to 


the  present  subject-matter.  If  the, objec- 
tion appears  on  the  face  of  the  pleading,  it 
must  be  raised  by  demurrer,  and  not  by  an- 
swer ;  and  this  is  substantially  the  same 
as  saying  that  it  must  always  be  raised 
by  demurrer,  because  the  misjoinder  will 
ahvai/s  appear  on  tiie  face  of  the  jjleading. 
See  James  v.  Wilder,  25  Minn.  .305  ;  Mead 
V.  Brown,  65  Mo.  552 ;  Finley  v.  Ha\'es, 
81  N.  C.  363;  Boon  v.  Carter,  19  Kans. 
135;  Keller  v.  Boatman,  49  Ind.  104; 
Rankin  v.  Collins,  50  id.  153;  Hardy  v. 
Miller,  11  Neb.  395. 

(^Gardner  v.  Gardner  (1896),  23  Nev. 
207,  45  Pac.  139  ;  Smith  v.  Putnam  (1900), 
107  Wis.  155,  82  N.  W.  1077;  Porter  r. 
Sherman  County  Banking  Co  (1893),  36 
Neb.  271,  54  N.  W.  424  ;  Beale  /•.  Baniett's 
Ad'm  (1901),  Ky..  64  S.  W.  833  ;  Murray 
>'.  Booker  (1900).  Ky.,  .58  S.  W.  788;  Sick- 
man  V.  WoUett  (190.3),  —  Colo.  — ,  71  Pac. 
1107;  Koss  r.  Wait  (1894).  4  S.  1).  584, 
57  N.  W.  497  ;  Corbett  v.  Wreun  (1894), 
25  Ore.  305,  35  Pac.  658.] 

1  QOhio,  Bates'  St.,  1900,  §  5065;  Wis- 
consin. St..  Ift98,  §  2686;  North  Carolina, 
Code.  §  272;]  New  York,  §  172  (497); 
Nebraska,  §  97  ;  Kansas,  §  92 ;  South  Car- 


olina, §  195.  See  Alexander  r.  Thacker, 
30  Neb.  614. 

-  I^Solomon  v.  Bates  (1896),  118  N.  C. 
311,  24  S.  E.  746:  Where  a  demurrer 
for  rai.sjoinder  of  causes  is  well  founded, 
the  action  should  not  be  dismissed  but 
simply  divided  (Code,  §  272).  But  where 
there  is  a  misjoinder  botii  of  cau.ses  and 
parties,  tlie  action  cannot  be  divided  under 
this  section  of  the  code  :  Cromartie  i*. 
Parker  (1897),  121  N.  C.  198,  28  S.  E. 
297  ;  Mortou  r.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. 
(1902),  1.30  N.  C.  299,  41  S.  E.  484.  See 
also  .Matthews  v.  Bank  (1901),  60  S.  C. 
183,  38  S.  E.  437;  Weeks  v.  McPhail 
(1901),   128  N.  C.   134,  38  S.  E.  292. 

Gattis  V.  Kilgo  (1S99),  125  N.  C.  13.3, 
34  S.  E.  246 :  Where  a  demurrer  is  sus- 
tained on  the  ground  of  misjoinder  of 
causes  of  action,  it  i.s  within  the  discretion 
of  the  judge  to  allow  an  amendment,  and 
if  such  amendment  is  not  made  it  becomes 
the  rJiily  of  tlie  judge  to  divide  the  action 
on  the  docket  for  separate  trials.] 

3  Qlowa,  Code  of  1897,  §3546:  "The 
plaintiff  may  at  any  time  before  the  final 
jiubmission  of  the  case  to  ti>e  jury  or  to 
the  court  when  the  trial  is  liy  the  court, 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION. 


453 


the  remedy  for  a  misjoinder,  are  similar  to  those  of  lowa.^  The 
practice  in  Indiana  differs  from  that  which  prevails  in  the  States 
generally,  and  also  from  that  established  in  Iowa.  A  demurrer 
for  misjoinder  is  permitted ;  but  its  effect  can  never  be  fatal  to 
the  action.  In  fact,  the  matter  seems  to  be  practically  left  in  the 
discretion  of  the  lower  or  trial  court,  and  any  disposition  of  the 
objection  to  a  misjoinder  made  by  it  cannot  be  assigned  as  error 
so  as  to  reverse  a  judgment  on  review.  The  sections  of  the 
Indiana  code  are  quoted  in  the  note.^ 


strike  from  his  petition  any  cause  of  ac- 
tion or  part  thereof."  §  3547  :  "  The 
court,  at  any  time  before  the  answer  is 
filed,  upon  motion  of  the  defendant,  shall 
strike  out  of  the  petition  any  cause  or 
causes  of  action  improperly  joined  with 
others."  §  3548 :  "  All  objectious  to  the 
misjoinder  of  causes  of  action  shall  be 
waived,  unless  made  as  provided  in  the 
last  preceding  section."  §  3549  :  "  When 
a  motion  is  sustained  on  the  ground  of 
misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  the  court, 
on  motion  of  the  plaintiff,  sliall  allow  him, 
with  or  without  costs,  in  his  discretion,  to 
file  several  petitions,  each  including  such 
of  said  causes  of  action  as  may  be  joined, 
and  an  action  shall  be  docketed  for  each 
of  said  petitions,  and  the  causes  shall  he 
proceeded  in  without  further  service,  the 
court  fixing  by  order  the  time  of  pleading 
therein."]] 

Tliis  mode  of  procedure  is  simple,  and 
eminently  just,  and  sweeps  away  a  mass 
of  technical  defences  which  .still  disfigure 
the  pure  ideal  of  the  American  system  in 
many  States.  For  a  construction  of  these 
provisions,  see  Hinkle  v.  Davenport,  38 
Iowa,  355,  358  ;  Cobb  t:  111.  Cent.  R.  Co., 
33  Iowa,  60!,  016;  Grant  v.  McCarty,  38 
Iowa,  468. 

£Bai  see  McDonald  v.  Second  Nat. 
Bank  (1898),  106  la.  517,  76  N.  W.  1011, 
where  it  was  held  that  under  Code,  §  3545, 
providing  that  "  Causes  of  action  of  what- 
ever kind,  ...  if  action  on  all  may  be 
brought  and  tried  in  that  county,  may  be 
joined  in  the  same  petition,"  there  is  a 
misjoinder  of  causes  of  action  when  fore- 
closure is  sought  in  one  petition  of  mort- 
gages on  two  different  pieces  of  land, 
securing  the  same  debt,  one  piece  of  land 
being  in  the  county  of  venue  and  the 
other  in  another  county.    See  also  Wedge- 


wood  V.  Parr  (1900),  112  la.  514,  84  X.  W. 
528,  where  it  was  held  that  where  a  peti- 
tion claimed  judgment  on  a  note  with  in- 
terest and  possession  of  wlieat,  tliere  was 
a  misjoinder  of  causes  under  the  Code, 
§  4164,  providing  that,  in  actions  of  re- 
plevin, there  could  be  no  joinder  of  any 
cause  of  action  not  of  tlie  .same  kind] 

1  [^Kentucky,  Code,  §§  84,  85,  86  ;] 
Sale  V.  Critchfield,  8  Bu.sh,  636,  646.  The 
defendant  must  move  before  answer  that 
plaintiff  elect  between  the  causes  of  ac- 
tion, and  strike  out  the  others  ;  if  no  .such 
motion  is  made,  tlie  objection  is  waived. 
Tiie  same  rule  prevails  as  to  tiie  misjoin- 
der of  parties,  which  is  never  ground  of 
demurrer;  defendant  must  move  to  strike 
out  the  improper  parties,  or  else  waive  aU 
objection.  Dean  v.  English,  18  B.  Mon. 
132;  Yeates  v.  Walker,  1  Duv.  84. 

2  I^Burns'  Indiana  St.,  1901,  §  342.] 
"  The  defendant  may  demur  to  the  com- 
plaint when  it  appears  upon  the  face 
thereof,  .  .  .  6th,  that  several  causes  of 
action  have  been  improperly  joined. 
§  343.  When  a  demurrer  is  sustained  on 
the  ground  of  several  causes  of  action 
being  improperly  joined  in  the  same  com- 
plaint, the  court  shall  order  the  misjoinder 
to  be  noted  on  the  order-book,  and  cause 
as  many  separate  actions  to  be  docketed 
between  the  parties  as  there  are  causes 
decided  by  tlie  court  to  be  improperly 
joined,  and  each  shall  stand  as  a  separate 
action,  and  the  plaintiff  shall  thereupon 
file  a  separate  complaint  in  each  of  the 
above  cases,  to  which  the  defendant  shall 
enter  his  appearance  and  plead  and  go  to 
trial,  or  suffer  a  default,  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  in  the  original  action.  §  344.  No 
judgment  shall  ever  be  reversed  for  any 
error  committed  in  su.staining  or  overrul- 
ing a  demurrer  for  misjoinder  of  causes 


454  CIVIL    EEMKDIES. 

§  339.  *  445.  Motion  by  Adverse  Party  Requiring  Correction  of 
Pleading.  There  is  another  section  found  in  all  the  codes, 
which  has  an  important  bearing  upon  the  suljject  under  con- 
sideration in  some  of  its  aspects,  —  that  which  permits  the  cor- 
rection of  pleadings  at  the  instance  of  the  adverse  party  on  his 
motion  by  striking  out  irrelevant  and  redundant  matter,  and  by 
requiring  the  pleading  to  be  made  more  definite  and  certain  by 
amendment  where  its  allegations  are  so  indefinite  and  uncertain 
that  the  precise  nature  of  the  charge  or  defence  is  not  apparent.^ 

§  340.  *446.  Possible  Forms  of  Misjoinder.  Three  forms  or 
modes  of  alleged  misjoinder  are  possible,  and  tliey  must  be  ex- 
amined separately  in  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  the  objection 
thereto  should  be  taken.  They  are,  (1)  When  different  causes 
of  action  which  may  properly  be  united  are  alleged  in  the  one 
complaint  or  petition  not  distinctly  and  separately  as  required  by 
the  statute,  but  combined  and  mingled  together  in  a  single  state- 
ment. (2)  When  different  causes  of  action  which  cannot  prop- 
erly be  united  are  alleged  in  the  one  complaint  or  petition,  and 
are  separately  and  distinctly  stated.  (3)  When  different  causes 
of  action  which  cannot  properly  be  united  are  alleged  in  the  one 
complaint  or  petition  not  distinctly  and  separately,  but  combined 
and  mingled  together  in  a  single  statement.^  These  three  cases 
will  be  examined  in  order. 

§  341.  *  447.  First  Form  of  Misjoinder  not  Ground  of  Demurrer. 
Remedy  is  by  Motion.  Although  the  sections  of  the  codes,  de- 
fining what  causes  of  action  may  be  united,  all  require  in  posi- 
tive terms  that  when  so  joined  each  must  be  separately  stilted,^  it 
is  settled  by  the  weight  of  authority,  and  seems  to  be  the  gen- 
eral rule,  that  a  violation  of  this  particular  requirement  is  not  a 
ground  of  demurrer.    This  conclusion  is  based  upon  the  language 

of   action."     "§  346.    Where  any  of  the  44  Ind.  22.3,  227,  that  no  objection  can  be 

matters   enumerated    in    §  [342]    do   not  rai.sed  on  appeal, 
appear  on  the  face  of  the  complaint,  the  '  See  supra,  §  *434. 

objection  (except  for  misjoinder  of  causes)  -  QLewis  v.  Hinson  (1902),  64  S.  C.  .571, 

may  be   taken    by  answer."     It   is  plain  43  S.  E.  15  (quoting  the  tcxt).^ 
from   the    foregoing    tliat    the    practical  "  [^Xot  so  in  Connecticut.     See  Knap[) 

effect  of  a  siicce.ssful  demurrer  is  trivial,  r.  Walker  (1900),  7-3  Conn.  459,47  Atl.  6.5.'>. 
It  compels  the   separation  of  the  action,  And  in  Ronth  Carolina,  by  the  act  of 

and  the  trial  of  two  or  more  suits  instead  1898,  it  is  not  necessary,  in  an  action  er 

of  one.     No  discretion  is  left  to  the  court,  delicto,  to  make  use  of  separate  allegations 

as  in  New  York,  Iowa,  and  other  States ;  setting  up  actual  and  punitive  damages : 

the  court  .s/,nll  cau.se  tlie  separate  actions  Machen   v.  Tol.  Co.  (1902),  63  S.  C.  363, 

to  be  docketed.     See  Clark  c.  Liueberger,  41  S.  E.  448-3 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES   OF   ACTION. 


455 


of  the  codes  autliorizing  a  demurrer  for  the  reason  that  causes  of 
action  "  are  improperly  united  in  the  complaint  or  petition."  ^  It 
is  said  that  this  expression  only  points  to  the  case  in  which 
causes  of  action  have  been  embraced  in  one  pleading  which  could 
not  properly  be  joined ;  while  in  the  special  case  under  considera- 
tion it  is  assumed  that  all  the  causes  of  action  may  be  united,  and 
the  only  error  consists  in  the  external  form  or  manner  of  their 
joinder.  The  remedy  is,  therefore,  not  by  a  demurrer,  but  by  a 
motion  to  make  the  pleading  more  definite  and  certain  by  sepa- 
rating and  distinctly  stating  the  different  causes  of  action.^     The 


1  QThis  ground  for  demurrer  applies  to 
the  whole  complaint,  aud  not  to  one  of 
several  paragraphs:  (iilleuwaters y.  Camp- 
bell (1895),  142  Ind.  529,  41  N.  E.  1041.] 

■^  Bass  V.  Conistock,  38  N.  Y.  21  ;  36 
How.  Pr.  382,  and  cases  cited ;  Wood  v. 
Anthony,  9  How.  Pr.  78 ;  Hendry  v. 
Hendry,  32  Ind.  349  ;  MulhuUand  v.  Rapp, 
50  Mo.  42  ;  Pickering  r.  Miss.  Valley  Nat. 
Tel.  Co.,  47  Mo.  457, 460  ;  House  v.  Lowell, 
45  Mo.  381.  See  Wiles  i-.  Suydam,  6  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  292.  A  different  rule  formerly 
prevailed  in  Missouri,  and  it  was  held  that 
the  error  was  not  only  ground  for  a  de- 
murrer, but  even  for  a  motion  in  arrest  of 
judgment  after  verdict !  McCoy  v.  Yager, 
34  Mo.  134;  Clark's  Adm.  t;.  Han.  &  St. 
Jos.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  202 ;  Hoagland  v.  Han. 
&  St.  Jos.  R.  Co.,  39  Mo.  451  ;  Farmers' 
Bank  v.  Bayliss,  41  Mo.  274,  284,  per 
Holmes  .1.  These  prior  cases,  however, 
are  expressly  overruled  by  the  more  re- 
cent decisions  of  the  same  court  cited 
above.  See  also  Freer  v.  Denton,  61 
N.  Y.  492 :  Sentinel  Co.  v.  Thomson,  38 
Wis.  489  ;  Riemer  v.  Johnke,  37  id.  258 ; 
Hardy  v.  Miller,  11  Neb.  395;  but  see 
Watsou  V.  San  Francisco  &  H.  B.  R.  Co., 
50  Cal.  523.  See,  further,  Townsend  v. 
Bogert,  126  N.  Y.  370;  Ellsworth  v. 
Rossiter,  46  Kan.  237  ;  State  v.  Tittmann. 
103  Mo.  553.  The  mi.sjoinder  is  waived 
by  going  to  trial  without  objection  :  Beers 
V.  Kuehn  (Wis.,  Jan.  10.  1893),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  109.  If  the  plaintiff  refuse  to  sepa- 
rate and  distinctly  state  the  different 
causes  of  action,  it  is  pi'oper  to  dismiss 
the  suit,  but  without  prejudice ;  so  held 
in  Eisenhouer  v.  Stein,  37  Kan.  281. 

[^City  of  St.  Louis  r.  Weitzel    (1815), 
130  Mo.  600,  31   S.  W.  1045;    IMarviu  ?.-. 


Yates  (1901),  26  Wash.  50,  66  Pac.  131; 
Childs  V.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1893), 
117  Mo.  414,  23  S"  W.  373;  City  Carpet 
Beating  Works  v.  Jones  (1894),  102 
Cal.  506,  36  Pac.  841  (citing  the  te.xt)  ; 
Cargar  v.  Fee  (1894),  140  Ind.  572,39  N.  E. 
93;  Kearney  Stone  Works  v.  McPherson 
(1894), 5  Wyo.  178,  38  Pac.  920;  Richard.sou 
r.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.  (1895),  10  Wash. 
648, 39  Pac.  95  (citing  the  text) ;  A.  T.  &  S. 
F.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Comm'rs  of  Sumner  Co. 
(1893),  51  Kan.  617,  33  Pac.  312  ;  Shrigley 
V.  Black  (1898),  59  Kan.  487,  53  P.ac.  477  ; 
Fox  V.  Rogers  (1899),  8  Idaho,  710,  59 
Pac.  538. 

See  late  case  of  Lane  v.  Dowd  (1903),  172 
Mo.  167,  72  S.  W.  632,  in  which  the  court 
said :  "  There  is  a  long  and  unbroken  line 
of  decisions  drawing  the  distinction  as  to 
the  method  of  taking  advantage  of  a  de- 
fective petition.  If  there  are  two  causes  of 
action  that  can  be  united  in  one  petition, 
but  are  improperly  joined  in  one  count, 
this  defect  is  reached  by  a  motion,  before 
tlie  trial  is  begun,  to  elect  upon  which 
cause  of  action  the  plaintiff  will  proceed. 
If  the  petition  contains  two  causes  of 
action  that  are  of  such  character  that  they 
cannot  legally  be  joined  in  one  action, 
then  demurrer  is  the  proper  pleading  to 
reach  the  irregularity.  This  is  what  the 
cases  cited  by  appellant  hold.  Hence,  as 
there  is  no  dispute  on  that  proposition,  it  is 
unnecessary  to  further  refcrto  those  cases." 

But  see  Austin,  Tomlinson,  &  Webster 
M.  Co.  r.  Hei.ser  (1894),  6  S.  D.  429,  01 
N.  W.  445.  citing  the  text ;  Brewer  v.  V.c- 
Cain  (1895),  21  Colo.  382,  41  Pac.  822; 
Jackins  v.  Dickinson  (1893),  39  S.  C.  436. 
17  S.  E.  996;  Ponca  Mill  Co.  r.  Mikesell 
(1898),  55  Neb.  98,  75  N.  W.  46,  the  court 


456 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


plaintiff  can  thus  be  compelled  to  amend  his  complaint  or  peti- 
tion, and  to  state  each  cause  of  action  by  itself,  so  that  the 
defendant  may  deal  with  it  by  answer  or  demurrer  as  the  nature 
of  the  case  demands.  It  seems  to  be  the  settled  rule  in  Califor- 
nia, however,  that  the  defect  may  properly  be  taken  advantage  of 
by  demurrer.^ 

§  342.  *  448.  Remedy  when  Second  Form  of  Misjoinder  occurs. 
When  causes  of  action  separately  state  1  are  improperly  united  in 
the  same  com[)laint  or  petition,  the  rule  which  prevails  in  all  the 
States,  except  in  the  few  whose  special  legislation  has  already 
been  described,  is  the  same  as  that  which  applies  to  the  case  of  a 
defect  of  parties. ^  If  the  error  appears  on  the  face  of  the  plead- 
ing, the  defendant  must  demur,  and  cannot  raise  the  objection  by 
answer.^  The  statute  adds,  that,  if  the  error  do  not  thus  appear 
on  the  face  of  the  pleading,  the  defence  may  be  pi-esented  by  the 
answer.     If  the  defendant  omits  to  use  either  of  these  methods 


saying :  "  Moreover,  only  one  cause  of 
action  is  in  form  stated.  If  two  were  in 
fact  included  in  the  averments,  the  remedy 
was  by  motion  to  strike  out  surplusage  or 
to  require  the  two  causes  to  be  separately 
stated.  A  demurrer  does  not  reach  tlie 
commingling  of  two  causes  of  action  in  a 
single  count,  if  they  be,  under  the  code, 
of  such  character  tliat  they  may  be  joined." 
See  also  Chicago,  11.  I  &  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
O'Neill  (1899),  58  Neb.  2.39,  78  N.'w.  .521  ; 
Building  &  Loan  Assn.  v.  Cameron  (1896), 
48  Neb.  124,  66  N.  W.  1109;  Ponca  Mill 
Co  (;.  Mikesell  (1898),  5.t  Nel).  98,  75  N.  W. 
46  ;  Glover  v.  Remley  (1898),  52  S.  C.  492, 
30  S.  E.  405. 

A  motion  to  strike  out  surplusage 
would  also  be  projjer :  Ponca  Mill  Co.  r. 
Mikesell  (1898),  55  Neb.  98,  75  N.  W.  46. 
But  a  motion  to  compel  plaintiff  to  elect 
on  which  to  stand  will  not  lie  :  Austin,  etc. 
Co.  V.  Heiser  (1894),  6  S.  D.  429,  61  N.  W. 
445.  Nor  is  it  ground  for  dismissing  the 
complaint  that  with  one  good  cause  of 
action  others  are  mingled:  Mattliews  v. 
Bank  (1900),  60  S.  C.  183,  38  S.  E.  437. 

Hayden  v.  Pearce  (1898),  33  Ore.  89,  52 
Pac.  1049.  Where  a  misjoinder  of  causes 
of  action  ai)])ears  on  tlie  face  of  the  com- 
plaint, the  plaintiff  .should  be  re<|uired  to 
elect  on  whidi  cause  lie  will  proceed ;  but 
when  the  def<!ct  is  not  apparent  until  the 
judgment  is  entered  a  writ  of  review  will 


lie  to  correct  the  error.  (Compare  with 
Lane  v.  Dowd,  sit/ira.)  See  also  Smith 
v.  Day  (1901),  39  Ore.  531,  65  Pac.  1055, 
where  the  court  said  tliat  a  non-suit  should 
be  granted  fur  misjoinder  of  causes.  Un- 
less the  proper  objection  is  taken  by  mo- 
tion, the  defect  of  intermingled  counts 
is  waived  :  Smith  v.  Jones  (1902),  —  S.  D. 
—,92  N.  W.  1084] 

^  Nevada  Cy.,  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Kidd, 
43  Cal.  180,  37  Cal.  282;  Watson  v.  San 
Francisco  &  H.  B.  R.  Co.,  41  Cal.  17,  19  ; 
Buckingham  v.  Waters,  14  Cal.  146; 
White  V.  Cox,  46  Cal.  169.  In  Wright 
V.  Conner,  34  Iowa,  240,  242,  it  was  said : 
"If  through  bad  pleading  two  or  more 
distinct  causes  of  action  or  defences  are 
contained  in  one  division  of  a  j)etition  or 
answer,  which  is  called  a  count,  a  de- 
murrer may  be  directed  at  one  of  them 
if  insufficient  at  law."  In  strictness,  the 
objecting  party  ought  first  to  reiiuire,  by 
motion,  that  tiie  petition  or  answer  be 
properly  divided,  or  an  election  made  be- 
tween tlie  causes  of  action  or  tlie  defences ; 
but,  omitting  this,  he  may  demur. 

•-  ^Dudley  v.  Duval  (1902),  29  Wash. 
528,  70  Pac.  68  ;  Lane  v.  Dowd  (1903),  172 
]Mo.  167,72  S.  W.  632;  see  Bandmaun  v. 
Davis  (1899),  23  Mont.  382,59  Pac.  856.] 

'  QA  demurrer  for  want  of  sufficient 
facts  will  not  reach  this  objection.  Marvin 
y.  Yates  (1901),  26  Wash.  50,  66  Pac.  131-3 


JOINDER    OF    CAUSES    OV   ACTION.  457 

properly,  he  is  deemed  to  have  waived  the  objection.  The  prac- 
tical result  is,  that  a  demurrer  must  always  hj  resorted  to,  or  all 
objection  to  such  misjoinder  will  be  waived.^  The  demurrer 
may  be  by  any  of  the  defendants ;  '^  and  it  must  be  to  the  entire 
complaint  or  petition,  and  not  to  any  cause  or  causes  of  action 
supposed  to  have  boen  improperly  joined.^  To  sustain  a  demur- 
rer for  this  reason,  however,  the  complaint  must  contain  two  or 
more  good  grounds  of  suit  which  cannot  properly  be  joined  in 
the  same  action.  .When  a  complaint,  therefore,  consists  of  two  or 
more  counts,  and  one  sets  forth  a  good  cause  of  action,  and  an- 
other doos  not,  although  it  attempts  to  do  so,  the  pleading  is  not 
demurrable  on  the  ground  of  a  misjoinder,  even  though  the  causes 
of  action  could  not  have  been  united  had  they  been  sufficiently 
and  properly  alleged.^ 

§  343.  *  449.  Rule  in  Few  States.  In  a  very  few  States,  how- 
ever, the  practice  is  different,  and  a  demurrer  is  not  permitted  as 
the  remedy  for  a  misjoinder.  It  is  so  in  Kentucky.  The  defend- 
ant must  move  to  strike  out,  or  to  compel  the  plaintiff  to  elect 
which  cause  of  action  he  will  proceed  upon,  and  to  dismiss  the 
others  ;  and  a  failure  to  make  such  motion  is  a  complete  waiver 
of  the  objection.  The  plaintiff  may  also  at  any  time  before  trial 
withdraw  any  cause  of  action.^     The  sections  of  the  Iowa  code 

1  Blossom  I'.  Barrett,  37  N.  Y.  434, 436  ;  219  ;  Bassett  v.  Warner,  23  Wis.  673,  689, 
Smith  r.  Orser,  43  Barb,  187,  193;  Mead  690;  Willard  v.  Reas,  26  Wis.  .540,  544; 
V.  Bagnall,  1.5  Wis.  156  ;  Jamison  v.  Copher,  Lee  v.  Simpson,  29  Wis.  333  ;  Cox  v.  West. 
35  Mo.  483,  4S7  ;  Ashby  >\  Winston,  26  Pac.  R.  Co.,  47  Cal.  87,  89,  90;  Sullivan 
Mo.  210:  Flibernia  Sav.  Soc.  v.  Ordwav,  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  &  H.  R.  Co.,  19  Blatchf. 
38  Cal.  679;  Lawrence  v.  Montgomery,  388;  Jenkins  r.  Thomason,  32  S.  C.  254. 
37  Cnl.  183.  See  also  Field  v.  Hurst,  9  ^  Forkuer  u.  Hart,  Stanton's  Code,  p. 
S.  C.  277  ;  Eversdon  v.  Mayhew,  85  Cal.  1  ;  60  ;  Wilson  r.  Thompson,  id.  j).  GO ;  Hart 
QRoss  V.  Jones  (1896),  47  S.  C.  211,  25  v.  Cundiff,  id.  p.  61  ;  Hord  r.  Chandler, 
S.  E.  59.]  13  B.  Mon.  403;  McKoe  v.  Pope,  IS  id. 

2  Ashby  V.  Winston,  26  Mo.  210.  If  548,555;  Bonney  y.  Reardin,  6  Bu.'ih,  34  ; 
A.  and  B.  are  sued  together  on  several  Dragoo  v.  Levi,  2  Duv.  520 ;  Chiles  r. 
causes  of  action,  the  joinder  of  which  Drake,  2  Mete.  (Ky-)  l+G ;  Hancock 
would  have  been  proper  had  the  suit  v.  Johnson,  1  Mete.  (Ky.)  242 ;  Sale  v. 
been  against  A.  alone,  A.  may  demur  to  Crntchfield,  8  Bush,  636,  646;  Hinkle  v. 
the  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action.  Hoff-  Dave.nport,  38  Iowa,  355,  358  ;  Cobb  v.  111. 
man  v.  Wheelock,  62  Wis.  434.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  38  Iowa,  601,  616  ;  Grant  v. 

3  Boughcr  y.  Scobey,  16  Ind.  151,  154;  McCarty,  38  Iowa,  468.  If  the  plaintiff 
and  must  be  on  the  specific  ground  of  refuse  to  elect,  the  court  cannot  therefore 
the  misjoinder,  —  a  demurrer  for  want  of  dismiss  the  action,  but  must  make  the 
sufficient  facts  does  not  raise  the  objec-  election  for  him.  Sheppard  v.  Stephens 
tion  :  Cox  V.  West.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  47  Cal.  (Ky.  1887),  2  S.  W.  Rep.  548. 

87,  89,  90 ;  Remy  v.  Olds,  88  Cal.  537.  "[^Arkansas  also  follows  this  practice. 

*  Truesdell   v.  Rhodes,   26    Wis. -215,     Eiley  v.  Norman,  39  Ark.  158.     In  For- 


458  CIVIL   KEMEDIES, 

quoted   in    §  338   show   that   a   similar   practice    exists    in  that 
State. 

S  344.  *  450.  Remedy  wheu  Third  Case  of  Misjoinder  occurs. 
The  third  case  presents  some  difficulties.  When  the  complaint 
or  petition  contains  causes  of  action  which  cannot  properly  be 
united,  and  they  are  mingled  and  combined  in  the  same  allega- 
tions, —  in  other  words,  the  pleading  in  form  sets  forth  but  one 
cause  of  action,  while  in  reality  it  embraces  two  or  more  which 
cannot  be  joined  in  any  form,  —  is  the  defendant's  remedy  by 
demurrer,  or  by  motion  in  the  first  instance  that  the  pleading  be 
made  more  definite  and  certain  by  separating  the  causes  of  action, 
and  by  demurrer  when  such  separation  has  been  accomplished? 
In  Missouri  it  is  definitely  settled  that  the  remedy  is  by  demur- 
rer.^ That  this  is  a  proper  practice  is  implied  with  more  or  less 
distinctness  by  decisions  in  several  other  States.^ 

§  345.  *451.  Author's  Criticism  and  Suggestion  herein.  There 
are  grave  difficulties  attendant  upon  the  adoption  of  such  a  rule, 
although  it  seems  to  be  generally  supported  by  the  decided  cases. 
When,  upon  sustaining  a  demurrer  interposed  upon  the  ground  of 
a  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  the  action  itself  is  not  defeated, 
but  the  causes  of  action  improperl}'  united  are  merely  separated, 
and  new  actions  corresponding  with  such  division  are  proceeded 
with,  it  would  seem  to  be  a  necessary  prerequisite  that  the  causes 

dyce  I'.  Nix  (1893),  58  Ark.  1.36,  23  S.  W.  distinctly  held  by  these  later  cases  :  Gold- 

967,   the    defendant    demurred    for   mis-  berg  v.  Utley,  60  N.  Y.  427,  429  ;   Wiles  v. 

joinder,  but  the  court  considered  the  de-  Suydam,  64  id.  173  ;  Liedersdorf  v.  Second 

nuirrer  as  a  motion  to  strike  and  as  such  Ward   Bk.,   50    Wis.   406  ;    Anderson   v. 

p;issed  upon   its  merits.     See  also   Rev-  Scandia  Bk.  (Minn.,  May,  1893),  54  N.  W. 

nolds   r.    Roth   (1895),   61   Ark.  317,   33  Rep.   1062;  Lamming  v.  Galusha  (N.  Y. 

S.  \V.  105.]  App.  1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  1024. 

1  Mulhulland    v.    Rajjp,    50    Mo.   42 ;  [^Haskell    County    Bank   v.    Bank   of 

Ederlin  v.  Judge,  36  Mo.  350;  Young  v.  Santa  Fe  (1893),  51  Kan.  39,  32  Pac.  624. 

Coleman,  43  Mo.  179,  184;  Cheely's  Adm.  See  Lane  v.  Dowd  (1903),  172  Mo.  167,  72 

V.  Wells,  .33  Mo.  106,  109.     And  see  Pick-  S.  W.  632  ;  Baudmanu  v.  Davis  (1899),  23 

ering  v.  Miss.  Val.  N.  Tel.  Co.,  47  Mo.  457  ;  Mont.  382,  59  Pac  856,  in  which  the  court 

House  I'.  Lowell,  45  Mo.  381.  said  :  "  A  motion  to  exclude  evidence  or 

'^  Gary  v.  Wheeler,  14  Wis.  281  ;  Bur-  an  objection  to  receiving  it,  is  not  the  rem- 

rows  V.  Holderman,  31  Ind.  412  ;  Lane  r.  edy  for  the  intermingling  in  one  count  of 

State,  27  id.  108,  112;  Fritz  ?■.  Fritz,  23  several  causes  of  action  ;  nor  is  there  rem- 

iil.  .383,  390 ;  Hibernia  Sav.  Soc.  i-.  Ord-  edy  other  than  demurrer,   by  which  the 

way,  38  Cal.  679  ;  Ander.son  v.  Hill,  53  complaint    may    be    attacked    upon    the 

Barb.  238.    See,  however,  Rogers  v.  Smith,  ground  that  causes  of  action  are  improp- 

17  Ind.  323,  per  Perkins  .J.,  which  seems  to  erly  united."      Plaukinton  v.  Ilildebrand 

hold  that  tlie  remedy  should  be  by  motion.  (1895),  89  Wis.  209,  61  N.  W.  839.] 
That  a  demurrer  is  the  proper  remedy  is 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  '  459 

of  action  should  have  been  separately  and  distinctly  stated  in  the 
original  pleading.  To  allow  the  demurrer  to  a  complaint  or  peti- 
tion in  which  several  causes  of  action  are  mingled  up,  and  to 
divide  this  mass  of  confused  allegations  into  as  many  complaints 
as  there  are  causes  of  action,  would  seem  to  be  a  work  of  great 
difficulty,  if  not  of  absolute  impossibility.  Again :  it  is  always 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  determine  with  exactness  whether  a 
complaint  or  petition  does  contain  two  or  more  different  causes  of 
action  when  the  allegations  are  thus  combined  into  one  state- 
ment. If  the  averments  are  found  sufficient  to  express  one  cause 
of  action,  it  may  generally  be  said  that  the  other  averments  are 
mere  surplusage,  which  should  be  rejected  on  a  motion  made  for 
that  purpose,  and  not  the  material  allegations  which  set  forth  a 
second  cause  of  action.  For  these  reasons,  which  are  based 
chiefly  upon  notions  of  convenience,  a  demurrer  does  not  seem  to 
be  an  appropriate  remedy  until  the  causes  of  action  have  been 
separated,  and  it  is  known  with  certainty  what  and  how  many 
they  are.  In  this  case,  therefore,  the  more  convenient  practice 
would  seem  to  be  a  motion  in  the  first  instance  to  make  the  plead- 
ing more  certain  and  definite  by  arranging  it  into  distinct  causes 
of  action,  or  a  motion  to  strike  out  the  redundant  matter  and  sur- 
plusage and  thus  reduce  it  to  a  single  definite  cause  of  action. 
The  latter  order  would  take  the  place  of  a  demurrer ;  the  former 
would  be  followed  by  a  demurrer  after  the  causes  of  action  had 
been  separated.^ 

III.  Meaning  of  the  Term  "  Cause  of  Action  ; ''^  Where  one  Cause 
of  Action  only  is  stated^  although  several  Different  Kinds  of 
Relief  are  demanded. 

§  346.  *  452.  Confounding  "  Cause  of  Action "  ■with  "  Remedy." 
Decisions  herein.  Definition  Obtained  by  Analysis.  Tlie  cause 
of  action  is  very  often  confounded  with  the  remedy.  This  mis- 
take or  misconception  is  peculiarly  apt  to  occur  in  cases  where, 
under  the  code,  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  obtain  legal  and  equitable 
relief  combined,  the  right  to  such  relief  springing  from  the  same 
state  of  facts.  To  avoid  this  tendency  to  confusion,  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  ascertain  and  fix  with  certainty  the  true  mean- 

.    1  [[Lewis  r.  Hinson  (1902),  64  S.  C.  571,     Times  Publishiug  Co.  v.  Everett  (1894), 
43  S.  E.  15  (quoting  the  text)  ;  Cargar  v.     9  Wash.  518,  37  Pac.  695.] 
Fee  (1894),  140  Ind.  572,  39  N.   E.  93; 


460  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

iner  of  the  term  "  cause  of  action."'  The  American  courts  of  the 
present  clay  seem  to  avoid  the  announcement  of  any  general 
principle,  or  the  giving  of  any  general  definitions.  While,  there- 
fore, they  have  repeatedly  held  that  but  one  cause  of  action  was 
stated  in  a  case  before  them,  and  have  carefully  distinguished  it 
in  that  instance  from  the  reliefs  demanded,  they  have  not  at- 
tempted to  define  the  term  "  cause  of  action  "  in  any  general  and 
abstract  manner,  so  that  this  definition  might  be  used  as  a  test  in 
all  other  cases.  We  shall  obtain  no  direct  help,  therefore,  from 
their  decisions ;  but  they  will  furnish  examples  and  tests  to  de- 
termine whether  any  definition  which  may  be  framed  is  accurate. 
1  shall,  however,  attempt  a  definition  or  description,  basing  it 
upon  an  analysis  of  the  essential  elements  wliich  enter  into  every 
judicial  proceeding  for  the^jixutection  of  a  private  right  on  the 
OMC  side,  and  the  enforceiuent  o t  aT^jnyat'e  Hiity^h "_ffie  other. 
There  are  such  elements  or  ieatures  which  necessarily  combine  in 
every  action ;  they  are  independent  of  any  judicial  recognition ; 
they  exist  in  tha  very  nature  of  things;  and,  if  we  can  by  an 
accurate  analysis  discover  these  elements,  we  shall  at  once  have 
obtained  a  correct  notion  of  the  term  "  cause  of  action." 

§  347.  *  453.  Remedy.  Elements  of  every  Judicial  Action. 
Elements  Constituting  Cause  of  Action.  Every  action  is  brought 
in  order  to  obtain  some  particular  result  which  we  term  the 
remedij^  whicli  the  code  calls  the  "  relief,"  and  which,  when 
granted,  is  summed  up  or  embodied  in  the  judgment  of  the  court. 
This  result  is  not  the  "cause  of  action  "  as  that  term  is  used  in 
the  codes.  It  is  true  this  final  result,  or  rather  the  desire  of  ob- 
taining it,  is  the  primary  motive  which  acts  upon  the  will  of  the 
plaintiff  and  impels  him  to  commence  the  proceeding,  and  in  the 
metaphysical  sense  it  can  properly  be  called  the  cause  of  this  ac- 
tion, but  it  is  certainly  not  so  in  the  legal  sense  of  the  phrase. 
This  final  result  is  the  "  object  of  the  action  "  as  that  term  is 
frequently  used  in  the  codes  and  in  modern  legal  terminology.^ 
It  was  shown  in  the  introduction  that  every  remedial  riglit  arises 
out  of  an  antecedent  primary  riglit  and  corresponding  duty  and  a 
delict  or  breach  of  such  primary-  right  and  duty  by  the  person  on 
whom  tlie  duty  rests.     Every  judicial  action  must  therefore  involve 

^  Q"  Every  actiou  is  brought  in  orflcr  not  '  the  cau'^e  of  action ; '  it  is  rather 
to  obtain  some  particular  result  whicli  is  tlie  '  object  of  the  action.' "  Wildinau'T. 
termeii  the  remedy.     This  final  result  is     WiMnian  (ISOS,',  70  Conn.  700,  41  Atl.  1.] 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  461 

the  following  elements :  a  2£HB2LiXLisbi  B9§^6^si^^ 
and  a  corresponding  primary  duty. devolving  iip()n  the  defendant; 
a  delict  or  wrong  done   by  the  defendant  which  consistei|.. in  _a 
bfeacK  of  sucli"^i5"rrmarY  rifflit  and  duty  ;  a  remedial  xiirht  in  iayor 
of  the  plaintiff,  and  a  remedial  duty  resting   on  the  defendant 
springing  from  this  delict,  and  finally  the  remedy  or  relief  itself. 
Every  action,  however  complicated  or  however  simple,  must  con- 
tain these    essential   elements.     Of  these  elements,  the  primary- 
right  and  duty  and  the  delict  or  wrong  combined  constitute  thej 
cause  of  action  in  the  legal  sense  of  the  term,  and  as  it  is  usedJ 
in  the  codes  of  the  several  States.     They  are  the  legal  cause  oij 
foundation  whence  the  right  of  action  springs,  this  right  of  action 
being  identical  with  the  "  remedial  right "  as  designated  in  my 
analysis.^     In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  pleading  adopted 
in  the  new  American  system,  the  existence  of  a  legal  right  in  an 
abstract  form  is  never  alleged  by  the  plaintiff  ;  but,  instead  thereof, 
the  facts  from  which  that  right  arises  are  set  forth,  and  the  right 
itself  is  inferred  therefrom.     The  cause  of  action,  as  it  appears  in  \ 
the  complaint  when  properly  pleaded,  will  therefore  always  be  the  1 
facts  from  which  the  plaintiff's  primary  right  and  the  defendant's  j 
corresponding  primary  duty  have  arisen,  together  with  the  facts! 
whicli  constitute  the  defendant's  delict  or  act  of  wrong.^ 

1  [^Jameson  v.  Bartlett  (1902),  63  Neb.     out  of  tlie  wrong  of  the  defendant,  and  if 
638,  88  N.  W.  860.]  not,  what  that  cause  of  action  is.     The 

plaintiffs  are  the  owners  of  a  strip  of  land 
^  IXeariina  of  "Cause  of  Action."  ^^^^^  ^j^j^j^  jl^^  defendant  has  wrongfully 

"The  question  is  not  determined  by  entered  and  erected  a  wall  which  is  a  por- 

the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  for  though  tion  of  her  house.    The  facts  alleged  show 

in  section  484  it  prescribes  what  separate  one  primary  right  of  the  plaintiffs  and  one 

causes  of  action  may  be  joined  in  the  same  wrong  done  by  the  defendant  which  in- 

complaint,  it  nowhere   assumes  to  define  vol ves  that  right.    Therefore,  the  plaintiffs 

what  is  a  single  cause  of  actiou :  "  Reilly  have  stated  but  a  single  cause  of  action, 

I.'.  Sicilian  Asphalt  Paving  Co.  (1902),  170  no    matter    how  many  forms   and  kinds 

N.  Y.  40,  62  N.  E.  772.  of  relief  they   may  be  entitled  to.     The 

"  We  are  of  the  opinion  that  the  cause  relief  prayed  for,  or  to  which  they  may  be 

of  the  action  con.^ists  of  the  negligent  act  entitled,  is  no  part  of  their  cause  of  action 

which  produced  the  effect,  rather  than  in  (Pomeroy's   Code  Kemcdios,    §  *455):" 

the  effect  of  the  act  in  its  application  to  llahl  v.  vSugo   (1901),  169  N.  Y.  109,  62 

different  primary  rights,  and  that  the  in-  N.   E.   135.      "In  every  cause   of  action 

jury  to  the  person  and  property  as  a  result  tiiere  must  exist  a  primary  right,  a  corre- 

of  the  original  cau.se  gives  rise  to  different  sponding  primary  duty,  and  a  failure  to 

items  of  damage:"  King  v.  Chicago,  M.  perform  that  duty  :  "  South  Bend  Cliilled 

&  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  80  Minn.  83,  82  Plow  Co.  v.  George  C.  Cribb  Co.  (1900), 

N.  W.  1113.  105  Wis.  443,  81  N.  W.  675. 

"  Let  us  nov7  see  whether  the  plaintiffs  "  In  applying  the  rule,  some  confusion 

have  more  than  one  cause  of  action  arising  has  resulted  from  the  neglect  to  define  the 


462 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§  348.  *  454.  Cause  of  Action 
Examples.     The  cause  of  action 

terms  '  cause  of  action  '  and  '  action  ; '  to 
whidi,  tlicrefore,  our  attention  must  be 
first  directed.  The  latter  term  is  very 
comniouly  confounded  with  the  suit  (litis) 
ill  which  the  action  is  enforced.  But  this 
is  not  the  technical  meaning  of  the  term, 
according  to  which  an  action  is  simply  the 
right  or  power  to  enforce  an  obligation. 
'  An  action  is  nothing  else  than  the  right 
or  power  of  prosecuting  in  a  judicial  pro- 
ceeding wliut  is  owed  to  one,'  —  which  is  to 
say,  an  obligation,  .  .  .  The  action  there- 
fore springs  from  the  obligation,  and 
hence  the  '  cause  of  action  '  is  simply  the 
obligation.  .  .  .  The  '  cause  of  action  '  is 
therefore  to  be  distinguished,  also,  from 
the  '  remedy,'  —  which  is  simply  the  means 
by  which  the  obligation  or  the  correspond- 
ing action  is  effectuated,  —  and  also  from 
the  '  relief  '  sought :  "  Frost  v.  Witter 
(1901),  132  Cal.  421,  G4  Pac.  703.  "It 
does  not  appear  from  the  petition  that  the 
trustees  have  been  in  any  way  extravagant 
or  negligent  or  dilatory  in  the  perform- 
ance of  the  duties  of  their  office,  or  that 
they  have  violated  any  law  or  contract,  or 
caused  any  injury,  or  done  any  wrong,  or 
witiiheld  any  right,  or  that  they  have 
threatened  or  are  about  to  do  any  such 
thing.  At  least,  some  one  of  these  ele- 
ments is  essential  to  a  cause  of  action  :  " 
Sands  v.  Gund  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93 
N.  W.  990.  "  As  was  said  iu  Bruil  v. 
Northwestern  M.  K.  Ass'n,  72  Wis.  430, 
the  words  '  cause  of  action '  .  .  .  include 
the  act  or  omission  without  which  there 
would  be  no  cause  of  action  or  right  of 
recovery : "  Hosley  i'.  Wisconsin  Odd 
Fellows  Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1893),  86 
Wis.  463,  57  N.  W.  48.  Threatt  v.  Mining 
Co.  (1896),  49  S.  C.  95,  26  S.  E.  970. 

"  To  borrow  the  phraseology  of  Mr. 
Pomeroy,  the  primary  right,  which  the 
plaintiffs  are  seeking  to  enforce,  is  the 
right  to  have  the  assets  of  the  estate  of 
their  alleged  debtor  applied  to  the  pay- 
ment of  their  cbiirn,  and  the  breach  of  this 
primary  right  in  the  modes  stated  in  the 
complaint  is  the  delict  complained  of. 
These  two  things,  says  Mr.  Pomeroy,  in 
his  work  on  Remedies,  according  to  the 
Code  Pleailing,  at  page  487,  sec.  4.')3 
[*45.3],  con.«titute  the  cause  of  action:*' 


and  Remedial  Right  Differentiated, 
thus  defined  is  plainly  different 

Sheppard  v.  Green  (1896),  48  S.  C.  165,  26 
S.  E.  224.  Smith  -■.  Smith  (1897),  .50  S.  C. 
54, 27  S.  E.  545,  quotes  the  author's  Analy- 
sis of  a  cause  of  action  with  apparent 
approval.  Broughel  v.  So.  New  Eug.  Tel. 
Co.  (1900),  72  Conn.  617,  45  Atl.  435.  "  A 
cause  of  action  consists  of  a  right  belong- 
ing to  the  plaintiff,  which  has  been  violated 
by  some  wrongful  act  or  omi.ssion  of  the 
defendant :  "  Goodrich  v.  Alfred  (1899),  72 
Conn.  257,  43  Atl.  1041.  Wildman  v. 
Wildmau  (1898),  70  Conn.  700,  41  Atl. 
1,  quotes  from  §  *  453  of  the  text  and  adds  : 
"  Stated  in  brief,  a  cause  of  action  may  be 
said  to  cousist  of  a  right  belonging  to  the 
plaintiff  and  some  wrongful  act  or  omis- 
sion done  by  the  defendant,  by  which  that 
right  has  been  violated." 

"It  is  said,  though,  that  even  if  the 
amendment  set  forth  a  cause  of  action,  it 
should  have  been  stricken  for  the  reason 
that  it  set  forth  a  new  and  distinct  cause 
of  action.  To  determine  this  question  it 
is  necessary  to  ascertain  what  was  the 
cause  of  action  set  forth  in  the  original 
petition.  If  the  right  to  recover  the 
property  in  controversy  upon  the  legal 
title  was  the  cause  of  action  originally  set 
forth,  then  it  would  seem  that  the  amend- 
ment did  contain  a  new  cause  of  action, 
for  it  was  based  upon  an  alleged  right  to 
recover  the  projierty  upon  an  equitable 
title.  It  needs  no  argument  to  show  that 
an  equitalile  title  is  entirely  separate  and 
distinct  from  a  legal  title.  To  say,  how- 
ever, that  the  cause  of  action  set  forth  in 
the  original  petition  was  the  right  to 
recover  upon  a  legal  title  is  giving  the 
term  '  cause  of  action '  too  restricted  a 
meaning.  The  cause  of  action  in  such  a 
case  consists,  not  only  of  the  right  of  the 
plaintiff  but  of  the  wrong  of  the  defend- 
ant. The  right  of  the  plaintiff  consists  in 
being  entitled  to  the  possession  of  the 
property  which  i.s  owned  by  him,  and  the 
wrong  of  the  defendant  consists  in  his 
withhuMing  from  the  plaintiff  that  which 
is  rightfully  his.  Under  this  view  of  the 
matter  the  cause  of  action  set  forth  in 
the  original  petititm  was  based  upon  two 
facts  :  ownership  of  the  ])roj)erty  l)y  the 
plaintiff,  and  the  wrongful  withholding  of 
po.ssc.ssiou  by  the  defendants :  "  McCaud- 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION. 


463 


from  the  remedial  riglit,  and  from  the  remedy  or  relief  itself. 
The  remedial  right  is  the  consequence,  the  secondary  right  which 
springs  into  being  from  the  breach  of  the  plaintiff's  primary  right 


less  V.  Inland  Acid  Co.    (1902),  115   Ga. 
968,  42  S.  E.  449. 

"A  'cause  of  action,'  as  the  term  is 
used  in  pleading,  is  not  the  name  under 
which  a  state  of  facts  may  he  classed,  hut 
it  consists  of  the  facts  giving  rise  to  the 
action.  An  action  is  a  proceeding  in 
court.  Code,  section  3424.  The  cause  of 
action  is  the  fact  or  tlie  facts  that  'justify 
it  or  show  the  right  to  maintain  it.' 
Hence,  when  a  material  fact,  necessary  to 
a  recovery,  is  omitted  from  a  petition,  we 
say  it  does  not  state  a  cause  of  action. 
In  5  Am.  &  Eng.  Euc.  Law,  776,  it  is 
said  :  '  The  cause  of  action  is  the  entire 
state  of  facts  that  gives  rise  to  an  ehforce- 
ahle  claim.  The  phrase  comprises  every 
fact  which,  if  traversed,  the  plaintiff  must 
prove  in  order  to  obtain  judgment.'  This 
definition  is  taken,  substantially,  from 
the  case  of  Read  v.  Brown,  22  Q.  B.  Div. 
128.  In  that  case  it  is  said  that  a  cause 
of  action  is  '  every  fact  which  it  would 
be  necessary  for  plaintiff"  to  prove,  if 
traversed,  in  order  to  support  his  right  to 
the  judgment  of  the  court.'  It  is  tlien 
said  :  '  It  does  not  comprise  every  piece  of 
evidence  which  is  necessary  to  prove  each 
fact,  but  every  fact  which  is  necessary  to 
be  proved.'  In  Hutchinson  v.  Ains- 
worth,  73  Cal.  452  (15  Pac.  Eep.  82), 
speaking  of  a  cause  of  action  with  ref- 
erence to  the  statute  of  limitations,  it 
is  said :  '  The  facts  upon  which  the 
plaintiff's  right  to  sue  is  based,  and  upon 
which  the  defendant's  duty  has  arisen, 
coupled  with  the  facts  which  constitute 
tlie  latter 's  wrong,  make  up  tlie  cause  of 
action.'  See  Bruil  v.  Association,  72 
Wis.  430  (39  N.  W.  529),  and  Rapalje 
&  Lawrence,  Law  Dictionary,  180.  Care 
siiould  be  taken  not  to  confuse  the  term 
'  cause  of  action '  as  used  abstractly  and 
as  used  in  pleading.  In  a  general  sense, 
the  term  means  '  a  claim  which  may  be 
enforced.'  Bucklin  i-.  Ford,  5  Barb.  393. 
'  It  is  a  right  which  a  party  has  to  insti- 
tute and  carry  through  an  action.'  Myer 
V.  Van  Collem,  28  Barb.  230.  '  The  right 
to  prosecute  an  action  with  effect.' 
Douglas  V.  Forrest,  4  Bing.  704.     Look- 


ing to  these  cases,  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
term  '  cause  of  action '  is  used  with  no 
purpose  to  indicate  a  rule  by  which  one 
cause  of  action  may  be  distinguished  from 
a^iother,  but  merely  with  reference  to  the 
existence  of  a  cause  of  action.  We  use 
expressions  like  these:  '  A  cause  of  action 
for  negligence ; '  '  A  cause  of  action  for 
malicious  prosecution ; '  '  A  cause  of  action 
for  desertion.'  They  indicate  the  subject 
or  subject-matter  of  the  action,  but  are 
meaningless  as  showing  a  particular  cause 
of  action.  In  Rodgers  c.  Association,  17 
S.  C.  406,  are  the  following  (juery  and 
answer :  '  What  is  a  cause  of  action  1  We 
must  keep  in  view  the  difference  between 
the  subject  of  the  action  and  the  cause  of 
the  action.  The  subject  of  the  action  was 
what  was  formerly  understood  as  the  sub- 
ject matter  of  the  action.  .  .  .  The  cause  of 
the  action  is  the  right  claimed  or  wrong 
suffered  by  the  plaintiff,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  duty  or  delict  of  the  defendant, 
on  the  other ;  and  these  appear  by  the  facts 
of  each  separate  case.  We  have  empha- 
sized closing  words  to  call  especial 
attention  to  the  rule  when  applied  to  a 
particular  case  :  "  Box  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
P.  liy.  Co.  (1899),  107  la.  660,  78  N.  W. 
694. 

"  But  neither  the  conception  of  the 
plaintiffs  or  defendant,  nor  the  kind  of 
relief  prayed,  while  they  may  be  con- 
sidered, is  conclusive  upon  the  court  as  to 
what  the  cause  of  action  is  which  the 
pleading  sets  up.  That  fact  must  be 
determined  from  the  pleading  itself. 
Upon  a  careful  analysis  of  this  complaint, 
we  think  it  quite  clear  that  the  real  cause 
of  action  stated  is  the  violation  by  the 
trustee  of  his  duty  to  the  cestuis  que  trust- 
erit  in  indirectly  buying  for  himself  the 
trust  property  at  tlie  executor's  sale : " 
French  y.  Woodruff  (1898),  25  Colo.  339, 
45  Pac.  416.  "The  foundation  of  the 
cause  of  action  in  bot'a  complaints  is 
the  transaction  constituting  the  trust;  the 
cause  of  action  in  both  is  the  violation  of 
that  trust ;  and  both  are  equitable  in  char- 
acter :  "  Mullen  V.  McKim  (1896),  22 
Colo.  463,  45  Pac.   416.] 


\ 


464  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

by  the  defendant's  wrong,  wliile  tlie  remedy  is  the  consummation 
or  satisfaction  of  this  remedial  right.  From  one  cause  of  action, 
that  is,  from  one  primary  right  and  one  delict  being  a  breach 
thereof,  it  is  possible,  and  not  at  all  uncommon,  that  two  or 
more  remedial  rights  may  arise,  and  therefore  two  or  more  differ- 
ent kinds  of  relief  answering  to  these  separate  remedial  rights. 
This  is  especially  so  when  one  remedial  right  and  corresponding 
relief  are  legal,  and  the  other  equitable ;  but  it  is  not  confined  to 
such  cases.  One  or  tw^o  very  familiar  examples  will  sufficiently 
illustrate  this  statement,  and  will  show  the  necessity  as  well  as 
the  ease  of  discriminating  between  the  "•  cause  of  action  "  and  the 
remedy.  Let  the  facts  which  constitute  the  plaintiff's  primary 
right  be  a  contract  duly  entered  into  by  which  the  defendant 
agreed  to  convey  to  the  plaintiff'  a  parcel  of  land,  and  full  pay- 
ment by  the  plaintiff  of  the  stipulated  price  and  performance  of 
all  other  stipulations  on  his  part.  Let  the  debet  be  a  refusal  by 
the  defendant  to  perform  on  his  part.  This  is  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion, and  it  is  plainly  single.  From  it  there  arise  two  remedial 
rights  and  two  corresponding  kinds  of  relief ;  namely,  the  reme- 
dial right  to  a  compensation  in  damages,  with  the  relief  of  actual 
pecuniary  damages ;  and  the  remedial  right  to  an  actual  perform- 
ance of  the  agreement,  and  the  relief  of  an  execution  and  deliv- 
ery of  the  deed  of  conveyance.  If  the  plaintiff  in  one  action 
should  state  the  foregoing  facts  constituting  his  cause  of  action, 
and  should  demand  judgment  in  the  alternative  either  for  dam- 
ages or  for  a  specific  performance,  he  would,  as  the  analysis  above 
given  conclusively  shows,  have  alleged  but  one  cause  of  action, 
although  the  reliefs  prayed  for  would  be  distinct,  and  would  have 
belonged  under  the  old  system  to  different  forums,  —  the  common 
law  and  the  equity  courts.  Again  :  let  the  plaintiff's  primary 
right  be  the  ownership  and  right  to  possession  of  a  certain  tract 
of  land,  and  let  the  facts  from  which  it  arises  be  properly  alleged ; 
let  the  delict  consist  in  the  defendant's  wrongful  taking  and  re- 
taining possession  and  user  of  sucli  land  for  a  specified  period  of 
time,  and  let  the  facts  showing  this  wrong  be  properly  averred  in 
the  same  pleading.  Evidently  the  plaintiff  will  have  stated  one 
single  and  very  simple  cause  of  action.  The  remedial  rights  aris- 
ing therefrom,  and  the  remedies  tliemselves  corresponding  thereto, 
will  be  threefold,  and  all  of  them  legal :  namely,  (1)  the  right  to 
be  restored  to  possession,  with  the  actual  relief  of  restored  pos- 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  465 

session  ;  (2)  the  right  to  obtain  compensation  in  damages  for  the 
wrongful  withholding  of  the  land,  with  the  relief  of  actual  pecu- 
niary damages ;  and  (3)  the  right  to  recover  the  rents  and  profits 
received  by  the  defendant  during  the  period  of  his  possession, 
with  the  relief  of  an  actual  pecuniary  sum  in  satisfaction  therefor. 
Here,  also,  the  single  nature  of  the  one  cause  of  action  plainly 
appears,  and  its  .evident  distinction  from  the  various  remedial 
rights  and  actual  remedies  which  do  or  may  arise  from  it.^ 

§  349.  *  455.  Test  in  Determining  whether  Different  Causes  of 
Action  have  been  stated.  Caution  in  Applying  Test.  The  result  of 
this  analysis  of  tlie  necessary  elements  which  enter  into  every 
action  is  simple,  easily  to  be  understood,  and  yet  exceedingly  im- 
portant ;  and  the  principle  I  have  thus  deduced  will  serve  as  an 
unerring  test  in  determining  whether  different  causes  of  action 
have  been  joined  in  a  pleading,  or  whether  one  alone  has  been 
stated.  If  the  facts  alleged  show  one  primary  right  of  the  plain- 
tiff, and  one  wrong  done  by  the  defendant  which  involves  that 
right,  the  plaintiff  has  stated  but  a  single  cause  of  action,  no 
{A  matter  how  many  forms  and  kinds  of  relief  he  may  claim  that  he 
^,/is  entitled  to,  and  may  ask  to  recover ;  the  relief  is  no  part  of  the 
cause  of  action.  In  applying  this  test,  however,  it  must  be  ob- 
served that  the  single  primary  riglit,  and  the  single  wrong,  which, 
taken  togetlier,  constitute  the  one  cause  of  action,  may  eacli  be 
very  comj^licated.  For  example,  the  primary  right  of  ownership 
includes  not  only  the  particular  subordinate  rights  to  use  th^ 
thing  owned  in  any  manner  permitted  by  the  law,  but  also  similar! 
rights  to  the  forbearance  on  the  part  of  all  mankind  to  molest  the/ 
proprietor  in  such  use.  The  facts  which  constitute  the  delicti 
complained  of  may, embrace  not  only  the  wrongful  obtaining,  ana 
keeping  possession,  in  such  a  case  as  the  one  last  supposed,  but 
also  the  procuring  and  holding  deeds  of  conveyance,  or  other 
muniiheats^pf  title^jDy  which  such  possession  is  made  possible^ 
and  to  appear  rightful.  These  suggestions  are  necessary  to  guard 
against  the  mistake  of  supposing  that  a  distinct  cause  of  action 

1  The   fact   that  the   codes   generally  See  Larned  r.  Hudson,  57  N.  Y.  151,  which 

seem  to  treat  these  different  claims  for  is  based  entirely  upon  the  language  of  the 

relief  as  distinct  causes  of  action  does  not  statute. 

affect  the  correctness  of  my  analysis;  they  [^Christensen  v.  Hollingsworth  (1898), 

are  plainly  no  more  than  separate  reliefs  6  Idaho,  87,  53  Pac.  211 ;  Vermont  Loan  & 

or  remedies   based   upon  the  same  facts  Trust  Co.  v.  McGregor  (1897),  5  Idaho, 

which  constitute  a  single  cause  of  action.  320,  51  Pac.  102.J 

30 


466 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


will  arise  from  each  special  subordinate  right  included  in  the 
general  primary  right  held  by  the  plaintiff,  or  from  each  particular 
act  of  wrong,  which,  in  connection  with  others,  may  make  up  the 
composite  but  single  delict  complained  of.^ 


1  r Different  Kinds  of  Itclief  frotn  one 
Cause  of  Action, 

"  The  first  common  tirouml  of  demurrer 
is  that  several  causes  of  action  are  improp- 
erly united.  A  general  rule  governing 
such  objections  as  this  is  that  a  complaint 
in  equity  is  not  multifarious  which  presents 
but  one  primary  right  for  enforcement,  or 
one  subject  of  action  for  adjudication, 
though  it  may  pray  for  many  and  various 
forms  of  relief,  all  germane  to  that  single 
subject  of  the  action,  or  to  the  vindication 
of  that  primary  right :  "  Level  Land  Co. 
V.  Sivyer  (190l"),  1^2  Wis.  442,  88  N.  W. 
317;  Imperial  Shale  Brick  Co.  v.  Jewett 
(1901),  169  N.  Y.  143,  62N.  E.167;  White- 
head V.  Sweet  (1899),  126  Cal.  67,  58  Pac. 
376.  See  also  Washington  National  Bank 
V.  Woodrum  (1898),  60  Kan.  34,  55  Pac. 
330;  Sherrin  v.  Flinn  (1900),  155  Ind. 
422,  58  N.  E.  549  ;  Gunder  v.  Tibbits 
(1899),  153  Ind.  591,  55  N.  E.  7G2 ;  Darby 
V.  M.  K.  &  T.  Ky.  Co.  (1900),  156  Mo.  391, 
57  S.  W.  550;  Pryor  v.  Kansas  City  (1899), 
153  Mo.  135,  54  S.  W.  499  ;  Rissler  v.  Ins. 
Co.  (1899),  150  Mo.  366,  51  S.  W.  755; 
Wheeler  Savings  Bank  v.  Tracey  (1897), 
141  Mo.  252,  42  S.  W.  946;  Mcintosh  v. 
Kaukin  (189G),  134  Mo.  340,  35  S.  W- 
995;  Thompson  f.  Harris  (1902),  64  Kan. 
124,  67  Pac.  456;  Sheppard  v.  Green 
(1896),  48  S.  C.  165,  26  S.  E.  224,  quoting 
the  te.xt;  Adkins  v.  Loucks  (1900),  107 
Wis.  587,  83  N.  W.  934;  Jordan  v.  Estate 
of  Warner  (1900),  107  Wis.  539  ;  83  N.  W. 
94G;  Fo.ster  v.  Posson  (1899),  105  Wis.  99, 
81  N.  W.  123  ;  Perry  v.  Jefferies  (1901 ),  61 
S.  C.  292,  39  S.  E.  315  ;  Matthews  v.  Bauk 
(1901),  60  S.  C.  183,  38  S.  E.  437;  Day  v. 
Schneider  (1896),  28  Ore.  457,  43  Pac. 
6.'.0;  Hough  V.  Hough  (1894),  25  Ore.  218, 
35  Pac.  249;  Bostick  v.  Barnes  (1900),  59 
S.  C.  22,  37  S.  E.  24;  Mew  v.  Railway 
Co.  (1899),  55  S.  C.  90,  32  S.  E.  828; 
Sloan  V.  Railway  Co.  (1902),  64  S.  C. 
389,  42  S.  E.  197;  Farley  v.  Basket  and 
Veneer  Co.  (1897),  51  S.  C.  222,  28  S.  E. 
193 ;  Jackins  v.  Dickin.son  (1893),  39  S.  C. 
436.  17  S.  E.  996;  I)aw.«on  v.  Marsh 
(1902),  74  Conn.  498,  51    At).  529;   Brock- 


ett  1-.  Fair  Haven  &  W.  R.  Co.  (1900),  73 
Conn.  428,  47  Atl.  763 ;  Angliu  c.  Couloy 
(1903),— Ky.—,  71  S.  W.  926;  :\Iitchc]l 
V.  New  Farmers'  Bank's  Trustee  (1901), 
—  Ky.— ,  60  S.  W.  375;  Hueston  v.  Mis- 
sissippi &  Rum  River  Boom  Co.  (1899), 
76  Minn.  251,  79  N.  W.  92;  Chicago.  Rock 
Island,  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Haywood  &  Sou 
(1897),  102  la.  392,  71  N.  W.  358;  Eagle 
Iron  Works  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897),  101  la. 
289,  70  N.  W.  193;  Glover  I'.Narcy  (1894), 
92  la.  286,  60  N.  W.  531  ;  Baxter  i;.  Camp 
(1898),  71  Conn.  243,41  Atl.  803.  But  see 
Ramsdell  v.  Clark  (1897),  20  Mont.  103, 
49  Pac.  591  ;  Craft  Refrigerating  Machine 
Co.  V.  Quinnipiac  Brewing  Co.  (1893),  63 
Conn.  551,  29  Atl.  76,  in  wliich  the  courc 
said :  "  Separate  counts  are  required  for 
separate  and  distinct  causes  of  action,  but 
not  for  the  presentation  of  se])arnte  and 
distinct  claims  for  relief  founded  on  the 
same  cause  of  action  or  transaction." 

See  also  Threatt  v.  Mining  Co.  (1896), 
49  S.  C.  95,  26  S.  E.  970,  from  whirli  the 
following  is  quoted  :  "The  first  and  second 
grounds  of  appeal  are  intended  to  allege 
error  in  the  refusal  of  the  Circuit  Judge 
to  grant  defendant's  motion  to  recinire  the 
plaintiff  to  elect  which  one  of  the  several 
causes  of  action  set  out  in  the  complaint  he 
would  go  to  trial  upon.  No  doubt  exists 
that  the  Circuit  .Judge  met  this  issue 
squarely;  he  decided  that  the  complaint 
stated  but  one  cause  of  action.  Was  this 
error  ?  .  .  .  Alter  all  it  resolves  itself  into 
a  question  of  what  the  complaint  actually 
alleges,  wliether  it  was  one  or  several 
causes  of  action.  Great  care  must  always 
be  observed  to  grasp  the  question,  Wliat 
right  of  the  plaintiff  has  the  dcfcnd.iut  in- 
vaded  ?  .  .  .  What  the  plaintiff  in  tiie  case 
at  bar  really  seeks  is  to  prevent  the  de- 
fendant, tiirough  its  milling  operations, 
from  invading  his  riglit  of  property.  The 
injury  to  his  bottom  land  is  one  element 
m  this  invasion  of  his  right  of  property  ; 
the  injury  to  his  right  to  water  his  stock 
in  tlie  stream  is  another  element;  the  in- 
jury to  pure  air  at  his  home  is  another 
clement ;  the  injury  to  his  fishing  privilege 


JOINDER   OF   CAL'.si:s    uK    AUlioN.  467 

§  350.  *  456.  Two  or  more  Distinct  Rights  each  Invaded  by  Dis- 
tinct Wrongs,  and  t"wo  Rights  Invaded  by  one  and  the  same  Wrong, 
or  one  Right  Broken  by  two  Separate  Wrongs.  Oil  the  other 
hand,  if  the  facts  alleged  in  the  pleading  show  that  the  plaintiff 
is  possessed  of  two  or  more  distinct  and  separate  primary  rights, 
each  of  which  has  been  invaded,  or  that  the  defendant  has  coiii- 
niitted  two  or  more  distinct  and  separate  wrongs,  it  follows  inevi- 
tably, from  the  foregoing  principle,  that  the  plaintiff  has  united 
two  or  more  causes  of  action,  although  the  remedial  rights  aris- 
ing from  each,  and  the  corresponding  reliefs,  may  be  exactly  of 
the  same  kind  and  nature.  If  two  separate  and  distinct  primary 
rights  could  be  invaded  by  one  and  the  same  wrong,  or  if  the 
single  primary  right  should  be  invaded  by  two  distinct  and  sepa- 
rate legal  wrongs,  in  either  case  two  causes  of  action  would  re- 
sult ;  a  fortiori  must  this  be  so  when  the  two  primary  rights  are 
each  broken  by  a  separate  and  distinct  wrong. 

§  351.  *  457.  General  Principle  Drawn  from  Analysis  of  Essen- 
tial Elements  of  a  Judicial  Action.  The  general  principle  which  I 
have  thus  drawn  from  an  analysis  of  the  essential  elements  which 
make  up  a  judicial  action  can  be  applied  to  all  possible  cases,  and 
v.'ill  furnish  a  sure  and  simple  test  by  which  to  determine  whether 
one  or  more  causes  of  action  have  been  embodied  in  any  complaint 
or  petition.^     The  demand  for  relief  must  be  entirely  disregarded ; 

in  sucH  stream  is  another  element;  tlie  in-  ing  at  the  wliole  pleading,  there  is  more 
jury  to  the  two  neighborhood  roads  is  an-  than  one  primary  right  presented  thereby 
other  element;  tlie  injury  to  his  ditches  for  vindication.  There  may  be  many 
another  element ;  and  the  injury  to  the  air  minor  subjects,  and  facts  may  be  stated 
he  breathes  while  in  his  bottom  lands  is  constituting  independent  grounds  for  re- 
another  element.  All  these  elements  enter  lief,  either  as  between  the  plaintiff  and  all 
in  to  complete  the  alleged  wrong  to  plain-  the  defendants,  or  the  former  and  one  of 
tiff  by  this  defendant  tlirough  his  milling  the  latter,  or  between  defendants,  and 
operations.  The  Circuit  Judge  evidently  there  be  still  but  a  single  primary  purpose 
took  this  view  of  the  complaint  when  he  of  the  suit,  with  which  all  the  other  mat- 
overruled  this  objection  to  it.  We  take  the  ters  are  so  connected  as  to  be  reasonably 
same  view  of  tliis  matter,  and,  therefore,  considered  germane  thereto, —  parts  of  one 
overrule  these  two  exceptions."  Wildinan  entire  subject,  presenting  to  the  court  but 
V  Wildman  (1898),  70  Conn.  700,  41  Atl.  one  ])rimary  ground  i'or  invoking  its  juris- 
1  ;  South  Bend  Chilled  I*low  Co.  u.  George  diction.  That  was  the  rule  before  the 
C.  Cribb  Co.  (1900),  105  Wis.  443,  81  code,  and  it  was  preserved  thereby  iu  un- 
N.  W.  839.]  mistakable  language,  as  this  court  has  said 

1  \_Test  to  determiue  tvhHher  Plnad-  On  many  occasions:"  Herman  v.  Felthou- 

inff  states  one,  or  more  than  one,  sen    (1902),   114   Wis.  423,   90  N.  W.   432. 

Cause  of  Action.  Sec  also  Level  Laud  Co.  v.  Sivyer  (1901), 

"  The  test  to  be  applied  in  order  to  de-  112  Wis.  442,  88  N.  W.  317.     "  The  infal- 

termine  whether  a  complaint  states  more  lible  test,  by  which  to  determine  whether 

than  one  cause  of  action,  is  whether,  look-  a  complaint  states  more  than  one  cause  of 


468 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


whether  single  or  complex,  it 
effect  upon,  the  "  cause  of  action, 

action,  is,  Does  it  present  more  than  one 
subject  of  action  or  primary  right  for  ad- 
judication 1  ...  If  it  stand  that  test,  no 
matter  how  many  incidental  matters  may 
be  connected  with  the  primary  right,  ren- 
dering other  parties  than  the  main  defend- 
ant i)roper  or  necessary  to  the  litigation 
for  a  complete  settlement  of  the  contro- 
versy as  to  plaintiff,  or  for  the  due  protec- 
tion of  their  rights  as  against  him  or 
between  tliemselves,  there  is  yet  but  one 
cause  of  action,  and  a  demurrer  upon  the 
ground  of  tlie  improper  joinder  of  causes 
of  action  will  not  lie : "  Adkius  r.  Loucks 
(I'JOO).  107  Wis.  587,  83  N.  W.  934. 

'■  As  has  often  been  said  by  this  court, 
the  test  of  wliether  there  is  more  than  one 
cause  of  action  stated  in  a  complaint  is  not 
whether  there  are  different  kinds  of  relief 
prayed  for  or  objects  sought,  but  wlietlier 
there  is  more  than  one  primary  right 
sought  to  be  enforced  or  one  sul)ji'ct  of 
controversy  presented  for  adjudication  ;  " 
South  Bend  Chilled  Plow  Co.  v.  Geori^e  C. 
Cribb  Co.  (1900),  105  Wis.  443,  81  N.  W. 
675.  See  also  Zinc  Carbonate  Co.  v.  The 
rirst  National  Hank  of  Shullsburg  (1899), 
103  Wis.  125,  79  N.  W.  229;  Gager 
r.  Marsden  (1899),  101  Wis.  598,  77  N.  W. 
922.  In  Threatt  v.  Mining  Co.  (1896),  49 
S.  C.  95,  26  S.  E.  970,  it  is  said:  "Great 
care  must  always  l)e  observed  to  grasp  the 
question,  What  right  of  the  plaintiif  has 
the  defendant  invaded  ■?  " 

The  test  prescribed  in  the  text  was 
adopted  in  the  case  of  lleilly  v.  Sicilian 
Asphalt  Paving  Co.  (1902),  170  N.  Y.  40, 
62  X.  E.  772.  In  this  case  it  was  claimed 
by  appellant  "that  while  driving  in  Cen- 
tral Park  in  the  city  of  New  York  both 
his  person  and  his  vehicle  were  injured  in 
conse(|uence  of  collision  with  a  gravel 
heap  jjlaced  on  the  road  throuirh  tb.e  neg- 
ligence of  the  defendant.  Thereupon  he 
brought  an  action  against  the  defendant 
in  the  Court  of  Common  Pleas  to  recover 
damages  for  the  injury  to  his  person.  Sub- 
sequently he  brougiit  another  action  in  one 
of  tiie  District  C<jurts  in  tiie  city  of  New 
York  to  recover  for  the  injury  to  his  vehi- 
cle. In  this  la.st  action  he  obtained  jmig- 
ment,  which  was  paid  by  the  defendant. 
Thereafter  the  defendant  set  up  by  sup- 


forms    no  part  of,   and    has  no 
,""    Rejecting,  therefore,  all  those 

plemental  answer  the  judgment  in  the 
District  Court  suit,  and  its  satisfaction  as 
a  bar  to  the  further  maintenance  of  the 
action  in  the  Common  Pleas."  On  the 
trial  in  the  Supreme  Court  "  it  was  held 
that  the  plaintiff's  right  of  action  was 
merged  in  the  judgment  recovered  in  the 
District  Court  and  his  complaint  was  dis- 
missed. The  judgment  entered  upon  this 
direction  was  affirmed  by  the  Appellate 
Division."  The  Court  of  Appeals,  revers- 
ing the  judgment  appealed  from,  said  : 
"  The  question  now  before  us  has  been  the 
subject  of  conflicting  decisions  in  different 
jurisdictions.  In  Englaud  it  has  been 
held  by  the  Court  of  Aj)peal,  Lord  Cole- 
ridge, Chief  Justice,  dissenting,  that  dam- 
ages to  person  and  to  ])r(jperty,  though 
occasioned  l)y  the  same  wrongful  act.  gi\e 
rise  to  different  causes  of  action  (Bruns- 
den  V.  Humphrey,  L.  R.  [14  Q.  B.  D.] 
141)  ;  while  in  Massachusetts,  Miimesota, 
and  Missouri  the  contrary  doctrine  lias 
been  declared  (Doran  r.  Cohen,  147 
Mass.  342  ;  King  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P. 
liy.  Co.,  82  N.  W.  Rep.  1113;  Von  Frag- 
stein  V.  Windier,  2  Mo.  App.  598).  The 
argument  of  those  courts  which  maintain 
that  an  injury  to  person  and  property 
creates  but  a  single  cause  of  action  is  that 
as  the  defendant's  wrongful  act  was  single, 
the  cause  of  action  must  be  .single,  and 
that  the  different  injuries  occasioned  by  it 
are  merely  items  of  damage  proceeding 
from  the  same  wrong,  while  that  of  tlie 
English  court  is  that  the  negligent  act  of 
the  defendant  in  itself  constitutes  no  cause 
of  action  and  becomes  an  actionable  wrong 
only  out  of  the  damage  which  it  causes. 
'One  wrong  was  done  as  soon  as  the 
])laiiitiff's  enjoyment  of  his  proj)erty  was 
substantially  interfered  with.  A  further 
wrong  arose  as  soon  as  the  driving  also 
caused  injury  to  the  plaintiff's  ])erso:i' 
(Brunsden  r.  Humphrey,  .s-K/)m).  I  doubt 
whether  either  argument  is  conclusive. 
If,  when  one  person  was  driving  the  vehi- 
cle of  another,  both  the  driver  and  the 
vehicle  were  injured,  there  could  be  no 
doubt  that  two  causes  of  action  would 
ari.se.  one  in  f.ivor  of  the  person  injured 
and  the  other  in  favor  of  the  owner  of  the 
injured  property.     On  the  other  hand,  if 


JOINJiEli   OF    CAUSES    OF    ACTION. 


469 


portions  of  the  pleading  which  describe  the  remedy  or  relief  de- 
manded, the  inquiry  should  be  directed  exclusively  to  the  allega- 

botli  tlie  horse  and  the  vehicle,  being  the  faction.     Ujjon  the  trial  below,  judgment 

jToperty  of  the  same  person,  were  injured,  was  rendered  for  the  ftiil  amount,  and  de- 

tliere  would  be  but  a  single  cause  of  action  fendant  appeals."     In  the  course  of  the 

for  the   damage   to   both.     If,   wiiile   in-  opinion   it   is   said :  "  'I'he    learned    trial 

jury  to  the  horse  and  vehicle  of  a  person  judge,   in  a  carefully   written    memoran 

gives  rise  to  but  a  single  cause  of  action,  dum,  based  his  decision  upon  the  proposi- 

injury  to  the  vehicle  and  its  owner  gives  tion  that  at  the  common  law  every  person 

rise  to  two  causes  of  action,  it  must  be  was   possessed   of   two    distinct    primary 


because  there  is  an  e.ssential  difference 
between  an  injury  to  the  person  and  an 
injury  to  property  that  makes  it  imprac- 
ticable or,  at  least,  very  inconveinent  in 
the  administration  of  justice  to  Ideud  the 
two.  We  think  tliere  is  such  a  distinc- 
tion. .  .  .  While  some  of  the  difiiculties 
in  the  joinder  of  a  claim  for  injury  to  the 
person  and  one  for  injury  to  the  property 
in  one  cause  of  action  are  created  by  our 
statutory  enactments,  tbe  history  of  the 
common  law  shows  that  the  distinction 
between  torts  to  the  person  and  torts  to 
property  has  always  obtained.  .  .  .  Tliere- 
)re,    for  reason   of  the  great   difference 


riyhts,  —  the  right  of  personal  security 
and  the  right  of  private  property,  — and 
that  a  di.stinct  cause  of  action  arose  from 
an  infringement  of  either.  And,  it  is 
argued,  these  rights  have  been  carried 
into  our  system  of  jurisprudence,  and 
remedies  provided  for  their  preservation  ; 
that  the  constitution  guarantees  a  certain 
remedy  by  tlie  law  for  injuries  thereto; 
that  statutes  have  been  enacted  with  the 
special  purpose  of  keeping  these  rights 
separate  and  distinct,  in  order  that  the 
remedy  for  an  infringement  of  each  may 
he  enforced  without  reference  to  the  other, 
as  the  statute  of   limitations  .  .  . ;  also, 


lietween   the   rules  of   law  a])plicable  to  the  statute  providing  what  causes  of  ac- 

injuries  of  the  person  and  those  relating  tions   survive.      Counsel   for   respondent, 

to   injuries  to  property,  we  conclude  that  taking  this  distribution  of  primary  rights 

an  injury  to  person  and  one  to  property,  as  a  basis,  have  argued  ably  that  it  ueces- 

though  resulting  from  the  same  tortious  sarily  follows  that  the  cause  of  action  in 

act,  constitute  different  causes  of  action."  this  case  did  not  consist  of  the  act  of  neg- 


To  the^sarae  effect,  see  Watson  v.  Kail- 
way  Co*  (1894),  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  144,  27 
S.  W.  924. 

The  author's  test,  however,  was  rejected 
in  King  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St  P.  Ky.  Co. 
(1900),  80  Minn.  83,  82  N.  W.  111.3.  In 
this  case  the  facts  were  as  follows  :  ''  Plain- 
tiff, while  riding  in  and  driving  his  wagon 
across  defendant's  tracks,  was  run  into  by 
defendant's  train.  As  a  result,  he  was 
])ersonally  injured,  and  the  wagon  and 
horses  and  harness  were  damaged.    There- 


ligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  in 
injuring  the  plaintiff  and  his  property,  but 
the  cause  of  action  arose  from  the  results 
of  the  act;  that  instantly  upon  the  strik- 
ing and  throwing  of  plaintiff  by  the  engine 
the  cause  of  action  arose  for  injury  to  his 
person,  and  another  cause  arose  as  soon  as 
plaintiff's  enjoyment  of  his  pro])erty  was  in- 
terfered with.  .  .  .  We  are  of  the  opinion 
that  the  cause  of  the  action  consists  of  the 
negligent  act  which  produced  the  effect, 
rather  than  in  the  effect  of  the  act  in  its 


after  plaintiff  brought  an  action  against  application   to   different   primary   rights, 

defendant  to  recover  for  the  injuries  suf-  and  that  the   injury  to   the   person   and 

fered  in  his  person,  and  secured  a  judg-  property  as  a  result  of  the  original  cause 

ment  for  $1,000.     While  that  action  was  gives  rise  to  different  items  of  damage. 

still  pending  on  appeal  in  tiiis  court The  views  we  have  adopted  seem  to 

plaintiff  commenced  the  present  proceed-  us  more  in  harmony  with  the  tendency 

ing  to  recover  the  damage  sustained  by  towards  simplicity  and  directness  in  the 

the  injury  to  the  horses,  wagon,  and  har-  determination    of     controversial     rights, 

ncss,  alleged  to  be  $225.     As  a  defence  to  That    rule    of     construction     should    be 

this  action,  defendant  pleaded  the  former  ado])ted   which    will    most    speedily  and 

judgment  as  a  bar,  and,  by  an  amendment  economically  bring  litigation  to  an  end, 

later,  pleaded  its  full  payment  and  satis-  if  at  the  same  time  it  conserves  the  ends 


470 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


tions  of  fact  which  set  forth  the  primaiy  right  of  the  plaintiff  and 
the  wrong  done  by  the  defendant.  If  one  such  right  alone,  how- 
ever comprehensive,  is  asserted,  and  if  one  such  wrong  alone, 
however  complex,  is  complained  of,  but  one  cause  of  action  is 
alleged.^  If  the  examination  discloses  more  than  one  distinct  and 
independent  primary  right  held  by  the  plaintiff,  and  all  of  them 
invaded  by  the  defendant,  or  more  than  one  distinct  and  inde- 
pendent wrong  done  by  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff's  primary 
right  or  rights,  then  the  complaint  or  petition  has  united  different 
causes  of  action,  and  the  rules  which  control  their  joinder  are 
brought  into  opei'ation.^ 


of  justice.  There  is  nothing  to  be  gained 
in  splitting  up  the  rights  of  au  injured 
party  as  iu  this  case,  and  much  may  be 
saved  if  one  action  is  made  to  cover  the 
subject."  Judgment  reversed.  See  also 
Foerst  v.  Kelso  (1901),  131  Cal.  376,  63 
Pac  681  ;  and  Hanson  c.  Anderson  (1895), 
90  Wis.  195,  62  N.  W.  1055. 

^  ^Splitting  a  "Cause  of  Action." 

"The  rule  is  that  a  single  or  entire 
cause  of  action  cannot  be  subdivided  into 
several  claims  and  separate  actions  main- 
tained thereon.  Secor  v.  Sturgis,  16  N.  Y. 
548  ;  Nathans  v.  Hope,  77  N.  Y.  420.  As 
to  this  principle  there  is  no  dispute : " 
lleilly  r.  Sicilian  Asphalt  Paving  Co. 
(1902),  170  N.  Y.  40,  62  N.  E.  772.  See 
to  same  effect,  Brunsden  v.  Humphrey 
(1884),  L.  R.  [14  Q.  B.  D.]  141  ;  King  v. 
Chicago,  M.  &  St.  Paul  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  80 
Minn.  83,  82  N.  W.  1113;  Norvell  v. 
Mecke  (1900),  127  N.  C.  401,  37  S.  E.  452; 
Huffman  v.  Knight  (1900),  36  Ore.  581, 
60  Pac.  207;  Achey  v.  Creech  (1899), 
21  Wash.  319,  58  Pac.  208  ;  Haiil  i-.  Sugo 
(1901),  163  N.  Y.  109,  62  N.  E.  135  ;  Pat- 
node  V.  Westenhaver  (1902),  114  Wis. 
460,  90  N.  W.  467  ;  Smelker  v.  Chicago  & 
Northwestern  R.  Co.  (1900),  106  Wis. 
135,  81  N.  W.  994  ;  Richardson  v.  Opelt 
(1900),  60  Neb.  180,  82  N.  W.  377  ;  Don- 
nell  V.  Wright  (1899),  147  Mo.  639,  49 
S.  W.  874;  Fort  v.  Penny  (1898),  122 
N.  C.  230.  29  S.  E.  362  ;  Day  v.  Brenton 
(1897),  102  la.  482,  71  N.  W.  538  ;  Atlanta 
Elevator  Co  v.  Cotton  Mills  (1898),  106 
Ga.  427.  32  .S.  E.  541  ;  Little  v.  City  of 
Portland  (1894),  26  Ore.  235,  37  Pac.  911  ; 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Bulleue  (1893),  51  Kau. 


764,  33  Pac.  467  ;  Hoffman  v.  Hoffman's 
Executor  (1894),  126  Mo.  486,  29  S.  W. 
603 ;  Wheeler  Savings  Bank  v.  Tracey 
(1897),  141  Mo.  252,  42  S.  W.  946  ;  Wild- 
man  V.  Wildniaii  (1898),  70  Conn.  700,  41 
Atl.  1.3 

-  See  Davenport  r.  Murray,  08  Mo. 
198;  Donovan  v.  Dunning,  69  id.  436; 
Young  V.  Young,  81  N.  C.  91.  As  exam- 
ples of  only  one  cause  of  action,  altliough 
several  distinct  reliefs  are  asked  and  ob- 
tained, see  the  following  cases :  Pet>]ilc  v. 
Tweed,  63  N.  Y.  194,  5  Hun,  3.53  ;  ILiines 
V.  Hollister,  64  N.  Y.  1  ;  Boardman  v.  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  157  ;  Tis- 
dale  V.  Moore,  8  Hun,  19  ;  Skidmore  v.  Col- 
lier, 8  id.  50 ;  Walters  v.  Continental  Ins. 
Co.,  5  id.  343  ;  Young  v.  Drake,  8  id.  61  ; 
Prentice  v.  Jausen,  7  id.  86  ;  Van  Wagenen 
i\  Kemp,  7  id.  328 ;  Williams  v.  Peabody. 
8  id.  271  ;  Board  of  Supervisors  v.  Wal- 
bridge,  38  Wis.  179  ;  Liedersdorf  v.  Flint, 
50  id.  401  ;  Collins  r.  Cowen,  52  id.  634  ; 
Kahn  v.  Kahu,  15  Fla.  400;  Donovan  v. 
Dunning,  69  Mo.  436  ;  Stewart  v.  Carter,  4 
Neb.  564;  Young  v.  Young,  81  N.  C.  91 ; 
Barrett  v.  Watts,  13  S.  C.  441.  See  also 
Westlake  v.  Farrow,  34  S.  C.  270;  John- 
son !'.  Golder,  132  N.  Y.  116;  Tuers  v, 
Tuers,  100  N.  Y.  196;  Trow])ridge  v. 
True,  52  Conn.  190;  Louvall  v.  Gridley, 
70  Cal. '507;  Smiley  v.  Deweese,  1  lud. 
App.  211  ;  Loui.sville,  St.  L.  &  T.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Neafus  (Ky.  1892),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  1030 
(different  elements  of  damage  arising 
from  single  breach  of  contract) ;  Gran- 
dona  I'.  Lovdal,  70  Cal.  101  (prayer  for 
abatement  of  nuisance  and  damages).  In 
the  following  cases,  also,  it  was  held  that 
but  one  cause  of  action  was  stated  :  Sayles 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF  ACTION.  471 

§  352.  *  458.  Cause  of  Action  not  to  be  confounded  with 
Relief.  Illustrative  Cases.  Although  the  decisions  do  not  at- 
tempt to  furnish  any  general  test  by  which  one  may  determine 
the  nature  of  a  "  cause  of  action,"  and  whether  a  pleading  con- 
tains one  or  more,  they  fully  recognize  the  fact  that  the  cause 
of  action  is  not  to  be  confounded  with  the  relief,  and  that  the 
demand  for  or  the  granting  of  many  forms  of  remedy  may  be 
based  upon  a  single  cause  of  action.  The  following  cases  not 
only  exhibit  the  proneness  to  confound  the  remedy  with  the  cause 
of  action,  and  the  necessity  of  understanding  the  essential  dis- 
tinction between  them,  but  they  also  illustrate,  and  fully  sustain, 
the  foregoing  principles,  which  I  have  proposed  as  the  test  by 
which  such  distinction  may  be  at  once  recognized :  a  complaint 
alleged  that  the  plaintiff,  being  indebted  to  the  defendant  upon 
several  promissory  notes  held  by  the  latter,  had  assigned  to  it  a 
bond  and  mortgage  as  collateral  security ;  that  the  defendant  had 
collected  the  amount  due  on  the  bond  and  mortgage,  which  was 
more  than  sufficient  to  pay  all  the  notes  in  full ;  that  a  surplus 
was  left  remaining  in  its  hands,  and  upon  these  facts  demanded 
payment  by  the  defendant  of  such  balance,  and  surrender  and  can- 
cellation of  the  notes  so  given  by  the  plaintiff.  To  this  complaint 
the  defendant  demurred,  on  the  ground  that  causes  of  action  had 
been  improperly  joined.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held 
that  there  was  no  uniting  at  all  of  different  causes  of  action,  and 
that  only  a  single  one  was  stated,  although  two  distinct  reliefs 
were  demanded.^ 

V.  Bemis,  57   Wis.  31.5  (trespass  ou  land,  cellation  of  a  release  of  the  defendant  foi 

aggravated  by  injury   to   personal  prop-  liability  for  the  injuries) ;  also  Damon  v. 

erty)  ;    Whatling  v.  Nash,  41    Hun,    579  Damon,  28  Wis.  510;  Moon  ?;.  McKnight, 

(same)  ;  Gilbert  v.  Pritchard,  41  Hun,  46  54  Wis.  551.     Several  of  these  cases  ap- 

(trespass  on  land,  aggravated  by  assault) ;  pear  to  consider  the  invasion  of  distinct 

Butler  V.   Kirby,  53   Wis.  188;  Loveland  rights  of  the  plaintiff  by  one  tortious  act, 

■V.  Garner,  71   Cal.  541  ;  Thames  r.  Jones,  or  series  of    connected    tortious  acts,  as 

97  N.  C.  121 ;  Welch  v.  Piatt, 32  Hun,  194  ;  constituting  but  one  cause  of  action;  thus 

Lehnen  i\  Purvis,  55   Hun,   535 ;  United  making   the   latter    consist  in  the    delict 

States  L.  Ins.  Co.  I'.  Jordan,  21   Abb.  N.  alone.     Comjiare  ^josi,  p.  476,  note  5.     For 

Cas.    330;    Whitner  v.  Perhacs,  25  Abb.  an  instance  of  two  causes  of  action  itn- 

N.  Cas.    130;    Newcombe   i\    Chicago   &  properly  mingled,  see  American  Button- 

N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (N.  Y.  Supreme,  Jan.  1890),  Hole,  etc.  Sew.  Mach.  Co.  v.  Thornton,  28 

8   N.  y.   Suppl.  3C6  ;  Leary  v.   Melcher  IMinn.  418. 

(N.  Y.   Supreme,   May,    1891),   14  N.  Y.  i  Cahoon    v.  Bank  of   Utica,   7  N.  Y. 

Suppl.  689 ;    Wickersham    v.    Crittenden,  486.     The  defendant  insisted  that  a  cause 

93    Cal.   17  ;  Whetstone  v.  Beloit   Straw  of  action  for  the  recovery  of  money  was 

Board   Co.    (Wis.    1890),   45  N.  W.   535  united  with  one  equitable   in  its  nature, 

(damages  for  personal  injuries,  and  can-  The  court  said,  per  Johnson  J.   (p.  43S); 


472 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


§  353.  *  459.  Same  Subject.  Actions  brought  to  reform  instru- 
ments in  writing,  such  as  pohcies  of  insurance  and  other  con-  i 
tracts,  mortgages,  deeds  of  conveyance,  and  the  like,  and  to 
enforce  the  same  as  reformed  by  judgments  for  the  recovery  of 
the  money  due  on  tlie  contracts,  or  for  the  foreclosure  of  the 
mortgages,  or  for  the  recovery  of  possession  of  tlie  laud  conveyed 
by  the  deeds,  fall  within  the  same  general  principle.  One  cause 
of  action  only  is  stated  in  sucli  cases,  however  various  may  be  the 
reliefs   demanded   and  granted.^     Tlie  principle   also  applies  to 


"  The  ground  ou  which  this  case  ought  to 
be  put  is,  that  the  complaint  does  not  cou- 
tain  two  causes  of  action.  The  claim  is 
single.  .  .  .  The  plaintiff  now  seeks  an 
account  of  the  proceeds  of  the  mortgage 
and  of  their  disposition,  and  to  have  the 
balance  paid  over,  and  the  notes  which 
are  satisfied  delivered  up.  It  is  no  an- 
swer to  say  that  the  balance  of  moneys 
could  have  been  recovered  in  an  action  for 
money  had  and  received.  It  would  none 
the  less  have  been  the  proper  foundation 
for  a  bill  in  equity.  ...  It  is  only  be- 
cause there  is  no  dispute  about  the  amount 
due  that  there  seems  to  be  any  room  for 
mistake  as  to  the  character  of  the  claim. 
If  that  remained  to  be  ascertained,  it 
would  be  the  clearest  possible  case  for  an 
account ;  and  yet  this  case  is  not  clearer 
than  the  one  before  us.  ...  It  is,  in  short, 
a  complaint  by  a  debtor  to  have  his  obli- 
gation delivered  up  and  cancelled,  and  an 
account  of  the  securities  pledged,  and 
payment  of  the  surplus.  That  a  claim  so 
simple  in  its  character,  so  well  recognized, 
and  even  familiar,  under  the  old  practice 
in  chancery,  should  be  seriously  regarded 
as  two  distinct  causes  of  action,  requiring 
distinct  modes  of  trial,  and  incapable  of 
being  joined  in  a  single  suit,  is  quite  as 
surprising  as  the  doctrine  itself,  if  held  to 
be  well  founded,  wouM  be  inconvenient." 
See  also  Connor  v.  St.  Anthony  Bd.  of 
Ed.,  10  .Minn.  4.39,  444;  Sortore  V  Scott, 
6  Lans.  271,  275,  276;  Reedy  v.  Smith,  42 
Cai.  245,  250. 

1  Bidwell  V.  Astor  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  10 
N.  y.  263 ;  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  N.  VV.  Ins. 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  357 ;  Guernsey  v.  Am.  Ins. 
Co.,  17  Minn.  104,  108  (actions  to  reform 
a  policy  of  insurance,  and  to  recover  the 
amount  dne  on  it  as  reformed);  Gooding 
I'.  McAllister,  9  How.  Pr.  123  (action  to  re- 


form a  written  contract,  and  to  recover  a 
money  judgment  upon  it  for  the  sum  due 
when  corrected) ;  McCown  v.  Sims,  69 
N.  C.  159;  Rigsbee  v.  Trees,  21  Ind.  227 
(actions  to  reform  a  promissory  note,  and 
to  recover  the  amount  thus  shown  to  be 
due.  The  decision  in  the  latter  case  is  re- 
ferred, however,  to  the  special  provision  of 
the  Indiana  code,  §  72) ;  Hunter  v.  McC^oy, 
14  Ind.  528  ;  McClurg  v.  Phillips,  49  Mo. 
315,  316  (actions  to  reform  a  mortgage,  to 
foreclose  as  thus  corrected,  or  to  reform  a 
deed  and  quiet  the  title  thereunder).  Walk- 
up  i".  Zehring,  13  Iowa,  306  (action  to  cor- 
rect mistakes  in  a  series  of  title-deeds,  to  set 
aside  anotlier  deed  of  the  same  land,  and 
to  quiet  the  plaintiff's  title  and  possession). 
See,  however,  per  contra,  Harri.son  v.  Ju- 
neau Bank,  17  Wis.  340,  which  was^  suit 
to  reform  a  contract,  and  to  recover  the 
money  due  upon  it  when  corrected. 
Di.xon  C.  J.  said  (p.  350) :  "  The  com- 
plaint contains  two  distinct  causes  of  ac- 
tion,—  the  one  equitable,  the  other  legal, 
—  which  in  strictness  should  liave  been 
separately  stated.  That  for  the  reforma- 
tion was  equitable,  and  was  for  the  court ; 
the  other,  for  the  recovery  of  monev,  was 
lepal,  and  was  for  the  jury."  The  learned 
court  has  hero  fallen  into  the  evident  error 
of  confounding  the  cause  of  action  with 
the  relief;  and  its  decision  is  in  direct 
conflict  with  the  doctrine  established  by 
the  nnmerous  authorities  quoted  above 
and  below,  which  involve  similar  facts 
and  the  same  principle.  The  doctrine  of 
tliis  case  has  become  established  in  Wis- 
consin ;  a  union  of  equitable  and  legal 
causes  of  action  is  hardly  permitted  in 
that  State. 

[jChristensen  v.  Ilollingsworth  (1898), 
6  Idaho,  87.  53  Pac.  211  ;  Vermont  Loan 
&  Trust  Co.  V.  McGregor  (1897),  5  Idaho, 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION. 


473 


actions  brought  against  a  fraudulent  grantor  or  assignor  and  his 
grantees  or  assignees  to  set  aside  the  transfers,  although  made 
at  different  times  and  to  different  persons,  and   to   subject   the 
property  to  the  plaintiff's  liens,  as  in  creditors'  suits  ;  or  to  com- 
pel a  reconveyance  and  restoration  of  possession  of  the  propert}', 
as  in  the  case  of  suits  by  defrauded  lieirs  or  cestuis  que  trustent, 
and  the  like.     There  is    but   one    cause    of   action    against   the 
various  defendants  in  these  and  similar  suits. ^     In  like  manner, 
the  principle  applies  to  actions  brought  by  persons  holding  the 
I  equitable  title  to  lands  against  those  in  wliom  the  legal  title  is 
I  vested,  for  the  purpose  of  setting  aside  the  deeds  under  which 
the  latter  claim,  on  the  ground  of  fraud  or  other  illegality,  and  of 
I  recovering  or  confirming  possession  and  quieting  title.     The  dif- 
1  ferent  reliefs  which  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  obtain  do  not  constitute 
fdifferent  causes  of  action.^     It  also  applies  to  actions  for  the  fore- 


/t: 


320,  51  Pac.  102  ;  Jenkins  v.  Taylor  (1900), 
Ky.,  59  S.  W.  853  ;  Steinbach  i\  Prudential 
Ins.  Co.  (1902),  172  N.  Y.  471,  65  N.  E. 
281  (action  to  reform  policy  and  judgment 
thereon  as  reformed).  Imperial  Shale 
Brick  Co.  v.  Jewett  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  143, 
62  N.  E.  167  (also  an  action  to  reform  pol- 
icy and  recover  thereon  as  reformed). 
Hahl  V.  Sugo  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  109,  62 
N.  E.  135,  see  note  ( 1 )  to  p.  27,  ante,  for  the 
facts  of  this  case.  Robinson  v.  Brown 
(1901);  166  N.  Y.  59,  159  N.  E.  775;  Keys 
V.  McDermott  (1903),  —  Wis.  —,93 
N.  W.  553.] 

1  Bassett  v.  Warner,  23  Wis.  673,  685 ; 
Blake  v.  Van  Tilborg,  21  Wis.  672  ;  Bow- 
ers V.  Keesecher,  9  Iowa,  422 ;  Howse  v. 
Moody,  14  Fla.  59,  63,  64.  These  were 
actions  by  heirs,  or  otlier  persons  in  the 
position  of  benefiriaries,  against  adminis- 
trators, or  other  individuals  holding  a  fidu- 
ciary relation  to  them,  and  their  grantees 
or  assignees,  to  set  aside  fraudulent  trans- 
fers, to  compel  an  accounting  and  a  re.'^to- 
ration,  and  other  like  reliefs.  Tlie  doctrine 
of  the  text  was  freely  applied  in  them  all ; 
Winslow  V.  Dousman,  18  Wis.  456;  Gates 
V.  Boomer,  17  Wis.  455;  North  v.  Brad- 
way,  9  Minn.  183;  Chautauqua  Cy.  Bk.  v. 
White,  6  N.  Y.  236.  These  actions  were 
all  ordinary  creditors'  suits. 

2  Phillips  V.  Gorham,  17  N.  Y.  270; 
Laub  V.  Buckmiller,  17  N.  Y.  620;  Lattin 
V.  McCarty,  41  N.  Y.  107.     See,  further, 


Johnson  v.  Colder,  132  N.  Y.  116  (com- 
plaint alleging  that  tlie  plaintiff  is  the 
owner  of  laud  subject  to  a  mortgage  which 
was  fraudulently  foreclosed,  and  praying 
for  redemption,  accounting,  and  that  a 
pretended  mortgage  given  by  the  pur- 
chaser at  a  foreclosure  sale  be  cancelled, 
states  but  one  cause  of  action) ;  Louvall 
V.  Gridley,  70  Cal.  507  (prayer  that  a  deed 
be  declared  a  mortgage,  and  the  title  to 
the  land  involved  be  quieted). 

[[Beronio  v.  ^'entura  Lumber  Co.  (1900), 
129  Cal.  23-2,  61  Pac.  958,  was  an  action  to 
have  a  sheriff's  deed  adjudged  void  and  to 
quiet  title  to  certain  premises  tlierein  de- 
scribed.    Defendant  demurred  upon   the 
/  ground  that  two  causes  of  action  had  been 
/  improperly  united  in  the  complaint,  "viz., 
an  action  to  quiet  the  plaintiff's  title,  and  an 
i  action  to  have  the  slieriff 's  deed  declared 
;  void."     The  court  below  sustained  tlie  de- 
murrer.   The  Supreme  Court  in  reversing 
J    the  case  said :  "  The  complaint  presents 
\  only  a  single  cause  of  action,  viz.,  the  en- 
forcement of  the  plaintiffs  right  to  the      , 
premises  in  question  atfainst  tlie  unlawful     / 
claim   of   the   defendant   tliereto.      As   a     i 
^portion   of   the  remedy   for  the  enforce-    ( 
ment  of  that  right  it  .seeks  the  annulment    • 
of  the  sheriff's  deed,  but  a  plaintiff  may   I 
'frequently  be  entitled  to  several  species  I 
!  of  remedy  for  the  enforcement  of   a  sin-    I 
'\  gle  riglit  (Pomeroy's  Code  Remedies,  sec.   / 
V*459) ; "    San  Pedro  Lumber  Co.  v.  Rey-  j 


474 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


closure  of  mortgages,  where  the  phiintiff  seeks  to  obtain  not  only 
a  sale  of  the  mortgaged  premises,  but  also  a  judgment  for  a 
detioiency  against  the  mortgagor  and  other  persons  who  are  per- 
sonally liable  for  the  debt.^  In  several  States  the  codes  expressly 
authorize  such  actions.^  The  weight  of  authority,  however,  in 
those  States  whose  codes  do  not  contain  isuch  expiess  provisions, 
seems  to  be  the  other  way ;  and  the  rule  therein  seems  to  be  gen- 
erally established,  that,  in  an  action  of  foreclosure,  a  judgment 
for  a  deficiency  cannot  be  obtained  against  any  persons  liable  for 
the  debt  other  than  the  mortgagor  himself ;    it  is  said  that  the 


noMs  (1896),  HI  Cal.  5S8,  44  Pac.  309; 
Bremuer  i".  Leavitt  (1895),  109  Cal.  130, 
41  Pac.  859;  Richardson  v.  Opelt  (1900), 
m  Neb.  180,  82  N.  W.  377.] 

1  QReichert  i;.  Stilwell  (1902),  172 
N.  Y.  83,  64  N.  E.  790:  Uuder  the  statute 
iu  this  State  in  an  action  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  there  is  but  one  cause  of  action 
alleged,  even  if  the  bond  is  set  forth  iu 
the  complaint  and  judgment  for  deficiency 
is  demanded  as  a  part  of  tlie  relief.  The 
statutory  authority  to  render  a  personal 
judgment  for  the  deficiency  does  not 
create  a  distinct  and  independent  cause  of 
action,  but  is  an  incidental  remedy,  de- 
pendent wholly  upon  the  statute  and  sub- 
sidiary to  the  main  object  of  the  action. 
See  Plaukinton  v.  Hildebrand  (1895),  89 
Wis.  209,  61  N.  W.  839.  In  Security  Loan 
and  Trust  Co.  v.  Mattern  (1901),  131  Cal. 
326,  63  Pac.  482,  the  defendant  Lena  1). 
Mattern  executed  and  delivered  to  plain- 
tiff her  promissory  note  for  $3,500,  and 
secured  the  payment  of  the  same  by  her 
mortgage  upon  certain  land.  Subse- 
quently, Mrs.  Mattern  desiring  to  ex- 
change a  portion  of  the  land  mortgaged, 
the  plaintiff  released  tliis  portion  of  the 
land  from  the  lien  of  tlie  mortgage  in 
consideration  of  defendant  Bechtel  exe- 
cuting and  delivering  to  iiim  his  mortgage 
on  land  owned  by  the  latter  as  security 
for  the  payment  of  .said  note  in  lieu  of 
said  release.  The  action  was  brought  to 
recover  upon  the  note  and  to  foreclose  tlie 
Mattern  and  Bechtel  mortgages.  Mrs. 
Mattern  and  Bechtel  were  made  defend- 
ant.s.  Defendants  demurred  to  tlie  ctmi- 
plaint,  among  other  grounils,  because  of  a 
misjoinder  of  causos  of  action.  It  was 
claimed  that  two  distinct  causes  of  action 


were  set  fortli  in  the  complaint  —  one 
against  defendant  Mattern  and  one  against 
Bechtel.  It  seems  that  plaintiff  had  sep- 
arated his  complaint  into  two  "  Counts." 
In  sustaining  the  ruling  of  the  court  be- 
low in  overruling  the  demurrer  the  Su- 
preme Court  said:  "  Altliougti  one  portion 
of  the  complaint  is  entitled  therein  '  First 
Count '  and  another  portion  '  Second 
Couut, '  the  portions  so  entitled  do  not 
purport  to  set  forth  separate  causes  of  ac- 
tion, but  to  state  tlie  facts  by  which  the 
defendants  Mattern  and  Bechtel  are  re- 
spectively relateil  to  the  plaintiff's  cause 
of  action.  A  complaint,  while  setting 
forth  a  single  cause  of  action,  may  at  the 
same  time  ask  for  different  relief  from 
different  defendants,  according  as  they  are 
connected  with  this  cause  of  action,  and 
its  character  is  to  be  determined  from  its 
contents  rather  than  from  a  misnomer  on 
the  part  of  the  pleader."  In  American 
Savings  and  Loan  Association  v.  Burg- 
hardc  (1897),  19  Mont.  323,48  Pac.  391, 
it  was  held  that  a  complaint  in  such  a  case 
as  that  stated  in  tlie  text  did  not  state  two 
causes  of  action,  aiul  that  the  money  judg- 
ment and  the  decree  were  different  modes 
of  relief  for  the  same  wrong.  See  also 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Lambert  (1895),  63 
Minn.  263,  65  N.  W.  451.] 

2  Conn.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  i'.  Cross,  18 
Wis.  109;  Saner  v.  Steinbauer,  14  Wis. 
70 ;  Weil  v.  Howard,  4  Nev.  384 ;  Greither 
V.  Alexander,  15  Iowa,  470,  473,  per 
Wright  C.  J. ;  Eastman  v.  Turnian,  24 
Cal.  379,  382,  per  Sawyer  J.  ;  Rollins  v. 
Forbes,  10  Cal.  299;  Farwell  v.  Jackson, 
28  Cal.  105;  [^Endress  v.  Shove  (1901), 
110  Wis.  133,  85  N.  W.  653.] 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES   OF    ACTION.  4(.j 

making  such  third  person  a  party,  and  the  praying  a  decree  for 
deticiency  against  him,  is  a  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action.^  A 
suit  by  the  vendor  of  land  to  recover  the  purchase  price,  and  to 
enforce  his  hen  therefor  upon  the  premises  sold  or  conveyed,  in- 
cludes but  one  cause  of  action,  the  double  relief  plainly  arising 
from  the  single  state  of  facts.^ 

§  354.  *  460.  Same  Subject.  The  following  are  some  ad- 
ditional instances  in  which  the  doctrine  has  been  approved  and 
enforced  by  the  courts,  and  the  cause  of  action  lield  to  be  a  single 
one.  An  action  against  a  husband  and  wife,  brouglit  upon  an 
alleged  indebtedness  of  both,  and  an  agreement  of  Ijotli  to  secure 
the  same  by  a  mortgage  upon  the  wife's  lands,  although  at  the 
trial  the  debt  was  shown  to  be  against  the  husband  alone,  and  no 
such  agreement  as  the  one  alleged  was  proven  ;  ^  an  action  by  the 
vendee  in  a  land  contract  for  a  specific  performance  and  for  dam- 
ages, where  judgment  was  given  for  damages  alone  ;  *  an  action 
by  the  heirs  and  administrator  of  a  deceased  cestui  que  trust 
against  the  trustee,  who  held  both  real  and  personal  estate  in 
trust,  for  an  accounting,  a  conveyance  of  the  land,  and  a  transfer 
of  the  personal  property ;  ^  an  action  to  remove  a  nuisance,  for 
damages,  and  for  an  injunction ;  ^  for  admeasurement  of  dower, 
possession,  and  recovery  of  rents  and  profits  ; "  by  one  tenant  in 
common  against  the  other,  to  compel  a  specific  performance  of 
the  latter's  agreement  to  convey  his  share,  or  for  a  partition ;  ^  an 
action  by  a  stockholder  against  a  bank,  its  officers,  and  their 
assignee,  to  set  aside  an  assignment,  to  remove  the  officers,  for  an 
accounting,  and  for  a  winding-up  of  the  corporation,  —  all  based 

1  Faesi  v.  Goetz,  15  Wis.  231 ;  Gary  v.  v.  Sedgwick,  8  Cal.  398.  In  the  latter 
Wheeler,  14  Wis.  281  ;  Jesup  v.  City  Bk.  case,  the  action  was  on  notes  given  for  the 
of  Raciue,  14  Wis.  331  ;  Stilwell  v.  Kel-     price. 

logg,  14  Wis.  461  ;  Borden  v.  Gilbert,  13  ^  Marquat  v.  Marquat,  12  N.  Y.  336. 
Wis.  670;  Doan  v.  Holly,  26  Mo.  186,  2.5  *  Barlow  v.  Scott,  24  N.  Y.  40;  Stern- 
Mo.  357.     In  Ladd  v.  James,  10  Ohio  St.  berger  v.  McGovern,  56  N.  Y.  12,21.    And 
437,  it  was  said  that  when  a  mortgage  is  see  Duvall  v.  Tiusley,  54  Mo.  93,  95. 
given  to  secure  a  note,  and  an  action  is          ^  Bichtmyer  v.  Richtmyer,  50  Barb.  55. 
l)rought  setting  out  both,  and  demanding  "*  Davis  v.  Lambertson,  56  Barb.  480. 
judgment  for  money  on  the  note,  and  for          '  Brown  v.  Brown,  4  Robt.  688. 
a  foreclosure  and  sale  on  the  mortgage,          ^  Hall  v.  Hall,  38  How.  Pr.  97.     This 
any  issue  of  fact  affecting  the  former  de-  decision  is  certainly  opposed  to  the  prin- 
mand  for  relief  must  be  tried  by  a  jury  ciple  stated  in  the  text,  and  to  the  weight 
if  either  party  require  it.     See  also  Mc-  of  authority.  Two  different  primary  rights 
Carthy  i'.  Garraghty,  10  Ohio  St.  438.  are  clearly  stated  ;  one  based  upon  the  con- 

2  Stephens  v.  Magor,  25  Wis.  533 ;  tract,  and  the  other  upon  the  ownership  in 
Turner  v.  Pierce,  34  Wis.  658 ;  Walker  common. 


476  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

upon  the  fraudulent  practices  of  the  officers  ;  ^  where  a  debtor  who 
had  executed  a  deed  to  A.  in  trust  for  his  creditor  B.  alleged  that 
the  two  had  fraudulently  sold  the  land  which  had  been  bought  in 
by  B.,  and  sought  to  set  aside  the  sale  and  to  redeem ;  ^  an  ac- 
countino-  against  the  executor  of  a  father  and  the  administrator 
of  his  son,  where  the  estates  were  so  mingled  and  confused  that 
a  separate  accounting  was  impossible ;  ^  an  action  against  the 
executor  of  a  lessee  who  had  continued  to  occupy  the  premises, 
to  recover  the  rent  accruing  before  the  death,  as  well  as  that  ac- 
cruing after  ;  ^  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  negligently  driv- 
ing against  and  injuring  the  plaintiff  and  his  horse  and  carriage ;  ^ 
an  action  to  recover  damages  for  fraudulent  representations  in  the 
sale  of  some  sheep,  the  plaintiff  claiming  special  damages  for  the 
destruction  of  his  entire  flock,  caused  by  the  communication  of 
disease  from  those  which  he  had  purchased ;  ^  an  action  for  ma- 
licious prosecution,  in  which  special  acts  of  wrong  and  damage 
were  alleged  ; "'  and,  it  has  been  said,  an  action  to  recover  damages 
for  several  distinct  and  separate  breaches  of  one  contract.^ 

§  355.  *  461.  Cases  in  Missouri.  To  the  principle  which  I  have 
thus  stated,  and  the  doctrine  approved  by  such  an  overwhelm- 
ing weight  of  judicial  authority,  there  w^as  opposed  a  series  of 
decisions  in  Missouri,  which,  w^hile  they  remained  unquestioned, 
rendered  the  law  of  tlie  State  widely  different  in  this  respect 
fi-om  that  \\iiich  was  established  in  other  commonwealths.  The 
Supreme  Court  held  in  numerous  cases,  and  a  great  variety  of 
circumstances,  that  where  upon  the  facts  the  plaintiff  would  ulti- 
mately be  entitled  to  different  kinds  of  relief,  —  such  as,  for 
example,  the  setting  aside  deeds  of  conveyance  to  the  defendant, 
and  the  recovery  of  the  possession  of  the  land,  —  if,  after  alleging 

1  Mitchell  V.  Bank  of  St.  Paul,  7  Minn.  tlie.  injury  to  lliem  created  two  causes  of 

2.J2,  255.  action. 

■•2  McGlothlin  v.   Hemery,  44  Mo.  350.  «  Wilcox  r.  McCoy,  21    Oliio  St.  655, 

The  opinion  in  this  case  is  an  elaborate  citing  Packard  v.  Slack,  ."32  Vt.  9. 
discussion  of  the  entire  doctrine.  '^  Scheuck  v.  Biitsch,  32  Ind.  338. 

8  McLachlan  v.  Staples,  13  Wis.  448,  »  Fisk  v.  Tank,  12  Wis.  276,  298,  per 

451.  Dixou  C.  J.     Tlie  acts  and  defaults  com- 

*  Pugsley  V.  Aikiu,  11  N.  Y.  494.  jdained  of  in  this  ca.se  can  liardly  be  called 

°  Howe    V.   Peckhani,    10    Barb.    056  distinct  and  separate  Itreaches.     See  also 

(S.    T.).      The    correctness    of    this    de-  Smiley  v.  Dawcese  (Ind.  App.  1891),  27 

ci.sion  is. more  than  doubtful.     Ma.son  J.  N.  E.  Rep.  505.    See  Roehiing  r.  Huebsch- 

inakes    the    cause    of    action    to   con.sist  mann,  34  Wis.   185;    Kansas  City  Hotel 

of  the  delict  alone.     Certainly  the  plain-  Co.  v.  Sigement,  53  Mo.  170,  that  different 

tiff's    rigiit    to   his   own    person    and    to  items  of  an  account  or  claim  constitute 

his   property   were  different   rigiits,  and  but  one  cause  of  action. 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION.  477 

all  the  facts,  he  should  demand  the  separate  reliefs,  liis  complaint 
would  contain  different  causes  of  action,  and  would  be  held  bad 
on  demurrer,  or  even  judgment  arrested  after  verdict,  or  reversed 
on  appeal  because  of  tlie  error.  In  other  words,  the  court  .com- 
pletely identified  tlie  relief,  and  even  the  prayer  for  it,  with  the 
cause  of  action. ^  The  court  has,  however,  recently  receded  from 
this  most  untenable  position,  and  seems  to  have  overruled  this 
long  series  of  decisions.^  Tlie  Missouri  court  seems  to  have  finally 
brought  the  law  of  that  State  in  reference  to  the  subject-matter 
under  consideration  into  harmony  witli  the  plain  intent  of  the 
code  and  the  well-settled  doctrines  of  equity  jurisj)rudence,  as 
well  as  into  a  conformity  with  the  rule  settled  by  the  unanimous 
consent  of  other  courts.-^ 

§356.  *462.  Summary. — I  have  thus  described  the  cases  in 
which  but  one  cause  of  action  is  alleged,  although  the  many  and 
sometimes  conflicting  demands  for  relief  may  make  it  appear  that 
several  causes  of  action  have  been  united  and  mingled  together  in 
the  pleading.  I  have  stated  a  general  principle  whicli  will  furnish 
a  certain  test  for  determining  all  such  cases,  by  ascertaining  what 
allegations  contain  the  "  cause  of  action,"  and  what  contain  the 
demands  for  relief,  and  by  showing  the  essential  nature  of  each, 
and  the  necessary  distinctions  between  them.  I  shall  now  pro- 
ceed to  consider  the  classes  of  cases  in  which  different  causes  of 
action  are  united  either  properly  or  improperly. 

IV.  The  Joinder  of  Causes  of  Action  Arising  out  of  the  same  Trans- 
action   or    Transactions    Connected   with  the    same  Subject  of 
Action;    Legal   Meaimig   of  the    Terms   '■'-  Transaction^^    and ^ 
"  /Subject  of  Action.^^ 

§  357.  *  463.  Most  Frequent  Applications  of  this  Class.  In- 
cludes Legal  Controversies.  The  class  which  is  described  by  the 
language  of  the  codes  quoted  in  the  above  heading  is  broad, 
comprehensive,  vague,  and  uncertain.     The  principal  design  was 

1  Curd  V.  Lackland,  43  Mo.  139  ;  Wynn  3  {In  State  ex  rel.  v.  Horton  Land  and 

V.  Cory,  43  Mo.  301  ;  Gray  v.  Payne,  43  Lumber  Co.  (1901),  161  Mo.  664,  61  S.  W. 
Mo.  203;  Peyton  v.  Rose,  41  Mo.  2.57;  869,  it  is  said:  "The  character  of  the 
Gott  r.  Powell,  41  Mo.  416;  Moreau  v.  action  is  determined  by  the  facts  stated  in 
Detchemendy,  41  Mo.  431.  the  petition  and  not  by  the  prayer  for  re- 

2  Henderson  v.  Dickey,  50  Mo.  161,  lief."  See  also  Liese  2'.  Meyer  (1898),  143 
165,  per  Wagner  J.;  Duvall  v.  Tinsley,     Mo.  547,  45  S.  W.  282.] 

54  Mo.  93. 


478  CIVIL    RKMKDIES. 

undonbtedl}'  to  embrace  tlie  vast  mass  of  equitable  actions  and 
causes  of  action  which  could  not  be  classified  and  arranged  in  any 
more  definite  manner;  and  the  language  was  properly  left  vague, 
so  that  it  might  not  in  any  manner  interfere  with  the  settled  doc- 
trines of  equitable  procedure  and  pleading,  parties  and  remedies. 
Although  tiiis  general  design  is  very  apparent,  3'et  it  is  no  less 
evident  that  the  author  of  the  clause  failed  to  distinguish  between 
the  "  cause  of  action  "  and  the  remedy  or  relief  Avliich  is  sought 
to  be  obtained  by  means  of  the  action.  The  most  fre([uent  appli- 
cation of  this  class  in  the  actual  administration  of  justice  has  been 
and  will  be  to  equitable  actions :  but  the  language  is  not  confined 
to  them ;  it  includes  legal  controversies  as  well.  If  all  the  other 
requisites  of  the  statute  are  complied  with,  legal  causes  of  action 
of  the  most  dissimilar  character —  for  example,  contract  and  tort 
—  may  be  united  in  one  proceeding,  provided  they  all  arise  out  of 
the  same  transaction,  or  out  of  transactions  connected  with  the 
same  subject  of  action.^  With  respect  to  equitable  cases,  there 
cannot  be  much  difficulty ;  it  is  always  easy  to  say,  and  perliaps 
to  see,  that  the  facts  constituting  the  causes  of  action  arise  at 
least  in  some  vague  manner  from  the  same  transaction,  or  from 
transactions  connected  witli  the  same  subject  of  action.  With 
respect  to  legal  cases  the  difficulty  is  much  greater,  and  is  some- 
times impossible  to  be  overcome  by  any  logical  reasoning.  The 
question  will  be  sometimes  presented,  not  only  whether  the  facts 
constituting  two  or  more  causes  of  action  have  arisen  from  the 
same  transaction,  but  whether  it  is  possible,  in  the  nature  of 
things,  that  they  could  arise  in  such  a  manner. 

§  358.    *  464.    Controlling   "Words     herein.      Necessity  of  Judicial 
Definition  of.     A  full  interpretation  of  the  language  used  in  the 

*  QPollock  V.  Association    (1896),    48  and  each  of  them,  sounded  in  tort,  and 

R.  C.  65,  25  S.  E.  977,  citing  the  text.    See  tliey  all  grew  out  of  and  were  connected 

also  Dinges  u.  Kiggs  (1895),  43  Neb.  710,  with  the  same  transaction,  and  were  tliere- 

62  N.  W.  74,  a  suit  where  the   "petition  fore  properly  joined.     (Code  of  Civil  I'ro- 

set  up  three  causes  of  action:  First,  nia-  ccdure,    sec.   87;    Freeman  v.  Webb,  21 

licious    prosecution;    second,    damage   to  Neb.  160.)"     See  Commercial  Union  As- 

jilaintiff's  business  by  arresting  occujiants  surance  Co.  i:  Shoemaker  (1901),  63  Neb. 

of  her  place  of   business;  third,  slander."  173,  88  N.  VT.    156,  for   c;ise  suggesting 

'I'he  court  in  sustaining  the  ruling  of  the  that  "contract   and   tort"    may    not    be 

District  Court  in  overruling  the  motion  of  united.    See  also  Bank  ?'.  Grain  Co.  (1898), 

the  defemlant  to  compel  jilaintiff  to  elect  60  Kan.  30,  55  Tac.  277,  where  this  ques- 

upon   which   one  of   the  three   causes  of  tion  was  raised  but  not  decided ;  and  see 

action    stated    in    her  petition  she   would  further  Willey  c.  Nichols  (1898),  18  Wash, 

rely,  said:  "There  was    no  error  in   this  528,  52  Pac.  237.] 
ruling  of  the  court.     The  causes  of  action, 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION.  479 

codes  would  result  in  a  general  rule  applicable  to  all  actions ;  a 
rule  which  should  determine  when  causes  of  action  may  and  do 
arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  or  out  of  transactions  connected 
with  tlie  same  subject  of  action.  This  rule  would  be  obtained,  not 
from  an  analysis  of  all  possible  causes  of  action,  but  from  a  con- 
struction of  the  language  used  by  the  legislature ;  and  it  would 
require  a  legal  definition,  in  an  accurate  but  universal  manner,  of 
the  terras  "  titans  action,"  "  connected  Avitli,"  and  "  subject  of  ac- 
tion." These  three  terms  are  the  controlling  words  upon  which 
the  whole  clause  turns ;  and  until  the  courts  shall  have  defined 
them  in  a  general  and  positive  manner,  all  attempts  at  interpret- 
ing the  language  and  deducing  any  comprehensive  and  practical 
rule  from  it  must  be  futile.  Until  such  a  definition  is  made,  each 
case  must  be  decided  upon  its  own  circumstances,  in  a  mere  em- 
pirical method,  so  that  the  confusion  and  uncertainty  will  con- 
tinue, and  even  increase,  in  the  place  of  the  uniformity  and 
certainty  in  the  practice  which  the  profession  and  suitors  have 
the  right  to  demand.  In  short,  the  courts  must  break  away  from 
the  judicial  habit  which  has  of  late  years  grown  upon  them,  and 
must  be  willing  to  attempt  the  discussion  and  settlement  of  defi- 
nitions, principles,  and  doctrines  connected  with  the  reformed  pro- 
cedure, in  a  general  and  comprehensive  form.  Although  little 
aid  can  be  derived  from  judicial  decisions  I  shall  attempt  the 
extremely  difficult  task  of  defining  these  terms,  or,  to  be  more 
accurate,  shall  attempt  to  describe  their  legal  significance  and 
effect,  and  thus  to  aid  in  reaching  a  general  rule  or  principle  by 
which  to  determine  whether  any  given  cases  are  embraced  within 
the  class  designated  by  the  legislature. 

§  359.  *  465.  Language  of  Comstock  J.  and  Author's  Criticism. 
In  corroboration  of  the  statement  made  above  in  regard  to  the 
general  purport  and  object  of  the  class  in  question,  I  quote  the 
language  used  by  an  eminent  judge  of  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals,  which,  while  it  contains  some  unjust  remarks  upon  the 
authors  of  the  New  York  code,  is  a  very  pointed  and  accurate 
description  of  the  clause  and  of  its  immediate  design  :  "  In  respect 
to  the  joinder  of  causes  of  action,  the  provision  of  the  law,  so  far 
as  is  material  to  the  question,  now  is,  that  '  the  plaintiff  may  unite 
in  the  same  complaint  several  causes  of  action,  whether  they  be 
such  as  have  heretofore  been  denominated  legal  or  equitable,  or 
both,  where  they  all  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction  or  transac- 


480  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

tions  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action.'  The  authors  of 
the  code,  in  framing  this  and  most  of  its  other  provisions,  appear 
to  have  had  some  remote  knowledge  of  what  the  previous  law 
had  been.  This  provision  as  it  now  stands  was  introduced  in  the 
amendment  of  1852,  because  the  successive  codes  of  1848,  1849, 
and  1851,  with  characteristic  perspicacity,  had  in  effect  abrogated 
equity  jurisdiction  in  many  important  cases  by  failing  to  provide 
for  a  union  of  subjects  and  parties  in  one  suit  indispensable  to  its 
exercise.  This  amendment,  tlierefore,  was  not  designed  to  intro- 
duce any  novelty  in  pleading  and  practice.  Its  language  is,  I 
think,  well  chosen  for  the  purpose  intended,  because  it  is  so 
obscure  and  so  general  as  to  justify  the  interpretation  which  shall 
be  found  most  convenient  and  best  calculated  to  promote  the  ends 
of  justice.  It  is  certainly  impossible  to  extract  from  a  provision  so 
loose,  and  yet  so  comprehensive,  any  rules  less  liberal  than  those 
which  have  long  prevailed  in  courts  of  equity."  ^  'Sir.  Justice 
Comstock  plainly  regards  it  unnecessary,  if  not  impossible,  to 
attempt  a  definition  of  the  terms  employed  in  the  passage  which 
he  quotes,  and  would  leave  each  case  to  be  decided  upon  its  own 
circumstances.  This  is  undoubtedly  the  easier  method  for  the 
courts  to  pursue ;  but  suitors,  as  well  as  the  profession,  have  a 
right  to  ask  from  them  some  rules  by  which  a  reasonable  degree 
of  certainty  as  to  the  correct  manner  of  bringing  and  conducting 
causes  shall  be  secured.  Regarded  as  a  statutory  enactment  of 
the  equity  doctrine  touching  the  joinder  of  causes  of  action  in  one 
suit,  the  clause  perhaps  requires  no  special  interpretation,  since  it 
may  be  assumed  to  permit  tlie  previous  equitable  principles  and 
rules  of  procedure  to  exist  unchanged.  In  this  light  alone  it  is 
treated  by  Mr.  Justice  Gomstock  in  the  extract  taken  from  his 
opinion.  But  as  it  applies  also  to  legal  actions,  and  as  there  were 
no  prior  doctrines  and  rules  of  practice  in  courts  of  law  which 
it  reproduces  or  suffers  to  remain  operative,  it  does  as  to  them 
"  introduce  a  novelty  in  pleading  and  practice."  In  order  to  fix 
its  application  in  such  cases,  the  meaning  of  its  controlling  terms 
must  be  determined.  There  was  no  prior  rule  of  the  common-law 
procedure  which  permitted  the  union  of  a  claim  upon  contract 
with  another  arising  from  violence  to  property  or  person  under 
any  circumstances,  and  yet  it  is  possible  that  such  a  combination 
may  be  made  by  virtue  of  this  particular  provision. 

1   N.  Y.  k  N.  II.  R.  Co.  V.  Schuyler,  17  N.  Y.  592,  604,  per  Comstock  J. 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES   OF   ACTION.  481 

^  360.  *  466.  Observations  Made  by  Courts  Respecting  Meaning 
of  these  Terms.  I  shall  lirst  collect  some  general  observations 
which  have  been  made  by  the  courts  upon  tlie  legal  import  of 
these  terms,  and  shall,  with  whatever  aid  is  derived  from  the 
judicial  interpretation,  attempt  an  mdependent  analysis.  A  com- 
plaint united  a  cause  of  action  for  an  assault  and  battery  with  one 
for  slander,  alleging  that  the  defamatory  words  were  uttered  while 
tlie  beating  was  in  actual  progress.  To  a  demurrer  for  a  mis- 
joinder, it  was  answered  that  both  causes  of  action  arose  out  of 
the  same  transaction.  The  court  disposed  of  this  position  in  the 
following  manner :  "  It  by  no  means  follows  that,  because  the 
two  causes  of  action  originated  or  happened  at  the  same  time, 
each  cause  arose  out  of  the  same  transaction.  It  is  certainly 
neither  physically  nor  morally  impossible  that  there  should  be 
two  transactions  occurring  simultaneously,  each  differing  from  the 
other  in  essential  attitudes  and  qualities.  As  here,  the  transac- 
tion out  of  which  the  cause  of  action  for  the  assault  springs  is 
the  beating,  the  physical  force  used ;  while  the  transaction  out  of 
which  the  cause  of  action  for  the  slander  springs  is  not  the  beat- 
ing or  the  force  used,  but  the  defamatory  words  uttered.  The 
maker  of  a  promissory  note  might,  at  the  very  instant  of  its  de- 
livery and  inception,  falsely  call  the  payee  a  thief ;  and  yet  who 
would  say  that  the  two  causes  of  action  arose  out  of  the  same 
transaction  ?  It  has  been  held  that  a  contract  of  warranty  and  a 
fraud  practised  in  tlie  sale  of  a  horse  at  the  same  trade  did  not 
arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  so  as  to  be  connected  each  with 
the  same  subject  of  action,  and  that  a  complaint  containing  both 
causes  of  action  was  demurrable.^  Assault  and  battery  and  slan- 
der are  as  separate  and  distinct  causes  of  action  as  any  two  actions 
whatever  that  can  be  named.  The  subjects  of  the  two  actions  are 
not  connected  with  each  other.  Each  subject  is  as  distinct  and 
different  from  the  other  as  the  character  of  an  individual  is  from 
his  bodily  structure.  The  question  is  not  whether  both  causes  of 
action  sprang  into  existence  at  the-  same  moment  of  time.  Time 
has  very  little  to  do  with  solving  the  real  question.  The  questionV 
f  is,  Did  each  cause  of  action  accrue  or  arise  out  of  the  same  trans- 
[V  action,  the  same  tiling  done  f  It  is  apparent  that  each  cause  of''^ 
I  action  arose,  and  indeed  must  necessarily  have  arisen,  out  of  the ; 
1     doing  of  quite  different  things  by  the  defendant,  —  diiferent  in 

1  Sweet  ;•.  Lif^crscni,   12  How.  ]''r.  .3"!. 

."1 


482 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


ytheir  nature,  in  all  their  qualities  and  characteristics,  and  inflicting- 
.injuries  altogetlier  different  and  dissimilar.  The  same  evidence 
'would  not  sustain  each  cause  of  action,  and  they  may  require 
different  answers."  ^  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  the  twd 
causes  of  action  under  exactly  the  same  circumstances  do  arise! 
inut  of  the  same  transaction,  and  may  be  united  in  the  samaf 
complaint.^  -^ 

§  361.  *  467.  Author's  Criticism.  A  complaint  contained  one 
cause  of  action  for  the  breach  of  a  warranty  given  on  the  sale  of 
a  horse,  and  a  second  cause  of  action  for  fraudulent  representa- 


1  Anderson  v.  Hill,  53  Barb.  2.38,  245, 
per  T.  A.  Johnson  J. ;  and  see  Dragoo  i". 
Levi,  2  Duv.  520,  which  reaches  the  same 
conclusion.  It  should  be  noticed  that 
Judge  Johnson  offers  no  affirmative  defi- 
nition of  "  transaction,"  except  in  making 
"the  same  transaction"  equivalent  to 
"  the  same  thing  done  "  See  also  Wiles 
V.  Suvdam,  64  N.  Y.  173,  per  Church  C.  J. : 
Held,  that  the  two  causes  of  action  cannot 
be  joined ;  one  is  on  contract,  and  the 
other  is  for  a  penalty  given  by  statute; 
they  do  not  "  arise  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action,"^nor  are  they  "  connected  with  the 
same  su!)ject  of  action."  Hay  v.  Haj^  13 
Hun,  315;  French  v.  Salter,  17  id.  546; 
Douglas  Cy.  Sup.,  38  Wis.  179;  Ogdens- 
burgh  &  L."C.  R.  Co.  v.  Vt.  &  Can.  R.  Co., 
63  N.  Y.  176  (meaning  of  "  subject-matter 
of  the  action  "). 

-  Brewer  v.  Temple,  15  How.  Pr.  286  ; 
Harris  v.  Avery,  5  Ivans.  146  The  first 
of  these  was  a  special  term  decision,  and 
is  expressly  overruled  in  Anderson  v.  Hill. 
I  quote  from  the  opinion  in  the  other  as 
an  example  of  the  argument  on  the  other 
side  of  the  question.  The  defendant  had 
wrongfully  arrested  the  plaintiff,  and  at 
the  same  time  called  him  a  thief.  The 
court  say :  "  We  think  that  these  facts 
constitute  only  one  transaction.  .  .  .  Our 
code  has  abolished  all  cummon-law  forms 
of  action,  and  has  established  a  system 
for  the  joinder  of  actions  more  philo- 
sophical and  complete  in  itself.  It  fol- 
lows the  rules  of  equity  more  closely  than 
it  does  those  of  the  common  law,  one 
object  seeming  to  be  to  avcjid  the  multi- 
plicity of  actions,  and  to  settle  in  one  suit 
as  eijuity  did,  as  far  as  practicable,  the 
whole  subject-matter  of  a  controversy.     It 


is  probably  true  that  the  two  causes  of 
action  for  assault  and  battery  and  for 
slander  cannot,  under  our  code,  be  united, 
unless  both  arise  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action ;  but  we  do  not  know  any  reason 
why  they  should  not  be  united  when  both 
do  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction." 
The  court  here  simply  assumes  that  both 
causes  of  action  did  arise  out  of  the  same 
transaction,  but  does  not  venture  upon 
any  reasons  for  that  opinion.  The  deci- 
sion is  a  mere  begiring  of  the  question. 

[Benton  v.  Collins  (1896),  118  X.  C. 
196,  24  S  E.  122.  In  this  case  a  cause  of 
action  for  assault  and  batterv  and  an 
equitable  cause  of  action  to  set  aside  a 
deed  alleged  to  have  been  fraudulently 
executed  to  defeat  plaintiff  in  the  collec- 
tion of  his  claim  for  damages  for  the 
assault,  were  held  to  be  properly  joined 
in  the  same  complaint  See  also  Ferst's 
Sons  V.  Powers  (1900),  58  S  C  398.  36 
S  E.  744.  in  which  it  is  held  that  a  legal 
cause  of  action  for  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered may  be  joined  with  an  equitable 
cause  of  action  to  set  aside  a  sale  of  a 
.stock  of  goods  as  a  fraud  upon  creditors. 
See  also  Eudress  i\  Shove  (1901 ),  110  Wis. 
1.33,  85  N.  W.  653,  to  the  effect  that  "a 
cause  of  action  to  enforce  a  mortgage,  and 
one  to  recover  on  the  personal  liability 
of  the  mortgagor,  grow  out  of  the  same 
transaction  and  are  connected  with  the 
same  subject  tliereof,  hente  may  be  joined 
under  the  statute  on  that  subject  regard- 
less of  the  statutory  provision  for  defi- 
ciency judgments  in  foreclosure  cases, 
provided  no  one  other  than  the  debtor  is 
made  a  defendant  and  the  two  causes  of 
action  are  separately  stated.  "J 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION.  4S3 

tions  respecting  the  quality  and  condition  of  the  horse  made  at 
the  same  sale,  the  plaintiff  claiming  that  both  causes  of  action 
arose  out  of  the  same  transaction.  The  court  said  :  "  It  is  some- 
w  liat  dil'licult  to  determine  the  precise  extent  and  boundaries  of 
tlie  first  subdivision  of  §  167  of  the  code,  which  provides  for  the 
joinder  of  causes  of  action  where  they  arise  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action or  transactions  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action. 
In  this  case  the  plaintiff  first  counts  in  assumpsit  on  an  alleged 
warranty  of  the  horse,  and  in  the  second  count  for  fraud  and  de- 
ceit in  wrongfully  concealing  the  defects  of  the  same  horse.  It 
may  be  true  that  these  causes  of  action  arise  out  of  the  same 
transaction,  to  wit,  the  bargain  for  the  purchase  of  the  horse  ;  but 
are  they  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action  ?  The  subject 
of  the  action  is  either  the  contract  of  warranty,  or  it  is  the  fraud- 
ulent concealment  of  the  defects  complained  of.  These  causes  of 
action  cannot  consist  with  each  other.  I  am  inclined  to  think 
that  the  object  of  the  section  was  to  allow  the  plaintiff  to  include 
in  his  complaint  two  or  more  causes  of  action  actually  existing, 
arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  and  when  a  recovery  might 
be  had  for  both  in  the  same  action  ;  and  that  the  joinder  must  be 
of  those  -  causes  of  action  which  are  consistent  with,  not  those 
which  are  contradictory  to,  each  other."  ^  The  judge  here  fell 
into  at  least  one  palpable  error  and  misreading  of  the  statute.  If 
the  causes  of  action  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  they  should  also  be  connected  with  the  same  sub- 
ject of  action.  There  are  two  alternatives:  first,  the  causes  of 
action  must  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  that  is,  one  trans- 
action ,  or,  secondly^  they  must  arise  out  of  transactions  which  are 
themselves  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action.  When  it 
was  conceded  by  the  learned  judge  that  the  two  causes  of  action 
in  this  case  arose  out  of  the  same  transaction,  namely,  the  bargain 
for  the  sale  of  the  horse,  he  had  no  room  for  further  argument; 
the  case  was  practically  decided.  The  real  question  was,  whether 
they  did  in  fact  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction ;  whether  the 
negotiation  preceding  the  sale  ivas  the  "transaction  "  within  the 
legal  meaning  of  the  provision.     The  rule  laid  down  at  the  end  of 

^  Sweet  V.  Ingerson,  12  How.  Pr.  331,  stood  that  a  vendor  cannot  enter  into   a 

per  Bacon  J.     What  inconsistency  exists  contract  of  warranty,  and  also  make  false 

between    these   two    causes    of    action  ?  representations  at  the  same  sale    and  in 

Does  the  learned  judge  mean  to  be  under-  llic  Kdine  langiuvje? 


484  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

the  citation  affords  no  help  in  solving  the  difficulty,  if  indeed  it 
has  any  meaning  whatever. 

§  362.  *4:68.  Same  Subject.  In  a  case  where  the  defendants  — 
common  carriers  —  had  carried  a  quantity  of  wheat  of  the  plain- 
tiffs on  their  boats  from  Buffalo  to  New  York,  the  complaint 
separately  stated  two  causes  of  action.  The  first  alleged  a 
wrongful  conversion  of  340  bushels  of  wheat,  and  demanded 
judgment  for  their  value,  as  damages ;  the  second  alleged  an 
overpayment  of  freight  on  the  shipment  to  the  amount  of  il70, 
and  demanded  judgment  for  that  sum.  In  passing  upon  the 
question  raised  by  the  defendants'  demurrer,  the  court  said  :  "  It 
must  be  admitted  that  the  first  cause  of  action  is  for  a  tort,  and 
that  the  second  is  on  an  implied  contract  to  recover  back  money 
paid  by  plaintiffs  under  a  mistake  of  facts.  But  the  counsel  for 
the  plaintiffs  insists  that  both  causes  of  action  arise  out  of  the 
same  subject  of  action,  viz.  the  transportation  of  wheat  from  Buf- 
falo to  New  York,  or  arise  out  of  transactions  connected  %vith  that 
subject  of  the  action,  and  are  therefore  joined  under  the  first  sub- 
division of  §  167  of  the  code.  Cases  throw  but  little  light  on 
the  unmeaning  generality  of  the  first  subdivision  of  this  section. 
Now,  I  do  not  think  the  transportation  of  the  wheat  to  New  York 
is  the  subject  of  the  plaintiffs'  action.  The  plaintiffs  have  two 
causes  of  action.  The  subject  of  the  first  would  be  the  loss, 
waste,  or  wrongful  conversion  of  the  340  bushels  of  wheat  by  the 
defendants,  and  their  wrongful  neglect  or  act  by  which  the  plain- 
tiffs lost  their  property.  The  subject  of  the  second  cause  of  action 
would  appear  to  be  the  8170  of  the  plaintiffs'  money,  which  the 
plaintiffs  overpaid  to  the  defendants  on  account  of  freight,  and 
which  the  defendants  ought  to  have  paid  back  to  the  plaintiff's. 
But  have  both  these  causes  of  action,  or  subjects  of  action,  arisen 
out  of  the  same  transaction,  within  the  meaning  of  this  provision 
of  the  code  ?  I  do  not  want  to  nullify  the  code,  and  I  have  no 
right  to  nullify  it ;  and  this  provision  has,  or  was  intended  to 
have,  some  meaning.  Why,  then,  should  I  not  saj^  that  the  trans- 
action in  this  case,  out  of  which  have  arisen  the  plaintiffs'  two 
cau.ses  of  action,  and  subjects  of  action,  commenced  witli  the  ship- 
ment of  wheat  at  Buffalo,  and  has  not  ended  yet,  even  by  the 
commencement  of  this  action ;  the  plaintiffs'  two  causes  of  action 
being  links  in  tiie  chain  of  facts  containing  tlie  transaction,  and 
thus  arising  out  of,  or  connected  with,  the  same  transaction  ?     By 


JOIXDKR   OF   CAUSES   OF    ACTION.  485 

the  '  subject  of  action'  in  this  section  of  the  code  must  be  intended, 
not  the  subjects  of  the  different  counts,  or  of  the  several  causes  of 
action,  but  of  the  action  as  a  unit.  To  say  that  by  the  '  subject 
of  action '  is  meant  the  several  causes  of  action  nullifies  this  pro- 
vision of  the  code.  To  give  force  and  effect  to  it,  it  appears  to 
me  you  must  say  that  it  means  that  the  plaintiffs  can  unite  several 
causes  of  action  against  the  same  party,  arising  out  of  the  same 
transaction,  and  nothing  more  ;  and  you  must  treat  the  concluding 
words,  '  or  transactions  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action,' 
as  useless  and  unmeaning  surplusage.  Upon  the  Avhole,  I  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  plaintiffs  had  a  right  to  unite  the 
two  causes  of  action  in  this  complaint ;  but  I  have  done  so,  know- 
ing that  no  reasoning  on  this  point  can  have  much  logical  pre- 
cision, or  lead  to  a  satisfactory  result."  ^ 

§  363.  *  469.  Same  Subject.  This  opinion,  which  I  have  quoted 
in  full,  is  one  of  the  most  elaborate  attempts  to  be  found  in  the 
repo)'ts  at  an  analysis  and  definition  of  these  terms.  Some  obser- 
vations upon  it  are  appropriate  here,  before  passing  to  the  other 
citations.  It  is  plain  that  the  learned  judge  labored  under  a  hope- 
less confusion,  both  in  respect  to  his  notions  of  the  meaning  of 
the  important  terms,  ancl  in  respect  to  his  reading  of  the  clause 
itself.  He  is  completely  afloat  as  to  the  legal  import  of  "subject 
of  action,"  constantly  treating  it  interchangeably  with  "transac- 
tion," and,  notwithstanding  his  disclaimer,  confounding  it  with 
"cause  of  action."  Why,  in  the  one  case,  is  the  "subject  of 
action  "  declared  to  be  the  conversion  of  the  wheat,  the  wrongful 
act  or  neglect  by  which  tlie  wheat  was  lost  to  the  plaintiffs,  — 
that  is,  the  very  delict  committed  by  the  defendant,  and  in  the 
other  case  declared  to  be  the  ononey^  —  the  very  physical  thing 
which  the  plaintiffs  had  mistakenly  paid  to  the  defendants,  and 
which  the  defendants  were  under  an  implied  contract  to  repay  ? 
It  is  self-evident  that,  if  by  the  term  "  subject  of  action  "  is  meant 
the  delict  or  wrong  by  which  the  plaintiffs'  primary  right  of  prop- 
erty in  their  wheat  was  invaded,  it  must  also  mean  the  wrrong  in 
the  other  case,  — -  that  is,  the  breach  of  the  implied  contract  to 
repay  the  money;  ancl  if  it  denotes,  in  the  one  instance,  the 
money  which  is  the  subject  of  the  plaintiffs'  claim,  it  must  denote 
the  same  in  the  other.  But  the  great  error  of  the  learned  judge 
consists  in  his  mistaken  reading  of  the  statute.     The  view  of  the 

1  Adams  v.  Bissell,  28  Barb.  382,  385,  per  Sutherland  J. 


486  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

plaintiffs'  counsel,  which  he  repudiates,  was  certainly  simple  and 
intelligible.  That  view  regarded  both  causes  of  action  as  arising 
out  of  one  and  the  same  transaction,  —  the  transport  of  the  grain, 
with  all  of  its  incidents.  After  rejecting  it,  the  judge,  in  fact, 
returns  to  this  theory  at  last,  and  rests  his  decision  u[)on  it.  In 
his  discussion,  however,  he  reverses  the  order  of  the  statute ;  he 
treats  it  as  though  it  required  the  "  subjects  of  action  "  to  be  con- 
nected with  one  "transaction,"  instead  of  prescribing  that  the 
"  transactions "'  should  be  connected  with  the  same  "  subject  of 
action ; "  and,  finding  that  this  construction  leads  him  into  diffi- 
culties from  which  there  is  no  escape,  he  finally  pronounces  the 
important  clause  of  the  section  useless  surplusage,  to  be  entirely 
rejected.  I  need  hardly  say  that  courts  have  no  authority  to 
reject  any  portion  of  a  statute,  unless  it  be  absolutely  meaning- 
less. This  clause  is  certainly  not  thus  without  meaning.  Causes 
of  action  may  arise  from  the  same  transaction,  and  they  may  arise 
from  transactions  which  are  connected  with  the  same  subject  of 
action,  —  that  is,  which  have  a  common  point  of  connection  witli 
which  they  are  all  united,  and  whicli  common  point  is  the  subject 
of  the  action.  This,  I  say,  is  far  from  meaningless ;  on  the  con- 
trary, it  is  a  simple  and  plain  expression,  as  far  as  the  language 
is  concerned,  when  that  language  is  used  in  its  oixiinaiy  and  pop- 
ular signification.  The  difficulty,  and  the  only  difficulty,  springs 
from  the  question,  whether  the  words  are  thus  used  in  their  proper 
sense,  or  whether  they  must  receive  a  special  and  technical  legal 
inteipretation  in  order  to  amve  at  the  legislative  intent,  and  to 
frame  from  them  a  definite  rule  which  shall  be  applicable  to  all 
possible  cases.  It  is  an  abuse  of  judicial  power  to  reject  an 
express  provision  of  a  statute  on  the  sole  ground  of  a  difficulty 
in  understanding  and  enforcing  it. 

§  364.  *  470.  Same  Subject.  In  an  action  by  a  judgment  cred- 
itor against  his  debtor  and  an  assignee  of  such  debtor  to  set  aside 
transfers,  to  recover  propert}',  and  for  other  relief,  it  was  said  b}* 
the  court:  "  What  is  the  subject  of  the  action  in  this  case?  It  is 
the  restitution  of  the  propert}--  of  the  judgment  debtor,  whom  the 
plaintiff  represents.  To  entitle  himself  to  this  rehef,  the  plaintiff 
avers  in  liis  complaint  different  transactions  out  of  which  his  riglit 
to  a  restitution  flows."  ^  There  is  here  a  plain  cfmfusion  of  ideas. 
The  restitution  of  the  debtor's  property,  which  is  the  relief  de- 

1  Paleii  V.  Buslincll,  40  B.irlj.  24. 


JOINDER    OF    CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  487 

manded,  is  the  object  of  the  action.  If  there  is  anything  con- 
nected with  this  matter  clear,,  it  is  that  the  authors  of  the  code 
used  the  terms  "subject  of  action"  and  "object  of  the  action"  to 
describe  different  and  distinct  facts. 

§  365.  *4T1.  Jones  v.  Steamship  Cortes.  The  general  theory 
of  pleading  and  of  actions  embodied  in  the  new  system  was  stated 
with  some  fulness  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  California,  in  an 
action  brought  against  a  steamboat  company  by  a  passenger  to 
recover  damages.  The  plaintiff  had  purchased  a  ticket  from  San 
Francisco  to  San  Juan,  being  led  to  believe,  by  public  advertise- 
ments of  the  defendants,  that  the  vessel  landed  at  the  latter  place. 
She  was  carried  on  to  Panama,  the  boat  not  stopping  at  San  Juan, 
and  was  subjected  to  many  personal  discomforts  and  injuries,  and 
also  suffered  consequential  pecuniary  losses  and  damage.  The 
complaint  was  in  the  form  of  an  action  for  deceit,  rather  than 
on  the  contract,  and  contained  allegations  of  false  and  fraudulent 
representations.  In  respect  to  this  complaint,  the  court  pronounced 
the  following  opinion :  "  Our  system  of  pleadiiig  is  foi'med  upoJi 
the  model  of  the  civil  law,  and  one  of  its  principal  objects  is  to 
discourage  protracted  and  vexatious  litigation.  It  is  the  duty  of 
the  courts  to  assist  as  far  as  possible  in  the  accomplishment  of  this 
object,  and  it  should  not  be  frittered  away  by  the  application  of 
rules  Avhieh  have  no  legitimate  connection  with  the  system.  The 
provisions  for  avoiding  a  multiplicity  of  suits  are  to  be  liberall}' 
and  beneficially  construed  ;  and  we  see  no  reason  why  all  matters 
arising  from,  and  constituting  part  of,  the  same  transaction,  should 
not  be  litigated  and  determined  in  the  same  action.  Causes  of 
complaint  differing  in  their  nature,  and  having  no  connection  with 
each  other,  cannot  be  united ;  but  the  object  of  this  rule  is  to 
prevent  the  confusien  and  emljarrassment  which  would  necessarily 
result  from  the  union  of  diverse  and  incongruous  matters,  and  it 
has  no  application  to  a  case  embracing  a  variety  of  circumstances, 
so  connected  as  to  constitute  but  one  transaction.  .  .  .  Every 
action  under  our  practice  may  be  properly  termed  an  action  on 
the  case  ;  and  it  would  seem  that  every  ground  of  relief  which 
can  be  regarded  as  a  part  of  the  case  may  with  propriety  be  in- 
cluded in  the  action.  .  .  .  The  plaintiffs  have  brought  their  suit 
upon  the  whole  case  to  recover  damages,  not  only  for  the  breach 
of  the  contract,  but  for  the  wrongs  and  injuries  committed  by  the 
owners  and  agents  of  the  defendants  in  that  connection.     The 


488  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

defendants  are  liable  for  all  the  damages  resulting  from  these 
causes ;  and  there  is  certainly  no  impropriety  in  adjusting  the 
whole  matter  in  one  controversy."  ^  The  section  found  in  all  the 
codes  defining  a  "  counter-claim  "  contains  the  expressions  "  trans- 
action "  and  "  connected  with  the  subject  of  action,"  used  in  the 
same  sense  as  in  the  passage  now  under  consideration.  In  a  few 
of  the  decisions  which  have  been  based  upon  that  section,  there  is 
some  approach  towards  a  general  interpretation  of  these  phrases. 
The  cases  are  collected  in  the  succeeding  chapter,  in  the  section 
which  treats  of  the  counter-claim,  and  may  be  consulted  for  what- 
ever light  they  throw  upon  tlic  present  discussion. 

§  366.  *  472.  Observations  of  the  Author.  Two  Alternatives. 
It  is  plain  that  little  real  help  can  be  obtained  from  the  foregoing 
judicial  explanations,  and  we  must  return  to  the  very  language  of 
the  statute  itself.  This  language  must  be  caiefuUy  studied,  and 
the  proper  force  and  effect  given  to  all  its  words.  In  order  that 
different  causes  of  action  may  be  united,  they  must  arise  out  of  a 
transaction,  or  out  of  transactions.  Nothing  is  said  about  their 
being  connected  with  or  arising  out  of  the  same  "subject  of 
action."  There  are  two  alternatives  only :  First,  these  different 
causes  of  action  may  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  —  that  is, 
out  of  one  ;  or,  secondly,  they  may  arise  out  of  different  transac- 
tions ;  but  in  that  case  these  transactions  must  be  connected  with 
the  same  '•  subject  of  action."  The  words  "  arise  out  of  "  are 
important  and  em]^hatic.  They  indicate  a  sequence  of  cause  and 
effect,  so  that  the  causes  of  action  must  result  as  consequences 
from,  or  be  produced  by,  the  transactions.  It  is  plain  that  there 
must  be  a  close  connection  between  the  transaction,  as  the  origin, 
and  the  causes  of  action,  as  the  products. 

§  367.  *  473.  Meaning  of  "  Transaction."  "  Transaction  "  is  de- 
fined by  Worcester  as  "  the  act  of  transacting  or  conducting  any 
business;  negotiation;  management;  a  proceeding."  We  must 
recur  to  the  definition  of  cause  of  action  already  given.  It  in- 
cludes the  plaintiff's  primary  right  which  has  been  invaded,  and 
the  wrongful  act  or  defaidt  —  the  delict — of  the  defendant  by 
wliich  the  right  is  broken.  In  oider  that  causes  of  action  may 
arise  out  of  a  transaction,  tliere  must  therefore  be  a  negotiation, 
or  a  proceeding,  or  a  conduct  of  business,  between  the  parties,  of 
such  a  nature  that  it  produces,  as  necessary  results,  two  or  more 

1  .Joiie.s  V.  Stcain.sliip  Cortes,  17  Cal.  487,  497,  por  Cope  -J. 


JOINDER    OF    CAUSES    OF    ACTION.  489 

different  primary  rights  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  and  wrongs  done 
by  the  defendant  wliich  are  violations  of  sneh  rights.  The  pro- 
ceeding, or  negotiation,  or  conduct  of  business,  must,  of  course, 
be  a  unit,  one  affair,  or  else  it  would  not  be  a  single  transaction  ; 
and  yet  it  must  be  in  its  nature  complex,  for  it  must  be  the  origin 
of  two  or  more  separate  primary  rights,  and  of  the  wrongs  which 
violate  them.  In  order  that  tliis  may  be  so,  the  facts  from 
which  the  different  primary  rights  flow  must  he  parts  of^  or  stejjs 
in,  the  transaction ;  and,  for  the  same  reason,  the  wrongful  acts 
or  omissions  of  the  defendant  must  be  parts  of  the  same  transac- 
tion. If  a  single  transaction  —  that  is,  a  single,  continuous,  and 
complex  proceeding,  or  negotiation,  between  the  parties  —  is 
analyzed  and  reduced  into  its  series  of  acts  and  defaults,  and  some 
of  these  acts  are  the  facts  from  which  spring  one  primary  right 
in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  and  other  acts  are  the  facts  from  which 
spring  a  different  primary  right  in  his  favor,  and  others  still  are 
the  violations  or  breaches  of  these  rights,  these  two  causes  of 
action  do  truly  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction. 

§  368.  *  474.  Same  Subject.  It  is  clear  that  every  event  affect- 
ing two  persons  is  not  necessarily  a  "  transaction  "  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute  ;  indeed,  the  word  as  used  in  common 
speech  has  no  such  signification.  "  Transaction  "  implies  mutu- 
ality, something  done  by  both  in  concert,  in  which  each  takes 
some  part.  Much  less  can  it  be  said  that,  because  two  events 
occur  to  the  same  persons  at  the  same  time,  they  are  necessarily  so 
connected  as  to  become  one  transaction.  The  case  cited  above, 
in  which  a  cause  of  action  for  an  assault  and  battery  and  one  for 
a  slander  were  united,  illustrates  this  statement.  Two  events 
happened  simultaneously,  the  beating  and  the  defamation,  but 
neither  was  a  "transaction"  in  any  proper  sense  of  the  word. 
The  wrong  which  formed  a  part  of  one  cause  of  action  was  the 
beating  ;  that  which  formed  a  part  of  the  other  was  the  malicious 
speaking.  The  plaintiff's  primary  rights  which  previously  existed 
were  broken  by  two  independent  and  different  wrongs.  The  only 
common  point  between  the  causes  of  action  was  one  of  time  ;  but 
this  unity  of  time  Avas  certainly  not  a  "  transaction."  ^     Much  of 

1  [^See  De  Wolfe  v.  Abraham  (189G),  the  presence  and  hearing  of  a  large  nuni- 

151  N.  Y.  186,  45  N.E.  455,  in  which  "the  her   of  people,   the    defendants,   through 

plaintiff  sued  the  defendants,  merchants  their    lawful    agents,    charged    plaintiff 

in  the  city  of  Brooklyn,  for  slander,  alleg-  with   theft,  in  that  she  had  stolen  from 

ing  that  at  their  place  of  business,  and  in  them    a    certain      ring.     The    ])laintiff's 


490 


CIVIL    REMEDIKS. 


the  difficulty  in  construing  this  Language  has  resulted,  I  think, 
from  a  failure  to  apprehend  the  true  nature  of  a  "  cause  of  action," 
from  a  forgetfulness  that  it  includes  two  factors,  —  the  primary 


counsel,  in  opening  the  case  to  the  jury, 
stated  that  the  alleged  slander  was  not 
uttered  by  the  defendants,  or  either  of 
them,  but  by  a  clerk  or  salesman  in  their 
employ  ;  that  plaintiff,  at  the  time  of  tlie 
slander,  was  falsely  imjjrisoned  by  a  de- 
tective of  defendants,  and  that  slie  sought 
to  recover  damages  for  false  impris- 
onment and  the  slander.  Thereupon 
the  counsel  for  the  defendants  moved 
upon  the  complaint  and  the  opening 
for  a  dismissal  upon  the  ground  that 
the  defendants  were  not  liable  for  the 
slander  of  their  clerk,  and  that  the  com- 
plaint was  solely  for  slander.  This 
motion  was  denied  and  the  plaintiff  was 
allowed  to  withdraw  a  juror  for  the  pur- 
pose of  applying  to  the  Special  Term  for 
leave  to  amend  her  complaint,  so  as  to 
allege  a  cause  of  at'tion  for  false  imprison- 
ment against  the  defendants.  A  motion 
■was  accordingly  made  at  Special  Term, 
and  the  justice  ])residing  held  that  the 
proposed  amended  complaint  contained  a 
union  of  the  causes  of  action  for  slan- 
der and  false  imprisonment,  and  denied 
the  motion.  On  aj)])eal  the  Appellate 
Division  reversed  the  order  of  the 
Special  Term  and  allowed  the  amend- 
ment, hohling  that  '  injury  at  the  same 
time  to  the  jiersou  by  physical  violence 
and  to  the  character  by  language  may 
well  be  regarded  as  parts  of  a  single 
tort.'"  The  question  presented  to  the 
Court  of  Appeals  was  "  whether  under  all 
the  circumstances  of  tlie  case  the  plaintiff 
should  have  been  allowed  to  amend  her 
complaint  for  slander  by  adding  thereto 
the  statement  of  a  cau.se  of  action  for 
false  imprisonment."  lu  reversing  the 
order  appealed  from  the  Court  of  Appeals, 
among  other  tilings,  said :  "  We  are 
unable  to  agree  with  the  conclusion 
reached  by  the  learned  Appellate  Division 
that  injury  at  the  same  time  to  the  jjer- 
son  by  physical  violence  and  to  the 
character  by  language  may  well  be 
regarded  as  parts  of  a  single  tort.  We 
think  to  so  hold  is  to  ignore  a  distinction 
that  exists  in  all  jurisdictions  where  the 


common  law  is  administered.  It  is  not 
necessary,  however,  to  examine  pre- 
cedents, as  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure 
(§  484)  is  decisive  of  this  appeal."  After 
stating  the  provisions  of  this  section  of 
the  code  ttie  court  proceeds:  "It  thus 
apjjears  that  the  legislature  has  indicated 
with  great  clearness  and  j)articularity  the 
causes  of  action  that  may  i)e  united  in  the 
same  complaint.  The  test  is  very  simple, 
as  all  causes  of  action  united  must  belong 
to  the  same  subdivision  of  the  section  we 
are  considering.  False  imprisonment  is 
an  injury  to  the  person  and  is  embraced 
within  subdivision  2,  while  slander  is  in 
express  tern)s  excluded  therefrom  and 
])laced  in  subdivision  3.  The  plaintiff's 
case  is  not  aided  by  subdivision  9  of  the 
section,  which  provides  for  uniting  causes 
of  action  upon  claims  arising  out  of  the 
same  transaction.  It  does  not  follow  that 
two  causes  of  action,  originating  at  the 
same  time,  arose  as  matter  of  law  out  of 
the  same  transaction,  or  are  proved  l)y 
the  same  evidence  (Anderson  i".  Hill,  5-3 
Barb.  24.5,  246).  In  tlie  case  cited  the 
General  Term  of  the  Supreme  Court  held 
that  causes  of  action  for  assault  and  bat- 
tery and  slander  could  not  be  united  in 
the  same  complaint."  Here  the  court 
quotes  the  text  commenting  upon  the  case 
of  Anderson  i'.  Hill  cited  in  the  opinion 
and  concludes  as  follows :  "  The  separate 
and  distinct  nature  of  the  causes  of  action 
of  false  imprisonment  and  slander  are 
apparent  when  we  apply  the  test  under 
the  circumstances  of  the  case  at  bar, 
whether  the  same  evidence  would  prove 
the  plaintiff's  case.  It  is  obvious  that  it 
would  not ;  in  the  action  for  false  impris- 
onment plaintiff  must  show  an  unlawful 
arrest  and  detention ;  in  the  action  for 
slander  the  proof  would  be  the  uttering  of 
the  slander  in  the  ])resence  of  others,  its 
falsity,  if  justified,  and  extrinsic  evi- 
dence of  malice  if  any  existed.  Tlie 
measure  and  proof  of  damages  in  the  two 
causes  of  actiou  would  be  entirely  dif- 
ferent."] 


joindp:r  of  causes  of  action. 


491 


right  and  the  wrong  which  invades  it.  A  "  cause  of  action  "  can- 
not be  said  to  "  arise  out  of  "  an  event,  when  the  event  produces 
or  contains  but  one  of  these  factors, — the  deUct  or  wrongful 
act.^ 


1  rjUeaning  of  the  Term  "Transac- 
tion." 

Gutzman  v.  Clancy  (1902),  lU  Wis- 
589,  90  N.  W.  1081,  holds  that  the  word 
"  transaction,"  in  the  statute,  is  broad 
enough  to  include  an  entire,  continuous 
physical  encounter ;  Gilbert  r.  Loberg 
(1894),  8.6  Wis.  661,  57  N.  W.  982;  Story 
&  Isham'c.  Co.  v.  Story  (1893),  100  Cal. 
30.  -M  Pac.  671,  quoting  the  author.  In 
Kuapp  v.  Walker  (1900),  73  Conn.  459,  47 
Atl.  es."),  the  court  said  :  "  The  complaint 
before  us,  containing  but  one  count, 
describes  a  cause  of  action  for  fraud.  It 
alleges  that  the  defendant  by  certain 
false  and  fraudulent  representations, 
which  are  set  forth,  induced  the  plaintiff 
to  ])art  with  his  horse  of  the  value  of 
$100.  It  also  describes  a  cause  of  action 
for  breach  of  contract.  It  alleges  that 
the  defendant  failed  to  perform  his  agree- 
ment to  deliver  a  certain  gray  mare  in 
exchange  for  the  horse  vi^hich  he  had 
received  from  the  plaintiff.  Tiie  dealings 
between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  with 
reference  to  an  exchange  of  horses  was  the 
transaction  out  of  which  both  the  alleged 
causes  of  action  arose,  and  a  st:iteuient  of 
all  the  claimed  facts  of  the  entire  trans- 
action therefore  involved  a  statement  of 
both  of  said  causes  of  action." 

In  Craft  Refrigerating  Machine  Co. 
v.  Quinni])iac  Brewing  Co.  (1893),  63 
Conn.  551,  29  Atl.  76,  the  court  said : 
"  As  the  word  is  employed  in  American 
codes  of  pleading  and  in  our  own  Prac- 
tice Act,  a  transaction  is  something  wliich 
has  taken  place  whereby  a  cause  of  action 
has  arisen.  It  miist  therefore  consist  of 
an  act  or  agreement,  or  several  acts  or 
agreements  having  some  connection  with 
each  other,  in  which  more  than  one  per- 
son is  concerned,  and  by  which  the  legal 
relations  of  such  persons  between  them- 
selves are  altered.  The  transaction  be- 
tween the  parties  to  the  present  action 
began  when  they  made  the  contract  for 
the  manufacture  and  sale  of  the  two 
machines.  Then  followed  the  delivery  of 
the  machines,  the  refusal  to  accept  them. 


the  attempt  of  the  plaintiff  to  retake 
them,  the  forcible  prevention  of  their 
removal,  and  the  subsequent  continuance 
of  their  use  in  the  defendant's  business. 
Without  taking  each  aiul  all  of  these 
events  into  consideration,  the  legal  rela- 
tions of  the  parties  could  not  be  fully 
determined.  From  the  delivery  of  tlie 
machines  to  the  commencement  of  the 
action,  they  had  remained  continuously  in 
the  defendant's  possession.  It  had  simply 
dealt  with  them  in  a  different  way  at  dif- 
ferent times.  The  l^ractice  Act  is  to  be 
'  favorably  and  liberally  construed  as  a 
remedial  statute.'  ...  It  has  taken  the 
word  transaction,  not  out  of  any  legal 
vocabulary  of  technical  terms,  but  from 
the  common  speech  of  men.  So  far  as  we 
are  aware  it  has  never  been  the  subject 
of  any  exact  judicial  definition.  It  is 
therefore  to  he  construed  as  men  com 
monly  understand  it,  when  applied,  as  in 
our  Practice  Act  it  certainly  is  applied, 
...  to  any  dealings  between  the 
parties,  resulting  in  wrongs,  without 
regard  to  whetlier  tiie  wrong  be  done  by 
violence,  neglect,  or  breach  of  contract. 
It  seems  to  us  hardly  to  be  doubted  that 
any  ordinary  man  would  consider  every- 
thing stated  in  the  complaint  as  ])roperly 
belonging  to  a  narrative  of  the  whole 
transaction  between  the  parties,  and 
necessary  for  the  information  of  one  who 
was  to  form  a  judgment  as  to  their 
respective  rights.  That  a  broader  mean- 
ing should  be  given  to  the  term  '  trans- 
action' than  it  has  received  in  some  of  the 
courts  of  our  sister  States,  is  plain  from 
the  provision  in  the  Practice  BooJ;,  .  .  . 
that  'where  several  torts  are  connnit- 
tcd  simultaneously  against  the  j)laiiitiff 
(as  a  battery  accompanied  by  slanderous, 
words)  they  may  be  joined  as  causes  of 
action  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction, 
notwithstanding  they  may  belong  to  dif- 
ferent classes  of  action.'  This  was  the 
deliberate  adoption  of  a  view  of  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  in  question  which  had 
been  previously  disapproved  in  New  York, 
as  well  as  by  Judge  Bliss  in  his  treatise  on 


492  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  369.  *  475.  Meaning  of  "Subject  of  Action."  The  same  analysis 
applies  also  to  the  remaining  portion  of  the  clause,  the  sole  cliff er- 
ence  being  that  the  causes  of  action  arise  out  of  different  trans- 
actions instead  of  one.  The  common  tie  between  the  causes 
of  action  in  that  case  is,  that  the  transactions  themselves  are 
connected  v/ith  the  same  "  subject  of  action."  What  is  meant 
bv  this  term?  It  cannot  be  synonymous  with  "cause  of  action." 
This  appears  from  making  the  substitution,  since  the  result  would 
be,  "  causes  of  action  may  be  united  when  they  arise  out  of  trans- 
actions connected  with  the  same  cause  of  action ; "  which  is  an 
absurdity,  a  mere  statement  in  a  circle.  "  Subject  of  action  " 
must,  therefore,  be  something  different  from  "cause  of  action." 
It  is  also  different  from  "  object  of  the  action,"  The  object  of 
the  action  is  the  thing  sought  to  be  attained  by  the  action,  the 
remedy  demanded  and  finally  awarded  to  the  plaintiff.  Causes 
of  action  cannot  arise  out  of  transactions  connected  with  the 
"  object  of  the  action,"  because  that  object  is  something  in  the 
future,  and  could  have  had  no  being  when  the  transactions  took 
place  out  of  which  the  causes  of  action  arose.  As  the  causes  of 
action  arise  out  of  certain  transactions,  and  as  these  transactions 
are  connected  with  a  "  subject  of  action,"  it  is  plain  that  this  sub- 
ject must  be  in  existence  simultaneously  with  the  transactions 
themselves,  and  prior  to  the  time  when  the  causes  of  action  com- 
mence. This  fact  also  shows  that  the  "  subject "  must  be  some- 
thing other  than  the  cause  of  action.  The  phrase  was  not  used 
in  legal  terminology  prior  to  the  code,  but  another  one  very 
similar  to  it  was  in  constant  use,  and  had  acquired  a  well-defined 
meaning  ;  namely,  "  subject-matter  of  the  action.''''  Thus  the  rule 
is  familiar,  that  courts  must  have  jurisdiction  of  "  the  subject- 
matter  of  the  action,"  as  well  as  over  the  parties.  Courts  might 
have  the  power  in  a  proper  case  to  grant  any  kind  of  relief,  legal 
or  equitable,  and  to  entertain  any  form  of  proceeding,  and  yet 
not  have  jurisdiction  over  some  particular  "  subject-matter."  The 
term  "subject  of  action,"  found  in  the  code  in  this  and  one  or 
two  other  sections,  was  doubtless  employed  by  its  authors  and  the 
legislature  as  synonymous  with,  or  rather  in  the  place  of,  "  subject- 
matter  of  the  action."     I  can  conceive  of  no  other  interpretation 

Code  Pleading  (§125),  though   accepted     See  also  McHard  v.  Williams   (1S96),  8 
in    Kansai?.     Anderson  v.   Hill,  .5.3  Barb.     S.  D.  381,  66  N.  W.  930.3 
23S,  245;  Harris  f.  Avery,  5  Kans.   146." 


JOIXDER    OF    CAUSES    OF    ACTION. 


493 


which  will  apply  to  the  phrase  and  meet  all  the  requirements  of 
the  context.  "  Subject-matter  of  the  action  "  is  not  the  "  cause 
of  action,"  nor  the  "  object  of  the  action."  It  rather  describes  the 
physical  facts,  the  things  real  or  personal,  the  money,  lands,  chat- 
tels, and  the  like,  in  relation  to  which  the  suit  is  prosecuted.  It 
is  possible,  therefore,  that  several  different  "  transactions  "  should 
have  a  connection  with  this  "  subject-matter,"  or,  what  seems  to  me 
to  be  the  same  thing,  with  this  "  subject  of  action. "  The  whole 
passage  is,  at  best,  a  difficult  one  to  construe  in  such  a  manner 
that  any  explicit  and  definite  rule  can  be  extracted  from  it.^  I 
remark,  in  bringing  this  analysis  of  the  language  to  a  close,  that 
the  latter  clause  of  the  subdivision  —  "or  transactions  connected 
with  the  same  subject  of  action  "  —  can  probably  have  no  applica- 


1   [^Meaning   of  the   Term  "  Subject 
of  Action.^'' 

Ill  Box  V.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 

(1899),  107  la.  660,  78  N.  W.  964,  the 
court  quotes  as  follows  from  Rodgers  v. 
Association,  17  S.  C.  406:  "What  is  a 
cause  of  action  1  We  must  keep  in  view 
the  difference  between  the  subject  of  the 
action  and  the  cause  of  the  action.  The 
subject  of  the  action  was  what  was  for- 
merly understood  as  the  subject-matter 
of  the  action."  See  Adkins  v.  Loucks 
(1900),  107  Wis.  .587,  83  N.  W.  9.34;  Jor- 
dan V.  Estate  of  Warner  (1900),  107  Wis. 
5.39,  8.3  N.  W.  946 ;  Foster  v.  Posson 
(1899),  105  Wis.  99,  81  N.  W.  123.  In 
Zinc  Carbonate  Co.  v.  First  National  Bank 
of  Shullsburg  (1899),  103  Wis.  125,  79 
N.  W.  229,  the  court  said :  "  There  is 
but  one  subject  of  action,  —  the  conspir- 
acy to  defraud  and  its  consummation  to 
the  damage  of  plaintiff.  All  the  allega- 
tions of  fact  are  parts  of  the  presentation 
of  that  one  subject."  Dinau  v.  Coneys 
(1894),  143  N.  Y.  544,  38  N.  E.  715: 
"  The  subject-matter  of  the  plaintiff's  ac- 
tion w<as  the  alleged  right  of  possession  of 
the  land  sought  to  be  recovered.  The 
subject-matter  of  the  counter-claim  was  the 
right  to  recover  against  the  plaintiff 
the  amount  of  the  legacy,  and  also  .  .  . 
the  right  to  relief  by  sale  of  the  land  for 
its  payment."  Ponca  Mill  Co.  v.  Mikesell 
(1898),  55  Neb.  98,  75  N.  W.  46:  "An- 
other ground  of  demurrer  was  that  two 
causes  of  action   are   improperly    joined. 


This  is  because  the  plaintiff  alleged  the 
proceedings  to  set  aside  the  conveyance  to 
Jordan  and  the  lien  re.sulting  to  himself, 
and  prayed  a  foreclosure.  The  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  provides  (sec.  87)  that  the  plain- 
tiff may  u«ite  several  causes  of  action  relat- 
ing to  '  the  same  transaction  or  transactions 
connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action.' 
The  vagueness  of  tliat  language  has 
caused  the  profession  much  difficulty  ;  but 
the  facts  out  of  which  the  lieu  arose  em- 
brace a  part  of  the  fraudulent  conduct 
justifying  interposition  through  a  receiver- 
ship; they  resulted  in  giving  plaintiff  a 
special  interest  aside  from  that  of  a  stock- 
holder, and  it  would  certainly  seem  that 
the  language  quoted  is  I)road  enough  to 
cover  such  a  state  of  facts."  McHard  v. 
Williams  (1896),  8  S.  D.  381.  66  N.  W. 
930.  In  Craft  Refrigerating  Machine 
Co.  V.  Quinuipiac  Brewing  Co.  (1893),  63 
Conn.  551,  29  Atl.  76,  it  is  said :  "It  fol- 
lows that  both  the  causes  of  action  were 
properly  united  in  the  same  complaint. 
The  same  result  would  also  be  reached 
if  what  we  have  viewed  as  one  transaction 
could  be  regarded  as  consisting  of  several 
transactions,  since  such  would  all  be  con- 
nected with  the  same  subject  of  action, 
that  is,  the  two  machines  and  the  title  to 
them;"  Daniels  ;•.  Fowler  (1897),  120 
N.  C.  14,  26  S.  E.  635  ;  Solomon  v.  Bates 
(1896),  118  N.  C.  311,  24  S.  E.  746: 
"  There  is  the  same  '  subject  of  action  ' 
throughout,  i.  e.  the  plaintiff's  lo.ss  of  his 
deposit. "3 


494 


CIVIL    EEMEDIES. 


tion  to  legal  causes  of  action,  and  can  only  be  resorted  to  in  prac- 
tice as  describing  some  equitable  suits  which  involve  extremely 
complicated  matters.  In  fact,  Mr.  Justice  Comstock's  position  is 
doubtless  correct,  that  the  entire  subdivision  finds  its  primary  and 
by  far  most  important  application  to  equitable  rather  than  to  legal 
proceedings.^ 

§  370.  *  476.  Examples  of  Causes  of  Action  Held  to  have  arisen 
out  of  the  same  Transaction.  Althougli  the  courts  have  generally 
refrained  from  any  discussion  of  this  clause,  they  have  had 
frequent  occasion  to  invoke  its  aid  ;  and  the  following  cases  will 
furnish  some  examples  of  judicial  decisions  based  upon  it.'-  The 
causes  of  action  united  in  the  same  complaint  or  petition  were 
held  to  have  arisen  out  of , the  same  transaction,  where  one  was 
for  the  recovery  of  the  possession  of  land,  and  the  other  was  for 
the  value  of  its  occupation  by  the  defendant ;  ^  for  an  accounting 
and  payment  of  the  bahance  found  due,  and  for  the  surrender  up 
of  securities ;  *  for  injuries  to  the  person  and  for  those   to  the 

^  In  support  of  the  interpretation  of 
the  phrase  "  suhject  of  the  action,"  sug- 
gested by  the  text,  namely,  that  it  "  de- 
scribes the  physical  facts,  the  tilings  real 
or  personal,  the  money,-  lauds,  chattels, 
and  the  like,  in  relation  to  which  the  suit 
is  prosecuted,"  see  Holmes  v.  Abbott, 
53  Hun,  617,  6  N.  Y.  Suppl.  943.  A 
cause  of  action  entitling  to  injunction 
and  damages  for  continuous  interference 
with  rights  of  pn^perty  by  the  mainte- 
nance and  operation  of  a  steam  railn^ad 
in  a  highway  may  be  united  with  a  tdaim 
for  damages  for  personal  injuries  suffered 
by  the  plaintiff  while  driving  along  the 
highway  in  conseiiuence  of  his  horses  be- 
ing frightened  l)y  the  noise  of  a  passing 
engine  and  train  ;  since  both  claims  are 
"  connected  with  the  same  subject  of  ac- 
tion," wliicli  in  this  case  is  the  unlawful 
obstruction  of  the  highway  by  the  de- 
fendant :  Lamming  o.  Galusha,  135  N.  Y. 
239. 

2  [^Bush  V.  Froelick  (1896),  8  S.  D.353, 
66  N.  W.  939.  "  Under  Comp.  Laws,  sec. 
4932,  authorizing  the  joinder  of  causes  of 
action  arising  out  of  '  the  same  transac- 
tion, or  transactions  connected  with  the 
same  subject  of  action,'  the  holder  of  a 
note  secured  by  a  trust  deed  may  in  one 
action  seek  to  f<jrecloso  the  trust  deed,  to 
»et  aside  a  prior  foreclosure  made  by  the 


trustee  without  plaintiff's  knowledge  or 
consent,  to  enjoin  the  county  treasurer 
from  issuing  to  the  trustee  a  tax  deed  for 
the  mortgaged  premises,  ami  to  adjust  the 
equities  of  the  various  parties."  Dinges 
V.  Riggs  (1895),  43  Neb.  710,  62  N.  W.  74; 
for  malicious  prosecution,  for  damage  to 
plaintiff's  business  by  arresting  occupants 
of  iier  place  of  business,  and  for  slander. 
Maldaner  v.  Beurhaus  (1900),  108  Wis. 
25,  84  N.  W.  25  ;  Alliance  Elevator  Co.  v. 
Wells  (1896),  93  Wis.  5,  66  X.  W.  796: 
one  count  alleged  the  withholding  of 
premises  wrongfully  after  expiration  of 
lease  therefor;  the  other  count,  that  cer- 
tain ]iersonal  property,  that  by  the  terms 
of'  the  lease  defendant  was  entitled  to  the 
use  of,  had  been  converted.  Held,  upon 
demurrer  for  improper  joinder  of  causes, 
that  both  causes  arose  out  of  the  same 
transaction  or  transactions  connected  with 
the  same  subject  of  action.  Porter  v.  In- 
ternational Bridge  Co.  (1900),  163  N.  Y. 
79,  57  N.  K.  174;  Scott  v.  Flowers  (1900), 
60  Neb.  675,  84  N.  W.  81,  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion for  false  imprisonment  joined  with  a 
count  for  malicious  jtrosecution.] 

3  Armstrong  ;;.  Hinds,  8  Minn.  254. 
See  Larned  v.  Hudson,  57  N.  Y.  151  ; 
also  fiost,  §  *  494,  and  note. 

*  Montgomery  v.  McEwen,  7  Minn. 
351. 


JOINDEE   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  495 

property  of  a  passenger,  coinmitted  by  tlie  wrongful  acts  and 
frauds  of  a  steamboat  company  on  the  same  voyage ;  ^  where  the 
owner  of  stereotype  plates  of  a  book  alleged  a  breach  of  defend- 
ant's contract  to  furnish  paper  and  print  a  book  therefrom,  and 
also  injuries  negligently  done  to  the  plates  themselves  while  in 
the  defendant's  possession ;  ^  detaining  the  plaintiff's  chattels,  and 
wrongfully  and  negligently  injuring  tliem  wliile  thus  detained  ;  ^  an 
action  by  a  judgment  creditor  against  his  debtor  and  another  to 
recover  back  money  wrongfully  paid  as  usury  to  such  person  by 
the  debtor,  to  compel  this  assignee  to  account  for  actual  securities 
placed  in  his  hands  by  the  debtor,  and  to  set  aside  certain  trans- 
fers of  personal  property  made  by  the  debtor ;  *  an  action  in 
which  the  plaintiff  sought  to  recover  the  agreed  price  in  a  con- 
tract for  building  a  house,  damages  caused  by  the  defendant's 
delay  to  have  the  premises  read}-  in  time  for  the  work  to  go  on, 
and  the  price  of  extra  work  and  materials,  and  finally  to  set  aside, 
on  the  ground  of  fraud,  an  award  made  in  reference  to  certain  of 
the  matters  in  dispute  ;  ^  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the 
conversion  of  goods  by  the  defendant,  a  common  carrier,  and  to 
recover  back  money  mistakenly  paid  as  freight  for  the  same 
goods ;  ^  where  lands  incumbered  by  an  outstanding  mortgage 
had  been  conveyed  by  a  warranty  deed,  and  the  grantee  therein 
brought  an  action  against  the  grantor  and  the  holder  of  the 
mortgage,  and  prayed  a  judgment  fixing  the  amount  cUie  upon 
the  mortgage,  if  anj,  and  directing  the  same  to  be  delivered  up 
and  cancelled  upon  payment  hy  the  plaintiff  of  tlie  amount  so 
ascertained,  and  ordering  the  grantor  thereupon  to  repay  that  sum 
to  the  plaintiff ;  "*  action  against  a  constable  and  the  sureties  upon 
his  official  bond,  alleging  the  issue  of  an  execution  to  such  officer 
and  a  levy  by  him  upon  propei'ty  of  the  judgment  debtor  sufficient 
to  have  made  the  amount  due,  a  neglect  to  return  the  execution, 


1  Jones  V.    Steamboat  Cortes,  17  Cal.  ^  Paleu   r.  Bushnell,  46  Barb.  24.     It 
487,   497.     See,    however,    Graut    ;■.   Mc-  raiglit,  perhaps,  have   beeu  better  to  say 
Carty,  38  Iowa,  468.     Injury  to  tlie  per-  that  there  was  but  one  cause  of  action, 
son   and   injury   to   tlie   property  of  the          ^  Lee  v.  Partridge,  2  Duer,  463. 
])laintiff  by  one  negligent  act  of  the  de-          •'.Adams  v.  Bissell,  28  Barb.  382,  SS."). 
fendant :  Rosenberg  i'.  Staten  Island  Ky.  "  Wandle    v.     Turney,   5    Duer,    661. 
Co.  (Com.  n.  1891),  14  N.  Y.  Suppl.  476.  Although   Bosworth   J.    says    the   causes 
But  ste  Taylor  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  of  action  all  arose  out  of  the  same  trans- 
Co.,  .52  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  299.  action,  yet,  upon   the  principles   already 

2  Badger  v.  Benedict,  4  Abb.  Pr.  176.  stated  in  the  text,  there  was  actually  but 
^  Smith  r.  Orser,  43  Barb.  187.  one  cause  of  action. 


496  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

the  receipt  and  collection  of  the  money,  and  refusal  or  neglect  to 
pay  over  the  same  to  the  plaintiff,^  ^liere  the  plaintiff  alleged  that 
he  had  placed  SlOO  in  the  defendant's  hands  for  the  purpose  of 
entering  an  eighty-acre  lot  in  the  plaintiff's  name,  at  the  expected 
price  of  SI. 25  per  acre  ;  that  the  defendant  thereupon  entered  the 
lot  in  his  own  name,  but  paid  therefor  only  SIO,  and  converted 
the  residue  of  the  money  to  his  own  use ;  and  demanded  judgment 
for  the  S90  and  interest,  and  also  for  a  conveyance  of  the  land  to 
himself ;  ^  an  action  to  recover  a  specified  sum  due  upon  a  written 
contract,  and  damages  for  the  breach  of  certain  covenants  in  the 
same  instrument,  and  also  to  compel  the  specific  performance  of 
a  covenant  to  convey  land  contained  therein ;  ^  where  one  cause 
of  action  was  for  the  defendant's  deceit  practised  in  the  sale  of 
oil  leases  to  the  plaintiff,  and  the  other  was  for  money  had  and 
received,  being  the  price  paid  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  same  sales.* 
The  owner  in  fee  of  land  having  been  induced  by  the  defendant's 
fraud  to  convey  the  same  by  a  deed  in  which  the  wife  joined,  the 
grantor  and  his  wife  brought  a  joint  action  to  recover  damages 
for  the  deceit.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the 
husband  had  a  cause  of  action  for  the  loss  of  the  land  which  he 
owned  in  fee ;  that  the  wife  had  a  cause  of  action  for  the  loss  of 
her  inchoate  dower  right ;  that  they  could  recover  one  joint  judg- 
ment as  a  satisfaction  for  both  claims  ;  and,  finall}',  that  the  two 
causes  of  action  were  properly  united,  since  they  arose  out  of 
the  same  transaction,  —  namely,  the  bargaining  and  sale  of  the 
premises  and  the  fraudulent  representations  made  therein  by  the 
defendant.^     Several  of  the  cases  cited  in  the  last  preceding  sub- 

^  Moore  v.  Smith,  10  How.  Pr.  361.  they  may  be  joined)  ;  Barr  v.  Shaw,  10 

'■'  Callaghan  r.  McMahan,  33  Mo.  111.  Hun,  580  (causes  of  action  for  different 

3  Gray  v.  Dougherty,  25  Cal.  266.  torts  may  arise  out   of   the   same   trans- 

4  Woodbury  v.  Delap,   1   N.  Y.  S.  C.  action,  and  be  joined);  Young  y.  Young, 
20;  s.  c.  65  Barb.  501.     The   first   count  81  N.  C.  91. 

set  out  the  sale  and  tlie  deceit  and  the  ^  Simar  i;.  Canaday,  53  N.  Y.  298,  305, 
damages ;  the  others,  for  money  had  and  per  Folger  J.  The  coinphiint  was  not 
received,  alleged  that  the  money  had  been  framed  at  all  ufwn  the  theory  which  the 
had  and  received  by  the  defendant  "a.s  court  adopted  in  making  this  decision, 
above  stated."  This,  it  wa.s  held,  iucor-  It  did  not  purport  to  set  forth  two  sepa- 
porated  into  the  latter  counts  the  aver-  rate  causes  of  action ;  it  was  a  joint  com- 
ments of  the  former,  and  showed  that  all  plaint,  and  alleged  a  joint  cause  of  action 
arose  out  of  the  same  transaction.  See  in  favor  of  the  jjlaintiffs,  and  demanded 
also  Gertler  v.  Linscott,  26  Minn.  82  (if  a  a  single  joint  judgment.  The  peculiar 
cause  of  action  on  contract  and  one  for  a  feature  of  the  decision  is  that  which  sus- 
tort  arise  out  of  the  same  tran.saction,  or  tain,-*  a  single  judgment  for  one  sum  as 
out  of  a  series  of  connected  transactions,  damages  in  satisfaction  of  both  demands. 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION.  497 

division  of  this  section  might  perhaps  be  regarded  as  instances 
of  causes  of  action  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction ;  they  cer- 
tainly would  be  so  if  they  were  to  be  considered  as  embracing 
more  than  one  cause  of  action.^ 

§  371.  *  477.  Examples  of  Causes  of  Action  Held  not  to  have 
arisen  out  of  the  same  Transaction,  The  following  are  examples 
of  causes  of  action  contained  in  the  same  complaint  or  petition 
which  have  been  held  not  to  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction  : 
for  an  assault  and  battery  and  for  a  slander,  although  committed 
simultaneously ;  ^  for  a  breach  of  a  warranty  of  soundness  given 
on  the  sale  of  a  horse,  and  for  fraudulent  representations  as  to  the 
soundness  made  at  the  same  sale  ;  ^  a  claim  by  the  plaintiffs  as 
next  of  kin  and  legatees  of  A.,  two  of  tlie  defendants  being  A.'s 
executors,  and  a  claim  by  them  as  legatees  of  B.,  one  of  the 
defendants  being  B.'s  executor,  the  action  being  for  an  account 
and  settlement  of  both  estates.^ 

§  372.  *  478.  What  Facts  must  be  averred  herein.  When 
the  plaintiff  unites  two  causes  of  action  which  can  only  be  joined 
because  they  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  or  out  of  transac- 
tions connected  with  the  same  subject  of  action,  the  facts  show- 
ing such  common  origin  or  connection  must  be  averred,  so  tliat 
the  court  may  see  whether  the  joinder  is  proper.  A  mere  general 
allegation  that  the  causes  of  action  all  arose  out  of  the  same 
transaction  is  of  no  avail,  and  would  be  surplusage.^ 

although  tlie  case  is  expressly  based  upon  tion  in  this  case  clearly  arose  out  of  the 

tlie  doctrine  that  there  were  separate  aud  same   transaction ;   indeed,  a   more  illus- 

distinct  causes  of  action.     Assuming  that  trative   example   could    hardly   be   found 

the   court   was  correct    in   this   position,  among  purely  legal  actions, 
they  plainly  both  arose  out  of  the  same  *  Viall   v.  Mott,  37  Barb.   208.     The 

transaction.  Supreme  Court  of  North  Carolina,  in  a 

1  ^ee  supra,  §§*459,*460,andespecially  very  recent  case,  seems  to  deny  any  opera- 

Bidwell  V.  Astor  Mat.  Ins.  Co.,  16  N.  Y.  tive   force  whatsoever  to  the  first  clause 

263;  Phillips  v.  Gorham,  17  N.  Y.  270;  of  the  section  under  consideration,  which, 

Laub  V.  Buckmiller,  17  N.  Y.  620;  N.  Y.  as  it  occurs  in  the  code  of  that  State,  is 

Ice  Co.  V.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  3.57  ;  identical  with  the  one  given  in  the  text. 

Lattin  v.  McCarty,  41  N.  Y.  107  ;  Howe  Although  the  language  used  by  the  court 

V.  Peckham,  10  Barb.  6.56;  Blake  v.  Van  is  only  a  dictum,  it  is  a  strong  expression 

Tilborg,  21  Wis.  672;  Fish  v.  Berkey,  10  of  opinion   that  no  causes  of  action  can 

Minn.  199.  be   united   by  reason   of  that   particuhir 

-  Anderson  v.  Hill,  53  Barb.  238,  24.');  provision  unless  they  are  embraced  witliin 

Dragoo  r.   Levi,   2   Duv.   520.     But,  per  some  of  the  other  classes  mentioned  by 

contra,  see  Harris  v.  Avery,  5  Kan.  146;  tlie  section.    See  N.  C.  Land  Co.  y.  Beatty, 

Brewer  v.  Temple,  15  How.  Pr.  286.  69  N.  C.  329,  334. 

3  Sweet  V.  Ingerson,  12  Ilow.  Pr.  331.  ^  piynn  v.   Bailey,  50  Barb.   73.     See 

In  accordance  with  the  principles  main-  Woodbury  i'.  Delap,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  20,  65 

tained  in  the  text,  the  two  causes  of  ac-  Barb.  501. 

32 


498  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

V.  Instances  i)i  which  the  Proper  Joinder  of  Causes  of  Action  is 
connected  with  the  Proper  Joinder  of  Defendants  ;  Discussion 
of  the  Provision  that  all  the  Causes  of  Action  must  affect  all 
of  the  Parties. 

§  373.  *  479.  Statement  of  Question  Examined  in  this  Sub- 
division. Questions  relating  to  the  uniting  of  causes  of  action 
may  be  presented  in  two  forms.  In  whatever  one  of  the  enumer- 
ated classes  they  fall  they  may  (1)  be  against  the  single  defend- 
ant, or  the  several  defendants  all  equally  liable,  —  perhaps  jointly 
liable. —  in  which  case  the  inquiry  has  to  do  solely  with  the 
joinder  of  the  causes  of  action  themselves,  and  is  not  concerned 
with  the  joinder  of  the  defendants ;  or  (2)  they  may  be  against 
several  defendants  unequally  and  differently  liable,  one  cause  of 
action  affecting  a  portion  of  the  defendants  more  directly  and 
substantially  than  it  does  others.  In  such  case  the  inquiry  has 
to  do  with  the  joinder  of  the  defendants  as  well  as  with  the  union 
of  the  causes  of  action.  I  shall,  in  the  present  subdivision,  ex- 
amine the  latter  of  these  cases.  It  is  required  by  all  the  codes 
as  a  prerequisite  to  the  uniting  of  different  causes  of  action,  that, 
notwithstanding  they  may  all  belong  to  the  same  class,  they  must 
affect  all  the  parties  to  the  action.^  The  only  exception  men- 
tioned in  any  statute  is  the  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage.^ 

1  QHayden  v.  Pearce  (1898),  33  Ore.  (1901),    109    Wis.  366,   85   N.    W.    369; 

89,  52  Pac.  1049  ;  The  Victorian  Number  Hilton  v.  Hilton's  Adm'r  (1901),  110  Ky. 

Two  (1894),  26  Ore.  194,  41    Pac.  1103;  522,  62  S.  W.  6  ;  Clay  ton  ?■.  City  of  HendeV- 

Pretzfelder  v.  Merchants' Ins.  Co.  (1895),  son  (1898),  103   Ky".  228,  44  S.  W.  667; 

116  N.  C.491,  21  S.  E.  302  ;  Cook  i'.  Smith  Jamison  v.  Culligan  (1899),  151  Mo.  410, 

(1896),  119  N.  C.  350,  25  S.  E.  958  ;  Bur-  52    S.  W.  224;  Kruczinski  v.  Neuendorf, 

roll  f.  Hughes  (1895),  116  N.  C.  430,  21  99  Wi.s.  264,  74  N.  W.  974  ;  Anderson  v. 

S.  E.  97i  ;  Barry  v.  VVachosky  (1899),  57  Scandia  Bank  (1893),    53  Minn.    191,    54 

Neb.  534,  77  N.'  W.  1080;  A.  T.  &  S.  F.  N.  W.  1062;  Carrier  v.  Bernstein  (1898), 

md.  Co.  V.  Comm'rsof  Sumner  Co.  (1893),  104  la.  572,  73  N.  W.  1076  ;  Smith  v.  Day 

51  Kan.  617,33  Pac.  312  ;  Drapers.  Brown  (1901),  39  Ore.  531,  65  Pac.  1055  ;  Beane 

(1902),   115    Wis.    361,   91    N.    W.    1001;  i'.  Givens  (1898),  5  Idaho,  774,  51  Pac.  987  ; 

Stewart  v.  Iloseugren  (1902),  —  Neb. —,  Insley  v.  Shire  (189.5),   54  Kan.    793,   39 

92  N.  W.  586  ;    State  v.  Krause  (1897),  58  Pac.  713.^ 

Kan.  651,  50  Pac.  882;   Hughes  r.  Ilunner  ^  This   exception,    in    fact,   confounds 

(1895),  91  Wis.  116,  64  N.  W.  887;   John  "relief"  with  "cause  of  action."     It  sim- 

)i.  Davis  Lumber  Co.  v.  Home  Insurance  jdy  permits  dcfen<iants  to  be  joined  against 

Co.  of  New  York  (1897),  95  Wis.  542,  70  whom    some   .'special  relief  is  demanded, 

N.  W.  84,  tlie  olijection   tliat  the  causes  and  is  therefore  entirely  unnecessary.     In 

joined  do  not  affect  all  the  parties  to  the  every    such   suit  there   is  only  one  cause 

action  must  be  raised  by  demurrer  on  that  of    action,    unless   a  common-law   action 

ground  :  Blakely  v.  Smock  (1897),  96  Wis.  on  the  note  or  bond  is  combined  with  the 

611,71   N.   W.    1052;  Egaard   v.    Dahlke  foreclosure. 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION. 


499 


§  374.  *  480.  Effect  of  Code  Provision  Requiring  that  Causes  of 
Action  Joined  in  one  Complaint  must  affect  all  the  Parties.  While 
the  causes  of  action  thus  united  must  affect  all  of  the  parties, 
it  is  not  necessary  that  they  should  affect  them  all  equally  or  in 
the  same  manner.^  If  equality  and  uniformity  were  required,  a 
large  part  of  the  equity  jurisdiction  would  be  swept  away  at  one 
blow  ;  for  it  is  the  distinguishing  feature  of  that  system  that  all 
persons  having  any  interest  in  the  subject-matter  of  the  contro- 
versy or  in  the  relief  granted  should  be  made  parties,  however 
various  and  unequal  their  interests  may  be.  Indeed,  equality 
of  right  or  of  liability  was  not  essential  in  all  common-law 
actions.  It  was  only  when  the  proceeding  was  in  form  joint  that 
this  equality  was  indispensable  according  to  legal  conceptions. 
The  provision  of  the  codes  has  not  changed  any  of  these  former 
doctrines ;  it  simplj^  enacts  in  one  statutory  and  comprehensive 


1  Vermeule  v.  Beck,  1 5  How.  Pr.  333. 
Tlie  fullowiug  cases  furnish  illustrations 
of  the  questions  discu.ssed  in  this  and 
the  succeeding  paragraphs.  Schnitzer  r. 
Cohen,  7  Hun,  665  ;  Barton  v.  Speis,  5 
id.  60;  Nichols  r.  Drew,  19  id.  490; 
<"ook  V.  Horwitz,  10  id.  .586;  Brown  v. 
Coble,  76  N.  C.  391  ;  Mendenhall  v.  V7il- 
son,  54  Iowa,  589  ;  Thorpe  v.  Dickey,  51 
iJ.  676 ;  Cogswell  v.  Murphy,  46  id.  44 ; 
Addicken  v.  Schrubbe,  45  id.  315  ;  Hack- 
ett  V.  Carter,  38  Wis.  394 ;  Heath  v. 
Silverthorn  Min.  Co.,  39  id.  146;  Greene 
V.  Nnnnemacher,  36  id.  50  ;  Lull  v.  Fox 
&  Wis.  Imp.  Co.,  19  id.  101  ;  Arimond  v. 
Green  Bay  &  Miss.  Canal  Co.,  31  id.  316. 
See  also  Kelly  r.  Newman,  62  How.  Br. 
156  (defendants);  Higgius  v.  Crichton, 
11  Daly,  114;  Hynes  v.  Farmers'  Loan 
&  Tr.  Co.  (Supreme,  1890),  9  N.  Y.  Suppl. 
2G0  (plaintiffs) ;  Mitchell  v.  Mitchell  (N. 
C.  1887);  1  S.  E.  Rep.  648  (defendants); 
Himes  v.  Jarrett  (S.  C.  1887),  2  S.  E.  Rep. 
393  ;  Hoffinan  r.  Wheelock,  62  Wis.  434  ; 
Waddell  v.  Waddell,  99  Mo.  338  ;  Lever- 
ing V.  Schnell,  78  Mo.  167  (per.sons  injured 
by  fraud,  whose  interests  are  distinct,  can- 
not join  as  plaintiffs  unless  the  fi-aud  was 
accomplished  through  a  joint  transac- 
tion) ;  Mullen  v.  Hewitt,  103  Mo.  639 
(fraudulent  conveyances  to  .separate  gran- 
tees, no  common  design  shown)  ;  Faivre 
V.  Gillan  (Iowa,  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
46;  Berg  v.  Stanwood,  43  Minn.  176  (im- 


proper joinder,  where  complaint  alleges 
separate  promises  by  two  defendants  to 
I)ay  for  the  same  work,  and  does  not  allege 
a  joint  promise)  ;  Langevin  v.  St.  I'anl 
(Minn.  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  817;  Bren- 
ner V.  Egly,  23  Kan.  123  ;  Lindh  v.  Crov^r- 
ley,  26  Kan.  47  (a  cause  of  action  against 
all  the  parties  to  a  promissory  note  cannot 
be  united  with  a  cause  of  action  on  a  judg- 
ment rendered  on  the  note  against  one  of 
the  parties  thereto)  ;  Heutig  v.  S.  W. 
Mut.  Benev.  Ass.,  45  Kan.  462 ;  Rizer  v. 
Davis  Cy.  Comm'rs,  48  Kan.  389  ;  Has- 
kell Cy.  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Santa  Fc  (Kan. 
1893),  32  Fac.  Rep.  624;  Hoye  r.  Ray- 
mond, 25  Kan.  665  ;  Johnson  r.  Kirby,  65 
Cal.  482  ;  Powell  v.  Dayton,  etc.  R.  Co., 
13  Ore.  446.  It  is  not  a  misjoinder  to 
sue  tlie  sureties  on  a  guardian's  original 
bond  and  those  on  his  additional  bond  in 
a  single  action;  as  "the  rights  and  lia- 
bilities of  each  set  of  sureties  depend  for 
their  extent  on  a  correct  ascertainment 
and  adjustment  of  those  of  the  other  set, 
each  is  interested  in  the  result  of  the  liti- 
gation with  the  other ;  hence  all  the 
parties  are  affected  as  required  by  the 
code;"  26  Weekly  Law  Bulletin  (Cin- 
cinnati Com.  Pleas),  147,  148,  citing  Allen 
V.  State,  61  Ind.  268;  Matthews  i-.  Cope- 
land,  79  N.  C.  493 ;  Holerau  v.  School 
Dist.,  10  Neb.  406;  and  other  cases. 
[[Grady  r.  Maloso  '1896),  92  Wis.  666,  66 
N.  \V.  8O8.3 


500  CIVIL    ItEMEDIES. 

form  the  principle  which  controlled  the  courts,  both  of  law  and 
equity,  under  the  former  practice.  It  leaves  an  equitable  action 
to  be  governed  by  the  same  rules  as  to  parties  which  controlled 
it  when  equity  was  a  distinct  department,  and  it  extends  the 
theory  at  least  to  legal  actions  as  well.  The  practical  effect 
of  tliis  clause  in  the  statute  will  be  best  learned  from  an  ex- 
amination of  the  cases  in  which  it  has  been  applied,  and  from 
the  judicial  construction  which  has  been  thereby  put  upon  it. 
Those  which  are  quoted  first  in  order  pronounce  against  the  pro- 
priety of  the  union  made  by  the  plaintiff,  because  the  causes  of 
action  did  not  affect  all  the  parties. 

§  375.  *481.  Illustration.  The  owner  of  a  tract  of  land  had 
made  O.  his  agent  for  the  purpose  of  selling  it,  and  O.  had  sold 
the  land  to  S.,  who  also  stood  in  a  fiduciary  relation  to  the  owner, 
and  S.  had  conveyed  portions  of  the  land  to  different  purchasers. 
The  original  owner  thereupon  brought  an  action  against  O.  and 
S.,  charging  fraud  and  a  violation  of  their  fiduciary  duty  against 
both.  The  complaint  demanded  a  judgment  of  damages  against 
O.  for  his  deceit,  and  against  S.  an  account  and  payment  of  all 
the  proceeds  and  profits  that  he  had  or  might  have  made  from  his 
own  sales,  and  a  reconveyance  of  the  portion  yet  remaining  unsold. 
The  Xew  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  causes  of  action 
were  improperly  united ;  and,  as  its  opinion  is  instructive,  I  quote 
from  it  at  some  length.  "  The  plaintiff  has  elected  to  regaixi  S. 
as  his  trustee,  and  the  complaint  as  to  him  and  the  decree  proceed 
on  this  basis.  The  plaintiff  therefore  elects  to  aflirm  the  sale  as 
to  S.  He  cannot  uno  Jiatu  afiirm  it  as  to  him,  and  disaffirm  it  as 
to  the  defendant  O.  It  is  difficult  to  see  how  under  the  provision 
of  §  167  of  the  code  these  causes  of  action  may  be  united  in  the 
same  complaint.  Although  it  may  be  said  that  both  causes  of 
action  arise  out  of  tlie  same  ti-ansaction,  namely,  the  sale  of  the 
plaintiff's  land  to  the  defendant  S.,  yet  the  cause  of  action  against 
O.  is  for  an  injury  to  the  plaintiff's  property,  while  that  against 
S.  is  a  claim  against  him  as  a  trustee  by  operation  of  law.  The 
causes  of  action  joined  in  tlie  complaint  do  not  affect  both  of  the 
i^arties  defendant.  O.  is  not  affected  by  nor  in  any  way  responsi- 
ble for  S.'s  acts  as  plaintiff's  trustee,  and  the  complaint  does  not 
profess  to  make  him  liable  therefor.  So  S.  is  not  sought  to  be 
made  responsible  for  the  fraudulent  acts  of*0.  On  the  plain- 
tiff's own  showing,  he  has  separate  and  distinct  causes  of  action 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  501 

against  each  of  the   defendants  which  cannot  be  joined  under 
the  code."  ^ 

§  376.  *  482.  Illustrations.  The  same  doctrine  was  asserted  and 
ruHng  made  in  the  following  cases,  the  causes  of  action  being  held 
improperly  united  in  each  because  they  did  not  affect  all  of  the 
parties :  where  one  cause  of  action  was  on  a  judgment  against  the 
defendant  and  two  others,  a  second  on  a  judgment  against  the  de- 
fendant and  one  other,  while  a  third  was  on  a  judgment  against 
the  defendant  alone  ;  ^  where  the  first  cause  of  action  was  against 
a  husband  and  wife  for  a  slander  by  the  wife,  and  the  second 
against  the  husband  for  his  own  slander ;  ^  an  action  against  a 
husband  and  wife  on  a  contract  made  by  both  in  the  wife's  busi- 
ness, where  a  personal  judgment  was  demanded  against  him,  and 
a  judgment  to  enforce  the  demand  against  the  wife's  separate 
estate ;  *  where  the  plaintiff's  agent,  with  whom  certain  securities 
had  been  deposited,  had  transferred  them,  in  violation  of  his  duty, 
to  various  assignees,  and  a  single  action  was  brought  against  him 
and  all  these  transferees  to  set  aside  the  assignments  and  to  re- 
cover the  bonds  or  their  proceeds ;  ^  an  action  by  a  reversioner 
against  the  tenant  for  life  and  the  occupant  to  recover  damages 
for  injuries  done  b}^  them  to  the  land,  the  complaint  containing 

1  Gardner  i'.  Ogilen,  22  N.  Y.  327,  340,  fendantsalone,  even  though  such  certificate- 

per  Davies  J.  was  obtaiued  as  one  of  the  fruits  of  the  con- 

[|  Tew  y.  Wolfsohn  (1903),  174  N.  Y.  272,  spiracy."  Hawarden  r.  Youghiogheny  & 
66  N.  E.  934.  In  this  case  the  complaint  Lehigh  Coal  Co.  (1901),  111  Wis.  ,54.5,"  87 
alleged  that  one  defendant  conducted  a  N.  W.  472 :  k?ld,  that  a  cause  of  action  at 
certain  business  as  agent  for  the  other  law  for  damages  to  the  plaintiff  growing 
defendant,  liis  wife,  who  owned  it ;  that  he  out  of  an  unlawful  combination  cann(^t  be 
])retended  to  be  conducting  the  business  united  with  a  cause  of  action  in  equity  in 
as  his  own,  and  entered  into  a  contract  favor  of  the  plaintiff  and  others  similarly 
with  plaintiff  as  agent  for  his  wife,  his  situated  to  restrain  further  operations  by 
undisclosed  principal ;  that  the  defendants  the  combination,  since  both  causes  of  ac- 
refused  to  perform  the  terms  of  the  con-  tions  do  not  affect  all  the  parties.  Plank- 
tract,  and  induced  plaintiff  to  pay  money,  inton  v.  Hildebraud  (1895),  89  Wis.  209, 
for  which  they  refused  to  account.     Held,  61  N.  W.  839.] 

not  demurrable  on  the  ground  of  mi.sjoin-  ^  Barnes  v.  Smith,  16  Abb.  Pr.  420. 

der  of  causes  of  action,  as,  if  it  does  not  ^  Malone  r.  Stilwell,  15  Abb.  Pr.  421. 

state  a  single  cause  of  action  against  the  And  see  Dailey  v.  Houston,  58  Mo.  361, 

wife  only,  it  states  a  single  cause  of  action  366. 

against  both  defendants.     Haskell  County  *  Palen  v.  Lent,  5  Bosw.  713. 

Bank  v.  Bank  of  Santa  Fe'  (1893),  51  Kan.  ^  Lexington  &  B.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Goodman, 

39,  32  Pac.  624.     In  this  case  it  was  held  15  How.  Pr.  85.     This  was  a  special  term 

that  "an  action  to  recover  damages  against  decision,  and  is  therefore  not  entitled  to 

a  number  of  defendants  for  a  fraudulent  much  authority.     The  case  is  clearly  in 

conspiracy  cannot  be  joined  with  an  action  principle  identical  with  the  ordinary  cred- 

to  obtain  a  cancellation  of  a  certificate  of  iter's  suit, 
deposit  owued  and  held  by  one  of  said  de- 


502  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

a  cause  of  action  asfainst  07ie  defendant  for  cuttinsj  and  removingr 
timber,  a  second  against  both  for  the  same  acts,  and  a  third  against 
both  for  removing  fire-wood  already  cut;  ^  an  action  for  deceit,  in 
which  one  count  of  the  comphiint  alleged  fraudulent  acts  against 
a  part  of  the  defendants,  and  other  counts  charged  similar  acts 
against  all ;  ^  ^vhere  damages  were  claimed  from  the  owner  of  a 
city  lot  for  making  an  excavation  in  a  street,  into  which  the 
plaintiff  fell,  and  from  the  city  for  permitting  the  street  to  be 
broken  up ;  ^  an  action  against  two  defendants  to  recover  damages 
for  the  flowing  of  plaintiff's  lands,  the  complaint  alleging  in  the 
fii'st  count  that  one  defendant  erected  a  dam  in  the  north  branch 
of  a  certain  river,  and  in  the  second  count  that  the  other  defend- 
ant constructed  a  dam  in  the  south  branch  of  the  same  stream, 
by  the  combined  effects  of  which  obstructions  the  injury  was 
done ;  ^  an  action  against  two  defendants,  in  which  the  claim 
against  one  was  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  and  that  against 
the  other  was  on  his  promise  to  pay  the  price  thereof;  ^  an  action 
against  a  public  officer  and  the  sureties  on  his  official  bond  for  a 
breach  thereof,  the  complaint  containing  also  a  cause  of  action 
against  the  officer  alone  for  damages  caused  by  a  distinct  and 
different  negligent  act ;  ^  a  cause  of  action  against  A.,  B.,  and 
C.  for  money  loaned  to  them,  and  one  against  A.,  D.,  and  E.  on 
a  note  given  by  them  as  collateral  security  for  the  same  loan." 

§  377.  *  483.  Causes  of  Action  so  Joined  must  also  affect  all  the 
Plaintiffs.  Illustrations.  The  causes  of  action  must  not  only  affect 
all  the  defendants,  but  all  the  plaintiffs  as  well,  the  provision  of 
the  codes  applying  equally  to  both  parties.^     Thus  an  action  by 

1  Rodgers  i\  Rodgers,  II  Barb.  59.5.  [;Davis  r.  Novotney  (1901),   15  S.  D. 

2  Wells  i;.  Jewett,  11  How.  Pr.  242.  118,  87   N.  W.  582:   A   trustee  iu  baiik- 
"  Trowbridge  v.  Forepaugh,  14  Minu.     ruptcy  cannot  join  in  one  complaint  causes 

133.     See  also  Kelly  v.  Newman,  62  IIow.  of  action  against  several  defendants,  each 

Pr.  156.  of  whonijin  a  separate  suit,  obtained  prop- 

*  Lull  c.  Fo.\  &  Wis.  Imp.  Co.,  19  Wis.  erty  of  the  bankrupt  by  replevin  or  levied 
100, 102.  upon  it  in  attachment,  within  the  prohibi- 

^  Sanders  I.'.  Cla.son,  13  Minn.  379.  tiou  of    the    bankruptcy  act,  since  such 

*  State  '•.  Kruttschnitt,  4  Nev.  178;  causes  of  action  do  not  arise  out  of  the 
Ghirardelli  v.  IJourland,  32  Cal.  585.  And  same  transaction  nor  are  they  connected 
against  the  sureties  on  an  administrator's  with  the  same  subject  of  action.  There  is 
bond  for  a  breach  thereof,  and  against  the  also  a  misjoin<ler  of  parties  defendant] 
administrator  himself  for  a  viidation  of  iiis  ^  Where  a  husband  and  wife  sued  for 
trust.     Howse  v.  Moody,  14  Fla.  59,  C4,65.  an  assault  and  battery  upon  the  wife,  asxl 

'  Farmers'  Bank  of  Mo.  r.  Bayliss,  41  the  petition  set  forth  a  claim  for  the  iiijn- 
Mo.  274.  And  see  Lane  v.  State,  27  Ind.  ries  su-stained  by  the  wife,  fur  wliicii  1k)1]i 
108.  must  sue,  and  also  a  claim  for  the  loss  of 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION'. 


:.o;j 


three  persons  having  entirely  distinct  and  separate  claims  against 
the  defendant  for  work  and  materials,  brought  to  foreclose  their 
individual  mechanics'  liens  on  their  debtor's  house,  was  held 
improper ;  ^  and  where  six  persons,  owners  of  distinct  and  sepa- 
rate parcels  of  land  through  which  a  stream  ran,  each  being 
entitled  to  the  use  of  the  water  as  it  passed  through  his  land, 
joined  in  a  suit  to  restrain  the  defendant  from  diverting  the 
entire  stream  at  a  point  above  all  their  premises,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Nevada  condemned  the  complaint  as  improperly  uniting 
the  causes  of  action  and  the  plaintiffs.^  In  an  action  to  recover 
possession  of  land  brought  by  two  plaintiffs,  the  complaint  con- 


her  services,  for  which  he  alone  must  sue, 
two  causes  of  action  were  held  to  be  im- 
properly united.  Dailey  r.  Houston,  58 
Mo.  361,  366  ;  Tell  v.  Gibsou,  66  Cal.  247  ; 
Reynolds  v.  Robinson,  64  X.  Y.  589 ;  Filer 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  49  X.  Y.  47 ;  Mo- 
sier  V.  Beale,  43  Fed.  Rep.  358 ;  and  see 
mite,  §  *  242. 

^Anderson  v.  Scandia  Bank  (1893),  53 
Minn.  191,  54  N.  W.  1062:  A  cause  of 
action  by  a  husband  and  wife  to  avoid 
usurious  securities  given  by  them  upon  a 
loan  made  to  the  wife,  cannot  be  joined 
with  another  by  the  wife  alone  to  recover 
back  money  paid  by  her  upon  the  usurious 
contract.  See  also  Morton  r.  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  (1902),  130  N.  C.  299,  41 
S.  E.  484. 

The  several  causes,  in  order  that  they 
may  be  united,  must  not  only  affect  all  the 
plaintiffs  but  must  be  brought  in  the  same 
right.  In  the  case  of  Carrier  v.  Bernstein 
(1898),  104  la.  572,  73  N.  W.  1076,  plaintiff 
filed  a  petition  in  two  counts,  the  first 
being  a  suit  by  her  as  wife  under  §  1557 
of  the  code  to  recover  actual  and  exem- 
plary damages  for  injury  to  her  person, 
property,  etc.,  caused  by  sales  of  intoxicat- 
ing licjuors  to  her  husband,  the  second 
being  a  suit  by  her  as  a  citizen  of  the 
county,  under  Code,  §  1539,  for  one-half 
the  forfeit  imposed  by  law  for  the  selling 
of  liquor  to  an  intoxicated  person  or  ha- 
bitual drunkard.  Held,  that  there  was  a 
misjoinder  because  the  causes  of  caction, 
while  prosecuted  by  the  same  kind  of 
proceedings,  are  not  by  the  same  party  as 
plaintiff  or  in  the  same  right,  as  required 
by  Code,  §  2630.     As  to  the  parties  plain- 


tiff, in  one  the  plaintiff  sues  in  her  own 
name.  In  the  second  count  the  plaintiff 
does  not  sue  as  wife  but  as  a  citizen  of  the 
county  and  as  informer.  But  even  though 
the  actions  be  considered  brought  by  the 
same  party,  "  surely  it  cannot  be  said  that 
they  are  in  the  same  right.  The  first  is  in 
the  right  as  wife  (or  damages  to  her  per- 
son, property,  and  means  of  support,  aud  is 
a  right  existing  solely  and  exclusively  in 
favor  of  the  plaintiff,  for  injuries  actually 
suffered  by  her.  The  second  is  in  the 
right  of  the  county,  not  to  damages,  but 
to  the  forfeiture  to  its  school  fund.  The 
citizen  prosecuting  such  au  action  as  in- 
former has  no  personal  right  of  recovery. 
He  cannot  recover  anything  in  his  own 
right,  and  it  is  only  when  recovery  is  had 
in  favor  of  the  school  fund  that  the  in- 
former is  compensated  by  receiving  one- 
half  the  amount  recovered."  'J 

i  Harsh  ;;.  Morgan,  1  Kan.  293,  299. 
Tenants  in  common  who  have  been  im- 
posed on  by  the  fraud  of  a  common  vendee 
to  whom  they  have  at  different  times  exe- 
cuted separate  deeds,  each  of  his  interest, 
cannot  join  in  a  suit  to  set  these  aside: 
Jeffers  v.  Forbes,  28  Kan.  174. 

^  Schultz  r.  Winter,  7  Nev.  130.  For 
contrary  cases,  see  supra,  §  *  269  (note). 
Though  the  separate  owners  may,  by 
the  weight  of  authority,  join  in  claiming 
an  injunction,  the  uniting  of  their  several 
claims  for  damages  in  one  complaint  is 
improper,  as  the  plaintiffs  have  a  common 
interest  in  ol)taiuing  the  equitable,  but  not 
the  legal  relief.  See  Barham  v.  Ilostetter, 
67  Cal.  272 ;  Foreman  i-.  Boyle,  88  Cat 
290. 


504  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

tained  two  counts :  the  first  averred  a  title  to  the  premises  in  one 
of  the  pLaintiffs,  while  the  second  alleged  a  different  and  even 
hostile  title  in  the  other.  A  demurrer  to  this  complaint  was  sus- 
tained, on  the  ground  that  the  two  causes  of  action  did  not  affect 
both  of  the  plaintiffs.  The  former  practice  of  naming  different 
lessors  of  the  plaintiff  in  ejectment,  and  afterwards  of  uniting 
different  plaintiffs  who  claim  under  distinct  and  hostile  titles,  has 
been  abolished  by  the  code.  "  The  action  to  recover  possession 
of  land  now  stands  on  the  same  footing  precisely  in  respect  to 
parties  and  the  union  of  causes  of  action  with  all  other  actions."  ^ 
§  378.  *  484.  The  Doctrine,  as  Stated  by  the  New  York  Court 
of  Appeals,  respecting  a  Cause  of  Action  against  an  Executor,  Ad- 
ministrator, or  Trustee  United  with  one  against  him  in  his   Individual 

Capacity.  Causes  of  action  to  recover  possession  of  different 
chattels  from  different  defendants  cannot  be  joined  in  the  same 
suit.-^  Nor  can  a  cause  of  action  against  a  trustee  to  compel  the 
conveyance  of  the  trust  property  be  united  with  a  cause  of  action 
against  an  administrator  on  a  demand  growing  out  of  the  same 
property.^  A  cause  of  action  against  an  executor,  administrator, 
or  trustee,  in  his  representative  character,  cannot  be  united  with 
one  against  the  same  individual  personally.  The  doctrine  was 
recently  stated  by  the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  as  the  result 
of  an  elaborate  examination  of  the  authorities :  "  The  following 
principles  are  settled  by  these  authorities  :  1.  That,  for  all  causes 
of  action  arising  upon  contract  made  by  deceased  in  his  lifetime, 
an  action  can  be  maintained  against  the  executor  or  administrator 
as  such,  and  the  judgment  would  be  de  bonis  testatoris,  or  intesta- 
toris.  2.  That  in  all  causes  of  action,  where  the  same  arise  upon 
a  contract  made  after  the  death  of  the  testator  or  intestate,  the 

1  Hubbell  V.  Lerch,  62  Barb.  295,  297,  damages  for  withlioldin'^  the  same,  it 
per  T.  A.  Johnson,  J. ;  St.  John  v.  Pierce,  has  been  held,  cannot  he  joined  with  a 
22  Barb.  362  ;  Hubbell  v.  Lerch,  58  N.  Y.  similar  cause  of  action  in  respect  to  an- 
2.37,  241.  QSee  Behlow  v.  Fischer  (1894),  other  parcel,  sed  qu.,  Holmes  v.  Williams, 
102  Cal.  208,  36  Pac.  509.]  16  Minn.  164,  169  ;  nor  can  a  claim  for  a 

2  Robinson  v.  Rice,  20  Mo.  229.  specific  performance  against  A.  be  joined 

3  McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin,  16  Mo.  with  a  claim  to  recover  possession  of  land 
242.  Tiie  following  cases  are  additional  against  B.,  Fagan  v.  Barnes,  14  Fla.  53, 
illustrations  of  the  rule  that  the  causes  of  56  ;  nor  can  a  cause  of  action  for  fraud 
action  must  affect  all  the  parties.  Cheely's  agai«st  one  defendant  be  united  with  a 
Adm.  r.  Wells,  33  Mo.  106  ;  Liney  v.  cause  of  action  upon  contract  against  an- 
Martin,  29  Mo.  28  ;  Stalcup  v.  Garner,  26  other.  Van  Liew  v.  John.son,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C. 
Mo.  72.  A  cause  of  action  to  recover  f.48 ;  N.  C.  Land  Co.  v.  Beatty,  69  N.  C. 
possession   of    one    parcel   of   land    with  •'3^9. 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  505 

claim  is  against  the  executor  or  administrator  personally,  and  not 
against  the  estate,  and  the  judgment  must  be  de  honh  propriis. 
3.  That  these  different  causes  of  action  cannot  be  united  in  the 
same  complaint."  ^ 

§  379.  *485.  Illustrations.  Under  the  provisions  of  the  In- 
diana code  an  action  wi\s  sustained  against  a  husband  and  wife, 
brought  by  a  creditor  of  the  husband  to  recover  a  judgment  for 
the  amount  of  the  demand  against  him,  and  to  charge  certain 
land  held  by  the  wife  under  an  implied  trust  for  her  husband 
with  a  mechanic's  lien  which  accompanied  the  demand  ;2  and  also 
an  action  ao-ainst  a  husband  and  wife,  which  was  brought  to 
obtain  a  judgment  against  him  for  the  price  of  goods  sold  and 
delivered,  and  also  to  set  aside  his  deed  of  land  fraudulently  con- 
veyed to  her,  so  as  to  let  in  the  hen  of  the  judgment  when 
recovered.^ 

§  380.  *  486.  Discussion  of  Questions  under  Consideration  in 
Wilson  V.  Castro.  The  questions  under  consideration,  in  their 
application  to  equitable  actions,  were  thoroughly  and  ably  dis- 
cussed by  the  Supreme  Court  of  California  in  the  case  of  Wilson 
V.  Castro,*  and  I  shall  close  this  subdivision  with  an  extract  from 
the  opinion.  After  a  statement  of  the  general  rules  and  doctrines 
of  equity  in  relation  to  parties,  the  learned  judge  proceeds  to 
discuss  the  question  as  to  the  joinder  of  causes  of  action  in 
connection  with  the  union  of  the  defendants,  or,  to  adopt  the 
nomenclature  used  by  equity  courts,  the  subject  of  "  multifarious- 
ness.''^  "  A  bill  in  equity  is  said  to  be  '  multifarious '  when  dis- 
tinct and  independent  matters  are  joined  therein,  —  as,  for 
example,  the  uniting  of  several  matters,  perfectly  distinct  and, 
unconnected,  against  one  defendant,  or  the  demand  of  several 
matters  of  a  distinct   and    independent   nature,  against  severa 

1  Ferrin  i'.  Myrick,  41  N.  Y.  315,  319-  be  joined  with  a  claim  against  him  as  a 

322,  per  Hunt  C.  J. ;  Austin  v.  Munro,  47  trustee  of  the  company  for  the  same  de- 

N.  Y.  360,  364, 365,  per  Allen  J. ;  Austin  mand,  both  being  based  upon  a  statute. 

V.   Munro,  4  Lans.  67.     See,  per   contra.  Wiles  y.  Suydam,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  292,  citing 

Tradesman's  Bank  v.  McFeely,  61  Barb.  Durant  v.  Gardner,  10  Abb.  Pr.  445;  19 

522,  decided  in  the  face  of  Ferrin  v.  My-  How.  Pr.  94  ;  Sipperly  v.  Troy  &  B.  R. 

rick.     Joinder  of  causes  of  action  against  Co.,  9  How.  Pr.  83  ;  Dickens  v.  N.  Y.  Cent, 

executors  and  administrators  in  their  in-  R.  Co.,  13  How.  Pr.  228.     See /jos^,  §*  502. 

dividual   and    representative  capacities  is  ^Schlicker  v.  Hemeuway  (1895),  110  Cal. 

permitted  in  New  York  in  certain  ca.ses  579,42  Pac.  1063.] 

by  C.  C.  P.,  §  1815.     Bat  a  claim  against  2  Lindley  v.  Cross,  31  Ind.  106. 

the  defendant  as  a  stockholder,  to  recover  ^  Frank  v.  Kessler,  30  Ind.  8. 

a  demand  due  from  the  corporation,  may  *  W'ilsou  v.  Castro,  31  Cal.  420. 


506  CIVIL    REMEDIED. 

defendants.  But  the  case  of  each  particuLar  defendant  must  be 
entirely  distinct  and  independent  from  that  of  the  other  defend- 
ants, or  the  objection  cannot  prevail :  for,  as  said  by  Judge 
Story,  'The  case  of  one  may  be  so  entire  as  to  be  incapable  of 
being  prosecuted  in  several  suits,  and  yet  some  other  defendant 
may  be  a  necessary  party  to  some  portion  only  of  the  case  stated. 
In  the  latter  case  the  objection  of  multifariousness  could  not  be 
allowed  to  prevail.  So  it  is  not  indispensable  that  all  the  parties 
should  have  an  interest  in  all  the  matters  contained  in  the  suit ; 
it  will  be  sufficient  if  each  party  has  an  interest  in  some  matter 
in  the  suit,  and  they  are  connected  with  the  others.'  ^  The  same 
autlior  lays  it  down  that, '  To  support  the  objection  of  multifari- 
ousness because  the  bill  contains  different  causes  of  suit  against 
the  same  person,  two  things  must  concur:  firsts  the  different 
grounds  of  suit  must  be  wholly  distinct ;  secoyidly,  each  ground 
must  be  sufficient  as  stated  to  sustain  a  bill;  if  the  grounds  be 
not  entirely  distinct  and  unconnected,  if  they"  arise  out  of  one  and 
the  same  transaction,  or  series  of  transactions  forming  one  course 
of  dealing,  and  all  tending  to  one  end,  if  one  connected  story  can 
be  told  of  the  whole,  the  objection  does  not  apply.'  ^  When  the 
2)oint  in  issue  is  a  matter  of  common  interest  among  all  the 
parties  to  the  suit,  though  the  interests  of  the  several  defendants 
are  otherwise  unconnected,  still  they  may  be  joined.  In  Salvidge 
V.  Hyde,^  Sir  John  Leach  V.  C.  said,  '  If  the  objects  of  the  suit 
are  single,  but  it  happens  that  different  persons  have  separate 
interests  in  distinct  questions  which  arise  out  of  the  single  object, 
it  necessarily  happens  that  such  different  persons  must  be  brought 
before  the  court  in  order  that  the  suit  may  conclude  the  whole 
subject.'  In  Boyd  v.  Hoyt,*  Mr.  Chancellor  Walworth  laid 
down  the  same  doctrine  in  substantially  the  language  used  by 
Sir  John  Leach  in  Salvidge  v.  Hyde  ;  and  Mr.  Daniell,  in  his 
excellent  work,^  says,  in  reference  to  the  doctrine  held  in  Sal- 
vidge V.  Hyde,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  learned  judge  stated 
the  principle  correctly,  though  in  the  application  of  it  he  went, 
in  the  opinion  of  Lord  Eldon,  too  far.^  In  Whaley  v.  DaAvson," 
Lord  Kedesdale  observed  that  in  the  English  cases,  when  de- 
murrers, because  the  plaintiff  demanded   in   his  bill  matters  of 

1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  271,  271  a.  ^   1   Daniell's  Ch.  PI.  p.  386. 

2  Ibid.  §  271  6.  6   1  .Jac.  R.  151. 

8  Salvi(igei-.  Ilyde.SMadd.  Ch.  K.  138.  '  Whaley  i-.  Dawson,  2  Sch.    &   Lef. 

♦  Boyd  i;.  Hoyt,  5  Paige,  78.  370. 


JOINDEU   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  507 

distinct  natures  against  several  defendants  not  connected  in 
interest,  have  been  overrnled,  there  has  been  a  general  right 
in  the  plaintiff  covering  the  whole  case,  although  the  rights  of 
the  defendants  may  have  been  distinct.  In  such  cases  tlie  court 
proceeds  on  the  ground  of  preventing  multiplicity  of  suits,  when 
one  general  right  is  claimed  by  the  plaintiff  against  all  the 
defendants ;  and  so  in  Dimmock  v.  Bixby,^  the  court  held  that 
wlien  one  general  right  is  claimed  by  the  plaintiff,  although  the 
defendants  may  have  separate  and  distinct  rights,  the  bill  of 
complaint  is  not  multifarious.  In  the  elaborate  case  of  Campbell 
V.  Mackay,^  Lord  Cottenham  held  that  when  the  plaintiffs  have 
a  common  interest  against  all  the  defendants  in  a  suit,  as  to  one 
or  more  of  the  questions  raised  by  it,  so  as  to  make  them  all 
necessary  parties  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  that  common 
interest,  the  circumstance  of  the  defendants  being  subject  to 
distinct  liabilities  in  respect  to  different  branches  of  the  subject- 
matter  will  not  render  the  bill  multifarious.  In  the  same  case 
his  lordship  observed  that  it  was  utterly  impossible  upon  the 
authorities  to  lay  down  any  rule  or  abstract  proposition  as 
to  what  constitutes  multifariousness  which  can  be  made  uni- 
versally applicable.  The  only  way,  he  said,  of  reconciling  the 
authorities  upon  the  subject,  is  by  adverting  to  the  fact,  that 
although  the  books  speak  generally  of  demurrers  for  multifarious- 
ness, yet  in  truth  such  demurrers  may  be  divided  into  two  kinds, 
one  of  which,  properly  speaking,  is  on  account  of  a  misjoinder 
of  causes  of  action ;  that  is  to  say,  uniting  claims  of  so  different 
a  character  that  the  court  will  not  permit  them  to  be  litigated 
in  one  record,  even  though  the  plaintiff  and  defendants  may 
be  parties  to  the  whole  transactions  which  form  the  subject  of 
the  suit.  The  other  of  which,  as  applied  to  a  bill,  is  that  a  party 
is  brought  as  a  defendant  upon  a  record,  with  a  large  portion  of 
which,  and  with  the  case  made  by  it.  he  has  no  connection  wluit- 
ever.  A  demurrer  for  such  a  cause  is  an  objection  that  the  com- 
plaint sets  forth  matters  which  are  multifarious ;  and  the  real 
cause  of  objection  is,  as  illustrated  by  the  old  form  of  demurrer, 
that  it  puts  the  parties  to  great  and  useless  expense,  —  an  objec- 
tion which  has  no  application  in  a  case  of  mere  misjoinder  of 
parties.  Upon  this  subject  Judge  Story  says:  'In  the  former 
class  of  cases,  where  there  is  a  joinder  of  distinct  claims  between 

1  Dimmock  v.  Bixby,  20  Pick.  368.  ^  Campbell  v.  Mackay,  1  Myl.  &  Cr.  60.1. 


508  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

the  same  parties,  it  has  never  been  held  as  a  distinct  proposition 
that  they  cannot  be  united,  and  that  the  bill  is  of  course  demur- 
rable for  that  cause  alone,  notmthstanding  the  claims  are  of 
a  similar  nature,  involving  similar  principles  and  results,  and 
may  therefore  without  inconvenience  be  heard  and  adjudged 
together.  If  that  proposition  were  to  be  established  and  carried 
to  its  full  extent,  it  would  go  to  prevent  the  uniting  of  several 
demands  in  one  bill,  although  the  parties  were  liable  in  respect  to 
each,  and  the  same  parties  were  interested  in  the  property  which 
may  be  the  subject  of  each.  Such  a  rule,  if  established  in  equity, 
would  be  very  miscliievous  and  oppressive  in  practice,  and  no 
possible  advantage  could  be  gained  by  it.'  ^  He  states  in  conclu- 
sion the  result  of  the  principles  of  the  cases  to  be,-  '  Tliat  where 
there  is  a  common  liability  in  the  defendants,  and  a  common 
interest  in  the  plaintiffs,  different  claims  to  property,  at  least 
if  the  subjects  are  such  as  may  without  inconvenience  be  joined, 
may  be  united  in  one  and  the  same  suit ;  and  further,  that  where 
the  interests  of  the  plaintiffs  are  the  same,  although  the  defend- 
ants may  not  have  a  co-extensive  common  interest,  but  their 
interests  may  be  derived  under  different  instruments,  if  the 
general  objects  of  the  bill  will  be  promoted  by  their  being  united 
in  a  sincfle  suit,  the  court  will  not  hesitate  to  sustain  the  bill 
against  all  of  them.'  "  ^ 

1  Story's  Eq.  PI.  §§  531,  532.  cases  or  claims  united  in  the  bill  are  of 

'^  Ibid.  §§  533,  534.  so   different  a  character   that    the  court 

3  Wilson  V.  Castro,  31  Cal.  420,  42G-     will  not  permit  them  to  be  litigated  in  one 

431,  per  Currev  J.  record.     It  may  be  that  the  plaintiffs  and 

^  defendant.*  are  parties  to  the  whole  of  the- 

\  Multifariousness,  ,  ,.  i-  i     <•  ^i  i  •     ..      r 

I-  transactions   which  form    tlie  subject   of 

We  quote  at  length  from  the  case  of  the  suit,  and  nevertheless  those  transac- 

Benson  v.  Keller  (1900),  37  Ore.  120,  60  tions  may  be  so  dis.'^imilar  that  the  court 

Pac.  918,  as  follows:  "Objections  on  ac-  will  not  allow  them  to  be  joined  together, 

count  of  multifariousness  seem  to  be  di-  but   will    rc{|uire   distinct   records.      But 

vided  primarily  into  two  classes:  (1 )  Tiiose  what  is  more  familiarly  understood  by  the 

which  go  to  a  misjoinder  of  two  or  more  term  "multifariousness  "  as  applied  to  a 

independent  and  incompatible   causes  of  bill,  is  where  a  party  is  alile  to  say  he  is 

suit ;  and  (2)  where  several  matters  of  a  brought  as  a   defendant  u])ou  a  record, 

distinct  nature  are  .stated  and  demanded  with  a  large  portion  of  whicli,  and  of  the 

against  different  parties.     The  two  kinds  case  made  by  whicii,  he  has  no  connection 

of  objections  are  well  illustrated  by  Lord  whatever.'     See   also   G.irtland  v.  Dunn, 

Chancellor    Cottenham    in    Campbell    r.  11   Ark.  720.     It  is  said  in  Alexander  r. 

Mackay,  1   Mylne  &  C.  603,  wherein  the  Alexander,  85  Va.353, 363  (7  S.  E. 335,  .339, 

distinction   is   clearly   stated.      He   says:  1   L.  R.  A.  125.  127).  'that  a  bill  will  al- 

'  Frequently  the  objection  raised,  though  ways  he  deemed  multifarious  where  several 

termed  "  inultifariousnesiJ,"  is  in  fact  more  matters  joined  in  the  bill  against  one  de- 

properly  misjoinder;  that  is  to  say,   the  feudant  are  so  entirely  distinct  and  iude- 


JOINDER    OF    CAUSKS    OF   ACTION. 


509 


§  381.  *487.  Calvert's  Observations  upon  the  Distinction  be- 
tween "  Subject  "  and  "  Object  "  of  the  Action.  The  observations  of 
]\Ir.  Calvert  upon  the  distinction  between  "  subject "  and  "  ob- 


pendent  of  each  other  that  the  defendant 
will  be  compelled  to  unite  in  his  answer 
and  defence  different  matters  wholly  un- 
connected with  each  other,  and  as  a  con- 
sequence the  proof  applicable  to  each 
woultl  be  apt  to  be  confounded  with  each 
other,  and  great  delays  might  be  occa- 
sioned respecting  matters  ripe  for  hearing 
by  waiting  for  proofs  as  to  some  other 
matter  not  ready  for  hearing ;  or,  again, 
where  there  is  a  demand  of  several  mat- 
ters of  a  distinct  and  independent  nature 
in  the  same  bill,  rendering  the  proceeding 
oppressive  because  it  would  tend  to  load 
each  defendant  with  an  unnecessary  bur- 
den of  costs,  by  swelling  the  pleadings 
with  the  statement  of  the  several  claims 
of  the  other  defendants,  with  which  he 
has  no  connection.'  In  Attorney-General 
V.  Craddoc-k,  3  Mylne  &  C.  85,  it  was 
said :  '  The  object  of  the  rule  against 
multifariousness  is  to  protect  a  defendant 
from  unnecessary  expense,  but  it  would 
be  a  great  perversion  of  that  rule  if  it 
were  to  impt)se  upon  the  plaintiffs  and 
all  the  other  defendants  the  expenses  of 
two  suits  instead  of  one.'  .  .  .  The  diffi- 
culty of  laying  down  any  rule  of  universal 
application,  as  it  respects  the  subject  of 
nmltifariousness,  is  suggested  by  many  of 
the  authorities.  The  cases  upon  the  sub- 
ject are  extremely  various,  and  the  courts, 
in  deciding  them,  seem  to  have  considered 
'  what  was  convenient  in  particular  cir- 
cumstances, rather  than  to  have  attempted 
to  lay  down  any  absolute  rule.'  Gartland 
V.  Dunn,  11  Ark.  720.  The  objection  does 
not  go  to  the  merits  of  the  cause,  but  re- 
lates more  nearly  to  a  question  of  con- 
venience in  conducting  the  suit ;  and,  in  a 
large  measure,  it  simply  calls  for  an  exer- 
cise of  discretion  in  deciding  whether 
both  or  all  the  causes  of  suit  set  forth  in 
the  bill  shall  be  tried  in  a  single  suit,  or 
be  split  up,  and  the  parties  relegated  to 
the  bringing  of  two  or  more  suits  for 
the  accomplishment  of  their  purposes,  or 
whether  a  defendant  who  is  a  necessary 
party  in  respect  of  one  or  more  matters 
suggested  by  the  complaint  has  a  sufficient 
interest  in  or  connection  with  the  other 


matters  involved  to  make  him  a  proper 
party  in  respect  to  such  other  matters ; 
Bolles  >:  Bolles,  44  N.  J.  Eq.  38.5  (14  Atl. 
593).  Mr.  Justice  Depew,  in  Lehigh  Val. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  McFarlan.Sl  N.  J.  Eq.  706,  758, 
says :  '  The  rule  with  regard  to  multifa- 
riousness, whether  arising  from  the  mis- 
joinder of  causes  of  action  or  of  defendants 
therein,  is  not  an  inflexible  rule  of  practice 
or  procedure,  but  is  a  rule  founded  in  gen- 
eral convenience,  which  rests  upon  a  con- 
sideration of  what  will  best  promote  the 
administration  of  justice  without  nmltiplv- 
ing  unnecessary  litigation,  on  the  one 
hand,  or  drawing  suitors  into  ueedle.ss 
and  unnecessary  expenses  on  the  other.' 
See  also  Stevens  v.  Bosch,  54  N.  J.  Eq. 
59  (3.S  Atl.  293).  Upon  the  whole,  it 
would  seem  that  each  case  must  be  ex- 
amined with  reference  to  its  own  partic- 
ular and  peculiar  features  ;  and,  '  much,' 
as  Mr.  Justice  Story  remarks  in  Oliver  v. 
Piatt,  44  U.  S.  (3  How.)  333,  412, 'musT 
necessarily  be  left  —  where  the  authorities 
leave  it  —  to  the  sound  discretion  of  the 
court.'  See  also  Gaines  v.  Chew,  43 
U.  S.  (2  How.)  619;  Barney  v.  Latham, 
103  U.  S.  205,  215;  United  States  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.,  98  U.  S.  569,  604." 
In  Conley  v.  Buck  (1896),  100  Ga.  187, 
28  S.  E.  97,  the  court  said :  "  This  court 
has  repeatedly  decided  that  multifarious- 
ness is  an  objection  not  favored  by  courts 
of  equity.  A  leading  case  in  this  countrv, 
on  these  two  sulijects,  whicli  has  been 
cited,  approved,  and  followed  in  numerous 
decisions  by  courts  of  last  resort  in  Am- 
erica, is  that  of  Briukerhoff  v.  Brown, 
6  Johns.  Ch.  139,  where  it  was  urged  bv 
way  of  demurrer  that  the  bill  was  multi- 
farious, first,  as  to  parties  ;  second,  as  to 
the  objects  of  the  bill.  In  that  case  the 
court  decided  that  '  a  bill  may  be  filed 
against  several  persons,  relative  to  matters 
of  the  same  nature,  forming  a  connected 
series  of  acts,  all  intended  to  defraud  and 
injure  the  plaintiffs,  and  in  which  all  the 
defendants  were  more  or  less  concerned, 
though  not  jointly  in  each  act.'  And 
Chancellor  Kent,  after  an  able  and  elabo- 
rate review  of  the  leading  English  author- 


510 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


ject "  of  the  action,  and  upon  the  sense  in  which  the  former  term 
is  used  in  the  common  method  of  statins  the  g-eneral  rules  of 


ities,  said  :  '  The  principle  to  be  deduced 
from  these  cases  is,  tliat  a  bill  against 
several  persons  must  relate  to  matters  of 
tlie  same  nature  and  having  a  connection 
with  each  other,  and  in  which  all  of  the 
defendants  are  more  or  less  concerned, 
though  their  rights  in  respect  to  the  gen- 
eral subject  of  the  case  may  be  distinct.' 
In  Fellows  v.  Fellows,  4  Coweu,  682,  de- 
cided by  the  Court  of  Errors  of  New 
York,  in  1825,  one  of  the  defendants  de- 
murred to  the  bill  '  because  it  w^  for 
several  distinct  matters  and  causes  in 
many  of  which  the  defendant  was  not 
concerned ; '  but  the  court,  following  the 
ruling  in  Brinkerhoff  v.  Brown,  supra,  held 
'  that  the  defendants  were  properly  joined, 
and  that  the  demurrer  should  be  over- 
ruled.' And  the  court  said,  '  This  was 
held  as  well  because  there  was  one  con- 
nected interest,  centering  in  the  point  in 
issue,  or  one  common  point  of  litigation, 
as  that  the  joinder  tended  to  prevent  mul- 
tiplicity of  suits.'  The  court  stated  that 
'  the  general  rule  is,  that  where  a  bill  is 
filed  concerning  things  of  distinct  natures 
against  several  persons,  it  is  demurrable  ; 
but  unconnected  parties  may  join  in  a 
.'iuit,  when  there  is  one  connected  interest 
among  them  all,  centering  in  the  point  in 
issue  in  the  cause.'  " 

Montserrat  Coal  Co.  v.  Coal  Mining 
Co.  (1897),  141  Mo.  149,  42  S.  W.  822  : 
"  The  sole  question  presented  by  this  rec- 
ord is  the  propriety  of  the  judgment  of 
the  circuit  court  liolding  the  petition  mul- 
tifarious and  sustaining  the  demurrer.  In 
the  leading  case  of  Campbell  v.  Mackay, 
1  Myl.  &  C.  603,  13  Condensed  Eng. 
Chcy.  Repts.  543,  Lord  Cottenham,  after 
reviewing  the  English  cases,  remarked 
that  '  to  lay  down  any  rule  applicat)le 
universally,  or  to  say  what  constitutes 
multifariousness  as  an  abstract  proposi- 
tion, is,  upon  the  autliorities,  impossible.' 
The  decided  cases  since  his  lordship's  day 
do  not  render  the  solution  of  the  question 
any  tlie  less  difficult.  Indeed,  no  rule 
of  equity  pleading  has  less  of  certainty 
and  uniformity  in  its  application  ;  a  result, 
doubtless,  owing  to  the  variety  of  degrees 
of  right  and  interest  which  enter  into  the 
affairs   of    life.     The    general  definition 


given  by  this  court  in  Clark  et  al.  v.  Ins. 
Co.,  52  Mo.  272,  is  as  accurate  as  any  to 
be  found  in  the  books:  'A  bill  is  said  to 
be  multifarious  when  distinct  and  inde- 
j)eudent  matters  are  improperly  joined 
whereby  they  are  confounded,  as  the 
writing  in  one  bill  of  several  matters 
perfectly  distinct  and  unconnected  against 
one  defendant,  or  tlie  demand  of  several 
matters  of  a  distinct  and  independent 
nature  against  several  defendants  in  the 
same  bill.'  In  Gaines  v.  Chew,  2  How. 
(U.  S.)  619,  the  court  say:  'In  general 
terms  a  bill  is  said  to  be  multifarious 
wliich  seeks  to  enforce  against  different 
individuals  demands  which  are  wholly  dis- 
connected.' The  rule  is  best  illustrated 
by  the  cases  themselves."  See  also  Budde 
V.  Rebeuack  (1896),  137  :\Io.  179,  38  S.  W. 
910;  Boggess  v.  Boggess  (1894),  127  Mo. 
305,  29  S.  W.  1018. 

In  Fry  r.  Rush  (1901),  63  Kan.  429,  C5 
Pac.  701,  the  court  said  :  "  As  before  inti- 
mated, the  petition  in  this  case  is  also 
objectionable  because  it  presents  two  dis- 
tinct forms  of  the  vice  of  multifariousness, 
—  that  of  uniting  in  the  same  count  dis- 
tinct and  disconnected  subjects,  matters, 
and  causes,  and  that  of  joining  in  the 
same  suit,  both  as  plaintiffs  and  defend- 
ants, ])arties  who  are  without  a  common 
interest  in  the  subject  of  the  litigation  and 
have  no  connection  with  one  another." 

In  Demarest  v.  Holdeman  (1901),  157 
Ind.  467,  62  N.  E.  17,  it  is  said  :  "  It  has 
been  held  sufficient  to  sustain  a  bill  against 
the  charge  of  multifariousness,  that  each 
defendant  has  an  interest  in  some  one 
matter  common  to  all  the  parties.  And 
where  the  subject  of  the  action  has  become 
so  complicated  and  entangled  that  the 
rights  of  the  parties  are  involved  in  doubt, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  determine  who  is 
liable,  and  who  is  not,  except  upon  a  full 
hearing  in  which  all  the  persons  in  any 
way  affected  or  interested  are  before  the 
court,  equity  permits  the  joinder  of  all 
those  so  related  to  the  controversy,  and 
who  have  a  common  interest  in  some  one 
or  more  branches  of  it." 

In  Daniels  r.  Fowler  (1897),  120  N.  C. 
14,  26  >S.  E.  635,  the  court  said :  "  If  the 
grounds  of  the  complaint  '  arise  out  of  the 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION. 


511 


equity  procedure,  are  so  valuable  and  instructive,  that  I  shall 
quote  thera,  with  some  condensation.  They  apply  as  well  to  the 
doctrine  of  parties  heretofore  discussed  as  to  the  particular  lan- 
guage of  the  codes  under  consideration  in  the  present  section. 
After  layiilg  down  the  equity  rule  as  to  parties  in  the  customary 
form  adopted  by  several  eminent  judges,  in  which  the  necessity 
or  propriety  of  their  being  joined  is  made  to  depend  upon  their 
interest  in  the  "  subject "  of  the  suit,i  he  proceeds :  ^  "  The  ex- 
pression 'subject  of  suit'  may  mean  one  of  two  things, — either 
the  fund  or  estate  respecting  which  the  question  at  issue  has 
arisen,  or  else  that  question  itself.     For  instance,  in  a  foreclosure 


same  transaction,  or  series  of  transactions, 
forming  one  course  of  dealing,  and  all  tend- 
ing to  one  end;  if  one  connected  story  can 
be  told  of  the  wliole,'  it  is  not  multifarious." 

In  Foster  v.  Landon  (1898),  71  Minn. 
494,  74  N.  W.  281,  the  rule  was  said  to 
be  well  settled  that  "the  case  against  one 
defendant  may  be  so  entire,  as  to  be  inca- 
pable of  being  prosecuted  in  several  suits ; 
and  yet  some  other  defendant  may  be  a 
necessary  party  to  some  portion  only  of 
the  case  stated.  In  the  latter  case  the 
objection  of  multifariousness  could  not  be 
allowed  to  prevail,"  quoted  from  Story, 
Eq.  PI.  §  271  a.  The  court  also  cited 
Pomeroy,  Code  Rem.  §  *  486.  See  also 
Allred  v.  Tate  (1901),  113  Ga.  441,  .39 
S.  E.  101  ;  Level  Land  Co.  v.  Sivyer 
( 1 901 ),  1 1 2  Wis.  442,  88  N.  W.  37  ;  South 
Bend  Chilled  Plow  Co.  v.  George  C.  Cribb 
Co.  (1900),  105  Wis.  443.  81  N.  W.  675; 
Plankinton  v.  Hildebrand  (1895),  89  Wis. 
209,  61  N.  W.  839. 

In  Whitehead  v.  Sweet  (1899),  126  Cal. 
67,  58  Pac.  376,  the  court  said:  "On  well 
understood  principles  of  equity  pleading,  a 
bill  is  not  multifarious  because  the  plain- 
tiffs are  not  entitled  to  a  decree  in  their 
favor  jointly  or  in  solido.  It  is  sufficient 
if  they  are  injured  in  a  similar  way,  that 
they  have  common  grievances  to  redress, 
and  that  they  are  entitled  to  relief  of  the 
same  kind.  (4  Thompson  on  Corporations, 
sec.  4602.)  Applying  the  principles  above 
laid  down  to  this  case,  the  complaint  does 
not  contain  actions  improperly  joined.  It 
tells  one  continued  story,  and  alleges 
wrongs  wilfully  perpetrated  by  the  defend- 
ants, and   the   way  in  which   they  were 


])crpetrated.  No  third  parties  appear  in 
any  way  to  be  involved.  If  defendant 
Sweet  agreed  for  the  benefit  of  the  corpo- 
ration to  transfer  his  stock  with  proxy 
irrevocable,  and  has  violated  his  contract, 
why  should  he  not  now  and  in  this  action 
be  compelled  to  perform  it  ?  A  bill  iii 
equity  is  said  to  be  multifarious  when  dis- 
tinct and  independent  matters  are  joined 
therein.  If  the  subject-matter  in  the  main 
relates  to  one  transaction  around  which 
the  others  cluster,  and  each  ]jarty  has  an 
interest  in  some  matters  in  the  suit,  and 
they  are  connected,  even  tliough  all  the 
parties  do  not  have  an  interest  in  all 
the  matters  in  the  suit,  the  bill  is  not 
multifarious." 

"It  is  not,  however,  the  mere  fact  that 
several  causes  of  action  are  united  in  the 
same  suit  which  the  plaintiffs  may  bring- 
in  different  rights  that  will  make  a  com- 
plaint bad  by  reason  of  multifariousness. 
There  must  be  such  an  inconsistency  or 
repugnancy  in  the  various  rights  declared 
on  as  to  cause  confusion  and  embarrass- 
ment on  the  part  of  the  court  in  adminis- 
tering the  relief  which  the  facts  might 
warrant  were  separate  suits  brought  for 
the  enforcement  of  the  .several  rights : " 
Henshaw  v.  Salt  River  Canal  Co.  (1898), 
Ariz.,  54  Pac.  577."] 

1  See  Lord  Redesdale,  Plead.  164,170; 
Lord  Hardwicke  in  Poore  v.  Clarke,  2  Atk. 
515;  Lord  Thurlow  in  Anon,  1  Ves.  29  ; 
Sir  William  Grant  in  Palk  v.  Clinton,  12 
Ves.  58 ;  Wilkins  v.  Fry,  1  Meriv.  262 ; 
Lord  Eldon  in  Cockburn  v.  Thompson,  16 
Ves.  325 ;  Calvert  on  Parties,  pp.  3,  4. 

^  Calvert  on  Parties,  p.  5. 


512  CIVIL   PwEMEDIES. 

suit  it  may  mean  either,  in  the  first  sense,  the  mortgage  debt  or 
mortgaged  premises,  or,  in  the  second  sense,  the  question  whether 
a  foreclosure  ought  or  ought  not  to  take  place."  He  goes  on  to 
show  by  citations  from  their  judgments  that  in  the  cases  quoted 
below,  Lord  Eldon  and  Sir  William  Grant  used  the  phrase  in  tlie 
first  sense,  and  adds  :  "  If  the  words  '  subject  of  suit '  were  taken 
in  that  very  extensive  meaning  in  which  Lord  Eldon  and  Sir 
William  Grant  used  them,  the  general  rule  as  laid  down  by 
them  would  be  inconsistent  with  several  distinctions  which  are 
firmly  established."  This  statement  he  illustrates  by  a  refer- 
ence to  many  instances  in  which  it  is  well  settled  tliat  per- 
sons who  are  direct!)-  interested  in  the  property,  fund,  or  estate 
affected  by  the  action,  need  not  be  made  parties,  —  as  for  ex- 
ample in  an  action  by  or  against  trustees,  the  cestuis  que  trust- 
ent  are  under  some  circumstances  neither  necessary  nor  proper 
parties.^ 

§  382.  *488.  Same  Subject.  Upon  these  premises  Mr.  Calvert 
proceeds  to  develop  his  own  views  as  follows :  "  The  rule,  then, 
which  has  been  stated  in  these  cases  in  reference  to  the  '  subject 
of  the  suit,'  meaning  thereby  the  estate  or  fund  on  which  tlie 
question  at  issue  has  arisen,  does  not  appear  to  be  adapted  to 
general  application.  It  must  be  taken  in  connection  with  other 
authorities  wliich  will  now  be  quoted."  The  authorities  then 
cited  by  him,  while  using  the  same  phrase,  "subject  of  the  suit," 
make  the  necessity  of  a  person's  being  joined  as  a  party  to  depend 
upon  his  interest  in  the  questions  involved  in  the  litigation^  and  the 
effect  which  the  decree  tuill  have  upon  that  interest.  This  doctrine 
was  tersely  expressed  by  Lord  Lyndhurst :  "  The  general  rule  is, 
that  all  persons  who  are  interested  in  the  question  must  be  parties 
to  a  suit  instituted  in  a  court  of  equity."  ^  He  thus  sums  up  the 
matter:  "Not  all  concerned  in  the  subject-matter  respecting 
which  a  thing  is  demanded,  but  all  concerned  in  the  very  thing 
which  is  demanded,  the  matter  petitioned  for  in  the  prayer  of  the 
bill,  in  other  words,  the  object  of  suit,  should  be  made  parties  in 
equity.     Upon  a  combination  of  all  tliese  authorities,  it  is  pro- 

^  Calvert  on  Parties,  pp.  6,  7,  8.  Davis,  1  Ves.  &  B.  550 ;  Sir  John   Leach 

2  Small  V.  Atwood,  Younge,  458.     The  in   Smith  v.  Snow,  3  Madd.  R.  10;  Lloyd 

other  dicta  cited  by  Mr.  Calvert  are  Lord  v.  Lander,  5  Madd.  R.  289 ;    I<ord  Hard- 

Loupjhboroupjh  in  King  r.  Martin,  2  Ves.  wicke   in    Poore  u.   Clarke,    2    Atk.    515; 

643;  Lord  Eldon  in  Fenton  i'.  Hughes,  7  Com.  Dig.  Tit.  Chan,  E.  2. 

Ves.  288  ;  Sir  T.  Plumer  iu  Whitworth  v. 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES    OF    ACTION.  513 

posed  to  state  the  general  rule  in  the  following  words :  All  per- 
sons having  an  interest  in  the  object  of  the  suit  ought  to  be  made 
parties."  ^ 

§  383.  *489.  Author's  Criticism  of  Calvert's  Theory.  This 
theory  is  open  to  a  very  plain  criticism.  Assuming  that  "  subject 
of  the  suit "  may  be  used  in  the  two  senses  mentioned  by  Mr. 
Calvert,  and  conceding  that  the  rule  requiring  all  persons  in- 
terested in  the  "subject,"  taken  in  the  first  of  these  senses,  to  be 
made  parties,  would  not  be  universally  correct,  the  natural  con- 
clusion would  be  that  the  phrase  "  subject  of  the  suit,"  as  found 
in  the  sreneral  rule,  should  be  taken  in  its  second  sense.  The 
author  seems  in  his  argument  to  reach  this  position  ;  but  in  the 
very  act  of  arriving  at  this  result  he  confounds  this  second  sense 
of  the  expression  with  a  very  different  thing,  —  the  object  of  the 
suit.  The  "  object  of  the  suit "  is,  as  he  states  it  to  be,  the  very 
relief  prayed  for  by  the  bill,  the  remedy  asked  and  granted  ;  but 
this  relief  or  remedy  is  certainly  not  identical  with  the  "  subject 
of  the  suit "  used  in  its  secondary  meaning.  Taking  his  illustra- 
tion of  the  foreclosure  suit,  the  "  subject"  may  be  the  mortgaged 
debt  or  the  mortgaged  premises  on  the  one  hand,  or  the  question 
whether  a  foreclosure  ought  or  ought  not  to  take  place  on  the 
other.  The  latter  is  clearly  not  the  same  as  the  sale  of  the  land 
and  the  payment  of  the  debt  out  of  the  proceeds,  which  is  the 
only  object  of  the  action.  It  would  seem  very  clear  then,  by 
the  author's  own  argument,  that  tlie  final  conclusion  which  he 
reaches  is  not  derived  from  his  premises  nor  established  by  his 
reasoning.  The  authorities  agree,  in  one  form  of  expression  or 
another,  that  all  persons  materially  interested  in  the  "  subject  of 
the  suit  "  should  regularly  be  made  parties.  The  "  subject  of  the 
suit "  may  be  the  fund,  estate,  or  property,  in  respect  of  which 
the  action  is  maintained ;  and  it  is  true  that,  in  a  very  large  num- 
ber of  instances,  —  in  fact,  in  a  very  large  majority  of  instances, 
—  all  the  persons  interested  in  this  fund  or  estate  should  be  par- 
ties in  an  equity  suit.  But  the  "  subject  of  the  suit "  may  be 
regarded  as  describing  the  questions  respecting  this  fund  or  estate 
which  are  involved  in  the  litigation ;  and  if  the  rule  as  just  stated 
is  too  broad  to  be  of  absolutely  universal  application,  it  is  cer- 
tainly true  that  all  persons  materially  interested  in  these  questions 
ought  to  be  joined  as  parties. 

1  Calvert,  pp.  10,  11. 
.33 


514  CIVIL  i;i:medies. 

^  384.  *490.  Application  of  Calvert's  Analysis  to  the  Language 
of  the  Codes.  Let  us  apply  Mr.  Calvert's  analysis  of  the  term  to 
the  language  found  in  the  codes.  In  equitable  actions  there  is 
generally,  if  not  quite  always,  a  fund,  or  estate,  or  property, 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  suit,  as  well  as  questions  concerning 
the  same  to  whicli  the  terra  raay  also  be  applied.  The  provisions 
of  the  codes,  however,  embrace  legal  actions ;  and  in  them  it  can- 
not generally  be  said  that  there  is  any  fund,  property,  or  estate, 
in  relation  to  which  the  questions  at  issue  have  arisen,  and  which 
can  be  regarded  as  the  "  subject."  In  a  very  large  proportion  of 
legal  actions,  therefore,  the  term  "  subject  of  the  action  "  can  onl}' 
be  conceived  of  in  the  second  sense  which  has  been  attributed  to 
it,  and  denotes  the  totality  of  questions  at  issue  between  the  par- 
ties, embracing,  in  short,  both  the  primary  rights  and  duties  of 
the  litigants,  and  the  remedial  rights  and  duties  which  have 
sprung  from  the  injuries  complained  of.  The  term  does  not  seem 
capable  of  any  clear  and  complete  analysis,  and  the  result  is  that 
it  may  denote  the  "  thing/'  if  any,  —  land,  chattel,  person,  fund, 
estate,  and  the  like,  —  in  respect  of  which  rights  are  sought  to  be 
maintained  and  duties  enforced,  or  it  may  denote  the  sum  of  the 
questions  between  the  parties  to  be  determined  by  the  judgment 
of  the  court.  The  latter  meaning  is  distinguishable  and  is  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  "  object  of  the  action,"  which  is  always 
the  relief  to  be  obtained  by  the  determination  of  the  questions 
which  constitute  the  "  subject  of  the  action." 

VI.   Instances  in  which  all  the  Causes  of  Action  are  against  a  Single 
Defendant,  or  against  all  the  Defendants  alike. 

§  385.  *401.  Questions  Discussed  in  this  Subdivision  pertain 
■wholly  to  Joinder  of  Causes  and  not  to  Parties.  In  the  cases  in- 
cluded in  tliis  subdivision,  no  question  can  arise  respecting  the 
proper  joinder  of  defendants.  The  only  matter  of  inquiry  is, 
whether  all  the  causes  of  action  fall  within  some  one  of  the 
classes  enumerated  in  the  statute,  so  that  they  may  be  united  in 
one  judicial  proceeding.  As  the  fn"st  and  most  general  of  these 
classes  has  already  been  fully  considered  in  another  subdivision, 
it  will  not  be  again  referred  to.  No  general  principle  is  involved 
which  needs  illustration  and  explanation ;  and  I  shall  simply 
state,  first,  a  number  of  cases  as  examples  of  a  proper  joinder, 


JOINDER    OF    CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  515 

and,  secondly,  a  number  of  instances  in  which  the  joinder  has 
been  held  to  be  improper. 

§  386.  *  492.  Joinder  of  Causes  Arising  out  of  Contract.  Illus- 
trations. All  causes  of  action  arising  out  of  contract  may  be 
united,  and  this  includes,  of  course,  implied  as  well  as  express 
contracts.  A  complaint  contained  four  causes  of  action.  The 
first  alleged  that  the  father  of  the  defendant,  being  indebted  to 
the  plaintiff,  devised  and  bequeathed  all  of  his  property,  real  and 
personal,  to  the  defendant,  and  in  his  will  declared  that  "  the 
said  [defendant]  is  to  pay  all  the  debts  that  I  may  owe  at  my 
decease,"  "and  also  $35  annually  during  her  lifetime  to"  the 
plaintiff :  that  the  defendant  accepted  such  gifts  and  took  pos- 
session of  the  property,  and  thus  became  liable  to  pay  such  debts 
and  said  annuity.  The  second  count  was  for  money  had  and 
received,  the  third  on  an  express  promise  to  pay  money,  and  the 
fourth  for  rent  due.  Upon  demurrer  to  this  complaint,  the  de- 
fendant's liability  in  respect  to  the  matters  alleged  in  the  first 
count  was  held  to  be,  in  contemplation  of  law,  on  an  implied 
promise,  and  all  the  causes  of  action  thus  arising  out  of  contract 
were  properly  united.^ 

§  387.  *  493.  When  Tort  is  ■waived  and  Suit  is  brought  upon 
Implied  Promise.  Illustrations.  In  certain  cases  the  plaintiff  is 
allowed  an  election  to  treat  the  wrong  done  as  a  tort,  or  to  waive 
the  tort,  and  sue  as  upoji  an  implied  promise  of  the  defendant. 

1  Gridley  v.    Giidle}-,   24    N.  Y.    130.  (1894),   .5  Wyo.   178,38  Pac.   920  (cause 

See  also  Quellen  i-.  Arnold,  12  Nev.  234;  of  action  for  work  and  labor  joined  witli 

Sullivan  1-.  The  Sullivan  Co.,  14  S.  C.  494;  one    for    money    loaned);    McCorkle    v. 

South  Side  Ass'u  v.  Cutler,  etc.  Co.,  64  Mallory  (1903),  30  Wash.  632,  71  Pac.  186 

Ind.  SCO;   Witte  v.  Wolfe,  16  S.   C.    256  (a  cause  of  action  to  recover  damages  for 

(on  an  unsecured  money  demand,  and  to  breach  of  contract  united  with  one  alleg- 

foreclose  a  mortgage)  ;  Childs  c.  Harris  ing  the  same  contract  and  that  defendant 

Manuf.  Co.,  68  Wis.  231  (a  judgment  is  a  had  wrongfully  taken  possession  of  certain 

contract  within  the   meaning  of  the  code  buildings  erected  by  plaintiff  in  order  to 

provision).     Joinder  of    causes  of  action  fulfil   the    contract).      Dudley    v.  Duval 

upon  a  (/iiaiitum  meruit  and  for  the  breach  (1902),  29  Wash.  528,  70  Pac.  68   (a  cause 

of  an    express    contract :     Waterman    r.  of  action  on  a  contract  for  services  united 

Waterman,  81  Wis.  17;  Wilson  v.  Smith,  with    one   upon  a  guaranty).      Reindl   v. 

61    Cal.  209;    Cowan  v.  Abbott,   92    Cal.  Heath  (1901),  109  Wis.  570,  85  N.  W.  495 

100.     A  statute    allowing  an  attachment  (a  cause  of  action  to  recover   for   work 

to  issue,  under  certain   circumstances,  on  done  by  plaintiff  under  a  contract,  united 

a  claim  before  it  is  due,  does  not  make  it  with   a   cau.se  of  action  for  breach  of  a 

a  cause  of  action,  so  that  it  may  be  joined  provision  in  the  same  contract  by  which 

in  the  same  action  with  causes  of  action  defendant  agreed  to  furnish  a  certain  quan- 

on   claims    that    are    due:    Wurlitzer  v.  tity  of  logs  to   be  sawed).     Gundersou  u. 

Suppe,  38  Kan.  31.  Thomas   (1894),   87    Wis.   406,  58  N.  W. 

QKearuey  Stone  Works  v.  McPherson  7bO~] 


516  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

When  this  is  permitted,  a  cause  of  action  of  such  a  nature  in 
which  the  tort  has  been  waived  and  the  claim  placed  upon  the 
footing  of  an  implied  promise  may  be  joined  with  causes  of  action 
arising  out  of  any  other  form  of  contract,  express  or  implied ;  as, 
for  example,  where  the  first  cause  of  action  was  for  goods  sold 
and  delivered,  and  the  second  averred  that  the  defendant  had 
wrongfully  taken  the  goods  of  the  plaintiff,  had  sold  them  and 
received  their  price,  and  demanded  judgment  for  this  sum  so  re- 
tained by  him.^  It  has  been  recently  held  by  the  Supreme  Court 
in  New  York,  that  where  the  plaintiff  seeks  to  unite  a  cause  of 
action  merely  upon  contract  with  another  cause  of  action  origi- 
nally for  a  tort,  but  in  which  the  tort  may  be  waived  and  the 
liability  treated  as  springing  from  an  implied  promise,  the  plead- 
ing must  show  in  some  direct  manner  that  the  tort  is  waived, 
and  that  the  claim  is  upon  a  promise ;  and  to  this  end  tlie  plain- 
tiff must  not  only  allege  the  facts  as  they  occurred,  but  must 
aver  a  promise  to  have  been  made  by  the  defendant,  in  the  same 
manner  as  an  action  of  assumpsit  was  distinguished  under  the 
former  system.^  A  complaint  contained  three  counts.  The  first 
alleged  a  sale  by  the  defendants  of  certain  county  warrants  dra^vn 
in  their  favor  as  payees,  and  facts  constituting  an  implied  prom- 
ise or  guaranty  that  these  instruments  were  legal  and  genuine, 
but  that  they  were  not  genuine,  and  hatl  been  adjudged  invalid 
as  against  the  county  in  an  action  brought  upon  them  ;  tlie  sec- 
ond sought  to  charge  the  defendants  as  indorsers,  treating-  the 
instruments  as  negotiable  notes  ;  the  third  was  for  money  had  and 
received.  These  causes  of  action  were  held  to  be  properly  united, 
since  they  all  arose  out  of  contract.^ 

§  388.  *  494.  Additional  Illustrations.  A  claim  to  recover  pos- 
session of  land,  a  claim  to  recover  damages  for  its  detention  or 
wrongful  taking,  and  a  claim  for  the  rents  and  profits  thereof 
during  the  defendant's  occupanc}',  may  all  or  any  of  them  be 
united  in  one  action :  *  but  the  plaintiff  is  not  compelled  to  do  so ; 

1  Hawk  f.  Thome,  54  Barb.  164;  Leach  *  Vandevoort  v.  Gould,  36  N.  Y.  639, 
?•.  Leach,  2  N.  Y.  S.  C.  657.  See  also  045;  Livingston  v.  Tanuer,  12  Barb.  481  ; 
Freer  v.  Dentou,  61  N.  Y.  492;  Logan  i-.  Holmes  r.  Davis,  21  Barb.  265;  19  N.  Y. 
Wallis,  76  N.  C.  416.  Fifield  v.  Sweeney,  488;  Tompkins  v.  White,  8  How.  Pr.  520; 
62  WiH.  204.  Arm.strong  ;-.  Hinds,  8  Minn.  254,  256; 

2  Bootli  r.  Farmers'  &  Mech.  Bk.  of  Walker >•.  Mitchell,  18  B  Mon.  541  ;  Burr 
Rochester.  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  45.  v.   VVoodrow,    1    Bush,    602;    Sullivnii   r. 

•■'  Keller /■.  Hicks,  22  Cal.  457.  Davis,  4   Cal.   291;    Laiig.sdiile   r.    W.xil- 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  517 

he  may  sue  separately  on  each.^  An  action  to  compel  the  spe- 
cific performance  of  a  contract  to  convey  land  is,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  an  action  to  recover  possession  of  lands, 
and  may  be  united  with  a  cause  of  action  for  damages  on  account 
of  defendant's  delay  in  performing  the  contract.^  In  like  manner, 
a  claim  to  recover  possession  of  chattels  may  be  united  with  a 
claim  for  damages  for  their  taking  or  detention.'^ 

§  389.  *  495.  Causes  for  Injuries  to  Property.  Illustrations. 
Causes  of  action  for  injuries  to  property  form  a  distinct  class, 
and  the  generality  of  this  language  permits  the  union  of  claims 
arising  from  injuries  of  all  kinds,  whether  with  or  without  force, 
whether  direct  or  consequential,  and  whether  to  real  or  to  per- 
sonal property.  Singulai'ly  enough,  injuries  to  the  person  are 
})laced  in  the  same  group  in  most  of  the  States,  rather  than  in  a 
class  by  themselves,  or  with  injuries  to  character.*  The  following 
are  examples  of  causes  of  action  arising  from  injuries  to  property 
which  have  been  held  properly  united  in  a  single  suit :  in  an  ac- 
tion against  a  railroad  company,  (1)  for  damages  resulting  from 
the  unlawful  throwing  down  the  fences  on  plaintiff's  farm,  whereby 
cattle  entered  and  destroyed  the  growing  crops,  (2)  for  damages 
caused  by  water  thrown  on  to  the  farm  by  means  of  an  embank- 
ment, (3)  for  damages  from  earth  piled  upon  the  farm,  obstructing 
the  passage  of  teams  and  the  free  use  of  the  land,  (4)  for  damages 
occasioned  by  the  killing  of  cattle  by  means  of  passing  engines ;  ^ 

leu.   120  Ind.    16;    Hiles    v.  .Johnson,  67  Carter,  .38  Wis.  394;  Spahr  v.  Nicklaus, 

Wis.  517;  Black  v.  Drake,  28  Kau.  482;  51  Ind.  221  ;  Bottorf  u.  Wise,  53  id.  32. 
Fletcher  v.  Brown  (Neb.  1892),  53  N.  W.  i  Ibid. 

577.     A  claim  to  recover  land,  with  dam-  -  Worrall  v.  Munn,  38  N.  Y.  137.     A 

ages   for  withholding   the    same,    and    a  demand  for  a  specific  performance  against 

claim  of  the  rents  and  profits  for  its  use,  A.  cannot   be,  united   with  a  demand  to 

are  distinct  causes  of  action,  and  evidence  recover   possession  against  B.     Fagan  v. 

to  prove  the  latter  is  inadmissible  under  a  Barnes,  14  Fla.  53,  56. 
complaint  which  does   not    contain   such  '^  Pharis  v.  Carver,  13  B.  Men.  236. 

cause  of  action,   but   simply   alleges  the  '^  []Thelin  v.  Stewart  (1893),  100  Cal. 

former.     Larned  v.  Hudson,  57  N.  Y.  151 ;  372,  34  Pac.  861,  holding  that  a  .cause  of 

Pengrai'.  Munz,  29  Fed.  Rep.  830.     But  action  for  an  injury  to  the  person  cannot 

cninpare  §  *454,  an/e.     It  has  been  held  be  united  with  a  separate  cause  of  action 

tliat  a  claim  to  recover  possession  of  one  for  a  subsequent  injury  to  property,  aud 

p-xrcel   of  land  cannot  be  joined  with  a  that  a  demurrer  to   a  complaint  on  this 

similar   claim   in  respect  to  another  and  ground,  where  such  causes  of  action  are 

distinct  parcel.     Holmes  v.  Williams,  16  so  set  out,  will  be  sustained.     Code  Civ. 

Minn.  164,    169.     See,  however,  Beronio  Proc,  §  427.] 

V.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  86  Cal.  415.    See  '  Clark's  Adm.  v.  Han.  &  St.  Jos.  R. 

also  Merrill   v.   Deering,  22  Minn.  376 ;  Co.,   30  ]Mo.    202 ;    and  see  Teudesen  v. 

Lord  y    Deering,  24  id.   110;  Ilackett  v.  Marshall,  3  Cal.  440. 


518  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

an  action  by  a  mine-owner,  alleging  (1)  injuries  caused  by  the 
bursting  of  defendant's  dam,  negligently  constructed,  whereby 
gold-bearing  earth  was  washed  away  and  (2)  damages  resulting 
from  the  delay  and  hindrance  in  working  the  mine ;  ^  where  the 
complaint  contained  two  counts,  the  first  being  for  trespasses 
done  to  the  land  prior  to  its  conveyance  to  the  plaintiff,  the  claim 
having  been  assigned  to  him,  and  the  second  alleged  that  the 
plaintiff  was  owner  and  in  possession  of  the  land,  that  the  defend- 
ants were  about  to  enter  upon  the  same  and  quarry  and  carry 
away  minerals  therefrom,  and  prayed  an  injunction  restraining 
the  trespassers,  the  two  causes  of  action  were  held  to  be  properly 
joined,  although  one  was  legal  and  the  other  equitable.^  On  the 
same  principle,  in  a  suit  to  recover  possession  of  land,  a  separate 
cause  of  action  may  be  added  to  restrain  a  threatened  trespass 
and  commission  of  waste.^  A  cause  of  action  for  deceit  practised 
in  the  sale  of  chattels  may  be  joined  with  one  for  the  unlawful 
taking  and  conversion  of  other  goods  ;  the  claim  of  damages  for 
the  fraud  in  such  a  case  arises  from  an  "  injury  to  property  " 
within  the  meaning  of  the  codes.^ 

§  390.  *  496.  Malicious  Prosecution  and  Slander  or  Libel. 
Within  the  class  of  "injuries  to  character"  fall  not  only  actions 
for  libel  and  for  slander,  but  those  for  malicious  prosecution ;  the 
gist  of  the  latter,  according  to  the  old  authorities,  being  the  wrong 
done  to  the  plaintiff's  reputation.^    A  cause  of  action  for  malicious 

1  Fraler  v.  Sears  Union  Water  Co.,  12  expressly  authorizes  a  party  to  'unite  in 
Cal.  .'J55.  the  same  complaint  several  causes  of  ac- 

2  More  V.  Massini,  32  Cal.  590,  595,  tion  .  .  .  where  they  arise  out  of '  and 
per  Shafter  J.  The  opinion  in  this  case  is  '  belong  to  one  '  of  the  several  classes 
instructive.  tlierein  mentioned  and  affect  all  the  '  pur- 

■*  Natoma   Water   Co.    v.    Clarkin,    14  ties  to  the  action  '  and   do  '  not  require 

Cal.  544.  different  places  of  trial '  and  are  'stated 

*  Cleveland  r.  Barrows,  59  Rarb.  364,  separately.'    R.  S.  1878,  sec.  2647.   One  of 

374,  375,  ])er  T.  A.  Johnson  J.     See  also  the  classes  so  named  therein  is 'injuries 

De  Silver  v.  Holden,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  to  character.'     Id.  Under  this  statute  this 

236.     Joinder  of  a  cause  of  action  for tres-  court  has  held  that  a  plaintiff  may  unite 

pass  to  real  property  with  one  fur  assault,  in  the  same  comjilaint  a  cause  of  action 

Craig  V.  Cook,  28  Minn.  232;  waste,  and  for  lil)el  and  another  cause  of  action  for 

deceit  in  the  .sale  of  personalty,  Gilbert  r.  .slander.     Noonan  i-.  Orion,  32   Wis.  lOO. 

Loberg  (Wis.  1892),  .53  N.  W.  500.  It  li><rically  follows  that  two  or  more  sepa- 

^  ^Fred  v.  Traylor  (1903),  —  Ky.  — ,  rate  causes  of  action  for  slander  may  bo 
72  S.  \V.7G8,  Ilellsiern  r.  Katzer  (1899),  united  in  the  same  complaint.  In  the  case 
103  Wis.  391,  79  N.  W.  429,  in  which  the  at  bar  we  arc  clearly  of  the  opinion  that 
court  said  :  "  One  ground  of  demurrer  aa-  only  one  cause  of  action  is  alleged,  or 
signed  is  that  several  causes  of  action  attempted  to  be  alleged.  True,  the  coin- 
have  been  improperly  united.   The  statute  plaint  sets   forth   three  several    c.\cerpts 


JOINDER    OF    CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  519 

prosecution  may  therefore  be  joined  with  one  for  libel  or  slander, 
or  both.^ 

§  391.  *  497.  Special  Cases.  The  following  are  some  special 
cases.  In  Wisconsin  a  complaint  was  sustained  in  an  action  by 
a  creditor,  one  count  of  which  set  up  a  cause  of  action  against  a 
bank  to  recover  certain  property  or  its  value,  and  another  count 
alleged  a  cause  of  action  against  delinquent  stockholders  of  the 
corporation.^  Where  a  complaint  contained  two  causes  of  action, 
the  first  to  enforce  an  implied  trust  alleged  to  have  arisen  in  favor 
of  the  plaintiff  on  the  conveyance  of  lands  from  himself  to  the 
defendant,  and  the  second  to  enforce  a  vendor's  lien  on  the  same 
lands,  they  were  held  to  be  properly  united,  since  both  arose  out 
of  trusts,  the  one  by  virtue  of  a  contract,  and  the  other  by  opera- 
tion of  law.3  In  another  equitable  suit  the  joinder  of  four  causes 
of  action  was  sustained,  where  the  first  was  to  reform  a  certain 
trust  deed  by  inserting  the  name  of  a  trustee,  and  to  foreclose  it 
when  reformed,  the  second  was  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  upon  the 
same  land,  while  the  third  and  fourth  were  to  enforce  certain 
charges  which  were  liens  on  the  land,  and  which  the  plaintiff  had 
been  compelled  to  pay  in  order  to  protect  his  security.* 

§  392.  *  498.  Rule  in  Iowa.  All  of  the  foregoing  cases  were 
decided  under  State  codes  which  contain  substantially  the  same 
provisions  and  the  same  division  into  classes.  In  Indiana  and 
Iowa,  it  will  be  remembered,  the  corresponding  sections  of  the 

from  the  discourse  complained  of ;  but  it  prosecution,  both  causes  of  action  arising 
alleges  that  they  were  each  and  all  made  out  of  the  same  trausaction.] 
at  the  same  time  and  place,  in  the  same  ^  Martin  v.  JMattison,  8  Abb.  Pr.  3 ; 
connection,  and  that  the  language  em-  Hull  v.  Vreeland,  18  Abb.  Pr.  182;  Wat- 
ployed  in  each  of  such  excerpts  was  un-  son  v.  Hazzard,  3  Code  Rep.  218  ;  Shore 
derstood  by  the  persons  then  and  there  v.  Smith,  15  Ohio  St.  173 ;  Hargau  v. 
present  in  the  congregation,  or  by  the  Purdy  (Ky.  1892),  20  S.  W.  432  (slander 
most  of  them.     It  is  true  that  in  discuss-  joined  with  libel). 

ing  the  subject  of  damages  it  has  been  ^  Seaman   v.    Goodnow,    20    Wis.  27, 

said  that  where  the  article  complained  of  sed  qu. 

contains  several  expressions,  each  of  which  ^  Burt   v.   Wilson,  28   Cal.  632.      See 

is  libellous  per  se,  each  such   e.xpiession  also  Price  v.  Brown,  10  Abb.  N.  Cas.  67 

is,  in  legal  effect,  a  separate  cause  of  ac-  (causes  of  action  arising  out  of  breach  of 

tion.     Caudrian   v.    Miller,   98   Wis.    168.  trust  may  be  united  in  a  suit  against  the 

But  that  does  not  mean  that  each  such  trustee's  executors). 

expression  must  necessarily  be  pleaded  as  *  Eurnside   v.    Wayman,  49  Mo.  356. 

a  separate    cause    of    action."      Scott  v.  The  "  trust  deed  "  mentioned  was,  in  fact. 

Flowers  (1900),  60  Neb.  675,  84  N.  W.  81,  a  form  of  security  used  in  several  of  the 

in  which  it  was  said  a  cause  of  action  for  States   instead  of  a  mortgage.     See  also 

false  imprisonment  may  be  joined  in  the  Williams  v.  Peabody,  8  Hun,  271  ;  Hay  v. 

same  petition  with  a  count  for  malicious  Hay,  13  id.  315. 


520  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

statute  are  peculiar,  and  more  latitude  is  permitted,  especially  in 
the  latter  State,  in  the  joinder  of  unlike  causes  of  action.  As 
in  Iowa  all  legal  or  equitable  causes  of  action  may  be  united, 
a  claim  arising  upon  contract  may  be  included  in  the  same  petition 
with  one  for  damages  resulting  from  any  kind  of  tort.^  And 
where  twent3^-two  different  parcels  of  land  belonging  to  the  same 
owners  had  been  conveyed  to  the  plaintiff  by  as  many  separate 
tax  deeds,  he  was  permitted  to  foreclose  all  these  deeds,  and  thus 
cut  off  the  owner  s  right  of  redemption  in  one  action. ^  In  con- 
struing the  sections  of  the  Iowa  code  which  give  the  trial  court  a 
discretion  in  reference  to  the  joinder  of  unlike  causes  of  action, 
and  which  authorize  it  to  compel  ,an  election,  or  to  strike  out 
on  the  defendant's  motion,  it  is  held  that  the  provision  for 
compelling  the  plaintiff  to  elect  applies  only  to  a  case  where 
the  various  causes  of  action  set  forth  in  the  petition  are  merely 
different  modes  of  stating  one  and  tlie  same  demand,  and  the 
defendant  must  file  an  affidavit  showing  this  fact  as  the  basis 
of  his  motion ;  but  the  court  may,  on  defendant's  motion,  strike 
out  a  cause  of  action  which  it  deems  impossible  or  inconven- 
ient to  try  ^vith  the  others,  but  in  no  case  is  a  demurrer  the 
proper  remedy.^ 

§  393.  *  499.  Illustrations  from  Indiana  and  California.  In 
Indiana,  a  cause  of  action  by  a  wife  for  an  absolute  divorce  was 
held  properly  joined  with  a  cause  of  action  to  compel  the  specific 
performance  of  an  agreement  to  convey  certain  lands  to  her  made 

^  Turner  r.  First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Keokuk,  tiffs  for  the  destruction  of  chattels  owned 

20    luwa,   562.     See   also   Memienhall   i-.  by  them  jointly,  and  also  for  au  assault 

Wilson,  54  Iowa,  589  (trespass  and  con-  and  battery    committed  upon  each  ;  but, 

tract);    Thorpe   v.    Dickey,    51    id.    676;  no    motion   havinj^  been   made  to   strike 

Stevens  v.  Chance,  47  id.  602.  out,  the  irregularity  was  thereby  waived : 

2  Byington  r.  Woods,  13  Iowa,  17,  19.  Grant  i\  McCarthy,  38  Iowa.  468;  an  ac- 

See,  per  contra,   Turner  v.  Duchman,  23  tion    l)y   two    persons  not  partners  for  a 

Wis.  500.  slander  of  each,  but  on  the  trial  the  case 

[^Campbell  v.  Equitable  Loan  &  Trust  was  severed,  and  the  trial  proceeded  on  be- 

Co.  (1901),  14  S.  I).  483,  85  N.  W.   1015.  half  of  one  alone,  and  this  was  held  proper  : 

Under  the    statute    allowing    joinder  of  Hinkle  v.  Davenport,  38  Iowa,  335.     For 

causes  of  action  to  recover  real  j)roperty,  it  furtlier   illustration,  see  Faivre  i'.  Gillan 

is  proper  to  joiu  five  causes  of  action  to  (Iowa,  1S92),  51  N.  W.  46. 
set  aside  five  tax  deeds  on  five  separate  ^See  the  following  recent  Iowa  cases : 

tracts  of  land.]  Devin   r.   Walsh   (1899),   108   la.  428,  79 

8  Keed  i-.    Howe,  28   Iowa,  250,   252  ;  N.   W.  133  ;  Prader  r.  Nat.  Acc't.  Ass'n. 

Iowa  &  Minn.  II.  Co.  v.  Perkins,  28  Iowa,  (1899),  107  la.  431,  78  N.  W.  60  ;  Clayton 

281.     In  the  following   cases,  the  causes  County  j-.  Ilerwig  (1897),  100  la.  03],  69 

of   action   were   held   to    have    been    im-  N.  W.  1035;  Jenks   v.   Lansing  Lumber 

properly  joined:  an  action  by  two  plain-  Co.  (1896),  97  la.  342,  66  N.  W.  231.] 


JOINDER   OF   CAUSES   OF    ACTION.  521 

by  the  husband  at  the  time  of  their  separation.^  In  California,  by- 
virtue  of  the  provisions  of  a  special  statute,  a  cause  of  action 
against  a  sheriff  to  recover  damages  for  his  neglect  to  execute  and 
return  process  may  be  joined  with  a  claim  to  recover  a  statutory 
penalty  for  the  failure  in  his  official  duty.'-^ 

§  394.  *  500.  Cause  of  Action  upon  Contract  cannot  be  joined 
w^ith  one  to  recover  Damages  for  a  Tort.  Illustrations.  Author's 
Criticism.  I  shall  conclude  this  section  with  a  classified  series  of 
decisions  which  will  illustrate  the  improper  union  of  different 
causes  of  action.  Except  in  Iowa,  the  rule  is  universal  that  a 
cause  of  action  upon  contract  cannot  be  joined  with  one  to  recover 
damages  for  a  tort,  unless  both  should  arise  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action, and  thus  fall  within  the  inclusive  terms  of  the  first  class. 
The  following  are  examples  merely  of  this  elementary  rule.^  A 
count  against  the  defendant  for  his  wrongful  acts  as  president  of 
a  bank,  and  one  against  him  as  a  stockholder  in  such  bank  to  re- 
cover on  its  notes,  were  improperly  embraced  in  the  same  com- 
plaint,* also  a  claim  against  certain  part  owners  of  a  vessel  to 
recover  her  hire,  which  they  had  received,  and  one  to  restrain 
them  from  a  threatened  wrongful  sale  of  the  ship.^  It  has  been 
held  that  a  demand  arising  from  the  breach  of  a  warranty  given 
upon  the  sale  of  chattels  cannot  be  joined  with  one  based  upon  the 
vendor's  deceit  practised  in  the    same    sale.^      Notwithstanding 

1  Fritz  r.  Fritz  ;  23  Iiid.  388.  25  Ore.  305,  35  Pac.  658  :   Where  a  com- 

QSee  late  cases  ill  Indiana  as  follows:  plaint  contains  allegations  of  a  covenant 

Coddington  v.  Canaday  (1901),   157  Ind.  against  incumbrances  and  its  breach,  and 

243,  61   N.  E.  567  ;  State  px  rel.  v.  Peck-  also  allegations  of  the  representations  of 

ham   (1893),   136  Ind.  198,  36  N.  E.  28;  the  defendant  as  to  the  freedom  of  the 

Kichwiue  v.  Presbyterian  Church  (1893),  property  from  incumlirances,  their  falsity, 

135  Ind.  80,  .34  N.  E.  737/]  defendant's    knowledge    that    they    were 

-  Pearkes  ?•.  Freer,  9  Cal.  642.  false,    and    plaintiif 's    reliance   on  them, 

^  [^Clough  V.  Rocky  Mountain  Oil  Co.  there  is  a  misjoinder  of  causes,  one  being 

(1898),  25  Colo.  520,  5.5  Pac.  809  :  A  cause  in  contract,  the  other  in  tort,  but  unless 

of  action  in  contract  against  a  corporation  the  objection  is  taken  by  demurrer  it  is 

cannot  be  joined  with  a  cause  of  action  waived.      See    also     Conant    v.    Storthz 

against  the  directors  of  the  same  corpora-  (1901 ),  69  Ark.  209,  62  S.  W.  415.] 

tion   brought  under  a  statute  making  the  ■*  Butt  v.  Cameron,  53  Barb.  642  ;  Imt 

directors  liable  for  the  deljts  of  the  com-  see  Wiles  v.  Suydam,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  292. 

pany  in  case  they  failed  to  make  certain  ^  Coster  v.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  3  Abb. 

reports  as  to  the  condition  of  the  com-  Pr.  332. 

pany,  the  latter  being  the  cause  of  action  ^  Springsteed  i\  Lawson,  14  Abb.  Pr. 

in  tort.     Allen  v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  328;  Sweet  f.  Ingerson,  12  How.  Pr.  331. 

(1899),  107  Ga.  838,  33  S.  E.  696  :  A  cause  See   Gertler    v.    Linscott,   26  Minn.    82  ; 

of  action  on  contract  cannot  be  joined  in  a  Logan  i\  Wallis,  76  N.  C.  416  ;  Doughty 

.single  suit  with  a  cause  of  action  arising  i\   Atlantic  &  N.   C.  R.    Co.,  78  id.   22; 

from  a  tort.     Corbett  v.   Wrenn   (1894),  Keller  v.  Boatman,  49  Ind.  104. 


522  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

these  decisions,  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  of  two  legal  causes  of 
action  which  more  completely  and  accurately  correspond  to  the 
lansruaofe  of  the  codes,  as  '"arising  out  of  the  same  transaction," 
The  bargain  between  the  parties  is  certainly  a  transaction  ;  certain 
language  used  by  the  seller  may  amount  to  a  contract  of  w^arranty  ; 
certain  other  language  may  be  the  false  representations ;  indeed, 
it  is  possible,  and  not  at  all  unlikely,  that  the  selfsame  words 
spoken  by  the  vendor  might  be  at  once  the  fraudulent  representa- 
tions and  the  promise,  for  language  otherwise  sulhcient  is  none 
the  less  a  promise  because  tlie  person  using  it  knowingly  lied 
when  he  uttered  it.  To  say  that  these  two  demands  do  not  arise 
out  of  the  same  transaction  is  virtually  to  say  that  no  two  different 
legal  claims  ever  can  so  arise.  I  cannot  regard  these  decisions, 
therefore,  otherwise  than  as  mistaken. 

§  395.  *  501.  Illustrations.  In  an  action  against  a  railroad 
company,  the  complaint  contained  three  counts:  the  first  for 
wrongfully  carrying  away  and  converting  cattle  ;  the  second  for 
the  same  injury  done  to  hogs ;  and  the  third  set  up  an  agreement 
to  transport  cattle  from  a  specified  place  to  another,  and  averred 
a  breach  thereof  by  means  of  a  negligent  omission  whereby  the 
plaintiff  lost  his  cattle.  On  demurrer,  it  was  said  tliat  the  first 
two  causes  of  action,  being  for  torts,  could  be  joined;  but  the 
third  was  upon  contract,  and  its  union  with  the  others  was  error.^ 
The  joinder  of  a  count  for  the  conversion  of  chattels  with  one  for 
money  had  and  received  would  be  clearly  wrong :  ^  and  the  same 
is  true  of  any  tort  and  implied  contract.^  It  is  doubtful  whether 
a  cause  of  action  on  contract  and  one  for  a  tort  to  the  person  can 
be  conceived  of  as  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  so  that  they 
may  be  embraced  in  the  same  pleading.  The  attempt,  however, 
has  been  made  to  unite  a  claim  for  the  breach  of  a  written  con- 
tract to  convey  land  \\\i\\  a  cause  of  action  for  assault  and  battery 

1  Cohvell  V.  N.  Y.  &  E.  R.  Co.,  9  How.  construct  and  maintain  a  farm  crcssiiig, 
Pr.  .311;  Hoagland  v.  Han.  &.  St.  .los.  R.  as  required  by  statute,  aii.^cs  upon  the 
Co.,  .39  Mo.  451.  See  also  Stark  v.  Well-  breach  of  an  iiii])lied  contract  to  perform 
man,  96  Cal.  400.  a  statutory   duty,   and    tlierefore    cannot 

-  Cobb  I'.  Dows,  9  Barb.  2.30,  and  cases  be  united  witli  a  cause  of  action  for  dam- 
in  last  note.  See  also  Teall  c  Syracuse,  ages  for  injuries  to  real  jiroperty  caused 
32  Hun,  .332.  by  the  diversion  of  a  stream.     Followed 

2  Hunter  v.  Powell,  15  IIow.  Pr.  221.  in  Hodges  v.  Wilmington  &  W.  R.  Co., 
It  was  held  in  Thomas  r.  Utica  &  B.  R.  R.  10.=)  N.  C.  170,  a  case  preseuting  similar 
Co.,  97  N.  V.  245,  that  a  cau.se  of  action  facts. 

for  the  omis.sion  by  a  railroad  com]>any  to 


JOINDER    OF   CAUSES    OF   ACTION.  523 

committed  by  the  defendant  in  forcibly  taking  the  instrument 
from  the  plaintiff's  possession,  but  it  was  unsuccessful.^  In  like 
manner,  a  cause  of  action  against  a  lessee  arising  upon  the 
lease  cannot  be  joined  with  a  claim  for  damages  on  account  of 
injuries  done  to  the  property,  unless,  of  course,  the  latter  is 
embraced  within  some  stipulation  or  covenant  of  the  lease,  so 
that  it  would  in  fact  be  a  demand  on  the  contract.^  It  can  make 
no  difference  with  the  rule  that  the  tort  is  a  fraud  consisting  in 
false  statements  or  concealments.  Thus,  a  complaint  by  an  in- 
dorsee against  liis  immediate  indorser  was  held  bad  on  demurrer, 
one  count  of  which  alleged  the  ordinary  liability  of  defendant  as 
indorser,  and  the  other  set  up  certain  false  representations  as  to 
the  solvency  of  the  maker,  by  which  the  plaintiff  was  induced 
to  purchase  the  paper.^  The  rule,  in  short,  applies  to  all  cases 
of  demands  based  upon  a  promise,  express  or  implied,  and  claims 
based  upon  fraud,  unless  the  tort  may  be  waived,  and  the  com- 
plaint be  framed  so  as  to  present  both  causes  of  action  as  arising 
from  contract.* 

§  396.  *  502.  Cause  of  Action  against  one  in  Personal  Char- 
acter cannot  be  united  -with  one  against  him  in  Representative 
Character.  Reason.  Author's  Criticism.  Illustrations.  Another 
particular  rule,  which  is  but  an  application  of  the  same  doc- 
trine, requires  that  the  several  causes  of  action  against  or  for 
a  given  person  should  all  affect  him  in  the  same  capacity. 
In  other  words  a  demand  for  or  against  a  party  in  his  per- 
sonal character  cannot  be  united  with  another  demand  for  or 
against  him  in  a  representative  character  as  trustee,  executor, 
administrator,  receiver,  and  the  like.^     The  reason  usually  given 

1  Ehle  t'.  Haller,  6  Bosw.  661.  liigh  Coal  Co.  (1901),  111   Wis.   545,  87 
-  Ederliu  v.  Judge,  36  Mo.  350.     Con-  N.  W.  472.     Plaintiff   was   a  retail    coal- 
versely,  a  claim  of  damages  for  the  breach  dealer  in  the  city  of  Superior,  and  filed  his 
of   the  lessor'.s  covenant  of  quiet   enjoy-  compiaiutin  two  counts  against  the  defend- 
ment,  and  a  claim  of  damages  for  a  tres-  ants,  who  are  wholesale  and  retail  coal- 
pass  in  his  wrongful  entering  upon  the  dealers.     His  first  count  stated  a  cause  of 
demised  premises  and  injuring  the  lessee's  action  in  favor  of  himself  alone,  for  dam- 
property  thereon,  cannot  be  joined.     Keep  ages  caused  by  an  alleged  malicious  con- 
V.  Kaufman,  56  N.  Y.  332.  spiracy  on  the  part  of  the  defendants  to 
^  Jamison  v.  Copher,  33  Mo.  483.  destroy  hisbusiness,  said  defendants  having 
■*  Forkner    v.    Hart,    Stanton's    Code  combined  for  the  purjiose  of  establishing 
(Ky.),  60;   Wilson  v.  Thompson,  Id.  60;  a  monopoly  and  preventing  plaintiff  from 
Hubbell   r.   Meigs,    50   N.    Y.    480,   487;  purchasing  coal.     His  second  count  stated 
Booth  V.  Farmers'  &  Mecli.  Bk.  of  Roch-  an  equitable  cause  of  action  in  favor  of 
ester,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  45.  himself  and  a  number  of  other  retail  coal- 
^  QHawardeu  v.  Youghiogheny  &  Le-  dealers  similarly  situated,  in  whose  behalf 


524  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

for  tliis  rule  when  applied  to  defendants  is,  that  the  judgment 
upon  one  cause  of  action  would  be  against  the  defendant  per- 
sonall)',  to  be  made  de  bonis  proprils,  while  the  judgment  upon 
the  other  cause  of  action  would  be  against  him  in  his  representa- 
tive or  official  capacity,  and  not  perhaps  to  be  made  out  of  his  own 
property;  as,  for  example,  it  might  be  made  de  bonis  testatoris. 
This  reasoning,  borrowed  from  the  old  law,  is  a  mere  formula  of 
w^ords,  for  there  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  things  w^hich  prevents 
such  a  double  judgment.  It  is  just  as  easy  for  such  a  judgment 
to  be  rendered  in  one  action  as  it  is  for  two  distinct  judgments 
to  be  granted  in  separate  suits.  The  argument,  however,  Hke  so 
much  of  so-called  legal  reasoning,  still  has  convincing  force  with 
most  of  the  courts,  even  while  administering  the  reformed  system. 
Tlie  following  cases  are  given  as  illustrations  of  this  doctrine,  and 
in  all  of  them  the  joinder  was  pronounced  improper :  a  com- 
plaint on  a  partnership  debt  against  the  defendant  as  surviving 
partner,  and  against  him  in  a  separate  count  as  executor  of  his 
deceased  partner ;  ^  against  the  defendant  personally,  and  also  as 
an  executor  or  administrator ;  ^  in  a  suit  against  an  executor  or 
administrator,  a  demand  w^hieh  existed  against  the  deceased  in 
his  lifetime,  and  a  different  demand  which  arose  from  a  promise 
made  by  the  executor  or  administrator  after  the  death,  for  as 
to  the  latter  claim  the  defendant  is  personally  liable.^     On  the 

he  sued  to  restrain  the  defendants  from  a  affects   but  one   party   phiintiff,  whereas 

further   enforcement  of  said   conspiracy,  tlie  second  cause  of  action  affects  numer- 

A  general  demurrer  was  filed  to  the  whole  ous  ])arties  plaintiff.     The  doctrine  is  fre- 

coniplaint  on  the  ground  that  two  causes  quently  stated  that  the  several  causes  of 

of   action   were   improperly  joined.     The  action  for  or  against  a  person  must  affect 

court   said  :   "  The   statute   provides   that  him  in  the  same  cajtacity  in  order  to  make 

causes  of  action,  in  order  to  be  united  in  them  capable  of  being  joined.     Pomeroy, 

one  complaint,  '  must  affect  all  the  parties  Code   Kemedics,   §  *  .502.     These   conclu- 

to   the   action.'      Stats.    1898,    sec.   2647.  sions  are  conclusive  to  tlie  effect  tliat  the 

It  is  clear  that  this  limitation  would   be  general  demurrer  to  the  whole  coiuplaint 

violated  if  the  two  causes  of  action  in  liiis  on  riie  ground  of  improper  joinder  .should 

comjdaint  were  allowed  to  be  united  in  have  been  sustained. "3 
one  complaint.     The  fir.«t  cause  of  action  ^  Landau  v.  Levy,  I  Abb.  ]'r.  376. 

is  a  straight  action  at  law  for  damages  to  -  McMahon  v.  Allen,  3  Abb.  Pr.  89. 

tlie  plaintiff  alone.     No  one  el.se  has  any  By  C.  C.  P.  of  New  York,  §   1815,  such 

interc,>it  in  the  judgment  in  that  action,  joinder   is    allowed    in    certain    specified 

whatever  it  lie.     But  the  second  cause  of  cases.     ^Crowley  v.  Hicks  (1898),  93  Wis. 

action  is  a  cause  of  action  in  favor  of  a  5G6,  79  N.  \V.  348.] 

large   numlper   of   persons  constituting  a  ^  Ferrin  r.  Myrick,  41  N.  Y.  315,  322; 

class  represented  by  the  plaintiff.     Poten-  Austin  r.  Munro,  47  N.  Y.  360,  364;  s.  c. 

tially  all  of  the  class  are  parties.      They  4  Lans.  67.     See,  however,  Trailesman's 

are  invited  to  become  formal  parties  plain-  Bank   ?;.   McFeely,  61    Barb.   522,  which 

tiff,  and  presumably  will  accept  the  invi-  cannot  be  regarded  as  correct  in  tlie  liglit 

tation.      Tims   the   first   cause    of   action  of  tlic.se  otiier  decisions. 


JOINDER   OF    CAUSES   OF   ACTION.  525 

same  principle,  a  demand  upon  a  contract  between  the  plaintiff 
and  the  defendant,  and  a  claim  by  the  plaintiff  as  a  shareholder 
in  an  unincorporated  company  against  the  defendant  as  president 
thereof,  in  respect  of  matters  connected  with  the  management 
of  its  affairs,  were  held  to  be  improperly  joined,  since  the  de- 
fendant's liability,  if  any,  in  the  latter  cause  of  action  existed 
against  him  as  a  trustee.^  The  plaintiff  must  also  sue  in  the 
same  capacity  in  respect  of  all  the  causes  of  action.  lie  cannot 
in  one  count  sue  as  an  executor  or  administrator,  and  in  another 
sue  in  his  personal  character.^  In  an  action  for  malicious  prose- 
cution the  complaint  contained  three  counts:  the  first  for  the 
malicious  prosecution  of  the  plaintiff  himself ;  the  second  for 
the  same  wrong  done  to  his  wife,  she  having  been  imprisoned ; 
and  the  third  for  a  like  tort  to  his  minor  children.  The  only 
legal  ground  for  recovery  on  the  second  and  third  of  these  counts 
was  declared  to  be  the  loss  of  the  wife's  society  in  the  one 
case,  and  of  the  children's  services  in  the  other;  as  these  inju- 
ries were  personal  to  the  plaintiff,  they  could  be  joined  with  the 
cause  of  action  alleged  in  the  first  count  for  the  tort  directly  to 
himself.^ 

§  397.  *  503.  Some  Unclassified  Cases.  Author's  Criticism.  The 
cases  which  follow  do  not  admit  of  any  classification,  and  several 
of  them  are  of  doubtful  authority,  even  if  not  palpably  erro- 
neous. A  cause  of  action  for  a  limited  divorce  on  the  ground 
of  cruelty,  desertion,  and  the  like,  cannot  be  united  with  one  for 
an  absolute  divorce  on  account  of  adultery,  or  of  any  other 
matter  prescribed  by  statute.  The  two  demands  are  simply  in- 
compatible.*    It  was  decided  by  one  judge  in  New  York  that  a 

1  Warth  V.  Radde,    18  Abb.   Pr.  396.  Co.  v.  Will's  Adm'r  (1002),  —  Ky.  — ,  66 

See,  however,  Logau  o.  Wallis,  76  N.  C.  S.  W.  628 ;  Lewis  Adm'r  v.  Taylor  Coal 

416.  Co.  (1902),  112  Ky.  84.5,  66  S.   W.    1044; 

-  Lucas  V.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  21  Barb.  Page  v.  Citizens  Banking  Co.  (1900),  111 

245.     But  see  Armstrong  v.  Hall,  17  How.  Ga.  73,  36  S.  E.  418.    "  Cau.ses  of  action  for 

I'r.  76.    ])er  C.   L.  Allen   J.,   at   Special  malicious  prosecution,  malicious  arrest,  and 

Term,  —  a   decision    in   direct  opposition  false  imprisonment,  all  sounding  in  tort, 

to  the  rule  stated  in  the  text ;  also,  Hart  may  be  joined  in  the  same  action  when 

V.    Metrop.    El.    Ry.    Co  ,    15    Daly,   391.  the  plaintiff  and  defendants  in  each  cause 

See  also  Quellen  v.  Arnold.  12  Nev.  234;  of  action  thus  joined  are  identical.     Civil 

Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chester,  57  Ind.  Code,  §  4944."     See  also  Sams  v.  Derrick 

299.  (1898),  103  Ga.  678,  30  S.  E.  668.] 

^  Rogers  v.  Smith,  17  Ind.  323.     QA  *  Henry  v.   Henry,    17    Abb.  Pr.  411  ; 

cause   of   action   for   pain   and    suffering  Mcintosh  y.  Mcintosh,  12  How.  Pr.  289; 

cannot  he  joined  with  the  statutory  cause  Zorn   v.  Zorn,  38  Hun,  67;  but  see  contra. 

;if  nciiiin    for  death.     See  Louisville  Ry.  Grant  v.  Grant    (Minn.    1893),   54  X     W. 


526 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


demand  to  recover  possession  of  a  chattel  cannot  be  united  with 
a  claim  of  damages  for  the  taking,  detaining,  and  converting  the 
same.  But  as  the  codes  expressly  authorize  the  joinder  of  claims 
for  the  possession  of  chattels,  and  of  damages  for  the  withholding 
the  same,  this  decision  can  hardly  be  sustained.  "  Withholding  " 
clearly  includes  "  detaining,''  and,  as  it  is  not  a  technical  term,  it 
was  doubtless  intended  to  embrace  "  taking  "  aud  "  conversion  " 
as  well.^  A  cause  of  action  to  recover  the  possession  of  a  certain 
parcel  of  land  cannot,  it  has  been  said,  be  united  with  a  demand 
of  damages  caused  by  the  defendant's  trespasses  upon  other  lands 
of  the  plaintiff.2  It  has  also  been  held  that  a  claim  to  recover 
possession  of  land,  and  a  demand  of  damages  for  the  defendant's 
tortious  entry  upon  the  same  land,  cannot  be  joined,  because  they 
are  entirely  inconsistent.^ 

§  398.  *  504:.  Grouping  of  Actions  for  Injuries  to  the  Person 
in  some  States.  Illustrations.  In  one  or  two  of  the  States, 
actions  for  injuries  to  the  person  constitute  a  separate  class, 
and  are  not  grouped  together  with  those  for  injuries  to  property. 
Thus  in  California,  an  "action  to  recover  damages  for  alleged 
injuries  to  the  person  and  property  of  the  plaintiff,  and  for  his 
false  imprisonment,  and  for  forcibly  ejecting  him  from  a  house 


1059.  It  would  be  difficult  to  determine 
in  what  class  the  action  for  either  kind  of 
divorce  fall.s.  One  judge  in  Mcintosh  v. 
Mcintosh  suggested  that  limited  divorce 
was  a  claim  for  injury  to  the  person.  It 
seems  to  be  casus  omissus.  See  also  Has- 
kell V.  Haskell,  .54  Cal.  262  (in  an  action 
for  divorce,  adultery  and  habitual  intem- 
perance are  distinct  causes) ;  Uhl  i'.  Uhl, 
.52  id.  250  (a  cause  of  action  to  annul  a 
marriage  by  reason  of  a  former  marriage 
of  the  plaintiff  to  one  still  alive  cannot  be 
joined  with  a  cause  of  action  to  (juiet 
plaintiff's  title  to  her  separate  property,  in 
which  defendant  falsely  claims  an  inter- 
est. Hut  in  Prouty  i:  Prouty,  4  Wash.  174, 
a  complaint  in  an  action  for  divorce  and 
alimony,  which  asked  tliat  alleged  fraud- 
ulent conveyances  by  the  husband  of  all 
his  property  be  set  aside,  was  held  to  pre- 
sent no  misjoinder.  The  same  complaint 
cannot  unite  causes  of  action  for  divorce, 
and  to  obtain  the  annulment  of  a  separa- 
tion deed :  fJalusha  v.  Galusha  (N.  Y. 
Apj),  May,  1893),  33  N.  E.  1062). 


1  Maxwell  v.  Farnam,  7  How.  Pr.  236, 
per  Harris  J.,  at  Special  Term. 

-  Hulce  V.  Thompson,  9  How.  Pr.  113. 
But  cannot  both  causes  of  action  be  re- 
ferred to  the  single  class  of  "  injuries  to 
property  "  ?  The  recovery  of  possession 
is  merely  the  relief,  and  not  the  cause  of 
action. 

3  Budd  V.  Bingham,  18  Barb.  494,  per 
Brown  J.  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  this 
inconsistency.  This  and  some  similar  de- 
cisions are  cited,  not  because  they  have 
any  authority  or  any  value,  but  to  com- 
plete the  statement  of  the  judicial  iuter- 
])retation  put  upon  this  provision  of  the 
statute.  For  further  illustrations,  see 
Buckmaster  r.  Kelley,  15  Fla.  180;  Mat- 
tair  V.  Payne,  15  id.  682:  Williams  r. 
Lowe,  4  Neb.  382;  Paxton  >:  Wood,  77 
N.  C.  11;  Suber  1-.  Allen,  13  S.  C.  317  ; 
Stevens  v.  Chance,  47  Iowa,  602 ;  Schnit- 
zer  V.  Cohen,  7  Hun,  665 ;  French  v. 
Salter,  17  id.  546;  Dyer  v.  Barstow,  5 
Cal.  652;  Brown  v.  Rice,  51  id.  89. 


GENERAL    PKIXCIPLKS    OP   PLEADING.  527 

and  lot  in  his  possession,  and  detaining  the  possession  thereof 
from  liini,"  was  held  to  be  an  improper  union,  as  it  embraced 
causes  belonging  to  two  if  not  three  of  the  classes  specified  in 
the  code ;  ^  and  in  another  case,  the  joining  of  a  claim  to  recover 
possession  of  land,  damages  for  its  detention,  damages  for  the 
forcible  expulsion  of  the  plaintiff  from  the  premises,  and  the 
value  of  the  im})roveraents  made  by  him,  was  pronounced  equally 
an  error  for  the  same  reason. ^ 

§  399.  *  505.  Holding  of  Wisconsin  Court  in  Action  to  quiet 
Title.  An  action  to  quiet  the  title  to  three  different  tracts  of 
land  which  had  belonged  originally  to  different  owners,  and 
which  the  plaintiff  held  under  three  distinct  tax  deeds  executed 
at  separate  times,  was  held  in  Wisconsin  to  violate  the  require- 
ments of  the  code.  The  proceeding  was  likened  by  the  court  to 
the  foreclosure  in  one  action  of  three  different  mortgages  given 
by  three  different  owners  upon  three  separate  parcels  of  land.^ 

SECTION   THIRD. 

THE   GENERAL  PRINCIPLES   OF   PLEADING. 

§  400.  *506.  The  Three  Types  of  Pleading  Prior  to  the  Re- 
formed System.  Pleading  by  Allegation.  In  order  that  the  sys- 
tem of  pleading  introduced  by  the  reformed  procedure  may  be 
accurately  understood,  I  shall  briefly  describe  the  essential 
principles  and  doctrines  of  those  which  prevailed  in  different 
courts  at  the  time  of  its  adoption,  and  the  comparison  which  can 
thus  be  made  will  be  of  great  assistance  in  arriving  at  correct 
results.  The  three  types  of  pleading  then  known  either  in 
England  or  in  this  country  were  the  common  law,  the  equity, 
and  that  which  in  the  absence  of  a  distinctive  name  I  shall  call 
"pleading  by  allegation."  The  last-mentioned  method  was  used 
in  the  courts  of  admiralty,  of  probate  and  divorce,  the  ecclesi- 
astical courts,  and  wherever  the  law  as  administered  was  based 
directly  upon  the  doctrines  and  modes  of  the  Roman  Civil  Law. 
Its  peculiar  features  consisted  (1)  in  breaking  up  an  entire 
pleading   into  a  number   of  separate   paragraphs,  —  technically 

1  McCarty   l.  Premont,    23   Cal.   196,  Bowles  v.  Sacramento  Turnp.  Co.,  5  Cal. 
197.    [See  late  case  of  Lamb  v.  Harbaugh  224  ;  Bigelow  v.  Gove,  7  Cal.  133. 
(1895),  105  Cal.  680,  39  Pac.  56.]  3  Turner  i'.  Duchman,  23  Wis.  500. 

2  Mayo  V.  Madden,  4  Cal.  27.    And  see 


523  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

"allegations,"  —  each  of  which  should  properly  contain  a  single 
important  circumstance  or  principal  fact  going  to  make  out  the 
cause  of  action ;  and  (2)  the  statement  in  each  allegation  of  all 
the  minute  and  subordinate  facts  which  taken  together  compose, 
and  are  evidence  of,  the  main  circumstance  or  fact  relied  upon 
by  the  litigant  party  to  sustain  his  contention.  The  pleading  as 
a  w^hole,  therefore,  comprised  not  only  averments  of  the  sub- 
stantial facts,  the  important  conclusions  of  fact  which  must  be 
established  by  the  proofs,  —  those  facts  which  in  the  common- 
law  system  are  called  "issuable"  or  "material,"  —  but  also  a 
narrative  of  all  the  probative  facts,  of  all  the  evidence  from 
which  the  existence  of  the  "issuable"  facts  must  be  inferred. 
A  libel  constructed  upon  this  theory  disclosed  the  whole  case  of 
the  complaining  party;  if  properly  framed,  it  set  forth  in  a  con- 
tinuous and  narrative  form  a  complete  account  of  the  transaction, 
describing  the  situation  of  the  parties  at  its  commencement,  all 
the  various  incidents  which  happened  in  its  progress,  its  final 
conclusion,  and  the  results  produced  upon  each,  and  prayed  for 
such  relief  as  the  law  affords  in  the  given  case.  The  codes  of 
several  States  have  plainly  intended  to  borrow  one  feature  of 
this  system ;  that  is,  the  separation  of  the  pleading  into  a  number 
of  distinct  paragraphs  continuously  numbered,  and  each  com- 
prising the  statement  of  a  single  material  or  issuable  fact.  The 
second  feature,  namel}',  the  narrative  of  probative  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances in  the  manner  above  described,  violates  the  funda- 
mental and  essential  principle  of  the  reformed  procedure. 

§  401.  *  507.  The  Equity  System  of  Pleading.  The  equity 
method  of  pleading,  when  freed  from  all  the  superfluous  addi- 
tions which  had  become  incorporated  with  it  in  practice,  and 
when  thus  reduced  to  its  mere  essential  elements,  consisted  in 
a  statement  of  all  tlie  facts  indicating  the  relief  to  which  the 
complainant  is  entitled,  and  in  this  original  aspect  it  did  not 
differ  in  principle  from  that  prescribed  by  the  codes.  I  pur- 
posely make  use  of  the  expression  "facts  indicating  the  relief  to 
which  the  complainant  is  entitled,"  rather  than  the  ordinary 
phrase  "facts  constituting  the  complainant's  cause  of  action," 
for  a  reason  which  will  be  fully  explained  in  the  sequel.  '  I  now 
call  attention  to  the  form  of  expression,  for  it  is  important,  and 
will  assist  in  removing  certain  difficulties  which  have  been  sug- 
gested by  some  of  the  judges  in  their  exposition  of  the  codes. 


PRINCIPLES    OF    EQUITY   PLEADING.  529 

Practically,  a  bill  in  equity,  prior  to  any  modern  reforms,  had 
been  changed  from  the  original  simplicity  as  above  described, 
and  had  come  to  consist  of  three  distinct  parts  or  divisions,  the 
narrative,  the  charging,  and  the  interrogative.  The  first  of 
these  contained  a  statement  of  the  complainant's  case  for  relief; 
the  second  anticipated  and  rebutted  the  defendant's  supposed 
positions;  while  the  last  was  used  to  probe  the  defendant's  con- 
science, and  to  extract  from  him  admissions  under  oath  in  his 
answer  concerning  matters  within  his  own  knowledge  which  the 
existing  rules  of  evidence  did  not  permit  to  be  proved  by  the 
j)arties  themselves  as  ordinary  witnesses.  The  result  of  these 
modifications  was  an  almost  entire  departure  from  the  simple 
conception  of  equity  pleading.  The  bill  and  answer  were  gen- 
erally made  to  include  the  evidence  by  which  either  party  main- 
tained his  own  contention,  or  defeated  that  of  his  adversary,  and 
also  legal  conclusions  and  arguments  which  more  appropriately 
belonged  to  the  briefs  of  counsel  and  the  discussions  at  the 
hearing.  All  this,  I  say,  although  very  common  and  perhaps 
universal  in  the  actual  practice  before  any  reforms  through 
legislation  or  rules  of  court,  was  really  unnecessary,  and  formed 
no  essential  part  of  the  theory  of  equity  pleading.  The  onlj^ 
indispensable  portion  of  a  bill  was  the  narrative.  Except  for  the 
purpose  of  eliciting  evidence  from  the  defendant,  there  was  no 
more  reason  why  this  should  contain  mere  evidence  of  the  facts 
that  were  the  foundation  of  the  complainant's  demand  for  relief, 
as  contradistinguished  from  those  facts  themselves,  than  there 
was  for  the  same  kind  of  probative  matter  to  be  inserted  in  a 
declaration  at  law.  The  bill  in  equity,  as  has  been  already  said, 
should  comprise  a  statement  of  all  the  facts  which  show  the 
relief  to  which  the  complainant  is  entitled,  which  indicate  the 
nature  and  extent  of  that  relief  whether  total  or  partial,  and 
the  modifications  or  exceptions  to  be  made  in  it;  wliile  the 
answer  should  perform  the  same  office  for  the  defendant.  By 
the  application  of  this  doctrine,  a  bill  in  equity  was  generally 
quite  different  in  its  contents  from  a  declaration  at  law;  it  was 
ordinarily  more  minute  in  its  averments,  and  contained  state- 
ments of  matter  which  in  a  legal  action  would  more  naturally 
and  properly  belong  to  the  evidence  rather  than  to  the  alle- 
gations of  issuable  facts.  The  reason  for  this  distinction  lay 
entirely  in  the  difference  between   equitable  and  legal  primary 

34 


530  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

rights  and  between  equitable  and  legal  remedies,  especially  in 
the  latter.  A  judgment  at  law  was  always  a  single  award  of 
relief;  the  recovery  either  of  a  specific  tract  of  land,  or  of  a 
specific  chattel,  or  of  a  definite  sum  of  money,  and  such  judg- 
ment, whatever  might  be  its  amount,  was  either  wholly  rendered 
for  the  plaintiff,  or  wholly  denied.  Furthermore,  the  right  to 
recover  a  legal  judgment  always  depended  uj)on  the  existence  of 
a  comparatively  few  important  facts,  —  "  issuable  "  or  "  material  " 
facts,  —  and  the  very  definition  of  an  issuable  fact  is,  one  which, 
if  denied  and  not  proved,  would  prevent  the  plaintiff  from  re- 
covering. In  equit}^  the  primary  rights  and  remedies  of  the 
complainant  were  often  very  different  from  those  which  existed 
at  law.  His  remedy  was  not  necessarily  a  single  recovery  of 
some  specific  form  of  relief;  it  might  vary  in  its  nature  and 
extent  through  a  wide  range;  it  might  be  total  or  partial,  it 
might  be  absolute  or  conditional.  The  defence,  on  the  other 
hand,  might  be  total  or  partial;  and  it  might  even  consist  of 
modifications  made  in  the  form  of  relief  demanded  by  the  com- 
plainant, or  in  supplemental  provisions  added  thereto  in  order 
to  meet  some  future  contingency.  In  short,  it  was  impossible 
to  say  that  the  complainant's  right  to  recover  always  depended 
upon  the  existence  of  certain  "  issuable  "  facts,  the  failure  to 
establish  either  one  or  even  all  of  which  would  necessarily  defeat 
his  contention.  It  is  true  that  in  some  cases  the  equitable 
remedy  sought  by  the  complainant  might  be  of  such  a  nature 
that  it  would  follow  from  the  proof  of  such  issuable  facts  as 
completely  and  directly  as  the  plaintiff's  right  to  a  common-law 
judgment  does  in  a  legal  action.  While  this  was  possible  in 
some  instances,  in  the  great  majority  of  equitable  actions  the 
relief  was  more  complicated ;  the  primary  rights  were  more  com- 
prehensive ;  and  the  decree  as  a  whole  was  shaped,  modified,  and 
adapted  to  various  circumstances  and  minor  facts  upon  which 
individually  the  cause  of  action  or  the  defence  did  not  entirely 
rest,  but  all  of  which  in  combination  entered  into  the  resulting 
remedial  right  belonging  to  the  litigant  parties.  Now,  on  the 
theory  of  equity  pleading,  all  these  facts  should  be  averred  by 
the  complainant  or  tlie  defendant  as  the  case  might  be;  and 
while  it  can  be  properly  said  that  they  all  indicate  and  affect 
the  relief  to  be  awarded  by  the  court,  they  cannot  all  be  said  "  to 
constitute  the  cause  of  action  "  or  tlie  defence  in  the  same  sense 


PRINCIPLES    OF   COMMOX-LAW    PLEADING.  531 

in  which  the  "issuable "'  or  "material "'  facts  constitute  the  cause 
of  action  or  the  defence  in  a  suit  at  law.  I  repeat  the  statement 
already  made,  for  it  is  an  important  one,  that  this  descri[)tion 
does  not  necessarily  apply  to  every  case  of  equitable  relief. 
Under  certain  circumstances,  and  in  some  particular  instances, 
the  remedy  and  the  right  to  its  recovery  are  single  and  depend 
upon  the  existence  of  a  few  well-defined  and  controlling  facts; 
such  facts  are  then  "  material "  or  "  issuable "  in  the  strictest 
sense  of  those  terms,  and  they  are  all  that  it  is  requisite  to  allege 
in  the  pleading.  In  most  instances,  however,  an  equity  pleading 
necessarily  contained  allegations  of  facts  which  were  not  "  issu- 
able "  in  the  technical  meaning  of  that  word,  but  which  m  ere 
nevertheless  the  basis  of  the  relief  demanded  and  obtained.  I 
have  dwelt  thus  carefully  upon  the  foregoing  analysis,  because  it 
is  the  element  which  enters  into  and  decides  a  most  important 
question  to  be  considered  in  the  sequel;  namely,  whether  the 
proper  modes  of  pleading  in  legal  and  in  equitable  actions  under 
the  reformed  procedure  can  be  referred  to  and  derived  from  the 
single  fundamental  principle  announced  by  all  the  codes.  An- 
other essential  feature  belonged  to  the  equity  method  of  pleading, 
and  distinguished  it  from  that  which  prevailed  in  courts  of  law. 
The  facts  upon  which  the  contentions  of  the  litigant  parties 
wholly  or  partially  depended  were  averred  as  they  actually  hap- 
pened or  existed,  and  not  the  legal  effect  or  aspect  of  those  facts. 
This  distinction  was  a  vital  one,  as  will  be  fully  pointed  out  in 
the  succeeding  paragraphs,  and  its  relations  with  the  reformed 
theory  of  pleading  are  direct  and  intimate. 

§  402.  *  508.  The  Common-La-w  System  of  Pleading.  Intro- 
ductory. I  come  finally  to  the  common-law  system  of  j^leading. 
It  has  frequently  been  said,  even  by  able  judges,  that  under  this 
method  the  material,  issuable  facts  constituting  the  cause  of 
action,  and  they  alone,  were  to  be  alleged ;  and  that,  as  exactly 
the  same  principle  lies  at  the  basis  of  the  new  system,  the  latter 
has  made  no  substantial  change,  but  has  only  removed  the  un- 
necessary and  troublesome  incidents  which  had  been  gathered 
around  the  original  simple  common-law  conception.  In  support 
of  this  view,  the  general  language  of  Chitty  and  other  text- 
writers  is  quoted  as  conclusive.  There  is  just  enough  truth  in 
this  description  of  the  common-law  pleading  to  make  it  plausible ; 
but  enough  of  error  to  render  it,   wlien  adopted  as  a  means  of 


532  CIVIL    KEMKWES. 

interpreting  the  codes,  extremel}'  misleading.  In  fact,  it  is  im- 
possible to  describe  the  common-law  pleading  as  a  unit:  it  was 
o-overned  by  no  universal  principles ;  the  modes  which  prevailed 
in  certain  actions  were  radically  unlike  those  that  were  employed 
in  othei-s.  I  shall  attempt  in  a  very  brief  manner  to  point  out  all 
its  essential  features,  and  to  explain  its  general  character. 

§  403.  *  509.  Technicality  of  the  System.  In  the  lirst  place, 
certain  elements  were  firmly  incorporated  into  the  system  which 
were  not  really  fandamental  and  essential,  although  often  re- 
garded and  spoken  of  as  its  peculiarly  characteristic  requisites. 
1  refer  to  the  extreme  nicety,  precision,  and  accuracy  which  were 
demanded  by  the  courts  in  the  framing  of  allegations,  in  averring 
either  the  facts  from  which  the  primary  rights  of  the  parties 
arose,  or  those  which  constituted  the  breach  of  such  rights,  in 
the  use  of  technical  phrases  and  formulas,  in  the  certainty  of 
statement  produced  by  negativing  almost  all  possible  conclusions 
different  from  that  affirmed  by  the  pleader,  in  the  numerous 
repetitions  of  the  same  averment,  and  finally  in  the  invention 
and  employment  of  a  language  and  mode  of  expression  utterly 
unlike  the  ordinary  spoken  or  written  English,  and  meaningless 
to  any  person  but  a  trained  expert.  This  requirement  of  accu- 
racy and  precision  was  in  former  times  pushed  to  an  absurd  and 
most  unjust  extreme ;  as  for  example,  the  use  of  the  past  tense 
"had,"  instead  of  the  present  "have,"  in  a  material  allegation, 
would  be  fatal  to  the  plaintiff's  recovery.  If  it  be  said  that 
these  extreme  niceties  and  absurd  technicalities  were  things  of 
the  past,  abandoned  by  the  law  courts  in  modern  times,  a  perusal 
of  some  standard  reports  —  for  instance,  those  of  Meeson  and 
"Welsln'  —  will  show  on  what  grounds  of  the  merest  form  the 
rights  of  litigant  parties  have  been  determined,  even  within  the 
present  generation.  Still,  I  do  not  regard  this  precision,  accu- 
racy, and  general  technicalit}-,  which  actually  distinguished  the 
common-law  system  of  pleading,  as  something  essential  to  its 
existence,  as  its  absolutely  necessary  elements.  It  might  have 
retained  all  its  fundamental  principles  in  respect  to  the  nature  of 
the  allegations  used  and  the  kinds  of  facts  averred,  and  at  the 
same  time  have  employed  the  familiar  language  of  common  nar- 
rative in  making  all  these  averments.  The  essential  elements 
of  the  system  would  then  be  presented  in  their  naked  sini[)licity. 
The  actual  technicalities  which  have  been  thus  mentioned,  and 


PKINGU'LKS    OF    COMMON- LAW    PLEADING.  533 

which  were  the  boast  of  the  skilful  special  pleader,  were  only  a 
disgrace  to  the  administration  of  justice.  However  pleasant 
they  might  have  been  as  exercises  in  logic,  they  were  productive 
of  untold  injustice  to  suitors.  It  is  simpl}^  amazing  that  they 
could  have  been  retained  so  long  and  adhered  to  so  tenaciously, 
and  even  lauded  with  extravagant  eulogium,  among  peoples  like 
tiie  English  and  the  American.  Tliat  they  were  entirely  abro- 
gated by  all  the  codes  of  procedure  is  plain ;  and  after  a  series  of 
improvements,  commencing  in  1834,  when  the  celebrated  "  Rules 
of  Hilary  Term  "  were  adopted,  the  British  Parliament  has  swept 
them  out  of  the  English  law,  and  has  introduced  the  substance 
of  the  American  system. 

§  404.  *  510.  Essential  Principles  and  Elements  of  Common-La-w 
Pleading.  Passing  from  these  technical  incidents,  I  proceed  to 
inquire  what  were  the  real  and  essential  principles  and  elements 
of  the  common-law  pleading.  How  far  was  it  true  that  the 
material  facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action,  and  these  alone, 
were  to  be  alleged  ?  This  statement  was  partly  correct,  —  that 
is,  correct  under  most  important  limitations  and  reservations,  in 
certain  of  the  forms  of  action ;  while  in  the  other  of  these  forms 
of  action  it  was  not  true  in, the  slightest  extent;  in  fact,  it  was 
diametrically  opposed  to  the  truth.  1  will  recapitulate  the 
important  actions,  and  refer  them  to  their  proper  classes.  In 
ejectment  there  can  be  no  pretence  that  any  attempt  was  made 
to  allege  the  actual  facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action;  the 
declaration  and  accompanying  proceedings  were  a  mass  of  fictions 
which  had  become  ridiculous,  whatever  may  have  been  their 
original  usefulness,  and  the  answer  was  the  general  issue;  the 
record  thus  threw  no  light  upon  the  real  issues  to  be  tried  by  the 
jury.  In  trover,  the  averments  of  the  declaration  were  that 
the  plaintiff  was  possessed,  as  his  own  property,  of  certain  speci- 
fied chattels.;  that  he  lost  them;  and  that  tlie  defendant  found 
them,  and  converted  them  to  his  own  use.  Throwing  out  of 
view  the  abused  fictions  of  a  loss  and  a  finding,  there  was  here 
the  statement  of  two  facts,  namel}',  the  description  of  the  chattels 
so  as  to  identify  them,  and  the  plaintiff's  property  in  them ;  but 
the  most  important  allegation  of  all,  the  one  upon  which  in  the 
vast  majority  of  cases  the  whole  controversy  would  turn,  was 
a  pure  conclusion  of  law.  The  statement  that  defendant  had 
converted  the  same  to  his  own  use  did  not  indicate  anv  fact  to 


534  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

be  considered  and  decided  by  the  jury  in  reaching  their  verdict. 
In  the  action  of  debt,  also,  the  important  allegation  was  a  mere 
conclusion  of  law,  namely,  that  the  defendant  was  indebted  to 
the  plaintiff  in  a  certain  sum  whereupon  an  action  had  accrued ; 
and  although  the  declaration  contained  a  further  statement  of 
the  consideration  or  cause  of  the  indebtedness,  yet  as  a  whole  it 
did  not  pretend  to  set  forth  the  material  facts  constituting  the 
cause  of  action.  In  assumpsit,  the  pleadings  were  of  two  very 
different  species,  in  all  cases  of  implied  promises,  and  especially 
when  the  common  counts  were  resorted  to,  the  averments  were 
purely  fictitious,  as  much  so  as  in  ejectment;  there  was  not  the 
slightest  approach  towards  a  statement  of  the  facts  constituting 
a  cause  of  action  as  they  actually  existed.  When  the  suit  was 
brought  upon  an  express  contract,  and  the  declaration  was  in  the 
form  of  a  special  assumpsit,  there  was  a  greater  appearance  of 
alleging  facts ;  but  even  here  the  facts  were  stated  in  their  sup- 
posed legal  aspect  and  effect,  as  legal  conclusions,  and  not  simply 
as  they  occurred.  There  are  left  to  be  considered  the  actions 
of  covenant,  detinue,  trespass,  and  case.  In  each  one  of  these, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  action,  the  facts  constituting  the 
grounds  for  a  recovery  were  more  nearly  stated,  although  in  some 
of  them  the  averments  were  required  to  be  made  in  an  exceed- 
ingly precise  and  technical  manner.  The  declaration  in  a  special 
action  on  the  case  necessarily  comprised  a  narrative  of  the  actual 
facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action ;  but  as  has  been  said,  this 
narrative  was  thrown  into  a  very  arbitrary,  technical,  and  un- 
natural shape.  It  therefore  bore  some  resemblance  in  substance 
to  a  complaint  or  a  petition,  when  properly  framed  according  to 
the  reformed  theory ;  and  some  judges  have  even  said  that  every 
such  complaint  or  petition  is  a  declaration  in  a  special  action  on 
the  case.  The  assertion  so  often  made  by  the  older  text-writei-s, 
and  repeated  by  modern  judges,  that  the  common-law  system  of 
pleading  demanded  allegations  of  the  facts  constituting  the  cause 
of  action  or  the  defence,  is  thus,  as  a  general  proposition,  mani- 
festly incorrect,  for  in  many  forms  of  action  there  was  no  pretence 
of  any  such  averments. 

§  405.  *511.  Same  Subject.  Hut  we  must  go  a  Step  farther 
in  order  to  oV)tain  an  accurate  notion  of  the  common-law  theory. 
In  all  the  instances  where  fictions  were  discarded,  and  where  the 
important  allegations  were  not  mere  naked  conclusions  of  law, 


PRINCIPLES    OF   COMMON-LAW    PLEADING.  535 

but  where,  on  the  contrary,  the  pUiintiff  assumed  to  state  the 
"issuable  "  facts  constituting  his  cause  of  action,  lie  did  not  nar- 
rate the  exact  transaction  between  himself  and  the  defendant 
from  which  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  respective  parties  arose ; 
he  stated  only  2v7tat  he  conceived  to  he  the  leyal  effect  of  these  facts. 
The  "  issuable  "  facts,  in  the  contemplation  of  the  common-law 
system,  were  not  the  actual  controlling  facts  as  they  really 
occurred,  and  as  they  would  be  proved  by  the  evidence,  from 
which  the  law  derived  the  right  of  recovery:  they  were  the  legal 
aspect  of  those  facts,  —  not  strictly  the  bare  conclusions  of  law 
themselves  derived  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  but  rather 
combinations  of  fact  and  law,  or  the  facts  with  a  legal  coloring, 
and  clothed  with  a  legal  character.  The  result  was,  that  the 
"issuable"  facts  as  averred  in  the  pleading  were  often  purely 
fictitious;  that  is,  no  such  events  or  occurrences  as  alleged  ever 
took  place,  but  they  were  represented  as  having  taken  place  in 
the  manner  conceived  of  by  the  law.  The  pleader  of  course  set 
forth  his  ovai  view  of  this  legal  effect  under  the  peril  of  a  pos- 
sible error  in  his  application  of  the  law  to  his  case ;  if  a  mistake 
was  made  in  properly  conceiving  of  this  legal  effect, — or,  in 
other  words,  if  the  facts  established  by  the  evidence  did  not 
correspond  with  his  opinion  as  to  their  legal  aspect  stated  in  the 
declaration,  —  the  plaintiff's  suit  would  entirely  fail.^ 

1  la  corroboration  of  these  conclusions,  put  his  case  as  wisely  as  he  might  have 
I  quote  a  paragraph  from  a  series  of  ex-  done.  In  practice,  dangers  of  this  l^iud 
ceedingly  able  articles  upon  the  English  are  mitigated,  though  by  no  means  in- 
Judicature  Bill,  which  appeared  in  the  variably  escaped,  by  inserting  a  multi- 
"  Saturday  Review"  during  the  year  tude  of  counts,  all  giving  slightly  different 
1873,  and  were  correctly  attributed  to  one  versions  of  the  same  transaction,  in  order 
of  the  foremost  English  barristers  as  their  that  on  one  or  other  of  them  the  plaintiff 
author.  While  discussing  the  pleading  may  be  found  to  have  stated  correctly  tlie 
which  ought  to  be  introduced,  he  describes  legal  effect  of  the  facts.  The  jjerinission 
the  common-law  methods  by  way  of  con-  to  do  this  was  in  fact  a  recognition  of  tlic 
trast,  and,  among  others,  the  following  plaintiff's  inherent  right  to  ask  alterna- 
as  one  of  its  features:  "The  first  .striking  tive  relief;  but  it  was  clogged  by  the  ab- 
difference  is  this,  that,  on  the  common-  surd  condition  that  he  could  only  do  so 
law  plan,  a  plaintiff  is  required  to  state,  by  resorting  to  the  clumsy  fiction  of  pre- 
not  the  facts,  but  what  he  considers  to  be  tending  to  have  a  number  of  independent 
the  legal  effect  of  the  facts.  If  his  ad-  grounds  of  action,  when  he  knew  that  he 
visers  take  a  wrong  view  of  a  doubtful  had  only  one,  but  did  not  know  exactly 
point,  and  make  him  declare,  say,  for  what  the  court  might  consider  the  legal 
goods  sold  and  delivered  when  the  real  effect  of  his  facts  to  be.  This  was  not 
facts,  as  proved,  only  make  a  case  of  only  unscientific  and  irrational,  but,  in 
goods  bargained  and  sold,  the  unlucky  some  cases,  it  has  led  to  enormou.s  ex- 
plaintiff  is  cast,  not  because  he  is  not  en-  pense  by  compelling  a  plaintiff  to  declare 
titled  to  recover,  but  because  he  has  not  on,  and  a  defendant  to  plead  to,  scores  ■  f 


536 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§  406.  *  512.  History  of  the  Action  of  Assumpsit.  The  extent 
of  these  fictitious  allegations  in  pleading,  and  their  influence 
upon  the  form  and  growth  of  legal  doctrines  at  large,  are  ex- 
hibited in  a  remarkable  manner  by  the  history  of  the  action  of 
assumpsit,  and  its  effect  in  originating  and  developing  the  doc- 
trine of  implied  promises  and  contracts.  At  an  early  day,  the 
action  of  debt  was  the  only  one  by  which  to  recover  for  the 
breach  of  an  unsealed  contract;  but  the  defendant  was  permitted 
to  "wage  his  law,"  and  by  that  means  to  greatly  embarrass,  if 
not  to  defeat,  the  plaintiff's  recovery.  To  obviate  this  difficulty, 
the  action  of  assumpsit  was  at  length  invented.  The  gist  of  this 
action  was  the  defendant's  promise;  the  distinctive  averment  of 
the  declaration  was  the  promise,  of  course  express  in  form,  and 
so  indispensable  was  it,  that,  if  the  allegation  was  omitted,  judg- 
ment would  be  arrested,  or  reversed  on  error,  even  after  verdict 
in  the  plaintiff's  favor.     The  promise  was  stated  to  have  been 


fictitiou.sly  differing  counts,  when  there 
was  only  one  matter  in  di.spute  between 
tliem.  We  do  not  suppose  that  the 
greatest  zealot  among  special  pleaders 
would  say  that  sucli  a  queer  sclieme  as 
this  is  ])referable  to  one  under  wliich  the 
plaintiff  states  the  facts  on  which  he 
founds  his  claim,  and  asks  for  such  relief 
as  their  legal  effect  may  entitle  him  to." 
"Saturday  Review,"  April  12,  1873,  vol. 
35,  p.  472.  In  the  face  of  this  most  ac- 
curate description  of  common-law  plead- 
ing in  its  essence,  the  assertion  that  it 
requires  a  statement  of  the  actual  facts 
constituting  the  cause  of  action  is  seen  to 
be  as  fictitious  as  many  of  its  ordinary 
allegations,  —  one  of  the  fictions  which 
make  up  so  large  a  part  of  the  system 
itself. 

^Some  recent  utterances  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  Missouri  are  interesting 
in  this  connection.  In  Estes  v.  Dcsnovers 
Shoe  Co.  (1900),  155  Mo.  577,  56  S.'  \W. 
3 1 G,  the  court  said:  "The  petition,  how- 
ever, was  obnoxious  to  a  salutary  rule  of 
pleading  which  would  have  rendered  it 
lial)le  to  demurrer  if  tlie  demurrer  lia.l 
covered  that  feature.  The  defect  in  tlic 
petition  is  tliat  it  sets  out  the  contract 
sued  on  in  hcEc  verba  instead  of  pleading 
it  by  its  legal  effect.  That  form  of 
pleading  is  to  be  considered  none  the  loss 
bad  because  it  is  not  of  uncommon  jirac- 


tice  even  among  learned  lawyers.  The 
rules  of  good  pleading  require  that  the 
instrument  relied  on  should  be  pleaded  by 
its  legal  effect,  which  requirement  is  not 
for  mere  form,  but  rests  on  substantial 
reason.  The  pleading  is  addressed  to 
the  court  and  should  state  the  pleader's 
theory  of  his  case,  not  leaving  it  to  the 
court  to  construct  a  theory  as  best  it  may 
from  the  evidence  set  out,  and  not  leav- 
ing his  adversary  in  the  dark  as  to  what 
the  theory  advanced  is,  or  what  construc- 
tion the  pleader  puts  upon  his  contract. 
It  is  not  a  contest  in  which  the  comba- 
tants may  catch  as  they  can.  If  the  con- 
tract is  inartificially  drawn  so  that  its 
meaning  or  effect  is  obscure,  it  is  all  the 
more  important  that  tlie  pleader  advanc- 
ing it  should  take  the  responsibility  of 
stating  its  legal  effect,  leaving  tlie  instru- 
:uent  itself  to  be  used  as  evidence,  which 
is  its  only  office."  And  in  tlie  still  later 
ca-e  of  Keilly  v.  CuUen  (1900),  159  Mo. 
322,60  8.  \V.  126,  the  Court  said  that  a  peti- 
tion which  alleged  a  contract  in  hcec  verba 
instead  of  by  its  legal  effect  left  the  issue 
uncertain,  tliat  the  code  system  of  plead- 
ing furnished  no  authority  for  such  uncer- 
tainty, and  that  such  a  petition  would  be 
held -bad  on  demurrer  on  the  ground  that 
it  did  not  state  facts  constituting  a  cause 
of  action.] 


PRINCIPLES    OF   COMMON-LAW    PLEADING.  537 

express,  and  in  fact  no  form  of  common-law  action  provided  for 
a  recovery  upon  an  implied  promise ;  in  every  case  of  assumpsit, 
either  general  or  special,  on  the  common  counts  or  otherwise,  the 
defendant  was  represented  as  having  expressly  promised.  For  a 
considerable  period  of  time  after  the  invention  of  assumpsit, 
undoubtedly  the  contracts  enforced  by  its  means  were  all  express, 
so  that  the  averment  of  the  declaration  accorded  with  the  actual 
transaction  between  the  parties,  as  shown  by  the  evidence.  In 
the  course  of  time,  however,  cases  were  brought  before  the  courts, 
in  which  the  right  of  action  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  liability  to 
pay  on  the  other,  depended  upon  a  moral  and  equitable  duty  of 
the  defendant,  arising,  not  from  any  promise  made  by  him,  but 
from  the  acts,  circumstances,  and  relations  existing  between  him 
and  the  plaintiff.  The  courts  were  thus  placed  in  a  dilemma. 
The  obligation  of  the  defendant  and  the  right  of  the  plaintiff 
were  founded  upon  the  plainest  principles  of  equity  and  justice, 
and  to  deny  their  existence  was  impossible.  Still,  there  was  no 
action  directly  appropriate  for  their  enforcement.  None  of  the 
actions  ex  delicto  could  be  used,  since  there  was  no  tort;  debt 
was  also  out  of  the  question,  because  the  amount  claimed  was 
unliquidated  damages ;  even  assumpsit  was  not  applicable,  for 
there  was  no  promise.  In  this  emergency  the  English  judges 
were  true  to  their  traditions,  and  to  all  their  modes  of  thought. 
Instead  of  inventing  a  new  action,  and  applying  it  to  the  new 
class  of  facts  and  circumstances,  they  reversed  the  order,  and 
applied  the  facts  and  circumstances  to  the  already  existing 
actions.  They  fell  back  upon  their  invariable  resource,  the  use 
of  fictions;  but  went  farther  than  ever  before  or  since;  and, 
instead  of  inventing  a  fictitious  element  in  the  action,  they 
actually  added  a  fictitious  feature  to  the  facts  and  circumstances 
from  which  the  legal  right  and  duty  arose.  They  selected  the 
existing  action  of  assumpsit  as  the  one  to  be  employed  in  such 
classes  of  cases ;  and  since  that  action  is  based  upon  a  promise, 
and  since  the  declaration  must  invariably  allege  a  promise  to 
have  been  made,  the  early  judges,  instead  of  relaxing  this  re- 
quirement of  pleading,  actually  added  the  fictitious  feature  of 
a  promise  which  had  never  been  made  to  the  facts  which  con- 
stituted the  defendant's  liability.  In  other  words,  the  courts 
invented  the  notion  of  an  implied  promise,  in  order  that  the 
cases  of  liability  and  duty  resulting  from  certain  acts,  omissions. 


53S 


CIVIL   REMEDIKS. 


or  relations  wliere  there  had  been  no  promise,  might  be  brought 
within  the  action  of  assumpsit,  and  be  tried  and  determined  by 
its  means.  There  is  no  more  singuhir  and  instructive  incident 
than  this  in  the  whole  history  of  the  English  law,  and  it  has  a 
most  direct  and  important  connection  with  the  practical  rules  of 
pleading  under  the  reformed  procedure  of  the  codes.  We  see 
that  the  notion  of  an  implied  promise  as  the  ground  of  recovery 
in  these  cases  of  moral  and  equitable  duty  did  not  exist  prior  to 
and  independent  of  the  action  which  was  selected  as  the  proper 
instrument  for  its  enforcement;  on  the  contrar}',  the  action 
already  existed  the  distinguishing  feature  of  which  Avas  the 
allegation  of  a  promise  made  by  the  defendant,  and  a  fictitious 
or  "  implied  "  promise  was  invented  and  superadded  to  the  actual 
facts  constituting  the  defendant's  liability,  for  the  simple  pur- 
pose of  bringing  his  case  within  the  operation  of  that  action  and 
its  formal  averment.^ 


1  It  would  be  both  interesting  and  in- 
structive to  trace  this  doctrine  of  implied 
promises  tlirouu;h  the  whole  series  of 
cases,  from  its  first  suggestion  as  a  fiction 
of  pleading  until  it  became  firmly  incor- 
porated into  the  general  theory  of  con- 
tracts; l)Ut  my  limits  will  not  permit  such 
an  excursion.  I  quote,  however,  the  con- 
clusions reached  by  Judge  Metcalf  in  his 
exceedingly  able  work  upon  Contracts,  as 
an  authority  for  the  position  taken  in  the 
text.  After  an  analysis  of  numerous  early 
cases,  he  says  :  "  As  there  will  be  no  occa- 
sion to  advert  hereafter  to  the  fictions 
adopted  in  setting  forth  the  plaintiff's 
claim  in  declarations  in  the  action  of  as- 
sumpsit, it  may  not  be  amiss  to  present  a 
succinct  view  of  those  fictions,  and  of  the 
reasons  on  which  they  are  founded.  The 
usual  action  on  a  simple  contract  in  old 
times  was  debt.  The  declaration  in  that 
action  averred  in  substance  that  the  de- 
fendant owed  the  plaintiff,  and  thereupon 
an  action  had  accrued,  etc.  No  promise 
was  alleged,  for  no  promise  was  necessary. 
But  the  defendant  was  allowed  to  wage 
hifl  law.  To  avoid  this  wager  of  law,  a 
new  form  of  action  was  devised,  to  wit, 
the  action  of  assumpsit,  in  which  a  prom- 
ise of  the  defendant  was  alleged,  and  was 
indispensable.  A  dedaraticjn  which  did 
not   aver   sucli    prornise    was    insuflficient 


even  after  verdict ;  and  the  law  is  the 
same  at  this  day.  The  promise  declared 
on  is  always  taken  to  be  express.  In 
pleading,  there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  im- 
plied promise.  But  as  no  new  rule  of  evi- 
dence was  required  in  order  to  support 
the  new  action  of  assumpsit,  it  being 
necessary  only  to  prove  a  debt,  as  was 
necessary  when  the  action  was  debt,  the 
fictitious  doctrine  of  an  implied  promise 
was  introduced  ;  and  for  the  sake  of  legal 
conformity  it  was  held,  when  the  defend- 
ant's legal  liability  was  proved,  that  the 
law  presumed  that  he  had  ])romised  to  do 
what  the  law  made  him  liable  to  do.  .  .  . 
A  single  example  will  illustrate  these 
two  fictions  Qhe  author  had  described  the 
kindred  fiction  of  an  (implied)  request 
alleged  to  have  been  made.]  A  husband 
is  bound  by  law  to  support  his  wife ;  and 
if  he  wrongfully  discard  her,  any  person 
may  furnisii  support  to  her,  and  recover 
pay  therefor  of  the  husband.  In  the  ac- 
tion of  debt,  there  would  be  no  necessity 
to  allege  a  promise  in  such  a  case.  But 
the  husband  might  wage  his  law,  and  de- 
fraud the  plaintiff.  In  the  action  of  as- 
sumpsit, the  furnisliing  of  the  supplies 
must  be  allet;ed  to  have  been  by  the 
plaintiff  at  the  husband's  request,  and  a 
promise  of  the  husband  to  i)ay  miLst  a"is(i 
be  alleged.     But  proof  of  the  actual  fac>b 


PRINCIPLES    OF    COMMON-LAW    PLEADING.  539 

§  407.  *  513.  Outline  of  Proposed  Discussion  o'f  Reformed  Pro- 
cedure. Having  thus  described  the  thiee  types  of  pleading  in 
existence  when  the  reformed  procedure  was  inaugurated,  I  now 
proceed  to  examine  the  system  introduced  by  that  procedure 
itself.  In  pursuing  this  investigation,  1  shall  endeavor,  firsts  to 
ascertain  the  essential  and  general  principles  upon  which  it  is 
founded;  secondly^  to  determine  the  manner  in  which  the  plain- 
tiff should  set  forth  the  affirmative  subject-matter  of  the  action 
in  his  complaint  or  petition;  and  thirdly,  to  apply  the  results 
thus  reached  to  the  most  important  and  common  instances  of 
action  and  remedy.  Although  I  shall  aim  at  a  close  conformity 
with  the  true  spirit  and  intent  of  the  statutory  legislation,  yet 
this  intent  will  be  sought  for  in  the  decided  cases  which  have 
given  a  judicial  interpretation  to  the  codes.  It  must  be  conceded 
at  the  outset  that  there  is  an  irreconcilable  conflict  between  two 
classes  of  decisions,  not  only  in  mere  matters  of  detail,  but  in 
their  whole  course  of  reasoning,  in  the  premises  which  they 
assume,  and  in  the  conclusions  which  they  draw  therefrom. 
But  this  conflict  was,  in  by  far  the  greater  part  of  the  States, 
confined  to  the  earlier  periods  of  the  reform,  and  has  virtually 
disappeared.  There  is  a  substantial  agreement  among  the  courts 
in  respect  to  the  general  principles  which  they  have  finally 
adopted:  whatever  differences  now  exist  arise  in  the  process  of 
applying  these  fundamental  doctrines  to  particular  cases.  The 
confusion  which  actually  prevails  to  a  very  great  extent  in  sev- 
eral of  the  States  results  not  from  any  uncertainty  either  in  the 
general  principles  or  in  the  more  subordinate  rules,  but  from  an 
entire  ignorance  or  disregard  of  them  by  pleaders,  and  from  a 
neglect  to  enforce  them  by  the  judges. 

§  408.  *  514.  Two  Theories  as  to  the  Relation  between  the  New 
and  Old  Systems.  Before  entering  upon  the  matter  thus  outlined 
a  preliminary  question  suggests  itself,  upon  the  answer  to  which 
much  of   the  succeeding  discussion    must  turn.     This  question 

supports    both    these    allegations.       The  in   an   action  to  enforce  such  a  liability 

husband,   being  in  law  liable   to   pay,  is  under  the  codes,  the  plaintiff  should,  in 

held  to  have  (impliedly)   made  both  the  addition   to  the  actual  facts  from  which 

request   and   the  promise."      Metcalf  on  the  defendant's  liabilitj-  arises,  also  allege 

Contracts,  pp.  203,  204.     This  origin  of  a   promise   to  have   been  made   by    him. 

the  implied  promise,  of  its  invention  as  a  The   promise   was   simply  a  formal  inci- 

liction  in  order  to  bring  the  case  within  dent   of  the  particular  action  in  the  old 

the   operation   of  "  assumpsit  "  throws  a  system,  and  is  certainly  no  more  than  auch 

strong  light  upon  the  question,  whether,  an  incident  in  the  new. 


540  '  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

involves  the  true  relations  between  the  doctrines  and  rules  of 
pleading  enacted  by  the  codes  and  those  which  existed  previously 
as  parts  of  the  common  law  and  the  equity  jurisprudence,  and 
may  be  stated  as  follows:  Are  the  doctrines  and  rules  contained 
in  the  statute  to  be  regarded  as  the  sole  guides  in  pleading  under 
the  reformed  procedure?  or  are  the  ancient  methods  still  con- 
trolling, except  when  inconsistent  with  some  express  provisions 
of  the  later  legislation?  In  answering  this  inquiry,  the  two 
schools  of  interpretation  so  often  mentioned  again  appear,  and 
the  difference  between  them  is  the  same  as  that  already  described 
under  a  somewhat  altered  shape.  It  is  plain  that  the  position 
taken  by  the  courts,  in  answering  the  question  here  suggested, 
must  to  a  very  great  extent  influence  the  wliole  body  of  practical 
rules  which  they  adopt  in  reference  to  pleading  as  well  as  to  all 
the  other  features  of  the  civil  action.  According  to  one  theory, 
these  doctrines  and  rules  of  the  common  law  and  of  equity  still 
remain,  although  changed  in  many  particulars  by  the  reform 
legislation :  the  pleader  must  first  recur  to  them,  and  must  then 
examine  how  far  their  requirements  have  been  abrogated  or 
altered  by  the  statute;  in  a  word,  the  legislation  is  purely 
amendatory,  and  is  not  reconstructive.  According  to  the  other 
theory,  these  doctrines  and  rules  of  the  common  law  and  of 
equity  do  not  exist  at  all  as  authoritative  and  controlling,  —  that 
is,  as  controlling  because  rules  of  the  common  law  or  of  equity. 
The  general  principles  and  fundamental  requirements  of  the 
codes  have  been  substituted  in  their  place,  completely  abrogating 
them,  and  constituted  by  the  legislature  as  the  only  sources  of 
authority  to  the  bench  and  the  bar  in  shaping  the  details  of  the 
reformed  procedure.  If  any  particular  doctrine  or  rule  which 
formerly  prevailed  is  also  found  existing  to-day,  it  so  exists  not 
because  it  is  a  part  of  the  common  law  or  of  the  equity  system, 
but  because  it  is  either  expressly  or  impliedly  contained  in  and 
enacted  by  the  reformator}'  statute.  When,  therefore,  in  dis- 
cussing and  interpreting  such  a  doctrine,  a  resort  is  had  to  the 
former  methods  for  aid,  the  reference  is,  not  to  obtain  authority, 
but  to  liiid  an  analogy  or  explanation.  In  other  words,  the 
system  introduced  by  the  codes  is  regarded  as  complete  in  itself, 
entirely  displacing  the  ancient  modes.  In  several  particulars, 
however,  its  doctrines  and  rules  are  either  identical  with  or 
closely  reseiuljle  those  which  existed  before;  and,  in  tlioir  judi- 


GENERAL   PKINCII'LES    OF    PLEADING.  541 

cial  construction,  recourse  must  })C  had  by  way  of  explanation 
and  analogy  merely  to  these  original  forms,  but  no  such  recourse 
is  to  be  had  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  authority  for  any 
proposed  measure  or  practical  regulation  connected  with  the 
pleading  under  the  new  procedure. 

§  409.  *  515.  The  Theory  generally  Adopted.  During  the  ear- 
lier periods  of  the  present  system,  there  was  an  evident  disposi- 
tion on  the  part  of  some  judges  and  courts  to  adopt  the  former 
of  these  two  views,  and  to  hold  that  the  old  methods,  rules,  and 
requisites  of  the  common  law  and  of  equity,  are  still  applicable 
in  substance  when  not  inconsistent  wdth  the  provisions  cf  the 
statute;  or,  in  other  words,  that  they  had  been  supplanted  only 
so  far  as  such  inconsistency  extends. ^  The  second  theory  has, 
however,  been  generally  if  not  universally  adopted  as  the  true 
interpretation  to  be  put  upon  the  language  of  the  codes,  and  as 
the  starting-point  in  the  work  of  constructing  a  system  of  prac- 
tical rules  for  pleading.  The  proposition,  as  stated  in  the  fore- 
going paragraph,  has  been  expressly  announced  in  well-considered 
judgments ;  in  the  vast  majority  of  instances,  however,  it  has 
rather  been  assumed  and  impliedly  contained  in  the  decision  of 
the  court,  yet  none  the  less  passed  upon  and  affirmed.  It  may 
now,  I  think,  be  regarded  as  the  established  doctrine,  that  the 
code  in  each  of  the  States  is  the  only  source  of  authority  from 
which  rules  of  pleading  may  be  drawn,  that  its  methods  have 
completelj'  supplanted  those  which  preceded  it,  so  that  the  latter 
can  no  longer  be  appealed  to  as  possessing  of  themselves  any 
force  and  authority. ^ 

§  410.  *516.  Essential  Principles  of  Reformed  System  of  Plead- 
ing. Introductory.  I  shall  now  proceed  to  gather  from  the  text 
of  the  codes,  as  interpreted  by  the  most  authoritative  decisions, 
and  to  state  in  order,  the  comparatively  few  general  and  essen- 
tial principles  of  pleading  introduced  by  the  reformed  procedure, 

1  See  Howard  v.  Tiffany,  3  Sandf.  695  ;  2  School  Sec.  Trs.  v.  Odlin,  8  Ohio  St. 

Fry  V.  Bennett,  5  Sandf.  54 ;  McMaster  v.  293 ;  Jolly  v.  Terre  Haute  Drawbr.  Co.,  9 

Booth,  4   How.  Pr.  427  ;  Rochester  City  lud.  421 ;  White  i-.  Joy,  13  N.  Y.  83,  90; 

Bank  v.  Suydara,  5  How.  Pr.  216  ;  Woodeii  People  v.  Ryder,  12  N.  Y.  433,  438,  439  ; 

V.   Waffle,   6    How.  Pr.   145  ;  Buddiugtou  Ahern  v.  Collins,  39  Mo.  145,  150.     See 

V.  Davis,  6    How.  Pr.  401  ;  Houghton  v.  also  Clark  v.  Bates,  1  Dak.  42 ;  Clay  Cy. 

Townsend,   8    How.   Pr.   447 ;    Boyce   v.  v.    Simonsen,    1    id.   403,    430 ;    Scott    v. 

'Brown,    7    Barb.   80  ;     Knowles    v.   Gee,  Robards,  67  Mo.  289  ;  Dunn  v.  Remington, 

8  Barb.  300 ;  Bank  of  Genesee  v.  Patchin  9  Neb.  82  ;  lugle  v.  Jones,  43  Iowa,  286. 
Bank,  13  N.  Y.  309,  313. 


542  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

which  constitute  the  foundation  of  its  simple,  natural,  and  scien- 
tific as  well  as  practical  system.  These  essential  principles  apply 
to  certain  classes  of  answers  in  addition  to  all  complaints  or 
petitions,  although  from  the  nature  of  the  two  pleadings  the}^ 
find  their  fullest  and  highest  expression  in  the  latter.  Whenever 
the  answer  is  simply  in  the  form  of  denial,  whether  general  or 
specific,  it  is  of  course  governed  by  rules  applicable  to  it  alone. 
But  so  far  as  the  answer  contains  defences  of  new  matter,  and 
a  fortiori  so  far  as  it  contains  a  counter-claim,  or  set-off,  or  the 
l)a8is  of  any  affirmative  relief,  its  allegations  and  those  of  the 
complaint  or  petition  must  conform  to  the  same  requirements, 
must  follow  the  same  method.  The  general  and  essential  prin- 
ciples of  the  reformed  pleading  now  to  be  discussed,  illustrated, 
and  arranged  in  an  orderly  manner,  apply  therefore  alike  to  the 
plaintiffs  statement  of  his  case  for  relief,  and  to  the  defendant's 
statement  of  affirmative  matter,  either  by  way  of  defences  in  con- 
fession and  avoidance,  or  by  way  of  cross-demands  against  any 
parties  to  the  action. 

§  411.  *ol7.  Manner  of  Averring  Material  Pacts.  The  funda- 
mental and  most  important  principle  of  the  reformed  pleading, 
the  one  from  which  all  the  others  are  deduced  as  necessary 
corollaries,  is  the  following:  The  material  facts  which  constitute 
the  ground  of  relief,  or  the  defence  of  new  matter  (confession 
and  avoidance),  should  be  averred  as  they  actually  existed  or 
took  place,  and  not  the  legal  effect  or  aspect  of  those  facts,  ^  and 

1  \_Ph(uUnq  according  to  Legal  Efftct.  according  to  their  legal  effect  or  as  thev 

The  rule  that  facts  should  be  averred  as  actually   existed,   at    the    option    of    the 

they  actually  existed  or  took  place,  and  pleader,  and   when    the   former   mode  is 

not   the   legal    effect    or  aspect  of  those  adopted  the  oppo.site  party  may,  if  lie  is 

facts,  is  not  universally  sustained  by  the  ignorant  of  the  exact  facts,  demand  a  bill 

cases.     Thus  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mi.s-  of    particulars   or  move    to    make    more 

Houri,  in  several  recent  cases,   has  taken  definite  and  certain.    New  York  News  Pub- 

the  other   view,  holding  that  a  contract  lishing  Co.  v.  Steamship  Co.  (1893),  148 

should   be  alleged,  not  in  hcEC  verba,   but  N.  Y.  .39,  42  N.  E.  514.     So,  in  Kentucky, 

according  to    its   legal   effect.      Estes    v.  in  Brady    v.  Peck  (1896),  91»  Ky.  42,  34 

Desnoyers  Shoe  Co.  (1900),  15.t  Mo.  577,  S.  W.  906,  it  was  held  to  be  immaterial 

56  S.   \V.  .316;  Heilly   v.  Cullen    (1900),  whether  an  averment  of  a  covenant  be  iu 

159  Mo.  322,  60  S.   W.  126;  Anderson  v.  the  words  used  in  the  deed  or  according  to 

Gaines  (1900),  156  Mo.  604,  57  S.  W.  726.  the  force  and  effect  which  the  statute  gives 

See  note  to  §  *  511,  where  the  fir.st  two  to  the  words.     See  also,  to  the  .same  effect, 

cases  are  quoted  from  at  length.    An  older  More  i;.  Elmore  County  Irr.  Co.  ( 1 893),  3 

case,  Nichols  v.   Nichols  (1896),  134  Mo.  Idaho,  729,  35  Pac.  171  ;     Porter  i'.  Allen 

187,  35  S.  W.  577,  on  the  contrary,  quoted  (1902),  —  Idaho,  — ,  69  Pac.  105  ;  Matthie- 

the   text  with  approval.      In  New   York,  sen  v.  Arata  (1897),  32  Ore.  342,  50  Pac. 

also,  it  is  held  that  facts  may  be  alleged  1015;  Blaine  v.  Knapp  &  Co   (1897),  140 


GENEKAL    rRINCIPLES    OF    PLEADING. 


543 


not  the  mere  evidence  or  probative  matter  by  which  their  exist- 


Mo.  241,  41  S.  W.  787;  Nelson  v.  Great 
Northern  Ky.  Co.  (1903),  28  Mont.297,  72 
Pac.  642.  See  also  §§  *  74  et  seq.  See  alio 
South  Milwaukee  Co.  v.  Murphy  (1902), 
112  Wis.  614,  88  N.  W.  583,  where  it  was 
held  that  the  performance  of  conditions 
precedent  might  he  alleged  according  to 
their  legal  effect,  but  solely  by  reason  of 
the  statute. 

Exhibits.  Another  method  of  pleading 
a  written  instrument  is  to  attach  the  same 
to  the  pleading  as  an  exhibit,  but  diffc^r- 
ent  rules  prevail  in  different  jurisdictions 
as  to  the  precise  function  of  such  exhibits. 
In  some  States  the  exhibit  is  considered  a 
part  of  the  pleading  for  all  purposes,  and 
may  be  looked  to  in  considering  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  pleading  :  Elliot  v.  Roche 
(1896),  64  Minn.  482,  67  N.  W.  539; 
Realty  Revenue,  etc.  Co.  v.  Farm,  etc. 
Co.  (1900),  79  Minn.  465,  82  N.  W.  857  ; 
Union  Sewer  Pipe  Co.  v.  Olson  (1901),  82 
Minn.  187,  84  N.  W.  756  ;  Cox  v.  Henry 
(1901),  113  Ga.  259,  38  S.  K.  856;  South- 
ern Mut.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Turnley  (1896), 
100  Ga.  296,  27  S.  E.  975 ;  Walters  v. 
Eaves  (1898),  105  Ga.  584,32  S.  E.  609; 
Reed  v.  Equitable  Trust  Co.  (1902), 
115  Ga.  780,  42  S.  E.  102;  Savan- 
nah Ry.  Co.  V.  Hardin  (1900),  110  Ga. 
433,  35  S.  E.  681);  Fitch  j;.  Applegate 
(1901),  24  Wash.  25,  64  Pac.  147  ;  Haj's  v. 
Dennis  (1895),  11  Wash.  360,  39  Pac.  658 
(recommending  that  the  better  practice  is 
to  state  a  cause  of  action  in  the  body  of 
the  complaint  without  reference  to  ex- 
hibits) :  New  Idea  Pattern  Co.  v.  Whelan 
(1903),  75  Conn.  455,  53  Atl.  953;  Cran- 
mer  v.  Kohn  (1898).  11  S.  D.  245,  76 
N.  W.  937;  First  Nat.  Bank  ;•.  Dakota 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  { 1894),  6  S.  D.  424,  61  N.  W. 
439  ;  Davison  v.  Gregory  (1903),  132  N.  C. 
389,  43  S.  E.  910;  Stephens  v.  Am.  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  (1896),  14  Utah,  265,  47  Pac.  83  ; 
Hudson  !•.  Scottish  Union  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 
110  Ky.  722,  62  S.  W.  513;  Porter  v. 
Allen  (1902),  —  Idaho —,  69  Pac.  105. 
See  also  Am.  Freehold  Co.  v.  McManus 
(1900),  68  Ark.  263,  58  S.  W,  250. 

In  Nebraska  an  exhibit  is  considered  a 
part  of  the  pleading  only  when  it  consists 
of  an  instrument  for  the  unconditional 
payment  of  money  only  :  First  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Engelbercht    (1899),  58    Neb.    639,    79 


N.  W.  556  ;  Lincoln  Mortgage  &  Trust  Co. 
V.  Ilutchins  (1898),  55  Neb.  158,  75  N.  W. 
538  ;  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Arthur  (1896), 
48  Neb.  461,  67  N.  W.  440  ;  Holt  County 
Rank  v.  Holt  Co.  ('1898),  53  Neb.  827,  74 
N.  W.  259. 

In  Indiana  an  exhibit  is  deemed  a  part 
of  the  pleading  only  when  the  iu.strument 
is  one  upon  whicli  the  action  is  founded: 
Thompson  v.  Recht  (1902),  158  Ind.  302, 
63  N.  E.  569 ;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Greger 
(1901),  157  Ind.  479,  62  N.  E.  21  ;  Bird  v. 
St  Johns  Episcopal  Church  (1899),  154 
Ind,  138,  56  N.  E.  129;  Murphy  v.  Brana- 
inan  (1900),  156  Ind.  77,59  N.  E.  274; 
Indiana,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Plank  (1898),  1.^2 
Ind.  197,  52  N.  E.  991  ;  Frankel  v.  Michi- 
gan Mutual  Ins.  Co.  (1902),  158  Ind.  304, 
62  N.  E.  703 ;  Miller  v.  Bottenberg 
(1895),  144  Inil.  312,  41  N.  E.  804;  Fitcli 
V.  Byall  (1897),  149  Ind.  554,  49  N.  E. 
455  ;  Forbes  i\  Union  Central  Life  Ins. 
Co.  (1898),  151  Ind.  89,  51  N.  E.  84; 
Fuller  V.  Cox  (1893),  135  Ind.  46,  34  N.  E. 
822. 

The  Indiana  rule  lias  been  followed  in 
Oklahoma :  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Jones 
(1894),  2  Okla.  353,  37  Pac.  824  ;  Dunham 
r.  Holloway  (1895),  3  Okla.  244,  41  S.  W. 
140;  Grimes  v.  Cullison  (1895),  3  Okla. 
268,  41  S.  W.  355. 

On  the  other  hand,  some  courts  have 
held  tliat  the  exhibit  cannot  avail  to  aid 
the  averments  of  the  pleading:  Hickory 
County  t;.  Fugate  (1898),  143  Mo.  71,  44 
S.  W.  789  (see  also  Cooms  Commission 
Co.  V.  Block  (1895),  130  Mo.  668,  32  S.  W. 
1139);  Estate  of  Cook  (1902),  137  Cal. 
184,  69  Pac.  1124  (may  aid  formal  but 
not  substantial  defects)  ;  Palmer  r.  La- 
vignc  (1894),  104  Cal.  30,  37  Pac.  775  ; 
Savings  Bank  v.  Burns  (1894),  104  Cal. 
473,  38  Pac.  102)  ;  Cave  v.  Gill  (1900),  5» 
S.  C.  256,  37  S.  E.  817  (may  aid  formal 
defects)  ;  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kahn 
(1893),  4  Wyo.  364,  34  Pac.  895  ;  Altemus 
V.  Asher  (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W.  245 
(where  merely  filed  with  and  referred  to 
in  a  pleading).  But  see  Gardner  v.  Con- 
tinental Ins.  Co.  (1903),  Ky.,  75  S.  W. 
283,  where  the  court  said :  "The  rule  is 
tliat  an  exhibit  will  not  cure  a  defective 
j)leading  or  supply  averments  omitted  in 
the  pleading:.     But  it  is  also  the  rule  that 


:,u 


CIVIL    IIE.MEDIES. 


ence  is  established.^     I  have  purposely  refrained  from  using  the 


iu  a  suit  on  a  written  contract,  if  the  con- 
tract sliows  that  no  cau^e  of  action  exists, 
the  court  on  demurrer  will  consider  the 
exhibit.  In  other  words,  wliile  an  exhibit 
cannot  niaiie  a  pleading  good,  it  ma\'  make 
it  bad."3 

1  I'eople  V.  Ryder,  1 2  N.  Y.  433,  487 ; 
HiU  V.  Barrett,  14  B.  Mon.  83 ;  Green  v. 
Palmer,  15  Cal.  411,  414;  Rogers  r.  Mil- 
waukee, 13  Wis.  CIO,  GU  ;  Bird  v.  Mayer, 
8  Wis.  362,  367  ;  Horn  v.  Ludingtou,  28 
Wis.  81,  83;  Groves  v.  Tallman,  8  Xev. 
178;  Pier  c.  Ileinrichoffen,  52  Mo.  333, 
335;  Wills  V.  Wills,  34  Ind.  106,  107; 
De  Graw  v.  Elmore,  50  X.  Y.  1  ;  Cowin  v. 
Toole,  31  Iowa,  513,  516;  Singleton  v. 
Scott,  11  Iowa,  589;  Bowcn  r.  Aubrey,  22 
Cal.  566,  569  ;  Pfiffner  f.  Krapfel,  28  Iowa, 
27,  34  ;  White  v.  Lyons,  42  Cal.  279,  282; 
Louisville  &  P.  Canal  Co.  v.  Murphy,  9 
Bush,  522,  527 ;  Gates  v.  Salmon,  46  Cal. 
361,  379;  King  r.  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.,  45 
Ind.  43,  55;  Lytle  v.  Lytle,  37  Ind.  281  ; 
Van  Schaick  v.  Farrow,  25  Ind.  310;  Chi- 
cago &  S.  W.  R.  Co.  V.  N.  W.  U.  Packet 
Co  ,  38  Iowa,  377,  382  ;  Boweu  v.  Emmer- 
son,  3  Ore.  452;  Cline  v.  Cline,  3  Ore. 
355,  358  ;  Gates  v.  Gray,  66  N.  C.  442, 
443;  Farron  v.  Sherwood,  17  N.  Y.  227  ; 
Coryell  v.  Cain,  16  Cal.  567,  571.  The 
opinion  of  Marvin  J.  in  People  r.  Ryder  is 
exceedingly  instructive,  and  covers  most 
of  the  subordinate  questions  that  arise  in 
connection  with  the  general  topic.  He 
said  (p.  437):  "This  rule  (§  142  of  the 
New  York  Code)  is  substantially  as  it  ex- 
isted, prior  to  its  enactment,  in  actions  at 
law.  Chitty  says :  '  In  general,  whatever 
circumstances  are  necessary  to  constitute 
the  cause  of  complaint  or  ground  of  de- 
fence must  be  stated  in  the  pleadings,  and 
all  beyond  is  surplusage  ;  facts  only  are 
to  be  stated,  and  not  arguments  or  infer- 
ences or  matter  of  law,  in  which  respect 
pleadings  at  law  appear  to  differ  materi- 
ally from  those  in  equity.'  (1  Ch.  PI.  245.) 
At  page  266  he  says:  'It  is  a  most  im- 
portant principle  of  the  law  of  pleading, 
that  in  alleging  the  fact  it  is  unnecessary 
to  state  such  circumstances  as  tend  to 
prove  the  tnith  of  it.  The  dry  allegation 
of  the  fact,  without  detailing  a  variety  of 
minute  circumstances  whicli  constitute  the 
evidence    of  it,  will  suffice.      The  object 


of  the  pleadings  is  to  arrive  at  a  specific 
issue  upon  a  given  and  material  fact ;  and 
that  is  attained  although  the  evidence  of 
such  fact  to  be  laid  before  a  jury  be  not 
specifically  developed  in  the  pleadings.' 
I  have  supposed  it  safe,  and  a  compliance 
with  the  code,  to  state  the  facts  consti- 
tuting the  cause  of  action  substantially  in 
the  same  manner  iu  which  they  were 
stated  in  the  old  system  in  a  special  count. 
By  that  system  the  legal  issuable  facts 
were  to  be  stated,  and  the  evidence  by 
which  those  facts  were  to  be  established 
was  to  be  brought  forward  u])on  the  trial. 
This  position  will  not  embrace  what  were 
known  as  the  common  counts.  ...  It  has 
been  supposed  that  a  wider  latitmle  should 
be  allowed  in  equity  pleading,  and  tiiat 
evidence  may  to  some  extent  be  incor- 
porated in  the  statement.  The  rule  of 
the  code  is  broad  enough  for  all  cases ; 
and  it  permits  a  statement  of  facts  and 
circumstances  as  contradistinguished  from 
the  evidence  whtch  is  to  establish  those 
facts.  But  in  all  equitj'  cases  the  facts 
may  be  more  numerous,  more  compli- 
cated, more  involved ;  and  the  pleader 
may  state  all  these  facts  in  a  legal  and 
concise  form  wliich  constitute  the  cau.se 
of  action,  and  entitle  him  to  relief.  The 
rule  touching  the  statement  of  facts  con- 
stituting the  cause  of  action  is  tlie  same 
in  all  cases ;  and  the  rules  by  whicii  the 
sufficiency  of  ])leadings  is  to  be  deter- 
mined are  prescribed  by  the  code."  How 
far  the  positions  quoted  from  Mr.  Chitty 
are  correct  is  shown  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs  of  this  section.  No  more  ac- 
curate exposition  of  the  fundamental  doc- 
trine announced  by  the  codes  is  to  lie  found 
in  the  books  than  the  foregoing  opii.ion 
of  Mr.  Justice  Marvin.  In  several  of  the 
cases  to  be  cited  the  di.«cussion  has  l)een 
confined  to  legal  actions,  and  general 
statements  have  been  made  in  reference 
to  the  "  material  "  or  "  issuable  "  facts 
which  are  plainly  erroneous  when  applied 
to  suits  brought  for  ei|uitable  relief.  The 
principle  as  formulated  by  Mr.  Justice 
Marvin  embraces  both  species  of  actions, 
and  brings  them  both  within  the  purview 
of  the  statutory  provision.  In  Green  r. 
Palmer,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Cnlifomia 
laid  down  the  rules  iu  respect  to  tlie  kinds 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF   PLEADING. 


545 


common  formula,  "facts  which  constitute  the  cause  of  action^'''  in 


of  facts  wliic-h  sliould  be  averred,  and  de- 
fined the  nature  of  "material"  or  "issu- 
able "  facts  in  a  most  exhaustive  manner. 
From  the  elaborate  opinion  of  Field  C.  J. 
the  following  extracts  are  taken  (p.  414) : 
"  First  rule.     Facts  only  must  be  stated. 
This    means    the    facts    as    contradistin- 
guislied   from   the   law,    from   argument, 
from    hypothesis,   and   from   evidence   of 
the  facts.     The  facts  must   be  carefully 
distinguished   from   the   evidence   of  the 
facts.      The  criterion   to  distinguish   the 
facts  from  the  evidence  is,  —  Second  rule. 
Those   facts,   and   those   alone,    must   be 
stated  which  constitute  the  cause  of   ac- 
tion, the  defence,  or  the   reply.     There- 
fore   (1)    each    party   must   allege   every 
fact  which  he  is  required  to  prove,  and 
•will  be  precluded  from  proving  any  fact 
iiot  alleged.     The  plaintiff,  on  his  part, 
must  allege  all  that  he  will  have  to  prove 
to   maintain    his    action ;   the   defendant, 
on  his  part,  all   that   he   must   prove  to 
defeat  the  plaintiff's  title  after  the  com- 
plaint  is   admitted   or    proved.      (2)    He 
must  allege  nothing   affirmatively  which 
he  is  not  required  to  prove.     This  is  some- 
times put   in    the    following   form :    viz., 
'  that  those  facts,  and  those  only,  should 
be  stated  which  the  party  would  be  re- 
quired to  prove.'     But  this  is  inaccurate, 
since  negative  allegations  are  frequently 
necessary,  and  they  are  not  to  be  proved. 
The  rule  applies,  however,  to  all  affirma- 
tive allegations,  and,  thus  applied,  is  uni- 
versal.    Every  fact  essential  to  the  claim 
or  defence  should  be  stated.     If  this  part 
of  the  rule  is  violated,  the  adverse  party 
may  deumr.     In  the  second  place,  nothing 
should  be  stated  which  is  not  essential  to 
the  claim  or  defence  ;  or,  in  other  words, 
none    but    '  issuable '    facts     should     be 
stated.     If  this  part  of  the  rule  be  vio- 
lated,  the    adverse    party  may   move   to 
strike  out  the  unessential  parts.     An  un- 
essential, or  what  is  the   same  thing,  an 
immaterial  allegation,  is  one  which  can  be 
stricken  from  the  pleading  without  leav- 
ing it  insufficient,  and,  of  course,  need  not 
be  proved  or  disproved.     The  following 
question    will    determine    in    every   case 
whether  an  allegation  be  material :  Can  it 
be  made  the  subject  of  a  material  issue  ? 
In  other  words,  If  denied,  will  the  failure 


to  prove  it  decide  the  case  in  wiiole  or  in 
part  ?     If  it  will  not,  then  the  fact  alleged 
is  not  material  (issuable) ;  it  is  not  one 
of  those  which  constitute  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion, defence,  or  reply."     This  opinion  was 
ado])tcd,  and  tlie  mode  of  distinguishing 
"  material "  or  "  issuable  "  allegations  was 
approved  by  tlie  Supreme  Court  of  Ore- 
gon in  Cline  v.  Cliue,   .'3   Ore.  35.5,  358, 
359.     The  criterion  thus  proposed  by  Mr. 
Chief  Justice  Field  is-  perfect  in  its  appli- 
cation to  legal  actions,  l)ut  is  hardly  broad 
enough  to  include  all  cases  wheje  equi- 
table  relief   is   demanded,  unless   it  was 
intended   to  embrace   such   cases   in   the 
language   "  decide  the  case   in  whole  or 
in  part."     If  such  was  the  intention,  the 
manner  of  stating  the  rule  is  somewhat 
obscure,  and  it  clearly  needs  amplification 
and  explanation.    I  return  to  this  question 
in  a  subsequent   paragraph  of  the   text. 
In  Pier  v.  Heinrichoffen,  52  Mo.  333,  whicli 
was  an  action  against  the  indorsers  of  a 
note,  the   petition   alleged   a  demand  of 
payment  at  maturity,  and  notice  of  non- 
payment given  to  the  defendants.     At  the 
trial  the  plaintiff  proposed  to  prove  facts 
excusing  such  demand  and  notice ;  and,  the 
evidence  being  rejected,  a  verdict  was  ren- 
dered against  him.     This  ruling  was  sus- 
tained by  the  Suj^reme  Court,  Ewing  J., 
after    saying    tliat    the    plaintiff's    mode 
of    pleading    would     have    been    proper 
under  the  common-law  system,  proceeds 
(p.  335) :  "  As  the  vice  of  the  old  system 
of  pleading  was  its  ])roKxity,  its  general 
averments   and    general    issues,    and   the 
del.ay  and   expense     inseparable   from    it 
the   new  system  which  we  have  adopted 
has  little  claim  to  be  considered  a  reform, 
unless   it   avoids    such   defects,    and   fur- 
nishes rules  by  which  the  great  object  of 
all  pleadings   is  attained  ;  viz.,  to  arrive 
at  a  material,   certain,  and    single   issue. 
Hence  the  great  improvement  of  our  code 
consists  in  requiring  the  pleadings  to  con- 
tain a  plain  and  concise  statement  of  the 
facts  constituting  the  cause  of   action,  or 
matter  of  defence.      Facts  and   not   evi- 
dence  nor   conclusions    of   law,  must    be 
stated.     Every   fact   which    the   plaintiff 
must  prove  to  maintain  his  suit  is  consti- 
tutive  in    the   sense  of  the  code."     The 
petition  in  this  case,  it  was  held,  sliould 


546  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

order  tliut  the  principle  niiglit  be  expressed  in  its  most  compre- 
hensive manner,  and  might  include  equitable  as  well  as  legal 
actions.  As  will  be  shown  in  tlie  sequel,  it  is  only  in  legal 
actions  that  the  material  or  issuable  facts  which  are  to  be 
averred  "constitute  the  cause  of  action"  in  the  strict  sense  of 
the  term;  while  in  equitable  actions  facts  may  be  material,  and 
must  be  alleged,  which,  while  they  form  the  basis  of  or  modify 
the  remedy  demanded,  do  not  properly  constitute  the  cause  of 
action.  This  distinction  will  be  fully  developed  in  subsequent 
paragraphs  which  discuss  the  mode  of  pleading  in  equitable 
actions.  This  single  and  simple  principle  lies  at  the  foundation 
of  the  entire  reformed  method  introduced  by  the  codes.  When 
fully  comprehended,  it  will  be  found  to  involve  all  the  other 
requisites  of  the  system.  It  distinguishes  the  new  pleading  from 
each  of  the  three  types  which  formerly  prevailed,  and  which 
have  already  been  described;  from  the  modes  used  in  the  equit}^ 
and  the  civil-law  courts,  by  wholly  dispensing  with  any  state- 
ments of  probative  matter,  and  by  limiting  the  averments  to  the 
fundamental  facts  which  constitute  the  cause  of  action  or  the 
grounds  of  relief;  and  from  the  mode  used  in  the  common-law 
courts,  by  discarding  all  fictions,  all  technicalities,  all  prescribed 
formulas,  and  by  requiring  the  material  facts  to  be  alleged  as 

have  averred  the  matters  of  excuse  sought  Murphy,  9  Bush,  522,  527,  the  Kentucky 
to  be  proved.  The  description  here  given  Court  of  Appeals  stated  the  general  doc- 
of  issuable  or  "  constitutive  "  facts  is  ap-  trine  in  the  following  manner  :  "  While 
propriate  to  legal  actions  only,  and  must  the  ancient  forms  of  pleading  are  abol- 
be  modified  in  its  terms  in  order  to  meet  ished,  still  every  fact  necessary  to  enable 
the  characteristic  features  of  many  equi-  tlie  plaintiff  in  the  action  to  recover  must 
table  suits.  Wills  v.  Wills,  34  Ind.  106,  be  alleged,  and  every  essential  averment 
is  also  very  instructive,  and  contains  a  required  to  make  a  declaration  good  at  the 
princi])le  of  wide  application  which  dis-  common  law  upon  general  demurrer  must 
tinguislies  the  present  from  the  former  be  made  in  the  petition.  Tlie  facts  must 
theory  of  pleading.  In  Pfiffner  r.  Krapfel,  be  alleged  so  as  to  enable  the  opposite 
28  Iowa,  27,  34,  Cole  J.  very  truly  said  :  party  to  know  what  is  meant  to  be  proved, 
"  Our  system  of  pleading  is  essentially  and  also  tiiat  an  issue  may  be  framed  in 
a  fact  system,  intended  to  require  the  regard  to  the  subject-matter  of  dispute, 
parties  in  judicial  proceedings  to  state  and  to  enalile  the  court  to  pronounce  the 
the  facts  of  their  claims,  and  advise  the  law  upon  the  facts  stated.  The  dry  alle- 
opposite  party  of  the  true  nature  and  gation  of  the  facts  in  the  petition,  without 
object  of  the  suit.  It  is  against  the  spirit  setting  forth  the  evidence  of  the  truth 
and  plain  intent  of  our  code  to  alhiw  par-  of  the  statements  made,  is  all  that  is  re- 
ties  to  claim  as  fruits  of  their  litigation  quired."  See,  as  further  examjdcs,  Clark 
that  whicli  was  not  by  the  fair  and  obvious  v.  Bates,  1  Dak.  42  ;  Clay  Cy.  v.  Simon.sen, 
import  of  the  pleadings  put  in  issue  and  1  id.  403,  430 ;  Scott  i\  Kobards,  67  Mo. 
litigated  between  them."  In  the  very  re-  289;  Dunn  v.  Remington,  9  Neb.  82; 
cent  case  of  Louisville  &  P.  Canal  Co.  v.  Ingle  i-.  Jones,  43  Iowa,  286. 


GENERAL    rillNCIPLES    OF    PLEADING.  .  547 

they  actually  existed,  and  not  tlieir  legal  effect,  and  still  less 
the  legal  conclusions  inferred  from  them.  In  discussing  this 
fundamental  principle,  and  developing  from  it  the  subordinate 
doctrines  and  practical  rules  which  are  involved  in  its  general 
terms,  its  component  elements  must  be  separately  examined, 
and  the  full  import  of  each  must  be  carefully  ascertained.  This 
analysis  will  lead  me  (1)  to  define  the  legal  meaning  of  the  term 
"cause  of  action"  as  used  in  the  codes,  and  to  point  out  the 
somewhat  different  senses  which  must  be  given  to  the  phrase 
when  it  is  applied  to  legal  and  to  equitable  actions;  (2)  to 
determine  the  nature  of  the  facts  which  "constitute  the  cause 
of  action  "  in  each  of  its  two  significations,  and  in  this  connec- 
tion to  point  out  the  difference  between  the  "  issuable  facts " 
averred  in  legal  actions  and  the  facts  material  to  the  remedy  but 
not  strictly  "  issuable "  sometimes  necessary  to  be  alleged  in 
equitable  actions,  and  to  explain  the  distinction  in  this  respect 
which  inheres  in  the  modes  of  pleading  employed  in  these  two 
classes  of  suits;  and  (3)  to  discuss  the  requirement  that  these, 
material  facts  should  be  stated  as  they  actually  occurred  or 
existed,  and  not  their  legal  effect  and  meaning,  and  to  display 
its  full  force  and  significance.  The  result  of  this  analysis  will 
then  be  applied  in  developing  the  various  general  rules  which 
make  up  the  reformed  system  of  pleading. 

§  412.  *  518.  The  Term  "  Cause  of  Action."  The  term  "  cause 
of  action  "  is  employed  by  the  framers  of  the  codes  in  several 
different  connections;  but  it  must  be  assumed  that  in  each  of 
them  it  was  intended  to  have  the  same  signification,  that,  wher- 
ever used,  it  was  designed  to  describe  the  same  elements  or 
features  of  the  judicial  proceeding  called  an  action.  The  courts 
have  never,  so  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  discover,  attempted  any 
thorough  and  exhaustive  discussion  of  the  phrase,  and  determined 
its  meaning  by  any  general  formula  or  definition ;  and  little  or  no 
aid  will  therefore  be  obtained  in  this  inquiry  from  judicial  inter- 
pretation. The  few  decided  cases  which  venture  upon  a  partial 
description  were  quoted  in  the  last  preceding  section.  In  another 
instance,  not  there  referred  to,  in  which  the  plaintiff  alleged  that 
the  legal  title  to  certain  lands  was  vested  in  the  defendant,  but 
that  these  lands  were  held  by  him  in  trust  for  the  plaintiff,  and 
demanded  an  execution  of  the  trust  by  conveyance,  etc.,  the 
cause  of  action  was  decided  to  be  "the  trust;"  the  court  declar- 


548  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

ing  that  in  every  money  demand  on  contract  "  the  debt "  is  the 
cause  of  action,  and  holding  that,  in  the  case  before  them,  the 
cause  of  action  itself  —  the  trust  —  was  stated  in  the  complaint, 
but  that  the  facts  constituting  it  were  not  averred.^ 

§  413.  *519,  True  Signification  of  the  Term.  The  true  signifi- 
cation of  the  term  "cause  of  action  "  was  carefully  examined  and 
determined  in  the  second  section  of  the  present  chapter;  and  I 
shall  not  repeat  the  course  of  discussion  there  pursued,  but  shall 
simply  recapitulate  the  conclusions  which  were  reached.  Every 
action  is  based  upon  some  primary  right  held  by  the  plaintiff, 
and  upon  a  duty  resting  upon  the  defendant  corresponding  to 
such  right.  By  means  of  a  wrongful  act  or  omission  of  the 
defendant,  this  primary  right  and  this  duty  are  invaded  and 
broken;  and  there  immediately  arises  from  the  breach  a  new 
remedial  right  of  the  plaintiff,  and  a  new  remedial  duty  of  the 
defendant.  Finally,  such  remedial  right  and  dut}'  are  consum- 
mated and  satisfied  tby  the  remedy  which  is  obtained  through 
means  of  the  action,  and  which  is  its  object.  Now,  it  is  very 
plain,  that,  using  the  words  according  to  their  natural  import 
and  according  to  their  technical  legal  import,  the  "cause  of 
action  "  is  what  gives  rise  to  the  remedial  right,  or  the  right  of 
remedy,  which  is  evidently  the  same  as  the  term  "  right  of  ac- 
tion "  frequently  used  by  judges  and  text-writers.  This  remedial 
right,  or  right  of  action,  does  not  arise  from  the  wrongful  act  or 
omission  of  the  defendant  —  the  delict  —  alone,  nor  from  the 
plaintiff's  primary  right,  and  the  defendant's  corresponding  pri- 
mary duty  alone,  but  from  these  two  elements  taken  together. 
The  "cause  of  action,"  therefore,  must  always  consist  of  two 
factors,  (1)  the  plaintiff's  primary  right  and  the  defendant's 
corresponding  primary  duty,  whatever  be  the  subject  to  which 
they  relate,  person,  character,  property,  or  contract ;  and  (2)  the 
delict,  or  wrongful  act  or  omission  of  the  defendant,  by  which 
the  primary  right  and  duty  have  been  violated.  Every  action 
when  analyzed  will  be  found  to  contain  these  two  separate  and 
distinct  elements,  and  in  combination  they  constitute  the  "cause 
of  action."  The  primary  right  and  duty  by  themselves  are  not 
the  cause  of  action,  because  when  existing  by  themselves,  un- 
})roken  by  the  defendant's  wrong,  they  do  not  give  rise  to  any 
action.     For   this   reason,    that   definition   is   clearly   erroneous 

1  Iloru  V.  Ladington,  28  Wis.  81,  83. 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF   PLEADING.  549 

which  pronounced  the  "debt"  in  an  action  on  contract,  or  the 
"trust"  in  a  suit  to  enforce  a  trust,  to  be  the  "cause  of  action." 
Much  less  can  the  delict  or  wrong  by  itself  be  the  cause  of 
action,  because,  without  the  primary  right  and  duty  of  the 
parties  to  act  upon,  it  does  not  create  any  right  of  action  or 
remedial  right  as  I  have  used  the  phrase.  It  is  very  clear  from 
this  analysis  that  the  "cause  of  action  "  mentioned  in  the  codes  in- 
cludes and  consists  of  these  two  branches  or  elements  in  combina- 
tion, —  the  primary  right  and  duty  of  the  respective  parties,  and 
the  wrongful  act  or  omission  by  which  they  are  violated  or  broken. 
§  414.  *  520.  Complete  Statement  of  Entire  Cause  of  Action 
■TO-onld  include  Legal  Rules  and  Rights  and  Duties.  The  first  of 
these  branches  must  always,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  a 
conclusion  of  law.  The  law  by  its  commands  creates  a  rule 
applicable  to  certain  facts  and  circumstances,  by  the  operation  of 
which,  when  these  facts  and  circumstances  exist,  a  right  arises, 
and  is  held  by  the  plaintiff,  and  a  corresponding  duty  arises  and 
devolves  upon  the  defendant.  While  this  first  factor  of  the 
"cause  of  action"  is  therefore  always  a  conclusion  or  proposition 
of  law,  and  results  from  the  command  of  the  supreme  power  in 
the  State  as  its  cause^  it  necessarily  presupposes  the  existence  of 
certain  facts  and  events  as  the  occasion  of  its  coming  into  opera- 
tion. A  complete  and  exhaustive  exhibition  of  it  would  thus 
require  a  statement  of  the  legal  rule  itself  applicable  to  the 
given  condition  of  facts  and  circumstances,  and  of  the  primary 
right  and  duty  arising  therefrom ;  and  also  an  allegation  that  the 
facts  and  circumstances  themselves  to  which  the  rule  applies,  and 
on  the  occasion  of  which  the  right  and  duty  arise,  do  actually 
exist  or  have  existed.  If  this  principle  were  adopted  in  plead- 
ing, every  cause  of  action  would  demand  a  mingled  averment  of 
legal  rules,  of  the  facts  and  events  to  which  they  apply,  and  of 
the  rights  and  duties  resulting  from  the  operation  of  the  given 
rule  upon  the  existing  facts.  In  the  second  branch  of  the  cause 
of  action,  there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  no  element  whatever  of 
the  law:  it  is  simply  and  wholly  matter  of  fact.  It  consists 
entirely  of  affirmative  acts  wrongfully  done,  or  of  negative  omis- 
sions wrongfully  suffered  by  the  defendant;  and  its  statement  in 
a  pleading  can  be  nothing  more  than  a  narrative  of  such  acts  or 
omissions.  A  primary  right  existed  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
a  corresponding  duty  devolved  upon  the  defendant,  of  which  an 


550  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

integral  element  is  a  legal  rule:  this  right  and  this  duty,  if 
positive,  called  upon  the  defendant  to  do  some  act  towards  the 
plaintiif,  the  nature  of  which  depended  upon  the  nature  of  the 
right  and  duty;  if  negative,  they  called  upon  the  defendant  to 
forbear  from  doing  some  act  towards  the  plaintiff,  tlie  nature  of 
which  was  determined  in  like  manner.  In  the  one  case,  the 
defendant's  delict  consists  in  his  not  doing  the  act  winch  his 
duty  obliged  him  to  do;  and  in  the  other  case,  in  doing  the  act 
which  his  duty  forbade  him  to  do.  In  both  instances,  therefore, 
the  wrong  which  constitutes  the  second  factor  or  branch  of  the 
cause  of  action  is  a  fact  more  or  less  complex,  and  not  either 
wholly  or  partially  a  legal  conclusion  or  rule. 

§  415.  *521.  Term  as  Applied  to  Legal  Actions.  Such  being 
the  general  nature  and  signification  of  the  term  "cause  of  action," 
its  different  phases-  of  meaning,  when  applied  either  to  legal  or 
to  equitable  actions,  will  next  be  pointed  out  and  described. 
These  differences  do  not  extend  to  its  essential  elements ;  they 
are  wholly  formal,  and  they  result  entirely  from  the  external 
differences  sometimes  subsisting  between  legal  and  equitable 
primar}^  rights  and  between  legal  and  equitable  remedies.  In  a 
legal  cause  of  action,  the  primary  right  of  the  jjlaintiff  and  duty 
of  the  defendant  are  generally  si7nple  in  their  nature  as  contra- 
distinguished from  complex;  that  is,  they  call  for  some  single, 
simple,  and  complete  act  or  forbearance  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant; and  when  broken  by  the  defendant's  delict,  the  remedial 
right  and  duty  which  arise  always  demand  a  single,  simple,  and 
complete  act  to  be  done  by  the  defendant;  namel}',  either  the 
payment  of  a  sum  of  money  as  debt  or  damages,  or  the  delivery 
of  possession  of  a  specific  chattel,  or  the  delivery  of  possession 
of  a  specific  tract  of  land,  which  constitute  the  only  remedies 
that  can  be  oljtaincd  b}'  a  legal  action.  It  follows,  therefore, 
from  the  nature  of  a  legal  primary  right  and  duty  and  of  a  legal 
remedy,  that  the  cause  of  action  in  a  legal  suit  is  always  simple, 
and  can  be  stated,  and  must  necessarily  be  stated,  in  such  a 
manner,  that  the  remedial  right,  if  it  exists  at  all,  will  be  shown 
at  once  in  its  completeness  and  certainty.  Furthermore,  the 
legal  primary  right  must  necessarily  depend  upon  a  few  facts; 
and  these  being  all  indispensable  to  its  existence,  the  absence  of 
even  a  single  one  will  entirely  invalidate  the  whole  cause  of  action, 
and  will  sliow  that  no  remedial  riirht  whatsoever  has  arisen. 


GENERAL    I'KINCII'LES    OF    PLEADING.  551 

§  416.  *  522.  Term  as  Applied  to  Equitable  Actions.  The 
foregoing  description  does  not  apply  to  e(iuitable  actions  gener- 
ally, although  it  undoubtedly  does  to  some.  In  very  many,  and 
indeed  in  most,  equitable  causes  of  action,  not  merely  the  facts 
which  are  the  occasion  of  the  right,  but  the  primary  rights  and 
duties  themselves  of  the  parties,  arc  complex :  it  cannot  be  said 
of  them  that  they  must  either  wholly  exist,  or  must  be  entirely 
denied;  they  do  not,  in  other  words,  demand  a  single  specific  act 
or  omission  on  the  part  of  the  defendant,  but  a  series,  and  often 
a  very  complicated  series,  of  acts  and  omissions.  In  determining 
these  primaiy  rights  and  duties  of  the  respective  parties  to  an 
equitable  suit,  there  must  frequently  be  a  settlement  and  adjust- 
ment of  opposing  claims;  one  must  be  modified  by  another;  and, 
as  the  result,  a  collection  of  rights  and  duties  is  established 
inhering  in  each  of  the  litigants,  and  embracing  a  great  variety 
of  particulars.  In  certain  classes  of  equitable  actions  it  cannot 
be  properly  said  that  any  wrong  or  delict  has  been  committed  by 
the  defendant,  or  any  violation  of  the  plaintiff's  primary  rights, 
unless  an  ignorance  of  those  rights  by  all  the  parties,  and  a 
consequent  hesitation  on  the  part  of  all  to  act,  can  be  deemed  a 
technical  wrong.  These  classes  of  suits  are  prosecuted,  not 
hecause  there  has  been  any  denial  of  right  or  duty,  but  because 
in  the  absence  of  an  accurate  knowledge  of  their  rights,  or  of 
power  to  arrange  and  adjust  them  by  voluntary  proceedings,  an 
appeal  to  the  courts  becomes  necessary  in  order  to  solve  the 
problem  or  to  accomplish  the  adjustment.  An  action  brought  to 
construe  a  will  may  be  mentioned  as  an  illustration  of  the  first 
class,  and  the  ordinary  suit  for  partition  as  an  example  of  the 
second.  Again:  the  remedies  furnished  by  equity  are  seldom 
the  single,  simple,  and  complete  awards  of  pecuniary  sums,  or 
of  possession  of  lands  or  of  chattels,  as  is  the  case  with  all  legal 
judgments.  They  are  complex  and  involved ;  they  often  consist 
in  an  adjustment  and  award  of  partial  reliefs  to  each  of  the 
parties;  they  may  provide  for  future  and  contingent  emergen- 
cies; and  they  are  sometimes  nothing  more  than  an:  authoritative 
determination  by  the  court  of  the  primary  rights  themselves 
belonging  to  the  plaintiffs  and  the  defendants.  This  sketch 
shows  very  plainly  that  an  equitable  cause  of  action  is  often  very 
different,  in  its  external  form  at  least,  from  any  legal  cause  of 
action;    and  although    the   same   general  principle  of   pleading 


552  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

applies  to  each,  yet  it  must  undergo  some  modification  in  that 
application.  The  facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action  are  to 
be  stated  in  an  equitable  as  well  as  in  a  legal  action;  but  facts 
do  not  constitute  the  equitable  cause  of  action  in  the  same  sense 
nor  in  the  same  manner  that  they  constitute  the  legal  cause  of 
action. 

§  417.  *  523.  Nature  of  the  Facts  Constituting  a  Cause  of  Action 
■when  Term  is  applied  to  both  Legal  and  Equitable  Suits.  The 
result  thus  reached  leads  to  the  second  subdivision  of  tlie  present 
inquiry;  namely,  the  nature  of  the  facts  which  constitute  the 
cause  of  action  when  that  term  is  applied  both  to  legal  and  to 
equitable  suits.  As  has  already  been  remarked,  the  first  branch 
or  division  of  the  cause  of  action  contains  three  distinct  elements, 
two  of  them  legal,  and  the  other  of  fact;  the  second  branch  con- 
sists wholly  of  facts ;  while  the  remedial  right  which  flows  from 
the  two  is  of  course  a  conclusion  of  law.  If  the  theory  of  plead- 
ing required  that  all  these  elements  should  be  expressed,  then 
the  plaintiff's  complaint  or  petition  would  always  comprise  the 
following  averments:  (1)  The  rule  of  law  applicable  to  certain 
facts  from  which  his  primary  right  and  the  defendant's  primary 
duty  arise;  (2)  the  existence  of  the  facts  to  which  such  rule 
applies,  and  which  are  the  occasion  of  the  right  and  duty;  (3) 
the  primary  right  and  duty  themselves  wliich  spring  from  the 
operation  of  such  rule  upon  the  given  facts,  —  these  three  sub- 
divisions forming  the  first  branch  of  the  "cause  of  action;"  (4) 
the  facts  constituting  the  violation  of  the  primary  right  and  duty; 
that  is,  the  wrongful  acts  or  omissions  of  the  defendant,  —  this 
statement  being  the  second  branch  of  the  "cause  of  action;  "  (5) 
the  remedial  right  held  by  the  plaintiff,  and  the  remedial  duty 
devolving  upon  the  defendant,  which  result  from  the  "  cause  of 
action,"  and  are  wholly  conclusions  of  law.  In  this  manner 
everything  which  enters  into  the  plaintiff's  case,  fact  and  law, 
would  be  spread  upon  the  record.  A  bill  of  complaint  in  chan- 
cery, prior  to  any  statutory  modification,  was  substantially  con- 
structed upon  this  plan,  although  the  various  subdivisions  were 
not  so  logically  separated  and  arranged.  The  mode  of  pleading 
which  prevailed  in  the  sui)erior  courts  of  Scotland  seems  to  have 
been  in  complete  conformity  with  this  theory.-^ 

1  [^Tlie  Supreme  Court  of  Coiinectirut  ford  (1902),  75  Conn.  TG,  52  Atl.  4S7.  oom- 
iii   New  York,  etc.  11.  K.  Co.  v.  Hunger-     pared   au   action  at   law  to  a  svllogism. 


GENEKAL   PEINCIPLES    OF    PLEADING.  553 

§  418.  *  524.  Elements  Omitted  and  Retained  vsrhen  Cause  of 
Action  is  set  forth  in  the  Complaint.  Tlie  reformed  system,  fol- 
lowing in  this  respect  the  common-law  method,  dispenses  with 
several  of  these  elements  which  make  up  the  plaintiff's  entire 
ground  for  relief:  it  wholly  rejects  all  the  subdivisions  which 
are  mere  legal  rules  or  conclusions,  and  admits  only  those  that 
consist  of  the  facts  to  which  the  legal  rules  apply,  and  which  are 
the  occasion  whence  the  conclusions  arise.  It  assumes  that  the 
courts  and  the  parties  are  familiar  with  all  the  doctrines  and 
requirements  of  the  law  applicable  to  every  conceivable  condition 
of  facts  and  circumstances,  so  that,  when  a  certain  condition  of 
facts  and  circumstances  is  presented  to  them,  they  will  at  once 
perceive  and  know  what  are  the  primary  and  the  remedial  rights 
and  duties  of  both  the  litigants ;  and  this  knowledge  being  com- 
plete and  perfect,  it  is  a  useless  incumbrance  of  the  record  to 
spread  out  upon  it  the  legal  propositions  and  inferences  with 
which  every  one  is  assumed  to  be  acquainted.  A  complaint  or 
petition,  therefore,  drawn  in  accordance  with  this  theory,  must 
omit  (1)  the  legal  rule  which  is  the  direct  cause  of  the  primary 
right  and  duty,  (2)  the  primary  right  and  duty  themselves  which 
are  the  results  of  this  rule  acting  upon  the  given  facts,  and  (3) 
the  remedial  right  and  duty  which  accrue  to  the  plaintiff;  and 
it  must  only  state  (1)  the  facts  which  enter  into  the  first  branch 
of  the  cause  of  action  and  are  the  occasion  of  the  primary  right 
and  duty,  and  (2)  the  facts  which  constitute  the  defendant's 
wrongful  act  or  omission,  —  that  is,  the  delict  which  is  the 
second  branch  of  the  cause  of  action.  As  will  be  seen  in  the 
sequel,  a  statement  of  the  legal  rule,  or  of  the  primary  legal  right 
and  duty  without  the  facts  to  which  they  apply,  and  which  are 
the  occasion  for  their  existence,  is  insufficient:  it  alleges  no  cause 
of  action,  and  cannot  be  made  the  basis  of  an  issue ;  while  such 
a  statement  in  addition  to  those  facts  is  surplusage,  and,  if  the 
rules  of   pleading   are  strictly  enforced,   will  be    struck  out  on 

using    the    following     language :     "  The  for  instance,  the  defendant  has  done  cer- 

major  premise  is  a  proposition  of  law,  as,  tain  acts  (being  the  acts  referred  to  in  the 

for  instance,  whoever  does  certain  speci-  proposition    of    law)    to  the   damage   of 

fied  acts  to  the  injury  of  another  is  bound  the  plaintiff.     These  facts  are  alleged  in 

to  pay  that  other  the   damages  thus  in-  the   complaint.      The    conclusion  is    the 

flicted.     This  proposition  is  not  pleaded,  judgment  or  sentence  of  the  law,  which 

but    is    necessarily   involved    in    stating  necessarily  follows   the   establishment  of 

the  facts  alleged  in  the  complaint.     The  the  truth  of  the  two  premises."^ 
minor  premise  is  a  statement  of  facts,  as, 


55-4  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

motion,  and  will,  at  all  events,  be  wholly  disregarded.  We 
thus  arrived  at  the  first  general  doctrine  in  relation  to  the  facts 
constituting  tlie  cause  of  action ;  namely,  the  facts  which  are 
among  the  elements  of  the  cause  of  action,  that  is,  those  which 
are  the  occasion  for  the  primary  right  and  duty  to  arise,  and 
those  which  form  the  breach  of  such  right  and  duty  must  be 
alleged,  to  the  entire  exclusion  of  the  other  elements  that  enter 
into  the  cause  of  action,  — -  the  legal  rules,  and  the  legal  rights 
and  duties  of  the  parties. 

§  419.  *  525.  Cases  -wrhere  Facts  Show^ing  Primary  Right  are 
omitted  because  presumed.  Before  proceeding  to  the  second 
general  doctrine,  I  shall  notice  an  apparent  modification  of  or 
departure  from  the  one  just  announced,  which  occurs  in  a  cer- 
tain class  of  actions.  In  a  very  great  majority  of  instances,  the 
complaint  or  petition  must  narrate  in  an  express  manner  those 
facts,  which,  as  I  have  shown,  form  an  element  of  the  first 
branch  or  division  of  the  cause  of  action,  —  those  facts  to  which 
the  general  rule  of  law  applies  in  order  to  create  the  primary 
right  and  duty  of  the  parties.  In  these  cases,  therefore,  the 
pleading  does  actually  contain,  in  direct  and  positive  terms,  the 
allegations  of  two  distinct  groups  of  facts:  first,  those  which  are 
the  occasion  of  the  primary  right  and  duty;  and  secondly,  those 
which  are  the  breach  of  such  right  and  duty,  —  the  wrong  or 
delict.  There  is  nothing  of  fact  left  to  be  understood  or  as- 
sumed. In  another  class  of  cases,  however,  the  first  group  of 
facts  is  not  expressly  averred ;  it  is  omitted ;  it  is  assumed  to 
exist  in  the  same  manner  that  the  legal  rules  are  assumed;  and 
the  complaint  or  petition  actually  contains  only  those  facts  which 
constitute  the  breach,  —  the  Avrongf ul  act  or  omission  of  the  de- 
fendant. The  peculiar  class  of  actions  thus  mentioned  do  not, 
however,  depart  from  or  violate  the  theory  of  pleading  before 
described,  but  are  constructed  in  exact  conformity  with  it.  The 
facts  upon  which  the  primary  right  and  duty  of  the  parties 
depend  are  omitted,  because  they  are  in  accordance  with  the 
universal  experience  of  mankind,  and  must  therefore  be  presumed 
to  exist,  so  that  their  averment,  like  the  averment  of  legal  rules, 
is  unnecessary.  A  simple  and  familiar  illustration  is  the  action 
to  recover  damages  for  an  assault  and  battery.  The  primary 
right  of  the  plaintiff  is  the  right  to  liis  own  pcn'son,  free  from 
molestation    or   interference    by  any  one.     This    right,   Ijcing   a 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    PLEADING.  555 

legal  conclusion,  is  of  course  not  averred.  The  fact  upon  which 
it  depends  is  simply  that  the  plaintiff  is  a  human  being,  existing 
iind  possessing  the  common  faculties  and  attributes  of  humanity. 
Since  this  fact  conforms  to  the  universal  experience,  its  averment 
in  the  complaint  or  petition  is  needless;  it  is  tacitly  assumed; 
and  the  pleading  consists  wholly  in  statements  of  the  wrongful 
trespass  committed  by  the  defendant.  Another  illustration  is 
the  action  for  slander  or  libel.  The  facts  upon  which  the  pri- 
mary right  and  duty  of  the  parties  depend  is  the  existence  of  the 
plaintiff  as  a  member  of  society,  and  as  possessing  a  character 
among  his  fellow-men.  Although  the  common-law  declaration 
contained  averments  of  the  plaintiff's  reputation,  they  are  un- 
necessary, and  the  complaint  or  petition  may  contain  merely  an 
account  of  the  defamatory  words  spoken  or  published  by  the 
defendant  and  the  other  elements  of  the  wrong.  It  may  be 
stated  as  a  general  proposition,  that,  in  actions  brought  for 
injuries  to  the  plaintiff's  own  person  or  character,  the  facts 
which  enter  into  the  first  branch  of  the  cause  of  action,  and  are 
the  occasion  whence  the  primary  right  and  duty  of  the  parties 
arise,  need  not  be  expressly  averred;  they  are  assumed  to  exist, 
and  nothing  but  the  delict  need  be  alleged.  Notwithstanding 
this  abridgment,  the  pleading  in  such  cases  is  based  upon  the 
same  theory  and  governed  by  the  same  rules  as  the  pleading  in 
all  other  classes  of  actions. 

§  420.  *526.  Only  Ultimate  Facts  are  to  be  alleged.  The 
second  of  the  general  doctrines  included  within  the  principle 
under  consideration  is,  that,  in  stating  the  two  required  groups 
of  facts,  those  important  and  substantial  facts  alone  should  be 
alleged  which  either  immediately  form  the  basis  of  the  primary 
right  and  duty,  or  which  directly  make  up  the  wrongful  acts  or 
omissions  of  the  defendant,  and  not  the  details  of  probative  mat- 
ter or  particulars  of  evidence  by  which  these  material  elements 
are  to  be  established.  This  doctrine  applies  to  all  classes  of 
actions,  and  if  strictly  enforced  it  would  render  the  pleadings 
simple,  and  the  legal  issues  at  least  clear,  cei'tain,  and  single. 
The  courts  have  been  unanimous  in  their  announcement  of  the 
rule,  and  the  decisions  already  quoted,  as  well  as  those  to  be 
cited  in  subsequent  paragraphs,  will  show  the  variety  of  circum- 
stances, allegations,  and  issues  to  which  it  has  been  applied. 
There  can  be  no  real  difficulty,  if  the  action  is  legal,  in  distiu- 


55G  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

guishing  between  the  facts  which  are  material  and  issnable  and 
shoukl  therefore  be  averred,  and  those  which  are  merely  pro- 
bative or  evidentiary  and  shonld  be  omitted.  Since  the  legal 
priniary  right  and  duty  are  always  simple,  and  demand  from  the 
defendant  the  performance  or  the  omission  of  some  single  and 
well-defined  act,  they  will  always  depend,  for  their  occasion,  upon 
a  few  positive,  determined,  and  certain  facts,  all  of  which  are 
necessary  to  their  existence,  so  that  neither  of  these  facts  could 
be  modified,  and  much  less  could  be  omitted,  without  entirely 
defeating  the  right  and  duty,  and  with  them  the  cause  of  action 
itself.  The  same  is  true  of  the  facts  which  make  uj)  the  defend- 
ant's delict  or  wrong.  In  order,  therefore,  tliat  any  given  legal 
cause  of  action  should  exist,  in  order  that  au}^  given  remedial 
ris'ht  or  risfht  of  action  should  arise,  these  determinate,  un- 
changed,  and  positive  elements  of  fact  must  all  conspire  to  pro- 
duce that  result,  and  must  be  alleged;  they  literally  "constitute  '* 
the  cause  of  action,  and  form  the  "'material"  or  "issnable  "  aver- 
ments spoken  of  by  the  courts.  The  subordinate  facts,  on  the 
other  hand,  which  make  up  the  probative  matter  and  the  details 
of  evidence,  may  vary  indefinitely  in  their  nature ;  and  so  long 
as  they  perform  their  function  of  establishing  the  "  issuable " 
averments,  the  cause  of  action  will  not  be  affected.  To  illustrate 
by  a  very  familiar  example:  In  an  action  to  recover  damages  for 
the  breach  of  a  written  contract,  the  allegation  that  the  defend- 
ant executed  the  agreement  is  material  and  issuable ;  it  cannot 
be  modified,  and  much  less  abandoned,  without  destroying  the 
whole  cause  of  action.  Its  denial  raises  a  direct  issue,  to  main- 
tain or  disprove  which  evidence  can  be  offered.  The  subordinate 
probative  matter  l)y  which  this  averment  is  established  may  vary- 
according  to  the  exigencies  of  the  case,  and  a  resort  to  or  failure 
with  one  method  will  not  prevent  the  use  of  another.  The  plain- 
tiff might  rely  upon  the  defendant's  admissions  that  he  executed 
the  paper,  or  upon  the  testimony  of  a  witness  who  saw  him  sign 
it,  or  upon  the  opinions  of  persons  who  are  acquainted  with  his 
handwriting,  and  who  testify  that  the  signature  is  liis.  One  or 
the  other,  or  even  all,  *of  these  means  might  be  resorted  to,  and 
the  material  fact  to  be  proved  would  remain  tlie  same.  If,  how- 
ever, instead  of  directly  averring  that  the  defendant  executed  the 
written  contract,  the  plaintiff  should  allege  tliat  the  defendant 
had  a'lniiltcd  liis  signature  to  be  genuine,  or  that  a  specified  indi- 


GENERAL    PlilNCU'LES    OF   PLEADING.  .         557 

vidual  asserts  that  he  saw  the  instrument  signed,  or  that  persons 
familiar  with  his  handwriting  declare  the  signature  to  be  his,  it 
is  plain  that  neither  of  these  statements  would  present  a  material 
issue ;  that  is,  an  issue  upon  which  the  cause  of  action  would  de- 
pend. This  familiar  illustration  covers  the  whole  field  of  legal 
actions.  The  allegations  must  be  of  those  principal,  determinate, 
constitutive  facts,  upon  the  existence  of  which,  as  stated,  the  en- 
tire cause  of  action  rests,  so  that,  when  denied,  the  issue  thus 
formed  with  each  would  involve  the  whole  remedial  right.  ^  Every 
legal  cause  of  action  will  include  two  or  more  distinct  and  sepa- 
rate facts;  and  in  order  that  these  facts  may  be  issuable,  the 
failure  to  prove  any  one  of  them  when  denied  must  defeat  a 
recovery.  If  this  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  reformed  pleading 
is  fairly  and  consistently  enforced  in  actual  practice,  the  issues 
presented  for  trial  must  necessarily  be  simple  and  single.  Single- 
ness and  simplicity  of  issues  do  not  require  that  the  cause  should 
contain  but  one  issue  for  the  jury  fo  decide,  one  affirmation  and 
denial  the  determination  of  which  disposes  of  the  whole  contro- 
versy. This  result  of  the  common-law  special  pleading  is  often 
described  by  enthusiastic  admirers  of  the  ancient  system,  but  it 
was  seldom  if  ever  met  with  in  the  actual  administration  of  jus- 
tice. The  issues  are  single  when  each  consists  of  one  and  only 
one  material  fact  asserted  by  the  plaintiff  and  controverted  by 
the  defendant,  of  such  a  nature  that  its  affirmative  decision  is 
essential  to  the  cause  of  action,  while  its  negative  answer  defeats 
a  recovery.  The  reformed  theory  of  pleading  contemplates  and 
makes  provision  for  such  issues;  and  if  its  provisions  are  faith- 
fully carried  out,  the  disputed  questions  of  fact  would  be  as 
sharply  defined,  and  as  clearly  presented  for  decision  to  juries,  as 
can  be  done  by  any  other  possible  method. 

§  421.  *527.  The  Doctrine  as  Applied  to  Equitable  Suits.  The 
discussion  thus  far  of  this  particular  doctrine  has  been  confined 
to  legal  actions ;  are  any  modifications  necessary  to  be  made  in  its 
statement  when  applied  to  equitable  suits?  The  differences  in 
form  between  legal  causes  of  action  and  remedies  on  the  one  side 
and  equitable  causes  of  action  and  reliefs  on  the  other  have  been 
described,  and  need  not  be  repeated.  By  virtue  of  these  inherent 
differences,  the  material  facts  which  must  be  alleged  in  an  equi- 
table suit  are  often,  in  their  nature  and  effects,  quite  unlike  the 

1  ^Nichols  i\   Nichols  (1896),  134  Mo.  187,  35  S.  W.  577,  quoting  the  text.] 


558  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

"issuable"  facts  which  constitute  a  legal  cause  of  action.  In 
the  legal  action  the  issuable  facts  are  few;  in  the  equitable  suit 
the  material  facts  upon  which  the  relief  depends,  or  which  influ- 
ence and  modify  it,  are  generally  numerous,  and  often  exceed- 
ingly so:  in  the  former  they  are  simple,  clearly  defined,  and 
certain;  in  the  latter  they  may  be  and  frequently  are  compli- 
cated, involved,  contingent,  and  uncertain.  These  are  mere 
differences  of  external  form,  but  there  is  another  much  more 
important,  and  wliich  more  nearly  affects  their  essential  nature. 
The  legal  cause  of  action  so  completel}'  rests  for  its  existence 
upon  the  issuable  facts,  that  if  any  one  of  them  when  denied 
fails  to  be  established  by  proof,  the  plaintiff's  entire  recovery  is 
defeated  thereby,  a  result  which  is  recognized  by  all  the  judicial 
decisions  as  involved  in  the  very  definition  of  a  legal  issuable 
fact.  An  equitable  cause  of  action  may  undoubtedly  rest  in  like 
manner  upon  a  given  number  of  determinate  facts.  In  general, 
however,  as  has  already  been  fully  explained,  facts  may  exist 
material  to  the  recovery  in  a  certain  aspect,  or  in  a  certain  con- 
tingency, or  to  a  certain  extent,  and  which  therefore  enter  into 
the  cause  of  action,  but  which  are  not  indispensable  to  some  kind 
or  measure  of  relief  being  granted  to  the  plaintiff.  These  facts 
if  established  will  determine  the  character,  extent,  and  com- 
|)]eteness  of  the  remedy  conferred  by  the  court;  but  if  they  are 
not  established,  the  remedy  is  not  thereby  wholly  defeated;  it  is 
only  in  some  particulars  modified,  limited,  or  abridged.  Since 
tliese  classes  of  facts  assist  in  determining  the  nature,  amount, 
and  details  of  the  relief  to  be  awarded,  they  in  part  at  least 
"constitute  the  cause  of  action"  within  the  true  meaning  of  the 
term,  and  must  l)e  alleged.  While  the  material  facts  of  an  equi- 
table cause  of  action  differ  in  the  manner  thus  described  from 
the  issuable  facts  of  a  legal  cause  of  action,  the  single  and  com- 
prehensive principle  of  the  reformed  procedure  embraces  and 
controls  both  classes  of  suits.  Mere  evidence,  probative  matter 
as  contradistinguished  from  the  principal  facts  upon  which  the 
remedial  right  is  based,  are  no  more  to  be  spread  upon  the  record 
in  an  equitable  than  in  a  legal  action.  A  distinction  iniieres  in 
the  nature  of  the  causes  of  action,  and  from  this  distinction  the 
facts  material  to  the  recovery  in  an  equitable  suit  may  be  numer- 
ous, complicated,  affecting  the  right  of  recovery  partially  instead 
of  wholly,   modifying  rather  than    defeating  the  remedy  if    not 


GENERAL    PRINCirLES   OF    PLEADING.  559 

established ;  but  still  they  are  the  material  facts  constituting  the 
cause  of  action,  and  not  mere  details  of  evidentiary  or  probative 
matter.^ 

§  422.  *  528.  This  Distinction  between  Material  Facts  in  Legal 
and  Equitable  Actions  Sustained  by  the  Courts.  The  existence 
and  necessity  of  this  distinction  between  the  material  facts  to  be 
alleged  in  legal  and  equitable  actions  are  fully  recognized  and 
admitted  by  judicial  opinions  of  the  highest  authority.^  It  also 
prevails,  I  believe,  universally  in  practice.  By  no  judge  has  it 
been  more  accurately  and  exhaustively  discussed  than  by  Mr. 
Justice  S.  L.  Selden  in  two  early  cases  which,  although  without 
the  binding  authority  of  precedents,  have  the  force  of  cogent  and 
unanswerable  reasoning.*^  With  the  practical  conclusions  in 
reference  to  the  nature  of  the  material  facts  that  should  be 
averred  in  an  equitable  complaint  or  petition  at  which  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Selden  arrives,  I  entirely  concur;  his  course  of  argument 
upon  which  those  conclusions  are  based  is  the  same  in  substance 
which  has  been  pursued  in  the  foregoing  paragraphs.  I  wholly 
dissent,  however,  from  his  inference  that  these  results  are  not 
contemplated  by  and  embraced  within  the  single  and  comprehen- 
sive principle  announced  by  the  codes,  that  the  facts  constituting 
the  cause  of  action,  and  they  alone,  must  be  stated.  This  infer- 
ence does  not  follow  from  his  argument,  nor  from  the  final  posi- 
tions which  he  reaches;  it  is  wholly  unnecessary;  and  it  has 
been  rejected  by  judges  who  have  accepted  and  maintained  the 
very  doctrines  concerning  the  nature  of  equitable  pleading  under 
the  code  which  he  so  ably  supports.  It  is  only  by  giving  to  the 
phrase  "facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action"  a  narrow  inter- 
pretation, which  it  was  plainly  not  intended  to  receive,  that  the 
material  facts  of  an  equitable  cause  of  action  can  be  thus  widely 
separated  from  the  issuable  facts  of  a  legal  one.  Both  are  aptly 
described  by  the  phrase  which  is  found  in  all  the  codes.  The 
averment  of  issuable  facts  in  one  class  of  cases,  and  of  the  mate- 
rial facts  affecting  the  remedy  in  the  other  class,  without  the 
details  of  evidence  or  probative  matter  relied  upon  to  establish 

1  [See  Smith  v.  Smith  (1897),  50  S.  C.  2  gge  People   v.  Ryder,  12  N.  Y.  433, 

54,  27  S.  E.  545,  where  the  court  quotes  437 ;  Horn  v.  Ludingcon,  28  Wis.  81,  83 ; 

with  approval  almost  the  entire  section  of  White  v.  Lyons,  42  CaL  279,  282. 

the  text  relative  to  the  difference  between  ^  Rochester    City    Bank    v.    Suydam, 

material  facts  in  equity  and  issuable  facts  5    How.  Pr.  216;    Wooden  v.    Waffle,  6 

at  law.]]  How.  Pr.  145. 


560  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

either,  is  a  necessary  coDsequence  of  the  single  comprehensive 
principle  which  underlies  the  whole  reformed  system. 

§  423.  *  529.  Facts  should  be  alleged  as  they  actually  existed 
or  occurred,  not  their  Legal  Effect.  The  third  and  last  point 
remains  to  be  considered  in  this  general  discussion.  The  issu- 
able facts  in  a  legal  action,  and  the  facts  material  to  the  relief 
in  an  equitable  suit,  should  not  only  be  stated  to  the  complete 
exclusion  of  the  law  and  the  evidence,  but  they  should  be  alleged 
as  they  actually  existed  or  occurred,  and  not  their  legal  effect, 
force,  or  operation.  This  conclusion  follows  as  an  evident 
corollary  from  the  doctrine  that  the  rules  of  law  and  the  legal 
rights  and  duties  of  the  parties  are  to  be  assumed,  while  the 
facts  only  which  call  these  rules  into  operation,  and  are  the  occa- 
sion of  the  rights  and  duties,  are  to  be  spread  u})on  the  record. 
Every  attempt  to  combine  fact  and  law,  to  give  the  facts  a  legal 
coloring  and  aspect,  to  present  them  in  their  legal  bearing  upon 
the  issues  rather  than  in  their  actual  naked  simplicity,  is  so  far 
forth  an  averment  of  law  instead  of  fact,  and  is  a  direct  violation 
of  the  principle  upon  which  the  codes  have  constructed  their 
system  of  pleading.  The  peculiar  method  which  prevailed  at 
the  common  law  has  been  fully  described ;  it  was  undoubtedly 
followed  more  strictly  and  completely  in  certain  forms  of  action 
than  in  others ;  in  a  few  instances  —  as  in  a  special  action  on  the 
case  —  the  declaration  was  framed  in  substantial  conformity  with 
the  reformed  theory.  But  in  very  many  actions,  and  those  in 
constant  use,  the  averments  were  almost  entirely  of  legal  con- 
clusions rather  than  of  actual  facts.  The  familiar  allegations 
that  the  plaintiff  had  "bargained  and  sold,"  or  "sold  and  deliv- 
ered," that  the  defendant  "was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff,"  or 
"had  and  received  money  to  the  plaintiff's  use,"  and  very  fre- 
quently even  the  averment  of  a  promise  made  by  the  defendant, 
may  be  taken  as  familiar  illustrations  from  among  a  great  num- 
ber of  other  similar  phrases  which  were  found  in  the  ordinary 
declarations.  Rejecting  as  it  does  the  technicalities,  the  fictions, 
the  prescribed  formulas,  and  the  absurd  repetitions  and  redun- 
dancies, of  the  ancient  common-law  system,  the  new  pleading 
radically  differs  from  the  old  in  no  feature  more  important  and 
essential  than  this,  that  the  allegations  must  be  of  dry,  naked, 
actual  facts,  while  the  rules  of  law  applicable  thereto,  and  the 
legal  rights  and  duties  arising  therefrom,  must  be  left  entirely 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES   OF   PLEADING.  561 

to  the  courts.  While  this  doctrine  has  been  uniformly  recog- 
nized as  correct  wlien  thus  stated  in  an  abstract  and  general 
manner,  it  has  sometimes  been  overlooked  or  disregarded  in 
passing  upon  the  sufficiency  and  regularity  of  particular  plead- 
ings. Whether  those  decisions  which  have  permitted  the  com- 
mon counts  to  be  used  as  good  complaints  or  petitions,  and  those 
which  have  required  the  promise  implied  by  law  to  be  expressly 
averred  as  though  actually  made,  are  in  conformity  with  this 
doctrine,  will  be  considered  in  subsequent  paragraphs,  and  the 
various  cases  bearing  upon  the  question  will  be  cited  and  dis- 
cussed. It  is  sufficient  for  my  present  purpose  to  state  the 
doctrine  in  its  general  form,  and  to  reserve  its  application  for 
another  portion  of  the  chapter. 

§  424.  *  530.  Cases  Supporting  Doctrine  that  Facts,  not  Legal 
Conclusions,  are  to  be  stated.  As  the  foregoing  analysis  has  been 
exclusively  based  upon  the  text  of  the  codes,  I  shall  now  test 
the  correctness  of  its  conclusions,  and  illustrate  the  extent  and 
application  of  its  general  doctrines,  by  a  reference  to  the  decided 
cases,  following  in  the  arrangement  of  the  subject-matter  the 
order  already  adopted.  The  rule  that  facts  alone  are  to  be 
stated,  to  the  exclusion  of  law  and  of  the  legal  rights  and  duties 
of  the  parties,  has  been  uniformly  accepted  by  the  courts,  and 
has  been  enforced  in  every  variety  of  issues  and  of  special  cir- 
cumstances. In  a  very  recent  decision,  this  general  doctrine  was 
expressed  in  the  following  language :  "  Matter  of  law  is  never 
matter  to  be  alleged  in  pleading.  No  issue  can  be  framed  upon 
an  allegation  as  to  the  law.  Facts  only  are  pleadable,  and  uj)on 
them  without  allegation  the  courts  pronounce  and  apply  the  law. 
This  is  true  alike  in  respect  to  statutes  and  to  the  common  law."  ^ 

1  People   V.    Marlboro  H.   Com'rs,   54  of  the  law,"  and  then  adds  the  language 

N.  Y.  276,  279.     The  question  was  as  to  quoted    in   the  text.     See  also  Comnion- 

the   validity   of  a   certain    statute.     The  wealth  v.  Cook,  8  Bush,  220,  224 ;  Clark 

defendants,    in    their    pleading,   had   ad-  v.  Lineberger,  44  Ind.  223,  228,  229.    The 

mitted  its  validity,  and   that    they  were  material,  issuable  facts,  not  mere  legal  or 

required  by  it  to  do  the  acts  sought  to  be  other  conclusions, — as   illustrations    see 

enforced  by  the  action,  and  had  nowhere  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  Ey.  Co.  v.  Keller, 

raised  any  objection  on  the  record.     The  49  Ind.  211   (in  a  complaint  in  an  action 

adverse  party  claimed  that  this  admission  against  a  railroad    for   killing  plaintiff's 

precluded  the  defendants  from  raising  the  cattle  which  got  on   the  track,  it  is  not 

question   at  the   argument.     Johnson   J.  sufficient  to   allege,  in    reference   to   the 

said:     "The  objection  to   its  [this  ques-  fencing  of  the  track,  "that  the  said  rail- 

tion]  being  raised  is  that  the  defendants  road  was  not  at  the  time  and  place  said 

have,  in  pleading,  admitted  the  obligation  animals  were  killed  fenced  in  by  said  de- 

3G 


562 


CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 


Among  tlie  allegations  which  have  been  condemned  as  legal  con- 
clusions, and  for  that  reason  as  forming  no  material  issue,  and 
which  have  been  rejected  as  failing  to  state  any  element  of  a 
cause  of  action,  the  following  are  given  as  illustrations:  in  an 
action  to  dissolve  a  partnership,  for  an  accounting,  etc.,  the 
averment  that  on  a  day  named,  and  for  a  long  time  previous 
thereto,  the  defendant  and  the  plaintiffs  "were  partners  doing 
business  under  the  firm  name  of  T.  &  C.;"^  in  an  action  to 
restrain  the  removal  of  a  county  seat  under  a  statute  which  was 
claimed  to  be  special  and  therefore  void,  the  allegation  that  "said 
act  is  a  special  law  in  a  case  where  a  general  law  of  uniform 
operation  throughout  the  State  exists,  and  can  be  made  appli- 
cable ;"2  in  an  action  apparently  to  recover  damages  for  the 
wrongful  interference  with  the  plaintiff's  possession   of   certain 


fendant  in  manner  and  form  as  in  the 
statute  provided ") ;  Tronson  v.  Union 
Lu;iib.  Co.,  38  Wis.  202  (in  an  action  of 
replevin  the  averments  that  "  the  taking 
[hy  defendant]  wa.s  wrongful,  and  tlie  de- 
tention unjust,"  are  mei-e  jiropositions  of 
law) ;  Page  ?•.  Kennan,  38  Wis.  ."20  (in 
an  action  to  quiut  title  to  land  tlie  com- 
plaint alleged  that  defendant  claimed  un- 
der certain  deeds,  and  that  her  "  claim 
is  without  foundation  in  law,"  and  "that 
she  has  no  legal  claim  or  lien  u])on  or 
title  or  interest  in  or  to  the  laud  ;  "  A<  W, 
a  mere  legal  conclusion,  and  insufficient 
to  show  the  invalidity  of  defendant's 
title):  Surginer  v.  Paddock,  31  Ark.  528; 
Schilling  v.  Rominger,  4  Col.  100 ;  Clay 
Co  f.  Simonsen,  1  Dak.  403,  430;  Scott  v. 
liohards,  67  Mo.  289 ;  Botey  v.  Griswold, 
2  Mont.  447 ;  Peter.'^on  r.  Koach,  32  Ohio 
St.  374 ;  Pittsburgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  33  id.  384  ;  Scott  v.  B.  &  S.  W.  R. 
Co.,  52  Iowa,  18;  Cooper  v.  French,  52 
id.  531  ;  Ockendeu  v.  Barnes,  43  id.  615; 
Northern  Kan.  T.  Co.  v.  Oswald,  18  Kan. 
336;  Sheridan  v.  Jackson,  72  N.  Y.  170, 
173;  Stack  v.  Beach,  74  Ind.  571  ;  Leach 
V.  Rhoiles,  49  Ind.  291  (in  action  on  a 
contract  a  general  averment  that  there 
was  a  full  and  valuable  consideration,  is  a 
mere  conc-lusion  of  law,  and  not  suflicient ; 
tied  fjH.  is  not  this  the  issuable  allegation  of 
fact?);  Moore  v.  Ilobbs,  79  N.  C.  535 ; 
Estate  of  David  Gharky,  57  Cal.  274  ; 
Pavne  v.  McKinlev,  54   id.  532;    Fite  v. 


Orr's  Ass'n  (Ky.  1886),  1  S.  W.  Rep.  5?2 ; 
McEntee  v.  Cook,  76  Cal.  187  ;  Bowers  v. 
Smith  (Mo.  1892),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  101  ; 
Johnson  r.  Vance,  86  Cal.  128  (alle;rntion 
that  yjlaintiff  is  "  owner  in  fee  simple  "  of 
property  in  dispute  is  statement  of  an  ulti- 
mate fact,  not  of  a  conclusion  of  law) ;  Go- 
ing V.  Dinwiddle,  86  Cal.  633  ;  Mitchell  v. 
Clinton,  99  Mo.  153.  The  complaint  need 
never  anticijjate  any  defences  which  may 
be  set  up  in  the  answer,  nor  contain  alle- 
gations to  meet  them.  Caflin  v.  Taussig. 
7  Hun,  223  ;  Metrop.  L.  Ins.  Co.  r.  Meeker, 
85  N.  Y.  614;  Cohen  v.  Continental  L. 
Ins.  Co.,  69  id.  300,  304 ;  Roth  v.  Palmer, 
27  Barb.  652  ;  Kayser  v.  Sichel,  34  id.  89  ; 
Bliss  r.  Cottle,  32  id.  322  ;  Wygand  v. 
Sichel,  3  Keyes,  120. 

1  Groves  r.  Tallman,  8  Nev.  178.  A 
general  demurrer  to  the  complaint  was 
sustained,  the  court  holding  that  this  alle- 
gation was  a  mere  condu.sion  of  law,  and 
that  the  executed  agreement  of  partner- 
ship should  have  been  set  forth.  The 
decision,  a.s  it  seems  to  me,  is  entirely 
wrong :  the  plaintiff  had  stated  the  issu- 
able fact,  while  the  court  demanded  the 
evidence  :  there  may  have  been  no  written 
contract  of  partnership.  See  Kelsey  v. 
Henry,  48  Ind.  37,  which  fully  sustains 
the  views  expressed  in  this  note. 

2  Evans  v.  Job,  8  Nev.  322,  the  court 
further  holding  that,  when  the  complaint 
alleges  a  mere  conclusion  of  law,  no  an- 
swer to  such  allegation  is  necessary. 


GENKRAL    rillXCIPLES    OF   PLEADING.  563 

land,  the  averment  that  the  plaintiff  "was  entitled  to  the  ex- 
clusive possession  of"  the  premises  in  question;^  in  an  action 
against  a  subscriber  to  the  stock  of  a  corporation  to  be  organ- 
ized, brought  to  recover  the  amount  of  his  subscription,  an 
averment  that  the  "company  was  legally  organized,  into  which 
organization  the  defendant  entered." ^ 

§  425.  *  531.  Same  Subject.  Also,  in  an  action  to  recover  on 
a  policy  of  fire  insurance,  by  the  terms  of  which  the  sum  assured 
did  not  become  payable  until  certain  acts  had  been  done  by  the 
plaintiff  as  conditions  precedent,  an  averment  merely  "that  the 
whole  of  said  sum  is  now  due;  "^  in  an  action  to  restrain  the  col- 
lection of  a  tax  on  the  plaintiff's  land,  an  allegation  that  the 
land  "is  by  the  laws  of  the  State  exempt  from  taxation;"*  in  a 
suit  to  recover  a  stock  subscription  to  a  corporation,  an  allega- 
tion that  the  party  became  a  subscriber  to  the  capital  stock  "by 
signing  and  delivering"  a  specified  agreement;^  an  allegation 
"  that  the  title  of  the  plaintiff  to  said  lots  by  virtue  of  said,  tax 
sale  is  invalid,  from  an  irregularity  in  the  notice  of  such  tax 
sale ;  "  ^  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  judgment  for  a  tax,  an  allega- 
tion "  that  no  notice  was  given  of  the  said  proceedings,  or  any 
of  them,"  which  resulted  in  the  tax;"  in  an  action  brought  to 
recover  land  claimed  by  inheritance  from  a  former  owner,  the 
allegation   that   the   plaintiff  was  "one  of    the    heirs  of"    such 

1  Garner  v.  McCullough,  48  Mo.  318.  *  Quinney  w.  Stockbridge,  33  Wis.  505. 
The  petition  did  not  state  that  the  plain-  There  was  no  other  statement  showing 
tiff  was  or  had  ever  been  in  possession,  that  the  land  was  exempt;  and,  in  order 
and  failed  to  disclose  the  nature  of  his  that  it  should  be  so,  certain  special  cir- 
claim  or  the  source  of  his  right,  the  cumstances  must  have  existed.  Tlie 
allegation  (juoted  being  the  sole  asser-  averment  was  held  to  be  of  no  force  what- 
tion  of  a  right  in  the  land.  It  was  held  ever,  unless  accompanied  by  allegations 
that  no  cause  of  action  was  stated,  and  all  of  the  proper  facts;  and  a  preliminary 
evidence  should  be  exchuled  at  the  trial,  injunction  was  therefore  dissolved  upon 
although  the  defendant  had  answered.  the  complaint  alone. 

2  Hain  ;;.  N.  W.  Gravel  R.  Co.,  41  Ind.  &  Wheeler  v.  Floral  Mill  Co.,  9  Nev. 
196.  This  averment  was  held  to  have  254,  258.  In  an  action  against  the  corn- 
raised  no  issue,  citing  Indianapolis,  C.  &  pany,  it  set  up  the  demand  mentioned  in 
L.  R.  Co.  V.  Robinson,  35  Ind.  380.  the  text  as  a  set-off  or  counter-claim,  al- 

3  Doyle  V.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  44  Cal.  leging  the  plaintiff's  liability  in  the  man- 
264,  268.  The  court  having  decided  that  ner  described.  A  judgment  in  favor  of 
the  comjilaint  did  not  sufficiently  aver  a  the  defendant  was  reversed,  because  there 
performance  of  the  conditions  precedent  was  no  averment  in  the  answer  which 
by  the  plaintiff,  and  so  failed  to  state  a  made  out  a  cause  of  action,  citing  Barron 
cau.se  of  action,  added:  "  The  allegation  r.  Frink,  30  Cal.  486;  Burnett  v.  Stearns, 
that  'the  sum  is  now  due'  may  be  laid  33  Cal.  473. 

out   of   the   case,   inasmuch  as   that  is  a  ^  Wel)b  v.  Bidwell,  15  Minn.  479,  485. 

coiiclusion  of  law  merelv."  '^  Stokes  i\  Geddcs,  46  Cal.  17. 


564  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

former  owner ;^  in  an  action  on  a  contract  where  the  defendant's 
liability  depended  upon  the  performance  of  certain  conditions 
precedent  by  a  third  person,  the  mere  allegation,  without  stating 
any  performance  by  such  person,  that  "  the  defendant  neglected 
and  refused  "  to  perform  the  stipulated  act  on  his  part  "  accord- 
ino-  to  the  terms  of  said  acjreement."^  The  law  of  another  State 
or  countr}^  however,  is  regarded,  for  purposes  of  pleading,  as 
matter  of  fact,  and  must  be  averred  with  so  much  distinctness 
and  particularity  that  the  court  may,  from  the  statement  alone, 
judge  of  its  operation  and  effect  upon  the  issues  presented  in 
the  cause.  Thus,  in  an  action  upon  a  note  executed  and  made 
payable  in  Illinois,  the  allegation,  "that  by  the  law  of  Illinois 
the  defendant  was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  in  tlie  amount  of  such 
note,"  was  held  insuihcient  to  admit  evidence  of  what  the  Illinois 
law  is  in  reference  to  the  subject-matter.^  In  Indiana  the  aver- 
ment, that  the  defendant  "is  indebted"  to  the  plaintiff  in  a 
specified  amount,  is  held  to  be  sufficient.  This  ruling,  however, 
is  not  based  upon  the  general  principles  of  pleading  announced  by 
the  codes,  Ijut  upon  certain  short  forms  authorized  by  the  legis- 
lature, which  were  copied  from  the  ancient  common  counts  in 
assumpsit.*  Examples  similar  to  the  foregoing  might  be  indefi- 
nitely multiplied ;  })ut  these  are  sufficient  to  illustrate  the  action 
of  the  courts,  and  to  show  how  firmly  they  have  adhered  to  the 
doctrine  that  facts,  and  not  law,  must  be  alleged,  and  that  the 
averments  of  legal  conclusions  without  the  facts  from  which  they 
have  arisen  form  no  issues,  state  no  causes  of  action,  admit  no 
evidence,  and  do  not  even  support  a  verdict  or  judgment,  —  in 
short,  that  they  are  mere  nullities.'^ 

1  Larue  c.  Hays,  7  Bush,  50,  53.     Tliis  doctrine  or  rule  relied  upou  must  be  fully 
allegation  was    held    not  to  be  admitted  and  accurately  stated  in  the  pleading.    See 
by  a  faihire  to  deny  it,  citing   Bani<s  v.  Woolsey  v.  Williams,  34  Iowa,  413,  415. 
•lohnson,  4  J.  J.   Marsh.   649;  Currie  v.  *  .lolinson    v.    Kilgore,    39    Ind.    147. 
Fowler,  5  .1.  J.  Marsh.  145.  Tiiese   statutory   forms,   in   my    opinion, 

2  Wilson  V.  Clarlv,  20  Minn.  367,  309.  violate  the  fundamental  princijdes  of 
This  was  declared  to  be  a  mere  conclu-  plcailing  adopted  by  tlie  reformed  pro- 
sion  of  liiw ;  and  as  no  facts  were  stated  cedure,  more  so  even  than  the  ancient 
from  which  it  could  be  inferred,  it  wa.s  a  common  counts.  Tiiis  question  will  be 
nullity.  particularly   examined   in    a    subsequent 

^  Hoots  ('.    Merriwether,  8   Rush,  397,  paragraph. 
401.     As  a  foreign  law  is  a  matter  of  fact, 

the  court  does  not  take  judicial  notice  of  ^  £Facts,  not  Leyal  Conclusions, 

it.  and  if  different  from  that  of  the  forum,  «''«"'<^  ''^  pleaded. 

and  if  it  must  be  invoked  in  order  to  make  Upou  this  general  proposition,  and  in 

out   the  cause   of  action,   the   particular  support  thereof,  .sec  the  following  ca.se.s : 


GENERAL    PKINCIPLES    OF    PLEADING. 


565 


§426. 


*.532.     Cases   Supporting   Doctrine  that  Material,  not  Pro 
bative,  Facts   are  to   be   stated. 


Wabaska  P^lectric  Co.  v.  City  of  Wymore 
(1900),  60  Neb.  199,  82  N.  W.  G26  ;  Wood- 
ward V.  State  (1899),  .58  Neb.  598,  79 
N.  W.  164;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Osborn  (1900), 

60  Neb.  415,  83  N.  W.  357;  Blakeslec  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  lly.  Co.  (1894),  43  Neb.  61, 

61  N.  W.  118;  Ilobinsoiir.  Berkey  (1896), 
100  la.  136, 69  N.  W.  433  ;  Deiini.s  v.  Nelson 
(1893),  55  Miun.  144,  56  N.  W.  589;  Folaud 
V.  Town  of  Frankton  (1895),  142  Ind.  546, 
41  N.  E.  1031 ;  Davis  v.  Clements  (1897), 
148  Ind.  605,  47  N.  E.  105G;  Lanier  v. 
Union  Mortgage  Co.  (1897),  64  Ark.  39, 
40  S.  W.  466;  Malliiickrodt  Chemical 
Works  V.  Nemnich  (1902),  169  Mo.  388, 
69  S..  W.  355  ;  Livingstone  v.  Buff  (1903), 
65  S.  C.  284,  43  S.  E.  678  ;  First  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Myers  (1895),  44  Neb.  306,  62  N.  W. 
459.  " 

But  a  pleading  is  not  rendered  insuffi- 
cient because  in  addition  to  averments  of 
fact  there  are  also  conclusions  of  law : 
Nourse  v.  Weitz  ( 1903),  —  La.  — ,  95  N.  W. 
25  L 

An  averment  of  a  legal  conclusion  is 
not  admitted  by  demurrer  nor  by  failure 
to  deny  it :  Lanier  v.  Union  Mortgage 
Co.  (1897),  64  Ark.  39,  40  S.  W.  466; 
Greer  v.  Latimer  (1896),  47  S.  C.  176,  25 
S.  E.  136;  State  v.  Kanisey  (1897),  50 
Neb.  166,  69  N.  W.  758  ;  Markey  v.  School 
District  (1899),  58  Neb.  479,  78  N.  W.  932  ; 
Hoyer  v.  Ludiugtou  (1898),  100  Wis.  441, 
76  N.  W.  348;  knapp  w.  St.  Louis  (1900), 
156  Mo.  343,  56  S.  W.  1102  ;  Bogaard  v. 
Ind.  Dist.  of  Plainview  (1895),  93  la.  269, 
61  N.  W.  859  ;  Peake  v.  Buell  (1895),  90 
Wis.  508,  63  N.  W.  1053;  Edwards  v. 
Smith  (1897),  102  Ga.  19,  29  S.  E.  129. 

The  objection  tliat  some  of  the  allega- 
tions of  the  complaint  are  mere  legal 
conclusions  is  one  of  form  rather  than  sub- 
stance, and  does  not  render  the  pleading 
subject  to  a  demurrer  for  want  of  facts : 
Harris  v.  Halverson  (1901),  23  Wash. 
779,  63  Pac.  549.  But  in  Mallinckrodt 
Chem.- Works  v.  Nemnich  (1902),  169  Mo. 
388,  69  S.  W.  355,  it  was  held  that  a  legal 
conclusion  rendered  a  pleading  obnoxious 
to  attack  by  general  demurrer.  Same 
rule  stated  in  Ryan  v.  Holliday  (1895), 
110  Cal.  335,  42  Pac.  891,  but  this  case 
was    expressly   overruled   by   Penrose   c. 


Pursuing  the  order  before  indi- 

Winter  (1901),  135  Cal.  289,  67  Pac.  772. 
See  also  Smith  u.  Kaufman  (1895),  3  Okla. 
568,41  Pac.  722.  A  legal  conclusion  ren- 
ders the  pleading  liable  to  attacli  by 
motion  to  make  more  definite  and  certain  : 
Griffith  v.  Wright  (1899),  21  Wash.  494, 
58  Pac.  582.  A  pleading  containing  only 
conclusions  of  law  is  to  be  regarded  as 
irrelevant,  interposed  for  delay  only,  and 
may  be  stricken  out  on  motion  :  Dennis  v. 
Nelson  (1893),  55  Minn.  144,  56  N.  W.  589. 

A  mixed  statement  of  fact  and  legal 
conclusion  may  properly  be  pleaded  :  Liv- 
ingstone V.  Ruff  (1903),  65  S.  C.  284,  43 
S.  E.  678,  quoting  witli  approval  Clarke  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  28  Minn.  71.  So,  also, 
facts,  together  with  the  conclusion  which 
tlie  law  implies  from  them,  may  both 
properly  be  pleaded :  Wetmore  v.  Crouch 
(1899),  150  Mo.  671,  51  S.  W.  738.  But 
it  was  held  in  Manry  v.  WaxelVjaum  Co. 
(1899),  108  Ga.  14,  33  S.  E.  701,  that  where 
a  written  instrument  is  sued  upon,  allega- 
tions in  the  petition  which  merely  sought 
to  construe  it  were  properly  stricken  out. 

Facts  or  conclusions  which  are  pre- 
sumed or  necessarily  implied  from  facts 
pleaded,  need  not  be  alleged :  City  of 
Brookfield  v.  Tooey  (1897),  141  Mo.  619, 
43  S.  W.  387 ;  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Kahn  (1893),  4  Wyo.  364,  34  Pac.  895; 
Bishop  (;.  Middleton  (1894),  43  Neb.  10,  61 
N.  W.  129;  Henke  y.  Eureka  Endowment 
A,ss'n  (1893),  100  Cal.  429,  34  Pac.  1089; 
McMurray-Judge,  etc.  Co.  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis  (1896),  138  Mo.  608,  39  S.  W.  467  ; 
Lord  I'.  Russell  (1894),  64  Conn.  86,29 
AtL  242  ;  Pyle  v.  Peyton  (1896),  146  Ind. 
90,  44  N.  E.  925. 

Conclusions  of  Fact.  Allegations  of  con- 
clusions of  fact  cannot  avail  unless  they 
are  accompanied  by  statements  of  the 
facts  tliemselves  from  wliich  the  court 
may  draw  the  conclusions:  Longshore 
Printing  Co.  v.  Howell  (1894),  26  Ore.  527, 
38  Pac.  547;  Bordeaux  i'.  Greene  (1899), 
22  Mont.  254,  56  Pac.  218.  When  so  ac- 
companied they  are  useful  as  indicating 
the  pleader's  theory  of  his  case  :  Robinson 
V.  Berkey  (1896),  100  la.  136,  69  N.  W.  433. 
Conclusions  do  not  limit  the  evidence 
which  is  admissible :  Allend  v.  Spokane 
Falls,  etc   Ry.  Co.  (1899),  21  Wash.  324, 


566 


CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 


catecl,  the  following  cases  will  explain  and  illustrate  the  second 
doctrine  that  the  principal,  material,  and  issuable  facts  must  be 


58  Pac.  24-1.  Specific  facts  control  general 
stateiiieuts  of  fact :  Frain  v.  Burgett  (1898), 
152  Ind.  55,  50  N.  K.  873. 

Instances  of  Allegations  Held  to  be  Con- 
clusions of  [mw. 

Tliat  money  is    due :    Creecy   v.    Joy 
(1901),  40  Ore.  28,  66  Pac.  295  ;  Penrose  v. 
Winter  (1901),  133  Cal.  289,  67  Pac.  772  ; 
Kyan  v.  Holliday  (1895),  110  Cal.  335,  42 
Pac.  891  ;  Ricliards  v.   Lake  View  Land 
Co.    (1897),   115  Cal.    642,   47   Pac.  683; 
Baldwin   r.   Burt  (1895),  43   Neb.  245,   01 
N.    W.   601.     'That   a   note   is   a  wife's 
separate  estate  :  "  Leahy  v.  Leahy  (1895), 
97  Ky.  59,  29  S.  W.  852.     That  a  wife,  as 
sole  lieir  of  her  husband,  owns  a  cause  of 
action:    Butties  i-.   De  Baun   (1903),   116 
Wis.  323,  93  N.  W.  5.     Tlie  allegations  in 
the  petition  that  the  ordinance  in  question 
was  passed,  "  without  any  legal  warrant  or 
authority  therefor ;  "  that  "  the  passage  of 
said  ordinance  was  a  violation  by  the  city 
of  its  duties  as  trustee  ; "  that  "  the  use 
hv  the  chemical  company  of  the  vacated 
portions  of  tlie  street  is  wholly  illegal ;  " 
that  "  plaintiff  has  no  adequate  remedy  at 
law  ;  "  that  the  "  damages  of  plaintiff  are 
irreparable,"   are    merely   conclusions   of 
law  and  not  averments  of  facts :   Knapp 
V.  St.  Louis  (1900),  156  Mo.  343,  56  S.  W. 
1102.      See   also  State   ex    rel.  v.   Wood 
(1900),  155  Mo.  425,  56  S.  W.  474,  where 
same  rule  is  stated  respecting  allegation 
of  irreparable  injury.     That  there  was  no 
legal  and  sufficient  levy  of  taxes  :  Weston 
V.   Meyers   (1895),  45  Neb.  95.  63  N.  W. 
117.     That  the  tax  deed  under  which  de- 
fendant claims  is  void,  because  the  officers 
who   made    the  a.ssessment  and  executed 
tiie   deed    were   legally    disciualified,  and 
failed  to  publish  jiroper  notice  :  O'Hara  v. 
Parker  (1893),  27  Ore.  156,  39  Pac.  1004; 
^ha!lnon   i>.  Portland   (1900),  38  Ore.  382, 
62  Pac.  30.     An  allegation,  in  an  action  to 
enjoin  tiie  collection  of  a  certain  tax,  that 
"  the  said  board  of  directors  has  no  juris- 
diction   or    |)(jwer    to     appropriate    said 
money    for    said     propo.sed      highway : " 
Bog.iard  V.  Jud.  Dist.  of  Plainview  (1895), 
93  la    269,  61   N.    W.  859.     That  a  sale 
wa.s  made  fraudulently  for  the  purpose  of 
iiindcriag,  delaying  and  defrauding  credit- 
ors :  Coue  V.  Ivinsou  (1893),  4  Wyo.   203, 


33  Pac.  31.     That  a  judgment  was  pro- 
cured by  fraud  and  is  contrary  to   law  : 
Thomas    v.  Markmann    (1895),   43    Neb. 
823,  02  N.  W.  20G.     That  the  execution  of 
a  deed  was  procured  by  fraud  :  First  Nat. 
Bank  of  Sutton   v.  Grosshans  (1901),  61 
Neb.  575,  85  N.  W.  592.     In  an  action  by 
a  mortgagor  to  recover  a  surplus  left  in 
tlie  hands  of  the  sheriff,  an  allegation  that 
"  the  remaining  S51  arising  from  said  sale, 
as  aforesaid,  is  surplus  payable  to  plaintiff, 
who    is   entitled    to    the    same   as   mort- 
gagor, and  by  virtue  of  a  deed  of  convey- 
ance of  said  property  so  sold,  to  her  made 
and  delivered  by  said  Arthur  W.  Clyde  :  " 
Clyde   V.  Johnson  (1894),  4  N.  I).  92,  58 
N.  W.  512.     That  it  was  defendant's  duty 
to  erect  and  maintain  guards  over  a  certain 
window:  Peake  v.    Buell  (1895),  90  Wis. 
508,  63  N.  W.  1053.     That  a  pole,  wiiich 
caused  personal  injuries,  was  "  too  near 
the   track : "     Blackstone    v.    Central   of 
Georgia  Ry.  Co.  (1898),  105  Ga.  380,  31 
S.  E.  90.     Tliat  tlie   plaintiff  had  "  used 
all  the  diligence  he  could  :  "  Edwards  v. 
Smith   (1897),    102   Ga.   19,29   S.  E.   129. 
That  a  certain  fence  is  liable  to  be  blown 
over  on  plaintiff's  buildings  :  Bordeaux  v. 
Greene  (1899),  22  Mont.  254,  56  Pac.  218. 
That  a  corporation  is  the  successor  of 
another,  assumed  all  its  liabilities,  and  is 
liable  for  tiie  payment  of  the  obligations 
sued  on  :  Khorer  v.  Middlesboro  Co.  ( 1S98), 
103  Ky.  146,44  8.  W.448.   That  the  "  said 
1'.  W.  Smith  is  not  now  or  never  ha.s  been 
legally  appointed  assignee  for  J.  A.  New- 
kirk  :  "  Smith  r.  Kaufman  (1895),  3  Okla. 
508,  41  Pac.  722.      That    defendant's  re- 
fusal to   transmit  the  message   tendered 
was    "  witliout      reasonable     grounds :  " 
Kirbyu.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  (1893), 
4  S.  D.  463,  57  N.  W.  202.     That  defend- 
ant put  it  ab.solutely  out  of  his  power  to 
l)erform  his  contract :  Garberius  v.  Koberts 
(1895),    109  Cal.  12.5,  41   Pac.  857.     That 
"  plaintiff   is   not  an  innocent  holder  for 
value  of  said  note  :  "    Voorhees  v.  Fisher 
(1893),  9   Utah,  303.   34  Pac.    64.     That 
plaintiff  has  a  lien  on  certain  cattle  :   Hill 
i:   Campbell   Commission   Co.    (1898),  54 
Neb.    59,   74   N.    W.   38)^.     That   jdaiiitiff 
has  a  special   ownership  in  certain  ])r(ip- 
erty:    Griffing   v.  Curtis  (1897).  50   Neb. 


GENERAL   PRINCirLES    OF    PLEADING. 


567 


pleaded,  and  not  the  details  of  evidentiary  or  probative  matter 
from  which  the  existence  of  the  final  facts  is  inferred.  The 
language  employed  by  the  court  in  an  action  brought  to  restrain 
the  execution  of  tax  deeds  of  the  plaintiff's  land,  on  account  of 
illegality  in  the  proceedings,  furnishes  a  very  instructive  example 
of  such  averments :  "  The  plaintiff  relied  upon  the  absence  of 
preliminary  proceedings  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  tax  sales. 
But  instead  of  averring,  either  of  his  own  knowledge  or  upon 
information  and  belief,  that  such  proceedings  were  not  had,  he 
only  averred  that  he  had  searched  in  the  proper  offices  for  the 
evidence  that  they  were  had,  and  failed  to  find  it.  The  only 
issue  that  could  be  made  upon  such  an  allegation  would  be 
whether  he  had  searched  and  found  the  evidence  or  not,  which 
would  be  entirely  immaterial."  ^     In  pleading  certain  classes  of 


334,  69  N.  W.  964.  That  certain  acts  of 
au  agent  were  within  the  apparent  scope 
of  his  employment :  Hoyer  v.  Ludington 
(1898),  100  Wis.  441,  "76  N.  W.  348. 
That  a  contract  was  not  one  for  the  sale 
of  goods,  but  merely  an  agreement  as  to 
prices  which  should  be  paid  for  goods 
ordered  from  time  to  time:  Gipps  Brew- 
ing Co.  V.  De  France  (1894),  91  la.  108, 
58  N.  W.  1087.  That  plaintiff  is  lessee  of 
premises  and  entitled  to  possession  and  to 
the  rents  payable  from  tenants  :  Harris  v. 
Halverson  (1901),  23  Wash.  779,  63  Pac. 
549.  That  certain  assessments  were  duly 
levied  :  Harlow  v.  Supreme  Lodge  (1901), 
Ky.,  62  S.  W.  1030.  That  a  plat  did  not 
contain  a  dedication  to  the  public  use  of 
certain  streets,  etc.  ;  Bellevue  Imp.  Co.  v. 
Ivayser  (1903),  —  Neb. —,  95  N.  W.  499. 
That  the  Constitution  requires  every  bill 
to  be  read  by  sections  on  three  several 
days,  unless  the  sevei'al  readings  are  dis- 
pensed with  by  two-thirds  vote  :  Laudes  v. 
State  (1903),  —  lud.  — ,  67  N.  E.  189. 

Instances  of  Allegations  Held  not  to  be 
Conclusions  of  Law. 

That  defendant  waived  the  non-pay- 
ment of  the  entire  stock  :  MacFarland  >•. 
West  Side  Improvement  Ass'n  (1898),  56 
Neb.  277,  76  N.  W.  584.  In  a  suit  to  en- 
force payment  of  city  warrants,  an  allega- 
tion that  the  warrants  "  were  registered 
for  payment  according  to  law  by  the " 
city  treasurer  "  at  the  dates  of  their  re- 
s)iective  presentations  :  "  Freeman  v.  City 
of  Huron  (1897),  10  S.  D.  368,  73  N.  W. 


260.  "  That  the  plaintiff  is  the  owner 
and  that  the  property  is  her  sole  and 
separate  property : "  Kemp  v.  Folsom 
(1896),  14  Wash.  16,43  Pac.  1100.  That 
"  he  waived  demand  and  notice : "  Bay 
View  Brewing  Co.  v.  Grubb  (1901),  24 
Wash.  163,  63  Pac.  1091.  That  title  to 
land  is  in  the  United  States  and  is  not 
subject  to  taxation :  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  r. 
Ilenrie  (1901),  63  Kan.  330,  65  Pac.  665  ; 
Security  Co.  v.  Harper  County  (1901),  63 
Kan.  351,  65  Pac.  G60.  That  defendant 
unlawfully  procured  the  arrest  of  plaintiff : 
Reynolds!;.  Price  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W. 
502.  That  an  assessment  was  duly  made 
and  that  notice  thereof  was  duly  given  to 
the  assured :  Miles  v.  Mutual  Reserve 
Fund  Life  Ass'n  (1901),  108  Wis.  421,  84 
N.  W.  159,  criticising  Am.  M.  A.  Soc.  v. 
Helburn,  85  Ky.  1,  where  the  contrary 
was  held.  That  a  warrant  was  duly  and 
legally  signed  :  Stephens  (-.  Spokane  ( 1 895), 
11  Wash.  41,  39  Pac.  266.  That  the  debt 
sued  on  is  the  .same  debt  evidenced  by  a 
certain  note :  Shirley  v.  Stephenson  (1898), 
104  Ky.  518,  47  S.  W.  581.] 

1  Rogers  r.  Milwaukee,  13  Wis.  610, 
61 1.  If  the  plaintiff  had  alleged  that  the 
proceedings  iu  question  had  been  omitted, 
the  facts  stated  by  him  would  have  been 
proper  evidence  in  support  of  the  aver- 
ment. This  case  exhibits  very  clearly  the 
distinction  between  the  ultimate  issuable 
fact  which  cannot  be  changed  in  order 
to  make  out  a  given  cause  of  action,  and 
the  probative  matter  by  wiiich  such  fact 


568 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


issues,  it  is  undoubtedly  difficult  sometimes  to  discriminate 
between  the  final  facts  and  the  probative  matter.  This  is  espe- 
cially true  in  charging  fraud,  which  must  almost  invariably 
consist  of  many  different  circumstances,  some  affirmative  and 
some  negative ;  but  the  rule  should  nevertheless  be  applied.  "  It 
is  not  necessary  nor  proper  for  the  pleader  to  set  out  all  the 
minute  facts  tending  to  establish  the  fraud ;  the  ultimate  facts, 
and  not  the  evidence,  should  be  pleaded."^  An  allegation  of 
mere  evidentiary  matter,  and  not  an  ultimate  or  issuable  fact,  is 
surplusage ;  it  need  not  be  controverted,  and  is  not  admitted  by 
a  failure  to  deny.  As  was  said  in  a  recent  decision,  "  the  matter 
averred  is  not  an  ultimate  fact;  that  is  to  say,  a  fact  which  is 
required  to  be  stated  in  a  complaint,  and  which,  if  not  denied  by 
the  answer,  would  stand  as  admitted;  but  it  is  merely  matter  of 
evidence  which  might  be  stricken  out  of  the  complaint.  "^  If  in 
addition  to  the  issuable  or  material  facts  the  pleading  also  con- 
tains the  details  of  evidence  tending  to  establish  them,  these 
latter  averments  should  be  stricken  out  on  motion  as  surplusage.^ 


is  established,  and  which  may  vary  ac- 
cording to  the  exigencies  of  the  case.  Of 
course  the  omission  of  the  preliminary 
proceedings  must  be  proved,  but  it  could 
be  proved  by  many  different  kinds  of 
evidence.  This  distinction  is  a  certain 
test  by  which  to  determine  whether  any 
given  fact  is  issuable  and  material,  or  is 
only  probative. 

1  Cowin  V.  Toole,  31  Iowa,  513,  516; 
Singleton  i-.  Scott,  1 1  Iowa,  589. 

2  Gates  V.  Salmon,  46  Cal.  361,  379. 
See  also,  as  further  illustrations.  Clay 
Cy.  V.  Siraonsen,  1  Dak.  403,  430;  Scott 
V.  Robards,  67  Mo.  289  ;  Terry  v.  Musser, 
68  id.  477;  Cook  v.  Putnam  Co.,  70  id. 
668 ;  Kansas  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McCormick, 
20  Kan.  107  ;  Harris  v.  Hillegass,  54  Cal. 
463 ;  Elder  v.  Spinks,  53  id.  293  ;  Damb- 
raan  v.  White,  48  id.  439;  Schilling  v. 
Rominger,  4  Colo.  100  (mode  of  allegation 
in  equitable  actions).  The  complaint 
need  not  anticijiate  and  meet  expected 
defences.  Claflin  v.  Taussig,  7  Hun,  223, 
and  cases  cited ;  Metrop.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Meeker.  85  N.  Y.  614;  Cohen  v.  Conti- 
nental Life  Ins.  Co.,  69  id.  300,  304. 

2  King  V.  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.,  45  Ind. 
43  ;  Van  Schaiik  v.  Farrow,  25  Ind.  310; 
Lytle  V.  Lytle,  37  Ind.  281. 


^Ultimate,  not  Probative  Facta,  to  be 
alleged. 

In  support  of  this  general  proposition, 
see  the  following  cases :  Stewart  v.  An- 
derson (1900),  111  la.  329,  82  N.  W.  770; 
Durell  V.  Abbott  (1895),  6  Wyo.  265,  44 
Pac.  647  ;  Markey  v.  School  District  (1899), 

58  Neb.  479,  78  N.  W.  932;  Bee  Publish- 
ing Co.  V.  World  Publishing  Co.  (1900), 

59  Neb.  713,  82  N.  W.  28  ;  McCarville  v. 
Boyle  (1895),  89  Wis.  651,  62  N.  W.  517  ; 
Stephens  v.  Spokane  (1895),  11  Wash.  41, 
39  Pac.  266. 

What  are  Ultimate  Facts  ? 

Meyer  v.  School  Di.«trict  (1893),  4 
S.  D.  420,  57  N.  W.  68:  "  Ar  ultimate  or 
issuable  fact  in  a  pleading  is  one  essential 
to  the  claim  or  defence,  and  wliich  cannot 
be  stricken  from  the  pleading  without 
leaving  it  insufficient.  Such  issuable  facts 
quite  frequently  involve  a  legal  proposi- 
tion also."  Atkinson  v.  Wal)ash  R.  R. 
Co.  (1895),  143  Ind.  501,  41  N.  E.  947: 
The  test  of  the  materiality  of  averments 
is  whether  they  tend  to  constitute  a  cause 
of  action  or  defence.  Culbertson  Irrigat- 
ing, etc.  Co.  V.  Cox  (1897),  52  Neb.  684, 
73  N.  W.  9 :  "A  material  allegation  is 
one  essential  to  a  claim  or  defence  wiiicli 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES    OF   PLEADING. 


569 


There  is  a  class  of  allegations  which  are  necessar}',  Lut  which 
are  not  issuable  in  the  ordinary  meaning  of  this  term  as  already- 
defined,  —  that  is,  the  cause  of  action  is  not  defeated  by  a  failure 
to  prove  them  as  averred,  and  an  omission  to  deny  them  does  not 
admit  their  truth,  but  still  they  must  be  stated,  and  a  complaint 
or  petition  w^ould  be  insufficient,  or  at  least  incomplete,  without 
them.     This  class  includes  in  general  the  statements  of  time,^ 


cannot  be  stricken  from  the  pleading  with- 
out leaving  it  insufticient."  McLean  v. 
City  of  Levviston  (1902),  Idaho,  69  Pac. 
478 :  In  actions  for  negligence,  "  the 
pleader  must  state  all  facts  necessary  to 
inform  the  defendant  of  all  acts  or  omis- 
sions that  are  charged  against  the  defend- 
ant, so  as  to  enable  him  to  make  a  full 
and  complete  defence  thereto." 

"  A  material  fact  not  alleged  is  pre- 
sumed not  to  exist : "  Stillings  v.  Van 
Allstine  (1902),  Neb.,  89  N.  W.  756. 

Consequences  of  Pleading  Evidence. 

McCaughey  v.  Schuette  (1897),  117  Cal. 
223,  46  Pac.  666,  48  Pac.  1088.  Where 
ultimate  facts  are  not  pleaded  but  the 
complaint  contains  averments  of  such 
evidentiary  facts  as  would,  if  proved,  au- 
thorize the  court  in  finding  the  ultimate 
facts,  the  complaint  is  bad  on  general 
demurrer  for  want  of  sufficient  facts. 
The  court  say,  "  To  uphold  such  a  plead- 
ing is  to  encourage  prolixity  and  a  wide 
departure  from  that  defiuiteness,  certainty, 
and  perspicuity  which  is  one  of  the  para- 
mount objects  sought  to  be  enforced  by 
the  code  system  of  pleading.''  This 
decision  seems  opposed  to  the  current  of 
authority  and  is  not  warranted  by  the 
previous  decisions  in  California.  The 
cases  cited  by  the  court  do  not  go  as 
far  as  this  case. 

But,  for  the  contrary  view,  see  Dilla- 
hunty  r.  Railway  Co.  (1894),  59  Ark.  629, 
28  S.  W.  657.  In  this  case,  where  a  fact 
material  to  the  cause  of  action  was  not 
alleged  as  such  in  the  complaint,  but  only 
evidence  of  such  fact  was  alleged,  a  demur- 
rer on  the  ground  that  it  did  not  state 
facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of 
action  was  overruled.  It  was  held  that 
the  proper  practice  was  to  interpose  a 
motion  to  make  more  definite  and  certain. 
So  in  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hemingway 


(1902),  63  Neb.  610,  88  N.  W.  673,  it  was 
held  that  the  remedy  for  argumentative 
pleading  was  by  motion,  not  demurrer. 

Facts  within  Knowledge  of  Opposite  Parti/. 

In  Brashear  v.  City  of  Madison  (1895), 
142  Ind.  685,  36  N.  E.  252,  the  court  said  : 
"  The  true  rule,  as  we  understand  it,  is 
that  facts  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge 
of  the  party  against  whom  they  should  be 
pleaded,  and  not  accessible  to  the  pleader, 
may  be  dispensed  with,  but  this  may  not 
be  done  without  showing  that  such  facts 
are  so  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of 
the  opposite  party,  and  not  accessible  to 
the  pleader.  .  .  .  Under  our  code,  the  bur- 
den rests  upon  the  pleader  to  state  in  a 
plain  and  concise  manner  the  facts  re- 
quiring the  relief  demanded,  and  to  be 
excused  from  this  duty  he  must  allege 
that  such  facts  are  beyond  hfs  reach  and 
not  w^ithin  his  knowledge."] 

1  [[Railway  Co.  v.  State  (1894),  59 
Ark.  165,  26  "s.  W.  824.  Where  plaintiff 
alleged,  in  suing  for  a  penalty,  that  on 
the  24M  of  February,  1889,  at  about  11 
o'clock  A.M.,  the  defendant  on  a  certain 
engine  of  a  passenger  train  ffoing  south 
failed  to  ring  bell  or  sound  whistle,  and 
proved  on  the  trial  that  in  the  spring  of 
1889,  on  a  certain  engine  of  a.  freight  train 
going  north  the  failure  occurred,  held  that 
there  was  a  total  variance.  The  court 
discusses  the  allegation  and  proof  of  time, 
and  holds  that  the  plaintiff  must  make 
such  allegation  specific  and  establish  it  by 
proof,  in  order  to  advise  the  defendant 
what  it  is  to  meet  on  the  trial.  In  the 
following  cases  it  was  held  that  the  time 
was  immaterial,  and  need  not  be  proved  as 
laid:  Bancroft  Co.  v.  Haslett  (1895),  106 
Cal.  151,  39  Pac.  602  (date  of  conversion)  ; 
Carrier  v.  Bernstein  (1898),  104  la.  572,  73 
N.  W.  107G  (date  of  illegal  .sale  of  intoxi- 
cating liquors    in    action    for  penalty) ; 


570  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

place, ^  value,-  quantity,  amounts,^  and  the  like;  although,  under 
peculiar  circumstances,  the  allegation  of  any  one  of  these 
matters  may  become  in  ever}'  sense  of  the  term  issuable  and 
material.  Ordinarily,  however,  this  is  not  so.  The  rule  thus 
given  prevailed  in  the  common-law  pleading,  and  has  not  been 
changed  by  the  new  procedure.  Thus,  for  example,  in  an  action 
for  the  conversion  of  chattels,  the  statement  of  their  value  is  not 
issuable;  failure  to  deny  does  not  admit  its  truth,  nor  exclude 
evidence  as  to  the  real  value.* 

§  427.  *  533.  Instances  of  Allegations  Approved  or  Condemned 
by  the  Courts.  The  decisions  which  follow  in  this  and  one  or 
two  subsequent  paragraphs  are  cited  in  order  to  furnish  some 
examples  of  allegations  which  have  been  judicially  tested  and 
pronounced  sufficient  or  insufficient,  as  the  case  may  be.  A  few 
such  particular  instances  will  better  illustrate  the  general  doc- 
trine of  the  codes,  and  will  more  clearly  explain  the  requisite 
form  and  nature  of  issuable  and  material  averments  than  can  be 
done  by  any  other  method,  either  of  description  or  of  argument. 
In  an  action  upon  a  guaranty  of  a  note,  the  objection  was  raised 
by  the  defendant  that  the  complaint  failed  to  state  any  cause  of 
action.  It  set  out  a  note  payable  to  the  defendant  which  fell 
due  October  1,  1867,  and  alleged  "that  on  the  9th  of  October, 
1867  [after  it  was  due],  the  defendant,  for  value  received,  trans- 
ferred said  note  to  the  plaintiff,  and  then  and  there  guaranteed 
the  payment  thereof  by  his  written  guaranty,  indorsed  thereon  as 
follows:  'For  value  received,  I  hereby  guarantee  the  payment  of 
the  within  note  when  due,  October  9,  1867 ; '  and  although  said 
note  became  due  and  payable  before  the  commencement  of  this 
action,  yet  the  said  makers  of  said  note,  nor  the  said  defendant, 

Delsman  v.  Friedlander  (1901),  40  Ore.  .3.3,  Cincinnati,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  McLain  (1897), 

66    Pac.   297  (date  of  execution   and   in-  148  lud.  188,  44  N.  E.  306;  Au.sic  v.  KuW- 

dorsement  of  note  ."sued  on).     See  subject  way  Co.  (1901),  10  N.  I).  215,  86  N.  W . 

Time,  ill  note  on  Necessity  and  Form  of  719;  Coulter  c.  Great  Nortliern   Ry.  Co. 

Particular  Allegations,  p.  687.]  (1896),  5  N.  1).  568,  67  N.  \V.  1046.] 

1  QFor  ca,ses  holding  that  there   is  no  ^  [^Plumb  v.  Griffin    (1901).  74  Conn, 

material  variance  where  there  is  a  differ-  132,  50  Atl.  1  ;  Derrick  r.  Cole  (1894),  60 

ence  between  the    place  allegeil  and  that  Ark.  394,  .30   S.    W.  760;    Campbell    v. 

proved,  see   Barrett    r.    Village  of  Ham-  Brosius  (1893),  36  Neb.    792,   55    N.   W. 

mond  (18'J4),  87  Wis.  654,  58  N.  W.  1053  ;  215.] 

J'rewittj'.  Mi.ssouri,oto.  Hy.  Co.  (1896),  134  »  QDenn  v.  Peters  (1900),  36  Ore.  486, 

Mo.  615,  .36  S.  W.  667.  59  Pac.  1109.] 

For  cases  holding  that  such  difference  ■•  Cliicago  &  .S.  VV.  U.  Co.  v.  N.  W.  U. 

does  constitute    a  material    variance,  see  Packet  Co.,  38  Iowa,  377,  382. 


GENERAL    riilNClPLES   OF    I'LKADING.  571 

have  paid  the  same,  nor  any  part  thereof;  that  the  plaintiff  is 
the  owner  and  holder,"  etc.,  stating  the  amount  due,  and  making 
the  usual  demand  of  judgment.     The  defendant  claimed  that  the 
complaint  did  not  state  a  cause  of   action    because  it  failed  to 
allege  that  the  amount  due  is  due  on  the  note  and  guaranty  or 
on  the    guaranty,  or  from    the   defendant   to  the  plaintiff,  and 
failed   to  allege   that  the    maker  had  not   paid  the    note ;    also 
because  the  guaranty  being  executed  after  the  note  became  due, 
and    stipulating    payment   ivhen   due,    is   impossible    and    void. 
After  disposing  of  the  last  objection  by  holding  that  the  guaranty 
was  payable  at  once,  the  court,  by  applying  the  rule  of  favorable 
construction  prescribed  by  the  code,  pronounced  the  complaint 
sufficient.^     In  an  action  against  a  railroad  company  for  killing 
the  plaintiff's  horses,  which  had  strayed  upon  the  track  and  been 
run  over,  the  only  negligence  charged  upon  the  defendant  at  the 
trial  was  in  reference  to  its  construction  and  maintaining  of  its 
fences  through  which  the  animals  escaped  and  reached  the  track. 
The  sole  allegation  of  the  complaint  was  that  the  defendant  "so 
carelessly  and  negligently  ran  and  managed  the  said  locomotive 
and  cars, 'and  the  said  railroad  track,  grounds,  and  fences,  that 
its    said   locomotive    and    cars    ran   against   and    over   the   said 
horses."      It   was    not   even    stated   that   the    animals    escaped 
through   the  fences.     In   pronouncing  upon   the   sufficiency  of 
this  averment,   it  was  said  by  the  court   that  the  best  possible 
construction  for  the  plaintiff  which  could  be  put  upon  the  lan- 
guage was  "  that  the  defendant  so  negligently  managed  the  fences 
that  its  train  ran  over  the  horses,"  and  that,   even    under  the 
liberal  rule  prescribed  by  the  codes,  this  could  not  be  taken  as 
alleging  a  cause  of  action  for  negligently  constructing  the  fences, 

1  Gunn  V.  Madigan,  28  Wis.  loS,  163,  the  aid  of  that  rule  to  enable  us  to  hold 

164.      The   opiniou  of    the    court,    after  that  it  is  a  good  pleading.     It  sets  out  the 

stating   the   positions  of  the    defendant's  contract  and  the  alleged  breach  thereof, 

counsel,  proceeded :  "  The  rule  practically  the  interest  of  the  plaintiff  and   the  lia- 

applied  by  him  is,  that  a  pleading  must  l)ility  of  the  defendant,  and  demands  the 

be  construed    most    strictly   against    the  proper  judgment.     Ought  we  to  demand 

pleader.      He   seems   to    have    forgotten  more  ? "      The   only    real    defect   of   the 

that  this  stern  rule  of  the  common  law  is  pleading  is,  that,  from   the  grammatical 

repealed   by  the  code,  and  in  its  place  a  construction  of  a  single  clause,  it  does  not 

more   beneficent   one    has    been   enacted,  allege  that  the  note  was  not  paid.     "  Yet 

Looking  at  the  complaint  in  the  light  of  the  said  makers  of  said  note,  nor  the  saiil 

this  new  rule,  it  seems  to  us  that  it  states  defendant,   have   paid   the    same."     It   is 

a  cause  of  action.     Indeed,   we  are   not  thus  made  to  aver  that  the  makers  have 

quite  sure  that  it  is  necessary  to  invoke  paid  it. 


572  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

or  suffering  them  to  be  out  of  repair,  so  that  the  animals  escaped 
through  them  on  to  the  track.  ^ 

§  428.  *  534.  Same  Subject.  In  an  action  for  trespass  to  hind, 
the  petition  stated  that  "plaintiff  by  virtue  of  a  contract  -with 
one  E.  was  entitled  to  the  exclusive  possession  of  "  the  premises, 
"  that  subsequently  to  this  contract  the  premises  were  purchased 
by  the  defendant  with  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff's  rights,  tliat 
the  defendant  forcibly  took  possession  and  excluded  the  plain- 
tiff," but  did  not  allege  tliat  the  plaintiff'  was  ever  in  possession, 
nor  the  relation  which  E.  bore  to  the  land,  nor  the  terms  of  the 
contract  with  him,  nor  that  defendant's  acts  Avere  Avrongful. 
This  petition,  it  Avas  held,  stated  no  cause  of  action,  and  was 
properly  dismissed  at  the  trial. ^  In  an  action  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  of  land,  the  plaintiff  obtained  a  preliminary  injunction 
to  restrain  the  removal  of  machinery  which  had  been  so  affixed' 
to  the  land  as  to  become  part  of  the  freehold.  A  motion  was 
made  on  the  pleadings  to  dissolve  the  injunction  on  the  ground 
that  the  complaint  contained  no  allegations  which  could  be  made 
the  basis  of  that  relief.  The  clause  relied  upon  by  the  plaintiff 
was  the  following:  That  the  defendants  had  erected  on  the 
premises  a  manufacturing  establishment,  "and  put  therein  ma- 
chinery which  had  become  part  and  parcel  thereof,"  and  that 
"among  other  machinery  which  they  put  therein  was  a  steam- 
engine,"  etc.,  enumerating  other  articles.  This  was  held  to  be  a 
sufficient  averment  that  the  engine,  etc.,  had  become  part  of  the 
realty.  If  the  defendants  desired  a  more  explicit  allegation  they 
should  have  moved  for  that  purpose,  the  manner  of  raising  the 
objection  which  they  had  adopted  being  tantamount  to  a  de- 
murrer for  want  of  sufficient  facts.^  The  complaint,  in  an  action 
on  a  note  against  the  maker  and  indorsers,  alleged  several  suc- 
cessive indorsements  until  it  was  thus  indorsed  and  transferred 
to  one  M.,  but  omitted  to  state  an  indorsement  and  transfer  from 
him  to  the  plaintiff.  It  contained,  however,  the  following  aver- 
ment, "  that  the  plaintiff  is  now  the  lawful  owner  and  liolder  of 

1  Autisdel  v.  Chicago  &  X.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  suits  and  issuable  facts  in  legal  actions. 
26  Wis.  145,  147.  A  failure  to  prove  this  special  averment 

2  (uirner  v.  McCuUough,  48  Mo.  .318.  would  not  defeat  the  cau.se  of  action  ;  it 

3  Kimball  c.  Darling,  .32  Wis.  675,  084.  would  simply  modify  and  limit  the  amount 
The  allegation  in  question  is  an  admira-  of  relief  to  be  obtained  by  the  plaintiff; 
hie  illu.'Jtration  of  the  di.stinctiou  between  but  it  was  certainly  a  necessary  allegation 
facts   material    to   the  remedy   in    ecpiity  fur  tliat  jjurpo.se. 


GENERAL  rRINCIPLES  OF  PLEADING.  573 

the  said  note,  and  the  defendants  are  justly  indebted  to  him 
tliereon,"  etc.  This  was  held  to  be  a  sufficient  statement  of  the 
plaintiff's  title ;  the  defect,  if  any,  was  one  which  should  be  cured 
by  motion  to  make  the  pleading  more  definite  and  certain.^  The 
material  portion  of  the  complaint  in  an  action  for  work  and  labor 
simply  stated  that  the  plaintiff  performed  w^ork  "  for  the  defend- 
ant at  an  agreed  price  of  $26  per  month."  It  was  objected  on 
demurrer  that  no  request  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  was 
alleged,  but  the  pleading  was  held  to  be  sufficient  under  the  rule 
of  construction  adopted  by  the  codes. ^  In  an  action  on  a  town 
treasurer's  official  bond,  the  complaint,  after  setting  out  the 
bond,  averred  the  breach  thereof  in  the  following  manner,  simply 
negativing  the  conditions:  "He  has  not  duly  and  faithfully  per- 
formed the  duties  of  his  office,  and  has  not  faithfully  and  truly 
accounted  for  and  paid  over  according  to  law  all  the  state  and 
county  taxes  which  came  into  his  hands ;  "  but  it  did  not  allege 
that  any  such  taxes  had  ever  come  into  his  hands.  This  com- 
plaint was  pronounced  fatally  defective  on  demurrer,  as  the  facts 
constituting  the  breach  should  have  been  pleaded."^ 

§  429.  *  535.  Same  Subject.  The  petition  in  an  action  against 
H.  as  maker  and  C.  as  indorser  of  a  note  set  out  the  note  made 
by  H.  payable  to  bearer  and  a  guaranty  thereon,  "I  guarantee 
the  payment  of  the  within  note  to  C.  E.  [the  plaintiff']  or  order," 
signed  by  C,  and  added:  "The  defendant  H.  is  liable  on  said 
note  as  maker,  and  the  defendant  C.  as  indorser  and  guarantor. 
The  plaintiff  C.  E.  is  the  holder  and  owner  of  said  note.  There 
is  due  from  the  defendants  to  the  plaintiff  on  said  note  the  sum 
of,"  etc.  On  demurrer  by  the  defendant  C,  he  Avas  held  to  be 
absolutely  liable  as  a  guarantor,  and  that  under  the  liberal  rule 
of  construction  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  imported  a  cause 
of  action,  and  w^ere  sufficient.*     In  an  action  by  the  vendee  for 

1  Reeve  v.  Fruker,  32  Wis.  243.  *  Clay  v.  Edgerton,   19  Ohio  St.  549. 

-  Joubert   v.   Carli,   26  AYis.  594,  per  The  court,  after  stating  that  the  defendant 

Paiue  J.:  "The  allegation  that  one  has  C.  was  absolutely  liable  as  a  guarantor, 

performed  work  for  another  at  an  agreed  added   that   the  allegations    above  stated 

price  per  mouth  or  per  day,  must  be  held  implied  a  transfer  of  the  note  from  him 

to  fairly  import  that  the  agreement  was  to  the  plaiutiff,    and   a  consideration  by 

prior  to  the  performance  of  the  work,  and  means  of  such  transfer.     C.  is  thus  shown 

that   the    work   was    done    in    pursuance  to  be  au  indorser,  and  is,  as  it  appears, 

of  it."  therefore  held  liable  as  a  guarantor.    This 

3  Wolff  r.  Stoddard,  25  Wis  503,  505;  decision,  in  my  opinion,  cannot  be  sup- 
Franklin  Tp.  Sup.  V.  Kirby,  25  Wis.  498.  ported  on  principle.  It  is  such  ruling  as 
Dixon  C.  J.  dissented  in  both  cases.  this  that  destroys  the  scientific  character 


574  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

fraudulent  representations  miide  on  a  sale,   the  complaint  must 
allege  that  the  plaintiff  relied  upon  them;    and  the  absence  of 
sucli  an  averment  will  not  be  supplied  by  a  statement  of  mere 
evidentiary  matter  tending  to  show  the  existence  of  that  material 
fact,  unless  the  evidence  so  stated  is  conclusive.^     In  an  action 
brought  to  recover  damages  for  the  conversion  of  chattels,  the 
complaint  was  substantially  as  follows:    That  the  plaintiff  was 
on,  etc.,  the  owner  of  certain  chattels;  that  he  leased  them  to 
one  S.  by  a  written  lease,  in  which  he  reserved  the  right  to  take 
l^ossession  of  them,  and  to  terminate  the  letting,  whenever  he 
should  deem  himself  unsafe,  or  that  the  chattels  were  not  well 
taken  care  of;  that  S.  took  possession  under  the  lease;  that  the 
defendant,  who  is  a  United  States  marshal,  seized  them  while 
thus    in    the    possession  of   S.    under  a  process   in   bankruptcy 
against  S.  ;    that  plaintiff  demanded  them  from   the  defendant, 
who  refused,   etc. ;    that  the  plaintiff    demanded  the  possession 
from  the  defendant  "on  the  ground    that  the  plaintiff   deemed 
himself  unsafe,  and  did  not  think  that   the    property  was  well 
taken  care  of;"  and  that  the  defendant  had  converted  the  same 
to  his  own  use.     The  complaint  did  not  contain  any  further  or 
more  express  statement  that  the  plaintiff  did  as  a  matter  of  fact 
deem  himself  unsafe.     A  demurrer  for  want  of  facts  was  sus- 
tained, and  the  pleading  was  held  insufficient  because  it  did  not 
show  a  right  of  possession  in  the  plaintiff  when  the  action  was 
brought,  in  that  it  failed  to  allege  any  fact  entitling  him  to  ter- 
minate the  letting,  and  to  resume  possession  of   his  property. ^ 
The  petition  in  an  action  for   conversion    alleged  that   the  de- 
fendant "had  in  his  possession,  and  under  his  control,  $5,000  in 
money,  and  $10,000  in  hardware,  stoves,  etc.,  of  the  money  and 

and  usefulness  of   the   reformed   system,  amonilmcnt  on  a  motion  to  make  it  more 

and  tends  to  bring  it  into  discredit.  dotinitc  and  certain. 

1  Goings  V.  White,  33  Ind.  125.     This  -  Hatliaway  v.  Quinby,  1   N.  Y.  S.  C. 

decision    assumes    that,    although    in    ac-  386.     The  construction  given  to  the  oom- 

cordance  with  the  general  doctrine,    the  plaint  in  this   case  was   certainly  severe 

principal  fact  and  not  the  evidence  of  it  and  technical,  and  hardly  in  accordance 

should  be  pleaded,  yet  a  statement  of  the  with  the  rule  laid  down  in  the  code.     The 

evidence  mni/  untier  certain  circumstances  objection  is   for    incomjilotcness   and    in- 

be  suflicient  to  raise  a  substantial  issue,  definiteness  of  the  allegation.     The  j)lain- 

If  the  principal  fact  be  not  alleged,  but  tiff  certainly  does  state,  although  perhaps 

the   details   of    evidence   are    given,  and  in  a  jiartial  manner,  that  lie  deemed  hiin- 

thcse  are  positive  and  conclusive  in  their  self  unsafe.     A  motion  was  certainly  more 

nature,  the  pleailing  will  not  be  bail  ou  appropriate  than  a  demurrer. 
demurrer,  although  it  will  be  subject  to 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES    OF    PLEADING.  575 

property  owned  by  the  plaintiff,"  and  converted  tlie  same.  This 
was  declared,  on  a  motion  to  make  the  petition  more  definite  and 
certain,  to  be  a  sufficient  averment  that  the  money  and  goods 
were  the  property  of  the  plaintiff.  ^  If  an  action  is  brouglit  on  a 
bail  bond  given  in  a  criminal  proceeding,  the  complaint  should 
allege  that  the  person  was  released  from  custody  upon  the  execu- 
tion and  delivery  of  the  undertaking,  and  a  pleading  omitting 
this  statement  was  held  bad.^  Where  a  tender  is  essential  to 
the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  the  complaint  must  either  aver  it 
in  express  terms,  or  must  state  a  sufficient  excuse  for  omitting 
it.  In  such  a  case  the  plaintiff  alleged  "that  he  has  been  ready 
and  willing  during  all  the  time  aforesaid,  and  has  offered,  to 
accept  and  take  said  conveyance,  and  to  pay  the  balance  of  said 
purchase-money."  This  averment  was  pronounced  to  be  insuffi- 
cient, and  the  complaint  was  held  bad  on  demurrer,  as  it  neither 
stated  a  tender,  nor  an  excuse  for  not  making  a  tender.^  In 
actions  brought  to  recover  damages,  an  allegation  that  damages 
have  been  sustained  is  indispensable.  As  was  said  by  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  California  in  a  late  decision,  "it  is  not  alleged 
in  the  complaint  that  the  plaintiff  has  sustained  damages,  and 
therefore  he  is  not  entitled  to  judgment  for  damages."* 

1  Sturman  v.  Stone,  31  Iowa,  1 15.  Mo.  400  ;  Le  May  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  105 

2  Los  Angeles  Cy.  v.  Babcock,  45  Cal.     Mo.  361 ;  plaintiff'.s,  Higgins  v.  Jeff'erson- 
252.  ville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52  id.  110;  Toledo,  W. 

8  Englander   v.   Rogers,  41   Cal.   420,  &  W.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Harris,  49  id.  119  ;   Hath- 

422.  away  v.  Toledo,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  46  id.  25  ; 

■»  Bohall  w.  Diller,  41  Cal.  .532.  See  also  Jefferson  ville,  M.  &  R.  Co.  v.  Eowen,  40 
Bradley  w.  Aldrich,  40  N.  Y.  504,  and  si(p?a,  id.  545;  Durgin  v.  Neal,  82  Cal.  595; 
§  *  84,  note  3  ;  and  comp.  Graves  v.  Spier,  Young  v.  Shickle,  H.  &  H.  Iron  Co.,  103 
58  Barb.  Si9,  supra,  §*  81,  note  2.  The  Mo.  324;  Lafayette  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Huff- 
following  cases  furnish  illustrations  of  man,  28  id.  287  ;  Higley  ?-.  Gilmer,  3  Mont, 
allegations  held  to  be  sufficient  or  insuffi-  90 ;  in  slander  and  lihel,  Roberts  v.  Lovell, 
cient  in  a  variety  of  ordinary  actions  :  of  38  Wis.  211  ;  Hanuing  v.  Bassett,  12  Bush. ' 
fraud,  Smith  v.  Nelson,  62  N.  Y.  286  ;  361  ;  Harris  v.  Zanone,  93  Cal.  59  ;  of 
Jones  V.  Frost,  51  Ind.  69;  Arnold  r.  daynages,  Argotaingev  y.  Vines,  82  N.  Y. 
Baker,  6  Neb.  134;  Nicolai  v.  Lyon,  8  308;  Ferguson  v.  Hogan,  25  Minn.  135; 
Oreg.  56 ;  Lafever  v.  Stone,  55  Iowa,  49  ;  Johnson  v.  C,  R.  I.  &  P.  R.  Co.,  50  Iowa, 
Ockenden  v.  Barnes,  43  id.  615;  Pence  r.  25;  Comer  v.  Knowles,  17  Kan.  436; 
Croar,  51  Ind.  329  ;  Hess  v.  Young,  59  Ind.  Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Milligan, 
379  ;  Sacramento  Sav.  Bank  v.  Hynes,  50  50  Ind.  393  ;  Prescott  v.  Grady,  91  Cal. 
Cal.  105;  Hoester  v.  Sammelmann,  101  518;  Brown  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  J.  R.  Co., 
Mo.  619;  of  vegiigpnce,  defendant's,  Pitts-  99  Mo.  310;  actions  on  express  contracts, 
burgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.  v.  Nelson,  51  Ind.  performance  of  conditions,  Preston  v. 
150;  St.  Louis  &  S.  E.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Mathias,  Roberts,  12  Bush,  570  ;  Averbeck  v.  Hall, 
50  id.  65;  Smith  v.  Buttner,  90  Cal.  95;  14  id.  505;  Andreas  u.  Holcombe,  22  Minn. 
Pope  V.  Kansas  City  Cable  Ry.   Co.,  99  339 ;  Livesey  v.  Omaha  Hotel  Co.,  5  Neb. 


576 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


^  430.  *  536.  Attitude  of  Courts  in  Instances  Cited  largely  Due 
to  Liberal  Rule  of  Construction.  The  cases  contained  in  the  last 
three  paragraphs,  and  from  which  quotations  have  been  made, 
were  not  selected  as  examples  of  proper  pleading  according  to 
the  principles  established  by  the  reformed  procedure;  on  the 
contrary,  most  of  those  which  were  sustained  by  the  courts 
escaped  condemnation  only  by  applying  the  liberal  rule  of  con- 
struction prescribed  in  the  codes.  These  decisions  are  given 
rather  to  show  how  far  a  pleading  may  disregard  the  require- 


50 ;  Estabrook  v.  Omaha  Hotel  Co.,  5  id. 
76  ;  Lowry  v.  Magee,  52  Ind.  107  ;  Rhodes 
V.  Alameda  Co.,  52  Cal.  350;  Smith  r. 
Moha,  87  Cal.  489  ;  Ehrlich  v.  JFAna.  L. 
Ins.  Co.,  103  Mo.  231  ;  work  and  ma- 
terials, Steplienson  v.  Ballard,  50  Ind. 
176;  Wolf  V.  Scofield,  38  id.  175;  the 
consideration,  Leach  v.  Rhodes,  49  id. 
291  ;  a  written  instrument,  Waukon  &, 
:Miss.  R.  Co.  1-.  Dwyer,  49  Iowa,  121  ; 
Brown  i-.  Champlin,  66  N.  Y.  214,  218  ; 
Pettit  ('.  Hamh-u,  43  Wis.  314 ;  White  v. 
Soto,  82  Cal.  654  (modification  of  written 
contract  must  be  pleaded)  ;  McMenomy 
V.  Talbot,  84  Cal.  279 ;  non-payment, 
Roberts  i-.  Treadwell,  50  Cal.  520 ;  Grant 
V.  Sheerin,  84  Cal.  197  ;  Eliot  v.  Eliot,  77 
Wis.  634  ;  Tracy  v.  Tracy,  59  Hun,  1  ;  20 
Civ.  Pro.  R.  98 ;  Humphrey  v.  Fair,  79 
Ind.  410;  Singleton  i-.  O'Blenis,  125  Ind. 
151  ;  indebtedness.  Pine  Valley  v.  Unity, 
40  Wis.  632  ;  of  a  partnership,  Stixr.  Mat- 
thews, 63  Mo.  371;  Kilsey  v.  Henry,  48 
Ind.  47  ;  Jor  obtaininrj  an  injunction,  Wells, 
Eargo,  &  Co.  v.  Coleman,  53  Cal.  416; 
Boehme  v.  Sume,  5  Neb.  80  ;  Thorn  i-. 
Sweeney,  12  Nev.  251  ;  Portland  v.  Baker, 

8  Ore.  356 ;  of  time,  Balch  v.  Wilson,  25 
Minn.  299  ;  Leihy  v.  Ashland,  etc.  Co.,  49 
Wis.  165;  Cohn  v.  Wright,  89  Cal.  86; 
of  compliance  with  statutory  requirements, 
Biroa  v.  St.  Paul  Water  Com'rs,  41  Minn. 
519  ;  in  miscellanf-ons  rases,  Calvin  v.  llun- 
can,  12  Bush,  101  (action  on  vendor's 
lien);  Mitchell  r.  Mitchell,  61  N.  Y.  398 
(of  adultery)  ;  Rhodes  v.  Alameda  Co.,  52 
Cal.  350  (against  a  county) ;  Wiebbold  i-. 
Hermann,  2  .Mont.  609  (name  of  party) ; 
Orr  W.  Ditch  Co.  r.  Larcombe,  14  Nev. 
.53  (in  intcrjdeader)  ;    Broome  v.  Taylor, 

9  Hun,  155  (against  a  married  woman); 
Horn  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  38  Wis. 


463  (a  private  statute) ;  Pittsburgh,  C.  & 
St.  L.  R.  Co.  r.  Theobald,  51  Ind.  246 
(against  a  railroad  for  injury  to  a  passen- 
ger) ;  Crawford  v.  Neale,  56  Cal.  32  (a 
guardian  ad  liteni) ;  Darrah  v.  Gow,  77 
Mich.  16  (defects  in  workmanship  must 
be  specified)  ;  York  v.  Rockwood,  132 
Ind.  358  (action  to  set  aside  fraudulent 
conveyances) ;  Nordholt  v.  Nordholt,  87 
Cal.  552  (duress) ;  Chicago  &  O.  Coal, 
etc.  Co.  V.  Norman  (Oiiio,  1892),  32  N.  E. 
Rep.  857  (injury  to  employee  by  defective 
appliances);  Brown  r.  Brown  (Ind.  1893), 
32  N.  E.  Rep.  1128  (partition).  The  fol- 
lowing cases  furnish  examples  of  com- 
plaints or  petitions  in  some  commiMi 
species  of  actions  which  have  been  sus- 
tained ;  in  ejectment,  Sears  v.  Taylor, 
4  Col.  38 ;  Johnston  v.  Pate,  83  N.  C.  1 10 ; 
Thompson  v.  Wolfe,  6  Ore.  308;  Bent- 
ley  V.  Jones,  7  id.  108;  Austin  v.  Schluy- 
stcr,  7  Hun,  275  ;  for  a  conversion,  Wombie 
V.  Leach,  83  N.  C.  84 ;  Johnson  v.  Oreg. 
Nav.  Co.,  8  id.  35;  Pease  v.  Smith,  61 
N.  Y.  477  ;  Johnson  v.  Ashland  Co.,  44 
Wis.  119  ;  for  breach  of  contract  ,Va.rtT'u\ge 
V.  Blanchard,  23  Minn.  69  ;  Usher  i-.  Ileatt, 
18  Kan.  195;  ou  ]>romissory  Ho^es,  Adams 
J-.  Adams,  25  Minn.  72 ;  Harris  Man.  Co. 
r.  Mar.*h,  49  Iowa,  11  ;  Abiel  i\  Harring- 
ton, 18  Kan.  2.53;  Durland  i.-.  Pitcairn,  51 
Ind.  426;  Green  v.  Southain,  49  id.  139; 
Friddle  r.  Crane,  68  id.  583  ;  in  libel  or 
slander,  Cary  r.  Allen.  39  Wis.  481  ;  Stern 
V.  Katz,  38  id.  136;  Frank  ;•.  Dunning, 
38  id.  270;  Lipprant  i-.  Lipprant,  52  Ind. 
273;  Shiglcy  v.  Snyder,  45  id.  541; 
Downey  r.  Dillon,  52  id.  442 ;  Dor.sett  r. 
Adams,  50  id.  129  ;  Schnrick  v.  Kollm.an, 
50  id.  336  ;  in  replevin,  Crawford  v.  Fur- 
long, 21  Kan.  698;  Zitske  v.  Goldberg,  38 
Wis.  216. 


ALLEGATIONS    OF    IMPLIED    TROMISKS.  577 

ments  as  to  form  and  method,  and  may  violate  all  the  principles 
of  logical  order  and  precision  of  statement,  and  may  yet  be  held 
sufficient  on  general  demurrer,  because  the  material  facts  consti- 
tuting a  cause  of  action  can  be  discovered  among  the  mass  of 
confused  or  imperfect  allegations.  The  principles  and  doctrines 
of  pleading  adopted  and  enforced  by  the  courts  are  illustrated 
and  explained  by  such  examples  as  these,  but  the  cases  them- 
selves are  to  be  carefully  avoided  as  precedents.  The  mode  of 
correcting  imperfect  and  insufficient  averments  as  distinguished 
from  those  which  state  no  cause  of  action,  and  the  liberal  rule  of 
construction  introduced  by  the  code,  will  form  the  subject  of  a 
separate  and  careful  discussion  in  a  subsequent  portion  of  this 
chapter. 

§  431.  *  537.  Doctrine  that  Facts  Pleaded  should  be  stated  as 
they  occurred  or  existed.  Tvyo  Questions  Presented.  In  con- 
sidering the  third  general  doctrine  developed  in  the  preceding 
analysis,  —  namely,  that  the  facts  pleaded  should  be  stated  as 
they  actually  occurred  or  existed,  and  not  their  mere  legal 
aspect,  effect,  or  operation,  —  two  practical  questions  are  pre- 
sented, and  the  discussion  will  be  mainly  confined  to  them. 
These  questions  are,  (1)  whether  in  actions  based  upon  the 
common-law  notion  of  an  implied  contract  the  pleader  should 
simply  allege  the  facts  as  they  really  occurred  from  which  the 
legal  duty  arises,  without  averring  a  promise  which  was  never 
made,  or  whether  he  must  or  may,  as  in  the  common-law  as- 
sumpsit, state  a  promise  to  have  been  expressly  made  which  is 
the  legal  effect  or  operation  of  those  facts ;  and  (2)  whether  the 
ancient  common  counts,  or  allegations  substantially  identical 
therewith,  fulfil  the  requirements  of  the  new  procedure,  and  can 
be  used,  in  conformity  with  its  fundamental  principles,  as  com- 
plaints or  petitions  in  the  classes  of  actions  to  which  they  would 
have  been  appropriate  under  the  former  sj'stem.  I  shall  take 
up  these  questions  separately,  first  collecting  and  comparing  the 
decisions  bearing  upon  each ;  and,  secondly,  discussing  them 
upon  principle. 

§  432.  '^  538.  (l)  Necessity  or  Propriety  of  Alleging  a  Promise 
in  Actions  upon  Implied  Promises.  There  is  a  marked  unanimity 
of  opinion  among  the  decisions  which  directly  involve  this  ques- 
tion, since  most  of  them  accept  the  language  of  the  codes,  and 
fully  recognize  the   radical  change  in  principle  effected  by  the 

37 


578  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

reformed  procedure.  In  Farron  v.  Sherwood, ^  after  sustaining 
a  complaint  substantially  a  general  count  in  assumpsit  for  work 
and  labor  without  any  averment  of  a  promise  by  the  defendant, 
the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  said:  "It  is  not  necessary  to 
set  out  in  terms  a  promise  to  pay;  it  is  sufficient  to  state  facts 
showing  the  duty  from  which  the  law  implies  the  promise.  That 
complies  with  the  requirement  that  facts  must  be  stated  constitut- 
ing the  cause  of  action."  This  language  was  not  a  mere  dictmn ; 
it  was  absolutely  essential  to  the  judgment,  since  the  complaint 
contained  no  averment  of  a  promise,  and  was  nevertheless  held 
sufficient.  The  decision  must  therefore  be  regarded  as  settling 
the  doctrine  for  that  State.  In  another  action  to  recover  com- 
pensation for  work  and  labor,  where  the  complaint  stated  various 
services  performed  by  the  plaintiff  from  which  it  was  claimed  a 
duty  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  arose,  but  alleged  no  promise 
by  him,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York  adopted  the  same  rule 
of  pleading. 2  On  the  other  hand,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wis- 
consin said  by  way  of  a  dictum  in  an  early  case :  "  Good  pleading 
requires  that  a  promise  which  the  law  implies  should  be  stated."^ 
And  in  an  action  for  services  alleged  in  the  petition  to  have  been 
performed  at  the  request  of  an  agent  of  the  defendant,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  held  that  either  the  promise  must  be 
averred,  or  the  facts  from  which  a  promise  will  be  inferred,  as  a 
matter  of  law.*     In  Montana,  the  rule  is  distinctly  established 

1  Farrou  v.  Sherwood,  17  N.  Y.  227,  necessary,  and  perhaps  not  even  proper,  in 
230.  See  also  Mackey  v.  Auer,  8  Hun,  such  a  case,  for  the  plaintiff  to  allege  in  his 
180;  De  la  Guerra  v.  Newhall,  55  Cal.  complaint  any  promise  on  the  part  of  the 
21  ;  Moore  v.  Hobbs,  79  N.  C.  535  ;  Jones  defendant,  but  he  must  state  facts  which, 
V.  Mial,  79  id.  164;  Emslie  v.  City  of  if  true,  according  to  well-settled  principles 
Leavenworth,  20  Kan.  562;  Stephenson  of  law,  would  have  autliorized  him  to  al- 
V.  Ballard,  50  Ind.  176.  J^ge,  and  tlie  court  to  infer,  a  promise  on 

2  Cropsey  v.  Sweeney,  27  Barb.  310,  the  part  of  the  defendant  before  the  code. 
312,  jjer  Sutherland  J.,  who  delivered  the  TIic  form  of  assumpsit  is  no  longer  neces- 
following  opinion  :  "  Although  the  form  sary,  nor  perliaps  even  proper,  in  such  a 
of  the  action  of  assumpsit,  and  of  tiie  case;  but  facts  sufiicieut  to  raise  it,  and 
pleadings  therein,  has  been  abolished,  to  put  it  on  paper  were  it  lawful  to  do  so, 
yet  the  obligation  of  contracts  and  the  are  still  necessary."  He  goes  on  to  hold 
distinction  between  an  express  and  an  that  the  special  facts  alleged  in  the  corn- 
implied  assumpsit  remain;  and  notwith-  j)]aint  raise  no  implied  promise, 
standing  the  code,  in  a  large  class  of  "  Bird  c.  Mayer,  8  Wis.  362,  367.  This 
cases  now  as  before  the  code,  it  is  only  remark  was  entirely  obiter.  The  question 
on  tlie  theory  of  an  implied  assumpsit,  before  the  court  was,  whether  a  warranty 
inferred  from  the  conduct,  situation,   or  sued  on  was  express  or  implied. 

mutual  relations  of  the  parties,  that  jus-  *  Wells  r.  Pacific  K.  R.  Co.,  35  Mo.  164. 

tice  can  l^e  enforced,  and  tlie  performaiico  The  allegation  of  a  performance  at  the 
of  a  legal  duty  compelled.     It  is  no  longer     request   of    an   agent    of    the    defendant 


ALLKGATIONS    OF   IMPLIED    I'lvOMISES. 


79 


that  tlie  facts  from  wliic-h  the  promise  is  inferred  sliould  be 
pleaded,  and  not  the  promise  itself;  but  that  in  an  action  on  an 
express  promise  it  must  be  alleged. ^  The  Supreme  Court  of 
Indiana  has  held  with  evident  reluctance  that  in  such  a  case  it 
is  not  necessary  for  the  party  to  aver  a  promise,  and  that  it  is 
enough  for  him  to  state  the  facts  from  vi^hich  the  law  implies  it. 
The  court  added,  however,  after  this  concession,  that  it  is  better 
in  all  cases  to  allege  a  promise,  saying:  "  It  is  always  good  plead- 
ing to  state  the  legal  effect  of  the  contract  whether  it  is  written 
or  oral.  "^     And  in  another  case,  where  the  action  was  brought 


was  insufficient,  being  matter  of  evidence 
only. 

tin  Wetmore  v.  Crouch  (1899),  150  Mo. 
671,  51  S.  W.  7.38,  the  court  said  :  "  If  the 
contract  relied  on  is  express,  it  must  be  so 
pleaded,  but  if  it  is  implied,  the  facts  out 
of  which  it  is  claimed  to  arise  must  be 
pleaded."  See  also  Warder  v.  Seitz  (1900), 
157  Mo.  140,  57  S.  W.  537.  In  this  case 
the  petition  stated  that  plaintiff  told  de- 
fendant at  the  time  he  was  employed  by 
her  that  "the  customary  fee  for  such  ser- 
vices was  five  per  cent  if  settled  out  of 
court  and  ten  per  cent  if  settled  after  suit, 
upon  whatever  amount  she  received,  that 
defendant  made  no  objection  to  said  fee, 
but  instructed  plaintiff  to  take  charge  of 
her  interests  and  proceed  in  the  premises 
to  secure  a  settlement  by  compromise,  or 
failing  in  that,  to  bring  a  suit  to  break 
and  set  aside  said  will."  The  petition 
further  alleged  that  the  services  were  ren- 
dered at  the  special  instance  and  request 
of  the  defendant  and  were  reasonably 
worth  five  thousand  dollars.  "  These  are 
apt  and  appropriate  averments  in  a  suit 
upon  a  quantum  meruit,  and  have  no  place 
in  a  petition  based  upon  an  express  con- 
tract, and  they  clearly  and  unmistakably 
show  the  pleader's  intention  to  rely  upon 
a  guantnm  meruit  and  not  upon  a  con- 
tract."] 

^  Higgins  V.  Germaine,  1  Mont.  230. 

(^In  Conrad  Nat.  Bank  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.  (1 900),  24  Mont.  1 78,  61  Pac.  I, 
the  court  said  :  "  It  is  not  necessary  to 
allege  a  promise  to  pay  where  the  facts 
as  alleged  imply  a  promise,  as  where  the 
board,  food,  lodgings,  etc.,  are  furnished 
to  defendant  upon  request ;  but  where  the 
furnishing  or  delivery  is  to  a  third  person, 


upon  defendant's  request,  then,  nothing 
further  appearing,  no  promise  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  to  pay  is  implied  ;  for  a 
furnishing  or  delivery  to  a  tliird  party, 
though  upon  defendant's  request,  does  not, 
as  a  matter  of  law,  imply  an  undertaking 
by  defendant  to  pay.  .  .  .  Either  the  ex- 
press promise  should  be  alleged,  or  the 
facts  from  which  it  may  be  implied,  as 
that  the  credit  was  extended  to  the  em- 
ployer and  not  to  the  employee  (Chitty 
on  Pleading,  pp.  308,  356) ;  or  the  allega- 
tion should  have  been  made  generally  that 
the  food,  board,  lodging,  and  merchandise 
were  furnished  to  the  employer  at  its  re- 
quest." See  also  Voight  v.  Brooks  (1897), 
19  Mont.  374,  48  Pac.  549.2] 
2  Wills  V.  Wills,  34  Ind.  106,  107,  108. 
Qn  Cox  D.Peltier  (1902),  159  Ind.  355, 
65  N.  E.  6,  it  was  held  that  a  complaint 
on  an  undertaker's  bill,  which  alleges  that 
a  coffin  was  furnished  and  services  ren- 
dered "  at  the  special  instance  and  re- 
quest "  of  the  defendant,  sufficiently 
charges  an  implied  promise  on  defend- 
ant's part  to  pay  the  reasonable  value 
thereof. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Minne.sota,  in 
Oevermann  v.  Loebertmann  (1897),  68 
Minn.  162,  70  N.  W.  1084,  said:  "  It  is 
not  necessary  to  plead  implied  promises." 
See  also  Hurlhut  v.  Leper  (1900),  12  S.  D. 
321,  81  N.  W.  631.  Here  it  was  held  that 
a  complaint  alleging  that  "  prior  to  the 
22d  day  of  March,  1896,  the  plaintiff  per- 
formed work  and  labor  as  a  teamster  and 
laborer  for  the  defendant,  four  and  one- 
third  months,  at  .$40  per  month,"  and 
claiming  a  balance  of  $92.65,  with  interest 
at  seven  per  cent  per  annum,  does  not 
purport  to  allege  an  express  contract  but 


580  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

for  the  value  of  goods  sold,  etc.,  the  same  court,  while  passing 
upon  the  sufficiency  of  a  complaint  which  was  substantially  in 
the  form  of  an  old  common  count  without  a  request  or  a  promise 
averred,  used  the  following  language :  "  In  all  these  instances 
the  law  implies  the  promise  from  the  facts  stated,  and  our  statute 
simply  requires  the  statement  of  facts ;  and  if  upon  these  facts 
the  law  implies  a  promise,  the  complaint  would  be  good."  ^ 

§  433.  *  539.  Case  of  Booth  v.  Farmers'  and  Mechanics'  Bank 
(n.  y.).  The  question  was  discussed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of 
New  York  in  a  very  recent  decision;  and  the  importance  of  the 
case,  and  the  positions  taken  in  the  opinion,  make  it  necessary  to 
quote  from  the  judgment  at  some  length.  The  complaint  con- 
tained two  counts.  The  second  was  for  money  had  and  received 
to  the  plaintiff's  use.  The  first  set  out  the  facts  in  detail,  stat- 
ing a  liability  which  migliL  be  considered  as  resulting  from  the 
tortious  acts  of  the  defendant,  or  might  be  regarded  as  arising 
from  an  implied  contract,  but  omitting  to  aver  any  promise.  The 
defendant  demurred  on  the  ground  that  two  causes  of  action 
had  been  improperly  joined,  one  on  contract,  and  the  other  for 
a  tort,  —  an  injury  to  property.  The  plaintiff,  in  answer  to  this 
position,  claimed  that  he  could  elect  under  the  circumstances 
to  sue  either  for  tort  or  on  contract,  and  that  the  first  cause  of 
action  should  be  treated  as  of  the  latter  kind,  so  that  there  was 
no  misjoinder.  The  court,  however,  entirely  rejected  this  claim; 
and  after  stating  that  the  ancient  assumpsit  and  case  were  in 
many  instances  concurrent  remedies  for  injuries  to  personal 
propert}' ;  that  in  assumpsit  the  pleader  must  always  have  alleged 
that  the  defendant  ''undertook  and  promised,"  etc.,  and  a  breach 
of  that  promise,  while  in  case  the  declaration  was  substantially 
the  same  except  that  the  allegation  of  an  undertaking  and 
promise  was  omitted;  that  in  the  first  count  this  averment  is 
wanting,  and  "it  is  therefore  a  count  in  case,'^  —  proceeded  as 
follows:  "If  the  plaintiff  is  right  in  supposing  that  the  law 
implied  a  promise  by  the  bank  not  to  satisfy  the  judgment  after 

ouly    an     imjjlied     contract.      A    receut  1 75,  tliat  where  one  has  received  money 

Oregon   case  —  Waite    v.    Willis    (1902),  which   equitably  i)elongs   to   another,  an 

42  Ore.  288,  70   Pac.  1034  —  holds   that  action  lies  in  assumpsit,  but  sucli  action  is 

it  is  not   necessary  to  allege  a  fictitious  noi  founded  upon  the  idea  of  a ro?i^iar/,  but 

promise.  upon  the  idea  of  an  ohiifntinn  to  refund, 

It  was  held  in  Bates-Farley  Bank  i*.  and  no  privity  need  be  shown.] 
Dismukes  (1899),  107  Ga.  212,  33   S.  E.  i  Gwaltuey  i-.  Cannon,  31  Ind.  227. 


ALLEGATIONS    OF   IMPLIED    PROMISES.  581 

it  was  assigned  to  him,  he  was  bound  to  allege  that  the  Lank 
undertook  and  promised  not  to  satisfy,  etc.,  in  order  to  make  it 
a  count  on  contract.  .  .  .  The  codifiers,  while  i)roposing  to 
abolish  the  distinction  between  forms  of  action,  found  it  impos- 
sible or  impracticable  in  many  cases  to  effect  that  object;  and 
this  case  illustrates  their  failure  in  at  least  one  class  of  cases. 
When  case  and  assumpsit  were  at  the  common  law  concurrent 
remedies,  the  form  of  action  that  the  pleader  selected  was  deter- 
mined, as  I  have  shown,  by  the  insertion  or  omission  from  the 
declaration  of  the  allegation  that  the  defendant  'undertook  and 
promised.'  This  right  of  selection  remains;  and  whether  the 
action  is  tort  or  assumpsit  must  be  determined  by  the  same  cri- 
terion. If  this  is  not  so,  then  the  right  of  election  is  taken 
away.  If  taken  away,  which  of  the  two  is  left?  An  action 
on  contract  cannot  be  joined  with  one  in  tort.  How  are  we  to 
determine  whether  the  action  is  one  on  contract  or  in  tort, 
unless  the  pleader  by  averment  alleges  the  making  of  the  con- 
tract, and  demands  damages  for  a  breach  in  the  one  case,  or  by 
the  omission  of  such  an  averment  makes  it  an  action  in  tort?  I 
know  of  no  more  certain  or  convenient  criterion  by  which  to 
determine  the  class  to  which  a  cause  of  action  belongs  than  the 
one  suggested.  If  some  such  rule  is  not  established,  the  ques- 
tion of  misjoinder  will  arise  in  every  case  in  which  at  the  common 
law  assumpsit  and  case  were  concurrent  remedies."  ^ 

§  434.  *  540.  Conclusions.  It  is  very  evident  from  the  fore- 
going collection  of  decisions  that  the  courts  have,  by  an  over- 
whelming preponderance  of  authority,  accepted  the  simple 
requirement  of  the  codes,  and  have  not  destroyed  its  plain 
import  by  borrowing  the  notion  of  a  fictitious  promise  from  the 
common-law  theory  of  pleading.  The  practical  rule  ma}'  be 
considered  as  settled,  that,  in  all  instances  where  the  right  of 

1  Booth  V.  Farmers'  &  Mech.  Bk.  of  promise,   arises.     De   la  Guerra  v.  New- 

Roche.ster,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  45,  49,  50,  per  hall,  56  Cal.  21  ;  Mackey  v.  Auer,  8  Hun, 

Mulliu  J.     it  is  very  remarkable  that  the  180;   a   mere   allegation  of   indebtedness, 

judge   makes   no    reference   whatever   to  however,    is     not     sufficient :     Moore    v. 

the  prior  cases  of  Farron  v.  Sherwood  and  Hobbs,  79  N.  C.  535.     When  a  party  to 

Cropsey  v.  Sweeney,  which  are  decisive  of  an  express  contract  may  sue  upon  an  im- 

the  question  involved.     A  promise  need  plied  contract,  and  the  proper  allegations 

not  be  alleged,  and  if  alleged  a  denial  of  it  in  such  case,  see  Emslie  v.  Leavenworth, 

would  raise  no  material  issue,  where  the  20  Kan.  562  ;  action  for  labor  and  mate- 

fiicts  have  been  averred  from  which  the  rials,  see  Stephenson  v.  Ballard,  50  Ind. 

liability,  represented  by  the  fiction  of   a  176;  Jones  v.  Mial,  79  N.  C.  164. 


582  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

action  is  based  upon  a  duty  or  obligation  of  the  adverse  party 
which  the  common  law  denominates  an  implied  contract,  it  is  no 
longer  necessary  to  aver  a  promise,  but  it  is  enough  to  set  out 
the  ultimate  facts  from  which  the  promise  would  have  been 
inferred.  This  being  so,  we  must  go  a  step  farther.  If  it  is  not 
necessary  to  make  such  an  allegation,  then  it  is  not  proper  to  do 
so;  although  some  of  the  judicial  opinions,  from  a  failure  to 
apprehend  the  true  grounds  of  the  rule,  would  seem  to  permit, 
while  they  do  not  require,  the  averment.  A  promise  need  not 
be  allesfed  because  none  was  ever  made:  the  facts  constitutino: 
the  cause  of  action  are  alone  to  be  stated,  and  this  promise  is 
not  one  of  those  facts ;  it  is  simply  a  legal  inference,  contrived 
for  a  very  technical  purpose  to  meet  the  requirements  of  form  in 
the  ancient  legal  actions.  The  same  reason  which  shows  that 
the  averment  is  unnecessary  demonstrates  that  it  is  improper, 
that  it  violates  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  new  theory;  and 
if  an  harmonious  system  is  ever  to  be  consti-ucted  upon  the  basis 
of  the  reform  legislation,  this  doctrine  should  be  strictly  enforced. 
§  435.  *  541.  Criticism  of  Booth  v.  Farmers'  and  Mechanics' 
Bank.  The  only  recent  case  which  is  in  direct  conflict  with  these 
views  is  the  one  last  quoted,  Booth  v.  Farmers'  and  ^Mechanics' 
Bank;  and  it  seems  to  demand  some  comment.  Perhajis  there 
cannot  be  found  in  the  current  reports  a  more  striking  example 
of  exalting  form  above  substance,  and  of  repealing  an  express 
statutory  provision  by  judicial  construction,  than  is  shown  in 
this  decision.  The  learned  judge  virtually  admits  that  the  text 
of  the  code  is  opposed  to  his  conclusions,  when  he  assumes  that 
the  codifiers  failed  to  accomplish  the  results  which  they  intended. 
It  may  be  remarked  that  he  speaks  of  the  statute  as  though  it 
were  entirely  the  work  of  the  "codifiers,"  and  he  seems  to  ignore 
the  authority  of  the  legislature  which  made  it  a  law.  But  are 
the  common-law  notion  of  an  implied  undertaking  and  the  arbi- 
trary requisite  of  alleging  this  fictitious  promise  such  necessary- 
conceptions,  are  they  so  involved  in  the  essential  nature  of  juris- 
prudence, that  it  is  impossil)le  or  impracticable  for  the  legislature 
to  change  or  to  abolish  them?  The  very  suggestion  is  its  own 
answer.  Nothing  in  our  ancient  law  was  more  thoroughly  tech- 
nical and  arljitrary,  more  completely  a  mere  matter  of  form, 
without  even  the  shadow  of  substantial  and  necessary  existence, 
tlian  this  very  notion  of  a  certain  kind  of  legal  liabilit}^  being 


ALLEGATIONS    OF    IMTLIED    PROMISES.  583 

represented  as  arising  from  an  implied  promise,  and  the  accom- 
panying rule  that  the  promise  thus  imagined  must  be  averred  as 
though  it  were  actually  made.  It  was  shown  in  a  former  part  of 
this  section  that  the  action  of  assumpsit  was  not  even  invented 
as  an  instrument  by  which  to  enforce  the  liability  thus  conceived 
of;  but  the  fiction  of  an  implied  promise  was  itself  contrived  in 
order  that  the  liability  might  be  enforced  by  the  already  existing 
action  of  assumpsit,  in  which  the  allegation  of  a  promise  was  the 
distinctive  feature.  The  error  of  the  opinion  under  review  is, 
that  it  treats  these  matters  of  arbitrary  form,  these  fictitious 
contrivances  of  the  old  pleaders,  as  though  they  subsisted  in 
the  nature  of  things,  and  were  beyond  the  reach  of  legislative 
action.  The  difficulty,  suggested  by  the  learned  judge,  of  being 
unable  to  distinguish  between  an  action  of  tort  and  one  of  con- 
tract, in  order  that  an  election  might  be  made  between  them, 
exists  only  in  imagination.  If  we  will  look  at  the  matter  as  it 
really  is,  throwing  aside  the  old  technicalities  and  fictions,  there 
is  plainly  no  necessity  for  any  such  distinction.  If  the  pleader 
unites  a  cause  of  action  upon  express  contract  with  a  cause  of 
action  consisting  of  facts,  from  which  under  the  former  system  a 
promise  might  have  been  implied,  he  has  already  made  his  elec- 
tion, —  all  the  election  that  is  needed,  —  and  there  would  be  no 
possibility  of  any  subsequent  change  in  or  departure  from  this 
original  theory  of  his  complaint.  The  only  practical  difference 
which  could  ever  arise  from  treating  his  second  cause  of  action 
as  though  founded  upon  tort  would  be  the  power  sometimes 
given  of  arresting  the  defendant  either  on  mesne  or  final  process, 
and  this  power  would  plainly  have  been  surrendered.  To  sum 
up  the  foregoing  criticism,  the  whole  course  of  reasoning  pursued 
by  the  learned  judge  assumes  that  the  most  technical,  arbitrary, 
and  fictitious  distinctions  between  the  ancient  forms  of  action 
are  still  subsisting;  it  does  not  merely  ignore  the  legislation 
which  has  abrogated  those  distinctions,  but  it  expressly  denies 
the  ability  of  the  legislature  to  accomplish  such  a  result.  This 
is  not  interpreting,  it  is  repealing,  a  statute.  1  have  dwelt  upon 
this  case  longer  perhaps  than  it  intrinsically  merits ;  but  I  have 
done  so  because  the  principles  announced  in  it,  if  generally  fol- 
lowed, would  sap  the  very  foundations  of  the  reformed  procedure, 
and  prevent  the  erection  of  any  harmonious  and  symmetrical 
system  upon  the  basis  of  its  fundamental  doctrines. 


584 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  436.  *  542.  (2)  Common  Comits  under  the  Codes.  Is  a  com- 
plaint or  petition,  substantially  the  same  in  its  form  and  its  alle- 
gations with  the  old  common  or  general  count  in  assumpsit,  in 
accordance  with  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  new  pro- 
cedure, and  can  it  now  be  regarded  as  a  good  pleading?  The 
courts  have  almost  unanimously  answered  this  question  in  the 
affirmative,  and  have  held  that  such  complaints  or  petitions 
sufficiently  set  forth  a  cause  of  action  in  the  cases  where  the 
declarations  which  they  imitate  would  have  been  proper  under 
the  former  practice.^     Notwithstanding   the   imposing   array  of 


1  I  have  collected  in  this  uote  the  lead- 
ing cases  which  sustain  the  position  in  the 
text.  Allen  v.  Patterson,  7  N.  Y.  476  ; 
Meagher  v.  Morgan,  .3  Kan.  .372 ;  Clark 
V.  Fensky,  3  Kan.  389 ;  Carroll  v.  Paul's 
Ex.,  16  Mo.  226;  Brown  v.  Perry,  14 
Iiid.  32 ;  Kerstetter  v.  Raymond,  10  Ind. 
199;  Farron  v.  Sherwood,  17  N.  Y.  227, 
229;  Hosley  v.  Black,  28  N.  Y.  438; 
Hurst  V.  Litchfield,  39  N.  Y.  377 ;  Green 
V.  Gilbert,  21  Wis.  39.5  ;  Evans  v.  Harris, 
19  Barb.  416;  Grannis  v.  Hooker,  29 
Wis.  65,  66,  67 ;  Cudlipp  v.  Whipple,  4 
Duer,  610;  Bates  v.  Cobb,  5  Bosw.  29; 
Adams  v.  Holley,  1 2  How.  Pr.  326  ;  Betts 
V.  Baciie,  14  Abb.  Pr.  279;  Sloman  r. 
Schmidt,  8  Abb.  Pr.  .5  ;  Goelth  u.  "White,  35 
Barb.  76  ;  Stout  v.  St.  Louis  Tribune  Co., 
52  Mo.  342 ;  Curran  v.  Curran,  40  Ind. 
473 ;  Johnson  v.  Kilgore,  39  Ind.  147 ; 
Bon-slog  V.  Garrett,  39  Ind.  3-38 ;  Wolf  v. 
Schofield,  38  Ind.  175,  181 ;  Noble  v.  Bur- 
ton, 38  Ind.  206 ;  Higgins  v.  Germaine,  1 
Mont.  230;  Gwaltney  y.  Cannon,  31  Ind. 
227  ;  Fort  Wayne,  J.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Uc- 
Dotiald,  48  Ind.  241,  243;  Raymond  v. 
Ilanford,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  312 ;  Fells  v.  Vest- 
vali,  2  Keycs,  152;  Pavisich  v.  Bean,  48 
Cal.  364;  Wilkins  v.  Stidger,  22  Cal.  231  ; 
Abadie  v.  Carrillo,  32  Cal.  172;  Merritt 
V.  Gliddon,  39  Cal.  559,  564.  That  the 
common  counts  may  still  be  used,  see' also 
Magee  v.  Kast,  49  Cal.  141  ;  Ball  v.  Fullon, 
31  Ark.  379  ;  Jones  v.  :Mial,  82  X.  C.  252  ; 
79  id.  164  ;  Emslie  v.  Leavenworth,  20  Kan. 
562 ;  Jennings  Cy.  Com'rs  v.  Verbarg,  63 
Ind.  107;  Dashaway  A.ss'n  v.  Rogers,  79 
Cal.  211  ;  Castagnino  v.  Balletta,  82  Cal. 
250  ;  Leeke  c.  Hancock,  76  Cal.  127. 

^The  nse  of  the  common  counts  has  been 
approvf^d  ill  tlir^  following  cases:  Johnson- 


Brinkman  Co.  i-.  Bank  (1893),  116  Mo. 
558,22  S.  W.  813;  Fox  v.  Easter  (1900),  10 
Okla.  527, 62  Pac.  283  ;  Willard  v.  Carrigan 
(1902),  Ariz.,  68  Pac.  538;  Livingstone  v. 
School  District  (1898),  11  S.  D.  150,  76 
N.  W.  301 ;  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education 
(1894),  103  Cal.  531,  37  Pac.  503  ;  Snapp 
r.  Stanwood  (1898),  65  Ark.  222,  45  S.  W. 
546;  Goodman  v.  Alexander  (1901),  165 
N.  Y.  289,  59  N.  E.  145  ;  Hatch  v.  Leonard 
(1901),  165  N.  Y.  435,  59  N.  E.  270;  Van- 
derbeek  v.  Francis  (1903),  75  Conn.  467,  53 
Atl.  1015;  Messmer  v.  Block  (1898),  100 
Wis.  664,  76  N.  W.  598 ;  Burton  v.  Rose- 
mary Co  (1903),  132  N.C.  17,43S.  E.  480; 
Kilpatrick-Koch  Dry-Goods  Co.  v.  Box 
(1896),  13  Utah,  494,  45  Pac.  629 ;  Pleasant 
V.  Samuels  (1896),  114  Cal.  .34, 45  Pac.  998; 
Jenney  Electric  Co.  v.  Branham  (1896), 
145  Ind.  314,  41  N.  E.  448;  Minor  v.  Bal- 
dridge  (1898),  123  Cal.  187,  55  Cal.  783; 
Nichols  V.  Randall  (1902),  136  Cal.  426,  69 
Pac.  26;  School  Dist.  No.  9  v.  School 
Dist.  No.  5  (1903),  118  Wi.s.  233,  95  N.  W. 
148. 

See  the  following  cases  in  respect  to  the 
proper  method  of  pleading  the  common 
counts  and  im])lied  contracts:  Glover  v. 
Henderson  (1893),  120  Mo.  367,  25  S.  W. 
175;  Fox  V.  Easter  (1900),  10  Okla.  527, 
62  Pac.  283 ;  Hatch  v.  Leonard  (1901),  165 
N.  Y.  435,  59  N.  E.  270;  Goodman  v. 
Alexander  (1901),  165  NY.  289,  .59  N.  E. 
145;  Warder  v.  Seitz  (1900),  157  Mo.  140, 
57  .S.  W.  ;}37  ;  Ilurlbut  v.  Leper  (1900).  12 
S.  D.  321,  81  N.  W.  631  ;  Conrad  Nat. 
Bank  r.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 
24  Mont.  178,  61  Pac.  1  ;  Pioneer  Fuel  Co. 
r.  Hager  (1894),  57  Minn.  76,  58  N.  W. 
828;  Thompson  v.  Town  of  Elton  (1901), 
109  Wis.  589,  85  N.  W.  425  ;  Farwell  v. 


THE    COMMON    COUNTS. 


585 


judicial  authority  shown  by  the  citations  in  the  foot-note,  the 
courts  of  one  or  two  States  have  refused  to  foUow  this  course  of 
decision,  and  have  pronounced  such  forms  of  conij)laint  or  peti- 
tion to  be  in  direct  conflict  with  the  correct  principles  of  pleading 
established  by  the  codes.  Although  these  few  cases  cannot  be 
regarded  as  shaking,  or  as  throwing  any  doubt  upon,  the  rule  so 
firmly  established  in  most  of  the  States,  they  may  be  properly 
cited  in  order  that  all  the  light  possible  may  be  thrown  upon  this 
particular  question  of  interpretation.^ 


Murray    (1894),    104    Cal.   464,   38    Pac. 
199. 

The  use  of  the  conimou  couuts  is  pecu- 
liar in  Connecticut.  See  the  following 
cases  in  which  the  subject  is  discussed  : 
Cuminings  v.  Gleason  (1900),  72  Conn. 
.587,  45  Atl.  353  ;  McNamaia  v.  McDonald 
(1897),  69  Conn.  484,  38  Atl.  54  ;  New  York 
Breweries  Corporation  v.  Baker  (1896),  68 
Conn.  337,  36  Atl.  785. 

The  common  counts  are  available  in 
cases  where  they  would  have  been  so  at 
common  law:  Barrere  v.  Somps  (1896), 
113  Cal.  97,  45  Pac.  177.  They  are  avail- 
able against  a  municipal  corporation  as 
well  as  against  a  private  party  :  Brown  v. 
Board  of  Education  (1894),  10.3  Cal.  531,  37 
Pac.  503.  An  action  for  money  had  and  re- 
ceived may  be  maintained  not  only  in  case 
of  the  actual  receipt  by  defendant  of  money 
belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  but  where  any- 
thing is  received  as,  or  in  lieu  of,  money : 
Snapp  V.  Stanwood  (1898),  65  Ark.  222,  45 
S.  W.  546.;] 

1  Poerster  v.  Kirkpatrick,  2  Minn.  210, 
212;  Bowen  v.  Emmerson,  3  Ore.  452. 
The  complaint  in  the  first  of  these  cases 
was,  "  that  the  above-named  defendants 
are  justly  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  in  the 
sum  of,  etc.,  on  account  for  goods,  M'ares, 
and  merchandise  sold  and  delivered  by 
the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants  at  the  spe- 
cial instance  and  request  of  the  defend- 
ants, wherefore,"  etc. ;  and  it  will  be 
noticed  that  this  is  fuller  than  several  of 
the  forms  before  quoted,  since  it  alleges  a 
request.  In  sustaining  a  demurrer  to  this 
complaint,  the  court  held  it  defective,  be- 
cause it  contained  ( 1 )  no  statement  of  the 
time  of  sale,  and  (2)  no  averment  that 
the  goods  were  of  the  price  or  value  of  the 
sum   mentioned,  or   that  the   defendants 


promised  to  pay  that  sum,  and  laid  down 
the  general  doctrine  in  the  following  man- 
ner :  '•  In  actions  for  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered, it  is  essential  that  one  or  the 
otlier  of  these  allegations  should  be  made. 
Without  it  the  allegation  of  indebtedness 
is  a  mere  conclusion  of  law  unsupported 
by  any  fact.  The  defendant's  liability 
grows  out  of  the  fact  that  the  goods  were 
either  worth  the  amount  of  the  claim, 
or  else  tliat  they  promised  to  pay  that 
amount.  If  they  were  worth  the  amount, 
the  law  implies  a  promise.  Without  one 
or  the  other  of  these  allegations,  there 
appears  no  consideration  to  support  the 
pretended  indebtedness."  In  Bowen  v. 
Emmerson  the  Supreme  Court  of  Oregon 
pronounced  the  use  of  the  general  Cdunt 
in  assumpsit  to  be  entirely  inconsistent 
witli  the  reformed  theory  of  pleading,  and 
expressly  refused  to  follow  ihe  decision 
made  in  Allen  v.  Patterson.  I'he  opiiiion 
is  a  clear  and  very  strong  arjruinent  in 
favor  of  the  simple  and  natural  modes  of 
pleading  provided  by  the  codes. 

[;in  the  recent  case  of  Hammer  v. 
Downing  (1901),  39  Ore.  504,  65  Pac.  17, 
tiie  court  said  :  "  Under  tlie  code,  as  cim- 
strued  by  this  court,  the  mode  of  statement 
employed  by  the  '  common  counts  '  known 
to  the  common  law  is  inappropriate  and 
insufficient ;  it  being  deemed  essential  to 
set  out  the  facts  from  which  the  cause  of 
action  arises,  and  the  proofs  must  extend 
to  and  comprehend  all  the  items  goin^  to 
the  establishment  of  such  accumulation." 

In  Minnesota,  however,  the  court  does 
not  take  so  radical  a  position.  In  Pioneer 
Fuel  Co.  V.  Hager  (1894),  57  Minn.  76,  58 
N.  W.  828,  the  court  said  :  "  We  are  of 
opinion  that  the  courts  in  the  code  States 
have    sacrificed    the    principles   of    code 


586 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  437.  *  543.  Use  Sanctioned  also  where  Obligation  is  Express. 
Not  only  have  the  courts  in  this  manner  sanctioned  the  use  of 
the  coumion  counts  as  appropriate  modes  of  setting  forth  the 
pkintiffs  cause  of  action;  they  have  also  held  that  another  rule 
of  the  old  practice  is  still  retained  by  the  codes.  The  rule  thus 
declared  to  be  in  force  is  the  following:  When  the  plaintiff  has 
entered  into  an  express  contract  with  the  defendant,  and  has 
fully  performed  on  his  part,  so  that  nothing  remains  unexecuted 
but  the  defendant's  obligation  to  pay,  he  may  if  he  please  sue 
upon  the  defendant's  implied  promise  to  make  such  payment, 
rather  than  upon  the  express  undertaking  of  the  original  con- 
tract; and  to  that  end  he  may  resort  to  a  complaint  or  petition 
identical  with  the  ancient  common  counts;  except,  as  has  already 
been  shown,  the  averment  of  a  promise  may,  and  according  to 


pleading  more  than  they  ought  to  have 
done  iu  adopting  this  common-law  formula 
at  all,  and  that  we  should  not  outdo  the 
common  law  itself  hy  reducing  the  formula 
still  more  and  making  it  still  more  in  con- 
flict with  code  ])riuciples.  The  complaint 
must  at  least  be  sufficient  at  common  law, 
■which  it  is  not." 

But  iu  Nebraska  the  practice  of  using 
the  common  counts  has  been  condemned. 
The  court  of  that  State  said  iu  Penn 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Conoughy  (1898), 
54  \eh.  123,  74  N.  W.  422,  "The  Code  of 
Civil  Procedure  (sec.  92)  requires  a 
pleader  to  state  the  facts  which  consti- 
tute the  cause  of  action  or  defence  iu  or- 
dinary and  concise  language ;  and  the 
practice  of  adding  a  common  count  in  a 
pleading  is  one  not  contemplated  by  the 
code." 

Other  courts  have  criticised  the  use  of 
tliis  form  of  pleading,  but  have  neverthe- 
less adhered  to  it.  Thus  the  Supreme 
Court  of  California  said,  in  Minor  v. 
Baldridge  (1898),  123  Cal.  187,  55  Cal. 
783  :  "The  mode  of  pleading  is  inconsist- 
ent with  our  code,  and  it  may  be  a  matter 
of  regret  that  it  was  ever  tolerated,  but 
the  innovation  is  not  so  great  if  sucii 
complaint  must  fall  before  a  special 
demurrer,  which  is  like  a  motion  to  re- 
quire a  pleader  to  make  his  pleadings 
more  definite,  which  practice  prevails  in 
some  States." 

A  similar  view  was  expressed  by  the 


Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin  in  Thom- 
son V.  Town  of  Elton  (1901),  109  Wis- 
589,  85  N.  W.  425:  "At  most  the  com- 
plaint was  open  to  a  motion  to  make  more 
definite  and  certain.  In  a  complaint  for 
money  had  and  received  under  the  old 
sy!*tem  of  pleading,  the  facts  were  pleaded 
according  to  their  legal  effect,  and  it  has 
been  repeatedly  held  that  a  statement  of 
facts  good  at  the  common  law  in  actions 
like  this  is  sufficient  under  the  code.  .  .  . 
It  is  possible  that  the  framers  of  the  code 
did  not  contemj)late  such  a  result  of  their 
work  when  tliey  said,  '  The  complaint 
shall  contain  a  plain  and  concise  statement 
of  the  facts  constituting  each  cause  of 
action,  without  unnecessary  repetition  ; ' 
but  such  construction  was  adopted  by  the 
courts  in  the  State  from  which  we  took  the 
code,  before  its  adoption  liere,  though  at 
a  time  when  there  was  a  strong  inclina- 
tion to  hold  on  to  old  forms  and  ingraft 
tJiem  on  to  the  new  system  as  far  as  possi- 
ble. That  was  done,  and  it  is  believed 
the  courts  went  beyond  reason  in  some 
cases." 

And  in  Colorado  tlie  court  held  in 
Kimball  i:  Lyon  (1893),  19  Colo.  266, 
35  Pac.  44,  that  while  pleading  in  the 
form  of  the  common  counts  is  not  favored 
by  the  code,  yet  objection  can  be  made 
thereto  only  by  special  demurrer,  by 
motion  for  a  copy  of  the  account  sued  on 
or  for  a  bill  of  particulars.] 


THE    COMMON    COUNTS. 


587 


the  better  opinion  sJiould,  be  omitted.  ^     This  doctrine  is  sup- 


J  Farrou  v.  Slierwood,  17  N.  Y.  227, 
229  ;  Hosley  v.  Black,  28  N.  Y.  438 ;  Hurst 
I).  Litchfield,  39  N.  Y.  377  ;  Atkinson  v. 
Collins,  9  Abb.  Pr.  353 ;  Evans  v.  Harris, 
19  Barb.  416;  Green  r.  Gilbert,  21  Wis. 
395,  an  action  to  recover  for  the  part  pei-- 
formance  of  an  express  contract,  the  plain- 
tiff having  been  prevented  by  sickness 
from  completing;  Carroll  v.  Paul's  E.x., 
16  Mo.  226 ;  Brown  v.  Perry,  14  Ind.  .3^2  ; 
Ker.stetter  i'.  Raymond,  10  Ind.  199;  Stout 
V.  St.  Louis  Tribune  Co.,  52  Mo.  342 ;  Fri- 
ermuth  v.  Friennuth,  46  Cal.  42 ;  Ray- 
mond V.  Hanford,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  312;  Fells 
V.  Vestvali,  2  Keyes,  152;  Ashton  v.  Shep- 
herd, 120  Ind.  69.  In  Sussdorf  v.  Schmidt, 
55  N.  Y.  319,  324,  the  complaint  alleged 
an  agreed  compensation  for  services ;  but, 
at  the  trial,  the  plaintiff  was  permitted  to 
prove  their  value  as  upon  a  quantum  me- 
ruit,and  this  was  held  no  error,  or  at  most 
an  immaterial  variance ;  but,  pei-  contra,  in 
Davis  V.  Mason,  3  Ore.  154,  it  was  held 
that  in  an  action  for  services,  the  complaint 
stating  an  express  contract  to  pay  a  stipu- 
lated sum,  the  plaintiff  cannot  prove  and 
recover  their  value  i\Y>ona.(/ua7ttum  vieruit. 
In  Farron  v.  Sherwood,  which  is,  perhaps, 
the  leading  case,  the  doctrine  was  thus  an- 
nounced by  Strong  J.  (p.  229) :  "  The  case 
is  therefore  within  the  well-settled  rule, 
that  when  there  is  a  special  agreement, 
and  the  plaintiff  has  performed  on  his 
part,  the  law  raises  a  duty  on  the  part 
of  the  defendant  to  pay  the  price  agreed 
upon,  and  the  plaintiff  may  count  either 
upon  this  implied  assumpsit,  or  on  the  ex- 
press agreement.  A  new  cause  of  action, 
upon  such  performance,  arises  from  this 
legal  duty  in  like  manner  as  if  the  act  done 
had  been  done  upon  a  general  request, 
without  an  express  agreement.  This  rule 
is  not  affected  by  the  code.  The  plain- 
tiff might,  as  he  has  done,  rest  his  action 
on  the  legal  duty,  and  his  complaint  is 
adapted  to  and  contains  every  necessary 
element  of  that  cause  of  action."  In  Ker- 
stetter  v.  Raymond,  the  Supreme  Court 
enumerated  the  instances  in  which  the 
general  or  common  count  was  a  proper 
means  of  suing  upon  an  express  contract 
between  the  parties,  and  declared  that  they 
were  all  retained  by  the  codes.  These  in- 
stances  are,    (1)   when   the   plaintiff   has 


fully  executed,  and  the  time  of  payment  is 
passed,  the  measure  of  damages  being  the 
stipulated  price;  (2)  when  the  sjjecial  con- 
tract lias  been  altered  or  deviated  from  by 
common  con.sent;  (3)  when  the  plaintiff 
has  performed  a  part,  and  has  been  pre- 
vented from  performing  the  whole  by 
the  act  of  the  defendant,  or  by  tlie  act  of 
the  law;  (4)  when  the  plaintiff  has  not 
fully  complied  witli  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, but,  professing  to  act  under  it,  has 
done  for  or  delivered  to  the  other  party 
something  of  value  to  him  which  he  haa 
accepted.  This  last  doctrine  is  not  uni- 
versally accepted  in  the  broad  terms  here 
stated ;  but  it  is  the  settled  rule  in  Indiana. 
See  Loraax  v.  Bailey,  7  Blackf  599. 

QHeld,  in  Jenney  Electric  Co.  v.  Bran- 
ham  (1896),  145  Ind.  314,  41  N.  E.  448, 
that  a  recovery  may  be  had  upon  the  com- 
mon counts  notwithstanding  the  evidence 
shows  a  special  contract.  But  in  Duncan 
V.  Gray  (1899),  108  la.  599,  79  N.  W.  362, 
no  recovery  was  allowed  where  an  implied 
promise  was  alleged  and  an  express  prom- 
ise proved.  So  in  Roche  r.  Baldwin  (1902), 
135  Cal.  522,  65  Pac.  459,  where  a  com- 
plaint was  drawn  upon  a  quantum  meruit, 
and  evidence  produced  upon  the  trial  es- 
tablished a  contract  whereby  certain  per- 
sons named  were  to  fix  the  amount  to  be 
paid  for  the  services  rendered,  it  was  held 
a  fatal  variance.  The  probata  and  allegata 
do  not  at  all  correspond.  See  also,  to  the 
same  effect,  McCormick  v.  Interstate,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1900),  154  Mo.  191,  55  S.  W. 
252;  Burton  v.  Rosemary  Co.  (1903),  132 
N.  C.  17,  43  S.  E.  480. 

In  accord  with  Jenney  Electric  Co.  v. 
Branham  (supra),  it  was  held  in  West  v. 
Eley  (1901),  39  Ore.  461,65  Pac.  798,  that 
where  a  complaint  is  founded  upon  a  quan- 
tum meruit,  the  only  effect  of  proving  an 
express  contract  fixing  the  price  is  tliat 
the  stipulated  price  becomes  the  quantum 
meruit  in  the  case.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
variance,  but  only  of  the  mode  of  proof  of 
the  allegations  of  the  pleadings.  The 
same  rule  was  applied  in  Vanderbeek  r. 
Francis  (1903).  75  Conn.  467,  53  Atl.  1015  ; 
Hecla  Gold  Mining  Co.  v.  Gisborn  (1899), 
21  Utah,  68,59  Pac.  518  ;  Roberts  v.  Leak 
(1899),  108  Ga.  806,  33  S.  E.  995. 

Where  an  express  contract  is  alleged  in 


588  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

ported  by  numerous  decisions  in  various  States,  and  it  seems  to 
be  regarded  as  still  operative  in  all  the  circumstances  to  which  it 
was  applicable  under  the  former  S3-stera. 

§  438.  *  54-4.  Criticism  of  Doctrine.  In  the  face  of  this  over- 
whelming array  of  authority,  it  may  seem  almost  presumptuous 
even  to  suggest  a  doubt  as  to  the  correctness  of  the  conclusions 
that  have  been  reached  with  so  much  unanimity.  I  cannot, 
however,  consistently  with  my  very  strong  convictions,  refrain 
from'  expressing  the  opinion  that,  in  all  these  rulings  concerning 
the  use  of  the  common  counts,  the  couits  have  overlooked  the 
fundamental  conception  of  the  reformed  pleading,  and  have 
abandoned  its  essential  principles.  This  position  of  inevitable 
opposition  was  clearly,  although  unintentionally,  described  by 
one  of  the  judges  in  language  already  quoted,  when  he  says, 
"  We  are  inclined  to  sanction  the  latter  view,  and  to  hold  that 
ihe  facts  which,  in  the  judgment  of  the  law,  create  the  indebted- 
ness or  liability,  need  7iot  be  set  forth  in  the  complaint."  Now, 
the  "facts  which  create  the  liability"  are  the  "facts  constituting 
the  cause  of  action  "  which  the  codes  expressly  require  to  be 
alleged;  tlie  two  expressions  are  synonymous;  and  the  direct 
antagonism  between  what  the  court  says  need  not  be  done,  and 
what  the  statute  says  must  be  done,  is  patent.  But  the  objection 
to  the  doctrine  of  these  decisions  does  not  chiefly  rest  upon  such 
verbal  criticism;  it  is  involved  in  the  very  nature  of  the  new 
theory  when  contrasted  with  the  old  methods.  In  every  species 
of  the  common  count,  the  averments,  by  means  of  certain  pre- 
scribed formulas,  presented  what  the  pleader  conceived  to  be 
the  legal  effect  and  operation  of  the  facts  instead  of  the  facts 
themselves,  and  the  most  important  of  them  was  always  a  pure 
conclusion  of  law.  The  count  for  money  had  and  received  well 
illustrates  the  truth  of  this  proposition.  In  the  allegation  that 
"  the  defendant  was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  for  money  had  and 
received  by  him  to  the  plaintiff's  use,"  the  distinctive  element 

the  pleading,  and  the  proof  shows  only  an  (1895),  98  Ky.  186,  32  S.  AV.  623  ;  Price  i-. 
implied  contract,  no  recovery  can  he  had  :  Price's  Executor  (1897),  101  Ky.  28,  39 
I'ear.sou  v.  Switzer  (1898),  98  Wis.  397,  S.  W.  429;  Ilu.'ston  v.  Tyler  (1897),  140 
74  N.  \V.  214 ;  Walker  v.  Irwin  (189.5),  94  Mo.  252,  36  S.  W.  654 ;  Maddox  v.  Wag- 
la.  448,  62  N.  W.  785;  Harrison  v.  Puste-  iier  (1900),  111  Ga.  146,  36  S.  E.  609, 
oska  (1896),  97  la.  166,  66  N.  W.  93;  Bir-  Coiiira,  Burge.ss  v.  Helm  (1898),  24  Nev. 
lant  V.  Cleckley  (1896),  48  S.  C.  298,  26  242,  51  Pac.  1025;  Livingstone  v.  Wagner, 
S.    E.   600;    Newton's   Executor  v.  Field  23  Nev.  53,  42  Pac.  290.J 


THE    COMMON    COUNTS.  589 

was  the  phrase  "money  had  and  received  to  the  plaintiff's  use." 
This  technical  expression  was  not  the  statement  of  a/aci,  in  the 
sense  in  which  that  word  is  used  by  the  codes;  if  not  strictly  a 
pure  conclusion  of  law,  it  was  at  most  a  symbol  to  which  a  cer- 
tain peculiar  meaning  had  been  given.  The  circumstances  under 
which  one  person  could  be  liable  to  another  for  money  had  and 
received  were  very  numerous,  embracing  contracts  express  or 
implied,  and  even  torts  and  frauds.  The  mere  averment  that 
the  defendant  was  indebted  for  money  had  and  received  admitted 
any  of  these  circumstances  in  its  support,  but  it  did  not  disclose 
nor  even  suggest  the  real  nature  of  the  liability,  the  actual  cause 
of  action  upon  which  the  plaintiff  relied.  The  reformed  theory 
of  pleading  was  expressly  designed  to  abrogate  forever  this  general 
mode  of  averment,  which  concealed  rather  than  displayed  the 
true  cause  of  action ;  it  requires  the  facts  to  be  stated,  the  facts 
as  they  exist  or  occurred,  leaving  the  law  to  be  determined  and 
applied  by  the  court.  The  same  is  true  of  the  common  count  in 
every  one  of  its  phases.  A  careful  analysis  would  show  that  the 
important  and  distinctive  averments  were  either  naked  conclu- 
sions of  law,  or  the  legal  effect  and  operation  of  the  facts 
expressed  in  technical  formulas  to  which  a  particular  meaning 
had  been  attached,  and  which  were  equally  applicable  to  innu- 
merable different  causes  of  action.  The  rule  which  permitted  the 
general  count  in  assumpsit  to  be  sometimes  used  in  an  action 
upon  an  express  contract  was  even  more  arbitrary  and  technical, 
and  was  wholly  based  upon  fictitious  notions.  The  conception 
of  a  second  implied  promise  resulting  from  the  duty  to  perform 
the  original  express  promise  has  no  foundation  whatever  in  the 
law  of  contract,  but  was  invented,  with  great  subtlety,  in  order 
to  furnish  the  ground  for  a  resort  to  general  assumpsit  instead 
of  special  assumpsit  in  a  certain  class  of  cases.  All  the  reasons 
in  its  support  were  swept  away  by  the  legislation  which  abolished 
the  distinctions  between  the  forms  of  action,  since  it  was  in  such 
distinctions  alone  that  those  reasons  had  even  the  semblance  of 
an  existence.  My  space  will  not  permit  this  discussion  to  be 
pursued  any  farther,  although  much  more  might  be  added  to  the 
foregoing  suggestions.  If  the  principles  of  pleading  heretofore 
developed  in  the  text  are  true  expressions  of  the  reformed  theory, 
the  legislature  certainly  intended  that  the  facts  constituting  each 
cause  of  action  should  be  alleged  as  they  actually  happened,  not 


590  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

by  means  of  any  technical  formulas,  but  in  the  ordinary  language 
of  narrative;  and  it  is,  as  it  appears  to  me,  equally  certain  that 
the  use  of  the  common  counts  as  complaints  or  petitions  is  a 
violation  of  these  fundamental  principles. 

i$  439.  *  545.  Further  Rules  of  Pleading  to  be  considered.  Out- 
line of  Discussion.  From  the  few  general  principles  which  thus 
constitute  the  simple  foundation  of  the  reformed  pleading,  there 
result  as  corollaries  certain  subordinate  doctrines  and  practical 
rules,  to  the  development  and  illustration  of  which  the  remaining 
portion  of  the  present  section  will  be  devoted.  The  immediate 
object  of  these  special  rules  is  to  enforce  in  complaints  or  peti- 
tions and  answers  a  conformity  with  the  essential  principles  upon 
which  the  system  is  based,  and  at  the  same  time  to  procure  a 
decision  of  judicial  controversies  upon  their  merits,  and  not  upon 
any  mere  technical  requirements  as  to  form  and  mode.  They 
relate  to  the  practical  methods  which  must  be  pursued  in  setting 
forth  the  causes  of  action  and  the  defences;  and  the  particular 
subjects  with  which  they  deal  are  (1)  insufficient,  incomplete, 
or  imperfect  allegations,  (2)  immaterial  and  redundant  allega- 
tions, (3)  the  doctrine  that  the  cause  of  action  or  the  defence 
proved  must  correspond  with  the  one  alleged.  Connected  with 
and  subsidiary  to  these  topics  are  the  remedies  j^rovided  for  each, 
and  particularly  that  of  amendment,  which  the  codes  expressly 
authorize  with  the  utmost  freedom,  and  also  the  power  of  elect- 
ing between  the  two  modes  of  setting  forth  the  same  cause  of 
action  under  certain  circumstances  either  as  ex  contractu  or  as  ex 
delicto.  Preliminary,  however,  to  the  discussion  thus  outlined, 
I  shall  state  and  very  briefly  explain  a  principle  which  will 
necessarily  affect  its  whole  course,  and  largely  determine  its 
results, —  the  principle  of  construction  as  applied  to  the  pleadings 
themselves. 

§  440.  *546.  Strict  Construction  of  Pleadings  Superseded  by- 
Liberal  Construction.  It  was  a  rule  of  the  common  law  firmly 
established  and  constantly  acted  upon,  —  that,  in  examining  and 
deciding  all  objections  involving  either  form  or  substance,  every 
pleading  was  to  be  construed  strongly  against  the  pleader;  noth- 
ing could  be  presumed  in  its  favor;  nothing  could  be  added,  or 
inferred,  or  supplied  by  implication,  in  order  to  sustain  its  suffi- 
ciency. This  harsh  doctrine,  unnecessary  and  illogical  in  its 
original   conception,    and   often  pushed  to  extremes  that  were 


LIBEKAL  CONSTRUCTION  OF  PLEADINGS.  591 

simply  absurd,  was  the  origin  of  the  technicality  and  excessive 
precision,  which,  more  than  any  other  features,  characterized  the 
ancient  system  in  its  condition  of  highest  development.  All 
the  codes  contain  the  following  provision,  or  one  substantially 
the  same :  "  In  the  construction  of  a  pleading,  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  its  effect,  its  allegations  shall  be  liberally  construed 
with  a  view  to  substantial  justice  between  the  parties."^  The 
evident  intent  of  the  legislature  in  this  clause  was  to  abrogate 
at  one  blow  the  ancient  dogma,  and  to  introduce  in  its  place  the 
contrary  principle  of  a  liberal  and  equitable  construction;  that 
is,  a  construction  in  accordance  with  the  general  nature  and 
design  of  the  pleading  as  a  whole.  This  mode  of  interpretation 
does  not  require  a  leaning  in  favor  of  the  pleader  in  place  of  the 
former  tendency  against  him;  it  demands  a  natural  spirit  of  fair- 
ness and  equity  in  ascertaining  the  meaning  of  any  particular 
averment  or  group  of  averments  from  their  relation  and  connec- 
tion with  the  entire  pleading  and  from  its  general  purpose  and 
object.  The  courts  have  uniformly  adopted  this  view  of  the 
provision ;  and  although  in  particular  instances  they  may  some- 
times have  departed  from  it,  yet,  in  their  announcement  of  the 
theory^  they  have  unanimously  conceded  that  the  stern  doctrine 
of  the  common  law  has  been  abolished,  and  that,  instead  thereof, 
an  equitable  mode  of  construction  has  been  substituted.  From 
the  multitudes  of  decisions  which  maintain  this  position  with 
more  or  less  emphasis  I  select  a  few  examples,  and  other  illus- 
trations will  be  subsequently  given. 

§  441.  *  547.  Judicial  Approval  of  Liberal  Construction.  The 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  while  construing  a  complaint,  said: 
"  The  language  is  clearly  susceptible  of  this  interpretation ;  and 
if  so,  that  interpretation  should  be  given  in  preference  to  [another 
which  was  stated].  If  the  language  admits  of  the  latter  inter- 
pretation, it  may  be  said  to  be  ambiguous,  and  that  is  all.  It  is 
not  true  that  under  the  code,  if  there  be  uncertainty  in  respect  to 
the  nature  of  the  charge,  it  is  to  l)e  construed  strictly  against  the 
pleader.  By  §  159,  in  the  construction  of  a  pleading,  its  allega- 
tions must  be  liberally  construed  with  a  view  to  substantial  jus- 
tice."^ The  language  used  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin 
in  a  similar  case  is  still  stronger:  "Contrary  to  the  common-law 
rule,  every  reasonable  intendment  and  presumption  is  to  be  made 

1  [^See  §  *  434,  note  1  r\  -  Oleott  v.  Carroll,  39  N.  Y.  430,  438. 


592 


CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 


in  favor  of  the  pleading."^  The  same  interpietr.tion  is  g'ven 
to  the  provision  in  Iowa;  the  old  dogma  of  leaning  against  the 
pleader  is  abandoned,  and  a  liberal  and  equitable  construction  is 
now  the  rule.^  The  practical  force  and  operation  of  this  prin- 
ciple, and  liow  much  effect  it  actually'  produces  in  the  judicial 
process  of  construing  pleadings,  can  best  be  seen  by  an  examina- 
tion of  the  decisions  in  which  it  has  been  invoked.  A  few  of 
them  have  therefore  been  selected,  and  placed  in  the  foot-note." 


1  Morse  v.  Oilman,  16  Wis.  504,  507. 
See  also  Hazletou  v.  Union  Bk.  of  Colum- 
bus, 32  Wis.  34,  42,  43,  wliicli  holds  that 
greater  latitude  of  presumption  is  ad- 
mitted to  sustain  a  complaint,  when  objec- 
tion to  it  is  not  made  until  the  trial,  after 
issues  have  beeu  formed  by  an  answer. 

•2  Shank  v.  Teeple,  33  Iowa,  189,  191  ; 
Foster  v.  Elliott,  33  Iowa,  216,  223 ;  Gray 
?•.  Coan,  23  Iowa,  344 ;  Doolittle  v.  Green, 
32  Iowa,  123,  124. 

"  McGlasson  v.  Bradford,  7  Bush,  250, 
252  ;  .joubert  v.  Carli,  26  Wis.  594  ;  Clay  v. 
Edgerton,  19  Ohio  St.  549  ;  supra,  §  *  535  , 
Gunn  V.  Madigan,  28  Wis.  158,  164;  Rob- 
son  V.  Comstock,  8  Wis.  372,  374,  375  ; 
Morse  v.  Gilraau,  16  Wis.  504.  As  further 
examples,  see  Bushey  v.  Reynolds,  31  Ark. 
657  ;  Thompson  v.  Killian,  25  Minn.  Ill ; 
Ferguson  v.  Va.  &  T.  R.  Co.,  13  Nev.  184  ; 
Chiiders  v.  Veruer,  12  S.  C.  1 ;  Wilkins  v. 
Moore,  20  Kan.  .538  ;  Strong  v.  Hoos,  41 
Wis.  659  ;  Whitman  v.  Watry,  44  id.  491  ; 
Evans  i\  Neale,  69  Ind.  148  ;  ]\Ioore  v. 
Moore,  56  Cal.  89;  Wilcox  v.  Hausch,  57 
id.  139;  McAllister  i'.  Welker,  39  Minn. 
535  ;  Isaacs  v.  Holland,  1  Wash.  54. 

[^Construction  of  Pleadittf/s. 

Pleadings  are  to  be  construed  libei-ally 
with  a  view  to  substantial  justice  between 
the  parties:  Guy  v.  McDaniel  (1897),  51 
S.  C.  4.36,  29  S.  E.  196;  Cone  v.  Ivinson 
(1893),  4  Wyo.  203,31  Vac.  31  ;  McArthur 
V.  Clarke  Drug  Co.  (1896),  48  Neb.  899,  67 
N.  W.  861;  ilart7xll  r.  McClurg  (1898). 
54  Xeb.  313,  74  N.  W.  625  ;  Miller  v. 
Bayer  (1896),  94  Wis.  123,  68  N.  W.  869; 
South  Bend  Chilled  Plow  Co.  v.  Geo.  C. 
Cribb  Co.  (1897),  97  Wis.  2.30,  72  N.  W. 
749  ;  Benolkin  i\  Guthrie  (1901),  111  Wis. 
554,  87  N.  W.  466  ;  S.age  v.  Culver  (1895), 
147  N.  Y.  241,  41  N.  E.  513;  Dailey  r. 
Burlington,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1899),  58  Neb. 


396,  78  N.  W.  722;  Roberts  v.  Samson 
(1897),  50  Neb.  745,  70  N.  W.  384 ;  Wenk 
V.  City  of  New  York  (1902),  171  N.  Y.  607, 
64  N.  E.  509  ;  Coatsworth  v.  Lehigh  Valley 
Ry.  Co.  (1898),  156  N.  Y.  451,  51  N.  E. 
301  ;  Kain  v.  Larkin  (1894),  141  N.  Y.  144, 
39  N.  E.  9  ;  United  States  Saving  Co.  v. 
Harris  (1895),  142  Ind.  226,  40  N.  E.  1072  ; 
Strong  V.  Weir  (1896),  47  S.  C.  307,  25 
S.  E.  157;  Waggy  v.  Scott  (1896),  29 
Ore.  336,  45  Pac.  774  ;  Hood  v.  Nicholson 
(1896),  137  Mo.  400,  38  S.  W.  1095  ;  Vogel- 
gesaug  V.  City  of  St.  Louis  (1897),  139  Mo. 
127,  40  S  W.  653  ;  Baird  v.  Citizens'  Ry. 
Co.  (1898),  146  Mo.  265,  48  S.  W.  78; 
Ingraham  v.  Lyon  (1894),  105  Cal.  254, 
38  Pac.  892  (but  see  California  cases  cited 
infra,  holding  that  pleadings  are  to  be  con- 
strued most  strongly  against  the  pleader) ; 
Hall  V.  Woolcry  (1898),  20  Wash.  440,  55 
Pac.  562,  holding  that  in  the  absence  of  a 
demurrer,  a  complaint  is  entitled  to  a 
liberal  construction  ;  Blumenthal  v.  Pacific 
Meat  Co.  (1895),  12  Wa.sh.  331,  41  Pac.  47, 
to  same  effect. 

The  case  of  Cone  v.  Ivinson  (su/jra),  4 
"Wyo.  203,  has  a  very  elaborate  discussion 
of  the  question  of  construction.  Pomeroy, 
Bliss,  Swan,  and  Maxwell  are  all  copiously 
quoted,  and  the  authorities  are  thoroughly 
reviewed,  a  strong  dissenting  opinion  being 
filed.  Upon  a  rehearing  being  granted, 
the  case  was  tlioroughly  reargued,  the 
court  adhering  to  its  original  position. 

A  pleading  must  be  held  to  allege  all 
the  facts  that  can  be  imjjlieil  by  fair  and 
reasonable  intendment  from  the  facts  ex- 
pressly stated:  Sage  v.  Culver  (1895),  147 
N.  Y.  241,  41  N.  E.  513;  Kain  v.  Larkin 
(1894),  141  N.  Y.  144,  39  N.  E.  9  ;  Coats- 
worth  V.  Lehigh  Valley  Ry.  Co.  (1898), 
156  N.  Y.  451,  51  N.  E.  301;  Wenk  v. 
City  of  New  York  (1902),  171  N.  Y.  607, 
64  N.  E.  509 ;  Roberts  v.  Samson  (1897), 


LIBERAL   CONSTRUCTION    OF    PLEADINGS. 


193 


111  a  very  small  number  of  cases,  however,  the  courts  seem  to 
have    overlooked    this   change    made   by  the   statute,  and   have 


50  Neb.  745,  70  N.  W.  384  ;  Dailey  v.  Bur- 
lington, etc.  R.R.  Co.  (1899),  58  Neb.  396, 
78  N.  W.  722  ;  Miller  v.  Bayer  (1896),  94 
Wis.  123,  68  N.  W.  869. 

Where  a  pleading  i.s  assailed  for  the 
first  time  by  a  demurrer  ore  tenus,  it  will 
be  construed  liberally :  National  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  r.  P'astern  Building  &  Loan  Ass'n 
(1902),  63  Neb.  698,  88  N.  W.  863  ;  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Pennington  (1899),  57  Neb. 
404,  77  N.  W.  1084;  Holtz  v.  Hanson 
(1902),  115  Wis.  236, 91  N.  W.  663  ;  Werner 
V.  Ascher  (1893),  86  Wis.  349,  56  N.  W. 
869;  Phillips  v.  Carver  (1898),  99  Wis. 
561,  75  N.  W.  432;  Winkler  v.  Kacine 
Wagon,  etc.  Co.  (1898),  99  Wis.  184,  74 
N.  W.  973. 

A  pleading  attacked  for  tlie  first  time 
in  the  Supreme  Court  on  the  ground  that 
it  does  not  state  a  cause  of  action,  will  be 
liberally  construed  :  Omalia  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Iviper  (1900),  60  Neb.  33,  82  N.  W.  102; 
F'owler  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (1899),  35  Ore. 
559,  57  Pac.  421  ;  Roseburg  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Nosier  (1900),  37  Ore.  299,  60  Pac.  904. 
See  also  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Tompkins 
(1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W.  717. 

When  a  complaint  is  attacked  after 
judgment  for  want  of  facts  to  state  a  cause 
of  action,  it  must  be  liberally  construed : 
Mosher  v.  Bruhu  (1896);  15  Wash.  332, 
46  Pac.  397;  Cobb  v.  Lindell  Ry.  Co. 
(1899),  149  Mo.  135,  50  S.  W.  310;  Mer- 
rill V.  Equitable  Farm  &  Stock,  etc.  Co. 
(1896),  49  Neb.  198,68  N.  W.  365;  Ameri- 
can Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Landfare  (1898),  56 
Neb.  482,  76  N.  W.  1068.  A  decree  lor 
plaintiff  will  cure  tlie  inadvertent  omission 
of  the  won!  "  not "  in  a  complaint :  Wyatt 
V.  Wyatt  (1897),  31  Ore.  531,  49  Pac.  855. 
See  also  Montesano  v.  Blair  (1895),  12 
Wash.  188,  40  Pac.  731 ;  State  ex  rel.  v. 
Renshaw  (1902),  166  Mo.  682,  66  S.  W. 
953;  Milner  v.  Harris  (1903), —  Neb. —, 
95  N.  W.  682. 

Imperfect  allegations  have  frequently 
been  held  to  be  aided  by  verdict  or  judg- 
ment. See  Hall  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co. 
(1899),  Ariz.,  57  Pac.  617;  Ades  y.  Levi 
(189.3),  137  Ihd.  506,  37  N.  E.  388  ;  Philo- 
math V.  Ingle  (1902),  41  Ore.  289,  68  Pac. 
803  ;  Clian  Sing  v.  City  of  Portland  (1900), 


37  Ore.  68,  60  Pac.  718;  Mass.  Benefit 
Ass'n  V.  Richart  (1896),  99  Ky.  302,  35 
S.  W.  541 ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lawes  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W.  426  ;  Hill  v. 
Ragland  (1902),  —  Ky.  — ,  70  S  W.  634  ; 
Salmon  Falls  Bank  v.  Leyser  (1893),  116 
Mo.  51,  22  S.  W.  .504;  People's  Bank?;. 
Scalzo  (1894),  127  Mo.  164,  29  S.  W.  1032  ; 
Nicolai  v.  Krimbel  (1896),  29  Ore.  76,  43 
Pac.  865;  Miller  v.  Ilirschberg  (1895), 
27  Ore  522,  40  Pac.  506.  But  it  has  been 
held  that  such  aider  does  not  take  place 
where  the  complaint  is  radically  defective  : 
Nye  V.  Bill  Nye  Min.  Co.  (1903),  42  Ore. 
560,  71  Pac.  1043.  Compare  Gu.stin  v. 
Concordia  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  164  Mo.  172, 
64  S.  W.  128. 

When  olijection  is  made  for  the  first 
time  on  the  trial  that  the  complaint  does 
not  state  facts  constituting  a  cause  of 
action,  the  pleading  will  be  sustained  if 
.possible:  Johnston  v.  Spencer  (1897),  51 
Neb.  198,  70  N.  W.  982  ;  Chicago,  Burling- 
ton, etc.  R.  R.Co.  V.  Spirk  (1897),  51  Neb. 
167,  70  N.  W.  926;  Peterson  v.  Hopewell 
(1898),  55  Neb.  670,  76  N.  W.  451  ;  Butts 
1-.  Kingman  &  Co.  (1900),  60  Neb.  224,  82 
N.  W.  854;  Anderson  v.  Alsetli  (1895),  6 
S.  D.  566,  62  N.  W.  435  ;  Whitbeck  v. 
Sees  (1898),  10  S.  D.  417,  73  N.  W.  915  ; 
Broyhill  v.  Norton  (1903),  175  Mo.  190,  74 
S.  W.  1024  ;  Seibert  v.  Minneapolis,  etc. 
Ry.  Co,  (1894),  58  Minn.  39,  59  N.  W.  822  ; 
Commonwealth  Title  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dokko 
(1898),  71  Minn.  .533,  71  N.  W.  891. 

When  objections  are  made  to  the  intro- 
duction of  evidence  on  the  ground  that  the 
petition  fails  to  state  a  cause  of  action, 
the  pleading  will  be  liberally  construed : 
Zug  V.  Forgan  (1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  W. 
1129;  Fire  Ass'n  of  Philadelphia  v.  Ruby 
(1900),  60  Neb.  216,  82  N.  W.  629;  Norfolk 
Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  Hight  (1898),  56  Neb. 
162,  76  N.  W.  566. 

Under  the  liberal  rule  of  construction 
the  word  "  wages "  was  construed  as 
tliough  it  read  "  damages  "  when  the  latter 
should  have  been  used  :  Tiffin  Glass  Co.  v. 
Stoehr  (1896),  54  0.  St.  157,  43  N.  E. 
279  ;  the  word  "  pain  "  was  construed  to 
mean  "paid:"  Connor  r.  Becker  (1901), 
62  Neb.  856,  87  N.  W.  1065  ;  the  complaint 


38 


)94 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


expressly  declared  that  the  construction  must  be  adverse  to  the 
pleader,  thus   recognizing   the   ancient   rule  as  still    in  force  ;^ 


and  reply  were  read  togetlier  to  determiue 
the  intent  of  tlie  pleader :  Lavery  v.  Arnold 
(18J9),  36  Ore.  84,  58  Pac.  524 ;  "  where  a 
complaint  contains  words  which, if  properly 
arrangcMl,  might  state  two  causes  of  action, 
it  will  be  construed  as  stating  only  the  one 
principally  intended  :  "  Santa  Fe,  etc.  Ky. 
Co.  r.  Hurley  (1894),  Ariz.,  36  Pac.  216; 
where  a  complaint  may  be  treated  as  set- 
ting out  a  cause  of  action  either  ex  con- 
tractu or  ex  delicto,  anil  the  action  would 
be  barred  if  treated  as  ex  delicto,  it  will  be 
treated  as  ex  contractu  :  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  V.  Sweet  (1897),  63  Ark.  563,  40  S.  W. 
463  ;  the  words  "  entered  into  "  were  con- 
strued to  equal  "  executed,"  and  the  alle- 
gation of  the  execution  of  a  bond  was 
held  to  include  the  performance  of  every 
act  essential  to  the  making  and  approval 
of  the  bond :  Fire  Ass'n  of  Pliiladelphia  v. 
Ruby  (1900),  60  Neb.  216,  82  N.  \V.  629; 
an  allegation  that  a  child  was  six  years  of 
age,  held  to  include  an  allegation  tliat  said 
child  was  unmarried,  in  an  action  for  the 
death  of  an  unmarried  minor  diild  :  Baird 
V.  Citizens'  Ry.  Co.  (1898),  146  Mo.  265, 
48  S.  W.  78;  facts  not  conclusions  control 
in  construction  of  pleading:  Spargur  v. 
Komine  (1893),  38  Neb.  736,  57  N.  W.  .523  ; 
where  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  action  is 
legal  or  equitable,  it  should  be  so  con- 
stru<^d  as  to  maintain  the  jurisdiction  of 
tlie  court:  Adams  v.  Hayes  (1897),  120 
N.  C.  383,  27  S.  Iv  47  ;  a  pleading  in  the 
form  of  an  indictment  will  be  considered 
as  a  complaint  if  the  necessary  facts  are 
alleged :  St.  Louis,  etc.  K.  R.  Co.  v.  State 
(1901),  68  Ark.  561,  60  S.  W.  654. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri,  in  the 
case  of  Hood  v.  Nicholson  (1896),  137  Mo. 
400,  38  S.  W.  1095,  used  the  following 
language  resrecting  the  limits  applicable 
to  the  liberal  construction  of  pleadings ; 
"  Courts,  to  prevent  delays  and  avoid  hard- 
ships, will  disregard  all  defects  in  plead- 
ings whicl)  do  not  affect  the  substantial 
rights  of  the  adverse  party,  and  will  dis- 
regard form  and  look  to  the  substance  and 
at  all  times  give  .such  interpretation  to 
language  used  iis  fairly  appears  to  have 
been  intended  by  its  author;  yet  it  is  not 
authorized   to   rob,  by  construction,  lan- 


guage of  its  plain  and  obvious  moaning,  or 
of  the  fair,  reasonable,  and  obvious  conclu- 
sion to  be  deduced  therefrom,  to  enable  its 
author  to  relieve  himself  from  a  position  of 
embarrassment  wliere  by  its  use  he  has 
voluntarily  placed  himself." 

In  Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Haywood 
(1897),  102  la.  392,  71  N.  W.  358,  the  court 
said :  "  Where  the  right  of  recovery  is  based 
upon  a  written  contract,  as  in  tliis  case,  and 
the  averment  of  facts  constituting  another 
cause  of  action  is  necessary  to  bring  the 
remedy  sought  within  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract, then  it  will  be  assumed  that  only 
one  cause  of  action  was  intended.  In  other 
words,  parties  are  presumed  to  follow  the 
requirements  of  statute  in  preparing  their 
pleadings,  and  a  single  count  or  division 
of  a  petition  will  not  be  construed  to  state 
two  causes  of  action  unless  the  purpose  of 
the  pleader  so  to  do  clearly  appears.""] 

1  Commonwealth  v.  Cook,  8  Bush,  220, 
224 ;  Wrigiit  v.  McCormick,  67  N.  C.  27. 
And  see  Rogers  v.  Shannon,  52  Cal.  99  ; 
Henley  v.  Wilson,  77  N.  C.  216  (common- 
law  rule  applied;  ambiguous  language 
.strictly  construed  against  the  pleader ; 
no  intendments  in  his  favor) ;  Jaffe  v.  Lili- 
enthal,  86  Cal.  91  ;  Loehr  v.  Murphy,  45 
Mo.  A  pp.  519. 

^Im  the  following  cases  it  is  held  that 
the  pleadings  are  to  be  construed  most 
strongly  against  the  pleader :  May.s  v. 
Carman  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  1019; 
Friend  v.  Allen  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W.  418; 
Goff  V.  Marsden  Co.  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W. 
667;  Fox  v.  Mackey  (1899),  125  Cal.  54, 
57  Pac.  672 ;  California  Navigation  Co.  i\ 
Union  Transp.  Co.  (1898),  122  Cal.  641, 
55  Pac.  591 ;  Siskiyou  Lumber  Co.  r. 
Rostel  (1898),  121  Cal.  511,  53  Pac.  1118; 
Heller  v.  Dyerville  Mfg.  Co.  (1897),  116 
Cal.  127.  47  Pac.  1016;  Callahan  v.  Lough- 
ran  (1894),  102  Cal.  476,  36  Pac.  835  (but 
see  Ingraham  v.  Lyon  (1894),  105  Cal. 
2.54,  38  Pac.  892,  where  the  liberal  view  is 
announced);  Ilolt  v.  Pearson  (1895),  12 
Utah,  63,41  Pac.  560  (expressly  overruled 
in  Mangum  v.  Bullion,  etc.  Co.  (1897), 
15  Utah,  534,  50  Pac.  834);  Johnston  i-. 
Meaghr  (1897),  14  Utah,  426,  47  Pac.  861, 
holding  that,  on  demurrer,  pleadings  are 


IMPERFECT    OK    INFOKMAL    ALLEGATIONS.  595 

while  in  some  others  the  judicial  action  was  clearly  based  upon 
that  old  doctrine,  although  it  was  not  formally  announced  in  the 
opinions.  1  Under  the  light  of  this  beneficent  but  new  principle, 
that  pleadings  are  to  be  construed  fairly,  equitably,  and  liberally, 
with  a  view  to  promote  the  ends  of  justice,  and  not  enforce  any 
arbitrary  and  technical  dogmas,  I  shall  proceed  to  consider,  in 
the  order  already  indicated,  the  several  practical  rules  mentioned 
above,  which  regulate  the  manner  of  setting  forth  the  cause  of 
action  or  the  defence. 

§  442.  *  548.  I.  InsufiBcient,  Imperfect,  Incomplete,  or  Informal 
Allegations,  and  the  Mode  of  Objecting  to  and  Correcting  them. 
Distinction  between  Imperfect  and  wholly  Deficient  Allegations. 
The  codes  clearly  intend  to  draw  a  broad  line  of  distinction 
between  an  entire  failure  to  state  any  cause  of  action  or  defence, 
on  the  one  side,  which  is  to  be  taken  advantage  of  either  by  the 
general  demurrer  for  want  of  sufficient  facts,  or  by  the  exclusion 
of  all  evidence  at  the  trial,  and  the  statement  of  a  cause  of  action 
or  a  defence  in  an  insufficient,  imperfect,  incomplete,  or  informal 
manner,  which  is  to  be  corrected  by  a  motion  to  render  the 
pleading  more  definite  and  certain  by  amendment.  The  courts 
have,  in  the  main,  endeavored  to  preserve  this  distinction,  but 
not  always  with  success ;  since  averments  have  sometimes  been 
treated  as  merely  incomplete,  and  the  pleadings  containing  them 
have  been  sustained  on  demurrer,  which  appeared  to  state  no 
cause  of  action  or  defence  whatever;  while,  in  other  instances, 
pleadings  have  been  pronounced  wholly  defective  and  therefore 
bad  on  demurrer,  or  incajDable  of  admitting  any  evidence,  the 
allegations  of  which  appear  to  have  been  simply  imperfect  or 
incomplete.     It  is  undoubtedly  difficult  to  discriminate  between 

to  be  construed  most  strongly  against  the  Co.    (1900),   24    Mont.    178,    61    Pac.    i; 

pleader,  but,  after  trial,  in  the  pleader's  Fidelity  &  Casualty  Co.  d.  Vandyke  (1896), 

favor ;  Oregon  &  Cal.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack-  99  Ga.'542,  27  S.  E.  709. 
sou  County  (1901),  38  Ore.  589,  64   Pac.  In    Blumenthal    v.    Pacific    Meat    Co. 

.307,  holding  that,  when  tested  by  demur-  (1895),   12  Wash.   331,   41    Pac.    47,    the 

rer,  the  allegations  of  a  pleadiug  are  to  court  seems  to  favor  a  somewhat   strict 

be  construed   most  .strongly  against   tlie  construction  when  the  pleading  is  attacked 

]ilea(ler,  but   after   pleading  over   all  in-  by  motion  or  demurrer.^ 
tendments  must  be  indulged  in  favor  of  i  For     examples,     see     Hathaway   v. 

its  sufficiency ;  Mellott  y.  Downing  (1901),  Quinby,    1    N.   Y.    S.   C.    386;    Doyle    v. 

39  Ore.   218,    64   Pac.  393  (to  the  same  Phcenix  Ins.    Co.,  44    Cal.   264;   Scofield 

effect);  Patterson  v.  Patterson  (1902),  40  v.  Whitelegge,  49  N.  Y.  259,  261  ;   Holmes 

Ore.   560,   67    Pac.  664   (to  same  effect);  y.  Williams," 1 6  .Minn.  164,  168. 
Conrad  Nat.  Bank  i\  Great  Northern  Ry. 


596  CIVIL   LEMEDIE.S. 

these  two  conditions  of  partial  and  of  total  failure;  and  it  is 
utterly  impossible  to  frame  any  accurate  general  formula  which 
shall  define  or  describe  the  insufficiency,  incompleteness,  or  ini- 
perfectness  of  averment  intended  by  the  codes,  and  shall  embrace 
all  the  possible  instances  within  its  terms.  B}-  a  comparison  of 
the  decided  cases,  some  notion,  however,  may  be  obtained  of  the 
distinction,  recognized  if  not  definitely  established  by  the  courts, 
between  the  absolute  deficiency  which  renders  a  pleading  bad  on 
demurrer  or  at  the  trial,  and  the  incompleteness  or  imperfection 
of  allegation  which  exposes  it  to  amendment  by  motion;  and  in 
this  manner  alone  can  any  light  be  thrown  upon  the  nature  of 
the  insufficiency  which  is  the  subject  of  the  present  inquiry. 

§  443.  *  549.  Motion  the  Proper  Method  of  Attackins  Pleadings 
which  are  merely  Imperfect.  The  true  doctrine  to  be  gathered 
from  all  the  cases  is,  that  if  the  substantial  facts  which  constitute 
a  cause  of  action  are  stated  in  a  complaint  or  petition,  or  can  be 
inferred  by  reasonable  intendment  from  the  matters  M'hich  are 
set  forth,  although  the  allegations  of  these  facts  are  imperfect, 
incomplete,  and  defective,  such  insufficiency  pertaining,  how- 
ever, to  the  form  rather  than  to  the  substance,  the  proper  mode 
of  correction  is  not  by  demurrer,  nor  by  excluding  evidence  at 
the  trial,  but  by  a  motion  before  the  trial  to  make  the  averments 
more  definite  and  certain  by  amendment.^     From  the  citations  in 

1  People  V.  Ryder,  12  X.  Y.  43.3  ;  Prin-  v.  Hall,  43  Cal.  191  (objection  that  a  coni- 

dle  V.  Caruthers,  15  N.  Y.  425;  Flauders  plaint    is    ambiguous    cannot    be    rai.scd 

V.  McVickar,  7  Wis.  372,  377  ;  Kobson  v.  under   a   general   demurrer) ;    Blasdel    v. 

Comstocli,  8  Wis.  372,  374,  375;    Kuehn  Williams,  9  Nev.  161;  Smith  v.  Dennett, 

V.  Wilson,  13  Wis.  104,  107,  108;  Morse  c.  15  Minn.  81;  Lewis  c.  Edwards,  44  Ind. 

Oilman,  16  Wis.  504,  507  ;  Kimball  iv  Dar-  33;5,  336;  Snowden  i'.  Wiias,  19  Ind.  10; 

ling,  32  Wis.  675,  684 ;  Keeve  v.   Fraker,  Lane    v.    Miller,   27    Ind.    534 ;    Johnson 

32   Wis.   243;    Hazleton   v.  Union  Bk.  of  v.    Kol)insoD,    20  Minn.   189,    192;    Mills 

Columbus,  32   Wis.   34,  42,   43;    Horn  i-.  v.  Rice,  3  Neb.  76,  86,  87;  School  Trs.  r. 

Ludin<j;ton,  23  Wis.  81,  83  (a  motion  made  Odlin,  8  Ohio  St.  293,  296.     A  (juotation 

and  granted,  —  a  good  illustration  of  de-  from  a  few  of  these  cases  will  show  the 

fective    allegations    added    to);    Clay    v.  exact  position  taken  by  the  courts  in  refer- 

Edgerton,    19   Ohio  St.    549 ;    Winter   v.  ence   to  the  extent  of  defect  which  can 

Winter,  8  Nev.  129  (statement  of  a  ma-  and  must  be  cured  by  motion ;  and  I  select 

terial  fact  by  way  of  recital);   Saulslniry  from  among  tho.se  which  have  discussed 

/•.  Alexamler,  .50  Mo.  142,  144 ;  Corpenny  the  sul)ject  in  the  most  general  manner. 

V.  Sedalia,  57  Mo.  88  (a  motion   in   arrest  In  Prindle  v.  Caruthers,  15  N.  Y.  425,  the 

of  judgment   not    proper   when   a   cause  complaint   set   out   a    copy  of   a  written 

of  action  is  stated  however  defectively);  contract  made  by  defendant,  and  reciting 

Pomeroy    v.    Benton,   57    Mo.    531,    550;  that,  "for  value  received,"  he  "  promised 

Hale  c.Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  626,  to  i)ay  II.  C.  or  E.  C,"  etc.;  but  it  did 

6.30;    15artiiol    v.    Blakin,   34    Iowa,  452;  not,  in  any  other  manner,  allege  a  con- 

liussell   c.   Mixer,  42  Cal.   47.');    Mattery  sideration.     It  also  stated  that  "the  cou- 


IMPERFECT    Oli    INFORMAL    ALLEGATIONS. 


597 


the  foot-note,  it  is  clear  that  the  courts  have,  with  a  considerable 
degree  of  unanimity,   agreed  upon  this  rule,   and  have  in  most 


tract  is,  and  was  prior  to,  etc.,  the  property 
'of  the  plaintiff  by  purchase,"  but  did  not 
disclose  from  whom  the  transfer  was 
made,  nor  the  consideration.  The  de- 
fendant demurrin<r  for  want  of  sufficient 
facts,  the  court  held  that  the  copy  of  the 
contract  as  set  fortli  contained  a  sufficient 
allegation  of  a  consideration,  and  added  : 
"  The  remedy  for  all  defects  of  this 
nature  is  by  motion  to  make  the  faulty 
pleading  more  definite  and  certain ;  that 
])roceeding  has  taken  the  place  of  demur- 
rers for  want  of  form."  liobson  v.  Com- 
stock,  8  Wis.  372,  waa  an  action  for 
malicious  prosecution.  The  complaint 
merely  alleged  that  the  defendant,  mali- 
ciously and  without  probal)le  cause,  pro- 
cured the  plaintiff  to  be  arrested  and  to 
be  imprisoned,  to  his  damage,  etc.,  but  did 
not  state  the  nature  of  the  indictment, 
nor  in  what  the  charge  consisted,  nor 
even  that  it  was  false,  nor  that  there  had 
been  a  trial,  nor  that  the  plaintiff  had 
been  discharged  or  acquitted.  The  de- 
fendant answered  by  a  general  denial; 
and,  at  the  trial,  the  plaintiff  had  a  ver- 
dict. On  appeal  from  the  judgment,  the 
court,  by  Cole  J.,  held  (pp.  374,  S?."))  that 
the  complaint  was  exceedingly  defective 
and  informal  in  its  manner  of  setting  out 
the  cause  of  action  ;  but  it  was  cured 
by  the  verdict.  The  plaintiff  must  have 
jnoved  a  discharge  or  acquittal,  or  else 
he  could  not  have  obtained  a  verdict. 
The  code  requires  a  liberal  construction ; 
and  the  defendant  should  have  moved 
that  the  pleading  be  made  definite  and 
certain  by  supplying  the  omitted  aver- 
ments. In  Morse  v.  Gilmau,  16  Wis.  1)04, 
tlie  complaint  alleged  that  defendant 
entered  into  a  written  contract  with  one 
Merrick  for  grading  at  a  specified  price 
per  cubic  yard ;  that  the  work  had 
been  completed  by  M.  according  to  the 
agreement ;  that  there  was  due  thereon 
a  certain  named,  sum  ;  and  that  the  de- 
mand had  been  assigned  by  M.  to  the 
plaintiff ;  but  it  did  not  to  any  further 
extent  state  the  provisions  of  the  contract. 
At  the  trial,  all  evidence  on  the  part  of 
the  plaintiff  was  excluded,  and  the  com- 
plaint was  dismissed.      In  reversing  this 


ruling,  the  court,  by  Dixon  C.  J.,  said 
(p.  .')07):  "That  the  contract  between  M. 
and  the  defendant  is  not  set  out,  as  it 
undoubtedly  sliould  have  been,  is  not  an 
objection  which  can  be  taken  in  this  way. 
'I'he  remedy  of  the  defendant  for  this  de- 
fect is  by  motion  to  require  the  complaint 
to  be  made  more  definite  and  certain 
by  amendment.  A  complaint  to  be  over- 
thrown by  demurrer,  or  by  objection  to 
evidence,  must  be  wholly  insufficient.  If 
any  portion  of  it,  or  to  any  extent  it  pre- 
sents facts  sufl[icient  to  constitute  a  cause 
of  action,  or  if  a  good  cause  of  action  caii 
be  gathered  from  it,  it  will  stand,  how- 
ever inartificially  the.se  facts  may  be  pre- 
sented, or  however  defective,  uncertain, 
or  redundant  may  be  the  mode  of  their 
treatment.  Contrary  to  the  common-law 
rule,  every  reasonalile  intendment  and 
presumption  is  to  be  made  in  favor  of  the 
pleading;  and  it  will  not  be  set  aside  on 
demurrer  unless  it  be  so  fatally  defective, 
that,  taking  all  the  facts  to  be  admitted, 
tlie  court  can  say  they  furnish  no  cause 
of  action  whatever  ;  "  citing  and  approv- 
ing Cudlipp  v.  Whipple,  4  Duer,  610; 
Graham  v.  Camman,  5  Duer,  697  ;  Broder- 
ick  v.  Poillon,  2  E.  D.Smith,  .554  ;  Elfrauk 
r.  Seller,  54  Mo.  134;  Russell  v.  State  Ins. 
Co.,  55  Mo.  585  ;  Biddle  v.  Ramsey,  52 
Mo.  153.  The  court,  in  Mills  v.  Kice, 
3  Neb.  76,  86,  87,  said  that  when  a 
petition  is  uncertain  or  indefinite  in  its 
allegations,  when  it  attempts  to  set  up 
a  good  cause  of  action,  but  the  defect 
does  not  go  to  the  length  of  omitting  to 
state  any  cause  of  action,  tlie  defendant 
must  move  to  correct ;  he  cannot  take 
advantage  of  it  by  demurrer.  The  fol- 
lowing cases  are  additional  examples,  and 
they  generally  sustain  the  distinction 
stated  in  tlie  text  and  the  rule  there  laid 
down.  Ball  v.  Fulton  Cy.,  31  Ark.  379  (the 
rule  of  the  text,  §  *  549,  ([uoted,  approved, 
and  followed) ;  Kalckhoff  r.  Zoehrlaut,  40 
Wis.  427  ;  Lash  v.  Christie,  4  Neb.  262 ; 
Surginer  i\  Paddock,  31  Ark.  528;  AuU 
V.  Jones,  5  Neb.  500 ;  Farrar  v.  Triplet, 
7  id.  237  ;  Dorsey  v.  Hall,  7  id.  460 ;  State 
r.  North.  Belle  Min.  Co.,  15  Nev.  385; 
Coon  Dist.  Tp.  v.  Providence  Dist.  Tp. 


598  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

instances  applied  it  to  defects  and  mistakes  having  the  same 
general  features,  and  have  sometimes  severely  strained  the  doc- 
trine of  liberal  construction  in  order  to  enforce  it.  Thus,  if 
instead  of  alleging  the  issuable  facts  the  pleader  should  state  the 
evidence  of  such  facts,  or  even  a  portion  onlj-  thereof,  unless 
the  omission  was  so  extensive  that  no  cause  of  action  at  all  was 
indicated,  or  if  he  should  aver  conclusions  of  law,  in  place  of 
fact,  the  resulting  insutficiency  and  imperfection  would  pertain 
to  the  form  rather  than  to  the  substance,  and  the  mode  of  cor- 
rection would  be  by  a  motion,  and  not  by  a  demurrer.  It  is 
virtually  impossible,  however,  to  lay  down  a  dividing-line,  so 
that  on  the  one  side  shall  fall  all  the  errors  which  are  venial,  and 
on  the  other  all  those  which  are  fatal.  While  in  most  instances 
the  courts  have  held  that  a  motion  is  the  only  means  of  removing 
the  defect,  and  therefore  that  a  neglect  to  make  a  motion  waives 
all  objection  without  any  reference  to  the  stage  of  the  cause,  yet 
in  some  cases  a  considerable  stress  has  been  laid  upon  the  effect 
of  a  verdict  in  curing  the  error.  ^  And  in  certain  decisions  the 
language  of  the  judges  tends  to  create  an  unnecessary  confusion, 
and  to  incorporate  an  additional  element  of  doubt  into  the  rule, 

Dir  ,  52  Iowa,  287  ;  XlcCormick  v.  Basal,  called  for  trial) ;  Sukforth  /;.  Lord,  87  Cal. 

46  id.  235  ;  Bradley  c.  I'arkhurst,  20  Kan.  399  ;  Bush  v.  Cella,  52  Ark.  378 ;  Sweet  v. 

462;    Walter   v.    Fowler,    85  N.  Y.  621;  Desha  Lumber,  etc.  Co.  (Arl:.  1892),  20 

Marie  c  Garrison,  83  id.  14,  23;   Calvo  r.  S.  W.  Rep.   514;  Newport   Light  Co.  v. 

Davies,  73  id.  211  ;  Raster  v.  Raster,  52  Newport  (Ry.   1892),  19  S.  W.  Kep.  188; 

Ind.   531 ;  BrookviUe  &  C,  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Sheeks  v.  Krwin,  130  lud.  31  ;  De  Hart  i-. 

Pumphrey,  59  id.  78  ;  U.  S.  Expre.ss  Co.  v.  Etuire,  121  Ind.  242  ;  Cockerill  v.  i?tafford, 

Reefer.  59  id.  263;  Evansville  v.  Thayer,  102  Mo.  571. 

59  id.  324;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Sedwick,  i  See  Robson  v.  Comstock,  8  Wis.  372, 

59  id.  336 ;  Rees  v.  Cupp,  59  id.  566  ;  Shaw  374,  375  ;  Hazleton  v.  Union  Bk.  of  Colum- 

V.   Merchants'  Nat.  Bk.,  60  id.  83  ;  Boyce  bus,  32  Wis.  34,  42,  43  ;  Clay  v.  Edgerton, 

r.  Brady,  61    id.  432;  Sebbitt  v.  Stryker,  19  Ohio  St.  549  ;  Saulsbury  r.  Alexander, 

62  id.  41  ;  Barrett  v.  Leonard,  66  id.  422;  50  Mo.  142,  144;  Corpenny  v.  Sedalia,  57 

Wiles  V.  Lambert,  66  id.  494;  Proctor  r.  Mo.  88;  Pomeroy  r.  Benton,  57  Mo.  531, 

Cole,    66   id.    576;    Dale    v.   Thomas,   67  5.50;    Blasdel   c' Williams,    9  Nev.    161; 

id.  570;  Earle  v.   Patterson,  67   id.   503;  Smith  v.  Dennett,  15  Minn.  81.     In  Mis- 

Milroy  v.  Quinn,  69  id.  406  ;  Lee  r.  Davis,  souri,  and  in  a  few  other  States,  a  motion 

70  id.  464;  Smith  v.  Freeman,  71  id.  229;  in  arrest  of  judgment  is  permitted  by  the 

Trayser   Piano  Co.   v.  Kerschner,   73  id.  practice  under    some  circumstances,  and 

183;    Ohio   &    Miss.    R.    Co.    v.    CoUarn,  the  above  cases,  cited  from  that  State,  hold 

73  id.  261;   Snyder  t-.  Baber,  74  id.  47;  that  such  a  motion  is  not  proper  when  the 

Gentz    V.    Martin,    75   id.    228;    Drais   r.  petition  is  simply  defective  and  imperfect 

Hogan,  50  Cal.  121  ;  Jameson  v.  Ring,  50  in  its  statement  of  the  cause  of  action,  and 

id.   132;  Lo.s  Angeles  v.  Signoret,  50  id.  should  only  be  made  when  it  wholly  fails 

298;  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Snave-  to  set  forth  any  cause  of  action  ;  the  mere 

ley,  47   Kan.   637    (motion   generally  too  imperfection  is  cured  by  the  verdict, 
late  wlien  not  made  until  after  the  case  is 


IMPERFECT    OR   INFORMAL    ALLEGATIONS. 


599 


which  is  not  at  best,  from  its  very  nature,  capiible  of  absolute 
certainty.  In  the  cases  referred  to,  the  courts  have  declared 
that  if  the  defendant  omits  to  move  to  make  the  pleading  more 
definite  and  certain,  or  to  deviur,  but  answers  and  goes  to  trial, 
the  objection  is  waived.^  This  form  of  expression  is  a  plain 
departure  from  the  rule  as  given  above,  and  is  self-contradictory. 
The  very  distinctive  feature  of  the  class  of  defects  under  consid- 
eration is,  that  they  do  not  render  a  pleading  demurrable,  but 
only  expose  it  to  amendment  by  motion.  A  failure  to  demur  is 
therefore  entirely  immaterial ;  it  does  not  waive  anything,  because 
the  demurrer  if  resorted  to  would  have  accomplished  nothing. 
Doubt  and  obscuritj^  alone  as  to  the  true  meaning  and  the  exact 
force  of  the  rule  can  arise  from  this  careless  use  of  language. ^ 


1  Pomeroyr.  Benton,  57  Mo.  531,  550; 
Blasdel  v.  Williams,  9  Nev.  161  ;  Smith  v. 
Dennett,  15  Minn.  81  ;  Johnson  r.  Robin- 
son. 20  Minn.  189,  192. 

2  ^Imperfect ,  Incomplete,  and  Infor- 

mal Allegations. 

Indefiniteness  and  uncertainti/  in  a  pe- 
tition are  properly  reached  by  motion  and 
not  by  demurrer  :  McAdam  v.  Scudder 
(1894),  127  Mo.  345,  30  S.  W.  168;  Guth- 
rie v.  Shaffer  (1898),  7  Okla.  459,  54  Pac. 
698 ;  Seaboard  Air  Line  Ry.  Co.  v.  Main 
(1903),  — N.  C.  —  ,  43  S.  E.  930;  Allen 
V.  Carolina  Cent.  Ry.Co.  (1897),  120  N.  C. 
548,  27  S.  E.  76;  Rutherford  v.  Johnson 
(1897),  49  S.  C.  465,27  S.  E.  470;  Garrett 
V.  Weinberg  (1897),  50  S.  C.  310,  27  S.  E. 
770  ;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Jeter  (1901),  59  S.  C. 
483,  38  S.  E.  124  ;  Lockwood  v.  Bridge  Co. 
(1901),  60  S.  C.  492,  38  S.  E.  112;  Smith 
r.  Bradstreet  (1902),  63  S.  C.  525,  41  S.  E. 
763  ;  Sheeks  v.  State  (1900),  156  Ind.  508, 
60  N.  E.  142;  Coddington  v.  Canaday 
(1901),  157  Ind.  243,  61  N.  E.  567;  Frain 
V.  Burgett  (1898),  152  Ind.  55,  50  N.  E. 
873  ;  Clow  v.  Brown  (1897),  150  Ind.  185, 
48  N.  E.  1034;  Garard  i'.  Garard  (1893), 
135  Ind.  15,  34  N.  E.  442  ;  Cleveland,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Berry  (1898),  152  Ind.  607,  53 
N.  E.  415;  Olson  ?•.  Phoenix  Mfg.  Co. 
(1899),  103  Wis.  337,  79  X.  W.  409; 
Johnston  v.  Northwestern  Live  Stock  Ins. 
Co.  (1896),  94  Wis.  117,  68  N.  W.  868; 
Allen  V.  Chicago  &  Northwestern  Ry.  Co. 
(1896),  94  Wis.  93,  68  N.  W.  873  ;  Fitch 
V.  Applegate  (1901),  24  Wash.  25,  G4  Pac. 


147;  Fares  v.  Gleason  (1896),  14  Wash. 
657,  45  Pac.  314;  Stewart  v.  Bole  (1901), 
61  Neb.  193,  85  N.  W.  33;  Kyd  ;;.  Cook 
(1898),  56  Neb.  71,  76  N.  W. '524  ;  First 
Nat.  Bank  y.  Smith  (1893),  36  Neb.  199, 
54  N.  W.  254 ;  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stone 
(1894),  54  Kan.  83,  37  Pac.  1012  ;  Sanford 
V.  Lichtenberger  il901),  62  Neb.  501,  87 
N.  W.  305;  Murrell  I'.  Henry  (1902),  70 
Ark.  161,  66  S.  W.  647  ;  City  of  Santa 
Barbara  v.  Eldred  (1895),  108  Cal.  294, 
41  Pac.  410. 

Where  a  material  fact  can  be  only 
vaguely  inferred  from  the  allegations  of  a 
complaint,  a  motion  to  make  more  defi- 
nite and  certain  will  lie:  McFadden  v. 
Stark  (1893),  58  Ark.  7,  22  S.  W.  884  ; 
City  of  Santa  Barbara  v.  Eldred  (1895), 
108  Cal.  294,  41  Pac.  410. 

Demurrer  Held  Proper  in  some  States. 
By  statute  in  California,  Colorado,  Idaho, 
Montana,  Nevada,  and  Utah,  it  is  made  a 
ground  of  demurrer  that  the  complaint  is 
ambiguous,  unintelligible,  and  uncertain. 
See  note  to  §*433.  where  tlie  statutes  are 
given.  As  to  the  form  of  the  demurrer,  it 
was  held  in  Jacob  Sultan  Co.  v.  Union  Co. 
(1895),  17  Mont.  61,  42  Pac.  109,  that  a 
demurrer  which  merely  states  in  the  lan- 
guage of  the  statute  that  the  complaint  is 
ambiguous,  unintelligible,  and  uncertain, 
should  be  disregarded.  It  ought  to  specify 
wherein  the  ambiguity,  etc.  consists.  See 
also  Herbst  Importing  Co.  v.  Hogan  (1895), 
16  Mont.  384,  41  Pac.  135. 

In  California,  in  Greenebaum  i>.  Taylor 
(1894),  102  Cal.  624,36  Pac.   957,  it  waa 


600 


CIVIL    REMEDIES 


S  444.      *  550.     Demurrer,   or   Dismissal  of    Petition   at  the    Trial, 
Proper   when   Allegations   are   wholly   Deficient.      It  has  even  been 


held  that  a  demurrer  to  a  comphiint  on 
the  ground  that  it  is  ambiguous,  unintel- 
ligible, and  uncertain,  for  the  reasou  that 
it  does  not  contain  a  sulfioieiit  description 
of  the  property  sued  for;  should  be  over- 
ruled. The  complaint  was  clearly  neither 
unintelligible  nor  ambiguous,  aud  if  uu- 
certain  merely  the  demurrer  did  uot  reach 
it.  But  see  Field  v.  Andrada  (1895),  106 
Cal.  107,  39  Pac.  323,  where  a  demur- 
rer was  filed  on  these  three  grounds  con- 
junctively, but  the  only  specifications  were 
on  the  ground  of  uncertainty,  and  the 
court  sustained  the  demurrer  as  one  on 
the  latter  ground  only.  See  also  Henke 
V.  Eureka  Endowment  Ass'n  (1893),  100 
Cal.  429,  34  Pac.  1089,  where  it  was  said 
that  allegations  which  constitute  matters  of 
inducement  cannot  render  a  complaint 
bad  on  demurrer  on  the  ground  that  the 
complaint  is  ambiguous,  uncertain,  or 
unintelligible. 

In  Georgia,  where  no  such  statute 
exists,  uncertainty  is  held  to  be  a  ground 
for  special  demurrer  :  McClendon  i;.  Her- 
nando Co.  (1 896),  100  Ga.  219, 28  S.  E.  152  ; 
East  Georgia  R.  li.  Co.  v.  King  (1893), 
91  Ga.  519,  17  S.  E.  939;  Mayor  w.  Came- 
rgn  (1900),  111  Ga.  110,  36  S.  E.  462. 

Objections  going  to  Formal  Defects  in  a 
pleading  cannot  be  raised  by  demurrer, 
but  must  be  raised  by  motion  :  Grant  c. 
Commercial  Nat.  Bank  (1903),  — Neb. —, 
93  N.  W.  185  ;  Forbes  v.  Petty  (1893),  37 
Neb.  899,  56  N.  W.  730 ;  Cone  v.  Ivinson 
(1893).  4  Wyo.  203,33  Pac.  31  ;  Living- 
stoue  V.  Lovgren  (1902),  27  Wash.  102,  67 
Pac.  599  ;  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stone  (1894), 
54  Kan.  83,  37  Pac.  1012;  Johnson  v. 
Douglass  (1894),  60  Ark.  39,  28  S.  W. 
515.  But  in  Connecticut  a  question  of 
formal  defects  must  be  raised  by  de- 
murrer :  Levy  v.  Metropolis  Mfg.  Co. 
(1900),  73  Couu.  559,  48  Atl.  429. 

Alternative  Allegations.  It  is  provided 
by  statute  in  Kentucky  that  "  a  party 
may  allege  alternatively  the  existence  of 
one  or  another  fact,  if  he  states  that  one 
of  them  is  true  and  that  he  does  not  know 
which  of  them  is  true."  But  the  general 
rule  is  that  a  jileading  in  the  alternative  is 
subject  to  attack  by  motion :    Daniels  v. 


Fowler  (1897),  120  N.  C.  14,26  S.  E.  635; 
Pender  v.  Mallett  (1898),  123  N.  C.  57, 
31  S.  E.  351.  In  construing  the  Kentucky 
statute,  in  Brown  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1897),  100  Ky.  525,  38  S.  W.  862,  the 
court  held  that  it  applies  solely  to  alleging 
facts  in  the  alternative,  uot  parties,  and 
does  not  authorize  an  allegation  that  the 
loss  and  damage  occurred  "  by  reason  of 
the  negligence  of  one  or  the  other  of  de- 
fendants, or  of  both  defendants,  aud  as  to 
which  plaintiffs  are  unable  to  say  as  to 
whether  one  or  the  other,  or  both,  but  one 
of  these  alternatives  is  true."  Such  aver- 
ment is  insufficient  against  either  of  the 
defendants.  To  same  effect  see  Louis- 
ville, etc  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Ft.  Wayne  Elec.  Co. 
(1900),  108  Ky.  113,  55  S.  W.  918.  Each 
alternative  pleaded  should  be  a  complete 
cause  of  action :  Cumberland  Valley 
Bank's  Assignee  v.  Slusher  (1897),  102 
Ky.  415,  43  S.  W.  472;  Wehmhoff  v.  Ru- 
therford (1895),  98  Ky.  91,  32  S.  W.  288. 
Clerical  Error.  An  obvious  clerical 
error  in  a  pleading  will  be  disregarded  : 
Gibbs  V.  Southern  (1893),  116  Mo.  204,  22 
S.  W.  713. 

Form  of  Motion.  It  is  not  error  to  over- 
rule a  motion  to  make  a  pleading  more 
certain  when  it  does  not  point  out  wherein 
the  uncertainty  consists :  Grimes  v.  Cul- 
lison  (1895),  3  Okla.  268,  41  Pac.  355; 
Jacol)S  Sultan  Co.  v.  Union  Co.  (1895),  17 
Mont.  61,42  Pac.  109  (special  demurrer)  ; 
Wortham  v.  Sinclair  (1896),  98  Ga.  173» 
25  S.  E.  414  (special  demurrer) ;  Brown  v. 
Baker  (1901),  39  Ore.  66,  65  Pac.  799. 

Limitation  on  Use  of  Motion.  Amotion 
to  make  a  pleading  more  definite  aud 
certain  cannot  be  used  to  compel  the  party 
to  plead  his  evidence  :  Bowers  v.  Schuler 
(1893),  54  Minn.  99,  55  N.  W.  817.  A  mo- 
tion to  strike  will  not  lie  where  a  plead- 
ing is  indefinite  and  uncertain,  but  the 
remedy  is  by  motion  to  make  more  de- 
finite aud  certaiu :  Computing  Scales  Co. 
V.  Long  (1903),—  S.  C.  — ,  44  S.  E.  963. 
Vouseiiuence  of  Failure  to  make  Motion. 
In  Spires  i'.  South  liound  R.  R.  Co. 
(1896),  47  S.  C.  28,  24  S.  E.  992;  the 
conn  .said  :  "  When  a  complaint  is  general 
in  its  allegations  of  negligence,  aud  the 


IMPERFECT  OR  INFORMAL  ALLEGATIONS. 


601 


held  that  where  a  cause  of  action  is  so  defectively  set  out  that  a 


defendant  desires  to  know  upon  what 
particular  acts  of  negligence  tiie  plaintiff 
relies  to  sustain  his  action,  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  defendant  to  make  a  motion  to  have 
the  conij)laiut  made  more  definite  and 
certain  ;  and,  when  this  is  not  done,  the 
plaintiff  has  the  right  to  introduce  any 
competent  evidence  tending  to  sliow  neg- 
ligence on  the  part  of  the  defendant." 

Hijpothetical  Pleading.  It  was  held  in 
Emison  v.  Owyhee  Ditch  Co.  (1900),  37 
Ore.  577,  62  Pac.  13,  that  hypothetical 
pleading  is  bad,  but  whether  the  objection 
should  be  taken  by  motion  to  make  more 
definite  and  certain  (6  Ency.  PI.  &  Pr. 
269)  ;  or  by  motion  to  strike  out  (Bliss  on 
Code  PI.  §  317)  was  not  decided.  See 
also  Daniells  v.  Fowler  (1897),  120  N.  C. 
14,  26  S.  E.  635,  and  Pender  v.  Mallett 
(1898),  123  N.  C.  57,31  S.  E.  351.  where  it 
is  held  that  motion,  not  demurrer,  is  the 
proper  remedy. 

Facts  should  be  alleged  positively.  The 
material  facts  of  a  cause  of  action  or 
defence  should  be  alleged  unequivocally, 
and  will  not  be  considered  sufficient  where 
they  are  stated  as  contingent  or  conjec- 
tural:  Atchi.son,  T.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Atchison  Grain  Co.  (1902),  —  Kan.  —  ,  70 
Pac.  933. 

General  Pleading.  In  Chicago,  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolcott  (1894),  141 
Ind.  267,  39  N.  E.  451,  the  court  held  that 
in  civil  cases  it  is  the  rule  that  where  a 
subject  comprehends  multiplicity  of  mat- 
ter, and  a  great  variety  of  facts,  there,  in 
order  to  avoid  pi'olixity,  the  law  allows 
general  pleading.  Quoted  from  1  Chitty's 
Pleading  235,  and  approved.  And  it  was 
held  in  Equitable  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stout  (1893), 
135  Ind.  444,  33  N.  E.  6-23,  that  a  general 
allegation  is  ordinarily  sufficient  when 
the  matters  to  be  pleaded  tend  to  in- 
definiteness  and  multiplicity,  but  the 
complaint  must  show  by  allegation  the 
extended  and  complicated  character  of 
the  books,  accounts,  etc.,  or  other  allega- 
tions from  which  the  rule  may  be  applied. 
Although  a  general  averment  may  be 
sufficient,  if  the  pleader  alleges,  in  addi- 
tion thereto,  specific  facts,  the  latter  will 
control  the  general  averment :  Louis- 
ville, etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Kemper  (1896),  147 
Ind.    561,    47    N.    E.    214;    Fitzpatrick 


V.  Simonson  Bros.  (1902),  86  .Minn.  140, 
90  N.  W.  378;  Carlson  i-.  Presbyterian 
Board  (1897),  67  Minn.  436,  70  N.'w.  3; 
Gowan  v.  Bensel  (1893),  .W  Minn.  46,  54 
N.  W.  934 ;  Chesapeake,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
lianmcr  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  375;  Sebree 
Deposit  Bank  v.  Moreland  (1894),  96  Ky. 
150,  28  S.  W.  153. 

Necessity  of  Motion.  In  Sidway  v.  Mis- 
souri Land,  etc.  Co.  (1901),  163  Mo.  342, 
63  S.  \V.  705,  the  court  said  :  "  In  order 
to  raise  the  question  of  the  indefiniteness 
of  a  pleading,  however,  it  is  by  no  means 
necessary  to  file  a  motion  to  make  it  more 
definite  and  certain  ;  and  this  is  so  for  two 
reasons:  "  1st.  The  duty  of  requiring  the 
pleadings  to  be  definite  and  certain  de- 
volves on  the  court ;  2d.  The  onus  of  mak- 
ing the  pleading  definite  and  certain  is  on 
the  party  drawing  it. 

Pleading  by  Way  of  Recital.  It  is  a 
well-recognized  general  rule  that  material 
facts,  essential  to  the  cause  of  action, 
should  be  alleged  directly  and  not  by  way 
of  recital.  In  Berry  v.  Dole  (1902),  87 
Minn.  471,  92  N.  W.  334,  it  was  held  that  a 
pleading  which  offended  against  this  rule 
was  bad  on  general  demurrer.  The  same 
doctrine  was  announced  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Indiana,  in  Erwin  ?».  Cent.  Union 
Tel.  Co.  (1897),  148  Ind.  365,  46  N.  E. 
667.  The  rule  was  very  instructively  ap- 
plied, in  McElwaine-Richards  Co.  r.  Wall 
(1902),  159  Ind.  557,  65  N.E.  752,  to  a  com- 
plaint by  a  servant  for  an  injury  suffered 
from  a  fall  consequent  upon  his  being 
sent  to  work  in  an  insecure  and  unsafe 
place.  Also  in  Leadville  Water  Co.  v. 
Leadville  (1896),  22  Colo.  297,  45  Pac. 
362,  it  was  held  that  allegations  by  way 
of  recital  are  insufficient,  and  objection 
thereto  may  be  taken  by  general  demur- 
rer, for  the  reason  that  an  allegation  by 
way  of  recital  cannot  be  denied,  and  no 
issue  concerning  it  can  ever  be  raised. 
The  court  cites  the  text,  §§  *  549,  *  550. 
For  the  contrary  doctrine  see  City  of 
Santa  Barbara  r.'Eldred  (1895),  108  CaL 
294,  41  Pac.  410. 

Pleading  on  Information  and  Belief. 
In  Missouri  allegations  upon  information 
and  belief  are  not  deemed  proper.  In 
Nichols  &  Shepard  Co.  v.  Hubert  (1899), 
150  Mo.    620,  51   S.  W.  1031,  the  court 


602 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


demarrer  for  want  of  sufficient  facts  would  have  been  sustained, 


said  :  "  \Vhile  the  first  four  paragraphs  of 
t.'is  j)Ctiiio!i  state  and  aver  facts,  the  form 
of  averine!;t  is  changed  iu  the  fifth,  and 
the  pleader  tiieii  alleges  that  he  is  in- 
formed and  l)elie»-es  the  facts  therein  re- 
cited, and  ixs  these  recited  facts  are 
essential  to  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  tlie 
defect  is  fatal  unless  this  form  of  aver- 
ment is  permis3il)le  under  the  code.  The 
statute  requires  in  a  petition  a  plain  and 
coucise  statement  of  the  facts  constituting 
the  cause  of  action.  A  statement  of  iu- 
fornia'ion  and  belief  as  to  facts  is  not 
within  the  meaning  of  this  statute." 

In  Iowa,  however,  iu  the  case  of  Robin- 
son i.'.  Ferguson  (1903),  —  la.  — ,  93  N.  W. 
350,  t'aey  were  held  sufficient  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  motion  attacking  the  pleading 
on  tliat  ground.  In  Minnesota  the  court 
has  gone  still  further.  In  State  ex  rcl. 
V.  Co.. ley  (1894),  58  Minn.  514,  60  N.  W. 
33S,  after  referring  to  the  statute  requiring 
that  the  verification  of  pleadings  shall  be 
to  thft  effect  that  the  same  are  true  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  person  making  them,  ex- 
cept as  to  those  matters  stated  on  informa- 
tion and  belief,  and,  as  to  those  matters, 
that  he  believes  them  to  be  true,  the  court 
said :  "  This  language  is  not  confined 
merely  to  the  denials  in  the  answer  of  the 
controverted  allegations  in  the  complaint, 
but  applies  to  all  pleadings,  including 
matters  stated  in  the  complaint  on  infor- 
mation and  belief.  Why  else  should  the 
party  be  required  or  allowed  to  verify  the 
matters  stated  in  the  complaint  upon  in- 
formation and  belief,  unless  he  is  allowed 
to  insert  such  matters  in  that  form  ? 
Evidently,  this  section  of  the  statute  con- 
templates that  such  allegations  may  be 
inserted  in  any  of  the  pleadings ;  and  we 
believe  that  such  has  been  the  usual  pr.ac- 
tice  in  this  State  ever  since  its  admission 
into  the  Union  in  1858.  It  would  be  a  great 
misfortune  for  us  now  to  declare  that  prac- 
tice invalid,  and  we  refuse  so  to  do." 

The  objection  that  the  averments  in 
a  complaint  are  made  on  information  and 
belief  is  not  a  ground  for  demurrer  :  Car- 
penter V.  Smith  (1894),  '20  Colo.  39,  36 
Pac.  7.39  ;  Jones  v.  Pearl  Min.  Co.  (1894), 
20  Colo.  417,  38  Pac.  700. 

Pifdicating  Error  as  to  Formal  Defects. 
Tipton    Light,    etc.    Co.     v.    Newcomer 


(1900),  156  Ind.  348,  58  N.  E.  842:  It  is 
the  right  of  a  defendant  to  have  the  plain- 
tiff state  sjjecifically  the  facts  constituting 
alleged  negligence,  and  where  the  motion 
to  make  more  specific  is  well  taken  the 
court  has  no  discretion.  Failure  to  su.s- 
tain  such  a  motion  when  properly  made  is 
reversible  error. 

But  see  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.  v. 
Oy.ster  (1899),  58  Neb.  1.  78  N.  W.  359  : 
"  One  cannot  predicate  error  on  the  re- 
fusal to  recjuire  the  pleading  of  the  op- 
posite party  to  be  made  more  tiefinite  and 
certain  where  prejudice  has  not  resulted 
from  the  ruling."  The  same  rule  seems 
to  obtain  in  Wisconsin.  See  Adamson  i-. 
Raymer  (1896),  94  Wis.  243,  68  N.  W. 
1000,  where  it  was  held  that  an  order 
directing  a  pleading  to  be  made  more  de- 
finite and  certain  is  discretionary,  and  is 
not  api)ealable  unless  there  has  been  an 
abuse  of  discretion.  To  the  same  effect 
is  Crowley  v.  Hicks  (1898),  98  Wis.  566, 
74  N.  W.  348.  And  in  Washington,  in 
Green  v.  Tidball  (1901),  26  Wash.  338,  67 
Pac.  84,  it  was  held  that  in  order  to  cause 
a  reversal  there  must  be  not  only  techni- 
cal defects  in  the  pleading  but  also  some 
substantial  injury  resulting  therefrom  to 
the  complaining  party.  Sec  also  St.  Louis 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  V.  French  (1896),  56  Kan. 
584,  44  Pac.  12. 

Pleading  over  after  a  motion  is  over- 
ruled, is  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  have  the 
ruling  reviewed  :  Rinard  v.  Omaha,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (ISOl),  164  Mo.  270,  64  S.  W. 
124;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Merchants'  Bank 
(1901),  160  Mo.  640,  61  S.  W.  676  ;  San- 
guinett  V.  Webster  (1900),  153  Mo.  343, 
54  S.  W.  563 ;  Kelly  v.  Town  of  West 
Bend  (1897),  101  la.  669,  70  N.  W.  726; 
Wattels  I'.  Minchen  (1895),  93  la.  517,  61 
N.  W.  915;  ManwcU  ?•.  Hurlington,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1894),  89  la.  708,  57  N.  W.  441  ; 
Banker's  Reserve  Life  A.ss'n  v.  Finn 
(1002),  64  Neb.  105,  89  N.  W.  672. 

Standi nq  on  Plead iiuj  after  Motion  Sus- 
tained. McAdam  v.  Scuddcr  (1894),  127 
Mo.  3i5,  30  S.  W.  168  :  Where  the  court, 
on  motion  of  defendant,  rc'iuires  the  peti- 
tion to  be  made  more  definite  and  certain, 
and  plaintiff  elects  to  stand  on  the  jieti- 
tion,  the  cause  may  properly  be  dismi.s.sed 
by  the  court.     Same  rule  stated  in  Sidway 


IMPERFECT    OR    INFORMAL   ALLEGATIONS. 


603 


but  the  adverse  party  answers  instead,  and  goes  to  trial,   tlie 
objection  to  the  pleading  is  thereby  waived,  and  evidence  in  its 


V.  Missouri  Land,  etc.  Co.  (1901),  163  Mo. 
342,  63  S.  W.  705. 

Test  of  Dejiniteness.  In  American  Book 
Co.  V.  Kini^clom  Publishing  Co.  (1898), 
71  Minn.  363,  73  N.  W.  1089,  the  court 
said  :  "  If  the  court  can  see  the  meaning 
of  the  different  allegations,  and  the  cause 
of  action  or  the  defence  intended  to  be  set 
forth  by  them,  the  pleading  is  not  indefi- 
nite." See  also  City  of  Logausport  v. 
Kihm  (1902),  159  Ind.  68,  64  N.  E.  595, 
where  a  complaint  is  instructively  ana- 
lyzed and  shown  not  to  set  forth  the  facts 
constituting  tlie  cause  of  action  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  enable  a  person  of  common 
understanding  to  know  what  was  intended. 

Waiver  of  Formal  Defects.  Larsen  v. 
Utah  Loan  &  Trust  Co.  "(1901 ),  23  Utah, 
944,  65  Pac.  208  :  Where  allegations  of 
fraud  are  general  and  no  objection  is  made 
thereto  in  the  trial  court,  the  defect  is 
waived.  Bennett  v.  Minott  (1896),  28 
Ore.  339,  44  Pac.  283:  The  objection  of 
uncertainty  in  a  complaint  comes  too  late 
after  judgment.  Holman  ;;.  De  Lin  (1 897), 
30  Ore.  428,  47  Pac.  708:  A  motion  to 
strike  out  parts  of  an  answer  is  waived  by 
the  subsequent  filing,  hearing,  and  deter- 
mining of  a  demurrer  thereto.  Graves  v. 
Barrett  (1900),  126  N.  C.  267,  35  S.  E. 
539 :  A  defective  statement  of  a  good 
cause  of  action  is  waived  when  it  is  ap- 
parent from  tlie  answer  that  the  defendants 
were  fully  apprised  of  the  subject-matter 
of  the  suit.  See  also  Mizzell  v.  Ruffin 
(1896),  118  N.  C.  69.  23  S.  E.  927.  Ash- 
ton  V.  Stoy  (1895),  96  la.  197,  64  N.  W. 
804  :  Overruling  a  motion  for  more  specific 
statement  is  not  waived  where  no  subse- 
quent pleading  is  filed.  Zion  Church  v. 
Parker  (1901),  114  la.  1,  86  N.  W.  60:  A 
defect  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  plead- 
ings is  waived  if  no  objection  is  taken  in 
the  lower  court. 

Warthen  v.  Himstreet  (1900),  112  la. 
605,  84  N.  W.  702  :  The  court  said  :  "  We 
have  held  that  a  defendant  may  be  con- 
cluded by  a  default  when  the  facts  stated  in 
the  petition  do  not  state  a  good  cause  of  ac- 
tion at  law,  or  when  the  petition  is  so  defec- 
tive as  to  be  vulnerable  to  a  demurrer. 
Fred  Miller   Brewing  Co.  v.  Capital  Ins. 


Co.,  Ill  la.  590,  and  ca.ses  cited.  Doubt- 
less, if  no  cause  of  action  is  stated,  a  de- 
fault has  no  such  effect.  Bosch  v.  Kassiug, 
64  la.  312.  But  Himstreet  did  state  a  cause 
of  action.  The  defect  in  his  petition  was 
in  matter  of  form  only,  and  this  the  de- 
fendants could  waive,  and  by  tlicir  non- 
appearance did  waive."  Fenuer  v.  Crips 
(1899),  109  la.  455,  80  N.  W.  526: 
Where  defendant  asks  an  instruction 
based  on  a  fact  not  averred  with  sufficient 
di.stinctness  in  plaintiff's  petition,  he 
thereby  waives  the  defect.  Van  Etten 
I'.  Medland  (1898),  53  Neb.  569,  74  N.  W. 
33  :  "The  filing  of  a  demurrer  to  a  peti- 
tion is  a  waiver  of  the  right  to  insist  that 
the  allegations  of  the  pleading  shall  be 
made  more  definite  and  certain."  Man- 
gum  V.  Bullion,  etc.  Co.  (1897),  15  Utah, 
534,  58  Pao.  834  :  Failure  to  allege^  specific 
facts  constituting  causes  of  action  or  spe- 
cial defences  is  waived  by  failure  to  de- 
mur or  object  to  evidence,  hence  cannot 
be  taken  advantage  of  after  judgment. 
Same  rule  adiiered  to  in  Maynard  r. 
Locomotive,  etc.  Ass'n  (1897),  16  Utah, 
145,  51   Pac.  259. 

Young  V.  Severy  (1897),  5  Okla.  630, 
49  Pac.  1024  :  An  allegation,  though  in- 
definite and  uncertain  and  otherwise  de- 
fective, of  a  material  matter,  is  sufiicient 
when  first  questioned  by  an  objection  to 
the  introduction  of  any  testimony  there- 
under. So,  in  Frobisher  v.  Fifth  Ave. 
Transp.  Co.  (1897),  151  N.  Y.  431,  45 
N.  E.  839,  it  was  held  that  an  objection 
to  the  introduction  of  any  evidence  be- 
cause the  allegations  of  the  complaint 
were  too  general,  was  not  availalile  on 
appeal,  when  the  defendant  failed  to  uKJve 
to  make  more  specific.  Whitlock  v.  Uhle 
(1903),  75  Conn.  423,  .53  Atl.  891  :  Where 
a  complaint  asserts  necessary  facts  in  an 
insufficient  manner,  the  defect  cannot  be 
taken  advantage  of,  in  the  absence  of  de- 
murrer, after  trial  and  judgment  on  the 
merits. 

City  of  South  Bend  v.  Turner  (1900), 
156  Ind.  418,  60  N.  E.  271  :  Mere  uncer- 
tainty or  inadequacy  of  averment  will  be 
deemed  waived  by  proceeding  to  trial 
without  objection.      Courts   do  not  look 


604 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


support  must  be  admitted.^  Other  cases  are  directly  opposed 
to  this  position,  and  expressly  declare  that  if  the  complaint  or 
petition  fails  to  state  any  cause  of  action  the  objection  is  not 
waived,  and  all  evidence  should  be  excluded  at  the  trial,  even 
though  the  defendant  has  answered;  and  this  ruling  is  in  exact 
conformity  with  the  provisions  of  all  the  codes  regulating  the 
use  of  demurrers. 2  The  doctrine  first  stated  is  clearly  erroneous, 
and  the  dicta  or  decisions  which  sustain  it  ought  to  be  wholly 
disregarded;  it  violates  the  section  of  the  codes  which  enacts 
that  the  absence  of  sufficient  facts  as  a  ground  of  demurrer  is  not 
abandoned  by  an  omission  to  demur;  and  it  utterly  ignores  the 
established  distinction  between  a  failure  to  state  any  cause  of 
action  and  tlie  statement  of  a  cause  of  action  in  an  imperfect  and 
defective  manner.  It  is  only  when  the  answer  itself  by  some  of 
its  averments  supplies  the  omission  in  a  complaint  or  petition 
otherwise  demurrable,  that  the  fault  is  cured  and  the  objection 
waived   by   answering;    mere   answering   instead   of   demurring 


with  favor  on  the  practice  of  attack- 
ing pleadings  at  the  trial :  Ilaseltiue 
V.  Smith  (1900),  154  Mo.  404,  55  S.  W. 
633 

By  filing  an  answer  defendant  waives 
all  objections  of  form  in  the  petition : 
Gelatt  V.  Ridge  (1893),  117  Mo.  553,  23 
S.  W.  882;  McCall  v.  Porter  (1903),  42 
Ore.  49,  71  Pac.  926;  Hughes  v.  McCol- 
lough  (1901),  39  Ore.  372,  65  Pac.  85; 
Lovejoy  v.  Isbell  (1900),  73  Conn.  368.  47 
Atl.  682  ;  Welsh  v.  Burr  (1898),  56  Neb. 
361,  76  N.  W.  905  (reply).  But  defendant 
may,  in  his  answer,  expressly  reserve  the 
right  to  insist  on  a  motion  to  make  more 
definite  and  certain  when  duly  noticed  : 
Whaley  v.  Lawton  (1898),  53  S.  C.  580,  31 
S.  E.  660. 

Cases  where  Pleadings  have  been  held 
Uncertain.  Dodds  v.  McCormick  Har- 
vesting Mach.  Co.  (1901),  62  Neb.  759, 
87  N.  W.  911  :  a  petition  declaring  on  a 
promissory  note;  Kyd  v.  Cook  (1898),  56 
Neb.  71,  76  N.  W.  524 :  a  petition  in  an 
action  for  wrongful  attachment;  Olson  v. 
Pluiiuix  Mfg.  Co.  (1899),  103  Wis.  337, 
79  N.  W.  409 :  a  complaint  against  three 
contractors  for  negligence  ;  Buist  c.  Mel- 
chers  (1894),  44  S.  C.  46,  21  S.  E.  449:  a 
complaint  against  several  successive  boards 
of  directors  of  a  corporation  for  omission 


of  duty;  Koboliska  v.  Swehla  (1898),  107 
la.  124,  77  N.  W.  576  :  petition  in  action 
for  money  paid  at  request  of  defendant; 
Hall  V.  Law  Guarantee,  etc.  Co.  (1900),  22 
Wash.  305,  60  Pac.  643:  complaint  in 
replevin  ;  Union  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cross  ( 1 898), 
100  Wis.  174,  75  N.  W.  992:  answer  in 
action  on  promissory  note;  Koepke  v. 
Milwaukee  (1901),  112  Wis.  475,  88  X.  W. 
238  :  complaint  against  city  for  negligent 
injury;  McFadden  v.  Stark  (1893),  58 Ark. 
7,  22  S.  W.  884  :  complaint  in  action  to  en- 
force a  mechanic's  lien  ;  Maine  ;•.  Chicago, 
etc.  H.  R.  Co.  (1899),  109  la.  260,  80  N.  W. 
315:  petition  in  action  for  negligent  in- 
juries ;  Atchison,  etc.  Ky.  Co.  v.  Potter 
(1899),  60  Kan.  808,  58  Pac.  471  :  petition 
inaction  for  personal  injuries;  Hastings 
r.  Anacortes  Packing  Co.  (1902),  29 
Wa.sh.  224,  69  Pac.  776:  complaint  in  an 
action  for  possession  of  a  fishing  -site ; 
Dishueau  v.  Newton  (1895),  91  Wis.  199, 
64  N.  W.  879:  complaint  against  sure- 
ties on  sheriff's  bond  (held  sufficiently 
specific).] 

1  Tread  way  v.  Wilder,  8  Nov.  91. 

-  Garner  r.  McCullougli,  48  Mo.  318; 
Scofield  V.  Whitelegge,  49  N.  Y.  259,  261, 
262;  Saulsbury  v.  Alexander,  50  Mo.  142,, 
144. 


IMrEKFECT    OR   INFORMAL   ALLEGATIONS. 


605 


cannot  produce  tliat  effect.^  If  the  averments  are  so  defective,  if 
the  omission  of  material  facts  is  so  great,  that,  even  under  the 
rule  of  a  liberal  construction,  no  cause  of  action  is  stated,  it  is 
not  a  mere  case  of  insufficiency,  but  one  of  complete  failure;  and 
the  complaint  or  petition  should  be  dismissed  at  the  trial,  or  a 
judgment  rendered  upon  it  should  be  reversed.  A  few  examples 
are  placed  in  the  foot-note. 


While  the  general  doctrine  before 


1  Scofield  V.  Whitelegge,  49  N.  Y.  259, 
261,  262 ;  Bate  v.  Graham,  11  N.  Y.  237  ; 
Louisville  &  P.  Canal  Co.  v.  Murpliy,  9 
Bush,  522,  529. 

^  Autisdel  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ey.  Co., 
26  Wis.  145,  147 ;  Toinlinsou  v.  Mouroe, 
41  Cal.  94  (an  ambiguous  and  unintelli- 
gible complaint);  Holmes  v.  Williams,  16 
Minn.  164,  168.  The  case  described  in 
the  text  is  that  of  a  cause  of  action,  good 
if  properly  pleaded,  which  the  plaintiff 
intended  and  attempted  to  set  out,  but 
which  he  failed  to  set  out  by  reason  of 
omissions  and  defects  in  the  material  alle- 
gations ;  and  it  is  to  be  distinguished 
from  a  cause  of  action  entirely  bad  in 
law,  no  matter  how  complete  and  perfect 
may  be  tlie  averments  by  which  it  is 
•stated.  In  the  first  case  a  pure  question 
of  pleading  is  involved,  and  the  complaint 
or  petition  is  demurrable  because  the 
rules  of  pleading  have  been  essentially  vio- 
lated ;  in  the  second  case  a  pure  question 
of  law  is  involved,  and  the  complaint  or 
petition  is  demurrable,  although  the  rules 
of  pleading  have  been  in  every  respect 
complied  with. 

[Wholly  Deficient  Pleadhigs. 

Waiver  of  Defects  of  Substance. 
The  objection  that  a  pleading  does  not 
state  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action 
or  defence  is  never  waived,  but  may  be 
raised  at  anv  stage  of  the  proceedings  : 
O'Toole  ('.  Faulkner  (1902),  29  Wash.  544, 
70  Pac.  58 ;  Jones  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
<1896),  16  Wash.  25,  47  Pac.  226;  Hoff- 
man V.  McCracken  (1902),  168  Mo.  337, 
€7  8.  W.  878;  Lilly  v.  Menke  (1894),  126 
Mo.  190,  28  S.  W.  643;  McPeak  v.  Mo. 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1895),  128  Mo.  617,  30 
S.  W.  170;  State  ex  rel.  r.  Thompson 
(1899),  149  Mo.  441,  51  S.  W.  98;  Epper- 
.son  V.  Postal  Tel.  Co.  (1900),  155  Mo.  346, 
50  S.  W.  79.5.;  Wells  v.  Mutual  Benefit 
Ass'n  (1894),  126  Mo.  6.30,  29  S.  W.  607, 


holding  that  even  a  stipulation  by  the  par- 
ties as  to  tlie  issues  in  a  case  does  not  waive 
the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  a  petition  ; 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Moores  (1899),  58  Neb. 
285,  78  N.  W.  529;  Lateuser  v.  Misner 
(1898),  56  Neb.  340,  76  N.  W.  897  ;  Tracy 
V.  Grezaud  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W. 
214;  Hudelson  v.  first  Nat.  Bank  (1897), 
51  Neb.  557,  71  N.  W.  304;  Sage  v.  City 
of  Plattsmouth  (1896),  48  Neb.  553,  67 
N.  W.  455;  Kemper  v.  Renshaw  (1899), 
58  Neb.  513,  78  N.  W.  1071  ;  Dufrene  v. 
Ander.son  (1903),  — Neb.— ,  93  N.  W.  139; 
City  of  South  Bend  v.  Turner  (1900),  156 
Ind.  418,  60  N.  E.  271 ;  Galvin  i:  Britton 
(1898),  151  Ind.  1,  49  N.  E.  10G4;  Insur- 
ance Co.  V.  Bonner  (1897),  24  Colo.  220, 
49  Pac.  366 ;  School  District  v.  Flanigan 
(1901),  28  Colo.  431,  65  Pac.  24;  Mizzell 
V.  Ruffin  (1896),  118  N.  C.  69,  23  S.  E. 
927  ;  City  of  Guthrie  v.  Nix  (1895),  3  Okla. 
136,  41  Pac.  343  ;  De  Loach  Mill  Co.  v. 
Bonner  (1897),  64  Ark.  510,  43  S.  W.  504  ; 
Warner  v.  Hess  (1899),  66  Ark.  113,  49 
S.  W.  489;  Buckman  v.  Hatch  (1903),  139 
Cal.  53,  72  Pac.  445 ;  Moore  v.  Halliday 
(1903),  43  Ore.  243,  72  Pac.  ROl. 

But  see  Queen  (,'ity  Printing  Co.  v. 
McAden  (1902),  131  N.  C.  178,  42  S.  E. 
575,  and  O'Donohoe  v.  Polk  (1895),  45 
Neb.  510,  63  N.  W.  829,  where  it  was  held 
that  the  want  of  a  material  allegation  is 
waived  by  failure  to  demur.  See  also 
Cook  V.  Am.  Ex.  Bank  (1901),  129  N.  C. 
149,  39  S.  E.  746;  Duerst  v.  St.  Louis 
Stamping  Co.  (1901),  163  Mo.  607,  63 
S.  W.  827. 

Pleading  over  after  demurrer  for  want 
of  facts  has  been  overruled  is  not  a  waiver 
of  the  objection  :  Epperson  v.  Postal  Tel. 
Co.  (1900),  155  Mo.  346,  50  S.  W.  795; 
Hoffman  v.  McCracken  (1902),  168  Mo. 
337,  67  S.  W.  878 ;  Jones  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1896),  16  Wash.  25,  47  Pac.  226 
(but  see  Hardin  r.  Mullin  (1897),  16  Wash. 
647,  48  Pac.  349,  wliere  it  is  held  that  an 


606 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


stated,  as  to  the  nature  of  insufficient  and  defective  averments, 
has  been  universally  approved  in  the  abstract,  it  has  sometimes 


affirmative  waiver  of  the  demurrer  waives 
the  ubjcctiou)  ;  Cox  v.  Yeazel  (1896),  49 
>'cl..  .'U'?,  68  N.  W.  483 ;  Hopewell  v.  Mc- 
Grew  (1897),  50  Neb.  789,  70  X.  W.  397 
(but  see  Palmer  r.  Caywood  (1902),  64 
Neb.  372,  89  N.  W.  1034,  apparently  con- 
tra); Henderson  v.  Turngren  (1894),  9 
Utah,  432,  35  Pac.  495 ;  Seckinger  v. 
Philibert  Co.  (1895),  129  Mo.  590,  31 
S.  W.  957 ;  Thompson  v.  Brazile  (1898), 

65  Ark.  495,  47  S.  \V.  299. 

An  objection  to  the  sufficiency  of  a 
pleading  made  for  the  fir.«t  time  in  the 
Supreme  Court  is  not  favored,  and  the 
jdeadiug  will  be  liberally  construed : 
Brothers  v.  Brothers  (1901),  29  Colo.  69, 

66  Pac.  901  ;  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  r. 
Four  Mile  Ry.  Co.  (1901),  29  Colo.  90,  6G 
Pac.  902;  Sciiool  District  v.  Fianigan 
(1901),  28  Colo.  431,  65  Pac.  24;  Insur- 
ance Co.  V.  Bonner  (1897),  24  Colo.  220, 
49  Pac.  366;  Latenser  v.  Misner  (1898), 
56  Neb.  340,  76  N.  W.  897. 

In  South  Carolina  the  court  has  held 
that  tlie  statute  which  provides  that  the 
objection  that  facts  are  not  stated  sufficient 
to  constitute  a  cau.se  of  action  is  not  waived 
by  failure  to  demur,  applies  only  to  the 
Circuit  Court  and  not  to  the  Supreme 
Court.  Hence  the  objection  cannot  be 
raised  for  the  first  time  in  the  Supreme 
Court,  but  is  waived  if  not  rai.se<l  below : 
Green  r.  Green  (1897),  50  S.  C.  514,  27 
S.  E.  952 ;  Garrett  v.  Weinberg  (1897),  50 
S.  C.  310,  27  S.  E.  770;  Hillhouse  v.  Jen- 
nings (1901),  60  S.  C.  373,  38  S.  E.  599. 

In  Iowa  it  is  lield,  in  a  long  line  of 
decisions,  that  tlie  question  whether  a 
pleading  states  a  cause  of  action  is  waived 
unless  it  is  raised  by  demurrer  or  motion 
in  arrest  of  judgment :  Alexander  v.  Grand 
Lodge  (1903),  —  la.  — ,  93  N.  \V.  508; 
Enix  V.  Iowa  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (1901),  114 
la.  508,  87  N.  W.  417  ;  Osborne  r.  Metcalf 
(1900),  1 12  la.  540,  84  N.  W.  685 ;  Dubuque 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Kimball  (1900),  111  la.  48, 
82  N.  \V.  458 ;  Pier.son  v.  School  District 
(1898),  106  la.  695,  77  N.  W.  494;  Haden 
V.  Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1896),  99  la. 
735,  68  N.  \V.  733 ;  Zundeiowitz  v.  Web- 
ster (1896),  96  la.  587,  65  N.  W.  835; 
Fulmer  v.  Mahaska  County  (1894),  92  la. 
20,  60  N.  W.  207 ;  McCorkcU  v.  Karhoff 


(1S94),  90  la.  .545,  58  N.  W.  913  ;  Manwell 
V.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1894),  89  la. 
708,  57  N.  W.  441. 

lu  Washington  it  was  lield  in  State  ex 
ri'l.  V.  Indemnity  Ass'n  (1898),  18  Wash. 
514,  52  Pac.  234,  tliat  a  motion  for  a  non- 
suit on  the  grouud  that  the  complaint 
failed  to  state  a  cause  of  action  w:is  prop- 
erly- denied,  where  tliere  was  no  denmrrer 
and  the  defect  had  been  cured  by  the  ad- 
mission of  proof  without  objection.  And 
in  Mosher  v.  Bruhu  (1896),  15  Wash.  332, 
46  Pac.  397,  it  was  held  tliat  where  the 
objection  tliat  a  complaint  did  not  state  a 
cause  of  action  was  raised  by  demurrer, 
and  then  abandoned,  it  cannot  be  subse- 
quently raised.  To  the  same  effect  is 
Hardin  r.  Mullin  (1897),  16  Wash.  647,48 
Pac.  349. 

Wisconsin,  also,  seems  to  hold  that  a 
failure  to  seasonably  object  to  a  fatally 
defective  complaint  is  a  waiver  of  the  de- 
fect. See  Bigelow  v.  Town  of  Washburn 
(1898),  98  Wis.  553,  74  N.  W.  362 ;  Wells 
V.  Western  Paving  &  Supply  Co.  (1897), 
96  Wis.  116,  70  N.  W.  1071. 

Form  of  Objection. 

An  objection  to  the  introduction  of  any 
evidence,  on  the  ground  that  the  complaint 
does  not  state  a  cause  of  action,  need  not 
specify  wherein  the  complaint  is  insuffi- 
cient:  Wylly  V.  Grigsby  (1899),  1 1  S.  D. 
491,  78  N.  W.  957.  But  a  motion  to  direct 
a  verdict  for  defendant  because  the  evi- 
dence is  not  sufficient  to  show  a  cause  of 
action,  without  stating  the  si)ecific  defects 
in  the  evidence,  is  not  sufficient  :  Howie 
V.  Bratrud  (1901),  14  S.  1).  G48,  86  N.  W. 
747. 

An  objection  to  the  introduction  of  evi- 
dence upon  the  grounil  that  the  complaint 
does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute 
a  cause  of  action,  is  insufficient  when  it 
does  not  point  out  the  particular  defect 
relied  upon:  Chilson  v.  Bank  (1899),  9 
N.  I).  96,  84  N.  W.  354.  So  in  James 
River  Bank  ;•.  Purchase  (1900),  9  N.  D. 
280.  83  N.  W.  7.  But  in  Vidger  v.  Nolin 
(1901 ),  ION.  D.  353,  87  N.  W.  593,  such  an 
objection  directed  against  an  answer  as  a 
counterclaim  or  defence  was  held  sufficient. 

It  wiis  held  in  Galvin  i-.  Britton  (1898), 


IMPERFECT    OR    INFORMAL    ALLEGATIONS. 


607 


been  departed  from,  and  pleadings  have  been  wholly  condemned, 
which,  according  to  the  criterion  established  by  numerous  cases, 


151  IiuL  1,  49  N.  E.  1064,  that  where  the 
sufficiency  of  a  complaint  is  attacked  for 
the  first  time  on  iippeal,  it  must  be  on  the 
grountl  that  it  does  not  state  facts  suffi- 
cient to  constitute  a  cause  of  action,  and 
an  attack  on  the  ground  that  it  tloes  not 
state  facts  sufficient  to  entitle  plaintiff  to 
the  relief  prayed  will  not  be  considered. 

Methods  of  Raising  Question. 

The  failure  of  a  complaint  to  state  a 
cause  of  action  may  l)e  availed  of  by  de- 
murrer, by  objection  to  evidence,  by  mo- 
tion for  judgment  on  tlie  pleadings,  by 
motion  in  arrest  of  judgment,  or  on  mo- 
tion for  a  new  trial :  Consolidated  Canal 
Co.  V.  Peters  (1896),  Ariz.,  46  I'ac.  74. 
After  failure  to  demur,  the  method  of 
raising  the  question  of  the  sufficiency  of 
the  pleading  to  state  a  cause  of  action  or 
defence,  which  is  not  waived,  is  by  motion, 
either  for  judgment  on  the  pleadings  or 
for  new  trial :  James  River  Bank  v.  Pur- 
chase (1900),  9  N.  D.  280,  83  N.  W.  7. 

Held  in  the  following  cases  that  a  judg- 
ment on  the  pleadings  was  properly  given 
where  they  are  fatally  defective  :  Finley 
V.  City  of  Tucson  (1900),  Ariz.,  60  Pac. 
872;  Goldwater  v.  Bowen,  (1900),  Ariz., 
62  Pac.  691  ;  Hutchison  v.  Myers  (1893), 
.52  Kan.  290,  34  Pac.  742.  Nothing  out- 
side the  pleadings  can  be  cousidered  in 
passing  on  such  a  motion :  McCoy  t\ 
Jones  (1899),  61  0.  St.  119,  55  N.  E.  219. 
A  judgment  on  tlie  pleadings  is  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  common-law  judgment  non 
obstante  veiedicto :  Crew  v.  Hutcheson 
(1902),   115  Ga.   511,  42  S.  E.   16. 

In  Boyer  v.  Commercial  Building  Co. 
(1900),  110  la.  491,81  N.  W.  720,  the  court 
said :  "  When  the  case  came  on  for  trial, 
defendant  objected  to  the  introduction  of 
any  evidence,  because  no  cause  of  action 
Avas  stated  in  the  petition.  This  objection 
was  entered  of  record  and  overruled. 
The  first  assignment  of  error  is  based 
upon  this  action  of  the  court.  This  sort 
of  oral  demurrer  has  no  place  in  our  prac- 
tice, and  we  think  the  trial  court  was 
fully  justified  in  so  disposing  of  it."  To 
snme  effect,  see  Van  Sickle  v.  Keith 
(1893),   88   la.   9,   55   N.   W.   42.     Held, 


in  Sackman  r.  Sackman  (1898),  143  Mo. 
576,  45  S.  \V.  264,  that  such  an  objection 
would  bo  sustained  only  where  the  plead- 
ing was  so  defective  that  a  motion  in 
arrest  would  lie. 

The  legal  sufficiency  of  facts  alleged  in 
a  complaint  must  be  tested  either  by  de- 
murrer before  trial  or  by  motion  in  arrest 
of  judgment  after  verdict,  but  cannot  be 
tested  by  a  motion  for  nonsuit  during  the 
trial:  Cook  v.  Morris  (1895),  66  Conn. 
196,  33  AtL  994. 

In  Georgia,  it  was  held,  in  Fleming  v. 
Roberts  (1901),  114  (}a.  634,  40  S.  E.  792, 
that  tlie  question  of  the  sufficiency  of  a 
petition  cannot  be  raised  by  ol)jection  to 
evidence.  "  If  a  petition  is  not  good  in 
substance,  tliat  is,  taking  every  allegation 
to  be  true,  it  fails  to  set  forth  a  cause  of 
action,  objection  must  be  made  either  by  a 
general  demurrer,  or  motion  to  dismiss  the 
case  before  verdict,  or  by  a  motion  in  arre.st 
of  judgment,  or  a  motion  to  set  aside  the 
judgment  after  verdict.  We  know  of  no 
other  way  in  which  the  legal  sufficiency 
of  a  petition  can  be  properly  brought 
before  the  court."  But  this  case  was 
overruled  in  Kelly  v.  Strouse  (1903),  116 
Ga.  872,  43  S.  E.  280.  The  rule  in  Crew 
V.  Hutcheson  (1902),  115  Ga.  511,  42  S.  E. 
16,  in  which  it  was  held  that  it  was  not 
error  to  refuse  to  allow  a  defendant  to  sus- 
tain by  evidence  the  allegations  of  a  plea 
which  set  forth  no  defence,  was  extended 
to  cover  tlie  petition  as  well  as  the  plea. 

It  is  not  the  office  of  a  motion  to  cure 
fatal  defects.  Such  objections  should  be 
made  by  demurrer :  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Shepherd  (1894),  39  Neb.  523, 
58  N.  W.  189  ;  Holgate  v.  Downer  (1899), 
8  Wyo.  334,  57  Pac.  918. 

In  California  it  is  held  that  pleading 
evidence  is  a  fatal  defect,  and  hence  the 
objection  may  be  raised  by  a  general  de- 
murrer for  want  of  facts :  McCaughey  v. 
Schuette  (1897),  117  Cal.  223,  46  Pac. 
666,  48  Pac.  1088. 

Question  Raised  hy  Court  on  its  own 
Motion.  In  Thomas  v.  Franklin  (1894),  42 
Neb.  310,  60  N.  W.  568,  the  court  said: 
"  This  court  in  an  action  at  law  or  equity 
will,    on    its    own   motion,   look    into   the 


60S 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


set  forth  a  cause  of  action,  although  in  an  incomplete  and  imper- 
fect manner.  Some  illustrations  of  this  strict  method  of  decision 
are  given  in  the  note.^ 

record  of  a  case  brought  on  appeal  or 
error,  for  the  purpose  of  detenniuiug 
whether  tlie  petition  upou  which  the  ac- 
tion is  founded  states  a  cause  of  action, 
and  whether  the  court  has  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter  of  the  action." 

Predicating  Error  on  Ruling  on  Demurrer. 

A  defendant  who  pleads  over  after 
a  demurrer  is  sustained  to  his  answer, 
waives  the  right  to  have  such  ruling  con- 
sidered on  appeal :  Frick  i\  Kabaker 
(1902).  1 16  la.  494,  90  N.  W.  49S  ;  Nystuen 
V.  Hanson  (1902),—  la. —,91  N.  W.  1071. 
A  statute  in  Iowa  (Acts  25th  Gen.  Assem., 
ch.  96)  reads  as  follows:  '"When  a  de- 
murrer shall  be  overruled,  and  the  party 
demurring  shall  answer  or  reply,  the  rul- 
ing on  the  demurrer  shall  not  be  consid- 
ered an  adjudication  of  any  question 
raised  by  the  demurrer  ;  and  in  such  case 
the  sufficiency  of  the  pleading  thus  at- 
tacked shall  be  determined  as  if  no  de- 
murrer had  been  filed."  Construing  this 
statute,  the  court,  in  Frum  v  Keeney 
(1899),  109  la.  393,  80  N.  W.  507,  said': 
"  It  was  not  designed  to  permit  a  review 
of  the  ruliug  on  a  demurrer  wiiich  had 
been  overruled,  where  the  party  demur- 
ring had  afterwards  filed  an  answer  or 
reply,  but  to  provide  that  the  ruling 
should  not  have  tlie  effect  of  an  adjudi- 
cation, and  to  permit  the  party  demurring 
unsuccessfully  to  cjuestion  the  sufficiency 
of  the  pleading  in  other  ways  during  tlie 
progress  of  the  trial,  as  by  a  motion  to 
direct  the  verdict  ur  in  arrest  of  judgment. 
In  other  words,  in  such  a  case  the  party 
waived  his  right  to  complain  of  tlie  over- 
ruling of  the  demurrer  by  pleading  over, 
but  did  not  waive  his  right  to  attack  the 
pleading  on  the  grounds  upon  which  his 
demurrer  was  founded  at  any  subsequent 
time  in  the  progress  of  the  case ;  for  the 
statute  expressly  ])rovi(ied  that  where  a 
demurrer  was  overruled  tiie  sufficiency  of 
the  pleading  was  to  '  be  determined  as  if 
no  demurrer  had  been  filed.' "  See  the 
following  cases  in  whicli  this  statute  lias 
been  discussed;  Adams  v.  Holden  (1900), 
111   la.  54,  82  X.  W.  408;  Buchanan  v. 


Blackhawk  Coal  Works  (1903),  —  la.  — , 
9;5  N.  \V.  51  ;  Krause  r.  Lloyd  (1897),  100 
la.  660,  69  N.  W.  1002;  Long  ?'.  Mellet 
(1895),  94  la.  548,  63  N.  W.  190.  See 
also  VVyland  v.  (iriffitli  (1895),  96  la.  24, 
64  N.  W.  673;  Cook  v.  Doty  (1894),  91 
la.  721,  59  N.  \V.  35. 

By  answering  after  his  demurrer  to  tiie 
complaint  is  overruled  a  defendant  waives 
an  exception  to  tlie  decision  on  the  de- 
murrer: Cook  V.  Kittson  (1897),  68  Minn. 
474,  71  N.  W.  670;  Thompson  i-.  Ellcnz 
(1894),  58  Minn.  301,  59  N.  W.  1023. 

Filing  an  amended  pleading  after  a 
demurrer  thereto  has  been  sustained,  is  a 
waiver  of  error  in  sustaining  the  demur- 
rer: Heman  v.  Glaun  (1895),  129  Mo. 
325,  31  S.  W.  589;  G.anceart  v.  Henry 
(1893),  98  Cal.  281,  33  Pac.  92;  Berry  v. 
Barton  (1902),  12  Okla.221,  71  Pac.  1074. 

Pleadings  Construed  on  General  Demur- 
rer:  Jarrell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (1900),  58 
S.  C.  491,  36  S.  E.  910  (negligence); 
Morrison  v.  City  of  Eau  Claire  (1902), 
115  Wis.  538,  92  N.  W.  280  (negligence)  ; 
Andrews  u.  School  District  (1896),  49  Neb. 
420,  68  X.  W.  631  (action  by  a  firm  in 
partnership  name)  ;  Aurora  Water  Co.  v. 
Aurora  (1895),  129  Mo.  540,  31  S.  W.  946 
(action  against  city  to  recover  hydrant 
rentals);  Duryee  r.  Friars  (1897),  18 
Wash.  55,  50  Pac.  583  (action  to  enjoin 
city  from  issuing  bonds) ;  De  Baker  i\ 
Southern  Cal.  Ry.  Co.  (1895),  106  Cal. 
257,39  Pac.  610.] 

1  Scofield  V.  Whitelegge,  49  N.  Y.  259, 
261  ;  Hathaway  v.  Quinby,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C. 
386;  Doyle  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  44  Cal. 
264,  208;  Holmes  v.  Williams,  10  Minn. 
104,108.  Scofield  c.  Whitelegge  was  an 
action  to  recover  possession  of  a  chattel. 
The  complaint  alleged  that  the  defendant 
had  become  possessed  of  ami  wrongfully 
detained  from  the  plaintiff  a  piano  of  tlio 
value  of,  etc.,  and  demanded  the  usual 
judgment.  The  answer  denied  the  pos- 
se.s.'non  of  any  property  belonging  to  the 
plaintiff,  denied  tlic  wrongful  taking,  and 
denied  the  plaintiff's  ownership.  Tlie 
com])laint  was  dismissed  at  the  trial,  on 
the  ground  that  it  stated  no  cause  of  ac- 


KEDU.XDANT    OR   IRRELEVANT    ALLEGATIONS. 


60 :) 


§  445.  *551.  II.  Redundant,  Immaterial,  and  Irrelevant  Allega- 
tions, and  the  Mode  of  Objecting  to  and  Correcting  them.  Dis- 
tinctions.    In  a  lewal  action  all  matter  stated  in  addition  to  the 


tiou.  The  opinion  of  the  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals,  by  Folger  J.,  after  re- 
citing; the  common-law  rule  in  replevin, 
that  the  action  could  only  be  maintained 
by  one  who  had  the  general  or  a  special 
pro])erty  in  the  chattel,  that  this  property 
must  have  been  averred  in  the  declara- 
tion, that  the  action  under  the  code  takes 
exactly  the  place  of  the  old  replevin,  and 
that  the  plaintiff  in  it  must  have  a  prop- 
erty in  the  chattel,  proceeds  as  follows 
(p.  261):  "Nor  is  it  less  nece.ssary  now 
than  then  for- the  plaintiff  to  aver  the  facts 
which  constitute  his  cause  of  action.  He 
must  allege  the  facts,  and  not  the  evi- 
dence ;  he  must  allege  facts,  and  not  con- 
clusions of  law.  The  plaintiff  here  alleges 
that  the  defendant  wrong/ally  detains  from 
liiiii  tlie  chattel.  If,  indeed,  this  be  true, 
then  it  must  be  that  the  plaintiff  has  a 
general  or  special  property  in  the  chattel 
and  the  right  of  immediate  possession. 
But  uidess  he  has  that  general  or  special 
property  and  right  of  immediate  posses- 
sion, it  cannot  be  true  that  it  is  wrongfully 
detained  from  him.  The  last  —  the  wrong- 
ful detention  —  grows  from  the  first,  — 
the  property  and  right  of  possession.  The 
last  is  the  conclusion.  The  first  is  the 
fact  upon  which  that  conclusion  is  based ; 
it  is  the  fact  which,  in  a  pleading,  must 
be  alleged.  Is  not  the  statement  of  a 
conclusion  of  law,  without  a  fact  averred 
to  support  it,  an  immaterial  statement  1  " 
This  decision  is  certainly  technical  to  the 
last  degree  when  tested  by  the  standard 
established  in  the  codes  and  in  other 
cases.  The  complaint  was  undoubtedly 
imperfect ;  but  it  set  forth  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion, although  in  an  incomplete  manner. 
The  learned  judge  concedes  that  the  aver- 
ment "  the  defendant  wrongfully  detains 
from  the  plaintiff  "  necessarily  presupposes 
and  implies  a  property  and  right  of  pos- 
session in  the  plaintiff.  The  only  defect, 
therefore,  consisted  in  an  allegation  of 
the  evidence,  or  perhaps  of  the  legal  con- 
clusion, instead  of  the  issuable  fact.  The 
defendant  was  not  misled ;  his  answer 
shows  that  he  understood  the  claim,  and 
it  raised  all  the  issues  upon  which  he  re- 


lieil.  The  complaint  is,  indeed,  a  striking 
illustration  of  a  defective  pleading,  which 
shohld  be  corrected  by  motion,  and  not 
attacked  by  demurrer;  and  the  opin- 
ion is  a  clear  and  convincing  argument 
showing  why  such  a  motion  ought  to  be 
granted ;  but  it  violates  the  liberal  ])rin- 
ciple  of  construction,  and  returns  to  the 
common-law  rule  requiring  a  strict  inter- 
pretation against  the  pleader.  The  facts 
and  opinion  in  Hathaway  v.  Quinby, 
which  is  quite  similar  in  its  general 
character,  and  in  Doyle  v.  Phoenix  Ins. 
Co.,  may  be  found  supra,  §§  *5.'}1,  *5.35. 
The  following  cases  give  further  illus- 
trations of  the  rule  as  stated  in  the  text,  — 
that  defects  of  form  merely  are  waived 
by  going  to  trial  without  objection  and 
are  cured  by  verdict,  while  defects  which 
go  to  the  cause  of  action  itself  are  not 
thus  waived  nor  cured.  There  is  not, 
however,  an  absolute  unanimity  on  this 
point  among  the  decisions  ;  some  of  them 
cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  general  cur- 
rent of  authority,  nor,  in  my  opinion, 
witli  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  codes. 
Jefferson  v.  Hale,  31  Ark.  286  ;  People  v. 
Sloper,  1  Idaho,  158;  Hawse  v.  Burg- 
mere,  4  Colo.  313 ;  Revelle's  Heirs  v. 
Claxon's  Heirs,  12  Bush,  .558;  Thompson 
V.  Killian,  25  Minn.  Ill;  Reed  v.  Pixley, 
25  id.  482 ;  Chesterson  v.  Munson,  27  id. 
498 ;  International  Bk.  of  St.  Louis  v. 
Franklin  Cy.,  65  Mo.  105  ;  State  v.  Bart- 
lett,  68  id.  581 ;  Richardson  i-.  Iloole,  13 
Nev.  492  ;  Youngstown  v.  Moore,  30  Ohio 
St.  133;  State  v.  Cason,  11  S.  C.  392; 
Edgerly  v.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.,  43  Iowa,  587  ; 
Meyer  v.  Dubuque  Cy.,  43  id.  592  ;  Polster 
V.  Rucker,  16  Kan.  115  ;  Moody  v.  Arthur, 
16  id.  419  ;  Castle  v.  Houston,  19  id.  417; 
Sheridan  v.  Jackson,  72  N.  Y.  170,  172, 
173  ;  Streeter  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
Wis.  294,  301 ;  Univ.  of  Notre  Dame  v. 
Shanks,  40  id.  352  ;  Smith  v.  Barron  Cy. 
Sup.,  44  id.  686  ;  Vassar  v.  Thomp.son, 
46  id.  345;  Stetler  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W. 
Ry.  Co.,  49  id.  609  ;  Gander  v.  State,  50 
Ind.  539,  541  ;  Green  v.  Louthain,  49 
id.  139 ;  Donellan  v.  Hardy,  57  id.  393  ; 
Galvin  v.   Woollen,  66  id.  464  ;   Indiau- 


39 


CIO  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

allegations  of  issuable  facts,  and  in  an  equitable  action  all  such 
matter  in  addition  to  the  averments  of  material  facts  atfecting  the 
remedy,  is  unnecessar}',  and  therefore  immaterial  and  redundant. 
Whenever,  therefore,  the  issuable  facts  constituting  a  legal  cause 
of  action,  or  the  material  facts  upon  ^vhich  the  right  to  equitable 
relief  is  wholly  or  partially  based,  are  pleaded,  all  the  details  of 
probative  matter  by  which  these  facts  are  to  be  established,  and 
all  the  conclusions  of  law  inferred  therefrom,  are  plainly  embraced 
within  this  description.     It  would  not  be  strictly  correct  to  say 
that  statements  of  evidence  or  of  legal  conclusions  are,  under  all 
circumstances,  redundant.     If  a  complaint  or  petition  should,  in 
violation  of  the  principles  established  by  the  reformed  procedure, 
allesre  the  evidence  of  some  issuable  or  material  fact  instead  of 
the  fact  itself,  or  should  state  a  conclusion  of  law  in  place  of  the 
proper  fact  or  facts  which  support  it,  these  averments  would  be 
irregular,  imperfect,   insufficient,  and  liable  to  correction   by  a 
motion;   but  they  might  not  be   necessarily  redundant.     If  the 
pleading  was  not  reformed,  and  if  the  defect  was  not  so  serious 
as  to  render  it  demurrable,  it  would  be  treated  on  the  trial  as 
sufficient;    and  the   statement  of   probative    matter   or  of   legal 
conclusions  would  take  the  place  of  the  issuable  or  material  facts 
which  ought  to  have  been  averred,  and  would  thus  become  mate- 
rial.    It  is  self-evident,  however,  that  if  the  essential  doctrines 
of  pleading  are  complied  with,  and  the  proper  facts  constituting 
the  cause  of  action,  or  affecting  the  equitable  relief,  are  all  set 
forth,   then  any  detail  of  evidence  or  any  conclusion  of  law  is 
necessarily  surplusage,  and  redundant.     An  allegation  is  irrele- 
vant Avhen  the  issue  formed  by  its  denial  can  have  no  connection 
with   nor   effect   upon   the   cause  of   action. ^     Every  irrelevant 
allegation  is  immaterial  and  redundant:  but  the  converse  of  this 
proposition  is  not  true;  every  immaterial  or  redundant  allegation 
is  not  irrelevant.     This  general  description  can  only  be  explained 
and  illustrated  by  an  examination  of  individual  cases,  of  which  a 
few  have  been  collected  in  the  note  as  examples. ^ 

apolis  &  V.  Ti.  Co.  V.  McCaffery,  72  id.  i  CSmith  r.  Smith  (1897),  50  S.  C.  54, 

294;  Parker  v.  Clayton,  72  id.  307  ;  New-  27  S.  E.  545,  quoting  the  text.     See  also 

man  v.  Perrell,  73  id.  153;  Charlestown  Ragsdale  v.  Railway  Co.  (1901),  60  S.  C. 

Sch.  Dist.  V.   Hay,  74  id.  127;  Smock  v.  381,  38  S.  E   609.] 

Harrison,  74  id.  348;  Lewi.s  y.  Bortsfield,  ^  Bowman   r.  Sheldon,    5    Sandf.   657, 

75  id.  390;  King  v.  Montgomery,  50  Cal.  660;    Fasnacht  v.  Stehn,   53   Barh.  650; 

1 15  ;  Hanlin  v.  Martin,  53  id.  321.  Hunter  v.  Powell,  15  How.  Pr.  221  ;  Fab- 


REDUNDANT    OR   IRRELEVANT    ALLEGATIONS.  611 

§  446.  *  552.  Motion,  not  Demurrer,  Proper  Methocl  of  Objecting 
to  Superfluous  Allegations.  The  rule  is  established  by  the  unani- 
mous decisions  of  the  courts,  as  well  as  by  the  provision  found  in 
the  codes,  that  the  proper  and  onl}^  method  of  objecting  to  and 
correcting  redundant,  immaterial,  or  irrelevant  allegations  in  a 
pleading,  is  a  motion  to  strike  out  the  unnecessary  matter,  and 
not  a  demurrer,  nor  an  exclusion  of  evidence  at  the  trial. ^  The 
new  procedure  thus  furnishes,  by  means  of  these  motions  in  cases 
of  insufficiency,  redundancy,  or  irrelevancy,  a  speedy  and  certain 
mode  of  enforcing  the  fundamental  doctrines  of  pleading  which 
it  has  established,  and  of  causing  the  complaints  or  petitions  and 
answers  to  present  single,  clear,  and  well-defined  issues.  At  the 
same  time  it  prevents  a  sacrifice  of  substance  to  form,  and  a 
decision  of  controversies  upon  technical  points  not  involving  the 
merits,  by  requiring  these  objections  to  be  taken  before  the  trial, 
and  by  regarding  them  as  waived  if  the  j^rescribed  mode  of 
remedy  is  not  resorted  to.  The  courts  have  it  in  their  power, 
by  encouraging  these  classes  of  motions,  and  by  treating  them 
as  highly  remedial  and  important,  to  shape  the  pleading  into  an 
harmonious  and  consistent  system,  constructed  upon  the  few 
natural  and  j)hilosophical  principles  which  were. adopted  as  its 
foundation ;  or  they  may,  on  the  other  hand,  by  discouraging  a 
resort  to  these  corrective  measures,  and  by  treating  them  as  idle, 
unnecessary,  or  vexatious,  suffer  those  principles  to  become  for- 
gotten, and  to  be  finally  abandoned,  and  may,  thereby,  lose  all 

ricotti  V.  Launitz,  3  Sandf.  743  ;  Lee  Bank  prise  Ins.  Co.,  45  Ind.  43,  55  ;    Hynds  v. 

r.  Kitching,  7   Bosw.  664;    11    Abb.    Pr.  Hays,  25  Ind.  31  ;  Smith  v.  Countryman, 

435;  Cahill   v.   Palmer,  17  Abb.  Pr.  196;  30  N.  Y.  655;  Simmons  v.  Eldridge,   29 

Decker  r.  Mathews,  12  N.  Y.  313  ;  Gould  How.  Pr.  309  ;  19  Abb.  Pr.  296;  Cahill  v. 

V.  Williams,  9   How.  Pr.  51  ;    St.  John  v.  Palmer,  17  Abb.  Pr.  196.     See  also  Vliet 

Griffith,  1  Abb.  Pr.  39  ;  O'Connor  w.  Koch,  v.   Sherwood,   38    Wis.   159:    allegations 

56  Mo.  253 ;  Clague  v.  Hodgson,  16  Minn,  stating  a  good  cause  of  action  should  not 

329,  334,  335  ;  King  v.  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.,  be  struck  out  on  the  objection   that  they 

45  Ind.  43,  55  ;  Hynds  v.  Hays,  25  Ind.  31  ;  are  irrelevant  and  redundant ;  if  they  are 

Booher  r.  Goldsborough,  44  Ind.  490,  498,  improperly  in   the  complaint,   this   is  not 

499  (duplicity)  ;  Loomis  v.  Youle,  1  Minn,  the  mode  and  ground  of  relief.     Magee 

175;  Clark  v.  Harwood,  8  How.  Pr.  470;  v.  Waupaca  Cy.  Sup  ,  38  Wis.  247  ;  Biggs 

Edgerton  v.  Smith,  3  Duer,  614  ;  Sellar  v.  v.  Biggs,  50  id.  443 ;  Hoffmann  v.  Kop- 

Sage,  12  How.  Pr.  531  ;  13  How.  Pr.  230;  pelkora,  8  Neb.  344;  Johns  v.  Potter,  55 

Lee  V.  Elias,  3  Sandf.  736  ;  Lamoreux  v.  Iowa,  665 ;  Cooper  v.  Frencdi,  52  id.  531  ; 

Atlantic  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Duer,  680.     See  Schoonover  v.  Hinckley,  46  id.  207  ;  Davis 

also  the  additional  cases  cited  in  the  next  r.  C.  &  W.  W.  R.  li.,  46  id.  389 ;  Gabe  v. 

following  notes.  McGinnis,  68  Ind.  538;  Harris  v.  Todd,  16 

1  Loomis  u.  Youle,  1  Minn.  175  ;  O'Con-  Hun,    248;    Smith  v.    Summerfield,     108 

nor  i:  Koch,  56  Mo.  253  ;  King  v.  Enter-  N.  C.  284. 


ev2 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


the  benefits  which  were  designed,  and  \\hich  could   have  been 
obtained  from  the  reform.^ 


^  r  Jiciliindnnt,  Itntnntcrial ,  and  Irrel- 
evant  Alleyatious. 

Motion  Proper  Remedi/.  "  A  demurrer 
is  not  a  pruuiug  hook,  and  canuot  be  used 
to  trim  out  immaterial  aud  irrelevant 
matter.  This  must  be  done  by  motion:" 
In  re  Estate  of  McMurray  (1899),  107  la. 
648,  78  N.  W.  691.  To  the  same  effect 
see  Bolt  v.  Gray  (1898),  54  S.  C.  95,  32 
S.  E.  148;  Duke  f.  Brown  (1901),  113 
Ga.  310,  38  S.  E.  764;  City  of  Butte  v. 
Peasley  (1896).  18  Mont.  303,  45  I'ac.  210; 
McGiliivray  v.  McGiilivray  (1896),  9  S.  D. 
187,  68  N.  W.  316  ;  Campbell  v.  Equitable 
Loan  &  Trust  Co.  (1901).  14  S.  U.  483, 
85  N.  W.  1015. 

Form  of  Motion.  A  motion  to  strike 
out  portions  of  a  pleading  should  desig- 
nate with  particularity  tlie  averments 
which  it  attacks:  Stuht  v.  Sweesy  (1896), 
48  Xeb.  767,  67  N.  \V.  748;  Keairnes  v. 
Durst  (1899),  110  la.  114,  81  N.  W.  238; 
State  ex  inf.  v.  Fleming  (1898),  147  Mo. 
1,  44  S.  W.  758.  If  the  motion  is  too 
broad,  so  that  it  cannot  be  sustained  as 
made,  it  must  be  overruled,  thougli  a 
narrower  motion  might  have  been  well 
taken  :  Smith  v.  Meyers  (1898),  54  Neb.  1, 
74  N.  W.  277  ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.  v.  Spirk  (1897),  51  Neb.  167,  70  N.  W. 
926;  Gilbert  v.  Loberg  (1894),  86  Wis. 
661,  57  N.  W.  982. 

lV/i<it  may  be  stricken  out  as  Surplusage. 
A  paragraph  of  a  complaint  which  does 
not  allege  any  fact  essential  to  the  plain- 
tiff's cause  of  action,  should  be  stricken 
out  upon  motion :  Pitkin  i'.  New  York  & 
New  England  K.  R.  Co.  (1894),  64  Conn. 
482,  30  Atl.  772.  The  court  may,  on  its 
own  motion,  strike  out  scandalous  matter  : 
Morrison  v.  Snow  (1903),  26  Utah  247,  72 
Pac.  924.  Averments  of  oral  conversa- 
tions between  plaintiff  and  defendant  prior 
to  the  making  of  the  written  contract  set 
out  in  the  pleading,  are  properly  stricken 
out  on  motion  l)ecause  merged  in  the 
written  instrument :  Jordan  v.  Coulter 
(1902),  30  Wa.sh.  116,  70  Pac.  257.  It  is 
unnecessary  to  plead  facts  of  which  the 
court  will  take  judicial  notice:  George  v. 
State  (1899),  59  Neb  163,80  N.  W.486. 

C'l/useifitencc  of  Retaining  Surplnsaqe. 
While  unnece.ssfiry  averments  in  a  plead- 


ing need  not  be  proved  (Kerr  v.  Topping 
(1899),  109  la.  1.50,  80  N.  W.  321),  yet 
they  may  be  supported  by  evidence  if 
allowed  to  remain,  and  such  evidence 
should  not  be  ruled  out  on  objection : 
Dentr.  Hailroad  (1901),  61  S.  C.  329,39 
S.  E.  527;  Hicks  c.  Southern  Ry.  (1902), 
63  S.  C.  559.41  S.  E.  753;  Smith  v.  Meyers 
(1898),  .54  Neb.  1,  74  N.  W.  277. 

In  Kelly  v.  Clark  (1898),  21  Mont.  291, 
53  Pac.  959,  the  court  said  :  "  If  a  plaintiff 
aver  more  than  is  necessary,  and  fail  to 
sustain  immaterial  aud  redundant  aver- 
ments, but  does  prove  all  the  material 
facts  upou  whiclia  right  to  relief  is  based, 
aud  no  motion  to  correct  the  pleading  has 
been  made,  it  will  be  treated  as  sufficient, 
aud  the  surplus  allegations  disregarded." 
And  in  Smith  v.  Meyers  (1898),  54  Neb. 
1,  74  N.  W.  277,  the  court  said:  "A 
defendant  who  by  answer  pleaded  new 
matter,  which  the  court  refused  to  strike 
out  as  immaterial,  cannot  be  heard  to 
complain  that  the  court  erred  in  efusing 
to  strike  from  the  reply  allegations  trav- 
ersing those  of  the  answer." 

It  was  iield  in  Campbell  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  (1893),  121  Mo.  340,  25  S.  W. 
936,  that  thd-  fact  that  tiie  j)etition  un- 
necessarily charged  negligence  did  not 
prevent  a  recovery  under  the  statute  with- 
out proof  of  negligence,  the  statute  mak- 
ing railroad  companies  liable  without  proof 
of  negligence  for  ])roperty  injured  or  de- 
stroyed by  fire  set  by  their  locomotives. 
And  in  Oglesby  r.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
(1899),  150  Mo.  137,  37  S.  W.  829,"it  wa.s 
held  that  if  a  petition  founded  on  negli- 
gence states  two  acts,  each  constituting 
negligence  and  either  sufficient  in  itself 
to  sustain  the  cause  of  action,  if  there  be 
proof  to  sustain  one  and  no  proof  to 
sustain  the  other,  the  action  will  not  fail 
after  verdict. 

Inconsistent  Allegations.  If  a  complaint 
states  a  good  cause  of  action,  additional 
allegations  inconsistent  with  such  state- 
ment do  not  render  it  demurrable :  Ross 
V.  Charleston,  etc.  Co.  (1894),  42  S.  C. 
447,  20  S.  E.  285.  But  where  a  complaint 
states  a  good  cause  of  action  and  also 
states  facts  constituting  a  defence  thereto, 
it  is  bad  on  demurrer:  Roberts  v.  Indian- 


ALLEGATIONS  AND  PROOFS  MUST  COKKESPOND. 


613 


§  447.  *  553.  III.  The  Doctrine  that  the  Cause  of  Action  Proved 
must  correspond  with  the  One  Alleged.  Degrees  of  Variance 
between  Allegations  and  Proof.  The  cocles  describe  three  grades 
of  disagreement  between  the  proofs  at  the  trial  and  the  allega- 
tions in  the  pleadings  to  which  such  proofs  are  directed :  namely, 
(1)  An  immaterial  variance,  where  the  difference  is  so  slight  and 
unimportant  that  the  adverse  party  is  not  misled  thereby,  and  in 
which  case  the  court  will  order  an  immediate  amendment  without 
costs,  or  will  treat  the  pleading  as  though  amended,  permitting 
the  evidence  to  be  received  and  considered;  (2)  A  material 
variance,  where  although  the  proof  has  some  relation  to  and  con- 
nection with  the  allegation,  yet  the  difference  is  so  substantial 
that  the  adverse  party  is  misled  by  the  averment,  and  would  be 
prejudiced  on  the  merits,  in  which  case  the  court  may  permit  the 
pleading  to  be  amended  upon  terms ;  ^  (3)  A  complete  failure  of 
proof,  where  the  proofs  do  not  simply  fail  to  conform  with  the 
allegation  in  some  particular  or  particulars,  but  in  its  entire 
scope  and  meaning,  or,  in  other  words,  the  proof  establishes 
something  wholly  different  from    the  allegations.      In  this  case 


apolis  St.  Ry.  Co.  (1902),  158  lud.  634, 
C4  N.  E.  217. 

Where  an  answer  contains  allegations 
of  fraud  and  other  allegations  absolutely 
contradictory  of  and  inconsistent  with 
them,  the  latter  may  be  stricken  out  on 
motion  :  State  ex  rel.  v.  Dickerman  (1895), 
16  Mont.  278,  40  Pac.  698, 

It  was  held  in  Raming  r.  Metropolitan 
St.  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  157  Mo.  477,  57  S.  \\. 
268,  that  a  petition  which  states  acts  as 
being  both  negligent  and  wanton  or  wilful 
at  the  same  time  is  self-contradictory.  A 
claim  by  a  bank  of  a  general  lien  on  a 
debtor's  securities  for  a  balance  due  by 
the  debtor  is  not  inconsistent  with  its 
claim  of  a  lien  thereon  by  special  contract : 
Cockrill  V.  Joyce  (1896),  62  Ark.  216,  35 
S.  W.  221.  Nor  is  an  allegation  in  a 
complaint  on  a  promissory  note  that  the 
iiidorser  waived  notice  inconsistent  with 
allegations  showing  that  the  holder  was 
excused  from  giving  notice  by  the  subse- 
<jUGiit  action  of  the  iudorser:  Loveday  i'. 
Anderson  (1897),  18  Wash.  322,  51  Pac. 
463. 

Predicating  Error  on  Piuling  on  Motion. 
Tlie  refusal  of  the  court  to  strike  out 
redundant   and  irrelevant   matter   is   not 


reversible  error  unless  it  affirmatively  aj)- 
pears  that  the  rights  of  the  moving  party 
are  thereby  prejudiced :  Lincoln  Mortgage 
&  Trust  Co.  V.  Hutchins  (1898),  55  Neb. 
158,  75  N.  W.  538;  Hudelson  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank  (1898),  56  Neb.  247,  76  N.  W.  570; 
State  Bank  v.  Showers  (1902),  —  Kan. 
— ,  70  Pac.  332;  Pfau  v.  State  ex  rel. 
(1897),  148  Ind.  539,  47  N.  E.  927;  Cod- 
dington  v.  Canaday  (1901),  157  Ind.  243, 
61  N.  E.  567 ;  Atchison,  etc.  Ry.  Co',  v. 
Marks  (1901),  11  Okla.  82,  65  Pac.  996. 

Waiver  of  Objection.  It  is  too  late 
after  verdict  to  raise  the  objection  that  a 
petition  contains  redundant  and  immate- 
rial matter:  Bradley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  (1896),  138  Mo".  293,  39  S.  W.  763. 
And  it  was  held  in  Bright  v.  Ecker  (1896), 
9  S.  D.  192,  69  N.  W.  824,  that  a  com- 
plaint containing  redundant  matter  and 
allegations  relating  to  more  than  one 
cause  of  action,  will  be  lield  sufficient  in 
the  Supreme  Court  in  the  absence  of  an 
attack  by  motion,  if  the  facts  alleged 
show  any  cause  of  action.] 

1  ^See  Olson  v.  Snake  River  Valley 
R.  R.  Co.  (1900),  22  Wash.  139,  60 
Pac.  156.] 


614  CIVIL    IIKMEDIES. 

110  amendment  is  permitted,  but  the  cause  of  action  or  defence 
is  dismissed  or  overruled.^  In  these  statutory  provisions  the 
doctrine  that  the  proofs  must  correspond  with  the  allegations  is, 
in  a  somewhat  modilied  form,  united  with  the  subject  of  amend- 
ment, by  which  the  minor  grades  of 'the  variance  may  be  obviated. 
In  the  present  subdivision  I  shall  consider  only  the  former  of 
these  two  topics,  and  shall  discuss  the  scope  and  effect  of  the 
general  rule,  that  the  cause  of  action,  or  the  defence  as  proved, 
must  correspond  with  that  averred  in  the  pleading.'-^ 

§  448.  *  554.  Consequences  of  Different  Degrees  of  Variance. 
The  very  object  and  design  of  all  pleading  by  the  plaintiff,  and 
of  all  pleading  of  new  mattar  by  the  defendant,  is  that  the  ad- 
verse party  may  be  informed  of  the  real  cause  of  action  or  defence 
relied  upon  by  the  pleader,  and  may  thus  have  an  opportunity  of 
meeting  and  defeating  it  if  possible  at  the  trial.  Unless  the 
petition  or  complaint  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  answer  on  the 
other,  fully  and  fairly  accomplishes  this  purpose,  the  pleading 
would  be  a  useless  ceremony,  productive  only  of  delay,  and  the 
parties  might  better  be  permitted  to  state  their  demands  orally 
before  the  court  at  the  time  of  the  trial.  The  requirement, 
therefore,  that  the  cause  of  action  or  the  affirmative  defence 
must  be  stated  as  it  actually  is,  and  that  the  proofs  must  estab- 

1  See  these  provisions  quoted  supra,  Ass'n  (1894),  42  Neb.  439,  60  N.  W.  881 ; 
§  *4.35.  Omaha  Consolidated  Co.  r.  Burns  (1895), 

2  The  following  cases  will  illustrate  44  Xeb.  21,  62  N.  W.  301;  Matthews  v. 
this  rule  :  Bishop  r.  Griffith,  4  Colo.  68;  O'Shea  (1895),  45  Neb.  299,63  N.  W.820; 
Burd.'^all  v.  Waggoner,  4  id.  256;  Board-  Cannon  v.  Smith  (1896),  47  Neb.  917,  66 
man  u.  Griffin,  52  Ind.  101 ;  Long i-.  Doxey,  N.W.999;  Carter c.Gibson  (1896), 47  Neb. 

50  id.  385  ;  Baker  v.  Dessauer,  49  id.  28;  655,  66  N.  "VV.  631  ;  Esterly  Ilarv.  Mac!i. 
Stroup  V.  State,  70  id.  495  ;  Jeffersonville,  Co.  v.  Berg  (1897),  52  Neb.  147,  71  N.  W. 
M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  I,'.  Worland.  50  id.  339;  952;  Solt  r.  Anderson  (19U2),  63  Neb.  734, 
Arnold  y.  Angell,  62  N.  Y.  508 ;  Vrooman  89  N.  W.  306;  Elliott  v.  Carter  White- 
;;.  Jackson,  6  Ilun,326;  Moudran  v.  Goux,  Lead  Co  ( 1898),  53  Neb.  458,  73  N.  \V.  948; 

51  Cal.  151  ;  Hopkins  v.  Orcutt,  51  id.  537 ;  Smith  v.  Building,  etc.  Ass'u  (1895),  IIG 
Bolen  V.  San  Gorgouio  Fl.  Co.,  55  id.  164  ;  N.  C.  102,  21  S.  E.  33  ;  McMahan  t.  Cana- 
McCord  V.  Scale,  56  id.  262.  dian  Ry.  Co.  (1901),  40  Ore.  148,  66  Pac. 

QA  plaintiff  must  recover  according  to  70S;  Crawford  v.  Aultmau  &  Co.  (1897), 
the  allegations  of  his  complaint,  or  not  at  139  Mo.  262,  40  S.  W.  952;  Ilite  v.  Metro- 
all:  Thompson  i-.  Citizens'  St.  Ry.  Co.  politan  St.  Ry.  Co.  (1895),  130  Mo.  132,  31 
(1898),  152  Ind.46l,  53  N.E.  462;  Southern  S.  W.  262;  Chitty  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry. 
Kansas  Ry.  Co.  f.  Griffith  (1894),  54  Kan.  Co.  (1899),  148  Mo.  64,  49  S.  W.  868; 
428,  38  Pac.  478;  Imlioff  >-.  House  (1893),  Rumsey  v.  People's  Ry.  Co.  (1898),  144 
36  Neb.  28,  53  N  W.  1032;  Thomp.sou  r.  Mo.  175,  46  S.  W.  144*;  Solt  i'.  Anderson 
Wertz  (1894),  41  Neb.  31,  59  N.  W.  518;  (1903),  —Neb.  — .  93  N.  W.  205. 
Luce  r.  Foster  (1894),  42  Neli.  818,  60  And  this  is  so  uotwitli.standing  that  evi- 
N.  W.  1027  ;  Lewis  v.  Scotia  Bldg.  &  Loan  deuce  to  support  a  judgment  may  have  been 


ALLEGATIONS    AND    PROOFS    MUST   CORRESPOND. 


Gi; 


lish  it  as  stated,  is  involved  in  the  very  theory  of  pleading. ^  It 
frequently  happens,  however,  and  from  the  very  nature  'of  the 
case  it  must  happen,  that  the  facts  as  proved  do  not  exactly  agree 
with  those  alleged.  To  determine  the  effect  of  such  a  disagree- 
ment we  must  recur  to  the  reason  and  object  of  the  rule,  and 
they  furnish  a  certain  and  equitable  test.  If  the  diJBference  is  so 
slight  that  the  adverse  party  has  not  been  misled,  but,  in  prepar- 
ing to  meet  and  contest  the  case  as  alleged,  he  is  fully  prepared 
to  meet  and  oppose  the  one  to  be  actually  proved,  then  no  effect 
whatever  is  produced  by  the  variance;  to  impose  any  loss  or 
penalty  on  the  pleader  would  be  arbitrary  and   technical. ^     In 


admitted  without  objection  :  New  Idea 
Pattern  Co.  v.  Whelan  (1903),  75  Conn. 
445,  53  Atl.  953;  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cooper  (1894),  95  Ga.  406,  22  S.  E.  549; 
McMahan  r.  Canadian  Ry.  Co.  (1901),  40 
Ore.  148,  6G  Pac.  708 ;  Christian  v.  Conn. 
Mut.  Ins.  Co.  (1898),  143  Mo.  460,  45 
S.  VV.  268 ;  Greenthal  v.  Lincoln,  Seyms, 
&  Co.  (1896),  67  Conn.  372,  35  Atl.  266; 
Box  Butte  County  r.  Noleman  (1898),  54 
Neb.  239,  74  N.  W.  582 ;  Schmidt  v.  Ore- 
gon Gold  Min.  Co.  (1895),  28  Ore.  9,  40 
Pac.  406, 1014;  Coughanoury.  Hutchinson 
<1902),41  Ore.  4 19,  69  Pac.  68;  McGavock 
V.  City  of  Omaha  (1894),  40  Neb.  64,  58 
N.  W.'543;  Purbush  v.  Barker  (1894),  38 
Neb.  1,  56  N.  W.  996;  Brown  v.  Railway 
Co.  (1898),  59  Kan.  70,  52  Pac.  65 ;  Whit- 
ing V.  Koepke  (1898),  71  Conn.  77,  40  Atl. 
1053;  Moran  v.  Bentley  (1897),  69  Conn. 
392,  37  Atl.  1092;  Daly  v.  New  Haven 
(1897),  69  Conn.  644,  38  Atl.  397.  See 
also  McLaughlin  v.  Webster  (1894),  141 
N.  Y.  76,  35  N.  E.  1081. 

Contra,  Morrow  v.  Board  of  Education 
(1895),  7  S.  D.  553,  64  N.  W.  1126;  Brady 
V.  Nally  (1896),  151  N.  Y.  258,  45  N.  E.  547  ; 
Gillies  V.  Improvement  Co.  (1895),  147 
N.  Y.  420,  42  N.  E.  196;  Schoepflin  v. 
Coffey  (1900),  162  N.  Y.  12,  56  N.  E.502; 
Bassett  v.  Haren  (1895),  61  Minn.  346,  63 
N.  W.  713  ;  Ro.senberger  v.  Marsh  (1899), 
108  la.  47,  78  N.  W.  837  ;  Smith  v.  Phelan 
(1894).  40  Neb.  765,  59  N.  W.  .562.] 

1  [[But  the  issues  may,  by  written  stipu- 
lation, or  agreement  in  open  court,  be  nar- 
rowed so  as  to  be  confined  to  one  point : 
Grauby  Mining  Co.  v.  Davis  (1900),  156 
Mo.  422,  57   S.  W.  126.     And  the  issues 


may  be  broadened  by  stipulation.  In  Mc- 
Elwaine  v.  Hosey  (1893),  135  Ind.  481,  35 
N.  E.  272,  it  was  held  that  where  the 
parties  to  an  action  agree  before  entering 
upon  a  trial  "  that  all  facts  relating  in  any 
way  to  the  case  in  hand,  or  affecting  the 
merits  of  the  controversy  on  either  side, 
may  be  introduced  in  evidence  under  the 
pleadings  now  on  file,"  such  agreement 
precludes  all  insistence  that  the  relief 
granted  is  broader  than  the  pleadings 
authorize.3 

2  [[A  party  cannot  complain  of  a  mere 
variance  between  pleading  and  proof  un- 
less he  has  been  actually  misled  to  his 
prejudice:  Kuhn  v.  McKay  (1897),  7  Wyo. 
42,  49  Pac.  473 ;  and  such  prejudice  must 
be  shown  to  the  court :  Meldrum  v.  Keue- 
fick  (1902),  15  S.  D.  370,  89  N.  W.  863; 
Chicago  House  Wrecking  Co.  v.  Lumber 
Co.  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  1009; 
People's  Nat.  Bank  v.  Myers  (1902),  65 
Kan.  122,  69  Pac.  164. 

Variances  between  allegations  and  proof 
which  are  immaterial  or  not  jjrejudicial,  do 
not  call  for  a  reversal  of  the  judgment : 
Knight  V.  Finney  (1899),  59  Neb.  274,  80 
N.  W.  912;  Salazar  f.  Taylor  (1893),  18 
Colo.  538,  33  Pac.  369 ;  Lubker  v.  Grand 
Detour  Plow  Co.  (1897),  .53  Neb.  Ill,  73 
N.  W.  457 ;  Kuhn  v.  McKay  (1897),  7  Wyo. 
42,  49  Pac.  473.  A  variance  will  not  be 
deemed  material  unless  it  has  misled  the 
adverse  pai-ty  to  his  prejudice  :  Toy  v.  Mc- 
Hugh  (1901),  62  Neb.  820,  87  N.  W.  1059  ; 
Post-Intelligencer  Co.  v.  Harris  (1895),  11 
Wash.  500,  39  Pac.  965 ;  Dudley  r.  Duval 
(1902),  29  Wash.  528,  70  Pac'  68;  Mel- 
drum V.  Kenefick  (1902),  15  S.  D.  370,  89 


616  CIVIL    Ki:.MEDIES. 

the  second  place,  the  difference,  while  it  does  not  extend  to  the 
entire  cause  of  action  or  defence,  may  be  so  great  in  respect  to 
some  of  its  particular  material  facts  as  to  have  misled  the  adverse 
party,  so  that  his  preparation  in  connection  with  that  particular 
is  not  adapted  to  the  proofs  which  are  produced.  In  such  cir- 
cumstances an  amendment  is  proper  because  the  variance  is  par- 
tial, but  it  is  obviously  equitable  that  terms  should  be  imposed. 
Finally,  if  the  divergence  is  total,  that  is,  if  it  extends  to  such 
an  important  fact,  or  group  of  facts,  that  the  cause  of  action  or 
defence  as  proved  would  be  another  than  that  set  up  in  the 
pleadings,  there  is  plainly  no  room  for  amendment,  and  a  dis- 
missal of  the  complaint  or  rejection  of  the  defence  is  the  only 
equitable  result.  It  should  be  noticed  that,  in  order  to  constitute 
this  total  failure  of  proof,  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  discrepancy 
to  include  and  affect  each  one  of  the  averments.  A  cause  of 
action  as  stated  on  the  pleadings  might  consist,  say,  of  five  dis- 
tinct issuable  or  material  facts ;  on  the  trial  four  of  these  might 
be  proved  as  laid,  while  one  so  entirely  different  might  be  sub- 
stituted in  place  of  the  fifth  that  the  cause  of  action  would  be 
wholly  changed  in  its  essential  nature. 

§  449.  *  555.  Instances  -where  Variance  has  been  held  Immate- 
rial. The  conclusions  reached  in  the  foregoing  analysis,  and  the 
reasons  which  support  them,  are  fully  sustained  by  the  decided 
cases  which  constantly  discriminate  between  the  immaterial 
variance  which  is  disregarded,  and  the  total  failure  of  proof 
which  is  fatal  to  the  cause  of  action  or  defence.^  It  is  of  course 
impossible  to  give  any  comprehensive  formula  which  shall  deter- 
mine these  two  conditions;  the  scope  and  operation  of  the  doc- 
trine can  only  be  learned  from  the  decisions  which  have  applied 
it,  of  which  a  few  are  selected  as  illustrations.  In  the  following 
instances  the  variance  was  held  to  be  immaterial :  In  an  action 
upon  a  written  contract  which  was  properly  set  out  in  the  com- 
plaint except  that  one  material  stipulation  was  omitted,  but  a 
correct  copy  of  it  had  been  served  upon  the  defendant's  attorney  ;2 
in  an  action  against  a  city  for  injuries  done  to  the  plaintiff's 
house  and  grounds  by  the  unlawful  construction  of  sewers,  side- 

N.  W.  8f)3  ;  Wilcox  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ritte-  Wilcox  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ritteman  (1902),  88 

niiui    (1902),  88   Minn.  18,  92  N.  W.  472.  Minn.  18,  82  N.  W.  472.] 

Where  a  variance  i.s  immaterial  the  court  ^  QSee   Dudley    v.    Duval    (1902),    29 

■will  eitlier  disregard  it  altogether  or  order  Wash.  528,  70  Pac.  68.] 

an  immediate  amendment  without  costs:  ^  Fisk  i-.  Tank,  12  Wis.  276,  301. 


ALLEGATIONS    AND    PROOFS    MUST    CORRESPOND.  617 

walks,  etc.,  it  was  held  that,  if  the  manner  of  constructing  the 
works  was  unlawful,  the  failure  to  allege  negligence  in  the 
complaint  was  not  material,  and  might  be  either  disregarded  or 
amended  at  any  stage  of  the  proceeding ;  ^  in  an  action  upon  a 
warranty  given  in  a  sale  of  horses,  where  the  complaint  stated  in 
general  terms  that  the  defendant  warranted  them  to  be  sound, 
while  the  proof  was  that  he  warranted  them  to  be  sound  as  far  as 
he  knew;  that  they  were  unsound,  and  that  he  knew  them  to  be 
so,  the  court  saying  that  an  amendment  if  necessary  should  be 
made  at  any  time  even  by  the  appellate  court  ;2  in  an  action 
upon  a  warranty  of  quality,  where  the  complaint  set  forth  an 
express  warranty,  and  on  the  trial  facts  were  proved  from  which 
a  warranty  would  be  implied;^  in  an  action  against  two  defend- 
ants to  recover  damages  for  injuries  done  to  the  plaintiff's  sheep 
by  the  defendants'  dogs,  the  petition  alleging  that  "a  certain 
pack  or  lot  of  dogs  owned  by  the  defendants  worried,  etc.,  cer- 
tain sheep  of  the  plaintiff,"  while  the  proof  showed  that  one  of 
the  defendants  owned  a  portion  of  the  dogs,  and  the  other 
defendant  the  remainder,  but  there  was  no  joint  ownership;^  in 
an  action  by  a  husband  and  wife  against  a  husband  and  wife  for 
an  assault  and  battery  by  the  female  defendant  upon  the  female 
plaintiff,  the  petition  alleging  that  the  plaintiff  Mary  D.  is  the 
wife  of  the  plaintiff,  James  D.,  and  the  defendant,  Martha  H., 
is  wife  of  the  defendant,  Aaron  H.,  and  proof  was  admitted  that 
the  parties  were  respectively  man  and  wife  at  the  time  of  the 
affraj^ ;  ^  in  an  equitable  action  brought  to  set  aside  a  conveyance 
of  land  made  to  the  defendant,  on  the  ground  of  his  alleged 
fraud,  and  the  plaintiff  failed  to  make  out  a  case  of  fraud,  but 
did  prove  one  of  mutual  mistake;^  in  an  action  for  work  and 
labor  stated  in  the  complaint  to  have  been  done  for  an  agreed 
compensation,  but  at  the  trial  the  j^laintiff  proved  the  value  as 
upon  a  quantum  meruit.'     The  Supreme  Court  of  North  Carolina 

1  Harper  r.  Milwaukee,  30  Wis.  365,  *  McAdams   v.    Sutton,    24    Ohio    St. 
377,  378.     "  The  alleged  variance  did  not     333. 

change  the  gravamen  of  the  action."  ^  Dailey    v.    Houston,    58    Mo.    361, 

2  Chatfield   v.    Frost,    3    N.  Y.    S.   C.     366. 

357.  •>  Montgomery   v.    Shockey,    37    Iowa, 

3  Giffert  v.   West,  33    Wis.  617,  621;     107,    109;    Sweezey    v.   Collins,  36   Iowa, 
Leopold    V.   Vankirk,   27    Wis.    152,   155;      589,592. 

s.  c.  29  Wis.  548,  551.     At  the  common  "  Sussdorff  v.   Schmidt,  55  N.  Y.  319, 

•  law,  this  was  the  only  mode  of  alleging     324. 
an  implied  warranty. 


618 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


has  gone  so  far  as  to  hold  in  one  case  where  the  complaint  set  up 
a  cause  of  action  for  the  conversion  of  chattels,  and  the  proof  at 
the  trial  showed  only  a  liability  upon  an  implied  promise  for 
money  had  and  received,  that  the  plaintiff  could  recover,  since 
all  distinction  between  forms  of  action  had  been  abolished,  and 
amendments  were  freely  allowed.^  This  decision,  as  will  be 
seen,  stands  opposed  to  the  whole  current  of  authority  in  other 
States.  The  objection  that  the  proof  varies  from  the  allegation 
must  be  taken  at  the  trial ;  if  omitted,  then  it  cannot  be  after- 
wards  raised  on    appeal.^     The  reason  is  obvious;   when   made 


1  Gates  V.  Kendall,  67  N.  C.  241. 
But  see  Parsley  i'.  Nicholson,  65  N.  C 
207,  210,  which  maintains  the  general 
doctrine. 

•-  Speer  v.  Bishop,  24  Ohio  St.  598. 
See,  also,  as  further  examples  of  imma- 
terial variance,  Chamballe  v.  McKenzie, 
31  Arli.  155  ;  Bruguier  r.  U.  S.,  1  Dak. 
5;  McMahan  v.  Miller,  82  N.  C.  317; 
Gaines  v.  Union  Ins.  Co.,  28  Ohio  St. 
418 ;  Sibila  v.  Bahney,  34  Ohio  St.  399  ; 
Dodd  V.  Denney,  6  Ore.  156;  Miller  v. 
Hendig,  55  Iowa,  174;  Peck  i'.  N.  Y.  & 
N.  J.  Ry.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  246  ;  Duruford  v. 
Weaver,  84  id.  445 ;  Thomas  v.  Nelson, 
69  id.  118;  Lifler  y.  Sherwood,  21  Hun, 
573;  Clayes  v.  Hooker,  4  id.  231  ;  Cody 
V.  Berai.s  40  Wis.  666 ;  Flanders  v.  Cot- 
trell,  36  id.  564 ;  Giffert  v.  West,  37  id. 
115;  Chunot  u.  Larson,  43  id.  536;  Rus- 
sell V.  Loomis,  43  id.  545  ;  Aschermann 
V.  Brewing  Co.,  45  Wis.  262  ;  Union  Nat. 
Bk.  I'.  Roberts,  45  id.  373  ;  Dolaplaiue  v. 
Turuley,  44  id.  31 ;  Ryan  v.  Springfield 
F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.,  46  id.  671  ;  Wilier  v. 
Bergenthal,  50  id.  474 ;  Galloway  v. 
Stewart,  49  Ind.  156;  Glasgow  v.  Hobbs, 
52  id.  239,  242;  Wright  i\  Johnson,  50  id. 
454 ;  Stroup  v.  State,  70  id.  495  ;  Hunting- 
ton I'.  Mendenhall,  73  id.  460  ;  Tliigpen 
1-.  Staton,  104  N.  C.  40 ;  Merkle  v.  Ben- 
nington, 68  Mich.  133 ;  Thalheimer  v. 
Crow,  13  Colo.  397. 

[^Gillies  V.  Improvement  Co.  (1895), 
147  N.  Y.  420,42  N.  E.  196;  Brady  v. 
Naliy  (1896),  151  N.  Y.  258,  45  N.  E.  547  ; 
Ashe  V.  Beasley  (1896),  6  N.  D.  191,  69 
N.  W.  188;  yEtiia  Iron  Works  i-.  Firmen- 
ich  Mfg.  Co.  (1894),  90  la.  390,  57  N.  W. 
904;  Dean  u.  Goddard  (1893),  55  Minn. 
290,  56   N.    W.    lOGO;    Adams  v.  Castle 


(1896),  64  Minn.  505, 67  N.  W.  637  ;  Lind- 
say V.  Pettigrew  (1894),  5  S.  D.  500,  59 
N.  W.  726 ;  Chouquette  v.  Southern  Elec. 
R.  R.  Co.  (1899),  152  Mo.  257,  53  S.  W. 
897.  The  party  whose  proof  varies  from 
his  allegations  cannot  complain  :  Williams 
V.  Williams  (1899),  102  Wis.  246,  78  N .  W. 
419. 

In  Schirmer  v.  Drexler  (1901),  134 
Cal.  134,  66  Pac.  180,  the  court  said: 
"  The  findings  and  decree  seem  to  be  en- 
tirely outside  of  the  case  made  by  the 
pleadings.  The  said  findings  and  decree 
contradict  the  material  allegations  of 
plaintiff's  complaint,  and  there  seem  to  be 
no  allegations  at  all  in  the  complaint  to 
which  the  findings  and  decree  can  be  held 
to  be  material  or  pertinent.  The  whole 
theory  of  the  complaint  is,  that  the  plain- 
tiff's rights  are  those  of  an  owner,  ac- 
quired by  adverse  use  of  the  ditch  and  the 
water.  The  findings  and  decree  proceed 
upon  an  entirely  different  theory,  and  ex- 
pressly state  that  the  use  of  the  water  and 
of  the  ditch  by  the  plaintiff  and  his  pred- 
ecessor in  interest  therein  was  had  with 
the  consent  of  the  owners  thereof  and 
under  an  oral  license  or  agreement  there- 
for. The  decree  attempts  to  enforce  the 
specific  performance  of  a  contract  which 
is  not  only  nut  set  up  in  th?  complaint,  but 
to  which  no  reference  is  made  anywhere  in 
the  pleadings.  We  know  that  there  are 
cases  which  hold,  as  contended  by  re- 
spondent, that  where  a  question  is  treated 
by  both  parties  as  an  issue  in  the  case, 
and  evidence  is  taken  thereon  without  ob- 
jection, the  appellant  will  not  thereafter 
be  heard  to  say  that  the  i|uestion  was  not 
in  ii<sue.  That  is  a  salutary  general  rule, 
and  we  do  not  wish  to  overturn  it.     But 


ALLEGATIONS   AND    PROOFS   MUST   CORRESPOND. 


619 


at  the  trial,  there  is  an  opportunity  for  removing  it  at  once  by 
amendment.^ 


iu  noue  of  those  cases,  tliat  we  have  been 
ahle  to  find,  were  the  findings  and  decree 
clear  outside  of  the  case  as  made  by  the 
pleadings,  but  in  each  and  all  of  them  the 
findings,  taken  altogether,  have  some  re- 
lation to  the  issues  as  framed ;  but  here 
the  issues  as  made  by  the  pleadings  sus- 
tain no  degree  of  kinship  whatever  to  the 
findings  and  decree,  and  are,  besides,  iu 
direct  conflict  with  the  allegations  of  the 
complaint.  It  would  be  going  too  far  to 
hold  that  such  a  variance  as  this  should 
be  deemed  to  be  waived  by  failure  to  ob- 
ject to  evidence  at  the  trial.  If  the  bur- 
den was  on  the  plaintiff  to  establish  tlie 
case  made  by  his  complaint,  why  should 
the  defendants  object  to  evidence,  as  long 
as  it  went  to  show  that  the  case  as  thus 
made  did  not  exist  ?  If  this  kind  of  a 
judgment  can  be  upheld  on  this  kind  of  a 
record,  theu  written  pleadings  are  no 
louirer  neiessary,  and  may  well  be  dis- 
pensed with  altogether."     Cases  cited.] 

1  l^lii  :lie  following  cases  the  variance 
was  held  immaterial:  In  an  action  against 
a  national  bank  on  its  double  lial)ility  as 
a  stockholder  in  another  corporation,  an 
allegation  that  it  acquired  the  stock  in  a 
particular  manner  and  proof  that  it  ac- 
quired it  in  another  manner  not  ultra 
vires:  Bank  v.  Bank  (1902),  64  Kan.  134, 
67  Pac.  458;  error  m  the  description  of 
tlie  name  of  the  obligee  in  a  bond :  I'ost- 
Intelligencer  Co.  v.  Harris  (1895),  II 
Wash  .500,  30  Pac.  965;  a  mistake  iu  the 
description  of  a  house  upon  which  a  lien  is 
sought  to  be  foreclosed,  when  the  mistake 
is  so  slight  that  the  house  is  still  capable 
of  identification  :  Griffith  v.  Maxwell  (1 898), 
20  Wash.  403,  55  Pac.  571  ;  error  in  the  de- 
tails of  personal  injuries  suffered  by  an 
insured  by  reason  of  a  fall :  ilercier  v.  Trav- 
elers' Ins.  Co.  (1901),  24  Wash.  147,  64  Pac. 
158;  an  allegation  that  defendant  signed 
a  note  as  principal,  and  evidence  that  he 
signed  as  surety :  Hermiston  v.  Green 
(1898),  11  S.  D.  81,  75  N.  W.  819;  an 
allegation  that  defendant  and  another 
were  partners  until  the  other's  death  in 
1893,  and  proof  that  the  partnership  was 
dissolved  by  consent  iu  1885,  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  plaintiff  ;  an  allegation 


that  defendant  executed  a  separate  prom- 
issory note,  and  proof  that  it  was  a  joint 
and  several  note  of  defendant  and  another : 
Nichols  &  Shepard  Co.  i-.  Dedrick  (1895), 
61  Minn.  513,  63  N.  W.  1110. 

In  the  following  cases  it  was  held  that 
there  was  no  variance  between  the  plead- 
ings and  proof:  an  allegation  of  a  money 
indebtedness  for  services  rendered,  and 
proof  of  an  agreement  to  pay  in  specific 
articles  of  property:  New  York  News 
Publishing  Co.  v.  Steamship  Co.  (1895), 
148  N.  Y.  39,  42  N.  E.  514;  an  allegation 
that  promissory  notes  were  signed  by  de- 
fendant as  maker,  and  proof  that  they 
were  signed  by  defendant  and  others 
under  a  several  liability :  Hinchman  v. 
Point  Defiance  Ky.  Co.  (1896),  14  Wash. 
349,  44  Pac.  152;  an  allegation  that  the 
place  of  injury  was  a  sidewalk,  and  proof 
that  it  was  a  crosswalk :  Piper  v.  City  of 
Spokane  (1900),  22  Wash.  147,  60  Pac. 
138 ;  an  allegation,  in  an  action  for  tres- 
pass, of  ownership  of  property  in  fee,  and 
proof  of  an  equitable  interest  only  :  Olson 
V.  City  of  Seattle  (1903),  30  Wash.  687, 
71  Pac.  201  ;  an  allegation  that  plaintiff 
stumbled  over  the  nails  projecting  from  a 
walk,  and  proof  that  she  caught  her  foot 
between  two  planks :  Bell  v.  City  of 
Spokane  (1902),. 30  Wash.  .508,  71  Pac.  31  ; 
proof  of  interest  upon  a  balance  of  an  ac- 
count, where  there  is  no  allegation  of  in- 
terest due  in  the  complaint :  North  Star 
Boot  Co.  V.  Stebbius  (1893),  3  S.  D.  540, 
54  N.  W.  593  ;  an  allegation  of  slanderous 
words,  and  proof  of  the  use  of  words  only 
substantially  the  same  :  Emerson  c.  Miller 
(1902),  115  "la.  315,  88  N.  W.  803;  an  alle- 
gation of  defendant's  liability  as  a  com- 
mon carrier,  and  proof  of  liability  as  a 
warehouseman :  Cavallaro  v.  Texas,  etc 
Ey.  Co.  (1895),  110  Cal.  348,  42  Pac.  918 
(see  contra,  Normile  v.  Oregon,  etc.  Co. 
(1902),  41  Ore.  177.  69  Pac.  928)  ;  an  alle- 
gation that  plaintiff,  in  an  action  for 
fraud,  was  mentally  weak  and  incompe- 
tent, and  proof  that  she  was  weak-minded 
and  far  below  the  average  in  intellect : 
Haves  v.  Candee  (1902),  75  Conn.  131,  52 
Ati.  826.] 


620  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

§  450.  *  OoG.  Instances  of  Complete  Failure  of  Proof.  The  fol- 
lowing are  examples  of  a  complete  failure  of  proof.  In  all  these 
cases  one  cause  of  action  Avas  alleged  by  the  plaintiff,  and  another 
one  was  proved  or  attempted  to  be  proved  at  the  trial,  but  was 
rejected  by  the  court.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  while 
passing  upon  the  admissibility  of  evidence  which  made  out  a 
liability  under  implied  contract,  in  order  to  sustain  a  complaint 
that  charged  a  fraudulent  transaction  and  sought  to  recover  the 
money  obtained  by  means  of  such  fraud,  used  the  following 
language  in  a  recent  case:  "It  is  insisted  that,  under  the  code, 
forms  of  action  are  abolished,  and  that  the  facts  showing  the 
right  of  action  need  only  be  stated.  This  is  correct,  but  it  does 
not  aid  the  plaintiff.  The  plaintiff  had  a  cause  of  action  against 
the  defendant  upon  an  account  for  moneys  advanced  for  him. 
Instead  of  stating  this  cause  of  action,  the  allegation  is  in  sub- 
stance that  he  paid  him  money  as  the  price  of  stocks  fraudulently 
sold  by  defendant  to  plaintiff,  which  contract  has  been  rescinded 
by  the  plaintiff,  and  a  return  of  the  money  demanded,  which  has 
been  refused  by  the  defendant.  These  causes  of  action  differ  in 
substance.  The  former  is  upon  contract,  the  latter  in  tort;  and 
the  law  will  not  permit  a  recovery  upon  the  latter  by  showing  a 
right  to  recover  upon  the  former. "  ^  It  is  the  settled  rule  under 
the  codes,  contrary  to  that  prevailing  in  the  common-law  system, 
that  when  a  cause  of  action  depends  upon  the  performance  of 
some  act,  but  under  certain  circumstances  the  performance  may 

1  Degraw  v.  Elmore,  50  N.  Y.  1.  The  recover  on  breach  of  implied  contract  or 
following  cases  give  further  examples  of  of  common  carrier's  legal  duty  to  traus- 
a  material  or  fatal  variance,  or  a  failure  port  in  a  reasonable  time) ;  Hinkle  v. 
of  proof :  Bishop  v.  Griffeth,  4  Colo.  68  ;  San  Francisco  &  N.  P.  R.  Co.,  55  Cal.  627  ; 
Proctor  V.  Rief,  52  Iowa,  592;  Burns  v.  and  cases  cited  aitte,  under  §  *553.  See 
Iowa  Homestead  Co.,  48  id.  279 ;  York  v.  also  Ehrlich  v.  yEtna  L.  Ins.  Co.,  103  Mo. 
Wallace,  48  id.  .305;  Fauble  r.  Davis,  48  231  (allegation  of  performance  does  not 
id.  462  ;  McKoon  t".  Ferguson,  47  id.  636;  lay  foundation  for  evidence  excusing  non- 
Arnold  V.  Angell,  62  N.  Y.  508  (partner-  performance)  ;  Daley  v.  Russ,  86  Cal.  114 
ship) ;  Harris  c.  Kasson,  79  id.  381  ;  (same)  ;  Reed  v.  AlcConnell,  133  N.  Y. 
Stowell  V.  Eldred,  39  Wis.  614;  Cowles  425;  Clark  r.  Sherman  (Wash.  1893).  32 
r.  Warner,  22  Minn.  449;  Cumniings  v.  Pac.  771  (complaint  being  for  money  had 
Long,  25  id.  337  ;  Vrooman  v.  Jackson,  6  and  received,  plaintiff  cannot  recover  on 
Hun,  326  (ejectment)  ;  Southwick  r.  First  an  express  contract) ;  Distler  v.  Dabney, 
Nat.  Bk.  of  Memphis,  84  N.  Y.  420;  Gas-  3  Wash.  200  (same)  ;  Wcrnli  r.  Collins 
ton  I'.  Owen,  43  Wis.  103;  Streeter  v.  (Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W.  365  (complaint 
Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  44  id.  383;  Jefferson-  being  on  an  express  contract,  plaintiff 
ville,  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Worland,  50  Ind.  cannot  recover  on  a  quantum  meruit) ; 
339  (complaint  sets  forth  special  con-  Woolsey  i\  Ellenville  V.  Trs.  (Supreme, 
tract  for  transportation  of  goods  ;  cannot  1893),  23  N.  Y.  Suppl.  411. 


ALLEGATIONS  AND  PROOFS  MUST  CORRESPOND.       621 

be  excused  and  the  cause  of  action  still  remain  in  force,  the  facts 
showing  the  excuse  must  be  alleged  if  the  plaintiff  intends  to 
rely  upon  it,  and  not  upon  the  performance.  The  plaintiff  is  no 
longer  permitted  to  aver  the  performance  of  the  required  act, 
and  on  the  trial  prove  the  circumstances  which  excuse  such  per- 
formance, or  prove  any  other  alternative  than  the  one  specially 
alleged.^  Thus  where,  in  an  action  against  indorsers,  the  com- 
plaint stated  a  demand  at  maturity,  and  notice  thereof  to  the 
defendants,  and  on  the  trial  the  plaintiff  offered  to  prove  facts 
which  would  excuse  any  demand,  the  evidence  was  held  inad- 
missible, and  the  action  was  dismissed  ;2  and  in  a  similar  case 
under  a  statute  which  required  that,  in  order  to  make  an  indorser 
liable,  due  diligence  must  be  used  by  the  institution  of  a  suit 
against  the  maker,  or  else  that  such  a  suit  would  be  unavailing, 
the  petition  alleged  that  due  diligence  had  been  used  by  com- 
mencing a  suit  against  the  maker,  in  which  judgment  had  been 
recovered,  and  an  execution  had  been  issued  and  returned  un- 
satisfied ;  and  it  was  held  that  the  other  alternative,  the  maker's 
insolvency,  and  the  consequent  unavailing  character  of  a  suit 
against  him,  could  not  be  shown  on  the  trial ;  ^  and  in  a  similar 
action  against  the  drawer  of  a  bill  or  the  indorser  of  a  bill  or 
note,  when  the  petition  avers  the  demand  and  notice  in  order  to 
charge  the  defendant,  a  waiver  of  these  steps  cannot  be  proved, 
—  for  example,  a  subsequent  promise  by  the  defendant  to  pay  the 
note  when  the  steps  necessary  to  charge  him  had  been  omitted.^ 

§  451.  *  557.  Examples  of  Fatal  Disagreement  between  Cause  of 
Action  Pleaded  and  Proved.  The  following  are  miscellaneous 
instances  of  a  fatal  disagreement  between  the  cause  of  action 
pleaded  and  that  proved  on  the  trial.  In  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  trespass  to  lands,  the  complaint  alleging  that  the 
plaintiffs  were  possessed  of  the  premises ;  on  the  trial,  however, 
it  appeared  that  they  were  remainder-men  not  yet  erititled  to  the 
possession,  while  the  defendants  were  rightfully  in  possession, 
but  had  committed  acts  of  waste  for  which  they  would  be  liable 

^  I^See  subject  "Waiver"  in  note  on  Pac.  1.56;  New  England  Loan  &  Trust  Co. 

Kecessity  and  Form  of  Particular  Allega-  v.  Browne   (1900),  157  Mo.  116,  57  S.   W. 

tions,  p.  689,    where    cases   are   cited  in  760.3 

support  of,  and  in  opposition  to,  the  rule  '■'  Pierr.  Ileinrichoffen,  52  Mo.  333,335. 

stated  in  the  text.     See  also  Omaha  Con-  ^  Woolseyu.Willian)s,3-4  Iowa,413,415. 

solidated  Co.  v.  Burns  (1895),  44  Neb.  21,  *  Lumbert   v.  Palmer,   29   Iowa,    104, 

62   N.    W.   301  ;    Olson    r.    Snake  River  108.     See  also  Hudson  i'.  McCartney,  33 

Valley  R.  R.  Co.  (1900),  22  Wash.  139,  60  Wis.  331,  346,  and  cases  cited. 


622  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

in  an  action  properly  brought.  This  cause  of  action  being 
wholly  different  from  that  alleged,  the  complaint  was  dismissed.^ 
The  petition  in  an  action  of  forcible  entry  and  detainer  stating 
that  the  defendant  was  holding  over  af cer  the  expiration  of  his 
lease,  the  plaintiff  was  not  permitted  to  show  that  he  obtained 
possession  through  fraud ;  since  this  would  be  the  averment  of 
one  material  fact,  and  the  proof  of  another, ^  When  the  com- 
plaint set  forth  a  contract,  and  on  the  trial  the  plaintiff  proved 
without  objection  a  materially  different  one,  and  was  thereupon 
nonsuited,  the  nonsuit  was  sustained,  the  court  adding  that  the 
admission  of  the  evidence  Avithout  objection  made  no  difference 
with  the  operation  of  the  rule.^  And  if  a  complaijit  sets  forth 
a  cause  of  action  for  a  nuisance  of  a  certain  specified  kind,  an 
essentially  different  one  cannot  be  proved;  as,  for  example,  in 
an  action  by  a  lower  riparian  owner  for  increasing  the  flow  of  a 
natural  watercourse  by  draining  other  streams  into  it,  the  plain- 
tiff was  not  permitted  to  prove  a  nuisance  which  consisted  solely 
in  the  fouling  of  such  watercourse  by  the  defendant.^  A  written 
contract  having  been  set  out  in  the  petition,  the  plaintiff  cannot 
in  place  of  it  prove  facts  going  to  show  that  the  defendant  is 
estopped  from  denying  such  contract.^  When  a  iDetition  stated 
a  cause  of  action  for  work  and  labor  done  by  the  plaintiff  for  the 
defendant,  but  the  proofs  showed  that  defendant  had  only  guar- 
anteed the  payment  by  other  persons  for  services  rendered  to 
them,  a  recovery  was  held  impossible.^  An  allegation  that  the 
defendant  erected  a  fence  across  a  highwaj-,  and  thereby  ob- 
structed it,  cannot  be  sustained  by  proof  that  the  defendant  built 
a  stone  fence  fifteen  rods  from  the  road,  and  thereby  caused  Avater 
to  flow  upon  and  obstruct  the  same,  for  the  causes  of  action  are 
different;'  and  upon  an  allegation  that  the  plaintiff  did  work 
and  labor  for  defendant  on  his  milldam,  proof  that  the  services 
were  performed  in  harvesting  grain  is  a  fatal  variance.^ 

1  Tracv  i:  Ames,  4  Lans.  500,  506.  6  Packard  v.  SncU,  35  Iowa.  80,  82. 

2  Goldsmitli  V.  Boersch,  28  Iowa,  351,  7  Hill  r.  Supervisor,  10  Ohio  St.  621. 
354.  B  Thatcher  v.  Heisey,  21  Ohio  St.  668. 

3  John.'ion  v.  Moss,  45  Cal.  515. 

*  O'Brien  I'.  St.  Paul,  18  Minn.  176,  181.  QlrtrJawce. 

^  Phillips    V.    Van    Scliaick,  37  Iowa,  In  the  following  eases  it  was  held  that 

229,237.     It  was  added  that  if  the  plain-  there  was  a  variance  between  pleadings  and 

tiff  wishes  to  avail  himself  of  an  estoppel  proof:  — 

it  must  be  specially  pleaded,  citing  Kan-  Niglujence.     An  allegation  that  the  en- 

som  f.  Stanberry,  22  Iowa,  334.  gineer  of  the  train  which  struck  plaiutiff 


ALLEGATIONS    AND    PROOFS    MUST   CORIIKSPOND. 


623 


§  452.  *  558.  Variance  Fatal  where  Cause  of  Action  in  Tort 
Alleged  and  one  in  Contract  Proved.  By  far  the  most  important 
distinction  directly  connected  with   tliis  doctrine  is  that  which 


discovered  plaintiff  in  time  to  prevent  the 
injury,  and  proof  that  it  was  the  tirenian 
and  not  the  engineer  wlio  saw  plaintiff 
(not  curable  by  amendment)  :  Chun  v. 
Jveceivers  (1901),  Ky.,  64  S.  W.  649;  an 
allegation  of  negligence  in  running  de- 
fendant's cars,  and  proof  tliat  defendant 
did  not  provide  plaintiff  with  a  safe  place 
in  which  to  work :  Thompson  v.  Citizens' 
St.  Ry.  Co.  (1898),  1.52  Ind.  461,  53  N.  E. 
462;  an  allegation  that  plaintitf  injured 
herself  by  stepping  into  a  hole  caused  by 
a  missing  board  in  a  sidewalk,  and  proof 
that  she  stepped  upon  a  loose  hoard,  which 
"rocked,"  turning  her  foot  and  causing 
it  to  go  into  the  hole  :  Gagan  v.  City  of 
Janes ville  (1900),  106  Wis  662,  82  N.  W. 
.5.'<8 ;  an  allegation  of  an  injury  to  a  pas- 
senger by  reason  of  defendant's  negligence, 
and  ])roof  of  injury  to  a  trespasser  by 
reason  of  gross  negligence :  Fitzgibbon  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1899),  108  la.  614, 
79  N.  W.  477  ;  an  allegation  that  defend- 
ant was  negligent  in  failing  to  stop  its 
train  at  a  station  while  plaintiff  was 
getting  off,  and  proof  that  defendant  was 
negligent  in  not  showing  plaintiff  the 
safe  way  to  go  from  one  train  to  another : 
Moss  y."  North  Carolina  R.  R.  Co.  (1898), 
122  N.  C.  889,  29  S.  E.  410;  an  allegation 
that  the  gripman  pushed  plaintiff  from 
the  car,  and  proof  that  plaintiff  fell  in 
trying  to  dodge  a  hlow  aimed  at  him  by 
the  gripman :  Raming  v.  Metropolitan 
St.  Hy.  Co.  (1900),  157  Mo.  477,  57  S.  W. 
268 ;  an  allegation  that  fire  was  negli- 
gently taken  from  defendant's  threshing 
engine  and  placed  in  the  stubble  where  it 
communicated  to  plaintiff's  property,  and 
evidence  that  defendant  was  negligent  in 
not  properly  extinguishing  the  fire  after 
having  properly  taken  it  from  the  engine  : 
Lieuallen  v.  Mosgrove  (1898),  3.3  Ore.  282  ; 
54  Pac.  200 ;  an  allegation  of  joint  negli- 
gence and  proof  of  negligence  of  defend- 
ants severally :  Chetwood  v.  California 
Kat.  Bank  ('l896),  113  Cal.  414,  45  Pac. 
704  ;  an  allegation  of  negligence  in  opera- 
tion of  railroad  and  proof  of  negligence  in 
use  of  defective  spark  arrester :  Missouri, 
etc  Ry.  Co.  v.  Garrison  (1903),  —  Kan.  — , 


72  Pac.  225  ;  location  of  accident :  Dolau 
1-.  City  of  Milwaukee  (1895),  89  Wis.  497, 
fil  N.  W.  564;  Kolb  v.  City  of  Kond  du 
Lac  (1903),  118  Wis.  311,  95  N.  W.  149. 

Common  Carriers,  Actions  against. 
Plaintiff  having  sued  defendant  on  its 
common-law  liability  as  a  common  carrier, 
cannot  recover  on  proof  of  a  special  con- 
tract limiting  the  common-law  liability : 
Normile  v.  Oregon,  etc.  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore. 
177,  69  Pac.  928;  where  a  complaint  is 
drawn  on  the  theory  of  defendant's  lia- 
bility as  a  common  carrier,  a  recovery 
cannot  be  had  against  defendant  as  a 
warehouseman :  Same  case.  But  see, 
contra,  Cavallaro  v.  Texas,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1895),  110  Cal.  348,  42  Pac.  918. 

Fraud.  In  an  action  to  set  aside  a 
sale  as  fraudulent,  allegations  of  actual 
fraud  are  not  supported  by  proof  of  con- 
structive fraud.  The  court  said  :  "  If  the 
vice  which  renders  the  sale  null  as  to 
them  [defendants]  was  the  existence  of 
actual  fraud,  the  complaint  must,  as  this 
complaint  does,  charge  its  presence.  If 
the  vice  was  constructive  fraud,  then  it  is 
incumbent  upon  the  plaintiffs  to  state  the 
matters  which  constitute  that  cause  of 
action.  Of  course,  both  actual  and  con- 
structive fraud  may  be  pleaded  in  the 
same  complaint,  but  if  actual  fraud  only 
be  set  up,  then,  although  proof  of  con- 
structive fraud  may  be  evidence,  having 
a  tendency  to  support  the  allegation  of 
actual  fraud,  yet  the  finding  of  construc- 
tive fraud  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to 
support  a  judgment,  for  the  allegations 
and  proof  must  correspond : "  Finch  v. 
Kent  (1900),  24  Mont.  268,  61  Pac.  653. 
See  also  Kley  v.  Healey  (1896),  149  N.  Y. 
346,  44  N.  E.  150,  where  allegations  of 
fraud  were  held  not  to  be  supported  by 
the  proof. 

Title.  A  party  cannot  plead  absolute 
ownership  of  property  and  prove  a  lien 
upon  it  merely,  nor  vice  versa :  Randall  v. 
Persons  (1894),  42  Neb.  607,  60  N.  W.  898. 
See  Title,  p.  687.  But  see  Olson  v.  City 
of  Seattle(1903), 30  Wash. 687,71  Pac. 201, 
p.  619,  note  1.  Held,  in  Smith  r.  Runnels 
(189G),    97   la.  55,  65  N.  W.   1002,   that 


624 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


subsists  between  causes  of  action  ex  contractu  and  those  ex  delicto. 
It  is  settled  by  an  almost  unanimous  series  of  decisions  in  various 


plaintiff  ia  a  suit  to  partition  land,  who 
claims  in  the  petition  tu  have  a  life  estate 
therein,  is  not  entitled  to  relief  on  the 
ground  that  she  has  an  estate  in  fee 
simple.  See,  however,  the  following  cases  : 
Where  the  complaint  alleges  title  and 
right  of  possession  in  the  plaintiff,  a  re- 
covery may  be  had  on  proof  tliat  plaintiff 
owns  the  equity  of  redemption  :  Arritigton 
V.  Arrington  "(1894),  114  N.  C.  116,  19 
S.  E.  •!'%.  In  an  action  to  recover  lami, 
plaintiff  may  allege  title  by  inheritance 
and  prove  title  by  possession ;  Davis  v. 
Leeper  (1900),  Ky",  56  S.  W.  712.  In  an 
action  to  quiet  title  there  is  no  variance 
between  an  allegation  of  title  in  fee  and 
proof  of  an  equitable  title :  Oliver  i'. 
Dougherty  (1902),  Ariz.,  63  Pac.  553. 

Ex}iiess  and  Implied  Contract.  Where 
the  complaint  alleges  an  express  contract 
and  proof  shows  an  implied  contract,  and 
vt':e  versa,  no  recovery  can  be  had :  Buell 
V.  Brown  (1900),  131  Cal.  158,  63  Pac. 
167  ;  Morrow  v.  Board  of  Education  (1895), 
7  S.  D.  553,  64  N.  W.  1 126.  Contra,  Hecht 
V.  Stanton  (1895),  6  Wyo.  84,  42  Pac.  749. 
See  also  on  this  general  question.  Gillies 
V.  Improvement  Co.  (1895),  147  N.  Y.  420, 
42  N.  E.  196  ;  Columbus,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Gaffney  (1901),  65  0.  St.  104,  64  N.  E. 
152. 

Rescission.  Where  a  breach  of  contract 
is  alleged,  the  pleader  cannot  on  the  trial 
elect  to  rescind  the  contract  and  recover 
the  portion  of  the  price  paid :  Detroit 
Heating  Co.  v.  Stevens  (1897),  16  Utah, 
177,  52  Pac.  379. 

Mortgage.  Where  a  complaint  is  predi- 
cated on  the  theory  of  lack  of  mental 
capacity  to  execute  a  deed,  no  recovery 
can  be  had  on  theory  that  the  deed  i.s 
in  reality  a  mortgage :  Swank  i'.  Swank 
(1900),  37  Ore.  439,  61  Pac.  846. 

Trust.  In  an  action  to  enforce  a  trust, 
an  allegation  that  a  husband  i.s  trustee  of 
property  alleged  to  belong  to  his  deceased 
wife's  estate,  is  not  supported  by  evidence 
that  he  had  received  money  from  his 
wife's  separate  property :  Elmore  i-.  El- 
more (1896),  114  Cal.  .516,  46  Pac.  458. 

Insurance.  A  complaint  upon  a  con- 
tract of  insurance  for  ?500  upon  a  certain 
building  i.-*  not  supported  by  evidence  of 


a  contract  for  $600  insurance  upon  two 
buildings  on  the  same  lot :  Waldron  r. 
Home  Mutual  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  9  Wash. 
534,  38  Pac.  136. 

Nuisance.  Where,  in  an  action  against 
the  city  for  damages  caused  by  a  nuisance, 
the  petition  char<res  that  the  city  origi- 
nated the  nuisance,  proof  that  it  continued 
it  only  will  not  sustain  a  recovery,  since 
in  tiie  latter  case  a  request  to  abate  is 
necessary :  Kychlicki  i\  City  of  St.  Louis 
(1893),  115  Mo.  662,  22  S.  W.  908. 

Account  and  Account  Stated.  Where 
the  petition  sets  up  a  cause  of  action  on 
an  open  account,  plaintiff  cannot  recover 
upon  proof  of  an  account  stated,  as  the 
two  are  distinct  and  inconsistent :  Mc- 
Cormick  v.  Interstate,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 
1.54  Mo    191,  55  S.  W.  252. 

Trespass.  Where  one  act  of  trespass  is 
alleged  to  have  been  committed  at  a  desig- 
nated time  and  place,  no  recovery  can  be 
had  for  a  different  act  .shown  to  have 
been  committed  at  a  different  time :  La 
Rue  V.  Smith  (1897),  153  N.  Y.  428,  47 
N.  E.  796. 

Contract.  Plaintiff  cannot  allege  one 
special  contract  and  recover  on  proof 
of  a  different  contract :  Cremer  v.  Miller 
(1893),  56  Minn.  52,  57  N.  W.  318;  Win- 
chester V.  Joslyn  (1903),  —  Colo.  — ,  72 
Pac.  1079.  But  under  an  allegation  that 
plaintiff  performed  services  for  defendant 
"at  his  instance  and  request,"  evidence 
may  be  introduced  showing  facts  giving 
rise  to  an  implied  contract  only :  Colum- 
bus, etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gaffney  (1901),  65 
0.  St.  104,  61  N.  E.  1.52.  Under  an  alle- 
gation that  a  grantee  orally  agreed  to 
assume  a  mortgage  "and  thcrelty  and 
otherwise  became  legally  and  equitably 
bound  to  the  grantor  and  to  the  mort- 
gagee to  pay  the  same,"  evidence  that  the 
grantee  executed  a  bond  to  pay  the  de- 
ficiency if  any,  is  admissible :  Wager  v- 
Link  (1896),  150  N.  Y.  549,  44  N.  E.  1103. 
There  is  a  variance  between  an  allegation 
that  a  bond  sued  on  was  in  the  penal  sum 
of  §2,500  and  evidence  that  it  was  in  the 
sum  of  $1,500:  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Evans  (1896),  57  Kan.  286,  46  Pac.  303. 

Miscflloneous.  An  allegation  that  plain- 
tiff is  indebted  to  defendant  is  not  sup- 


ALLEGATIONS    AND    PROOFS    MUST    CORRESPOND. 


625 


States,  that  if  a  complaint  or  petition  in  terms  alleges  a  cause  of 
action  ex  delicto,  for  fraud,  conversion,  or  any  other  kind  of  tort, 


ported  by  evidence  that  plaintiff's  assignor 
is  indebted  to  defendant :  Anderson  v. 
Alsetii  (1895),  6  S.  D.  566,  62  N.  W.  435. 
There  is  a  fatal  variance  between  an  alle- 
gation that  a  contract  was  made  bv  all  the 
heirs  of  a  named  intestate  and  evidence 
that  it  was  made  by  a  portion  only : 
Thompson  v.  Fenn  (1896),  100  Ga.  2.34,  28 
S.  E.  39.  Where  suit  is  brouglit  on  a 
sheriff's  bond  for  damages  alleged  to  have 
been  sustained  by  the  failure  of  the  sheriff 
to  properly  perform  his  duties,  the  plaintiff 
cannot  recover  on  account  of  breaches  of 
duty  not  alleged  in  the  declaration  :  Hall 
&  IJrowu  Co.  V.  Barnes  (1902),  115  Ga. 
945,  42  S  E.  276.  If  the  pleading  is  of 
allowed  claims  and  the  proof  is  of  claims 
presented  but  not  adjusted,  there  is  a 
variance:  Hofmanu  v.  Tucker  (1899),  58 
Neb.  457,  78  Jv.  W.  941.  A  petition  alleg- 
ing that  a  certain  sum  had  come  to  the 
husband  by  reason  of  the  marriage,  is  not 
supported  by  evidence  that  the  money  was 
voluntarily  allowed  to  the  husband  by  the 
■wife  after  marriage :  Dillon  v.  Stariu 
(1895),  44  Neb.  881,  63  N.  W.  12. 

The  fact  that  acts  of  negligence  are 
alleged  conjunctively  does  not  require  that 
all  of  them  must  be  proved  :  Duell  v. 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (1902),  115  Wis. 
.516,  92  N.  W.  269*;  Stern  v.  City  of  St. 
Louis  (1901),  161  Mo.  146,  61  S.  W.  594; 
Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sheeks 
(1900),  155  Ind.  74,  56  N.  E.  434;  Came- 
ron V.  Bryan  (1893),  89  la.  214,  56  N.  W. 
434. 

And  in  general,  if  one  alleges  more 
than  is  necessary,  such  additional  alle- 
gations need  not  be  proved :  Young  v. 
Gormley  (1903),  119  la.  541,  93  N.  W.  .565  ; 
Kaline  r.  Stover  (1893),  88  la.  245,  55 
N.  W.  346;  Reizensteiu  i\  Clark  (1897), 
410  la.  287,  73  N.  W.  588;  Harwood  v. 
Davenport  (1898),  105  La.  592,  75  N.  W. 
487  ;  Anderson  v.  Union  Terminal  Ry.  Co. 
(1901),  161  Mo.  411,  61  S.  W.  874;  Meyer 
V.  Koehring  (1895),  129  Mo.  15,  31  S.  "w. 
449;  Gannon  v.  Laclede  Gas  Co.  (1898), 
145  Mo.  502,  46  S.  W.  968.  But  see,  how- 
ever, Botkin  V.  Cassody  (1898),  106  la. 
334,  76  N.  W.  722,  which  appears  incon- 
sistent with  this  rule. 


Evidence  Held  Admissible  under  Particular 
Allegations. 

In  general,  the  proof  must  be  confined 
to  the  issues  as  made  by  the  pleadings: 
Thompson  v.  Wertz  (1894),  41*Neb.  31, 
.59  N.  W.  518;  Callen  i'.  Rose  (1896),  47 
Neb.  638,  66  N.  W.  639  ;  Avers  i-.  Wolcott 
(1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  "w.  1036.  See 
the  following  cases  for  specific  illustra- 
tions of  this  rule  :  — 

Acr.ejitance :  Thompson  v.  Perkins 
(1896),  97  la.  607,  66  N.  W.  874.  Agree- 
ment to  dtliver :  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Has- 
selkus  (1893),  91  Ga.  382,  17  S.  E.  838. 
Agreement  to  pai/  for  services :  Owen  v. 
Meade  (1894),  104  "Cal.  179,  37  Pac.  923. 
Breach  of  warranty :  Snowden  v.  Water- 
man (1897),  100  Ga.  588,  28  S.  E.  121. 
Contract:  Duval  v.  Am.  T.  &  T.  Co. 
(1902),  113  Wis.  504,  89  N.  W.  482. 
Description  of  property  :  Boyd's  Adm'r  f . 
Farmers' Bank  (1902),  Ky.,69  S.  W.  964; 
Baruhart  v.  Ehrhart  (1898),  33  Ore.  274, 
54  Pac.  195.  Employment :  Holton  !.•. 
Waller  (1895),  95  la.  545,  64  N.  W.  6.33. 
Extreme  cruelty:  Winterburg  v.  Winter- 
burg  (1893),  52  Kan.  406,  34  Pac.  971. 
Finding  purchaser :  Clark  v.  Allen  (1899), 
125  Cal.  276,  57  Pac.  985.  Fraud:  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  McKinney  (1896),  47  Neb. 
149,  66  N.  W.  280.  Goods  sold  and  de- 
livered: Gaar,  Scott,  &  Co.  v.  Brundage 
(1903),  89  Mian.  412,  94  N.  W.  1091.  Illegal 
voting:  McLain  r.  Maracle  (1900),  60  Neb. 
359,  83  N.  W.  829.  Indebtedness :  Klein- 
schmidt  r.  Kleinschmidt  (1893),  13  Mont. 
64,  32  Pac.  1.  Money  loaned:  Clarksou 
V.  Kennett  (1895),  17  Mont.  563,  44  Pac. 
88.  Negligence  :  Dickey  v.  Northern  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  (1898),  19  Wash.  350,  53  Pac.  347; 
McClellan  v.  Chippewa  Valley  Elec.  Ry. 
Co.  (1901),  110  Wis.  326,  85  N.  W.  1018; 
Brown  v.  Benson  (1897),  101  Ga.  753,  29 
S.  E.  215;  Kelly  v.  Cable  Co.  (1893),  13 
Mont.  411,  34  Pac.  611;  Spaulding  v.  C. 
St.  P.  &  K.  C.  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  98  la.  205, 
67  N.  W.  227;  Lewis  v.  Schultz  (1896), 
98  la.  341,  67  N.  W.  266;  Jenkins  v.  Mc- 
Carthy (1895),  45  S.  C.  278,  22  S.  E.  883  ; 
Neville  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 
158  Mo.  293,  59  S.  W.  123  ;  Schwartzschild, 
40 


626 


CIVIL   KEMEDirS. 


and  the  proof  establishes  a  breach  of  contract  express  or  implied, 
no  recovery  can  be  had,  and  the  action  must  be  dismissed,  even 
though  by  disregarding  the  averments  of  tort,  and  treating  them 
as  surplusage,  there  might  be  left  remaining  the  necessary  and 
sufficient  allegations,  if  they  stood  alone,  to  show  a  liability  upon 
the  contract.  1  While  this  doctrine  is  firmly  established,  and 
Avhile  there  is  no  difficulty  in  its  application,  when  it  is  once 
ascertained  that  the  cause  of  action  is  for  a  tort,  it  is  not  so  easy, 
in  the  absence  of  any  specific  facts,  and  in  the  careless  mode  of 
pleading  which  is  too  prevalent,  to  determine  whether  the  cause 
of  action  stated  by  the  plaintiff  is  ex  delicto  or  ex  contractu. 
Under   the  former   system,  the    presence  or  absence   of   certain 


etc.  Co.  V.  Weeks  (1903),  66  Kan.  800,  72 
Pac.  274 ;  Nolaiid  v.  Great  Northern  Ry. 
Co.  (190.3),  31  Wash.  430,  71  Pac.  109S; 
Wolf  v.  Hemrich  Bros.  Co.  (1902),  28 
Wash.  187,  68  Pac.  440.  .Notice  and 
knowledge:  De  Lay  v.  Carney  (1897),  100 
la.  687,  69  N.  W.  1053 ;  Hunt  v.  City  of 
Dubuque  (1895),  96  la.  314,  65  N.  W. 
319;  King  v.  Howell  (1895),  94  la.  208, 
62  N.  W.  738.  Ownership:  Darnall  v. 
Bennett  (1896),  98  la.  410,  67  N.  VV.  273. 
t^ereices  rendered :  Bean  v.  Fercival  Cop- 
per Mining  Co.  (1901),  111  Wis.  598,  87 
N.  W.  465.  Validity  of  lev)/:  Chapman  ;;. 
James  (1895),  96  la.  233,  64  N.  W.  795. 
Votes  cast  at  election :  Furguson  v.  Henry 
(1895),  95  la.  439,  64  N.  W.  292.] 

1  From  the  great  number  of  cases 
which  maintain  this  doctrine  I  have  se- 
lected those  which  are  the  most  recent 
and  important,  and  which  discuss  it  with 
tlie  greatest  fulness.  Walter  v.  Bennett, 
16  N.  Y.  250;  Ro.«s  v.  Mather,  51  N.  Y. 
108;  De  Graw  r.  Elmore,  50  N.  Y.  1  ; 
Sager  v.  Blain,  44  N.  Y.  445,  448 ;  Moore 
V.  Noble,  53  Barb.  425 ;  Rothe  v.  Rothe, 
31  Wis.  570,  572;  Anderson  r.  Case,  28 
Wis.  505,  508  ;  Kewaunee  Cy.  Sup.  v. 
Decker,  30  Wis.  624;  Johannesson  w. 
Borscheniu.s,  35  Wis.  131,  135;  Dean 
r.  Yates,  22  Ohio  St.  388,  397 ;  Watts  v. 
McAllister,  33  Ind.  264.  See,  per  contra. 
Dates  V.  Kendall,  67  N.  C.  241  ;  Gulp  v. 
Steere,  47  Kan.  746.  See  also  Barnes  v. 
Quigley,  59  N.  Y.  265  ;  Matthews  r.  CadV, 
61  id.  561  ;  Lane  »\  Cameron,  38  Wi.s.  613  ; 
Pierce  v.  Carey,  37  id.  232 ;  Goss  v.  Boul- 
der Cy.  Com'is,  4  Culo.  468;  Neudeckerv. 


Kohlherg,  81  N.  Y.  296,  299,301;  People 
V.  Deiiisoii,  84  id.  272 ;  80  id.  656 ;  Neftel 
V.  Lightstone,  77  id.  96;  Lockwood  v. 
Quackenbush,  83  id.  600 ;  Lindsay  v.  Mul- 
queen,  26  Hun,  485;  Front  r.  Hardin,  56 
Ind.  165  ;  Hachett  v.  Bank  o^  Cal.,  57  Cal. 
335 ;  Freeman  r.  Grant,  132  N.  Y.  22 ; 
Mea  V.  Pierce,  63  Hun,  400.  These  cases, 
as  well  as  others,  show  that  an  action  can- 
not be  changed  from  tort  to  contract  by 
amendment  at  the  trial. 

[^Sce  also,  to  same  effect,  Noble  v.  Atchi- 
son, etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1896),  4  Okla.  534, 
46  Pac.  483  ;  A,  F.  Shapleigh  Hardware 
Co.  V.  Hamilton  (1902),  70  Ark.  319,  68 
S.  W.  490;  Miller  v.  Ilirschberg  (1895), 
27  Ore.  522,  40  Pac.  506  ;  Brooke  v.  Cole 
(1899),  108  Ga.  251,  33  S.  E.  849;  Holl- 
mann  v.  Lange  (1898),  143  Mo.  100,  44 
S.  W.  752  ;  Westinghouse  Co.  v.  Tilden 
(1898),  56  Neb.  129,  76  N.  W.  416;  Pcay 
V.  Salt  Lake  City  (1894),  11  Utah,  331,  40 
Pac.  206;  Ellis  r.  Flaherty  (1902),  65 
Kan.  621,  70  Pac.  586  (an  important  case). 

Compare  the  case  of  Wilson  v.  Fuller 
(1894),  58  Minn.  149,  59  N.  W.  988,  in 
which  it  is  held  that  where  a  party  alleges 
that  certain  representations,  amounting  to 
a  warranty,  were  fraudulently  made,  and 
])roves  the  warranty  and  its  breach,  but 
fails  to  prove  the  fraud,  he  may  recover 
for  the  breach  of  the  warranty.  The 
court  observes  that  the  contrary  is  held  in 
Ross  c.  Mather,  51  N.  Y.  108.  Followed 
in  Hrown  v.  Doyle  (1897),  69  Minn.  .543, 
72  N.  W.  814.  And  see,  in  this  connection, 
Higgins  r.  Hayden  (1897),  53  Neb.  61,  73 
N.  W.  280.] 


ALLEGATIONS   AND   PROOFS    MUST   COKRESPOND.  627 

technical  formulas  removed  all  doubt;  but  as  these  arbitrary 
means  of  distinction  have  been  abandoned,  and  as  pleadings  fre- 
([uently,  in  violation  of  true  principles,  combine  charges  of  fraud, 
of  guilty  knowledge,  of  taking,  carrying  away,  and  conversion, 
and  the  like,  with  averments  of  undertakings  and  promises  and 
their  breach,  it  is  sometimes  impossible  to  decide  which  class  of 
allegations  constitute  the  gravamen  of  the  action,  and  which  is 
to  be  regarded  as  surplusage.  The  decided  cases  will  not  give 
us  much  aid,  for  pleadings  with  substantially  the  same  averments 
have  received  diametrically  opposite  constructions.  There  is 
thus  a  conflict  among  the  decisions  in  reference  to  this  subject 
irreconcilable  upon  principle,  and  only  to  be  evaded  by  pronounc- 
ing one  set  of  them  to  be  erroneous.  Although  it  is  simply 
impossible  to  develop  any  general  rule  of  interpretation  from 
these  cases,  a  few  are  selected  as  examples. 

§  453.  *  559<  How  Nature  of  Cause  of  Action  is  determined. 
Illustrations  of  Causes  ex  contractu.  It  may  be  considered  a 
settled  point,  on  principle  and  on  authority,  that  the  nature  of 
the  cause  of  action  is  determined  by  the  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint or  petition,!  so  that  the  inquiry  need  never  extend  beyond 
this  first  pleading  in  the  suit.  I  shall  first  cite  illustrations  of 
causes  ex  contractu.  In  an  action  by  a  vendee  to  recover  damages 
arising  on  the  sale  of  a  horse  to  him,  the  complaint,  after  setting 
forth  the  sale,  and  that  the  horse  was  in  fact  "wind-broken," 
stated  that  the  defendant  knew  of  this  defect,  and  "  fraudulently 
concealed  the  same  with  intent  to  deceive  "  the  plaintiff,  giving 
the  circumstances  in  unnecessary  detail;  and  that,  "further  to 
mislead  and  deceive  the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  falsely  repre- 
sented and  warranted  to  the  plaintiff  that  the  horse  was  sound, 
etc. ;  that  by  reason  of  the  premises  the  plaintiff  was  deceived, 
and  was  induced  to  purchase  and  pay  for  the  horse ; "  concluding 
with  an  allegation  of  damages  and  a  prayer  for  judgment.     The 

1  Welsh   V.   Darragh,   52   N.   Y.    590.  564;  Graves  ;•.  Waite,  59  id.   156;  Green- 

Although    the    immediate    question   was  tree  v.  Roseustock,  61   id.  58-3;    Sheahan 

whetiier  the  cause  was    a  referable  oue,  v.  Shanahan,  5  Hun,  461  ;  Harden  v.  Cor- 

yet  the  reasoning  and  conclusion  are  gen-  bett,  6  id.  522 ;    Loomis  v.  Mowry,  8  id. 

eral.     Some  of  the  cases  lay  some  stress  311 ;  Harrington  v.  Bruce,  84  N.  Y.  103; 

upon  the  kind  of  summons  used  as  in-  Sparman  v.  Keira,  83  id.  245,  249;  Harris 

dicative  of  the  pleader's  intention.     The  v.  Todd,  16  Hun,  248;  Westcott  i;.  Aius- 

following  are  further  examples  of  actions  worth,  9  id.  53;  Stitt  v.  Little,  63  N.  Y. 

held  to  be  on  contract:  Freer  w.  Denton,  427,  432;   Bishop  v.  Davis,  9  Hun,  342; 

PI   N.  Y.  492;    Vilmar  v.  Schall,  61   id.  Slutts  r.  Chafee,  48  Wis.  617. 


628  CIVIL   REMEDIKS. 

Superior  Court  of  New  York  City  held  that  this  complaint  stated 
a  cause  of  action  on  contract  for  the  breach  of  a  warrant)-,  and 
that  all  the  averments  of  fraud  must  be  treated  as  surplusage.^ 
A  complaint  contained  the  following  averments :  that  the  defend- 
ants, having  in  their  possession  certain  securities,  the  property 
of  the  plaintiff,  entered  into  an  agreement  with  him,  whereby 
they  promised  to  deliver  up  said  securities  to  him ;  that  he  had 
demanded  the  same,  but  the  defendants  wrongfully  refused  to 
deliver  them,  and  wrongfully  disposed  of  and  converted  them  to 
their  oivn  use.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  pronounced 
this  cause  of  action  to  be  on  contract,  and  not  for  a  tort.^  In 
another  quite  similar  case  the  complaint  stated  that  the  plaintiffs, 
at,  etc.,  consigned  to  the  defendants,  who  were  commission- 
merchants  at,  etc.,  certain  specified  articles,  to  be  sold  by  them, 
and  the  net  proceeds  thereof  remitted;  that  the  defendants  re- 
ceived the  goods,  and  sold  them  for  a  sum  named;  and  after 
deducting  all  expenses,  there  was  due  to  the  plaintiffs  the  sum 
of,  etc.,  which  they  demanded  of  the  defendants,  who  omitted 
and  refused  to  pay  the  same,  and  have  converted  the  same  to 
their  own  use,  to  the  damage  of  the  plaintiffs  of,  etc.  This  cause 
of  action  was  also  held  by  the  same  court  to  be  on  contract,  and 
not  for  a  tort.^  In  a  more  recent  action,  brought  for  the  price  of 
certain  bonds  that  had  been  sold  to  the  plaintiff,  and  which  had 
turned  out  to  be  null  and  void,  the  claim  to  recover  was  put  at 

1  Quintard  v.  Newton,  5  Robt.  72.  The  See  also  Sheahan  v.  Shanahan,  5  Ilun, 
plaintiff,  at  the  trial,  proved  the  warrauty,  461;  Harden  v.  Corbett,  6  Iliin,  522; 
but  gave  do  evidence  of  the  scienter,  and  Greentree  v.  Rosenstock,  61  N.  Y.  583, 
the  complaint  was  dismissed.  The  Gen-  per  Dwight,  C. ;  Harlow  i-.  Mills,  58  Hun, 
eral  Term  held  that  he  should  have   re-  391. 

covered,  putting  their  decision  upon  the  ^  Conaughty  v.  Nichols,  42  N.  Y.  83. 
allegation  of  a  warranty.  As  this  aver-  The  complaint  was  dismissed  at  the  trial, 
ment  stood  alone,  it  would  seem  that  it  on  the  ground  that  the  cause  of  action 
ought  to  have  been  rejected  as  surplusage-  proved  was  on  contract,  while  the  one 
This  decision,  in  the  ligiit  of  more  recent  pleaded  was  for  tort.  Tliis  ruling  was 
ones,  must  be  regarded  as  erroneous  :  it  is  reversed,  the  appellate  court  s.niying  that 
not,  however,  opposed  to  the  leading  doc-  the  single  concluding  averment  of  a  con- 
trine  stated  in  the  text.  version  should  be  treated  as  surplusage. 

2  Austin  V.  Rawdon,  44  N.  Y.  63,  68,  The  opinion  contains  an  elaborate  discus- 
69.  The  statement  of  a  wrongful  dis-  sion  of  authorities.  This  and  the  preced- 
position  and  conversion  was  said  to  be  ing  case  are  substantially  alike.  See  also 
merely  the  averment  of  a  breach.  There  Byxbie  v.  Wood,  24  N.  Y.  607,  610,  611, 
can  be  no  doubt  as  to  t!ie  correctness  of  in  which  certain  averments  of  fraudulent 
this  decision.  The  central  fact  of  the  practices  were  held  to  be  surplusage,  and 
complaint  was  made  to   be  the  promise,  the  cause  of  action  to  be  on  contract. 

and  the  breach  was  iuartificially  cliarged. 


ALLEGATIONS    AND    I'KOOFS    MUST    COKKESI'OND.  629 

the  trial  on  the  ground  of  implied  contract,  —  a  warranty  of  title. 
The  defendant  moved  to  dismiss  the  complaint,  because  it  was 
based  upon  the  theory  of  fraud,  that  its  allegations  were  of  deceit 
and  false  representations.  The  reporter  does  not  think  best  to 
disclose  the  nature  of  the  complaint,  although  the  entire  decision 
turned  upon  it.  The  court  held  that  the  cause  of  action  was  on 
contract.^ 

§  454.  *  560.  Illustrations  of  Causes  ex  delicto.  The  following 
are  instances  of  actions  ex  delicto.  In  a  suit  growing  out  of  the 
sale  of  a  horse  bought  by  the  vendee,  the  complaint  was,  "  That 
on,  etc.,  at,  etc.,  the  plaintiff  purchased  a  certain  horse  of  the 
defendant  for  the  agreed  price  of  $120,  and  paid  defendant  said 
sum ;  that  the  defendant,  to  induce  the  plaintiff  to  buy  the  said 
horse,  falsely  and  fraudulently  represented  the  said  horse  worth 
and  of  the  value  of  $120,  and  guaranteed  the  said  horse  to  be 
sound  in  all  respects,  and  wholly  free  from  disease;  that  said 
horse  was  not  sound  or  free  from  disease,  but  was  unsound  and 
diseased  in  this  (describing),  which  said  disease  was  well  known 
to  defendant  at  the  time  of  the  sale,"  etc.,  to  the  plaintiff's 
damage,  etc.  This  cause  of  action  was  held  by  the  New  York 
Supreme  Court  to  be  for  deceit,  and  not  on  a  warranty. ^     The 

1  Ledwich  I'.  McKim,  53  N.  Y.  307,  316.  of  action  on  contract  by  which   the   tort 

As  to  the  allegations  which  must  be  made  damages  were  liquidated. 3 

and  proved  in  order  to  establish  a  cause  of  ^  Moore  v.  Noble,  53  Barb.  425.     The 

action  for  deceit,  see  Meyer  v.  Amidon,  45  following  are  additional  examples  of  ac- 

N.  Y.  169;  Oberlander  y.  Spiess,  45  N.  Y.  tions   held   to   be  ex   delicto:    Barnes   v. 

175  ;  Marsh  v.  Talker,  40  N.  Y.  562 ;  Mar-  Quigley,  59  N.  Y.  265 ;  Matthews  v.  Cady, 

shall  y.  Gray,  57  Barb.  414;  Weed  r.  Case,  61   id.  561;  Peck  v.   Root,  5  Huu,  547; 

55  Barb.   534 ;    Gutchess  v.  Whiting,  46  Lane  v.  Cameron,  38  Wis.  603 ;  Pierce  v. 

Barb.  139 ;  Stitt  v.  Little,  63  N.  Y.  427,  Carey,  37  id.  232  ;  Keudecker  v.  Kohlberg, 

432;  Westcott  v.  Ainsworth,  9  Hun,  53.  31  N.  Y.  296,  299,  301 ;  People  v.  Denison, 

^A    complaint    averring    the   delivery  84    id.    272 ;    80   id.    656 ;    Lockwood    v. 

of    merchandise   by  plaintiff    to   defend-  Quackenbush,  83  id.  600;  Stitt  r.  Little, 

ants,  under  an  agreement  that  defendants  63  id.  427,  432 ;  Bishop  v.  Davis,  9  Hun, 

should  sell  the  same,  and  account  for  the  342 ;  Westcott  v.  Ainsworth,  9  id.  53. 

proceeds,  less  expenses  and  a  certain  com-  ^Where  negligence  is  clearly  the  grava- 

mission,  but  that  defendants  "wrongfully  men  of  the  complaint,  the  allegations  of 

and  unlawfully  retained  and  converted  to  a  promise  to  repair  defective  machinery, 

tlieir  own  use"  an  excess  over  the  agreed  merely  to  negative  any  presumption  that 

commission,    declares    upon    a     contract  plaintiff  had  assumed  the  risk  of  the  de- 

rather  than  upon  a  tort.      Hutchcroft  v.  fective  machinery  by  continuing  in  the 

Herren  (1898),  33  Ore.  1,  52  Pac.  692.  employment    after     the     defect     became 

See  also  Mcintosh  v.  Rankin  (1896),  known  to  him,  does  not  warrant  defend- 

134  Mo.  340,  35  S.  W.  995,  for  an  inter-  ant   in   assuming   at   the   trial    that    the 

esting  case  involving  allegations  indicative  action  is.  for  breacli  of  contract  to  repair 

both  of  contract  and  tort,  where  the  court  defects  :  Manuum  v.  Bullion,  etc.  Mining 

held  tliat  the  petition  stated  a  single  cause  Co.  (1897),  15  Utah,  534,  50  Pac.  834.] 


630  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

following  case  is  even  still  stronger ;  for  although  it  was  conceded 
that  a  contract  was  fully  set  forth  in  the  pleading,  yet  the  aver- 
ments of  fraud  were  held  to  fix  the  true  character  of  the  action. 
The  claim  was  for  damages  arising  from  the  sale  of  a  horse,  and 
sustained  by  the  purchaser.  The  complaint  alleged  the  sale; 
that  at  the  time  thereof  the  horse  was  lame  in  cue  leg ;  that  de- 
fendant warranted  and  falsely  and  fraudulently  represented  that 
this  lameness  resulted  from  an  injury  to  his  foot,  and  nowhere 
else ;  that  when  his  foot  grew  out  he  would  be  well,  and  that  he 
had  only  been  lame  two  weeks ;  that  plaintiff,  relying  upon  this 
warranty  and  representation,  and  believing  them  to  be  true, 
bought  the  horse,  and  paid  the  price  (the  representations  were 
then  negatived);  that  the  horse  was  lame  in  his  gambrel  joint, 
and  had  been  so  for  a  long  time,  all  which  the  defendant,  at  the 
time  of  the  sale  and  the  making  such  warranty  and  representa- 
tions, well  knew ;  that  by  reason  of  the  premises  the  defendant 
falsely  and  fraudulently  deceived  him,  —  to  his  damage  of  $500. 
The  cause  of  action  thus  stated  was  held  to  be  for  deceit,  and 
not  for  a  breach  of  warrant}-.^ 

§  455.  *  561.  Further  Examples  of  Variance  where  Tort  is  Al- 
leged and  Contract  Proved.  The  doctrine  that  a  cause  of  action 
ex  contractu  cannot  be  proved  at  the  trial  when  the  complaint  or 
petition  states  one  ex  delicto  has  been  applied  to  the  following 
classes  of  cases:  where  the  complaint  alleged  improper,  careless, 
and  negligent  conduct,  and  concealment  of  material  facts  by  the 
defendant;^  where  the  complaint  was  for  the  conversion  of  goods 
or  moneys,  and  the  plaintiff,  at  the  trial,  relied  upon  the  breach 
of  an  implied  contract  for  money  had  and  received  ;3  where  the 

1  Ross  V.  Mather,  51  N.  Y.  108;  Mar-  allegations  of  fraud  were  irrelevant  and 

shall  V.  Gray,  57  Barb.  414;  McGoveru  v.  non-issuable;  also  that  the  summons  cau- 

Pavn,  32  Barb.  8.3,  all  of  which  hold  the  not  be  used  to  interpret    the  jjleadings. 

causes  of  action  therein  stated  to  be  fraud,  Graves  v.  Waite,  again,  was  distinguished 

and  that  the  plaintiff  must  prove  a  sc/>»/e;-;  in  Barnes  <;.   Quigley,  59  N.  Y.  265,  and 

AValter  v.  Bennett,  16  N.  Y.  2.50 ;  Belknap  Mattlicws  r.  Cady,  61  N.  Y.  651.    See  also 

I'.  Sealey,  14  N.  Y.  143.      Conaughty  v.  I'eck  v.  Root,  5  Hun,  547  (fraud) ;  Pierce 

Xiciiols,  42  N.  Y.  83.     Ross  v.  Mather  was  v.  Carey,  37  Wis.  232  (fraud), 
distinguished    in   the    ca.se    of   Graves   r.  -  Hothe  v.  Rothe,  31    Wis.    570,   572. 

Waite,  59  N.  Y.  156,    and  it  was  held  in  The  court  furtlier  held  that  the  rule  mu.st 

the  latter  ca.se  tliat,  the  gist  of  the  action  be  applied,  even  though  the  allegations  of 

beiuo'  upon  contract,  allegations  of  fraud-  tort  failed  to  state  a  sufficient  ground  for  a 

ulent  representations  inducing  the  plaintiff  recovery,  if  they  were  enough  to  determine 

to  enter  into  tlie  contract  and  a  demand  of  the  nature  of  the  cause  of  action, 
judgment  for  damages  for  the  same  did  •*  Anderson  v.  Case,  28  Wis.  505,  508; 

not  change  the  action  to  tort ;   that  the  Kewaunee  Cy.  Sup.  v.  Decker,  30  Wis. 


ALLEGATIONS    AND    PROOFS    MUST   CORRESPOND. 


631 


suit  was  brought  to  recover  the  possession  of  personal  property, 
and  the  cause  of  action  as  proved  was  for  money  had  and  re- 
ceived, or  money  due  upon  a  general  indebtedness ;  ^  and  finallj^ 
where  a  case  of  deceit  and  fraudulent  representations  was  stated, 
and  the  proof  established  the  breach  of  a  contract. ^  In  addition 
to  the  general  doctrine,  that  a  party  should  be  fully  and  truly 
apprised  of  the  nature  of  the  claim  set  up  against  him,  there  is 
a  special  reason  why  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  for  a  breach  of 
contract  when  the  cause  of  action  stated  in  the  record  is  for 
deceit  or  any  other  tort.  In  many  actions  of  tort  the  defendant 
maybe  taken  on  a  body  execution,  issued  upon  the  judgment; 
while  a  simple  breach  of  contract  never  exposes  him  to  that 
liability.  If,  therefore,  a  cause  of  action  on  contract  could  be 
proved  and  judgment  thereon  recovered  when  one  for  tort  was 
alleged,  the  record  might  show  a  case  for  arrest  on  final  process, 
although  the  issues  actually  tried  involved  no  such  consequence.'' 
[§§  *  562,  *563,  *  564.  These  sections,  consisting  of  quota- 
tions from  the  Wisconsin  case  of  Supervisors  v.  Decker,  are  given 
below  in  the  note.*] 


€24  ;  Johannesson  v.  Borschenius,  35  Wis. 
131,  13.5  ;  Walter  v.  Bcnuett,  16  N.  Y.  250. 

1  Sager  v.  Blain,  44  N.  Y.  445,  448,  450. 

■•2  De  Graw  v.  Elmore,  50  N.  Y.  1  ; 
Ross  V.  Mather,  51  N.  Y.  108;  Moore  r. 
Noble,  53  Barb.  425;  Watts  v.  McAllister, 
33  Ind.  264 ;  Dean  v.  Yates,  22  (Jhio  St. 
388,  397.  When  a  complaint  sets  out  a 
cause  of  action  upon  contract,  and  not  for 
tort,  as,  for  example,  to  recover  money 
had  and  received  by  the  defendant  to  the 
plaintiff's  use,  any  averments  as  to  the 
nature  of  the  defendant's  employment 
showing  that  it  was  of  a  fiduciary  char- 
acter, and  the  like,  are  wholly  immaterial ; 
they  form  no  part  of  the  cause  of  action, 
and  are  not  issuable.  Prouty  v.  Swift,  51 
N.  Y.  .594,  601. 

•^  This  special  reason  for  the  rule  is 
alluded  to  in  several  of  the  foregoing 
cases. 

■*  §  562.  I  shall  conclude  this  sub- 
division 'by  quoting  some  passages  from 
the  most  able  and  practically  instructive 
opinion  of  Mr.  Chief  Justice  Dixon  in  the 
case  of  [^Kewaunee  Sup.  v.  Decker,  30 
Wis.  624,  626.  The  action  was  brought 
to  recover  money  of  the  county  alleged 


to  have  been  converted  by  the  defend- 
ant to  his  own  use,  he  being  Clerk  of  the 
Board  of  Supervisors.  The  complaint 
contained  averments  of  fraud,  of  negli- 
gence, of  conversion,  and  of  contract.  A 
demurrer  to  it  having  been  overruled,  the 
defendant  appealed.]  The  whole  theory 
of  pleading  is  discussed  in  this  elaborate 
judgment ;  but  it  is  peculiarly  api)ropriate 
in  connection  with  the  subjects  of  insuffi- 
ciency, redundancy,  and  immateriality  of 
allegations.  "  It  would  certainly,"  he  said, 
"  be  a  most  anomalous  and  hitherto  un- 
known condition  of  the  law  of  pleading, 
were  it  established  that  the  plaintiff  could 
file  a  complaint,  the  particular  nature  and 
object  of  which  no  (me  could  tell,  but 
which  might  and  should  be  held  good  as 
a  statement  of  two  or  three  or  more  dif- 
ferent and  inconsistent  causes  of  action, 
as  one  in  tort,  one  upon  a  money  demand 
upon  contract,  and  one  in  equity,  all  com- 
bined or  fused  and  moulded  into  one 
count,  so  that  the  defendant  must  await 
the  events  of  the  trial,  and  until  the  plain- 
tiff's proofs  are  all  in,  before  being  in- 
formed with  any  certainty  or  definitcness 
what  he  was  called  u]>on  ti)  meet,     'i  lie 


632 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§  456.    *  565.     Amendments    Allowed    by    the    Code.      The   new 
procedure,  from  its  dread  lest  the  proper  requirements  as  to  form 


proposition  tliat  a  compliiint  or  any  single 
count  of  it  may  be  so  framed  with  a  double, 
treble,  or  any  number  of  aspects,  looking 
to  so  many  distinct  and  incongruous 
causes  of  action,  in  order  to  hit  the 
exigencies  of  the  plaintiff's  case  or  any 
possible  demands  of  his  proofs  at  the  trial, 
we  must  say  strikes  us  as  sometiiing  ex- 
ceedingly novel  in  the  rules  of  pleading. 
We  do  not  tliiuk  it  is  tlie  law,  and,  unless 
the  legislature  compels  us  by  some  new 
statutory  regulation,  shall  hereafter  be 
very  slow  to  change  this  conclusion.  The 
defendant  supposes  the  complaint  herein 
to  be  intended  to  be  one  in  trover, 
charging  or  seeking  to  charge  the  de- 
fendant with  the  wrongful  conversion 
of  certain  moneys  which  came  into  his 
hands  a.s  a  public  officer,  and  which  be- 
longed to  the  plaintiff;  and  acting  upon 
such  supposition,  he  has  demurred  to  the 
complaint  as  not  stating  facts  sufficient 
to  constitute  that  cause  of  action.  In  an- 
swer to  this  view,  the  plaintiffs  rather 
concede  than  otherwise  that  the  complaint 
is  and  was  intended  to  be  one  in  tort  for 
the  conversion ;  but  at  the  same  time  they 
insist,  that,  if  it  is  not  good  as  a  complaint 
of  that  kind,  it  is  sufficient  as  a  complaint 
or  count  in  an  action  for  money  had  and 
received ;  and,  being  sufficient  for  that 
purpose,  they  argue  that  the  demurrer 
was  properly  overruled.  In  other  words, 
their  position  is,  that  it  is  a  question  now 
open  to  speculation  and  inquiry  on  tliis 
demurrer,  whether  upon  all  or  any  of  the 
facts  stated  in  the  complaint  taken  col- 
lectively or  separately,  or  even  by  severing 
the  allegations  themselves  so  as  to  elimi- 
nate or  discard  certain  portions  of  them 
as  surplusage,  a  cause  of  action  of  any 
kind  is  or  can  be  made  out ;  and  if  it 
be  found  that  it  can,  then  the  demurrer 
should  be  overruled.  To  show  tliat  the 
complaint  may  be  upheld  as  one  for  money 
had  and  received  for  the  use  of  the  plain- 
tiff, and  the  action  considered  as  one  of 
that  kind,  counsel  gravely  contend  tliat 
the  averments  that  the  defendant  made 
fraudulent  representations,  and  acted 
falsely,  fraudulently,  and  wrongfully  in 
claiming   and   withholding    the    money.s, 


and  that  he  converted  the  same,  etc.,  may 
be  disregarded,  and  rejected  as  surplusage. 
§  .563.  "In  support  of  this  position, 
counsel  cited  several  New  York  decisions, 
and  .some  in  this  court  where  after  trial 
and  judgment,  or  after  issue  has  been  taken 
on  the  merits,  or  after  the  trial  has  commenced 
and  the  plaintiff's  case  is  closed,  it  has 
been  held  that  such  allegations  may  be 
disregarded.  The  decisions  were  in  ac- 
tions like  the  present,  aud  others  involv- 
ing a  somewhat  similar  question  under 
the  circumstances  above  stated,  and  were 
made  in  favor  of  a  good  cause  of  action 
proved  or  proposed  to  be,  and  which  by  a 
fair  and  reasonable  interpretation  of  the 
pleadings  could  be  said  to  be  within  the 
scope  of  them,  or  to  he  fairly  mapped  out 
and  delineated  by  the  averments,  so  that 
the  defendant  was  apprii^cd  of  the  demand 
made  against  him,  aud  of  the  facts  relied 
upon  to  establish  it.  The  great  liberality 
of  the  code  aud  the  broad  powers  of 
amendment  conferred  and  enforced  upon 
the  courts  under  such  circumstances  are 
well  known  [^citing  provisions  in  reference 
to  amendments,  variances,  and  the  inter- 
pretation of  pleadings].  These  provisions 
for  the  most  part,  if  not  entirely,  relate  to 
the  proceedings  in  an  action  after  issue 
joined  on  the  merits  upon  or  after  trial,  or 
after  judgment  on  the  merits,  when  the 
facts  are  made  to  appear,  and  the  substan- 
tial rights  of  the  parties  are  shown.  They 
are  enacted  in  amplification  and  enlarge- 
ment of  the  rules  of  the  common  law  on 
the  same  subject,  by  which  it  is  well  un- 
derstood that  there  were  many  defects, 
imperfections,  and  omissions  constituting 
fatal  objections  on  demurrer,  which  were 
waived  after  issue  joined,  and  a  trial  of 
verdict  and  judgment  on  the  merits.  The 
cases  cited  by  counsel  are  all  of  them 
manifestly  sucli  as  fall  within  these  pro- 
visions and  rules,  and  none  of  them  touch 
or  have  any  bt'ariug  upon  the  question 
or  case  here  presented.  No  case  arising 
U])on  demurrer  to  tlie  complaint  is  cited, 
and  it  is  believed  none  can  be,  hoMing 
any  such  doctrine  as  that  contended  for." 
The  learned  jutlgc  cites  the  following 
cases  as  illustrations:  Barlow  v.  Scott,  2i 


AMENDMENTS    OF    PLEADINGS. 


633 


should  degenerate  into  mere  technicalities,  and  from  its  opposi- 
tion to  the  decision  of  controversies  upon  points  not  involving 


N.  Y.  40 ;  Byxbie  v.  Wood,  24  N.  Y.  607  , 
Austin  V.  Kawdou,  44  N.  Y.  63 ;  Greason 
V.  Keteltas,  17  N.  Y.  491 ;  Emory  v.  Pease, 
20  N.  Y.  62 ;  Couauglity  v.  Nicliols,  42 
N.  Y.  83;  Wright  v.  Hooker,  10  N.  Y. 
51;  Walter  v.  Bennett,  16  N.  Y.  250; 
Strocl)e  V.  Fehl,  22  Wis.  347  ;  Hopkins 
V.  Oilman,  22  Wis.  481 ;  Tenney  v.  State 
Bk.  of  Wis.,  20  Wis.  152;  Leonard  v. 
Kogan,  20  Wis.  540;  Samuels  v.  Blau- 
chard,  25  Wis.  329  ;  Vilas  v.  Ma.son,  25 
Wis.  310,  328.  It  is  certain  that  the 
decision  in  some  of  these  cases  is  not 
based  upon  the  doctrine  stated  by  the 
judge,  —  that  is,  upon  any  ground  of 
amendment  or  of  waiving  the  objection 
by  answering,  etc. ;  but  it  is  put  upon  the 
broad  and  fundamental  principle,  that, 
under  the  codes,  equitable  and  legal  re- 
liefs may  be  granted  in  the  same  action, 
or  one  may  be  granted  when  the  other 
is  demanded :  the  other  cases,  however, 
fully  sustain  the  position  taken  by  the 
opinion. 

§  564.  "  It  thus  appears  that  the  au- 
thorities relied  upon  do  not  sanction  the 
position  that  a  complaint  in  the  first  in- 
stance, and  when  challenged  by  demurrer, 
may  be  uncertain  and  ambulatory,  pur- 
posely so  made,  now  presenting  one  face 
to  the  court  and  now  another,  at  the  mere 
will  of  the  pleader,  so  that  it  may  be  re- 
garded as  one  in  tort  or  one  on  contract  or 
in  equity,  as  he  is  pleased  to  name  it,  and 
as  the  necessities  of  the  argument  may 
require,  and,  if  discovered  to  be  good  in 
any  of  the  phases  which  it  may  thus  be 
made  to  assume,  that  it  must  be  upheld  in 
that  aspect  as  a  proper  and  sufficient  plead- 
ing by  the  court.  As  already  observed, 
the  opinion  of  the  court  is  quite  to  the 
contrary.  We  have  often  held  that  the 
inherent  and  essential  differences  and 
peculiar  properties  of  actions  have  not 
been  destroyed,  and  from  their  very  na- 
ture cannot  be.  Howland  v.  Needham,  10 
Wis.  495,  498.  These  distinctions  con- 
tinuing, they  must  be  regarded  by  the 
courts  now  as  formerly  ;  and  now  no  more 
than  then,  except  under  the  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances above  noted,  can  any  one  com- 
plaint or  count  be  made  to  subserve  the 


purposes  of  two  or  more  distinct  and  dis- 
similar causes  of  action,  at  the  option  of 
the  party  presenting  it.  If  counsel  dis- 
agree as  to  the  nature  of  the  action  or 
purposes  of  the  pleading,  it  is  the  province 
of  the  courts  to  settle  the  dispute.  It  is  a 
question,  when  properly  raised,  which  can- 
not be  left  in  doubt;  and  the  court  must 
determine  with  precision  and  certainty 
upon  inspectiim  of  the  pleading  to  what 
class  of  actions  it  belongs,  or  was  intended 
to  belong,  whether  of  tort,  upon  contract, 
or  in  equity ;  and  if  necessary  and  mate- 
rial, even  the  exact  kind  of  it  within  the 
class  must  also  be  determined.  See  Clark 
v.  Langworthy,  12  Wis.  441  ;  Gillett  v. 
Treganza,  13  Wis.  472.  This  is  not  only 
in  harmony  with  the  decisions  above  re- 
ferred to,  but  with  all  the  decisions  of  this 
court  bearing  upon  the  question,  and  we 
know  of  none  elsewhere  in  conflict.  It  is 
in  harmony  with  these  decisions  which 
have  been  made,  that  an  application  to 
amend  should  be  denied  which  professes 
to  entirely  change  the  cause  of  action  sued 
upon,  or  to  introduce  a  new  one  of  a  dif- 
ferent kind." 

Citing  Newton  v.  Allis,  12  Wis.  378; 
Sweet  V.  Mitchell,  15  Wis.  641,  664,  19 
Wis.  524 ;  Larkin  v.  Noonan,  19  Wis. 
82;  Stevens  v.  Brooks,  23  Wis.  196. 
The  opinion  proceeds  to  show  that  the 
conclusion  thus  reached  is  in  harmony 
with  the  decisions  made  in  Scheunert  v. 
Kaehler,  23  Wis.  523 ;  Anderson  i'.  Case, 
28  Wis.  505;  Lee  v.  Simpson,  29  Wis. 
333 ;  Bagan  v.  Simpson,  27  Wis.  355 ; 
Samuels  v.  Blanchard,  25  Wis.  329.  It 
also  declares  that  in  determining  upon 
demurrer  the  true  nature  of  the  com- 
plaint, its  object,  and  what  particular 
kind  or  cause  of  action  is  stated  in  it,  the 
character  of  the  summons  may  be  taken 
into  consideration  in  connection  with  the 
form  of  the  allegations  in  the  complaint ; 
and  this  particular  conclusion  is  also  sus- 
tained by  the  recent  decision  made  by  the 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  before  cited. 
Having  thus  laid  down  the  general  prin- 
ciples, the  learned  judge  applies  them  to 
the  case  before  him.  The  summons  is  for 
relief,  which  indicates  the  pleader's  inteu- 


634  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

the  merits,  has  made  most  ample  and  liberal  j)rovision  for  amend- 
ments. The  sections  of  the  codes  are  quoted  at  large  in  a  former 
paragraph.^  So  far  as  they  relate  to  the  pleadings,  amendments 
are  separated  into  two  general  classes,  —  those  made  before  the 
trial,  and  those  made  during  or  after  the  trial.  The  first  of  these 
classes  is  again  subdivided  into  (1)  the  amendments  of  course, 
without  any  application  to  the  court,  which  each  party  is  allowed 
to  make  once  in  his  own  pleading  within  a  specified  time  after  it 
is  filed  or  served;  (2)  the  amendments  which  are  made  by  per- 
mission of  the  court  as  the  result  of  a  special  motion  or  applica- 
tion for  that  purpose,  iiicluding  those  which  the  party  is  generally 
suffered  to  make  in  his  pleading  after  a  demurrer  to  it  has  been 
sustained.  The  amendments  of  the  second  class  are  for  the 
purpose  of  conforming  the  pleadings  to  the  facts  which  have 
been  proved,  or  which  are  proposed  to  be  proved,  at  the  trial. 
They  are  all  made  by  permission  of  the  court,  frequently  upon 
an  oral  application  during  the  trial  or  during  the  argument  on 
appeal;  often  by  the  court  itself  on  its  own  suggestion.  Some- 
tii\ies,  however,  the  trial  is  suspended,  and  the  party  desiring  an 
amendment  is  driven  to  a  formal  motion  in  order  to  obtain  it.^ 
It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  work  to  -describe  the  practice  in 
reference  to  amendments;  nor  to  discuss  the  particular  cases  in 
which  they  have  been  or  will  be  allowed.  I  shall  simply  state 
the  general  principles  which  have  governed  the  courts  in  the 
exercise  of  the  discretion  conferred  upon  them  by  the  statute. 

§  457.  *  566.  Conflict  of  Authority  on  Right  to  amend  by  Sub- 
stituting Different  Cause  of  Action.  In  giving  a  practical  inter- 
pretation to  the  clauses  of  the  codes,  a  conflict  of  decision  has 

tiou  to  bring  an  action  of  tort,  and  not  one         The  nature  of   the   reformed    pleading 
on  implied  contract  for  money  had  and  and  its  essential  principles  are  here  stated 
received.      The   complaint   itself    is   pro-  in    a   most    clear  and    accurate    manner, 
nounced    insutficieut    in    its    averments ;  while    the    description    of    the    improper 
the  charges  of  fraud  and  conversion  are  modes  wliicli  prevail  to  such    an   extent 
in  the  form  of  general  legal  inferences,  in  actual  practice  is  equally  grajjhic  and 
without  the  necessary  statements  of  facts,  correct.     The  one  explains  the  intent  and 
■*  A   general  charge    that   a  party  acted  design  of  tlie  reform  ;  the  otlier  shows  how 
fraudulently,    faLsely,    or   wrongfully,    or  that  design   has  been  ignored,  and   that 
that  he  made  fraudulent  representations  intent  frustrated, 
or  statements,  amounts  to  nothing;  there  ^  See  supra,  §  *4.35. 
must  be  a  specificatiort  of  facts  to  justify  ^  This   particular  instance   strictly  ba- 
it" (p.  6.34).      The   foregoing   quotations  longs  to  tlie  first  general  class,  since  it  is 
form  a  small  part  of  this  exceedingly  in-  virtually  an  amendment  before  the  trial, 
structivc  opinion. 


AMENDMENTS    OF   PLEADINGS.  635 

arisen  among  the  tribunals  of  the  different  States,  and  sometimes 
among  those  of  the  same  State,  which  it  is  utterl}^  impossible  to 
reconcile.  The  rule  is  established  b}-  one  class  of  cases,  and 
prevails  in  certain  States,  that  in  all  the  voluntar}'  amendments 
which  a  party  may  make  as  a  matter  of  course  in  his  own  plead- 
ings, and  in  all  amendments  before  trial  for  which  the  party 
applies  to  the  court  by  motion,  including  those  rendered  neces- 
sary by  the  sustaining  of  a  demurrer  to  his  pleading,  he  cannot 
under  the  form  of  an  amendment  change  the  nature  and  scope 
of  his  action;  he  cannot  substitute  a  wholly  different  cause  of 
action  in  place  of  the  one  which  he  attempted  to  set  up  in  his 
original  pleading. ^  A  very  different  rule  is  laid  down  by  another 
class  of  cases.  It  is  settled  in  New  York  by  a  carefully  consid- 
ered decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals,  which  overrules  a  number 
of  contrary  decisions  made  by  inferior  tribunals  of  that  State, 
that  a  complaint  may  be  amended  voluntarily  and  of  course,  by 
substituting  an  entirely  different  cause  of  acticm  for  the  one 
originally  alleged,  provided  the  summons  continues  to  be  ap- 
propriate. It  is  not  necessary  that  the  new  cause  of  action 
should  be  of  the  same  general  nature  or  class  as  the  first  one ; 
but  the  plaintiff  may,  by  omitting  a  cause  of  action,  substitute 
another  iu  its  stead  of  an  entirely  different  class  and  character, 
if  the  change  does  not  require  an  alteration  in  the  summons.  A 
like  rule,  it  was  held,  also  applies  to  answers  and  to  defences 
contained  therein.^     In  some    States   this   liberal  interpretation 

1  Kewaunee  Sup.  v.  Decker,  34  Wis.  be  added  to  an  answer  by  an  amendment 
378 ;  Rutledge  v.  Vanmeter,  8  Bush,  354,  of  course.  McQueen  v.  Babcock,  13  Abb. 
356;  McGrath  v.  Balser,  6  B.  Men.  141.  Pr.  268;  3  Keyes,  428;  Wymau  v.  Re- 
See  also  Vliet  v.  Sherwood,  38  Wis.  159;  mond,  18  How.  Pr.  272;  although  the 
Spinners  v.  Brett,  38  Wis.  648  ;  North-  Court  of  Appeals,  in  Brown  v.  Leigh, 
western  Union  Packet  Co.  v.  Shaw,  37  pointed  out  a  difference  between  the  terms 
Wis.  655  (an  amendment  may  change  the  of  the  section  which  permits  amendments 
action  from  one  on  express  contract  to  one  of  course  and  of  that  which  allows  amend- 
for  money  had  and  received  on  implied  ments  upon  ap))lication  to  the  court  before 
contract).  trial,  yet  it  did   not  hold  tiiat  the  latter 

■^  Brown  v.  Leigh,  12  Abb  Pr.  x.  s.  193  were  to  be  any  more  restricted   in  their 

(1872).      See   also,  to    the    same    effect,  scope  and  extent  than  the  former. 

Mason  v.  Whitely,  1  Abb.  Pr.  85  ;  4  Duer,  [Deyo  v.  Morss  (1894),  144  N.  Y.  216, 

611  ;  Prindle  v.  Aldrich,  13  How.  Pr.  466;  39  N.  E.  81. 

Troy  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Tibbits,  11   How.  Pr.  In  South  Carolina,  it  was  held  in  Jen- 

168;   Watson   v.  Rushmore,   15  Abb.  Pr.  nings  r.  Parr  (1898),  54  S.  C  109,32  8.  E. 

51 ;  Hall  v.  Woodward,  30  S.  C.  564,  575.  73,  that  the  limitation  on  the  power  to  allow 

Some  of  these  cases  apply  the  same  doc-  amendments  found  in  sec.  194  of  tlie  code, 

trine  to  amendments  made  upon  motion,  viz.,    that    they   shall    not    substantially 

By  this  rule,  an  entirely  new  defence  may  change  the  claim  or  defence,  has  no  appli- 


636 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


of  the  code  has  been  expressly  extended  to  those  amendments 
which  require  the  consent  of  the  court  granted  upon  a  motion, 
and  the  rule  is  settled  that  even  in  that  class  the  cause  of  action 
or  defence  may  be  entirely  changed.^  In  respect  to  the  amend- 
ments made  at  the  trial,  or  on  appeal,  or  by  the  court  upon  its 
own  motion,  great  freedom  is  used,  provided  the  paities  are  not 
misled  and  surprised,  and  the  issues  to  be  decided  are  not  wholly 
changed.  When  evidence  has  been  received  without  objection 
making  out  a  cause  of  action,  and  especially  after  a  favorable 
verdict  upon  such  evidence,  the  utmost  liberality  is  shown  by 
the  courts  iti  conforming  the  averments  of  the  pleading  to  the 
case  as  proved,  if  the  ends  of  justice  will  be  subserved  thereby.^ 


cation  to  amendments  made  before  the 
trial.  Tiie  only  limitation  in  such  cases  is 
that  the  amendment  shall  be  in  further- 
ance of  justice.  The  same  rule  seems  to 
be  followed  in  Oregon.  In  Talbot  v.  Gar- 
retson  (1897),  31  Ore.  256,  49  Pac.  978, 
the  court  said :  "  It  is  within  the  power  of 
the  trial  court  to  allow,  before  trial,  an 
amended  complaint  to  be  filed  containing 
a  new  cause  of  action  or  suit  muterial  to 
the  subject-matter  of  the  controversy  then 
before  the  court.  A  plaintiff  cannot,  of 
course,  abandon  his  original  cause  of 
action  or  suit,  and  substitute  an  entirely 
new  and  different  one,  because  in  such 
case  the  new  pleading  would  hot  be  an 
amendment,  but  a  substitution  for  the  ori- 
ginal. But  so  long  as  the  amendment  is 
germane  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  con- 
troversy, we  can  see  no  objection  to  the 
court,  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discretion, 
allowing  the  pleadings  to  be  amended  in 
the  furtherance  of  justice  by  inserting  new 
and  additional  allegations  material  to  such 
controversy,  although  they  may,  in  effect, 
constitute  a  uewcause  of  action  or  defence." 
This  decision  is  opposed  to  Board  of 
Supervisors  i".  Decker,  34  Wis.  378,  which 
it  cites,  and  in  harmony  with  Brown 
V.  Leigh,  49  N.  Y.  78 ;  Hatch  v.  Central 
Bank,  78  N.  Y.  487 ;  Freeman  v.  Grant, 
132  N.  Y.  22,  all  of  which  it  cites.  See 
also  Lieuallen  v.  Mosgrove  (1900),  37  Ore. 
44G,  61  Pac.  1022;  McMalian  i'.  Canadian 
Ky.  Co.  (1901),  40  Ore.  148,  66  Pac.  708. 
See,  in  this  coimection,  Mulhall  v.  Mulhall 
(1895),  3  Okla.  .304,  41  Pac.  109. 

In  California  it  was   held,  in  Frost  v. 


Witter  (1901),  132  Cal.  421,  64  Pac.  705, 
that  a  plaintiff  may,  by  amendment, 
change  the  nature  and  scope  of  his  action, 
but  that  he  may  not  introduce  in  that  way 
"  a  wholly  different  cause  of  action." 
Citing  the  text,  §  *  566.] 

1  This  is  particularly  tlie  case  in  North 
Carolina,  where  the  greatest  liberality  of 
amendment  prevails.  Robinson  v.  Wil- 
loughby,  67  N.  C.  84 ;  Bullard  v.  Johnson, 
65  N.  C.  436.  In  the  first  case  the  action 
was  brought  to  recover  possession  of  land 
under  a  deed  absolute  on  its  face  (eject- 
ment). The  court,  on  appeal,  held  that 
this  deed  was  in  fact  a  mortgage,  and  re- 
versed a  judgment  obtained  by  the  plain- 
tiff, ordering  a  new  trial.  Before  the 
second  trial,  an  amendment  was  per- 
mitted changing  the  canse  of  action  from 
its  original  form  to  one  for  the  foreclosure 
of  tiiis  mortgage.  See  also  Culp  v.  Steere, 
47  Kan.  746  (change  from  action  for  false 
representations  in  a  sale  to  action  for 
breach  of  express  warranty) ;  Hopf  v. 
U.  S.  Baking  Co.  (Buf.  Super"  Ct.  1892),  21 
N.  Y.  S.  589  (plaintiff  allowed  to  amend 
by  changing  a  course  of  action  sounding 
in  tort  to  one  sounding  in  contract). 

2  Kewaunee  Sup.  v.  Decker,  34  Wis. 
378;  Hodge  o.  Sawyer,  ^34  Wis.  397  ;  Bow- 
man r.  Van  Kuren,  29  Wis.  209,  215; 
Smith  r.  Whitney,  22  Wis.  438;  Robinson 
V.  Willoughhy,  67  N.  C.  84;  Bullard  v. 
Johnson,  65  N.  C.  436 ;  Oates  v.  Kendall, 
67  N.  C.  241  ;  Flanders  v.  Cottrell,  36 
Wis.  564 ;  Little  v.  Va.  &  G.  H.  Water 
Co.,  9  Nev.  317.  The  reporter's  head-note 
ia  much  broader  than  the  decision  actually 


AMENDMENTS    OF   PLEADINGS. 


637 


The  plaintiff  cannot,  however,  have  his  summons  and  complaint 
amended  during  the  trial  by  substituting  a  different  defendant  for 
the  single  one  who  was  sued,  and  who  had  appeared  and  defended.^ 


made,  and  is  manifestly  erroneous.  The 
following  cases  illustrate  the  general  rules 
concerning  amendments,  and  the  extent 
to  which  amendments  are  permitted.  It 
^eems  to  be  settled  by  a  very  decided  pre- 
ponderance of  authority  that  amendments 
at  the  trial  caunot  change  the  nature  of 
the  cause  of  action  or  of  the  defence  ;  but 
that  the  court  may  at  its  discretion  per- 
mit amendments  on  motion  before  trial 
which  change  the  cause  of  action  or  de- 
fence, add  a  new  cause  of  action  or  defence, 
and  the  like  (see  additional  cases  cited 
under  §  *  .558).  Johnson  v.  Filkington,  39 
Wis.  62  (cannot  amend  at  trial  so  as  to 
substitute  a  new  cause  of  action)  ;  Vliet 
V.  Sherwood,  38  id.  159;  Spinners  v. 
Urett,  38  id.  648;  North  West.  Union 
P.  Co.  r.  Shaw,  37  id.  655 ;  Flanders  v. 
Cottrell,  36  id.  564  ;  Tormey  v.  Pierce,  49 
Cal.  306  ;  Blood  v.  Fairbanks,  48  id.  171 ; 
Lottman  v.  Barnett,  62  Mo.  1 59  ; .  Jeffree 
V.  Walsh,  14  Nev.  14.'J;  Almance  Cy. 
Comm'rs  v.  Blair,  76  N.  C.  136 ;  Scott  v- 
•Chickasaw  Cy.,  54  Iowa,  47 ;  Spink  v. 
McCall,  52  id.  432  ;  Newell  r.  Mahaska 
Cy.  Sav.  Bk.,  51  id.  178;  Peck  v.  Shick, 
50  id.  281;  Hammond  v.  S.  C.  &  P.  R. 
Co.,  49  id.  450 ;  O'Connell  v.  Cotter,  44  id. 
48  ;  Hobson  v.  Ogden's  Ex.,  16  Kan.  388  ; 
Beyer  v.  Reed,  18  id.  86 ;  Leavenworth, 
L.  &  G.  R.  Co.  ;;.  Van  Riper,  19  id-  317  ; 
Harris  v.  Turubridge,  83  N.  Y.  92,  97; 
Reeder  v.  Sayre,  70  id.  180;  Weston  v. 
McMuUin,  42  Wis.  567  ;  Tauguay  v.  Felt- 
houser,  44  id.  30 ;  Tewsbury  v.  Brouson, 
48  id.  581  ;  Graham  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.,  49  id.  532;  Oro  Fino,  etc.  Min.  Co. 
V.  CuUen,  1  Idaho,  113;  Read  v.  Beards- 
ley,  6  Neb.  493;  Page  v.  Williams,  54 
Cal.  562  ;  Nichols  v.  Scranton  Steel  Co., 
137  N.  y.  471 ;  Dexter  v.  Ivins,  133  N.  Y. 
551 ;  Miner  v.  Bacon,  131  N.  Y.  677  ;  Free- 
man V.  Grant,  132  N.  Y.  22  ;  Davis  v.  N.  Y., 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  110  N.  Y.  646  (test 
proposed,  whether  recovery  on  the  origi- 
nal complaint  would  be  a  bar  to  recoverv 
on  the  amended  complaint) ;  Bockes  r. 
Lansing,  74  N.  Y.  437  ;  Lustis  v.  N.  Y., 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  65  Hun,  547  ;  Mea  v. 
Pierce,  63  Hun,  400 ;  Bowen  v.  Sweeney, 


63  Hun,  224;  22  Civ.  Pro.  R.  79;  Ager- 
singer  v.  Scorr,  54  Hun,  613 ;  Hopf  v. 
U.  S.  Baking  Co.  (Buf.  Super.  Ct.  1892), 
21  N.  Y.  Suppl.  589  (plaintiff  allowed  to 
amend  by  changing  a  cause  of  action 
sounding  in  tort  to  one  sounding  in  con- 
tract);  Zoller  r.  Kellogg,  66  Ilun,  194 
(change  from  legal  to  equitable  cause  of 
action  not  allowed)  ;  Sleeman  ;;.  Ilotch- 
kiss  (Supreme,  Jan.  1891),  13  N.  Y.  S.  98 
(change  from  equitable  to  legal  cause  of 
action  not  allowed)  ;  Cumber  v.  Schoen- 
feld,  16  Daly,  454  (change  from  malicious 
prosecution  to  false  imprisonment  not 
allowed) ;  Chamberlain  v.  Mensing  (S.  C), 
51  Fed.  Kep.  511  ;  Esch  v.  Home  Ins.  Co. 
of  N.  Y.,  78  Iowa,  3.34  ;  Plumer  v.  (  larke, 
59  Wis.  646  ;  Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Phil- 
lips (Wis.,  Nov.  1892),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  774; 
Carmichael  v.  Dolan,  25  Neb.  335;  Mc- 
Nider  v.  Sirrine  (Iowa,  Oct.  1891),  50 
N.  W.  Rep.  200  ;  Barnes  v.  Hekla  F.  Ins. 
Co.,  75  Iowa.  11;  Hughes  r.  McDivitt, 
102  Mo.  77 ;  Bradley  i-.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co., 
28  Mo.  App.  7  (amendment  Ijefore  an- 
swer or  reply)  ;  Missouri  Lumber,  etc. 
Co.  V.  Zeitinger,  45  Mo.  App.  114  (cannot 
change  from  statutory  action  for  treble 
damages  for  cutting  timber,  into  action  of 
trover  for  the  timber);  Gonrley  v.  St.  L. 
&  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.,  35  Mo.  App.  87  ;  Cald- 
well V.  Meshew,  53  Ark.  263  ;  Jackson  v. 
Jackson,  94  Cal.  446;  McKeighan  v.  Hop- 
kins, 19  Neb.  33.  As  to  amendment  en- 
larging the  amount  of  recovery,  see  Work 
V.  Tibbits,  133  N.  Y.  574;  Schuttler  v. 
King  (Mont.,  May,  1892),  30  Pae.  Rep.  25  ; 
Cain  V.  Cody  (Cal.,  April,  1892),  29  Pac. 
Rep.  778 ;  Guidery  v.  Green,  95  Cal.  630 
(amendment  by  defendant  during  trial 
must  be  allowed,  when  no  new  issue  pre- 
sented). That  answering  the  amended 
complaint  is  a  waiver  of  the  objection 
that  it  states  a  new  cause  of  action,  see 
Witkowski  v.  Hern,  82  Cal.  604. 

^  \_ Amendments. 

The  question  of  the  right  to  file  amended 
pleadings  during  the  trial  is  one  within 
the  sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court, 
and    its    rulings    will    not  be   disturbed 


638 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  458.    *  567.    Election   betw^een  Actions  ex  delicto  and   Actions 
ex   contractu.      Intimately   connected   with   tlie    questions   last 


nnless  the  record  shows  an  abuse  of 
discretion . 

Arizona  :  Brady  v.  Pinal  County  (1903), 
Ariz.,  71  Pac.  910. 

California:  Bean  v.  Stoneman  (1894), 
104  Cai.  49,  37  Pac.  777. 

Connecticut :  Kenuenberg  v.  Neff 
(1901),  74  Conn.  62,  49  Atl.  853;  Gulliver 
V.  Fowler  (1894),  64  Conn.  556,  30  Atl. 
852. 

Indiana:  Burnett  i\  Milnes  (1897),  148 
Ind.  230,  46  N.  E.  464. 

Iowa:  Aultman  v.  Shelton  (1894),  90 
la.  288,  57  N.  W.  857 ;  Guyer  v.  Minn. 
Thresher  Co.  (1896),  97  la.  132,  66  N.  W. 
83;  Greenlee  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (1897), 
103  la.  484,  72  N.  W.  676 ;  Rosenberger 
V.  Marsh  (1899),  108  la.  47,  78  N.  W.  837; 
Smith  V.  City  of  Sioux  City  (1903),  119 
la.  .50,  93  N.'W.  81. 

Kansas:  Laird  v.  Farwell  (1899),  60 
Kan.  512,  57  Pac.  98. 

Minnesota:  Reeves  &  Co.  v.  Cress 
(1900),  80  Minn.  466,  83N.  W.443;  Burke 
r.  Baldwin  (1893),  54  Minn.  514,  56  N.  W. 
173  ;  Minneapolis.etc.Ry.  Co.  I'.  Firemen's 
Ins.  Co.  (1895),  62  Miiiu.  315,64  X.  W. 
902. 

Missouri:  Evans  ?•.  Fulton  (1896),  134 
Mo.  653,  36  S.  W.  230. 

Nehrask-a :  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co. 
r.  Martelle  (1902),  —  Xeb.  — ,  91  N.  W. 
364  ;  Scherar  v.  Prudential  Ins.  Co.  (1902), 
63  Neb.  530,  88  N.  W.  687  ;  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  P.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Shaw  (1901),  63  Neb. 
380,  88  N.  W.  508  ;  Gage  v.  West  (1901), 
62  Neb.  612,  87  N.  W.  344;  Dunn  v.  Bo- 
zarth  (1899),  59  Neb.  244,  80  N.  W.  811  ; 
Harrington  r.  Connor  (1897),  51  Neb. 
214,  70  N.  W.  911  ;  Murray  v.  Loushmau 
(1896),  47  Neb.  256,  66  N.  W.  413  ;  Kleck- 
ner  v.  Turk  (1895),  45  Neb.  176,  63  N.  W. 
469;  Central  City  Bank  v.  Rice  (1895), 
44  Neb.  594,  63  n'  W.  60  ;  Barr  v.  City  of 
Omaha  (1894).  42  Neb.  341,  60  N.'w. 
591  ;  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Murray 
■  (1894),  40  Neb.  601,  59  N.  W.  102  ;  Man- 
ning V.  Viers  (1594),  38  Neb.  32.  56  N.  \V. 
719  ;  Omaha  &  R.  V.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mos- 
cliel  (1893),  38  Neb.  281,  56  N.  W.  825; 
Commercial  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gibson  (1893), 
37  Neb.   750,  56  N.  W.  616;  Ledwith  v. 


Campbell  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W. 
838. 

North  Carolina :  Barnes  v.  Crawford 
(1894),  115  N.  C.  76,  20  S.  E.  386. 

North  Dakota :  Martin  v.  Luger  Fur- 
niture Co.  (1898),  8  N.  D.  220,  77  N.  W. 
1003  ;  Q.  W.  Loverin-Browne  Co.  v.  Bank 
(1898),  7  N.  D.  569,  75  N.  W.  923. 

Oklahoma :  Tecumseh  State  Bank  v. 
Maddox  (1896),  4  Ukla.  583,  46  Pac.  563  ; 
Consolidated  Steel  &  Wire  Co.  i'.  Burn- 
ham  (1899),  8  Okla.  514,  58  Pac,  654. 

Oregon:  Clemens  v.  Hanley  (1895),  27 
Ore.  326,  41  Pac.  658;  Hume  v.  Kelly 
(1896),  28  Ore.  398,  43  Pac.  380;  Osmun 
v.  Winters  (1896),  30  Ore.  177,  46  Pac. 
780. 

South  Dakota:  Heegaard  r.  Dakota 
Loan  &  Trust  Co.  (1893),  3  S.  D.  569,  54 
N.  W.  656. 

Washington :  Long  v.  Eisenbeis  (1901 ), 
23  Wash.  556,  63  Pac.  249  ;  Hart  Lumber 
Co.  V.  Rucker  (1898),  20  Wash.  383,  55 
Pac.  320;  Bishop  v.  Averill  (1898),  19 
Wash.  490,  53  Pac.  726  ;  Seward  v.  Der- 
rickson  (1895),  12  Wash.  225,  40  Pac. 
939  ;  Hulbert  v.  Brackett  (1894),  8  Wash. 
438,  36  Pac.  264  ;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Superior 
Court  (1894),  9  Wash.  366.  37  Pac.  454. 

Wisconsin :  Illinois  Steel  Co.  r.  Bud- 
zisz  (1900),  106  Wi.s.  499,  82  N.  W.  534; 
Matthiesou  v.  Schomberg  (1896),  94  Wis.  1, 
68  N.  W.  416  ;  Studebaker  Bros.  Mfg.  Co. 
f.  Laugson  (1895),  89  Wis.  200,  61  N.  W. 
773. 

The  question  whether,  under  tlie  par- 
ticular facts,  the  ruling  of  the  court 
showed  an  abuse  of  discretion,  was  con- 
sidered in  the  following  cases  :  — 

California :  Schaake  v.  Eagle  Auto- 
matic Can  Co.  (1902),  135  Cal.  472,  63 
Pac.  1025. 

Idaho  :  Jones  v.  Stoddart  (1902),  Idaho, 
67  Pac.  650. 

loiva :  Clough  v.  Bennett  (1896),  99 
la.  69,  68  N.  AV.  578  ;  Ankrum  v.  City  of 
Marshalltown  (1898),  105  la.  493,  75  N.  W. 
360;  Burkhardt  1-.  Burkhardt  (1899),  107 
la.  369,  77  N.  W.  1069. 

Kentucki/:  Brady  v.  Peck  (1896),  99 
Ky.  42,  34  S.  W.  906;  Felton  v.  Dunn 
(1901),  Ky.,  60  S.  W.  298;  Metropolitan 


ELECTION    BETWEEN'    ACTIONS. 


G39 


discussed,  as  to  the  proper  forms  of  actions  and  tlic  correspond- 
ence between  the  allegations  and  tlie  proofs,  is  the  subject  indi- 


Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith  (1900),  Ky.,  59 
S.  W.  24. 

Minnesota:  Smith  v.  Prior  (1894),  58 
Minn.  247,  59  N.  W.  lOlG;  Minneapolis 
Stockyards  Co.  v.  Cunningham  (1894),  59 
Minn."  .325,  61  N.  W.  .329. 

Montana:  York  v.  Steward  (1898),  21 
Mont.  515,  55  Pac.  29;  Hanpt  v.  Inde- 
pendent Tel.  Co.  (1900),  25  Mont.  122,  63 
Pac.  1033. 

Nebraska:  Donovan  v.  Kibbler  (1902), 
Neb.,  92  N.  W.  637;  Hubenka  v.  Vach 
(1902),  64  Neb.  170,  89  N.  W.  789; 
Dufrene  v.  Anderson  (1902),  Neb.,  90 
N.  W.  221 ;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac.  K.  R. 
Co.  V.  Young  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W. 
922;  Missouri,  etc.  Trust  Co.  v.  Clark 
(1900),  60  Neb.  406,  83  N.  W.  202; 
Schlageck  v.  Widhalm  (1900),  59  Neb. 
541,  81  N.  W.  448;  Welch  v.  MiUiken 
(1898),  57  Neb.  86,  77  N.  W.  363;  Hor- 
bach  V.  Marsh  (1893),  37  Neb.  22,  55 
N.  W.  286  ;  Western  Assurance  Co.  v.  Dry 
Goods  Co.  (1898),  54  Neb.  241,  74  N.  W. 
592  ;  Perkins  County  v.  Miller  (1898),  55 
Neb.  141,  75  N.  W.  577. 

North  Dakota :  Anderson  i\  Bank, 
(1895),  5  N.  D.  80,  64  N.  W.  114. 

Oregon:  Wade  i-.  City  Railway  Co. 
(1900),  36  Ore.  311,  59  Pac.  875  ;  Nosier 
I'.  Coos  Bay  R.  R.  Co.  (1901),  39  Ore.  331, 
64  Pac.  644 ;  Tillamook  Dairy  Ass'n  v. 
Schermerhorn  (1897),  31  Ore.  308,  51  Pac. 
438. 

South  Dakota :  Brown  v.  Edmunds 
(1896),  9  S.  D.  273,  68  N.  W.  734. 

Utah:  Ruffatti  v.  Lexington  Mining 
Co.  (1894),  10  Utah,  386,  37  Pac.  591. 

Washington :  Norris  Safe  &  Lock  Co. 
V.  Clark  (1902),  28  Wash.  268,  68  Pac. 
718;  Newman  v.  Buzard  (1901),  24  Wash. 
225,  64  Pac.  139;  State  v.  Lorenz  (1900), 
22  Wash.  289,  60  Pac.  644  ;  Price  Baking 
Powder  Co.  w.  Rinear  (1897),  17  Wash. 
95,  49  Pac.  223 ;  West  Seattle  Land  Co.  v. 
Herren  (1897),  16  Wash.  665,  48  Pac.  341  ; 
Van  Lehn  r.  Morse  (1897),  16  Wash.  672, 
48  Pac.  404  ;  McDonough  v.  Great  North- 
ern Ry.  Co.  (1896),  15  Wash.  244,  46  Pac. 
3.34;  Price  v.  Scott  (1896),  13  Wash.  574, 
43  Pac.  634;  Maney  v.  Hart  (1895),  11 
Wash   67,  39  Pac.  268 ;  Barnes  v.  Pack- 


wood  (1894),  10  Wash.  50,  38  P.ac.  857 ; 
Morgan  v.  Morgan  (1894),  10  Wash.  99, 
38  Pac.  1054  ;  Gould  v.  Gleason  (1895),  10 
Wash.  476,  39  Pac.  123. 

Wisconsin  :  Jacobson  v.  Tallard  ( 1 903 ) , 
116  Wis.  662,  93  N.  W.  841  ;  Whereatt  v. 
Worth  (1900),  103  Wis.  291,  84  N.  W. 
441  ;  Sullivan  v.  Collins  (1900),  107  Wis. 
291,  83  N.  W.  310;  Carroll  v.  Fethers 
(1899),  102  Wis.  436,  78  N.  W.  604  J  St. 
Clara  Female  Academy  i-.  Northwestern 
Nat.  Ins.  Co.  (1899),  101  Wis.  464,  77 
N.  W.  893;  Rock  v.  Collins  (1898),  99 
Wis.  630,  75  N.  W.  426 ;  Schaller  v.  Chi- 
cago &  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.  (1897),  97 
Wis.  31,  71  N.  W.  1042  ;  'Segelke  &  Kohl- 
haus  Mfg.  Co.  V.  Hulberg  (1896),  94  Wis. 
106,  68  N.  W.  653;  O'Connor  v.  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  92  Wis. 
612,  66  N.  W.  795;  Geer  v.  Holcorab 
(1896),  92  Wis.  661,  66  N.  W.  793 ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Caledonian  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1896),  92 
Wis.  664,  66  N.  W.  801 ;  Kennan  v.  Smith 
(1902),  115  Wis.  463,  91  N.  W.  986. 

In  the  following  cases  it  is  held  that  a 
new  and  distinct  cause  of  action  or  defence 
cannot  he  introduced  by  amendment:  — 

Arkansas:  Freeman  v.  Lazarus  (1895), 
61  Ark.  247,  32  S.  W.  680;  Sarber  v. 
McConnell  (1897),  64  Ark.  450,  43  S.  W. 
395. 

California:  Frost  v.  Witter  (1901),  132 
Cal.  421,  64  Pac.  705  (an  important  case). 

Colorado :  Anderson  v.  Groesbeck 
(1899),  26  Colo.  3,  55  Pac.  1086. 

Connecticut:  Pitkin  v.  New  York,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  (1894),  64  Conn.  482,  30  AtL 
772. 

Idaho :  Hallettw.  Larcom  (1897),  Idaho, 
51  Pac.  108. 

Iowa:  Boos  v.  Dulin  (1897),  103  la. 
331,  72  N.  W.  533;  Denzler  v.  Rieckhoff 
(1896),  97  la.  75,  66  N.  W.  147;  Williams 
V.  Williams  (1902),  115  la.  520,  88  N.  W. 
1057. 

Kansas:  Ellis  v.  Flaherty  (1902),  65 
Kan.  621,  70  Pac.  586;  State  i;.  Krause 
(1897),  58  Kan.  651,  50  Pac.  882. 

Kentucky :    Greer    v.    Louisville,    etc. 
R.   R.   Co.   (1893),  94  Ky.  169,21  S.  W\ 
649;  Louisville,  etc.  R.   R.  Co.  i-.  Beau-, 
champ  (1900),  108  Ky.  47,  55  S.  W.  716; 


640 


CIVIL    llEMEDIES. 


cated  by  this  heading:  that  is,  the  power  held  by  the  plaintiff, 
under  certain  circumstances,  of  choosing  whether  he  will  treat 


DuckwaU  V.  Brooke  (1901),  Ky.,  65  S.  W. 
357  (allowing  the  addition  of  another 
cause  of  action,  when  the  two  might  have 
been  originally  joined). 

Minnesota:  U'Gonuan  r.  Sabin  (1895), 
62  xMinn.  46,  64  X.  W.  84. 

Missouri:  Hemau  v.  Glami  (1895),  129 
Mo.  325,  31  S  W.  589  ;  Chance  v.  Jen- 
nings (1901),  1.59  Mo.  .544,  61  S.  W.  177. 

Nebraska:  Western  Cornice,  etc. Works 
«.  Mever  (1898),  55  Neb.  440,  76  N.  W. 
23;  Undeland  v.  Stanfield  (1897),  53  Neb. 
120,  73  N.  W.  459;  Stratton  v.  Wood 
(1895),  45  Neb.  629,  63  N.  W.  917  ;  Scrog- 
gin  V.  Johnston  (1895),  45  Neb.  714,  64 
N.  W.  236;  Scott  i\  Spencer  (1895),  44 
Neb.  93,  62  N.  W.  312  ;  Dietz  i:  City  Nat. 
Bank  (1894),  42  Neb.  584,  60  N.  W.  896. 

JVorth  Carolina :  King  v.  Dudley 
(1893),  113  N.  C.  167,  18  S.  E.  110;  Miz- 
zell  i:  Ruffin  (1896),  118  N.C.  69,  23  S.  E. 
927  ;  Parker  v.  Harden  (1898),  122  N.  C. 
111,28  S.  E.  962;  Goodwin  v.  Fertilizer 
Works  (1898),  123  N.  C.  162,  31  S.  E. 
373 ;  Board  of  County  Commissioners  i\ 
Candler  (1898),  123  N.  C.  682,  31  S.  E. 
858  ;  Nims  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Blythe  (1900),  127 
N.  C.  325,  37  S.  E.  455  ;  Martin  v.  Bank 
(1902),  131  N.  C.  121,  42  S.  E.  558. 

North  Dakota:  Mares  v.  Wormington 
(1899),  8  N.  D.  329,  79  N.  W.  441. 

South  Carolina  :  Pickett  v.  Fidelity  Co. 
(1901),  60  S.  C.  477,  38  S.  E.  160. 

Wisconsin :  Gates  v.  Paul  (1903),  117 
AVis.  170,  94  N.  W.  55  (a  valuable  case); 
Klipstein  v.  Ra.schein  (1903),  117  Wis. 
248,  94  N.    W.  63. 

Wyominrj':  Sowin  v.  Pease  (1895),  6 
Wyo.  91,  42  Pac.  750. 

That  an  amended  pleading  changes 
the  cause  of  action  is  ground  for  motion 
to  strike  but  not  for  demurrer :  Beattie 
Mfg.  Co.  r.  Gerardi  (1901),  166  Mo.  142, 
65  S.  W.  1035;  Williams  v.  Williams 
(1902),  115  la.  520,  88  N.  W.  1057. 

In  the  following  cases  the  question  is 
considered  whether,  under  the  particular 
facts,  the  amendment  offered  amounted  to 
a  change  in  the  cause  of  action  or  ground 
of  defence. 

For  ca.«es  holding  that  it  did  not  change 
the  cause  of  action  or  defence,  see  :  — 


Colorado:  Messenger  v.  Northcutt 
(1899),  26  Colo.  527,  58  Pac.  1090. 

Connecticut :  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Wood- 
ward (1902),  74  Conn.  ti89,  51  Atl.  1084. 

Georyia:  Dinkier  v.  Baer  (1893),  92 
Ga.  432,  17  S.  E.  953  ;  Colley  v.  Gate  City 
Co.  (1893),  92  Ga.  604,  18  S.  E.  817;  Mc- 
Candless  v.  Inland  Acid  Co.  (1902),  115 
Ga.  968,  42  vS.  E.  449 ;  Craven  v.  Walker 
(1897),  101  Ga.  845,  29  S.  E.  152;  Causey 
I'.  Causey  (1898),  106  Ga.  188,  32  S.  E   138. 

loa-a :  Sachra  v.  Town  of  Manilla 
(1903),  120la.  562, 95  N.  W.  198 ;  Thoniitson 
V.  Brown  (1898),  106  la.  367,  76  N.  W.  819. 

Kansas:  St.  Louis  &  San  Francisco 
Railway  Co.  r.  Ludlum  (1901),  63  Kan. 
719,  66"Pac.  1045. 

Kentucky :  Adams  Oil  Co.  v.  Christ- 
mas (1897)^  101  Ky.  564,  41  S.  W.  545; 
Ford  Lumber  Co.  \:  Clark  (1902),  Ky., 
68  S.  W.  443  ;  Scottish  Union  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Strain  (1902),  Ky.,  70  S.  W.  274 

Missouri :  Courtney  v.  Blackwell  (1899), 
150  Mo.  245,  51  S.  W.  668. 

Montawi :  Murray  v.  Tingley  (1897), 
20  Mont.  260,  50  Pac.  723. 

Nebraska:  Massillon  Engine  &  Thresher 
Co.  V.  Prouty  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W. 
384;  Ball  r"  Beaumont  (1902),  63  Neb. 
215,  92  N.  W.  170. 

North  Carolina :  Craven  v.  Russell 
(1896),  118  N.  C.  564,  24  S.  E.  361. 

Oklahoma :  Myers  v.  First  Presbyte- 
rian Church  (1901),  11  Okla.  544,  69  Pac. 
874. 

South  Carolina :  Booth  v.  Langley  Co. 
(1897),  51  S.  C.  412,  29  S.  E.  204;  Whit- 
mire  V.  Boyd  (1898),  53  S.  C.  315,  31 
S.  E.  306. 

Utah:  Connor  v.  Raddon  (1898),  16 
Utah,  418,  52  Pac.  764. 

For  cases  holding  that  the  amendment 
did  introduce  a  new  cause  of  action  or 
ground  of  defence,  see :  — 

Arizona:  Motes  v.  Gila  Valley  Ry.  Co. 
(1902),  Ariz.,  68  Pac.  532. 

Arkansas :  Robinson  v.  United  Trust 
(1903),  —  Ark.  — ,  72  S.  W.  992. 

California :  Lambert  v.  McKenzie 
(1901),  135  Cal.  100,  67  Pac.  6;  Storer  v. 
Austin  (1902),  130  Cal.  588,  69  Pac.  277. 

Colorado:   Anthony  v.  Slayden  (1900), 


ELECTION    BETWEEN   ACTIONS. 


641 


his  cause  of  action  as  arising  from  tort  or  from  conti-act.     Tliis 
right  of  election  sometimes  occurs  M'hen  the  contract  is  express ; 


27  Colo.  144,  60  Pac.  826  (an  important 
case). 

Georgia  :  Georgia  R.  II.  Co.  v.  Hough- 
ton (1899),  109  Ga.  604,  34  S.  E.  1026; 
Charleston,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Miller  (1901), 

113  Ua.  15,  38  S.  E.  338;  Cox  v.  Henry 
(1901),  113  Ga.  259,  38  S.  E.  856 ;  Ilorton 
V.  Smitli  (1902),  115  Ga.  66,  41  S.  E.  253  ; 
Glaze  V.  Bogle  (1898),  105  Ga.  295,  31 
S.  E.  169;  Franklin  Bank-Note  Co.  v. 
Augusta,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1897),  102  Ga.  547, 
30  8.  E.  419. 

Indiana:  Cohoou  v.  Fisher  (1896),  146 
Ind.  583,  44  N.  E.  664. 

Kansas :  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Ilenrie 
(1901),  63  Kan.  330,  65  Pac.  665;  Kan.sa.s 
City  V.  Hart  (1899),  60  Kan.  684,  57  Pac. 
938";  Jewett  v.  Malott  (1899),  60  Kan.  509, 
57  Pac.  100. 

Missouri:  Bricken  v.  Cross  (1901),  163 
Mo.  449,  64  S.  W.  99. 

Nevada:  Schwartz  v.  Stock  (1901), 
Nev.,  65  Pac.  351. 

North  Carolina:  Sams  v.  Price  (1897), 
121  N.  C.  392,  28  S.  E.  486. 

Oregon :  Foste  i\  Standard  Ins.  Co. 
(1894),  26  Ore.  449,  38  Pac.  617  ;  Bailey  v. 
Wilson  (1899),  34  Ore.  186,  55  Pac.  973. 

Cases  in  which  particular  amendments 
have  been  allowed  or  disallowed  are  classi- 
fied and  cited  as  follows  :  — 

Arkansas :  Bank  of  Malvern  v.  Burton 
(1900),  67  Ark.  426,  55  S.  W.  483. 

California :  Porter  v.  Fillebrowu  (1897), 
119  Cal.  235,  51  Pac.  322;  County  of 
Mono  V.  Flanigan  (1900),  130  Cal.  105,  62 
Pac.  293. 

Georgia  :  Baldwin  Fertilizer  Co.  v. 
Carmichael  (1902),  116  Ga.  762,  42  S.  E. 
1002;  Allen  v.  Stephens  (1899),  107  Ga. 
733,  33  S.  E.  651  ;  Norton  v.  Scruggs 
(1899),  108  Ga.  802,  34  S.  E.  166;  Mad- 
dux V.  Central  of  Georgia  Ry.  Co.  (1899), 

1 10  Ga.  301,34  S.  E.  1036;  Mutual  Life 
Ins.  Co.    V.  Presbyterian  Church  (1900), 

111  Ga.  677,  36  S.  E.  880;  Equitable 
Building,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Holloway  (1901), 

114  Ga.  780,  40  S.  E.  742;  Smith  v. 
Columbia  Jewelry  Co.  (1901),  114  Ga. 
698,  40  S.  E.  735  ;  Wood  (•.  Bewick  Lum- 
ber Co.  (1897),  103  Ga.  235,  29  S.  E.  820  ; 
Williams  V.   Hall  (1898),  103  Ga.  796,  30 


S.  E.  660;  Roush  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 
(1897),  102  Ga.  109,  29  S.  E.  144  ;  Malono 
V.  Kelly  (1897),  101  Ga.  194,  28  S.  E.  689  ; 
Atlantic  Brewing  Co.  v.  Bluthentlial 
(1897),  101  Ga.  541,  28  S.  E.  1003  ;  King 
V.  McGhee  (1896),  99  Ga.  621,  25  S.  E. 
849  ;  Carey  v.  Cranston  (1896),  99  Ga.  77, 
24  S.  E.  869  ;  Ford  v.  Williams  (1896),  98 
Ga.  238,  25  S.  E.  416;  Carson  v.  Feara 
(1893),  91  Ga.  482,  17  S.  E.  342;  Purity 
Ice  Works  v.  Rountree  (1898),  104  Ga. 
676,  30  S.  E.  885  ;  Thompson  v.  Mallory 
Bros.  (1898);  104  Ga.  684,  30  S.  E.  887. 

Indiana :  Chapman  v.  Jones  (1897), 
149  Ind.  434,  47  N.  E.  1065. 

Iowa:  Clapp  v.  Greenlee  (1897),  100 
la.  586,  69  N.  W.  1049;  Kreuger  i-.  Syl- 
vester (1897),  100  la.  647,  69  N.  W.  10.59  ; 
Renner  Bros.  v.  Thornburg  (1900),  111 
la.  515,  82  N.  W.  950. 

Kansas  :  Chandler  v.  Parker  (1902),  65 
Kan.  860,  70  Pac.  368 ;  McManus  v.  Wal- 
ters (1901),  62  Kan.  128,  61  Pac.  686; 
Emporia  Nat.  Bank  v.  Layfeth  (1901),  63 
Kan.  17,  64  Pac.  973. 

Kentucki/ :  Traders'  Deposit  Bank  v. 
Day  (1899),  105  Ky.  219,  48  S.  W.  983; 
Bright  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  106  Ky. 
702,  51  S.  W.  442;  H.  Feltman  Co.  v. 
Thompson  (1900),  Ky.,  58  S.  W.  693  ; 
Town  of  Latonia  v.  Hopkins  (1898),  104 
Ky.  419,  47  8.  W.  248;  City  of  Newport 
V.  Commonwealth  (1899),  106  Ky.  434, 
50  S.  W.  845;  Leonard  v.  Boyd  (1903), 
Ky.,  71  S.  W.  508;  Jones' Admr.  v.  111. 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W. 
609  ;  Cincinnati  Tobacco  Warehouse  Co. 
V.  Matthews  (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W.  242. 

Minnesota:  Swank  v.  Barnum  (1896), 
63  Minn.  447,  65  N.  W.  722. 

Missouri':  Habel  r.  Union  Depot  Co. 
(1897),  140  Mo.  159,  41  S.  W.  459  ;  Barth 
V.  Kansas  City  Ry.  Co.  (1897),  142  Mo. 
535,  44  S.  W.  778;  Leavenworth,  etc.  Co. 
V.  Atchi.son  (1896),  137  Mo.  218,  37  S.  W. 
913;  Harlan  v.  Moore  (1895),  132  Mo. 
483,  34  S.  W.  70;  Clark  v.  St.  Louis 
Transfer  Co.  (1894),  127  Mo.  255,-30  S.  W. 
121. 

Montana:  Merrill  i'.  Miller  (1903), — 
Mont.  — ,  72  Pac.  423. 

Nebraska :  Pekin  Plow  Co.  v.  Wilson 
1 


G42 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


but,  on  account  of  the  tortious  acts  of  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff 
may  disregard  it,  and  sue  directly  for  the  wrong.     In  the  great 


(1902),— Neb.— ,92  N.  W.  176;  Norfolk 
Beet  Sugar  Co.  v.  Might  (1899),  59  Neb. 
100,  80  N.  W.  276;  Security  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Latimer  (1897),  51  Neb.  498,  71  N.  W.  38; 
Hanover  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Stoddard  (1897), 
52  Neb.  745,  73  N.  W.  291  ;  Burlington 
Voluntary  Relief  Dept.  v.  Moore  (1897), 
52  Neb.  719,  73  N.  W.  15  ;  Real  t-.  Honey 
(1894),  39  Neb.  516,  58  N.  W.  136  ;  Omaha 
Bottling  Co.  V.  Theiler  (1899),  59  Neb.  257, 
80  N.  W.  82;  Grotte  v.  Nagle  (1897),  50 
Neb.  363,  69  N.  W.  973;  Rosewater  v. 
Horton  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W.  681. 

NewYork:  Lyman  r. Kurtz  (1901),  166 
N.  Y.  274,  59  N.E.  903  ;  McLaughlin  v. 
Webster  (1894),  141  N.  Y.  76,  35  N.  E. 
1081  ;  Martin  v.  Home  Bank  (1899),  160 
N.  Y.  190,  54  N.  E.  717. 

North  Carolina :  Tillery  v.  Candler 
(1896),  118  N.  C.  888,  24  S.  E.  709;  Shell 
V.  West  (1902),  130  N.  C.  171,41  S.  E.  65. 

North  Dakota :  Power  v.  Bowdle  (1 893), 
3  N.  D.  107,  54  N.  W.  404. 

Ohio :  Raymond  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897), 
57  0.  St.  27l',  48  N.  E.  1093. 

Oklahoma :  Armour  Packing  Co.  v. 
Orrick  (189G),  4  Okla.  661,  46  Pac.  573; 
Lookabaugh  v.  La  Vance  (1897),  6  Okla. 
358,  49  Pac.  65 ;  Swope  v.  Burnham,  etc. 
Co.  (1898),  6  Okla.  736,  52  Pac.  924; 
Smock  V.  Carter  (1897),  6  Okla.  300,  50 
Pac.  262. 

Oregon :  Tillamook  Dairy  Ass'n  v. 
Schermerhorn  (1897),  31  Ore.  308,  51  Pac. 
438,  Foster  v.  Henderson  (1896),  29  Ore. 
210,  45  Pac.  898  ;  Koshland  v.  Fire  Ass'n 
(1897),  31  Ore.  362,  49  Pac.  865  ;  Farmers' 
Bank  v.  Saling  (1898),  33  Ore.  394,  54  Pac. 
190;  Christenson  v.  Nelson  (1901),  38 
Ore.  473,  63  Pac.  648. 

South  Carolina :  Baker  i\  Hornick 
(1897),  51  S.  C.  313.  28  S.  E.  941  ;  Stewart 
r.  Walterboro  Ry.  Co.  (1902),  64  S.  C.  92, 
41  S.  E.  827  ;  Glenn  i;.  Gerald  (1902),  64 
S.  C.  236,  42  S.  E.  155. 

Utah:  Murphy  v.  Ganey  (1901),  23 
Utah,  633,  66  Pac.  190;  Pugmire  v.  Dia- 
mond Coal  &  Coke  Co.  (1903),  26  Utah, 
115,  72  I'ac.  385. 

Washington :  Morrissey  r.  Faucett 
(1902),  28  Wash.  52,  68  Pac  352;  Daly  c. 
Kvr-rett    Pulp    &    Paper   Co.   (1903),"  31 


Wash.  252,  71  Pac.  1014  ;  Owen  v.  St.  Paul, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1895),  12  Wash.  313,  41  Pac. 
44;  Norris  Safe  &  Lock  Co.  v.  Clark 
(1902),  28  Wash.  268,  70  Pac.  129. 

]Visconsin :  Emerson  v.  Schwindt 
(1902),  114  Wis.  124.  89  N.  W.  822  ;  Jarvis 
V.  Northwestern  Mutual  Relief  Ass'n 
(1899),  102  Wis.  546,  78  N.  W.  1089; 
Charles  Baumback  Co.  *;.  Laube  (1898),  99 
Wis.  171,  74  N.  W.  96  ;  Hubbard  r.  Haley 
(1897),  96  Wi.s.  578,  71  N.  W.  1036;  Post 
t'.  Campbell  (1901),  110  Wis.  378,  85  N.  W. 
1032  ;  Robinson  v.  Eau  Claire  Stationery 
Co.  (1901),  110  Wis.  369,  85  N.  W.  983; 
John  R.  Davis  Lumber  Co.  v.  First  Nat. 
Bank  (1894),  87  Wis.  435,  58  N.  W.  743. 

The  question  of  the  right  to  amend  as 
related  to  the  operation  of  the  statute  of 
limitations  was  considered  in  the  following 
cases : — 

Arizona:  Motes  v.  Gila  Valley,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  (1902),  68  Pac.  532. 

Georgia:  Knox  v.  Laird  (1893),  92 
Ga.  123,  17  S.  E.  988;  Beaty  v.  Atlantic, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1896),  100  Ga.  123,  28 
S.  E.  32. 

Indiana :  Peerless  Stone  Co.  v.  Wray 
(1S98).  152  Ind.  27,  51  N.  E.  326. 

Iowa:  Curl  v.  Foehler  (1901),  113  la. 
597,  85  N.  W.  811;  Taylor  v.  Taylor 
(1900),  110  la.  207,  81  N.  W.  472. 

Kansas :  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Moffat 
(1899),  60  Kan.  113,  55  Pac.  837 ;  Huckel- 
bridge  v.  Atchison,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1903),  66 
Kan.  443,  71  Pac.  814  ;  Mis.souri,  K.  &  T. 
Ry.  V.  Bageley  (1902),  65  Kan.  188,  69  Pac. 
189. 

Kentucky :  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pointer's  Admr.  (1902),  —  Ky.  — ,  69 
S.  W.  1108. 

Missouri:  Bricken  v.  Cross  (1901),  163 
Mo.  449,  64  S.  W.  99. 

Nebraska :  Norfolk  Beet  Sugar  Co.  v. 
Hight  (1899),  59  Neb.  100,  80  N.  W. 
276 ;  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W. 
922. 

North  Carolina :  Gillam  v.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  (1897),  121  N.  C.  369,  28  S.  E.  470. 

Oklahoma:  Butt  v.  Carson  (1896),  5 
Okla.  160,  48  Pac.  182. 

South  Carolina:  Mayo  i.  Spartanburg, 


ELECTION    BKTWEEN    ACTIONS. 


643 


majority  of  instances,  however,  the  contract  invoked,  and  made 
tlie    basis  of   the  suit,   is  implied.     The    theory  of   the  implied 


etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1894),  43  S.  C.  225,  21 
S.   E.  10. 

South  Dakota:  Ilouts  v.  Bartle  (1901), 
14  S.  T).  322,  85  N.  W.  591. 

Washington :  McClaiue  v.  FaircliilJ 
(1901),  23  Wash.  758,  63  Pac.  517  ;  Morgan 
V.  Morgan  (1894),  10  Wash.  99,  38  Pac. 
1054. 

Wisconsin  :  Whereatt  v.  Worth  (1900), 
108  Wis.  291,  84  N.  W.  441  ;  Sullivan  v. 
Collins  (1900),  107  Wis.  291,  83  N.  W. 
310;  Kennan  v.  Smith  (1902),  115  Wis. 
463,  91  N.  W.  986  ;  Boyd  v.  Mutual  Fire 
Ass'n  (1903),  116  Wis.  155,  94  N.  W. 
171. 

When  an  amended  pleading  is  filed,  the 
original  ceases  to  be  a  part  of  the  record 
or  to  perform  any  function  as  a  pleading  : 
La  Societe  Frauyaise  v.  Weidmann  (1893), 
97  Cal.  507,  32  Pac.  583 ;  Mowry  v.  Ware- 
ham  (1897),  101  la.  28,  69  N.  W.  1)28; 
Town  of  Whiting  v.  Dooh  (1898),  152  Ind. 
157,  52  N.  E.  7.'i9;  Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.  V.  State  (1896),  146  Ind.  54,  44  N.  E. 
793  ;  Aydelott  v.  Collings  (1895),  144  Ind. 
602,  43  N.  E.  867  ;  City  of  Huntington  v. 
Folk  (1899),  154  Ind.  91,  44  N.  E.  759; 
Indianapolis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  ;;.  Center  Town- 
ship (1895),  143  Ind.  63,  40  N.  E.  1.34; 
Boland  v.  O'Neil  (1899),  72  Conn.  217,  44 
Atl.  15  ;  Raymond  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897), 
57  O.  St.  271,  48  N.  E.  1093;  Ralphs  v. 
Hensler  (1896),  114  Cal.  196,  45  Pac. 
1062  (holding  that  the  original  cannot 
even  be  used  as  evidence  against  the 
pleader.) 

But  see,  on  the  other  hand,  Threadgill 
V.  Commissioners  (1895),  116  N.  C.  616,  21 
S.  E.  425,  where  it  is  held  that  the  rule 
that  where  there  is  an  amended  pleading 
filed  the  case  must  be  tried  in  the  amended 
pleading,  and  not  in  the  original,  does  not 
obtain  in  this  State.  The  defendant  is  not 
limited  to  his  amended  answer,  and  may 
have  the  benefit  of  the  allegations  in  the 
original  answer. 

And  it  has  been  held  that  abandoned 
pler.dings  are  admissible  in  evidence  against 
the  pleader:  Spurlock  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
(1894),  125  Mo.  404,  28  S.  W.  6.34  ;  Lud- 
wig  V.  Blackshere  (1897),  102  la.  366,  71 
N.  W.  356  ;  Leach  v.  Hill  (1896),  97  la.  81, 


66  N.  W.  69;  Longiey  v.  McVey  (1899), 
109  la.  666,  81  N.  W.  150. 

Where  a  defendant  consents  to  the  filing 
of  an  amended  complaint,  he  waives  iii.s 
riglit  to  a  default  for  plaintiff's  failure  to 
reply  to  tlie  answer  to  the  original  com- 
plaint :  Radford  v.  Gaskill  (1897),  20  Mont. 
293,  50  Pac.  854. 

An  abandoned  pleading  cannot  form 
the  basis  for  a  judgment  on  the  pleadings: 
Cummiugs  v.  Hoffman  (1893),  113  N.  C. 
267,  18  S.   E.  170. 

As  to  the  time  when  an  amendment 
may  be  made,  see  the  following  cases:  — 

After  the  evidence  is  in  :  Metr(jpolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith  (1900),  Ky.,  59 
S.  W.  24  ;  Carter  1-.  Dilley  (1902),  167  Mo. 
564,  67  S.  W.  232  ;  Hocks  v.  Sprangers 
(1902),  113  Wis.  123,  87  Pac.  1101  ;  Ailend 
V.  Spokane  Falls,  etc.  By.  Co.  (1899),  21 
Wash.  324,  58  Pac.  244.  After  verdict: 
Walker  v.  O'Connell  (1898),  59  Kan.  306, 
52  Pac.  894  ;  Raymond  v.  Wathen  (1895), 
142  Ind.  367,  41  N.  E.  815.  After  plead- 
ing to  original:  Goodwin  v.  Caraleigh, 
etc.  Co.  (1897),  121  N.  C.  91,  28  S.  E.  192. 
After  motion  for  change  of  venue:  Kav  v. 
Pruden  (1897),  101  la.  60,  69  N.  W.  1137. 
In  the  Appellate  Court:  Ure  v.  Bunn 
(1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  W.  904;  Privett  v. 
Railroad  Co.  (1899),  54  S.  C.  98,  32  S.  E. 
75  ;  Martin  v.  Shannon  (1897),  101  la.  620, 
70  N.  W.  720;  Evans  v.  Hughes  County 
(1893),  4  S.  D.  33,  54  N.  W.  1049;  Greely 
V.  McCoy  (1893),  3  S.  D.  624,  54  N.  W. 
659;  Smith  v.  Wetmore  (1901),  167  N.  Y. 
234,  60  N.  E.  419.  During  trial :  Moore 
v.  Harrod  (1897),  101  Ky.  248,  40  S.  W. 
675.  Pending  motion  for  non-suit :  Earl 
Orchard  Co.  v.  Fava  (1902),  138  Cal.  76, 
70  Pac.  1073.  Pending  motion  f)r  judgment 
on  pleadings:  Bryant  v.  Davis  (1899),  22 
Mont.  534,  57  Pac.  143.  While  jury  is 
being  empanelled :  Jorgenson  v.  Butte  Co. 
(1893),   13  Mont.  288,  34  Pac.  37. 

As  to  when  the  Supreme  Court  will 
consider  as  made  amendments  whicli 
might  have  been  made  in  the  court  be- 
low, see  Evansville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Maddox  (1893),  134  Ind.  571,  33  X.  E. 
345;  Helphrey  v.  Strobach  (1895),  13 
Wash.   128,  42  Pac.    537;   Richardson  v 


644 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


promise,  and  its  invention  in  order  that  certain  classes  of  liabili- 
ties might  be  enforced  by  means  of  the  action  of  assumpsit,  have 


Moore  (1902),  30  Wash.  406,  71  Pac.  18; 
Scholey  v.  Demattos  (1898),  18  Wash. 
504,  52  Pac.  242. 

A  complaint  which  states  no  cause  of 
action  cannot  he  amended :  Whaley  v. 
Lawton  (1900),  57  S.  C.  2.56,  35  S.  E.  558  ; 
Ruberg  v.  Brown  (1897),  50  S.  C.  397,  27 
S.  E.  873;  Jacobs  v.  Gilreath  (1893),  41 
S.  C.  143,  19  S.  E.  308;  Mizzell  v.  Ruffin 
(1896),  118  N.  C.  69,  23  S.  E.  927. 

Tests  to  determine  whether  an  amend- 
ment introduces  a  new  cause  of  action, 
have  been  given  by  some  courts.  The 
Supreme  Court  of  Oregon,  in  Hume  v. 
Kelly  (1896),  28  Ore.  398,  43  Pac.  380, 
has  given  the  following  :  "  A  general  test 
as  to  whether  a  new  cause  of  action  would 
be  introduced  by  a  proposed  amendment 
is  to  inquire  if  a  recovery  had  upon  the 
original  complaint  would  bar  a  recovery 
under  the  complaint  if  the  amendment 
was  allowed,  or  if  the  same  evidence 
would  support  both,  or  the  same  measure 
of  damages  is  applicable,  or  both  are  sub- 
ject to  the  same  plea."  The  rule  given 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  is  as 
follows :  "  There  are  two  tests  by  which 
to  determine  whether  a  second  petition  is 
an  amendment  or  a  sub.stitution  of  a  new 
cause  of  action :  First,  whether  the  same 
evidence  will  support  both  petitions,  and, 
second,  whether  the  same  measure  of 
damages  will  apply  to  both.  If  these 
questions  are  answered  in  the  aflBrmative, 
it  is  an  amendment ;  if  in  the  negative,  it 
is  a  substitution  :  "  Liese  v.  Meyer  (1898), 
143  Mo.  547,  45  S.  W.  282.  See  also 
Grigsby  v.  Barton  County  (1902),  169 
Mo.  221,  69  S.  W.  296,  Avhere  the  test 
suggested  is  whether  the  same  evidence 
AviU  su]>port  both  and  the  same  judgment 
can  be  rendered  under  both. 

Miscellaneous  Rules  respecting  Amendments. 

"A  party  cannot  answer  an  amended 
petition,  and,  when  evidence  is  offered  to 
maintain  its  allegations,  object  for  the 
first  time  on  the  ground  that  tlie  amend- 
ment is  a  departure  from  the  original :  " 
Bender  v.  Zimmerman  (1896),  135  Mo. 
53,  36  S.  W.  210.  Enlarging  the  issues 
by  amendment,    if  properly   made,   does 


not  release  the  surety  for  costs  even  for 
the  costs  accruing  after  the  amendments. 
Schawacker  v.  McLauglilin  (1897),  139 
Mo.  333,  40  S.  W.  935.  A  motion  to 
strike  out  a  third  amended  petition 
should  not  be  sustained  if  the  cause  of 
action  stated  in  the  original  and  last  peti- 
tion is  the  same :  Sanguinett  v.  Web- 
ster (1900),  153  Mo.  343,  54  S.  W.  563. 
"  The  rule  is  well  established  and  is  not 
in  conflict  with  our  statute  regulating 
amendments  to  pleadings,  that,  where  a 
complaint  to  which  an  answer  has  been 
filed  is  amended  in  substantial  manner, 
the  defendant  has  an  alisolute  right  to 
plead  de  noro :  "  Schwartz  v.  Stock  (1 901 ), 
Nev.,  65  Pac.  351. 

Where  an  answer  denies  the  allega- 
tions of  the  original  complaint,  and  an 
amended  complaint  is  filed  containing  a 
mere  repetition  of  the  allegations  in  the 
original,  it  need  not  be  answered:  Bros- 
sard  V.  Morgan  (1900),  Idaho,  61  Pac. 
1031 ;  Schmidt  r.  Mitcliell  (1897),  101  Ky. 
570,  41  S.  W.  929.  Where  an  "amended 
complaint  "  is  identical  with  the  original 
to  which  a  demurrer  has  been  sustained, 
no  demurrer  can  be  heard  to  such  so-called 
amended  complaint,  since  it  is  out  of  the 
record.  The  ruling  on  the  original  com- 
plaint applies  equally  to  the  unchanged 
amended  complaint :  Ellis  v.  City  of  In- 
dianapolis (1897),  148  Ind.  70,  47  N.  E. 
218.  "  Prejudicial  error  cannot  be  pred- 
icated on  an  order  allowing  a  pleading  to 
be  amended  when  the  amendment  does 
not  change  the  issues,  nor  affect  the  quan-_ 
tum  of  proof  as  to  any  material  fact : " 
Cate  V.  Hutchinson  (1899),  58  Neb.  232,  78 
N.  W.  500.  "  It  is  not  reversible  error  to 
refuse  to  permit  a  petition  to  be  amended 
on  the  trial,  when  such  amendment,  taken 
in  connection  with  the  other  averments 
of  the  petition,  did  not  state  a  cause  of 
action:  "  Bartlett  v.  Scott  (1898),  55  Neb. 
477,  75  N.  W.  1 102.  "  Courts  very  properly 
refuse  afiirmatively  to  direct  wliat  lan- 
guage must  be  employed  in  drafting 
pleadings :  "  Omaha  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  l»org 
(1895), 44  Neb.  523,62  N.  W.862.  "  Wlicrc, 
U])on  tlic  trial  of  an  action,  testimcjny  is 
admitted  without  objection,  it  is  not  error 


ELECTION   BETWEEN    ACTIONS. 


C45 


been  already  explained.     As  the  fictitious  promise  was  implied 
or  inferred  by  the  law  from  acts  or  omissions  of  the  defendant 


for  the  court  to  permit  the  pleadings  to 
be  amended  to  conform  to  the  proof:'" 
Whipple  V.  Fowler  (1894),  41  Keb.  675,  60 
N.  W.  15. 

After  the  filing  of  an  amended  com- 
plaint, the  defendant  has  the  choice  of 
filing  a  new  answer  or  letting  the  old  one 
stand  as  his  answer  to  the  amended  com- 
plaint, but  after  his  election  to  file  a  new 
answer  the  old  one  cannot  be  resorted  to 
to  save  a  default,  and  judgment  may  he 
taken  against  him  if  he  neglects  to  file  his 
new  answer :  Gettings  i'.  Buchanan  ( 189G), 
17  Mont.  581,  44  Pac.  77  ;  Ermentrout  v. 
Am.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1895),  63  Minn.  194, 
65  N.  W.  270.  Where  an  amendment  is 
allowed,  eitiier  a  copy  of  the  amendment 
or  of  the  pleading  as  amended,  may  be 
filed  and  served,  though  the  latter  is  the 
better  practice  :  Holter  Hardware  Co.  v. 
Ontario  Mining  Co.  (1900),  24  Mont.  184, 
61  Pac.  3.  The  filing  of  an  amended 
]ileading  waives  any  error  committed  in 
rulings  upon  such  pleading:  State  ex  rel. 
V.  Jackson  (1895),  142  Ind.  259,  41  N.  E. 
534;  Gowen  v.  Gilson  (1895),  142  Ind. 
328,  41  N.  E.  594;  Weaver  v.  Apple 
(1896),  147  Ind.  304,  46  N.  E.  642.  An 
amendment  made  not  to  show  but  to  con- 
fer jurisdiction  is  not  allowable  :  Gillam  v. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  (1897),  121  N.  C.  369,  28 
S.  E.  470.  But  see  Boyd  r.  Roanoke 
Lumber  Co.  (1903),  132  N.  C.  184,  43 
b.  E.  631,  where  sucli  an  amendment  was 
allowed. 

"  To  strike  out  a  pleading  which  is  sus- 
ceptible of  being  amended  by  a  statement 
of  fticts  known  to  exist,  and  which  consti- 
tute a  cause  of  action  or  defence  to  an 
action,  is  a  harsh  proceeding,  and  should 
only  be  resorted  to  in  extreme  cases  : " 
Burns  r.  Scooffy  (1893),  98  Cal.  271,  33 
Pac.  86.  A  so-called  amendment  to  a  pe- 
tition may  be  stricken  out  on  motion  when 
the  matters  alleged  are  not  in  support  of 
the  cause  of  action  but  in  reply  to  matters 
alleged  in  appellee's  cross-petition  :  Wood 
V.  Brown  (1897),  104  la.  124,  73  N.  W. 
608.  A  material  amendment,  itnverified, 
to  a  verified  complaint,  renders  it  neces- 
sary to  treat  the  complaint  as  unverified  : 
Brown  r.  Rhinehart  Bros.  (1893),  1 12  N.  C. 


772,  16  S.  E.  840.  The  validity  of  an  at- 
tachment is  not  affected  by  the  filing  of  an 
amended  complaint  which  does  not  change 
the  cause  of  action  :  Meyer  r.  Brooks 
(1896),  29  Ore.  203,  44  Pac.  281.  "  Great 
liberality,  it  is  true,  should  be  exercised  iu 
allowing  amendments  to  pleadings;  but 
that  liberality  should  only  be  displaved  in 
furtherance  of  justice.  This  is  always  the 
controlling  consideration  before  the  trial 
court : "  Bank  of  Woodland  v.  Heron 
(1898),  122  Cal.  107,  54  Pac.  .537. 

"  When  a  judgment  is  reversed  and 
cau.se  remanded,  it  stands  the  same  as  if 
no  trial  had  been  had,  and  pleadings  may 
be  amended,  supplemental  pleadings  filed, 
and  new  issues  formed,  under  proper  re- 
strictions, except  that  an  issue  determined 
upon  an  agreed  statement  of  facts  cannot 
generally  be  reopened  :  "  C/'onsoliilated 
Steel  &  Wire  Co.  v.  Burnham  (1899),  8 
Okla.  514,  58  Pac.  654.  "The  trial  court 
may  well  refuse  to  permit  the  amendment 
of  a  defective  plea  in  abatement,  the  only 
purpose  of  which  is  to  prevent  the  court 
from  determining  on  its  merits  a  cause 
properly  before  it:"  Mitchell  i;.  Smith 
(1901),  74Coun.  125,  49  Atl.  909.  "Where 
the  objection  that  a  complaint  fails  to 
state  a  cause  of  action  because  of  the 
omission  of  a  material  allegation  is  not 
taken  by  demurrer,  but  b_v  a  motion  to 
dismiss  at  the  trial,  the  court  mav  in  its 
discretion  reserve  its  decision  until  pos- 
sessed of  the  case  upon  the  merits  and 
then  permit  an  amendment  when  the  sub- 
stantial rights  of  the  defendant  will  not 
be  injuriously  affected  thereby  ; "  National 
Bank  of  Deposit  r.  Rogers  (1901),  166 
N.  Y.  380,  59  N.  E.  922.  An  oral  deci.sion 
allowing  au  amendment  of  the  complaint 
is  sufficient :  Findlay  i-.  Knickerbocker  Ice 
Co.  (1899),  104  Wis.  375,  80  N.  W.  436. 
A  pleading  will  not  be  allowed  to  be 
amended  to  conform  to  the  proof  when 
the  facts  proved  are  admissible  under  the 
original  pleading  :  Buxton  v.  Sargent 
(1898),  7  N.  D.  503,  75  N.  W.  811.  The 
sufficiency  of  an  amendment  to  cure  the 
defect  in  the  pleading  is  not  a  question  to 
be  passed  on  in  determining  whetlier  or 
not   it   should    be   allowed  :    Freeman    v. 


646  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

which  created  a  liability  ex  cequo  et  bono,  it  sometimes  happened 
that  these  acts  or  omissions  were  tortious  in  their  nature.  In 
such  a  case,  tlierefore,  the  liability  could  be  regarded  in  a  double 
aspect;  namely,  as  directly  springing  from  the  tort  committed 
by  the  wrong-doer,  or  as  arising  from  the  promise  to  make  com- 
pensation which  the  law  implied  and  imputed  to  him.  As  the 
single  liability  thus  resulting  from  the  given  acts  or  omissions 
was  considered  under  these  two  different  aspects,  the  common 
law  provided  two  distinct  means  or  instruments  for  enforcing 
it,  —  one  by  the  form  of  action  appropriate  for  the  recovery  of 
damages  from  the  tort,  the  other  by  the  form  of  action  appropri- 
ate for  the  recovery  of  damages  from  the  breach  of  an  implied 
promise.  In  what  instances  —  that  is,  in  what  classes  of  tortious 
acts  or  omissions  —  the  right  of  action  existed  had  been  deter- 
mined by  the  courts,  although  there  was  not  a  complete  uniform- 
ity of  decision  among  the  tribunals  of  the  several  States. 

^  459.  *  568.  New  Procedure  makes  no  Change  in  Doctrine  of 
Election.  The  doctrine  of  electing  between  an  action  ex  delicto 
and  one  ex  contractu,  or,  to  speak  more  accurately,  between 
treating  the  cause  of  action  as  arising  from  tort  or  from  con- 
tract, has  been  retained  under  the  new  procedure ;  and  it  is  ap- 
plied in  the  same  classes  of  cases,  and  is  governed  by  the  same 
general  rules,   as  in  the    former  system.^     The   courts,  without 

Brown    (1902),    115    Ga.    23,    41     S.    E.  Where  a  new  defence  is  introduced  on 

385.  the  trial  by  amendment,  the  plaintiff  is  en- 

Where  evidence  is  admitted  whicli  is  titled  to  a  continuance :  Dunn  v.  Bozarth 

not  in   conformity  to  the  pleadings,  the  (1899),  59  Neb.  244,  80  N.  W.  811. 

latter  will  be  treated  as  amended  to  agree  "  The  mode  of   amending  pleadings  in 

with   the   proof :    Nicklace   v.    Dickerson  this  State   is   by  rewriting  the  pleading, 

(1898),  65  Ark.  422,  46  S.  W.  945  ;  Davis  leaving  out  such  allegations  and  inserting 

V.  Goodman  (1896),  62  Ark.  262,  35  S.  W.  such  other  allegations,  as  may  be  desired, 

231.  so  that  all  parts  of  the  pleading  shall  be 

The  prayer  for  relief  may  be  amended  :  in   one   instrument   complete   in   itself:" 

Hogueland'i-.  Arts  (1901),  113  la.  634,  85  Satterlund  v.  Beal  (1903),  —  N.  D.  — ,  95 

N.  °VV.   818;    Slater   v.   Estate  of  Cook  N.  W.  518.] 

(1893),  93  Wis.  104,67  N.  W.  15;  Liese  v.  i  [J.n  Downs  v.  Finnegan  (1894),  58 
Meyer  (1898),  143  Mo.  547,  45  S.  W.  282.  Minn.  112,  59  N.  W.  981,  the  court  said: 
In  the  last  case  it  was  held  that  such  an  "It  being  established  that  an  injured  party 
amendment  did  not  change  the  cause  of  may  elect  between  the  two  forms  of  re- 
action, medial  proceedings,  —  may  sue  in  tort  for 

An  amendment   substituting   the  real  the  wrong  done  him,  or  in  assumpsit  as 

party  in  interest  is  not  allowaljle  :  Wilson  upon  an  implied  contract,  —  it  follows  that 

V.  Kiesel  (1894),  9  Utah,  397,35  Pac.  488.  by  waiving  the  tort  the  demand  may  be 

Contra,  Service  i-.  Bank  (1900),  62  Kan.  counterclaimed  against  a  plaintiff's  cause 

857.  62  I'ac.  670;  Hud.son  i;.  Banitt  (1901),  of  action  arising  on  anotlier  contract,  or, 

62  Kan.  137,  61  Tac.  737.  where  itself  set  up  l^y  a  plaintKf  as  aiiMi.g 


ELECTION    BETWEKN    ACTIONS.  647 

perhaps  appreciating  the  full  extent  of  the  changes,  and  the 
effect  of  abolishing  all  distinctions  between  forms  of  actions, 
decided  that  the  power  of  choice  between  the  two  modes  of 
enforcing  demands,  of  waiving  the  tort  and  suing  upon  an  im- 
plied promise,  still  exists;  and  these  early  decisions  have  been 
followed  by  so  many  others  without  an  expression  of  dissent, 
that  the  rule  is  as  firmly  established  in  the  reformed  as  it  was  in 
the  common-law  pleading.  The  single  principle  upon  which  the 
entire  doctrine  rests  is  very  simple,  and  should  —  and  would,  if 
the  courts  were  always  consistent  in  acting  upon  it  —  afford  a 
ready  and  plain  solution  of  every  question,  new  or  old,  which 
can  be  suggested.  This  single  principle  may  be  thus  formulated: 
From  certain  acts  or  omissions  of  a  party  creating  a  liability  to 
make  compensation  in  damages,  the  law  implies  a  promise  to  pay 
such  compensation.  Whenever  this  is  so,  and  the  acts  or  omis- 
sions are  at  the  same  time  tortious,  the  twofold  aspect  of  the 
single  liability  at  once  follows,  and  the  injured  party  may  treat 
it  as  arising  from  the  tort,  and  enforce  it  by  an  action  setting 
forth  the  tortious  acts  or  defaults ;  or  may  treat  it  as  arising 
from  an  implied  contract,  and  enforce  it  by  an  action  setting 
forth  the  facts  from  which  the  promise  is  inferred  by  the  law. 
It  should  be  remembered  that  different  promises  may  be  inferred 
from  different  acts  or  omissions:  thus,  in  one  case,  the  jDromise 
might  be  to  pay  over  money  had  and  received  to  the  use  of  the 
injured  party;  and  in  another,  where  no  money  had  been  actually 
received,  the  implied  undertaking  might  be  that  the  Avrong-doer 
would  pay  the  value  or  price  of  goods  taken  by  him.     This  dis- 

on  contract,  it  may  be  opposed  by  a  coun-  might  be  maintained.     That  the  doctrine 

terclaim  arising  out  of  another  contract,  has  been  greatly  developed  and  extended 

.  .  .  The  right  to  waive  the  tort  and  to  in   application   is  apparent,  and   that   in 

recover  on  an  implied  assumpsit  is  an  ex-  cases   wliere   property    has   been  severed 

ception  to  the  principles  of  code  pleading,  from  real  estate  by  a  wrongdoer,  carried 

and  there  must  be  no  extension  beyond  from  tiie  freeliold,  and   converted  to  his 

what  is  allowed  at  common  law.  .  .  .  Cer-  own  use,  tlie  riglitf ul  owner  may  sue  and 

tain  it  is  that  the  rule  has  been  extended  recover  its  value  as  on  implied  contract,  is 

to  cases  wliere  there  has  been  a  wrongful  tlioroughly  established,  although  it    may 

conversion  of  property  of  one  person  to  not  be  in  harmony  with  the  reformed  sys- 

the  use  of  another,  whether  sold  or  not  by  teni  of  pleading.     No  reason  exists  why, 

the  latter,  and  also  to  cases  where  a  tres-  if  permissible  at  all,  it  should  not  include 

passer  has  severed  trees  from  land  in  pos-  cases  arising  out  of  trespass,  to  the  extent 

session  of  the  owner,  or  has  quarried  stone  that  the  property  carried  away  is  beneficial 

thereon,   and    has   afterwards   taken  the  to  the  trespasser,  except  where  it  would 

trees  or  stone  away,  converting  the  same  involve  a  trial  of  title  to  real  estate."] 
to  his  own  use,  so  that  trover  or  replevin 


648  CIVIL    REiMEDIES. 

tinction,    so   palpable   and   commonplace,    seems    to   have   been 
overlooked  in  some  classes  of  decisions. 

§  460.  *  569.  Classes  of  Cases  -w^here  Election  is  allcwed. 
Conversion.  Conflict  of  Authority.  Having  thus  formulated  the 
general  principle  which  prevailed  in  the  former  procedure,  and 
which  has  been  adopted  to  its  full  extent  in  the  present,  I  shall, 
in  its  further  illustration,  state  the  various  classes  of  cases  to 
which  it  has  been  applied  by  the  courts,  and  shall  thus  ascertain 
the  particular  instances  —  the  kinds  of  wrongful  acts  and  omis- 
sions —  in  which  the  right  of  election  exists.  To  this  will  be 
added  a  few  observations  upon  the  mode  of  indicating  the  fact 
that  an  election  has  been  made  by  the  pleader,  that  a  tort  has 
been  waived,  and  a  cause  of  action  upon  contract  has  been 
chosen.  The  most  common  classes  of  tortious  acts,  in  respect 
of  which  the  right  of  election  has  been  invoked,  are  the  wrongful 
taking  or  conversion  of  chattels,  or  things  in  action,  or  money; 
the  wrongful  use  of  land,  and  appropriation  of  its  rents  and 
profits ;  sales  of  goods  on  a  credit  procured  by  the  fraud  of  the 
purchaser;  frauds  and  deceits  generally  by  which  money  or 
things  in  action,  or  chattels,  are  obtained;  and  certain  cases  of 
express  contract,  in  which,  from  the  policy  of  the  law,  the  lia- 
bility is  regarded  as  resulting  from  a  violation  of  general  duty 
as  well  as  from  a  breach  of  the  stipulations  of  the  agreement. 
These  classes  will  be  considered  separately.  It  is  a  firmly  estab- 
lished rule,  from  which  no  dissent  has  been  suggested,  that  when 
goods  or  things  in  action  have  under  any  circumstances  been 
wrongfully  taken  or  detained  or  converted,  and  have  been  sold 
or  disposed  of  by  the  wrong-doer,  the  owner  may  sue  in  tort  to 
recover  damages  for  the  taking  and  carrying  away  or  the  conver- 
sion, or  he  may  waive  the  tort  and  sue  on  the  implied  promise 
to  refund  the  price  or  value  as  money  had  and  received  to  the 
plaintiff's  use.^  When,  however,  the  chattels  or  things  in  action 
have  been  simply  taken  or  converted,  but  not  sold  or  disposed  of 
by  the  wrong-doer,  a  conflict  of  opinion  exists  in  respect  to  the 
power  of  the  plaintiff  to  elect  between  the  two  forms  of  action. 

1  McKuight  r.  Dunlop,  4  Barb.  36,  42  ;  Evans,  43  Cal.  380;    Gordon   v.  Bruner, 

Hinds  V.  Tweddle,  7  How.  I'r.  278,  281 ;  49  Mo.  570,  571  ;  Putnam  v.  Wise,  I   Hill 

Harpendiiig  v.  Shoemaker,  37  Barb.  270,  (N.  Y.),  234,  240,  and  the  reporter's  note ; 

291  ;    Cliainbers  v.    Lewis,    2    Hilt.    591  ;  Berly  v.  Taylor,  5  Hill,  577,  584,  and  the 

Leach  i;.  Leach,  2  X.  Y.  S.  C.  657  ;  Tryon  reporter's  note. 
V.  Baker,   7   Lan.s.   511,   514;    Roberts  v. 


ELECTION    BETWEEN    ACTIONS. 


649 


Certain  cases  deny  this  power.  This  ruling  is  rested  upon  the 
ground  that  the  goods  remaining  in  the  hands  of  the  wrong-doer, 
and  no  money  having  in, fact  Leen  received  Ly  him,  an  implied 
promise  to  pay  over  money  had  and  received  by  the  defendant  to 
the  plaintiff's  use  does  not  and  cannot  arise. ^  In  this  country, 
however,  the  weight  of  authority  is  strongly  tlie  other  way. 
The  cases  generally  admit  an  election,  under  the  circumstances 
described,  between  an  action  based  upon  the  tort,  and  an  action 
based  upon  the  implied  promise  to  pay  the  price  or  value  of  the 
goods.  The  tort  is  waived,  and  the  transaction  is  treated  as  a 
sale,  and  not  as  an  instance  of  money  had  and  received.  This 
distinction  is  certainly  supported  by  the  plainest  principles,  if 
the  doctrine  of  implied  promises  and  election  is  to  be  admitted  at 
all. 2     If  money  has  been  converted,  the  right  of  election  exists 


1  McKnight  v.  Duiilop,  4  Barb.  3G,  42  ; 
Henry  v.  Marvin,  3  E.  D.  Smith,  71  ; 
Tryou  v.  Baker,  7  Lans.  511,  514.  [Held, 
iu  Brittain  v.  Payne  (1896),  118  N.  C.  989, 
24  S.  E.  711,  that  when  jjroperty  is  tor- 
tiously  taken  and  sold,  the  owner  may 
waive  the  tort  and  sue  in  assumpsit.] 

2  Hinds  V.  Tweddle,  7  How.  Pr.  278, 
281  ;  Chambers  v.  Lewis,  2  Hilt.  591  ; 
Putnam  v.  Wise,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  234,  240 
(and  see  note  of  the  reporter)  ;  Berly  i-. 
Taylor,  5  Hill,  577,  584  (and  note  of  "the 
reporter)  ;  Roberts  v.  Evans,  43  Cal.  380. 
Gordon  v.  Bruner,  49  Mo.  570,  571  :  "  In 
Massachusetts,  in  Jones  v.  Hoar,  5  Pick. 
285,  to  which  there  is  a  note  to  a  former 
opinion  reviewing  the  English  cases,  it 
was  held  that  no  contract  could  be  implied 
unless  the  goods  were  sold  and  converted 
into  money,  and  the  same  doctrine  was  held 
in  Pennsylvania,  in  Willett  v.  Willett,  3 
Watts,  277,  and  in  Morrison  v.  Rogers,  2 
111.  317.  But  such  lias  not  been  the  uni- 
form ruling.  In  Putnam  v.  Wise,  1  Hill, 
240,  the  court  holds  that,  '  according  to 
the  well-known  right  of  election  in  such 
cases,  the  plaintiff  might  have  brought 
''assumpsit"  as  for  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered against  those  who  had  tortiously 
taken  their  property.'  To  this  the  re- 
porter, Mr.  Hill,  adds  a  note,  reviewing 
the  cases,  and  disapproving  the  doctrine 
of  Jones  V.  Hoar.  (See  Hill  v.  I^avis, 
3  N.  H.  384 ;  Stockett  v.  'Watkins's  Adm., 
2  Gill  &  J.  326,  and  cases  cited.)  "     Quot- 


ing early  Missouri  decisions  to  the  same 
effect,  —  Floyd  v.  Wiley,  1  Mo.  430,  643  ; 
Johnson  v.  Strader,  3  Mo.  359,  —  the 
learned  judge  adds  :  "  It  may  be  treated, 
then,  as  the  doctrine  in  this  State,  that 
one  who  has  converted  to  his  own  use  the 
personal  property  of  another,  when  sued 
for  the  value  of  that  property  as  sold  to 
him,  will  not  be  permitted  to  say  in  de- 
fence that  he  obtained  it  wrongfully." 
See  also  Small  v.  Robinson,  9  Hun,  418  ; 
Cushman  v.  Jewell,  7  id.  525,  530  (an  un- 
supported dictum)  ;  Loomis  v.  Mowry, 
8  id.  31 1 ;  Freer  v.  Denton,  61  N.  Y.  492  ; 
Fields  V.  Bland,  81  id.  239  ;  Comstock  v. 
Hier,  73  id.  269 ;  Kalckhoff  v.  Zoehrlaut, 
40  Wi.s.  427;  Chamballe  v.  McKenzie,  31 
Ark.  155;  Huston  v.  Plato,  3  Colo.  402  ; 
Brady  I'.  Brennan,  25  Minn.  210;  Logan 
V.  Wallis,  76  N.  C.  416  ;  Loomis  v.  O'Neal, 
73  Mich.  582;  Lehmann  v.  Schmidt,  87 
Cal.  15;  Terry  v.  Munger,  121  N.  Y.  161  ; 
Abbott  V.  Blos.som,  66  Barb.  353,  356; 
Starr  Cash  Car  Co.  v.  Reinliardt  (Com. 
PI.  1892),  20  N.  Y.  Suppl.  872. 

QTo  the  same  effect  are  Galvin  v.  Mac 
Mining  Co.  (1894),  14  Mont.  508,  37  Pac. 
366;  Cragg  v.  Arendale  (1901),  113  Ga. 
181,  38  S.  E.  399;  Crown  Cycle  Co.  v. 
Brown  (1901),  39  Ore.  285,  46  Pac.  451  ; 
Biaithwaite  v.  Akin  (1893),  3  N.  D.  365, 
56  N.  W.  133;  Anderson  v.  Bank  (1896), 
5  N.  D.  451,  67  N.  W.  821. 

In  Anderson  v.  Bank  {supro),  it  was 
held  that  wliere  an  agent,  authorized  to 


650  CIVIL   llEMEDIES. 

under  the  operation  of  either  rule,  since  the  actual  receipt  of 
money  by  the  defendant  brings  the  case  exactly  within  the  reason 
and  operation  of  the  doctrine  as  first  stated.^  The  same  choice 
between  the  actions  may  sometimes  be  possible  when  the  liability 
is  connected  with  a  claim  to  land,  or  grows  out  of  its  use,  al- 
though the  instances  are  much  fewer  than  those  of  the  preceding 
class.  Thus,  when  the  owner  agreed  to  lease  certain  premises 
to  the  plaintiff  for  a  term  of  years  commencing  at  a  future  day 
named,  but  before  that  day  actually  leased  them  to  another  per- 
son who  took  possession,  and  when  the  time  arrived  the  plaintiff 
demanded  possession,  tendered  the  rent,  and  on  refusal  brought 
an  action  for  damages,  it  was  objected  on  the  trial  that  his  only 
remedy  was  ejectment  against  the  tenant  in  possession.  The 
court  held,  that,  while  the  plaintiff  might  have  maintained 
ejectment,  he  could  also  bring  an  action  against  the  lessor, 
which  could  be  either  upon  the  agreement  express  or  implied, 
or  in  tort  for  the  violation  of  the  duty  arising  from  the  relation 
of  lessor  and  lessee  between  the  parties.^  It  is  settled  in  Wis- 
consin, after  a  careful  consideration  and  an  exhaustive  analysis 
and  comparison  of  the  conflicting  decisions,  that  when  the  de- 
fendant had  committed  a  wilful  trespass  upon  the  plaintiff's  land 
by  deliberately  turning  his  cattle  thereon,  in  order  that  they  might 
feed  upon  the  grass,  the  plaintiff  might  waive  the  tort, and  sue 
upon  an  implied  contract  for  the  price  and  value  of  the  pasturage.^ 
§  461.  *  570.  Actions  against  Common  Carriers  for  Loss  or  In- 
jury to  Goods.  Other  Cases.  It  is  a  familiar  rule,  that  the  action 
against  a  common  carrier  for  a  loss  or  injury  of  goods  may  either 
be  in  tort  for  the  violation  of  his  general  duty,  or  on  the  contract 
which  he  expressly  or  impliedly  enters  into.  The  owner  has  his 
election  which  of  these  remedies  he  will  pursue ;  but  his  choice 
cannot  alter  the  extent  of  the  carrier's  liability.^     P"'raud  in  its 

sell  at  a  given  price,  sells  to  himself,  and  '  Norden  v.  Jones,  33  Wis.  600,  604, 

the  principal  waives  the  tort  and  sues  in  605.     The  opinion  of  Dixon  C.  J.  is  a  full 

assumpsit,  this  does  not  constitute  a  ratitt-  and  most  instructive  examination  of  the 

cation  of  the  agent's  act  so  as  to  limit  tiie  doctrine. 

recovery  to  the   price  at  which  the  agent  *  Campbell   v.  Perkins,  8  N.  Y.  430, 

had  been  authorized  to  sell.     The  suit  is  438;  Brown  v.  Treat,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.),  225; 

purely  one  in  general  a.ssumpsit.]  People  v.  Kendall,  2.5  Wend.  399  ;  Wallace 

1  Tryon  v.  Baker,  7  Lans.  511,  514.  t;.  Morss,  5  Hill,  391 ;  Campbell  v.  Stakes, 

2  Trull  V.  Granger,  8  N.  Y.  115.     See,  2  Wend.  137. 

however,   Carpenter   v.    Stilwell,  3   Abb.  QSee  Poly  r.  Williams  (1894),  101  Cal. 

Pr.  459.  648,  36  Pac.   102,  where   a  counterclaim 


ELECTION   BETWEEN    ACTIONS.  651 

various  phases  also  furnishes  many  occasions  and  opportunities 
for  the  exercise  of  an  election  between  actions.  One  of  the  most 
common  is  the  case  of  a  sale  upon  a  credit  procured  by  the  false 
and  fraudulent  representations  of  the  vendee  as  to  his  pecuniary 
responsibility.  Upon  discovering  the  fraud,  even  before  the 
expiration  of  the  credit,  the  vendor  may  rescind  the  sale  and 
immediately  bring  an  action  in  form  of  tort  either  to  recover  the 
goods  themselves,  or  damages  for  their  taking  and  conversion; 
or  he  may  waive  the  tort,  and  sue  at  once  on  contract  for  the 
price. ^  And  when  money  has  been  obtained  by  false  and  fraudu- 
lent representations,  or  by  fraudulent  practices  of  any  kind,  the 
plaintiif  has  the  option  to  sue  either  in  tort  for  the  deceit,  or 
in  contract  for  money  had  and  received  by  the  defendant  to  his 
use. 2 

§  462.  *  571.  Principle  -which  determines  -when  a  Promise  is 
Implied.  The  conflict  which  has  existed  to  a  certain  extent 
among  the  decisions  in  reference  to  the  right  of  election,  and  the 
classes  of  tortious  acts  and  omissions  embraced  within  it,  can 
only  be  put  to  rest  by  determining  with  certainty  the  occasions 
and   circumstances  in  which  a  promise  will  be  implied   by  the 

was  filed  to  recover  upon  an  account  for  son,  77  N.  Y.  400 ;  Western  Assur.  Co.  r. 

nunsery  stock,  consisting  of  fruit-trees  and  Towle,  65  Wis.   247;   Farmers'  Nat.  Bk. 

£;rape-vines   eaten   up   and   destroyed    by  v.  Fonda,  65  Mich.  533 ;  Hurt  v.  Barnes, 

hogs,  cattle,  and  horses  of  the  plaintiff.  24  Neb.  782. 

A  demurrer  to  this  counterclaim  was  over-  >       -  Byxbie  v.  Wood,  24  N.  Y.  607,  610; 

ruled.     So  in  Monroe  v.  Cannon   (1900),  Union  Bk.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Mott,  27  N.  Y.  633, 

24  Mont.  316,  61  Pac.   863,  an  action  in  636.      It  will  be  noticed  that  these   two 

assumpsit  for  the  value  of  the  pa.sturage  cases   were    alike    in    all   their   essential 

was   allowed   in   the   case  of  a  wrongful  facts,  and  that  in  one  of  them  the  tort 

herding  of  sheep  on  plaintiff's  land.     See  Avas  held  to  have  been  waived,  and  in  tlie 

in   this  connection   Tanderup   ik   Hansen  other  not  to  have  been  waived ;  and  this 

(1894),  5  S.  D.  164,  58  N.  W.  578;  Zander  distinction  was  in   fact   made,   not   upon 

V.  Valentine  Blatz  Brewing  Co.  (1897),  95  any  difference  in  the  allegations,  but  be- 

Wis.  162,  70  N.  W.  164.  cause  it  subserved  the  ends  of  justice,  and 

But    it  was    held    in    Commonwealth  defeated  an  objection  of  mere  form.     A 

Title  Ins.  Co.  v,  Dokko  (1898),  71   Mijm.  peculiar  instance  of  fraud  was  presented 

533,  74  N.  W.  891,  that  "if  defendant  was  in  the  recent  case  of  Booth  v.  Farmers' 

a  trespasser  plaintiff  could  not  waive  the  &  Mech.  Bk.  of  Rochester,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C. 

tort,  and  sue  him  on  contract  as  his  ten-  45,  49.      See   the  opinion   of  Mullen   J., 

ant."     Same  holding  in  McLaue  c.  Kelly  given  in  full,  snpra,  §  *539. 

(1898),  72  i\Iinn.  395,  75  N.  W.  601. ]        "  l^lt  was  held  in  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  K. 

1  Roth  V.  Palmer,  27  Barb.  652,  and  Co.  v.  Becker  (1899).  67  Ark.  1,  53  S.  W. 
cases  cited  ;  Kayser  v.  Sichel,  34  Barb.  406,  that  a  servant  of  a  railroad  company 
84  ;  s.  c.  on  app.  sub  nom.  Wigand  v.  wiio  is  injured  when  in  the  service  of  liis 
Sickel,  3  Keyes,  120,  approving  Roth  v.  employer,  has  an  election  to  recover  dam- 
Palmer.  See  Claffin  v.  Taussig,  7  Hun,  ages  either  by  an  action  on  the  express 
223  ;  National  Trust  Co.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Gleu-  contract  or  by  an  action  ex  delicto  ] 


652  CIVIL   REMEDIES, 

law.  It  is  very  clear  that  whenever  the  promise  will  be  implied, 
if  the  acts  or  omissions  from  which  it  is  inferred  are  at  the  same 
time  tortious,  the  election  to  sue  for  the  tort  or  for  a  breach  of 
the  contract  must  necessarily  exist,  or  else  it  must  be  denied  on 
some  mere  arbitrary  and  insufficient  ground.  The  whole  discus- 
sion is  thus  reduced  to  the  single  question,  When  is  a  promise 
implied  by  the  law?  The  comprehensive  principle  which  fur- 
nishes a  definite  answer  to  this  inquiry,  applicable  to  all  circum- 
stances and  relations,  has  been  well  stated  by  the  courts  in  the 
following  terms :  "  When  a  promise  is  implied,  it  is  because  the 
party  intended  it  should  be,  or  because  natural  justice  plainlt/ 
requires  it  in  consideration,  of  some  benefit  received. ^^^  It  was  also 
said  by  a  very  able  English  judge,  that  "  no  party  is  bound  to 
sue  in  tort,  when  by  converting  the  action  into  an  action  on 
contract  he  does  not  prejudice  the  defendant;  and,  generally 
speaking,  it  is  more  favorable  to  the  defendant  that  he  should  be 
sued  in  contract."^  If  these  quotations  are  correct  statements 
of  the  general  principle,  it  is  plain  that  the  rule  maintained  by 
some  decisions,  which  would  restrict  the  right  of  election  to 
those  cases  in  which  the  wrong-doer  has  actually  received  money 
equitably  belonging  to  the  plaintiff,  is  erroneous.^ 

^  463..  *  572.  Method  of  Indicating  Election.  Averment  of 
Promise  as  a  Test.  The  foregoing  examJ3les  sufficiently  illustrate 
the  scope  and  extent  of  the  doctrine  under  consideration,  and 
the  class  of  liabilities  to  which  it  is  applied.  It  remains  to 
inquire  how,  under  the  new  procedure,  the  plaintiff  shall  indicate 
in  his  pleading  the  fact  that  he  has  actually  made  his  election, 
and  has  brought  his  action  in  tort  or  on  contract,  as  the  case  may 
be.  Under  the  old  system  no  such  question  could  arise.  The 
election  was  disclosed  by  the  form  of  the  action  itself.  If  the 
liability  was  to  be  treated  as  arising  from  contract,  assumpsit 
was  of  course  the  action  selected;  if  from  tort,  trover  or  case 

1  Web.ster  v.  Drinkwater,  5  Greenl.  where  the  plaintiff  would  have  been  al- 
322 ;  also  per  Beardsley  J.  in  Osborn  v.  lowed  to  pursue  liis  remedy  in  tort."  See 
Bell,  5  Denio,  370.  also  the  following  eases  :    Centre  Turiip. 

2  Young  V.  Marshall,  8  Bing.  43,  per  Co.  v.  Smith,  12  Vt.  217;  Cummings  v. 
Tindal  C.  .1.  Vorce,   3    Hill,   282 ;   Osborn    i-.    Bell,   5 

'^  It  wa.s  said  V)y  Hogeboom  J.,  while  Denio,    370;    Camp   v.   Pulver,   5   Barb, 

commenting    upon    this    narrow   rule   in  91;  Butts  ?;.  Collins,  13  Wend.  139,  154; 

Roth    V.   Palmer,   27    Barb.    6.52:    "Our  Lightly  u.  Clon.ston,  1  T.aunt.  113 ;  Hilly, 

courts     recognize     no    such     distinction.  Perrott,  3  Taunt.  274  ;  Young  i>.  Marshall, 

They    allow    the    election    in    all    cases  8  Bing.  43. 


ELECTION    BETWEEN    ACTIONS.  653 

or  replevin,  or  sometimes  trespass,  was  the  proper  instrument. 
Since  these  forms  have  been  abolished,  and  all  the  technical 
phrases  which  distinguished  one  proceeding  from  another  are 
abandoned,  it  is  only  by  the  substantial  nature  and  contents  of 
the  allegations  themselves  —  the  facts  which  they  aver  —  that 
the  election  can,  if  at  all,  be  now  indicated.  In  other  words, 
as  the  pleader  can  express  his  design  by  means  of  no  arbitrary 
symbols  in  the  complaint  or  petition,  he  must  show  that  he  has 
chosen  to  sue  either  in  tort  or  on  contract  by  the  very  substance 
of  the  averments  which  constitute  the  cause  of  action.  In  a 
recent  case  the  New  York  Supreme  Court  proposed  a  certain 
test,  and  declared  that  when  the  plaintiff  claims  to  have  waived 
the  tort,  and  to  have  sued  upon  an  implied  contract,  the  only 
possible  mode  of  showing  this  election  is  by  expressly  alleging  a 
promise  to  have  been  made  by  the  defendant ;  that  in  no  other 
manner  can  the  design  of  making  the  action  one  ex  contractu^  and 
of  distinguishing  it  fi'om  one  ex  delicto^  be  disclosed  on  the  face 
of  the  pleading.^  It  has  already  been  shown  that  this  conclusion 
is  directly  opposed  to  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  reformed 
pleading,  and  that  it  is  a  return  to  the  most  technical  and  purely 
fictitious  dogmas  and  distinctions  of  the  common-law  system. 
It  is  also  opposed  to  decisions  and  judicial  dicta  in  relation  to 
this  very  question  which  declare  that  such  a  mode  of  stating  the 
cause  of  action  is  inadmissible,  and  that  the  facts  alone  which 
constitute  it  must  be  averred  as  they  actually  took  place. '^  • 

§464.  *573.  No  Difficulty  -where  Promise  i.s  Express.  Sum- 
mons Suggested  as  Means  of  Indicating  Election  in  Case  of  Implied 
Promise.  Whenever  the  contract  relied  upon  is  express,  there 
can  be  no  difficulty  in  showing  the  election  upon  the  face  of  the 

1  Booth  V.  Farmers'  &  Mech.  Bk.  of  that  a  party  by  its  use  may  shut  himself 

Tlochester,  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  45,  49.     See  the  out   from    the    remedy   which    his   facts 

opinion  of  Mullen  J.,  supra,  §  *  539.  would    give    hipi."     As    the   court   were 

-  Byxbie  v.  Wood,  24  N.  Y.  607,  610;  here  discussing  the  doctrine  of  election, 

Chambers    i'.    Lewis,    2    Hilt.     591.      In  and    as    they   held    that    the    complaint 

Byxbie  v.  Wood,  the  learned  judge  pro-  stated  a  cause  of  action  on  contract,  and 

ceeds  as  follows  :   "  Under  the  code,  this  not  one  on  tort,  alt/ionrj/i  no  promise  was  al- 

implied   promise   is   treated    as  a  fiction,  letjed,  this  language,  and  the  decision  upon 

and   the  facts  out  of  which    the   prior   law  it,  are  entirely  inconsistent  with  the  posi- 

raised  the  promise  are  to  be  stated  without  tion  taken  and  the  test  suggested  by  the 

am/  designation  of  a  form  of  action ;   and  Supreme  Court  in  Booth    v.   Farmers'   & 

the  law  gives   such   judgnjent   as,  being  Mech.  Bank.     In  Chambers  v.  Lewis,  the 

asked  for,  is  appropriate  to  the  facts.     Of  courtsimply  said  that  whether  a  waiver  has 

course  we  cannot  now  say  that  a  particular  been  made  must  now  be  shown  by  the  fact.s 

phrase  makes  a  particular  form  of  action,  so  averred  in  the  complaint  and  by  the  prayer. 


654  CIVIL    IIE.MEDIES. 

pleading.  If  the  plaintiff  chooses  to  bring  an  action  ex  contractu, 
his  complaint  or  petition  will  simply  state  the  terms  of  the  agree- 
ment, and  the  facts  which  constitute  the  breach  thereof.  If  he 
chooses  to  bring  an  action  ex  delicto  for  a  violation  by  the  de- 
fendant of  his  general  duty,  his  complaint  or  petition  will  set  out 
the  facts  showing  his  own  primary  right  and  the  defendant's 
duty,  disregarding  the  contract,  and  will  then  allege  the  tortious 
acts  or  omissions  by  which  that  right  and  duty  were  violated. ^ 
Although  the  same  actual  transaction  between  the  parties  would 
be  stated  in  either  case,  the  form  and  manner  of  the  statement 
would  be  entirely  and  plainly  different.  An  ordinary  claim 
against  a  common  carrier  for  the  loss  of  goods  furnishes  a  familiar 
example  of  these  two  modes.  But  when  the  contract  relied  upon 
is  implied,  and  is  simply  the  fictitious  promise  which  the  law 
infei-s  from  the  tortious  acts  themselves,  it  may  be  doubted 
whether  it  is  possible,  in  accordance  with  the  true  principles  of 
the  reformed  pleading,  to  frame  a  complaint  or  petition  in  all 
cases  which  shall  show  on  its  face  that  the  plaintiff  has  elected 
to  bring  his  action  either  in  tort  or  on  contract.  In  one  class 
of  liabilities  it  is  certainly  possible  to  do  so;  namely,  in  those 
which  result  from  the  defendant's  fraudulent  representations  and 
deceits.  The  allegation  of  a  scienter  is  indispensable  in  the 
action  ex  delicto  based  upon  such  a  liability,  and  distinguishes  it 
in  a  marked  manner  from  the  correlative  action  based  upon  the 
implied  promise.  But  when  the  liability  results  from  the  v.rong- 
ful  taking  or  conversion  of  chattels,  from  trespasses,  negligences, 
or  other  similar  kinds  of  wrongs,  the  very  facts  which  are  alleged 
in  the  action  of  tort  are  the  facts  from  which  the  promise  is  in- 
ferred ;  and,  according  to  the  true  theory  of  pleading,  these  facts 
must  also  be  stated  in  the  action  ex  contractu,  without  any  legal 
inferences  or  conclusions.  It  conclusively  follows,  that,  in  this 
general  class  of  liabilities,  as  the  facts  which  constitute  the  cause 
of  action  are  the  same  in  each,  the  averments  of  the  complaint  or 
petition  must  be  the  same  in  each  kind  of  action,  if  the  essential 
principles  of  the  reformed  S3'stem  are  complied  with,  so  that  it 
is  impossible  to  indicate  upon  the  face  of  the  pleading  alone  the 
election  which  the  phiintiff  has  made.^     The  form  of  summons 

1  [^See  Fordvce  r.  Nix  (1893),  58  Ark.  ^  Qin  Braithwaite    i".    Akin    (1893),  3 

136,  23  S.  W.  967,  where  a  somewhat  am-  N.  1).  365,  56  N.  W.  133.  tlie  court  said  : 

l.igiions  complaint  was  held  to  declare  on  "  To   establish   a  cause   of  action    in  as- 

a  tort."]  sunipsit  ilie  waiver  must  be  averrfd  either 


ELECTION    BETWEEN    ACTIONS. 


G55 


adopted  would  therefore  seem  to  be  the  only  certain  test,  in  this 
class  of  cases,  by  which  the  nature  of  the  action  can  be  deter- 
mined, and  the  fact  of  an  election  can  be  made  known  to  the 
adverse  party.  The  only  other  alternative  is,  to  insert  in  the 
complaint  certain  legal  conclusions  or  descriptive  phrases  which, 
in  reference  to  the  statement  of  the  cause  of  action,  are  purely 
immaterial  and  redundant.^ 


express!}'  or  by  t^ie  manner  of  stating  the 
cause  of  action,  for  without  the  waiver  no 
cause  of  action  in  assumpsit  arises.  It  is 
not  the  wrong  which  gives  the  injured 
party  the  right  to  sue  on  contract ;  it  is 
tiie  wrong  coupled  with  the  waiver  of  the 
tort."  But  see  Lenhardt  v.  French  (1900), 
57  S.  C.  493,  .35  S.  E.  761,  where  the 
court  said,  respecting  an  election  to  waive 
a  tort  and  sue  in  contract,  "  the  code  re- 
quires no  specific  words  claiming  that 
such  an  election  has  been  made.  It  is 
enough  if  it  appears  to  be  made  in  effect 
in  the  pleadings." 

It  was  held  in  Tanderup  v.  Hansen 
(1894),  5  S.  D.  164,  58  N.  W.  578,  that 
where  plaintiff  sets  out  facts  showing  a 
cause  of  action  in  trespass,  and  then  pro- 
ceeds to  allege  that  he  waives  the  tort 
aforesaid,  and  for  further  cause  of  action 
alleges  a  fictitious  promise  to  pay  based 
on  the  same  facts  as  set  out  in  the  tres- 
pass, the  fictitious  averments  of  promise 
will  be  disregarded  as  surplusage,  and  the 
cause  of  action  as  appearing  in  the  facts 
shown  will  not  be  considered  vitiated  by 
the  subsequent  averments.^ 

^   ^Election. 

In  regard  to  the  general  subject  of  elec- 
tion, it  is  a  well  recognized  rule  that  in 
order  to  apply  the  doctrine  of  election  of 
remedies  the  party  must  actually  have  at 
command  inconsistent  remedies:  Elliott 
r.  Collins  (1898),  Idaho,  55  Pac.  301; 
Easton  v.  Somerville  (1900),  111  la.  164, 
82  N.  W.  475 ;  Austin  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Decker 
(1899),  109  la.  277,  80  N.  W.  312;  City  of 
Omaha  v.  Redick  (1901),  61  Neb.  163,  85 
N.  TV.  46  ;  State  v.  Bank  of  Commerce 
(1900),  61  Neb.  22,  85  N.  W.  43  ;  Fuller- 
Warren  Co.  V.  Harter  (1901),  110  Wis. 
80,  85  N.  W.  698;  Marshall  v.  Rugg 
(1896),  6  Wyo.  270,  44  Pac.  700. 

An  election,  to  be  bindinir,    must   be 


made  with  full  knowledge  of  the  facts : 
Blaker  v.  Morse  (1898),  60  Kan.  24,  55 
I'ac.  274 ;  City  of  Earned  v.  Jordan 
(1895),  55  Kan.  124,  39  Pac.  1030 ;  Deere, 
Wells,  &  Co.  V.  Morgan  (1901),  114  la. 
287,  86  N.  W.  271  ;  Jones  Co.  v.  Daniel 
(1899),  67  Ark.  206,  53  S.  W.  890.  Where 
the  court  orders  an  election  the  ruling 
will  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  except  in 
case  of  an  abuse  of  discretion  :  Phillips 
V.  Carver  (1898),  99  Wis.  561,  75  N.  W. 
432. 

An  election  once  made  is  conclusive: 
Wright,  Barrett,  etc.  Co.  v.  Robinson 
(1900),  79  Minn.  272,  82  N.  W.  632; 
Blaker  v.  Morse  (1898),  60  Kan.  24,  55 
Pac.  274 ;  City  of  Earned  v.  Jordan 
(1895),  55  Kan."l24,39Pac.  1030;  Carroll 
V.  Fethers  (1899),  102  Wis.  436,  78  N.  W. 
604;  Theusen  v.  Bryan  (1901),  113  la. 
496,  85  N.  W.  802 ;  Remington  v.  Hudson 
(1902),  64  Kan.  43,  67  Pac.  636. 

Where  a  complaint  contains  inconsist- 
ent counts,  the  remedy  is  a  motion  to 
strike:  Keller  v.  Strong  (1898),  104  la. 
585,  73  N.  W.  1071  ;  Fox  v.  Graves  (1896), 
46  Neb.  812,  65  N.  W.  887.  A  motion  to 
require  plaintiff  to  elect  is  also  proper : 
Fox  V.  Graves  (1896),  46  Neb.  812,  65 
N.  W.  887. 

Cases  in  which  remedies  were  held  to 
be  inconsistent :  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Henrie  (1901),  63  Kan.  330,  65  Pac.  665, 
damages  for  refusal  to  issue  railway  passes 
in  consideration  of  right  of  way,  and  ac- 
tion for  value  of  land  appropriated; 
Franey  v.  Wauwatosa  Park  Co.  (1898), 
99  Wis.  40,  74  N.  W.  548,  rescission  of 
contract  and  damages  for  fraud  in  obtain- 
ing it;  Eimited  Inv.  Co.  v.  Glendale  Inv. 
Ass'n  (1898),  99  Wis.  54,  74  N.  W.  633, 
same;  Rildebrand  v.  Tarbell  (1897),  97 
Wis.  446,  73  N  W.  53,  insisting  on  rights 
under  an  assignment  and  bringing  act^oT; 
to  have  i'  ."ot  a.-ide  ;.  Endinirtoij  r    P;;:  •'.; 


656 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


SECTION   FOURTH. 


THE   FORM   OF   THE   COMPLAINT   OR   PETITION. 

§  465.  *  574.  Introductory.  Having  thus  discussed  and  de- 
termined the  fundamental  principles  and  general  doctrines  of  the 
reformed  pleading,  which  apply  to  all  causes  of  action,  and  to 


(1901),  111  Wis.  208,  86  N.  W.  571,  action 
on  contract  for  damages  and  action  to 
rescind  ;  First  Nat.  Bank  i-.  Tootle  (1899), 
59  Neb.  44,  80  N.  W.  264,  action  on  con- 
tract on  account  for  goods  sold  under 
fraudulent  representations,  and  rescission 
of  sale ;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  McKinney 
(1896),  47  Neb.  149.  66  N.  W.  280,  same; 
Hargadiue-McKittrick  Dry  Goods  Co.  r. 
Warden  (1899),  151  Mo.  578,  52  S.  W.  59.3, 
same ;  City  of  Cincinnati  ^^  Emerson 
(1837),  57  0.  8t.  132,  48  N.  E.  667,  con- 
testing validity  of  assessment  on  a  ground 
common  to  plaintiff  and  all  other  owners 
of  abutting  lots,  and  on  a  ground  pertain- 
ing to  plaintiff's  lot  alone;  MacMurray- 
Judge,  etc.  Co.  v.  City  of  St.  Louis  (1896), 
138  Mo.  608,  39  S.  W.  467,  damages  for 
injury  to  property  and  injunction  re- 
straining such  injury ;  Davis  v.  Tubbs 
(1895),  7  S.  D.  488,  64  N.  W.  534,  action 
on  express  contract  and  on  implied  con- 
tract; Hackettr.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1894),  95  Ky.  236,  24  S.  W.  871,  damages 
for  death  and  for  suffering;  Thomas's 
Adm'r  V.  Maysville  Gas  Co.  (1900),  108 
Ky.  224,  56  S.  W.  153,  same;  Owensboro 
&  Nashville  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barclay's  Adm'r 
(1897),  102  Ky.  16,  43  S.  W.  177,  same; 
Seymore  v.  Rice  (1894),  94  Ga.  183,  21 
S.  E.  293,  fraud  and  breach  of  warranty  ; 
Vaule  V.  Steenerson  (1895),  63  Minn.  110, 
65  N.  W.  257,  damages  for  refusing  to 
make  a  levy  by  virtue  of  an  execution, 
and  damages  for  levying  another  execu- 
tion issued  ou  the  same  judgment  and 
appropriating  the  pnjceeds. 

Cases  in  which  remedies  were  held 
uot  to  be  inconsistent :  Bent  v.  Barnes 
(1895),  90  Wis.  631,  64  N.  W.  428,  re- 
ydevin  for  portion  of  goods  and  ecjuitable 
action  to  enforce  a  trust  in  funds  derived 
fr<jni  tlie  remainder ;  Simons  v.  Fagan 
(1901),  62  Neb.  287,  87  N.  W.  21,  damages 


for  maliciously  attaching  property  and 
action  ou  the  attachment  bond ;  Eastou 
V.  Somerville  (1900),  111  la.  164,82N.  W. 
475,  conversion  against  a  guardian  for 
buying  a  mortgage  with  funds  of  the  ward 
and  an  action  against  one  who  received 
these  funds  with  knowledge  of  the  facts  ; 
Savage  v.  Savage  (1899),  36  Ore.  268,  59 
Pac.  461,  action  on  a  note  and  on  the 
original  indebtedness ;  Johnsou-Brink- 
man  Co.  »;.  Mo.  Pac.  Ky.  Co.  (1894),  126 
Mo.  344,  28  S.  W.  870,  attachment  against 
a  vendee  and  replevin  ;  Saunders  v.  United 
States  Marble  Co.  (1901),  25  Wash.  475, 
65  I'ac.  782,  action  on  express  contract 
and  on  retaining  benefits  from  such  con- 
tract ;  Humphrey  i;.  Kingler  (1895),  94  la. 
182,  62  N.  W.  685,  prayers  in  the  alterna- 
tive that  a  deed  be  set  aside  for  fraud,  or 
that  contract  price  be  recovered. 

Tlieory  of  Case. 

A  complaint  must  proceed  upon  some 
definite  theory  and  must  be  good  upon 
that  theory  :  Yorn  v.  Bracken  (1899),  153 
Ind.  492,  55  N.  E.  257  ;  Terre  Haute,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  McCorkle  (1894),  140  Ind. 
613,  40  N.  E.  62 ;  Pittsburg,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Sullivan  (1894),  141  Ind.  83,  40  N.  E. 
138  ;  Citizens'  Street  Ry.  Co.  v.  Willoeby 
(1893),  134  Ind.  563,  33N.  E.  627;  Grent- 
ner  v.  Fehrenschield  (1902),  64  Kan.  764, 
68  Pac.  619;  Codding  v.  Munson  (1897), 
52  Neb.  580,  72  N.  W.  846  ;  Truesdell  v. 
Bourke  (1895),  145  N.  Y.  612,  40  N.  E. 
83. 

A  party  cannot  try  his  case  upon  one 
tlieory  and  on  appeal  adopt  another : 
Lebcher  v.  Lambert  (1900),  23  Utah,  1, 
63  Pac.  628;  Gray  ;,•.  Worst  (1895),  129 
Mo.  122,  31  S.  W.  585;  Anderson  v. 
Foster  (1898),  105  Ga.  563,  32  S.  E.  373; 
Shropshire  v.  Ryan  (1900),  111  la.  677, 
82  N.  W.  1035  ;  McHale  v.  Maloney  ( 1903), 


FORM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT    OR   I'ETITION.  057 

all  defences  by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance  or  of  affirmative 
relief,  I  shall  now  briefly  consider  the  rules  wliich  pertain  to  the 
form  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  and  which  regulate  the  manner 
of  stating  and  arranging  its  allegations.  These  rules  are  few 
and  simple ;  and  their  object  is  to  render  the  issues  single  and 
certain,  and  to  present  the  cause  of  action  for  a  decision  upon 
its  merits,  and  not  upon  any  technical,  incidental,  or  collateral 
questions.  In  one  important  feature  the  new  system  stands  in 
marked  contrast  with  the  old,  —  the  entire  absence  of  all  special 
phrases  or  formulas  by  which  the  kinds  of  actions  are  distin- 
guished, or  by  which  the  pleadings  or  any  parts  of  them  are 
characterized. 

§  466.  *  575.  Separate  Statement  of  Different  Causes  of  Action. 
Inducement  and  Prayer  need  not  be  repeated.  When  a  complaint 
or  petition  contains  two  or  more  causes  of  action,  all  the  codes 
require  that  they  shall  be  distinctly  and  separately  stated  and 
numbered ;  and  the  method  by  which  a  violation  of  this  require- 
ment is  to  be  corrected  has  already  been  explained. ^  It  is  a 
settled  rule,  that  if  the  pleading  is  of  this  kind,  each  separate 
division  or  count  must  be  complete  by  itself,  and  must  contain  all 
the  averments  necessary  to  a  perfect  cause  of  action. ^  Defects 
and  omissions  in  one  cannot  be  supplied  by  the  allegations  found 
in  another;  nor  can  the  pleader,  by  merely  referring  to  material 
facts  properly  set  forth  in  a  former  count,  incorporate  them  into 
and  make  them  part  of  a  subsequent  one.  In  other  words,  all 
the  issuable  or  material  facts  constituting  the  ground  for  a  re- 
covery must  be  stated  in  each  cause  of  action,  even  though  some 
repetition  might  thereby  become  necessary. ^     This  requirement, 


—  Neb.   — ,  9.3  N.  W.   677;    Lansing  v.  Relief  Ass'n  (1894),  87  Wi.s.  Ill,  58  N.  W. 
Commercial  Union  Assurance  Co.  (  190.3),  76;  Moore  v.  Ilalliday  (1903),  43  Ore.  243, 

—  Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W.  7.56.  72  Pac.  801.     But  a  failure  to  allege  that 
Want  of  a  definite  theory  is  not  ground  they  are   separate  is  not  ground  for  de- 
fer a  demurrer,  but  for  a  motion  to  make  murrer:  Gunderson  v.  Thomas  (1894),  87 
more  definite  :  Scott  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  Ry.  Wis.  406,  58  N.  W.  750. 

Co.   (1895),   144  Ind.   125,  43  N.  E.  133.  "If  any  one  count  of  a  petition  or  any 

See   also,    upon    the   general   subject   of  separate  defence  set  up   in  an  answer  is 

theory  of  complaint.  Mark  v.  North  (1900),  adjudged  insufficient,  such  ruling  does  not 

155  Ind.   575,  57   N.   E.   902;   Cleveland,  affect  the  other  counts  of  the  petition  or 

etc.  Ry.  Co.  !.'.  Gray  (1897),  148  Ind.  266,  the   other  separate    defences:"    Munford 

46  N.  E.  675.]  v.   Keet    (1900),    15-i   Mo.    36,   55   S.  W. 

1  See  supra,  §§  *447,  *450.  27 1.] 

2  [Clark  V.  Ross  (1895),  96  Ta.  402.  65  3  j^In  McKay  v.  McDougal  (1897),  19 
N.  W.   1.340;  Johns  v.  Northwestern  Mut.  Mont.  488,  48    Pac.  98S,  the  court  said- 

42 


658 


CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 


however,  applies  only  to  the  material  and  issuable  facts  which 
constitute  the  cause  of  action.  Matter  which  is  simply  introduc- 
tory or  by  way  of  inducement,  and  not  part  of  the  gravame'n, 
after  having  been  once  set  out  at  the  commencement  of  the 
pleading,  need  not  be  repeated  in  each  paragraph,  but  should  be 
referred  to  merel3^  And  this  introductory  matter  includes  all 
descriptions  of  the  character,  capacity,  or  particular  right  in 
respect  of  which  the  plaintiffs  and  defendants  are  made  parties 
to  the  action,  as  executors,  trustees,  public  officers,  and  the  like; 
These  and  similar  statements  properly  form  the  commencement 
or  introduction  of  the  complaint,  distinct  from  the  several  causes 
of  action,  and  equally  applicable  to  all  of  them.  Whenever, 
therefore,  a  cause  of  action  is  attacked  by  a  demurrer  directed 
either  against  it  alone  or  against  the  entire  pleading,  it  must 
stand  or  fall  by  its  own  averments,  and  cannot  be  helped  out  by 
any  facts,  however  sufficient  in  themselves,  alleged  in  anothei 
paragraph  or  count.  ^     But  the  particular  sum  of  damages  claimed 


"  Each  separate  division  or  count  of  the 
coniphiint  must  be  complete  in  itself,  and 
tlie  ])lcader,  by  merely  referring  to  ma- 
terial facts  properly  set  forth  in  a  former 
count,  cannot  incorporate  them  into  and 
make  them  part  of  a  subsequent  one. 
This  rule  should  not  be  extended  to  the 
inclusion  of  a  descrij)tion  of  the  property 
itself,  nor  to  a  point  requiring  exhibits  to 
he  repeated,  but  it  should  be  held  to  em- 
Ijrace  tliose  material  and  issuable  facts  of 
ownership  which  constitute  the  plaintiff's 
action." 

In  support  of  this  view,  see  Cooper 
V.  Portlier  Brewing  Co.  (1900),  112  Ga. 
894,  38  S.  E.  91 ;  Aulbach  v.  Dahler 
(1896),  Idaho,  43  Pac.  322;  Corbey  v. 
Kogers  (1898),  \h2  Ind.  169,  52  N.  E. 
748. 

But  in  other  States  it  is  held  that  ma- 
terial facts  alleged  in  one  count  may  be 
made  a  part  of  another  count  by  appropri- 
ate reference.  To  this  effect  see  Treweek 
I'.  Howard  (1895),  105  Cal.  434,  39  Pac. 
20;  Hopkins  j;.  Contra  Costa  Co.  (1895), 
106  Cal.  566,  39  Pac.  933;  Uamsey  v. 
Johnson  (1897),  7  Wyo.  392,  42  Pac.  1084; 
Hut.son  V.  King  (1894),  95  Ga.  271,  22 
S.  E.  615;  Realty  lievenue,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Farm,  etc.  Co.  (1900),  79  Miun.  465,  82 
N.  W.  857.     In  this  la.st  ca.se  the  court 


held  the  allegation  that  "  plaintiff  realleges 
and  reaffirms  all  the  allegations  of  para- 
graphs 1,  2,  and  3  of  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action,"  a  sufficient  reference.] 

1  Abeudroth  v.  Boardley,  27  Wis.  555  ; 
Durkee  i'.  City  Bk.  of  Kenosha,  13  Wis. 
216,  222;  Curtis  v.  Moore,  15  Wis.  134; 
Sabin  v.  Austin,  19  Wis.  421,  423;  Catlin 
V.  Pedrick,  17  Wis.  88,  91  ;  Barlow  v. 
Burns,  40  Cal.  351, 353  ;  Potter  v.  Earnest, 
45  Ind.  416;  Mason  v.  Weston,  29  Ind. 
561  ;  Day  v.  Vallette,  25  Ind.  42;  Leabo 
V.  Detrick,  18  Ind.  414  ;  Nat.  Bk.  of  Mich. 
V.  Green,  33  Iowa,  140  (answer)  ;  Silvers  r. 
Junction  R.  Co  ,  43  Ind.  435,  446  (reply). 
See  also  Scott  v.  Robards,  67  .Mo.  289  ; 
State  V.  Yellow  Jacket  S.  Min.  Co.,  14 
Nev.  220;  Birdsall  v.  Birdsall,  52  Wis. 
208;  McCarnan  v.  Cochran,  57  Ind.  106; 
Killian  r.  Eigenman,  57  id.  480;  Barnes 
V.  Stephens,  62  id.  226  ;  Pennsylvania  Co. 
V.  Holderman,  69  id.  18;  Haskell  v.  Has- 
kell, 54  Cal.  262 ;  Sharp  v.  Miller,  54  id. 
329 ;  see  also  Jasper  v.  Hazen.  2  N.  Dak. 
401  ;  Neier  v.  Missouri  I'ac.  Ry.  Co.,  12 
Mo.  App.  35  ;  Anil  Sav.  Bk.  v.  Lexington, 
74  Mo.  104  ;  Boeckler  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co., 
10  Mo.  App.  448;  Farri.s  v.  Jones,  112 
Ind.  498  ;  Bidwell  v.  Babcock,  87  Cal.  29  ; 
Yost  V.  Commercial  Bk.  of  Santa  Ana, 
94  Cal.  494  ;  Green  v.  Clifford,  94  Cal.  49  ; 


FORM   OF   THE    COMPLAINT   OU   PETITION. 


G59 


in  each  cause  of  action  need  not  necessarily  be  given  at  its  close; 
it  is  sufficient  if  the  aggregate  amount  is  alleged  and  demanded 
at  the  end  of  the  complaint.  ^ 

§  467.  *  576.  Rule  as  to  Statement  of  Same  Cause  of  Action  in 
Different  Counts.  Since  the  reformed  pleading  requires  the  facts 
to  be  averred  as  they  actually  took  place,  it  does  not  in  general 
permit  a  single  cause  of  action  to  be  set  forth  in  two  or  more 
different  forms  or  counts,  as  was  the  familiar  practice  at  the 
common  law.  The  rule  is  undoubtedly  settled,  that,  under  all 
ordinary  circumstances,  the  plaintiff  who  has  but  one  cause  of 
action  will  not  be  suffered  to  spread  it  upon  the  record  in  differ- 
ing shapes  and  modes,  as  though  he  possessed  two  or  more  dis- 
tinct demands;  and  when  he  does  so  without  special  and  sufficient 
reason,  he  will  be  compelled,  either  by  a  motion  before  the  trial 
or  by  an  application  and  direction  at  the  trial,  to  select  one  of 
these  counts,  and  to  abandon  the  others. ^  It  is  certain  that 
different  causes  of  action  in  the  complaint  or  petition  must,  as 


Pennie  v.  Hiklreth,  81  Cal.  127  ;  but  see 
St.  Louis  Gas  Light  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  86 
Mo.  495.  As  to  what  are  not  separate 
causes  of  action,  so  that  they  mai/  be 
stated,  in  one  count,  see  Rayan  v.  Day, 
46  Iowa,  239  (two  promissory  notes,  sed 
qu.) ;  State  v.  Milwaukee,  L.  S.  &  W.  Ry. 
Co.,  45  Wis.  579  (distinct  grounds  of  for- 
feiture). 

1  Spears  v.  "Ward,  48  Ind.  541  ;  Blan- 
chard  v.  Jefferson,  28  Abb.  N.  Cas. 
236. 

[]It  is  held  in  Connecticut  that  good 
pleading  requires  the  claim  or  claims  for 
relief,  no  matter  how  many  couuts  there 
may  be,  to  be  set  out  at  the  end  of  the 
entire  complaint :  Goodrich  v.  Stanton 
(1899),  71  Conn.  418,  42  Atl.  74;  Baxter 
V.  Camp  (1898),  71  Conn.  245,  41  Atl.  803. 
In  support  of  the  rule  stated  in  the  text 
see  H.  B.  Clafliu  Co.  v.  Simon  (1898),  18 
Utah,  153,  55  Pac.  376.] 

■^  [^In  support  of  this  proposition,  see 
Reed  v.  Poindexter  (1895),  16  Mont.  294, 
40  Pac.  596;  Leonard  v.  Roberts  (1894), 
20  Colo.  88, 36  Pac.  880  ;  Bas.sett  v.  Shares 
(1893),  63  Conn.  39,  27  Atl.  421  ;  Palmer 
V.  Hartford  Dredging  Co.  (1900),  73  Conn. 
182,  47  Atl.  125  ;  Finken  v.  Elm  City  Brass 
Co.  (1900),  73  Conn.  423,  47  Atl.  670; 
Brown  v.  Wilcox  (1900),  73  Conn.  100,  46 


Atl.  827;  Goodrich  v.  Stanton  (1899),  71 
Conn.  418,  42  Atl.  74;  Freeman's  Appeal 
(1899),  71  Conn.  708,  43  Atl.  185  ;  Oley  i'. 
Miller  (1901),  74  Conn.  304,  50  Atl.  744  ; 
Wehmhoff  v.  Rutherford  (1895),  98  Ky. 
91,  32  S.  W.  288. 

The  practice  of  setting  out  the  facts  in 
different  form  in  the  several  couuts  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  proof,  has  been 
held  proper  in  the  following  cases:  Es- 
trella  Vineyard  Co.  v.  Butler  (1899),  125 
Cal.  232,  57  Pac.  980;  Rucker  v.  Hall 
(1895),  105  Cal.  425,  38  Pac.  962;  Bern- 
stein V.  Downs  (1896),  112  Cal.  197,  44 
Pac.  557 ;  Stockton,  etc.  Works  v.  Glens 
Falls  Ins.  Co.  (1898),  121  Cal.  167,  53 
Pac.  565 ;  Rinard  v.  Omaha,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  (1901),  164  Mo.  270,  64  S.  AV.  124; 
Willard  i\  Carrigan  (1902),  Ariz.,  68  Pac. 
538;  Armstrong  v.  Penn  (1898),  105  Ga. 
229,  31  S.  E.  158;  Cawker  City  Bank 
V.  Jennings  (1893),  89  la.  230,  56  N.  W. 
494. 

Cawker  City  Bank  v.  Jennings  (1893), 
89  la.  230,  56  N.  W.  494 :  The  first  count 
of  plaintiff's  petition  declared  on  a  ]>romis- 
sory  note  executed  by  defendant  to  plain- 
tiff. The  second  count  expressly  purported 
to  set  up  the  same  cause  of  action,  and  de- 
clared on  money  advanced  and  loaned  to 
the    defendant.      Held,    that    the    second 


660  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

a  general  rule,  imply  as  many  distinct  causes  of  action  actually 
held  or  claimed  to  be  held  by  the  plaintiff.^  It  cannot  be  said, 
however,  that  this  rule  is  absolutely  inflexible.  As  it  is  one  of 
convenience  simply,  it  must  sometimes  yield  to  the  demands  of 
justice  and  equit}-.  Under  peculiar  circumstances,  when  the 
exact  legal  nature  of  the  plaintiff's  right  and.  of  the  defendant's 
liability  depends  upon  facts  in  the  sole  possession  of  the  defend- 
ant, and  which  will  not  be  developed  until  the  trial,  tlie  pLaintiff 
may  set  forth  the  same  single  cause  of  action  in  varied  counts 
and  ^\  ith  differing  averments,  so  as  to  meet  the  possible  proofs 
which  will  for  the  first  time  fully  appear  on  the  trial.  This 
proposition  is  plainly  just  and  right,  and  is  sustained  by  the 
authority  of  able  courts. ^ 

§  468.  *  577.  Effect  of  Demurring  to  Entire  Complaint  -when 
Made  up  of  Several  Counts.  Joint  Demurrers  by  Two  or  More 
Defendants.  When  a  complaint  or  petition  contains  two  or  more 
distinct  causes  of  action,  a  demurrer  to  it  as  a  whole,  or  to  all  or 
some  of  the  causes  of  action  jointly,  must  fail  and  be  overruled  if 
any  one  of  the  separate  causes  of  action  included  in  the  demurrer 
is  good;  and  the  same  rule  applies  to  separate  defences  in  an 
answer.^     The  defendant  should  never  demur  to  an  entire  corn- 


count   (lid    not  set   up  a   new   cause   of  in  his  complaint  two  distinct  causes   of 

action.  action  —  (1)  aj^ainst  the  defendant   as   a 

Where  two  causes  of  action  are  iden-  common  carrier,  and  (2)  against  defeud- 

tical,  the  remedy  is  not  a  motion  for  an  ant  as  a  wajehousemau  —  for  the   negli- 

election  but  a  motion  to  strike  out  as  sur-  gent  loss  of  the  goods.     This  manner  of 

pi  usage :    Pollock  v.  Whijiple  (1895),  45  pleading  was  held  proper  under  the  cir- 

Neb.  844,  64  N.  W.  210.J  cnm.^ances,  and  the  plaintiff  could  not  be 

1  Sturges  V.  Burton,  8  Ohio  St.  215;  compelled  to  elect  on  the  trial.  The  sub- 
Muzzy  V.  Ledlie,  23  Wis.  445 ;  Lackey  ject  is  exhaustively  discussed  by  Di.xon 
r.  Vanderbilt,  10  How.  Pr.  155;  Nash  v.  C.  J.,  pp.  .340-.342.  See  also  Smith  t;. 
McCauley,  9  Abb.  Pr.  159;  Sippcrly  r.  Douglass,  15  Abb.  Pr.  266;  Jones  v. 
Troy  &  R.  Tl.  Co.,  9  How.  Pr.  8.3  ;  Hillman  Palnier,  1  Abb.  Pr.  442.  And  as  further 
I'.  Hillman,  14  How.  Pr.  456;  Churchill  v.  examples,  Van  Brunt  r.  Mather,  48  Iowa, 
Churchill,  9  How.  Pr.  552;  Ford  v.  Mat-  .503;  Pearson  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
tice,  14  How.  Pr  91 ;  Dunning  v.  Thomas,  45  id.  497  ;  La  Pofnte  T.  Sup.  v.  O'Malley, 
11  How.  Pr.  281;  Bishop  v.  Chicago  &  46  Wis.  35;  Brinkman  r.  Hunter,  73  Mo. 
N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  67  Wis.  610.  172  ;  Cramer  v.  Oppenstein,  16  Colo.  .504  : 

2  Whitney  r.  Chicago  &N.W.Ry.  Co.,  Manders  v.  Craft  (Colo.  App.  1893),  32 
27  Wis.  327,340-342.  The  plaintiff  had  Pac.  Rep.  836 ;  Plummer  v.  Mold,  22 
shipped  wool  on  defendant's  road  for  Minn.  15;  Hawley  y.  Wilkinson,  18  Minn. 
Chicago,  and  it  was  never  delivered.     He  525. 

did  not  know  whether  it  had  been  lost  in  *  Curtis  r.  Moore,  15   Wis.   134;   Jif- 

the  transit,  or  had  been  burned  at  a  fire  fersonville,  M.  &  L  R,  ("o.  v.  Vaiicant,  40 

which    had   consumed   defendnnt's   ware-  Ind.  233 ;  Heavenridge  v.  Mondy,  34  Lid. 

house  in  Chicago.     He  therefore  set  forth  28 ;  Hale  i;.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49  N.  Y. 


FORM   OF   THE  pOMPLAINT   OR   PETITION. 


661 


plaint  or  petition  consisting  of  several  distinct  causes  of  action, 
nor  to  two  or  more  causes  of  action  jointly,  unless  he  is  certain 
that  they  are  all  insufficient;  and,  under  all  circumstances,  it  is 
the  better  and  safer  practice  to  demur  in  express  terms  to  each 
separately,  for  each  will  then  stand  or  fall  upon  its  own  merits.^ 
The  same  rule  also  applies  to  a  demurrer  for  want  of  sufficient 
facts  by  two-  or  more  defendants  jointly ;  it  will  be  overruled  as 
to  all  who  unite  in  it  if  the  complaint  or  petition  states  a  good 


626,  630 ;  Ward  v.  Guyer,  3  N.  Y.  S.  C.  58  ; 
Alexander  ?•.  Thacker,  30  Neb.  614  ;  Pin- 
kum  V.  P]au  Claire,  81  Wis.  301  ;  Silvers  v. 
JuDCtiou  K.  Co.,  43  lud.  435,  442,  445.  In 
the  last  case  the  question  arose  on  a 
reply  which  contained  several  paragraphs 
or  defences.  The  defendant  demurred 
as  follows ;  '"Now  conies  the  defendant 
and  demurs  to  the  second,  third,  and 
fourth  paragraphs  of  the  plaintiff's  reply, 
upon  the  following  grounds:  Fiisl,  said 
second  paragraph  does  not  ^  state  facts 
sufficient,  etc. ;  second,  said  third  para- 
graph does  not  state  facts,  etc. ;  third,  said 
fourth  paragraph  does  not,"  etc.  This 
demurrer  was  held  to  be  joint,  and  not 
several ;  and  the  rule  of  the  text  was  en- 
forced. The  opinion  carefully  discusses 
the  question,  what  language  makes  a  de- 
murrer or  an  answer  joint,  and  what  sev- 
eral, citing  on  this  topic  Lane  v.  State, 
7  Ind.  426  ;  Earner  v.  Morehead,  22  Ind. 
354 ;  Jewett  !-.  Honey  Creek  Draining 
Co.,  39  Ind.  245;  Parlier  v.  Thomas.  19 
Ind.  213 ;  Fankboner  v.  Fankbouer,  20 
Ind.  62  ;  Aiken  v.  Bruen,  21  Ind.  137  ; 
Hume  V.  Dessar,  29  Ind.  112.  The  follow- 
ing cases  are  further  illustrations  of  both 
branches  of  the  rule, — a  demurrer  to  all 
the  causes  of  action  or  defences,  and  a  de- 
murrer by  the  defendants  jointly  :  Collier 
V.  Erwin,  2  Mont.  335 ;  Dann  v.  Gibson, 
9  Neb.  513;  Hyde  r.  Kenosha  Cy.  Sup, 
43  Wis.  129;  American  Button-hole,  etc. 
Co.  I'.  Gurnee,  44  id.  49 ;  Lamon  >•.  Hackett, 
49  id.  261  ;  Schiffer  v.  Eau  Claire,  51  id. 
385  ;  Stanford  v.  Davis,  54  Ind.  45  ;  Wil- 
kerson  2\  liust,  57  id.  172;  Romine  v. 
Romine,  59  id.  346;  Price  v.  Sanders, 
60  id.  310;  Carter  v.  Zenblin,  68  id.  436  ; 
Parman  u.  Chamberlain,  74  id.  82  ;  Shafer 
V.  State,  49  id.  460,  and  cases  cited  ;  Kelsey 
V.  Henrv,  48  id.  37. 


[^Raymond  v.  Wathen  (1895),  142  Ind- 
367,  41  N.  E.  815  ;  Palmer  v.  Breed  (1896), 
Ariz., 43  Pac.  219;  Mayors.  Smith  (1900), 
111  Ga.  870,  36  S.  E.  955  ;  Harris  County 
V.  Brady  (1902),  115  Ga.  767,  42  S.  E.  7l"; 
Pryor  v.  Brady  (1902),  115  Ga.  848,  42 
S.  E.  223  ;  Kearney  Stone  Works  r.  Mc- 
Pherson  (1894),  5  Wyo.  178,  38  Pac.  920; 
Florence  v.  Pattillo  (1898),  105  Ga.  577, 
32  S.  E.  642  ;  Brake  v.  Payne  (1893),  137 
Ind.  479,37  N.  E.  140;  Rownd  v.  State 
(1898),  152  Ind.  39.  51  N.  E.  914;  A.  E. 
Johnson  Co.  v.  White  (1899),  78  Minn. 
48,  80  N.  W.  838;  Barbre  v.  Goodale 
(1896),  28  Ore.  465,  43  Pac.  378  ;  Asevado 
V.  Orr  (1893),  100  Cal.  293,  34  Pac.  777; 
Hurst  V.  Sawyer  (1894),  2  Okla.  470,  37 
Pac.  817;  Hanenkratt  r.  Hamil  (1900),  10 
Okla  219,  61  Pac.  1050;  Carter  v.  Wann 
(1899),  Idaho,  57  Pac.  314;  Corns  v. 
Clouser  (1893),  137  Ind.  201,  36  N.  E. 
848 ;  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Char- 
man  (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  67  N.  E.  923. 

It  was  held  in  Maynard  v.  Waidlich 
(1900),  156  Ind.  562,  60  N.  E.  348,  that  a 
demurrer  as  follows :  "  The  defendant, 
Harriet  Maynard,  demurs  to  the  second, 
third,  and  fourth  paragraphs  of  plaintiff's 
reply  to  the  second  paragraph  of  the  an- 
swer of  the  said  defendant,  and  says  that 
neither  of  said  paragraphs  of  said  reply 
states  facts  sufficient  to  avoid  said  answer," 
is  joint  and  not  several.] 

1  Durkee  v.  City  Bk.  of  Kenosha,  13 
Wis.  216,  222  ;  Ter're  Haute  &  L.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sherwood,  132  Ind.  129  ;  Glassy.  Murphy 
(Ind.  App.  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep.  1097. 

[^But  a  demurrer  does  not  lie  to  a  single 
paragrapli  of  a  complaint  unless  it  purports 
to  present  a  complete  cause  of  action  : 
Lowman  v.  West  (1894),  8  Wash.  355, 
36  Pac.  268.3 


662 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


cause  of   action  against  even  one  of   tliem.^     A  different  rule, 
however,  prevails  in  some  States. ^ 

§  469.  *  578.  Admission  by  Failure  to  deny.  It  is  expressly 
provided  in  all  the  codes,  that  material  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint or  petition  not  controverted  by  the  answer  are  admitted, 
and  they  need  not  be  proved;  the  same  is  of  course  true  of  aver- 
ments expressly  admitted.  A  denial  of  the  legal  conclusion, 
such  as  the  indebtedness,  while  the  answer  is  silent  with  respect 
to  the  i-ssuable  facts  from  which  the  conclusion  follows,  is  a  mere 
nullity,  and  raises  no  issue. ^  What  averments  are  material,  and 
are  thus  admitted  unless  controverted,  is  a  question  of  law  to  be 
decided  by  the  court,  and  not  by  the  jury.*  The  result  just 
mentioned  does  not  arise  from  a  failure  to  deny  immaterial  alle- 
gations ;  such  statements  are  not  issuable,  and  their  truth  is  not 
conceded  for  the  purposes  of  the  trial  l)y  the  defendant's  neglect 


1  McGonigal  r.  .Colter,  .32  Wis.  614; 
Webster  v.  Tibbits,  19  Wis.  438;  Shore  v. 
Taylor,  46  lud.  34.') ;  Owen  v.  Cooper,  46 
Ind.  524.  See  al.so  Benedict  v.  Farlow, 
lud.  App.  160;  Couant  v.  Barnard,  103 
N.  C.  315;  Murdock  v.  Cox,  118  Ind.  266. 

([Hirsheld  i-.  Weill  (1898),  121  Cal.  13, 
53  Pac.  402  ;  Dalrymple  v.  Security  Loan 
Co.  (1900),  9  N.  D.  306,  83  N.  W.  245; 
Mark  Paine  Lumber  Co.  v.  Improvement 
Co.  (1896),  94  Wis.  322,  68  N.  W.  1013  ; 
Miller  V.  Rapp  (1893),  135  Ind.  614,  34 
N.  E.  981;  Frankel  v.  Garrard  (1903),  — 
Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  687;  Evans  v.  Fall 
River  County  (1896),  9  S.  D.  1.30,68  N.  W. 
195  ;  Palmer  v.  Bank  of  Zumbrota  (1896), 
65  Minn.  90,  67  N.  W.  893  ;  Burr  r.  Brant- 
ley (1893),  40  S.  C.  538,  19  S.  E.  199; 
Stahn  V.  Catawlia  Mills  (1898),  53  S.  C. 
519,  31  S.  E.  498;  Asevado  v.  Orr  (1893), 
100  Cal.  293,  34  Pac.  777 ;  Rogers  v. 
Scbulenburg  (1896),  111  Cal.  281,43  Pac. 
899,  citing  tiie  text ;  Stiles  i'.  City  of 
Guthrie  (1895),  3  Okla.  26,41  Pac.  383  ; 
Neal  V.  Bleckley  (1897),  51  S.  C.  506,  29 
S.  E.  249. 

And  similarly,  a  joint  motion,  if  not 
good  as  to  all,  should  be  dismi.ssed :  Leon- 
hardt  v.  Citizens'  Bank  (1898),  56  Neb.  38, 
76  N.  W.  472;  Cortelyou  i-.  McCarthy 
(1898),  .53  Neb.  479,  73  K  W.  921  ;  Car.son 
V.  Fears  (1893),  91   Ga.  482,  17  S.  E.  .342. 

Where  several  defendants  demur 
"  jointly,  as  well  as  separately  and  sever- 


ally, to  tlie  first,  second,  and  third  para- 
graphs of  the  complaint,  and  to  each  of 
them  separately,"  licld,  that  it  is  a  sepa- 
rate demurrer  as  to  the  paragraphs  of  the 
complaint  but  joint  as  to  the  parties,  cit- 
ing Carver  v.  Carver,  97  Ind.  497  :  Arm- 
strong L\  Dunn  (1895),  143  Ind.  433,  4L 
N.  E.  540. 

A  separate  demurrer  by  one  of  several 
joint  defendants  must  be  considered  as 
though  the  demurrant  were  the  sole  de- 
fendant:  Frankel  ;•.  Garrard  (1903),— 
Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  687  ;  Cummings  ;•.  Town 
of  Lake  Realty  Co.  (1893),  86  Wis.  382, 
57  N.  W.  43] 

2  Wood  V.  Olney,  7  Nev.  109.  Tlie  de- 
murrer was  sustained  as  to  some,  and 
overruled  as  to  the  others. 

3  Skinner  v.  Clute,  9  Nev.  342  ;  Jen- 
kins V.  N.  C.  Ore  I)re.«sing  Co.,  65  N.  C. 
563.  Sec  also  Trapnall  v.  Hill,  31  Ark. 
345;  Mohr  v.  Barnes,  4  Col.  350;  Dole  v. 
Burceigh,  1  Dak.  227  ;  Kansas  City  Hotel 
Co.  r.  Sauer,  65  Mo.  279 ;  Bonham  v. 
Craig,  84  N.  C.  224  ;  Bensley  v.  McMil- 
lan, 49  Iowa,  517;  Alston  v.  Wilson,-  44 
id.  130;  Fellows  v.  Webb,  43  id.  133; 
Blake  v  John.son  Cy.  Com'rs,  etc.,  18  Kan. 
266;  Wands  v.  School  Dist.,  19  id.  204  ; 
Murray  v.  N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  236, 
239  ;  Lange  v.  Benedict,  73  id.  12  ;  Marsh 
V.  Pugh,  43  Wis.  507  ;  Tracy  v.  Craig,  55 
Cal.  91. 

*  Becker  v.  Crow,  7  Bush,  198. 


FORM    OF   THE   COMPLAINT    OR    PETITION.  663 

# 

to  controvert  them.  In  this  class  are  included  all  species  of  im- 
material and  non-issuable  matter,  such  as  details  of  evidence, 
conclusions  of  law,  and  averments  of  time,  place,  value,  amount, 
and  the  like,  in  all  ordinary  circumstances.^  An  important 
question  presents  itself  in  this  connection  as  to  the  effect  of  a 
qualified  admission  contained  in  the  defendant's  answer,  and  the 
decisions  in  respect  to  it  are  somewhat  conflicting.  The  rule  is 
settled  by  one  group  of  cases,  that  when  the  answer  expressly 
admits  certain  material  averments  of  the  complaint  or  petition, 
but  at  the  same  time  accompanies  this  concession  with  the  state- 
ment of  affirmative  matter  in  explanation  and  qualification  by  the 
way  of  defence,  the  plaintiff  may  avail  himself  of  the  admissions 
without  the  qualifications ;  he  is  not  bound  to  take  the  defend- 
ant's entire  statement;  he  is  freed  from  the  necessity  of  proving 
his  own  averments  that  are  admitted,  while  the  defendant  must 
prove  those  which  he  sets  up.^  Other  cases  seem  to  lay  down 
a  different  rule,  denying  to  the  plaintiff  the  full  benefit  of  the 
admission,  and  requiring  him  to  accept  it,  if  at  all,  with  the 
defendant's  qualifying  matter.^  When  different  defendants  have 
put  in  separate  answers,  an  admission  by  one  cannot  be  used 
against  the  others ;  *  and  the  same  doctrine  extends  to  separate 
defences  of  one  party  in  a  single  answer;  the  admissions  in  a 
defence  of  confession  and  avoidance  do  not  overcome  the  effect 
of  a  denial  contained  in  another.^ 

§  470.  *  579.  Defective  Complaint  Aided  by  Averments  in 
Answer.  A  defective  complaint  or  petition  may  be  supple- 
mented, and  substantial  issues  may  thus  be  presented  by  the 
answer  itself.**     When  the  plaintiff  has  failed  to  state  material 

1  Doyle  V.  Franklin,  48  Cal.  537,  539 ;  19  Wis.  350 ;  Farrell  v.  Heuuesy,  21  Wis. 

Gates  V.   Salmon,  46  Cal.  361,   379  (evi-  632. 

dence) ;  Chicago  &  S.  W.  R.  Co.  v.  N.  W.  »  Troy  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  17  Barb. 

U.  Packet    Co.,  38  Iowa,  377,  382  (value  581.     As  to  the  effect  of  admissions,  see 

of  goods) ;  People  y.  Marlboro' H.  Com'rs,  also   Simmons    v.  Law,   8   Bosw.    213;  3 

54    N.   Y.  276,   279  (conclusion   of  law).  Keyes,  217  ;  Paige  y.  Willett,  38  N.  Y.  31 ; 

See  also  Sands  v.  St.  John,  36  Barb.  628 ;  Tell  v.  Beyer,  38  N.  Y.  161  ;  Robbins  v. 

23  How.  Pr.  140  ;  Fry  v.  Bennett,  5  Sandf.  Codman,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  325. 

54  :  Newman  r.  Otto,  4   Sandf.  668  ;  Oechs  *  Swift     v.    Kingsley,    24    Barb.  541; 

r.  Cook,  3  Duer,  161  ;  Harlow  v.  Hamil-  Troy  &  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,    17   Barb.  581, 

ton,  6   How.  Pr.  473  ;  Connoss   v.  Meir,  2  599. 

E.  D.  Smith,  314  ;  Mayor,  etc.  of  Albany  '  ^  Vassear  i'.  Livingston,  13  N.  Y.  256; 

^.  Cunliff,  2  N.  Y.  165,171.     .  4  Duer,  285  ;  Ay  res   v.   Covill,    18   Barb. 

-  Dickson  v.  Cole,  34   Wis.   621,  626,  264;  9  How.  Pr.  573. 

€27  ;  Sexton  v.  Rhames,  13  Wis.  99  ;  Hart-  ^  QState  ex  rel.  v.  Thum  (1898),  Idaho, 

well  V.  Page,  14  Wis.  49;  Orton  v.  Noonan  55  Pac.  858.     But  a  complaint  demurred 


664 


CIVIL   KKMEDIES. 


facts,  so  that  no  cause  of  action  is  set  forth,  but  these  very  facts 
are  supplied  by  the  averments  of  the  answer,  the  omission  is 
immaterial,  and  the  defect  is  cured. ^  This  rule  should  properly 
be  confined  to  the  case  where  the  answer  affirmatively  alleges  the 
very  fact  that  is  missing  from  the  complaint  ;2  but  it  has  in  some 
instances  been  enforced,  although  the  answer  simply  contained  a 
denial  of  the  necessary  fact  which  should  have  been  averred  by 
the  plaintiff.3     ^  statement  in  the  reply,  however,  of  a  fact  which 


to  ore  tenns  at  the  trial  cannot  be  aided  by 
the  answer :  Wisconsin  Lakes  Ice  Co.  v. 
Ice  Co.  (1902),  115  Wis.  .377,  91  X.  W.  988. 
In  Shute  v.  Austin  (1897),  120  N.  C. 
440,  27  S.  E.  90,  the  conrt  said :  "  The  doc- 
trine of  aider  can  only  be  invoked  in  aid 
of  a  defective  statement  of  a  good  cause 
of  action ;  but  cannot  be  used  to  aid  the 
statement  of  a  bad  or  defective  cause  of 
action."  See  also  Harrison  v.  Garrett 
(1903),  132  N.  C.  172,  43  S.  E.  594. 

1  I^Ricketts  v.  Hart  (1899),  150  Mo.  64, 
51  S.  W.  825;  Doerner  v.  Doerner  (1901), 
ICl  Mo.  407,  61  S.  W.  802  ;  Casler  v.  Chase 
(1901),  160  Mo.  418,  60  S.  W.  1040;  Og- 
den  V.  Ogden  (1894),  60  Ark.  70,  28  S.  W. 
796;  Ware  v.  Long  (1902),  Ky.,  69  S.  W. 
797 ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pittman 
(1901),  Ky.,  64  S.  W.  460;  Daggett  v. 
Gray  (1895),  110  Cal.  169,  42  Pac.  568; 
Shively  v.  Semi-Tropic  Land  Co.  (1893), 
99  Cah  259,  33  Pac.  848,  quoting  the  text ; 
Crowder  v.  McDonnell  (1898),  21  Mont. 
367,  54  Pac.  43;  Beebe  v.  Latimer  (1899), 
59  Neb.  305,  80  N.  W.  904;  Hess  v.  Adler 
(1900),  67  Ark.  444,  55  S.  W.  843;  Rail- 
way Officials,  etc.  Ass'n.  v.  Drummond 
(1898),  56  Neb.  235,  76  N.  W.  562. 

Wiiere  a  material  fact  is  omitted  from 
a  complaint,  and  such  fact  is  found  in  a 
special  finding,  this  will  not  cure  the  com- 
plaint: Goodwine  f.  Cadwallader  (1901), 
158  Ind.  202,  61  N.  E.  939;  Cleveland, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Parker  (1899),  154  Ind.  153, 
56  N.  E.  85. 

Where  a  complaint  states  facts  only 
infereutially,  an  admission  of  such  facts 
in  the  answer  will  be  considered,  for  juris- 
dictional purposes,  in  aid  of  tlie  complaint : 
Lockhart  v.  Hear  (1895),  117  N.  C.  298, 
23  S.  E.  484.  Wiierc  defendant,  by  its 
answer,  shows  tliat  it  understands  the 
nature  of  a  claim  set  forth  defectively  in 
tlie  c<jnij)laint,  tliere  is  no  reason  why  it 


should  be  surpri.«ed  or  injured  by  trying 
the  issues  raised  by  tlie  pleadings :  White- 
ley  V.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  119  N.  C- 
724,  25  S.  E.  1018.] 

2  {In  Vanalstine  v.  Whelan  (1901),  135 
Cal.  232,  67  Pac.  1 25,  a  material  averment 
was  omitted  in  the  complaint,  and  a  denial 
of  the  saitl  omitted  averment  was  con- 
tained in  the  answer.  It  was  claimed  l)y 
the  jdaintiff  that  the  defect  was  cured  by 
the  answer.  The  court  said  :  "  The  prin- 
ciple is,  that  an  omission  of  a  material 
fact  is  cured  by  the  express  averment  of 
that  very  fact  in  the  defendant's  pleadings. 
But  there  is  nothing  of  the  kind  in  the 
case  at  bar.  The  contention  of  respon- 
dent rests  on  the  fact  that  defendants, 
in  their  answers,  say,  among  other  things, 
that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  owner  or  en- 
titled to  the  possession  of  the  goods  at  the 
time  alleged  in  the  complaint,  'or  at  any 
other  time,'  which,  it  is  said,  included  the 
time  of  the  commencement  of  the  action. 
But  that  is  the  very  converse  of  the  aver- 
ment which  respondent  ought  to  have 
made  in  his  complaint, — namely,  that  at 
the  time  of  the  commencement  of  the  ac- 
tion he  was  the  owner,  etc.  Tlie  judg- 
ment must  therefore  be  reversed  for  the 
insufficiency  of  the  complaint."  See  also 
Windsor  v." Miner  (1899),  124  Cal.  492,  57 
Pac.  386.  Both  these  cases  seem  at  vari- 
ance with  Vance  v.  Anderson  (1896),  113 
Cal.  532,45  Pac.  816.  In  Nye  v.  Bill  Nye 
Mining  Co.  (1903),  42  Ore.  560,  71  Pac. 
1043,  it  was  held  that  an  answer  consist- 
ing of  specific  denials  only  cannot  aid  a 
complaint.] 

8  Dayton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kelley,  24  Ohio 
St.  345,  357 ;  Miller  v.  White,  6  N.  Y. 
S.  C.  255;  Garrett  v.  Trotter,  65  N.  C. 
430,  432;  Bate  v.  Graham,  11  N.  Y.  237; 
Louisville  &  P.  Canal  Co.  v.  Mnrphy,  9 
Bush,  522,  529    (a  simple  denial  in   the 


FORM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT    OR    PETITION. 


665 


ought  to  have  been  alleged  in  the  complaint  or  petition,  is  not 
sufficient,  and  does  not  cure  the  defect.^ 

§  471.  *  580.  Prayer  for  Relief.^  The  prayer  for  relief  is  gen- 
erally regarded  as  forming  no  part  of  the  cause  of  action,  ^  and  as 
having  no  effect  upon  it,  and  as  furnishing  no  test  or  criterion 


answer) ;  but  see  Scofield  v.  Whitelegge, 
49  N.  Y.  259,  261,  which  expres.sly  holds 
that  a  denial  merely  in  the  answer  is 
not  sufficient;  Shartle  v.  Minneapolis,  17 
Minn.  308,  312.  See  also  De  la  Mar  v. 
Hurd,  4  Col.  442;  Herschficld  v.  Aiken, 
3  Mont.  442 ;  Haggard  v.  Wallen,  6  Neb. 
271  ;  Worthley's  Adm.  v.  Hammond,  13 
Bush,  510;  Quaid  i'.  Cornwall,  13  id.  601  ; 
Howland  Coal,  etc.  Works  v.  Brown,  13 
id.  681;  Grigsby  v.  Barr,  14  id.  330; 
Pearce  v.  Mason,  78  N.  C.  37;  Goff  v. 
Outagamie  Cy.  Sup.,  43  Wis.  55 ;  Kretser 
(".  Carey,  52  id.  374 ;  Wiles  v.  Lambert, 
66  Ind.  494;  Allen  v.  Chouteau,  102  Mo. 
309  ;  Donaldson  v.  Butler  Cy.,  98  Mo.  163  ; 
Henry  v.  Sneed,  99  Mo.  407  ;  Cohen  v. 
Knox,  90  Cal.  266  ;  Hegard  v.  Cal.  Ins. 
Co.  (Cal.,  June,  1886),  II  Pac.  Rep.  594  ; 
Schenk  v.  Hartford  F.  Ins.  Co.,  71  Cal. 
28;  Cohu  v.  Husson,  113  N.  Y.  662; 
Sengf elder  v.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  of  N.  Y.,  31 
Pac.  Rep.  (Wash.,  1893)  428. 

[^Vance  v.  Anderson  (1896),  113  Cal. 
532,  45  Pac.  816;  City  of  Louisville  v. 
Snow's  Adm'r  (1900),  107  Ky.  536,  54 
S.  W.  860;  Main  v.  Ray  (1900),  Ky.,  57 
S.  W.  7 ;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Par- 
sons (1903),  Ky.,  72  S.  W.  800.  An  an- 
swer which  assumes  that  the  complaint 
contains  an  allegation,  supplies  tlie  omis- 
sion of  it:  Lynch  v.  Beciitel  (1897),  19 
Mont.  548,  48  Pac.  1112.  And  where  a 
complaint  is  merely  ambiguous,  an  answer 
which  clears  up  the  ambiguity  cures  the 
defect:  Hamilton  v.  Great  P'alls  Ry.  Co. 
(1895),  17  Mont.  334,  42  Pac.  860] 

1  Webb  V.  Bidwell,  15  Minn.  479, 
485. 

^But  where  plaintiff  omitted  certain 
essential  allegations  from  his  petition,  and 
defendant  alleged  the  absence  of  such 
omitted  f.acts,  and  plaintiff  filed  a  reply 
denying  the  averments  of  the  answer,  an 
issue  was  thereby  raised  as  to  the  omitted 
facts :  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thieman  (189.5),  96  Ky.  507,  29  S.  W.  357. 
So,  also,  a  reply  may  aid  a  defective  coun- 


ter-claim: Gaskins  r.  Davis  (1894),  115 
N.  C.  85,  20  S.  E.  188. 

But  in  Water  Supply,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lari- 
mer, etc.  Co.  (1898),  25  Colo.  87,  53  Pac. 
386,  the  court  said :  "  A  defective  com- 
plaint may  be  aided,  and  omissions  sup- 
plied, by  the  answer,  or  an  allegation  in 
the  replication,  if  acquiesced  in."] 

-  ^Farwell  Co.  v.  Lykins  (1898),  59 
Kan.  9C),  52  Pac.  99  ] 

^  [[Therelief  to  be  granted  depends  upon 
the  facts  alleged  and  proved  and  not  upon 
the  prayer  for  relief :  Dennison  v.  Chap- 
man (1895),  105  Cal.  447,  39  Pac.  61  ;  Ru- 
tenic  V.  Hamaker  (1902),  40  Ore.  444,  67 
Pac.  192 ;  Hendon  v.  North  Carolina  R.  R. 
Co.  (1900),  127  N.  C.  110,  37  S.  E.  155; 
Adams  v.  Hayes  (1897),  120  N.  C.  383,  27 
S.  E.  47  ;  Giilam  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1897), 
121  N.  C.  369,  28  S.  E.  470;  Stubblefield 
V.  Gadd  (1901),  112  la.  681,  84  N.  W.  917; 
McClure  v.  La  Plata  County  (1896),  23 
Colo.  130,  46  Pac.  677;  Miller  v.  Rapp 
(1893),  135  Ind.  614,  34  N.  E.  981  ;  State 
ex  rel.  v.  Horton,  etc.  Co.  (1901),  161  Mo. 
664,61  S.  W.  869  ;  Sherrin  y.  Flinn  (1900), 
155  Ind.  422,  58  N.  E.  549;  French  v. 
Woodruff  (1898),  25  Colo.  .339,  54  Pac. 
1015  ;  .Johnson  v.  Polhemus  (1893),  99  CaL 
240, 38  Pac.  908  (in  an  equity  case) ;  Klein- 
schmidt  v.  Steele  (1894),  15  Mont.  181,  38 
Pac.  827  (in  an  equity  case) ;  State  ex  rel. 
V.  Tooker  (1896),  18  Mont.  540,  46  Pac. 
530  (in  an  equity  case) ;  Toy  v.  McHugh 
(1901),  62  Neb.  820,  87  N.  W.  1059;  Top- 
ping V.  Parish  (1897),  96  Wis.  378,  71 
N.  W.  367. 

A  general  prayer  for  relief  is  sufficient 
to  warrant  the  court  in  granting  any  relief 
consistent  with  the  jjleadings  and  evi- 
dence: Mackay  v.  Smith  (1902),  27  Wash. 
442  ;  67  Pac.  982 ;  Dormitzer  r.  German 
Savings  Bank  (1900),  23  Wash.  132,  62 
Pac.  862;  Yarwood  v.  Johnson  (1902),  29 
Wash.  643,  70  Pac.  123;  Kelley  v.  Wehn 
(1902),  63  Neb.  410,  88  N.  W.  682;  Rees 
V.  Shepherdson  (1895),  95  la.  431,  64 
N.  W.  286  (in  an  equity  case) ;  Hession  v. 


666 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


bv  which  its  nature  may  be  determined. ^     This  prevailing  view 


Liiiastnitli  (1895),  96  la.  483,  65  N.  W. 
399  (ill  an  equity  case)  ;  McHugli  v.  Louis- 
ville Bridge  Co.  (1901),  Ivy.,  65  S.  W.  456. 
See,  iiowever,  Sclimitt  c.  Schueider  (1899), 
109  Ga.  628,  35  S.  E.  145;  Ilairalson  v. 
Carsou  (1900),  111  Ga.  57,36  S.  E.  319; 
Steed  V.  Savage  (1902),  115  Ga.  97,  41 
S.  E.  272. 

A  defective  prayer  for  relief  is  uot  a 
ground  for  demurrer  :  McGillivray  v.  Mc- 
Gillivray  (1896),  9  S.  D.  187,68  N.  W.  316  ; 
Levy  V.  Noble  (1902),  135  Cal.  559,  67  Pac. 
1033. 

The  entire  omission  of  any  prayer  for 
relief  would  not  subject  the  petition  to  a 
general  demurrer:  Fox  i-.  Graves  (1896), 
46  Neb.  812,  65  N.  W.  887.  But  in 
Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Martelle 
(1902),  —Neb.—,  91  N.  W.  364,  the  court 
suggested  a  qmcre  whether  such  a  com- 
plaint would  sustain  a  verdict  and  judg- 
ment. "  A  prayer  for  judgment  is  only  a 
matter  of  form  :"  Carson  v.  Butt  (1896), 
4  Okla.  133.  46  Pac.  596. 

A  complaint  is  not  demurrable  when 
its  allegations  show  that  the  plaintiff  is 
entitled  to  some  relief,  thougli  not  to  the 
relief  prayed  for :  Conner  i;.  Ashley  (1897), 
49  S.  C.  478,  27  S.  E.  473  ;  Keuaston  v. 
Lorig  (1900),  81  Minn.  454,  84  N.  W. 
323;  Morey  v.  City  of  Duluth  (1897),  69 
Minn.  5,  71  K  W.  694  ;  Whitehead  v. 
Sweet  (1899),  126  Cal.  67,  58  Pac.  376. 
But  not  so  when  only  nominal  damages 
could  be  recovered  and  a  judgment  for 
nominal  damages  would  not  carry  costs : 
Kenyon  r.  West.  Union.  Tel.  Co.'(1893), 
100  Cal.  4.54,  35  Pac.  75.  Contra,  Copelaud 
V.  Cheney  (1902),  116Ga.  685,  43  S.  E.  59, 

The  amount  in  controversy  is  deter- 
mined by  the  allegations  of  the  complaint, 
not  by  the  prayer  for  judgment :  Town  of 
Central  City  v.  Treat"(1897),  101  la.  109, 
70  N.  W.  110.  And,  similarly,  the  alle- 
gations, not  the  prayer,  determine  the 
question  of  jurisdiction  :  Sams  Car  Coupler 
Co.  V.  League  (1898),  25  Colo.  129,  54  Pac. 
642;  Lchuhardt  v.  Jennings  (1897),  119 
Cal.  192,  48  Pac.  56  ;  Prince  v.  Takash 
(1903),  75  Conn.  616,  54  Atl.  1003. 

A  prayer  for  excessive  relief  does  not 
remier  the  coraplaint  demurrable:  Siegel 
V.  Town  of  Liberty  (1901),  111  Wis.  470, 
87  N.  W.  487  ;  Citizens'  Loan  &  Trust  Co. 


V.  Witte  (1901),  110  Wis.  545,  86  N.  W. 
173;  Allen  v.  Frawley  (1900),  106  Wis. 
638,  82  N.  W.  593  ;  Howard  v.  Seattle  Nat. 
Bank  (1894),  10  Wash.  280,  38  Pac.  1040; 
Laird-Norton  Co.  v.  lierker  (1895),  6  S.  1). 
509,  62  N.  W.  104 ;  Level  Land  Co.  i-. 
Sivyer  (1901),  112  Wis.  442,  88  N.  W.  317; 
Hudson  V.  Archer  (1893)  4  S.  1).  128,  55 
N.  W.  1099;  Crossen  r.  Grandy  (1902),  42 
Ore.  282,  70  Pac.  906.  Contra,  Seals  /•. 
Augusta  Ry.  Co  (1897),  102  Ga.  817,  29 
S.  E.  116. 

In  Brown  v.  Iowa  Legion  of  Honor 
(1899),  107  la.  439,  78  N.  W.  73,  it  was 
held  that  a  relief  not  included  in  the 
prayer  must  be  denied.  See  also  Nichols 
&  Shepard  Co.  r.  Wiedemann  (1898),  72 
Minn.  344,  75  N.  W.  208,  where  the  same 
rule  substantially  was  applied,  though  the 
court  sought  to  make  a  distinction.  See 
also  Bank  of  California  v.  Dyer  (1896),  14 
Wash.  279,  44  Pac.  534;  Uverstreet  v. 
Citizens'  Bank  (1903),  12  Okla.  383,  72 
Pac.  379. 

Costs  need  not  be  asked  for  in  the  peti- 
tion :  Reed  i'.  Corrigan  (1901),  114  la. 
638,  87  N.  W.  676.  The  prayer  of  the 
complaint  in  Johns  v.  Northwestern  Relief 
A.ss'u  (1894),  87  Wis.  Ill,  58  N.  W.  76, 
was  held  so  ambiguous  as  to  be  subject 
to  a  motion  to  make  more  definite  and 
certain.  Alternative  reliefs  may  be  prayed 
for:  Grant  v.  Grant  (1893),  53  Minn.  181, 
54  N.  W.  1059.] 

1  Goodall  V.  Mopley,  45  Ind.  355,  359 ; 
Lowry  v.  Dutton,  28  Ind.  473 ;  Bennett  v. 
Preston,  17  id.  291 ;  Cincinnati  &  C.  R. 
Co.  V.  Washburn,  25  id.  259 ;  Hale  v. 
Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  626,  631. 
This  doctrine  cannot,  of  course,  be  true 
in  the  one  or  two  States  who.se  codes 
provide  for  a  demurrer  when  the  facts 
alleged  show  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  en- 
titled to  the  relief  demanded  in  his  petition 
or  complaint.  For  further  illustrations  of 
the  general  rule  that  the  relief  actually 
granted  after  a  trial  depends  upon  the 
facts  properly  alleged,  and  not  upon  the 
prayer,  see  Shilling  v.  Rominger,  4  Col. 
100;  Radford  v.  So.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  12 
Bush,  434 ;  First  Div.  St.  Paul  &  Pac.  R. 
Co.  I'.  Rice,  25  Minn.  278 ;  Saline  Co.  v. 
Sappington,  64  Mo.  72;  Mo.  Valley  Land 
Co.  V.  Bushuell,   11    Neb.    192;   Gilman  r. 


FORM    OF    THE    GOMFLAINT    Oil    I'lyriTIOX.      '  667 

was  well  expressed  by  a  recent  decision  of  the  New  York  Court 
of  Appeals  in  language  which  I  quote:  "The  relief  demanded  by 
no  means  characterizes  the  action,  or  limits  the  plaintiff  in  respect 
to  the  remedy  which  he  may  have.  If  there  be  no  answer,  the 
relief  granted  cannot  exceed  that  which  the  plaintiff  shall  have 
demanded  in  his  complaint.  But  the  fact,  that  after  the  allega- 
tion of  the  facts  relied  upon  the  plaintiff  has  demanded  judgment 
for  a  sum  of  money  by  way  of  damages,  does  not  preclude  the 
recovery  of  the  same  amount  upon  the  same  state  of  facts  by  way 
of  equitable  relief.  The  relief  in  the  two  cases  would  be  pre- 
cisely the  same;  the  difference  would  be  formal  and  tcclinical. 
If  every  fact  necessary  to  the  action  is  stated,  the  plaintiff  may 
even,  when  no  answer  is  put  in,  have  any  relief  to  which  the 
facts  entitle  him  consistent  with  that  demanded  in  the  com- 
plaint."^ Although  this  theory  has  been  accepted  by  most  of 
the  courts,  and  is  approved  in  numberless  cases,  at  least  one 
tribunal  of  high  character  has  suggested  that  the  prayer  for  relief 
may  be  properly  appealed  to  as  the  test  by  which  the  nature  of 
the  action  can  be  determined  in  all  cases  where  the  pleader  has, 
by  his  mode  of  alleging  the  facts,  left  his  intention  in  doubt.^ 
I  have  thus  discussed  and  stated  those  fundamental  principles 

Pilmore,  7  Ore.  374;  Balle  v.  Mossley,  ^  Gillett  z;.  Treganza,  13  Wis.  472,  475, 
13  S.  C.  439;  Dawsoa  v.  Graham,  48  per  Dixon  C.  J.  :"  Under  our  present  sys- 
lowa,  378;  Herring  v.  Hely,  43  id.  157;  tem,  the  test  by  which  we  are  to  deter- 
Mackey  ?;.  Auer,  8  Hun,  180;  Benedicts,  mine  the  character  of  actions  in  those 
Benedict,  85  N.  Y.  625;  Tewksbury  v.  cases  where  the  facts  stated  indicate  two 
Schulenberg,  41  Wis.  584;  Gibson  r.  Gib-  or  more  actions  must  be  the  relief  de- 
son,  46  id.  449  ;  Acker  v.  McCullough,  50  manded.  We  may,  at  least,  safely  adopt 
Ind.  447 ;  Rogers  v.  Lafayette  Co.,  52  id.  this  rule  in  cases  of  doubt,  and  in  cases 
297;  Bonnell  v.  Allen,  53  id.  130;  Sohn  like  the  present,  where  the  pleader,  cou- 
V.  Marion,  etc.  Co.,  73  id.  78 ;  Carpenter  ceiviug  himself  entitled  to  prosecute  sev- 
V.  Brenham,  50  Cal.  549 ;  Hall  v.  Lonkey,  eral  actions,  has  so  stated  his  facts  as  to 
57  id.  80.  See  also  State  v.  Boone,  108  leave  it  uncertain  which  he  intended  to 
N.  C.  78;  Sannoner  i;.  Jacobson,  47  Ark.  pursue." 

31;  Korrady  v.   L.  S.   &   M.  S.   liy.  Co.,  []See  also  O'Brien  r.  Fitzgerald  (1894), 

131   Ind.    261  ;    Alworth  v.  Seymour,   42  143  N.   Y.  377,  38  N.  E.  371,  where  the 

Minn.  526;   Crosby  r.  Farmers'  Bk.,  107  court  hold  that  the  prayer  for  relief  may 

Mo.  436 ;   Ross  v.  Purse,  17  Colo.  24.     In  be  looked   to  in  determining  whether  the 

judgment   by  default   plaintiff   can   have  action  is  legal   or    equitable,    where   the 

no  greater  relief  than  is  demanded  by  the  facts  alleged  would  support   equally  an 

prayer:  Maxwell  i'.  Dudley,  13  Bush,  403  ;  action  at  law  or  in  equity.     In  Georgia  it 

Hansford  v.  Holdam,  14  id.  210;  Peck  i;.  is  held  that  the  prayer  for  relief  should 

N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Ry.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  246  ;  Bui-  generally  be  considered  as  indicating  the 

lard  V.  Sherwood,  85  id.  253.         '  nature  of   the   action,  whether    legal   or 

1  Bradley   v.    Aldrich,    40  N.  Y.  504;  equitable:   Steed   v.  Savage    (1902),    115 

Hale  V.  Omaha  Nat.  Bank,  49  N.  Y.  626,  Ga.  97,  41  S.  E.  272.] 
631,  per  Allen  J. 


668 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


and  general  doctrines  of  the  reformed  pleading  which  are  common 
to  all  causes  of  action.  The  more  special  rules  which  prescribe 
the  nriuner  and  form  of  averring  particular  facts,  and  which 
determine  the  mode  of  alleging  the  various  causes  of  action  con- 
sidered separately  and  individually,  must  be  omitted  from  the 
present  volume.^     They  will  find  their  appropriate  place  in  the 


1   rSecvssiti/  anil  Fortn  of  I'articiiliir 
Allftfdtious. 

The  author  did  not  undertake  to  dis- 
cuss this  subject,  and  the  editor  has  not 
aimed  to  treat  it  at  all  exhaustively  in 
this  note.  But  the  cases  dealing  with  it 
which  have  appeared  during  the  period 
covered  by  this  revision  have  been  classi- 
fied and  briefly  summarized  as  follows  :  — 

Account. 

Statutes  in  many  of  the  States  allow 
an  account  to  be  pleaded  by  copy  thereof. 
See  p.  438,  note  2.  See  McArthur  r. 
Clarke  Drug  Co.  (1896),  48  Neb.  899,  67 
N.  W.  861,  construing  one  of  these  stat- 
utes. In  Fletcher  r.  Co-Operative  Pub- 
lishing Co.'  (1899),  58  Neb.  511,  78  N.  W. 
1070,  it  was  held  that  the  statute  was 
merely  permissive,  and  it  was  still  proper 
to  plead  the  facts. 

As  to  method  of  pleading  an  account 
when  payments  have  been  made  upon  it, 
see  Hammer  r.  Downing  (1901),  39  Ore. 
504,  65  Pac.  17,  where  the  court  said: 
"  If  any  payment  has  been  made  upon  the 
account,  good  pleading,  under  our  prac- 
tice, requires  that  the  gross  .sum  be  stated 
as  the  amount  in  which  the  defendant  is 
indebted,  and  also  the  payments,  if  any,  at 
least  in  the  aggregate,  so  that  tlie  amount 
due  becomes  a  matter  of  deduction  ap- 
parent upon  the  face  of  the  complaint. 
This  brings  into  the  investigation  the  en- 
tire account,  and  the  balance,  when  ascer- 
tained, is  the  amount  subject  to  recovery." 

Account  Stated. 
It  is  unnecessary,  in  an  action  upon  an 
account  stated,  to  set  forth  in  the  com- 
plaint the  subject-matter  of  the  original 
debt :  Schutz  v.  Murctte  (1895),  146  N.  Y. 
l.'J7,  40  N.  E.  780. 

An  account  stated  is  a  new  and  inde- 
pendent contract,  behind  which  one  cannot 
go:  Conver.se  i;.  Scott  (1902),  137  Cal. 
2.39,  70  Pac.  13;  Haley.  Hale  (1901),  14 


S.  D.  644,  86  N.  W.  650;  Schutz  v.  Mo- 
rette  (1895),  146  N.  Y.  137,  40  N.  E.  780. 
See  Xodine  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1902),  41 
Ore.  386,  68  Pac.  1109,  and  Bailey  v. 
Wilson  (1899),  34  Ore.  186,55  Pac.  973, 
for  good  discussions  of  tlie  subject  of  ac- 
count stated. 

Accounting. 
A  complaint  does  not  state  a  cause  of 
action  for  an  accouuliug  whicli  does  not 
show  the  nature  of  the  dealings  between 
the  parties  and  present  a  coj)v  of  the  ac- 
count as  an  exhibit:  Gise  v.  Cook  (1898), 
152  Ind.  75,  52  N.  E.454. 

Action  for  Price. 
In  order  to  support  an  action  for  an 
agreed  price  there  must  have  been  such  a 
delivery  as  will  pass  title  to  the  purchaser  ; 
and  if  title  remains  in  the  seller,  and  the 
buyer  renounces  his  contract,  the  law  re- 
quires the  seller  to  treat  the  ])roperty  as 
his  own  and  to  sue,  if  at  all,  for  the  dam- 
ages he  has  sustained  :  McCorniick  Har- 
vesting Mach.  Co.  V.  Belfany  (1899),  78 
Minn.  370,  81  N.  W.  10. 

Ar/e7icy. 

"Where  a  contract  was  made  or  other  act 
done  by  an  authorized  agent,  it  is  proper 
to  allege  that  it  was  done  by  the  principal : 
Shull  V.  Arie  (1901),  113  la.  170,  84  N.  W. 
1031  ;  Helena  Xat.  Bank  v.  Tel.  Co. 
(1898),  20  Mont.  379,  51  Pac.  829;  Chesa- 
peake &  Ohio  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Thicman 
(1895),  96  Ky.  .507,  29  S.  W.  357  ;  Wage- 
ner  v.  Kirven  (1899),  56  S.  C.  126,  34  S.E. 
18;  Topcka  Capital  Co.  v.  KLMuington 
(1900).  61  Kan.  6,  59  Pac.  1062;  Blotcky 
r.  Miller  (1902),  Neb.,  91  N.  W.  52.3*; 
Richmond  v.  Voorhees  (1894),  10  Wa.sh. 
316,  38  Pac.  1014;  Higbee  v.  Trumbauer 
(1900),  112  la.  74,  83  N.  W.  812. 

But  where  orticrs  were  drawn  on  an 
agent,  and  not  on  his  princijjal,  and  the 
(inly   acceptance  was   by   the    agent,    no 


FORM   OF   THE   COMPLAINT   OR   PETITION. 


669 


second  part  of  the  work,  which  will  treat  cf  the  different  remedies 
themselves  that  may  be  obtained  by  means  of  the  civil  action. ^ 


recovery  can  be  had  on  a  petition  alleging 
that  they  were  drawn  on  and  accepted  by 
the  principal :  Wiuburn  i\  Fidelity,  etc. 
Ass'n  (1900),  no  la.  374,  81  N.  W.  682. 

In  an  action  brought  under  §  1816  a, 
L.  &  B.  Ann.  St  ,  for  injuries  sustained  by 
cue  employee  through  the  negligence  of 
another,  the  complaint  must  clearly  allege 
the  relation  between  the  negligent  servant 
and  the  company  :  Albrechc  v.  Milwaukee, 
etc.  Co.  (1894),  87  Wis.  105,  58  N.  W.  72. 

Altered  Contract. 

"Where  a  corporation  employed  the 
plaintiff  under  an  agreement  to  pay  what 
his  services  were  worth,  and  the  rate  of 
wages  was  afterwards  fixed  by  the  parties, 
it  was  proper  to  allege  in  declaring  on  the 
contract  that  the  company  agreed  to  pay 
the  wijges  fixed  in  tlie  adjustment,  and 
under  such  allegation  proof  of  the  original 
contract  and  the  subsequent  adjustment  is 
admissible :  Sandberg  v.  Victor  Mining 
Co.  (1901),  24  Utah,  1,  66  Pac.  360. 

Altered  Instrument. 
A  written  instrument  which  has  been 
altered  by  a  stranger  may  still  be  used  as 


1  [^Verijication :  The  verification  is  no 
part  of  the  pleading :  Johnson  v.  Puritan 
Miu.  Co.  (1896),  19  Mont.  30,  47  Pac- 
337;  Bryant  v.  Davis  (1899),  22  Mont. 
.534,  57  Pac.  143.  But  where  a  verifica- 
tion is  required,  and  is  omitted,  the  plead- 
ing may  be  stricken  out  on  motion  or 
judgment  may  be  had  on  the  pleadings : 
Hearst  v.  Hart  (1900),  128  Cal.  327,  60 
Pac.  846.  In  Bryant  v.  Davis  (1899),  22 
Mont.  534,  57  Pac.  143,  it  was  held  that 
judgment  could  not  be  rendered  on  the 
pleadings  on  account  of  a  defective  verifi- 
cation. Verification  by  one  co-plaintiff  or 
co-defendant  is  suificient :  Butterfield  v. 
Graves  (1902),  138  Cal.  155,  71  Pac.  510; 
Claiborne  i-.  Castle  (1893),  98  Cal.  30,  32 
Pac.  807. 

Want  of  a  verification  subjects  a  plead- 
ing to  attack  by  motion  but  not  to  a  de- 
murrer: Scott-Force  Hat  Co.  v.  Ilombs 
(1894),  127  Mo.  392,  30  8.  W.  183;  Butter- 
field  ?•.  Graves  (1902),  138  Cal.  155,  71  Pac. 


a  basis  for  a  recovery,  but  it  should  be 
pleaded  according  to  its  original  terms 
and  not  according  to  its  terms  as  altereil  : 
I'erkius  Windmill  &  Ax  Co.  v.  Tillman 
(1«98),  55  Neb.  652,  75  :N.  W.   1098. 

Anticipating  Defences. 
A  pleader  is  not  required  to  anticipate 
defences :  Larson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 
(1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  729  ;  Sawyer 
V.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  156  Mo.  468, 
57  N.  W.  108;  Hamilton  v.  Love  (1898), 
152  Ind.  641,  53  N.  E.  181  ;  Eomer  v. 
Conter  (1893),  53  Minn.  171,  54  N.  W. 
1052;  Trotter  v.  Mutual  Reserve  Life 
Ass'n  (1897),  9  S.  D.  596,  70  N.  W.  843; 
Indianapolis  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Robinson 
(1901),  157  Ind.  414,  61  N.  E.  936;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Henley  (1901),  157 
Ind.  90,  60  N.  E.  682 ;  Massillon  Engine 
&  Thresher  Co.  r.  Prouty  (1902),—  Neb. 
— ,  91  N.  W.  384. 

Articles  of  Incorporation. 

It  is  sufficient  to  plead  articles  of  in- 
corporation and  by-laws  by  stating  their 
substance  and  legal  effect,  without  set 
ting   them    out    in    hcec    verba  :    Seal    v. 

510.  Unless  made  before  trial  the  objec- 
tion is  waived:  Myers  v.  Douglass  (1896), 
99  Ky.  267,  35  S.  W.  917.  A  verification 
mav  be  amended  iu  the  discretion  of  the 
trial  court:  Cantwell  v.  Herring  (1900), 
127  N.  C.  81,  37  S.  E.  140;  Steidl  v.  State 
(1902),  63  Neb.  695,  88  N.  W.  853. 

As  to  when  a  verification  is  necessary, 
see  Butte  &  Boston  Co.  v.  Montana  Co. 
(1900),  24  Mont.  125,  60  Pac.  1039  ;  Fisher 
V.  Patton  (1895),  134  Mo.  32,  33  S.  W. 
451  ;  Cady  v.  Case  (1895),  11  Wa.sh.  124, 
39  Pac.  375  ;  Reichert  v.  Lonsberg  (1894), 
87  Wis.  543,  58  N.  W.  1030. 

And  see  the  following  cases  for  form 
of  verification  ;  Phifer  v.  Travelers'  Ins. 
Co.  (1898),  123  N.  C.  410,  31  S.  E.  716; 
Cole  V.  Boyd  (1899),  125  N.  C.  496,  34 
S.  E.557  ;  Payne  v.  Boyd  (1899);  125  N.  C. 
499,  34  S.  E.  631  ;  Martin  v.  Martin  (1902), 
130  N.  C.  27,  40  S.  E.  822 ;  Roosevelt  v. 
Ulmer  (1898),  98  Wis.  356,  74  N-  W.  124.] 


670 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


Cameron   (1901),   24   Wash.   62,   63    Pac. 

110.3. 

Assif^nmenl. 

An  allegation  that  a  thing  was  assigned 
implies  on  ilemnrrer  that  the  assignment 
was  valid:  (Juuderson  v.  Thomas  (1894), 
87  Wis.  406,  .58  N.  W.  750.  See  also  Rol- 
lins i:  Humphrey  (1897),  98  Wis.  66,  73 
N.  W.  331. 

Assignment  /or  Benefit  of  Creditors. 

An  allegation  that  A.  was  duly  ap- 
pointed assignee  of  the  firm  of  B.  &  Co. 
and  thereafter  duly  qualified  as  such  as- 
signee and  entered  into  the  discharge  of 
his  trust,  c;uinot  be  considered  as  an  alle- 
gation that  B.  &  Co.  made  a  general  as- 
signment to  A.  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  : 
Sellers  v.  First  Presbyterian  Church 
(1895),  91    Wis.  328,  64  N.   W.   1031. 

Attorney,  Qualifications  of. 

In  a  suit  for  services  rendered  by  an 
attorney,  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  that 
he  is  an  attorney  admitted  to  practice: 
Miller  v.  Ballerino  (1902)  135  Cal.  566, 
67  Pac.  1046,  68  Pac.  600. 

Where  an  action  is  brought  by  a  county 
and  the  petition  is  signed  by  reputable  at- 
torneys in  its  behalf,  there  is  no  necessity 
tiiat  their  authority  to  so  act  should  ap- 
pear on  the  face  of  the  petition  :  Hickory 
County  y.  Fugate  (1898),  143  Mo.  71,  44 
S.  W.  789. 

An  allegation  that  an  attorney  of  a 
corporation  was  appointed  and  held  under 
said  appointment  for  two  years  is  a  suffi- 
cient allegation  that  his  term  was  for  two 
years  :  Germania  Spar  &  Bau  Verein  v. 
Flynn  (1896),  92  Wis.  201,  66  N.  W.  109. 

Bond. 

In  an  action  on  an  official  bond  brought 
against  the  principal  and  sureties,  an  alle- 
gation that  tlie  bond  was  approved  is  not 
necessary:  Fire  Ass'n  v.  Ruby  (1900),  60 
Neb.  216,  82  N.  W.  629.  Nor  is  it  neces- 
sary to  separately  state  the  several  items 
of  defalcation  :  State  v.  McDonald  (1895), 
4  Idalio,  .343,  40  Pac.  312.  See  also  State 
ex  rel.  v.  Tittmann  (1896),  134  Mo.  162,35 
S.  W.  579.  Compare  witli  this  last  case, 
Pryor  v.  Kansas  City  (1899),  153  Mo. 
135,  54  S.  W.  499,  which  seems  inconsis- 
tent therewith. 


Breach  of  Covenants. 
"  In  assigning  breaches  of  the  usual 
covenants  accomjianying  tiie  transfer  of 
lands,  tlie  general  rule  is  that  the  pleader 
may  assign  them  generally,  unless  such 
assignment  does  not  amoufit  to  a  breach. 
.  .  .  But  not  so  as  it  respects  the  covenant 
against  incumbrances,  the  covenant  of 
warranty,  and  tliat  for  (piiet  enjoyment, 
as  the  grantor  does  not  covenant  against 
all  possible  incumbrances,  or  all  interrup- 
tions or  claims  or  ousters,  and  it  therefore 
becomes  necessary  to  specify  the  iucum- 
br.ance  or  title  paramount  by  reason  of 
which  the  covenantee  or  his  assigns  have 
been  ousted  or  disturbed  in  the  posses- 
sion :  "  Jennings  v.  Kiernau  (1898),  35 
Ore.  349,  55  Pac.  443.  It  was  held  in 
Evans  v.  Fulton  (1896),  134  Mo.  653,  36 
S.  W.  230,  that  a  breach  of  a  covenant  ia 
well  a.ssigned  by  negativing  the  words  of 
the  covenant. 

Breach  of  Promise  to  ^larry. 
In  an  action  for  breach  of  promise  to 
marry,  allegations  of  seduction  by  means 
of  such  promise  may  be  pleaded  merely 
in  aggravation  of  damages,  and  do  not 
subject  the  complaint  to  the  charge  of 
embracing  two  causes  of  action :  Geiger 
V.  Payne  (1897),  102  la.  581,  69  N.  W. 
5,54,   71   X.   W.  571. 

Breach  of  Warranty. 
The  character  and  extent  of  the  war- 
ranty and  the  nature  and  particulars  of  the 
breach  must  be  alleged :  Shirk  v.  Mitch- 
ell (1893),  137  Ind.  185,  36  N.  E.  850.  It 
is  necessary  to  allege  that  the  purchaser 
relied  upon  the  warranty  and  was  thereby 
deceived,  in  an  action  for  its  breach : 
Abilene  Nat.  Bank  v.  Nodine  (1894),  26 
Ore.  53,  37  Pac.  47.  The  petition  must 
allege  that  the  plaintiff  was  evicted  by 
title  paramount :  Hampton  v.  Web.ster 
(1898),  56  Neb.  628,  77  N.  W.  .50. 

Capacity. 

The  suffi.\  "trustee"  in  the  caption  of 
a  complaint  will  be  treated  as  mere  de- 
scri/itio  persona-,  where  tliere  is  no  aver- 
ment in  the  complaint  that  the  ]daiuti£f  is 
trustee  of  an  e.\])re.ss  or  other  trust  or  is 
suing  for  the  benefit  of  another.  "  When 
an  action  is  brouL'bt  by  a  trustee,  the  com- 
]daint   should  disclose   the  name   of   the 


FORM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT   OR    PKTITIOX. 


671 


cestui  que  trust,  so  that  an  issue,  if  neces- 
sary, may  be  formed  upon  that  allegation, 
and  also  that  the  cestui  (jue  trust  may  be 
bound  hy  the  judgment  or  decree  :"  Marion 
Bond  Co.  V.  Mexican  Coffee  Co.  (1902), 
—  Ind.  — ,  G.5  N.  E.  748. 

An  allegation  "that  the  jilaintiff  is  the 
duly  apjiointed,  qualified,  and  acting  ad- 
ministrator of  the  estate  of  Julia  Collins, 
deceased,"  is  good,  in  the  absence  of  a  spe- 
cial demurrer:  Collins  v.  O'Laverty  (1902), 
136  Cal.  31,  68  Pac.  327;  Willis  v.  Tozer 
(1894),  44  S.  C.  1,  21  S.  E.  617,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  any  other  objection  than  oral  de- 
murrer at  the  trial.  A  general  averment 
of  cajjacity  is  sufficient :  Sparks  v.  Nat. 
Accident  Ass'u  (189r)),  100  la.  458,  69 
N.  W.  678. 

A  complaint  is  good  against  a  general 
demurrer  which  in  its  title  and  body  desig- 
nates plaintiff  as  administrator  of  decedent, 
though  tlie  complaint  contains  no  allega- 
tion of  decedent's  death  and  the  issuing 
of  letters  to  plaintiff :  Toner  v.  Wagner 
(1901),   1.58  Ind.  447,  63  N.  E.  8.59. 

Where  a  plaintiff  sues  as  executor  or 
administrator,  he  should  allege  that  he  is 
such  b}^  virtue  of  letters  issued  out  of 
a  probate  court,  giving  the  name  thereof, 
and  the  term  at  which  such  letters  were 
granted  :  Hamilton  v.  Mclndoo  (1900),  81 
Minn.  324,  84  N.  W.  118. 

An  allegation  that  a  cause  of  action 
was  sold  and  assigned  to  plaintiff  as  ad- 
ministrator of  a  decedent's  estate  for  a 
valuable  consideration,  sufficiently  alleges 
plaintiff's  legal  capacity  to  sue  :  Brossard 
V.  Williams  (1902),  lu' Wis.  89,  89  N.  W. 
832. 

tjWhere  a  guardian  sues  on  behalf  of 
minors  it  is  necessary  for  him  to  allege 
facts  showing  his  representative  capacity, 
and  if  he  does  not  do  so,  the  complaint  is 
demurrable  on  the  ground  of  want  of 
capacity  to  sue :  Dalrymple  v.  Security 
Loan  Co.  (1900),  9  N.  D.  306,  83  N.  W. 
245.  Mere  description  held  sufficient : 
Bennett  i'.  Bennett  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  91 
N.  W.  409.  Where  plaintiffs  seek  parti- 
tion in  behalf  of  an  unincorporated  church 
association,  they  should  aver  that  they,  as 
trustees  of  the  church,  "  sue  for  themselves 
and  all  other  members  of  said  church  : " 
Lillv  V.  Menke  (1894),  126  Mo.  190,  28 
S.  W.  643. 

"  Where  the  pleadings  disclose  a  cause 


of  action  against  defendant  personally, 
superadded  words,  such  as  '  agent,'  '  ex- 
ecutor,' or  '  director,'  should  be  rejected 
as  dc.srrlptio  perso/ue :  "  Andres  v.  Kridler 
(1896),  47  Neb.  585,  66  N.  W.  649. 

Conditions  Precedent. 

Performance  of  conditions  precedent  to 
liability  on  the  part. of  defendant  must  be 
pleaded  by  the  plaintiff:  Albers  v.  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  (1896),  98  la.  51,  66 
N.  W.  1040;  Root  v.  Childs  (1897),  68 
Minn.  142,  70  N.  W.  1078;  Ary  v.  Ches- 
more  (1901),  113  la.  63,  84  N.  W.  965; 
Manaudas  v.  Heilner  (1896),  29  Ore.  222, 
45  Pac.  758;  Weeks  v.  O'Brien  (1894), 
141  N.  y.  199,  36  N.  E.  185;  Boden  v. 
Maher  (1897),  95  Wis.  65,  69  N.  VV.  980  ; 
Moody  V.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  52  0.  St.  12,  38 
N.  E.  1011;  Milburn  v.  Glynn  County 
(1899),  109  Ga.  473,  34  S.  e"  848;  Cope 
V.  Type  Foundry  Co.  (1897),  20  Mont.  67, 
49  Pac.  387 ;  Long  Creek  Bldg.  Ass'n  r. 
State  Ins.  Co.  (1896),  29  Ore.  569,  46  Pac. 
366;  Closz  v.  Miracle  (1897),  103  la.  198, 
72  N.  W.  502  ;  Charles  Baumbach  Co. 
V.  Laube  (1898),  99  Wis.  171,  74  N.  W. 
96;  McGlauflin  v.  Wormser  (1903),  — 
Mont.  — ,  72  Pac.  428. 

The  performance  of  conditions  prece- 
dent may  be  alleged  generally:  Miles  v. 
Mutual  Reserve  Fund  Life  Ass'n  (1900), 
108  Wis.  421,  84  N.  W.  159;  McGannon 
V.  Millers'  Nat.  Ins.  Co.  (1902),  171  Mo. 
143,  71  S.  W.  160;  Kenney  v.  Bevilheimer 
(1902),  158  Ind.  653,  64  N.  E.  215;  Mc- 
Cullough  V.  Colfax  County  (1903),'—  Neb. 
— ,  95  N.  W.  29  (only  in  case  of  a  contract). 
This  rule  is  prescribed  by  statute  in  a  num- 
ber of  States,  as  in  Montana,  Indiana, 
Missouri,  South  Carolina,  and  others. 
But  these  statutes  are  permi.ssive  only, 
and  specific  averments  are  equally  proper  : 
Kenney  v.  Bevilheimer  (1902),  158  Ind. 
653,  64  N.  E.  215;  Grand  Lodge  v.  Hall 
(1903),  —  Ind.  App.  — ,  67  N.  E.  272; 
Brock  V.  Des  Moines  Ins.  Co.  (1895),  96 
la.  39,  64  N.  W.  685 ;  Hart  v.  Accident 
A.ss'n  (1898),  105  la.  717,  75  N.  W.  .508. 

As  a  test  to  determine  whether  a  con- 
dition is  precedent  or  subsequent,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota,  in  Root  r. 
Childs  (1897),  68  Minn.  142,  70  N.  W. 
1078,  said:  "Where  the  obligation  of  a 
party  to  a  contract  is  to  pay  only  upon 
the  happening  of  a  contingency,  e.  g.,  the 


672 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


return  of  an  instrument  duly  recorded, 
such  contingency  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
condition  precedent,  and  its  occurrence 
must  he  alleged  in  the  complaint.  But, 
if  payment  is  not  to  be  made  if  a  con- 
tingency liapj)ens  during  its  continuance, 
e.  y.,  if  the  piirty  is  enjoined  from  using 
the  article  which  is  the  subject-matter  of 
the  contract,  he  is  not  to  pay  tlie  purcha.se 
price  until  the  iujnuctiou  is  dissolved,  tiie 
contingency  is  in  che  nature  of  a  condition 
subsequent,  and  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege 
in  the  complaint  the  non-happening  or 
non-continuance  of  the  contingency."  For 
a  further  discussion  of  the  same  question 
see  Moody  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  52  O.  St.  12, 
38  N.  E.  ion. 

In  Montana,  in  Kent  i'.  Tuttle  (1897), 
20  Mont.  203.  50  Pac.  559,  and  Zion  Co- 
operative Ass'n  V.  Mayo  (1898),  22  Mont. 
100,  55  Pac.  915,  it  was  held  that  where 
the  statute  prescribes  certain  acts  on  the 
part  of  a  foreign  corporation  a.s  conditions 
precedent  to  its  right  to  do  business  in  the 
State,  its  complaint  must  allege  perform- 
ance or  that  the  business  done,  out  of 
which  the  cause  of  action  arose,  was  inter- 
state commerce.  But  in  American  Shoe 
Co.  V.  O'Rourke  (1900),  23  Mont.  530,  59 
Pac.  910,  it  was  held  tliat  such  allegations 
■were  unnecessary. 

Where  performance  of  conditions  prece- 
dent is  not  alleged  by  the  plaintiff,  the 
defendant  may  raise  the  objection  by  de- 
murrer, or  by  answer,  or  he  may  raise  it 
on  the  trial:  Weeks  v.  O'Brien  (1894), 
141  N.  Y.  199,  36  N.  E.  185.  See  also 
Duff  V.  Fire  Ass'n  (1895),  129  Mo.  460,  30 
S.  W.  1034. 

Where  a  demand  and  refusal  are  con- 
ditions precedent  to  plaintiff's  case,  and 
defendant  in  his  answer  denies  all  liability 
so  that  it  is  apparent  a  demand  would  have 
been  met  by  a  refusal,  defendant  cannot 
complain  that  such  demand  was  not  shown : 
Thompson  v.  Whitney  (1899),  20  Utah,  1, 
57  Pac.  429. 

Conditions  Subsequent,  Negativing. 
"  Must  the  conditions  or  exceptions, 
the  existence  of  which  may  relieve  the 
defendant  from  liability,  be  pleaded  by 
plaintiff,  <jr  are  they  so  far  matters  of 
defence  that  the  burden  is  upon  the  de- 
fendant to  plead  and  prove  them  ?  In  our 
judgment  tliey   were  not  required  to  be 


pleaded  or  proven  by  plaintiff.  .  .  .  They 
were  each  and  all  matters  of  defence,  but, 
not  constituting  a  part  of  the  plaintiff's 
case,  the  burden  did  not  rest  upon  him 
either  to  plead  or  prove  the  absence  of 
tliein,  in  the  first  instance.  And  not  being 
required  to  negative  these  conditions,  if  he 
does  so  in  his  pleading  such  averments  are 
unnecessary  and  need  not  be  proved : " 
Jones  V.  Accident  Ass'n  (1894),  92  la.  652, 
61  X.  W.  485.  See,  in  support  of  the  rule 
above  indicated.  Modern  Woodmen  v, 
Noyes  (1901),  1.58  Ind.  503,  64  N.  E.  21  ; 
Wallace  v.  Kyan  (1894),  93  la.  115,  61 
N.  W.  395 ;  Mtns,  Ins.  Co.  v.  Gla.sgow 
Elec.  Co.  (1899),  107  Ky.  77,  52  S.  W. 
975;  Fletcher  r.  German-American  Ins. 
Co.  (1900),  79  Minn.  .337,  82  X.  W.  647; 
Schrepfer  v.  Kockford  Ins.  Co.  (1899),  77 
Minn.  291,  79  N.  W.  1005;  O'Conner  v. 
City  of  Fond  du  Lac  (1898),  101  Wis.  83, 
76  X.  W.  1116;  Little  Xestucca  Road  Co. 
V.  Tillamook  County  (1897),  31  Ore.  1,  48 
Pac.  465. 

"  Generally,  a  plaintiff  is  only  required  to 
bring  his  case  within  tlie  terms  appearing 
on  the  face  of  the  contract  in  suit,  and 
need  not  negative  conditions  and  e.\cep- 
tions  endorsed  thereon  :  "  Railway  Offi- 
cials, etc.  Ass'n  v.  Drummond  (1898),  56 
Neb.  235,  76  N.  W.  562. 

Where  an  insurance  policy  provides 
that  if  the  insured  is  killed  in  certain 
extra-hazardous  occupations,  the  bene- 
ficiary should  get  a  reduced  sum,  the 
complaint  should  allege  that  he  was  not 
so  killed,  else  the  court  cannot  render 
judgment  for  the  sum  which  is  due  under 
the  policy:  American  Accident  Co.  v. 
Carson  (1896),  99  Ky.  441,  36  S.  W.  169. 
But  in  Insurance  Co.  v.  McLeod  (1896), 
57  Kan.  95,  45  Pac.  73,  it  was  held  that 
where  a  policy  allowed  concurrent  insur- 
ance, and  provided  for  prorating  in  such 
cose,  such  concurrent  insurance  need  not 
be  alleged  in  the  petition. 

Consideration. 
In  an  action  upon  a  bond  it  need  not 
be  alleged  that  it  wa,s  executed  upon  a 
consideration  :  Northern  Assurance  Co.  v. 
Hotchkiss  (1895),  90  Wis.  415,  63  N.  W. 
1020;  Considiue  v.  Gallagher  (1903),  31 
Wash.  669,  72  Pac.  469.  Nor  is  it  neces- 
sary to  allege  consideration  in  an  action 
against  a  common  carrier  upon  a  contract 


FORM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT    or    rKTITION. 


673 


for  the  carriage  of  poods :  Davis  v.  Jack- 
sonville, etc.  Line  (1894),  l:>t;  Mo.  69,  28 
iS.  \V.  965.  Au  assignee  of  a  chose  in 
action  need  not  show  that  he  paid  a  con- 
sideration for  it  because  the  complaint 
avers  a  sale  as  well  as  an  assignment  to 
him,  for  the  allegation  of  sale  may  be 
treated  as  surplusage :  Gregoire  v.  Rouriie 
(18115),  28  Ore.  275,  42  Pac.  996. 

The  word  "  consideration  "  need  not 
appear  in  a  pleading:  Ramsey  v.  Johnson 
(1897),  7  Wyo.  392,  42  Pac.  1084.  An 
allegation  that  a  contract  was  made  "  upon 
sufficient  consideration "  is  sufficient : 
Oslin  V.  Telford  (1899),  108  Ga.  803,  34 
S.  E.  168;  Pattillo  v.  Jones  (1901),  113 
Ga.  330,  38  S.  E.  745. 

Contrihutorij  Nei^iigence. 

Contributory  negligence  is  a  matter  of 
defence  and  need  not  be  negatived  in  the 
complaint  :  Reading  Township  v.  Telfer 
(1897),  57  Kan.  798,  48  Pac.  134  ;  Whitty 
V.  City  of  Ushkosh  (1900),  106  Wis.  87, 
81  N.  W.  992;  Randall  v.  City  of  Ho- 
quiam  (1902),  30  Wash.  435,  70  Pac.  1111  ; 
Walker  c.  McNeill  (1897),  17  Wash.  582, 
50  Pac.  518;  Johnson  v.  Bellingham  Bay 
Co.  (1896),  13  Wash.  455,  43  Pac.  370; 
Thompson  c.  Great  Northern  Ry.  Co. 
(1897),  70  Minn.  219,  72  N.  W.  962; 
House  V.  Meyer  (1893),  100  Cal.  592,  35 
Pac.  308;  Boyd  v.  Oddous  (1893),  97  Cal. 
510,  32  Pac.  569  ;  Tucker  v.  Northern  Ter- 
minal Co.  (1902),  41  Ore.  82,  68  Pac.  426. 

In  Indiana,  a  long  line  of  decisions  lield 
that  it  was  necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to 
negative  contributory  negligence  in  his 
complaint  as  part  of  his  cause  of  action  : 
Gartiu  v.  Meredith  (1899),  153  Ind.  16,  53 
N.  E.  836  ;  Cleveland,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Klee 
(1899),  154  Ind.  430,  56  N.  E.234  ;  Sale  v. 
Aurora,  etc.  Co.  (1896),  147  Ind.  324,  46 
N.  E.  669 ;  Baltimore,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Young  (1896),  146  Ind.  374,  45  N.  E.  479  ; 
Evansville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  i-.  Krapf  (1895), 
143  Ind.  647,  36  N.  E.  901.  But  the  legis- 
lature, by  the  act  of  1899,  Burns'  Rev.  St., 
1901,  §  359  a,  changed  this  rule,  making 
such  allegation  unnecessary.  See  Indian- 
apolis St.  Ry.  Co.  r.  Robinson  (1901),  157 
lud.  232,  61  N.  E.  197,  holding  the  act 
constitutional.  Also  see  Aspy  r.  Botkins 
(1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  462,  construing 
the  act. 

In  Iowa,  the  rule  is  firmlv  established 


that  freedom  from  contril)ul()ry  negligence 
must  be  pleaded  and  ])roved  l)y  the  plain- 
tiff: Rabe  v.  Somuierbeck  (1895),  94  la. 
656,  63  N.  W.  458  ;  Gregory  v.  Wood- 
worth  (1895),  93  la.  246,  61  N.  W.  962  ; 
Stuber  v.  Gannon  (1896),  98  la.  228,67 
N.  W.  105;  Kleiueck  v.  Reiger  (1899),  107 
la.  325,  78  N.  W.  39  ;  Elenz  v.  Conrad 
(1901),  115  la.  183,  88  N.  W.  337;  De- 
catur V.  Simp.son  (1902),  115  la.  348,88 
N.  W.  839.  Same  rule  held  in  Idaho: 
Hauer  v.  Northern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1900), 
62  Pac.  1028. 

In  New  York,  also,  due  care  must  be 
affirmatively  shown  by  the  plaintiff : 
Whaleu  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Light  Co.  (1896), 
151  N.  Y.  70,  45  N.  E.  363. 

In  Connecticut  it  was  held  in  Brockett 
17.  Fairhaven,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1900),  73 
Conn.  428,  47  Atl.  763,  that  a  direct  alle- 
gation that  an  injury  was  caused  by  the 
negligent  act  of  another  necessarily  in- 
volves the  allegation  that  plaintiff's  negli- 
gence did  not  contribute  to  it,  and  a 
separate  averment  to  that  effect  is  not 
necessary. 

In  Montana  it  is  held  that  plaintiff's 
freedom  from  contributory  negligence  need 
be  alleged  only  when  the  complaint  shows 
that  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury  was 
plaintiff's  own  act :  Snook  v.  City  of  Ana- 
conda (1901),  26  Mont.  128,  66  Pac.  756; 
Cummiugs  v.  Helena,  etc.  Smelting  Co. 
(1902),  26  Mont.  434,  68  Pac.  852. 

Where  a  petition  shows  such  contribu- 
tory negligence  as  would  bar  a  recovery 
if  pleaded  as  a  defence,  the  petition  is  de- 
nmrrable  :  Stillwell's  Adm'r  i\  Land  Co. 
(1900),Ky.,  58  S.  W.  696. 

In  actions  for  wilful  injury,  no  show- 
ing of  freedom  from  contributory  negli- 
gence need  be  made :  Cleveland,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  U.Miller  (1897),  149  Ind.  490,49  N.  E. 
445. 

Freedom  from  contributory  negligence 
need  be  pleaded  only  in  general  terms : 
Gregory  v.  Woodworth  (1895),  93  la.  246, 
61  N.  'W'.  962  ;  Stuber  v.  Gannon  (L896), 
98  la.  228,  67  N.  W.  105;  Kleineck  v. 
Reiger  (1899),  107  la.  32.5,  78  N.  W.  39  ; 
Carter  v.  Seattle  (1898),  19  Wash.  597,  53 
Pac.  1102. 

Conversiun. 

An  averment  that  defendant  converted 
the  property  to  his  own  use  is  a  sufficient 


43 


674 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


averment  of  the  fact  of  conversion  :  Lowe 
V.  (Jznaun  (1902),  137  Cal.  257,  70  Pac.  87  ; 
Sauford  V.  Janseu  (1896),  49  Neb.  766,  69 
N.  W.  108;  First  Nat.  Mank  r.  Gaddis 
( 1903),  31  Wash.  .')96,  72  Pac.  460 ;  Stevens 
f.  Curran  (1903),  28  Mout.  366,  72  Pac. 
753  (ill  the  absence  of  a  special  demurrer) ; 
Cordill  I'.  Minn.  Elevator  Co.  (1903),  89 
Minn.  442,  95  N.  W.  306. 

Corporate  Existence. 

"  It  is  not  necessary  for  a  plaintiff 
corporation,  in  bringing  suit,  to  allege 
that  it  is  a  corporation.  Its  legal  capacity 
to  sue  will  be  presumed  in  law  until  tlie 
contrary  is  made  to  appear;  and,  unless  it 
affirmatively  appears  from  the  face  of  the 
petition  that  the  plaintiff  has  no  legal 
capacity  to  sue,  such  question  cannot  be 
raised  by  demurrer.  The  point  that 
plaintiff  is  not  a  corporation  should  be 
raised  by  a  special  plea  iu  the  nature  of  a 
plea  in  abatement.  If  it  is  not  so  raised 
before  pleading  to  tiie  merits,  the  question 
is  waived.  By  pleading  to  the  merits,  a 
defendant  admits  plaintiff's  capacity  to 
maintain  the  action :  "  Leader  Printing 
Co.  V.  Lowry  (1899),  9  Okla.  89,  59  Pac. 
242. 

In  support  of  the  proposition  that 
corporate  existence  need  not  be  averred, 
except  where  the  gist  of  the  action  in- 
volves the  corporate  existence,  see  How- 
land  V.  Jeuel  (1893),  55  Minn.  102,  56 
N.  W.  581  ;  Holden  v.  Great  Western 
Elevator  Co.  (1897),  69  Minn.  527,  72 
N.  W.  805 ;  Brady  v.  Nat.  Supply  Co. 
(1901),  64  O.  St."  267,  60  N.  E.  218; 
Fletcher  v.  Cooperative  Pub.  Co.  (1899), 
58  Neb.  511,  78  N.  W.  1070 ;  German  Ins. 
Co.  V.  Frederick  (1899),  57  Neb.  .538,  77 
N.  W.  1106;  Barber  v.  Crowell  (1898), 
55  Neb.  571,  75  N.  W.  1109. 

A  petition  by  a  corporation  for  the  re- 
moval of  a  cause  to  the  federal  court  by 
reason  of  diverse  citizenship,  must  spe- 
cifically aver  that  it  is  a  corporation 
created  under  the  laws  of  another  State, 
and  it  is  not  enough  to  allege  that  it  is  a 
citizen  of  another  State,  for  corporations 
are  not  strictly  citizens.  Many  federal 
decisions  cited  :  Springs  v.  Southern  Ky. 
Co.  (1902),  1.30  N.  C.  186,  41  S.  E.  100. 

In  some  cases,  however,  it  is  held 
necessary  to  plead  coryiorate  existence. 
See    Carpenter   v.  McCord   Lumber  Co. 


(1900),  107  Wis.  fill,  83  N.  W.  7G4  ;  State 
I'.  Chicago,  etc.  Ky.  Co.  (1893),  4  S.  D.261, 
56  N.  W.  894.  In  tlie  last  case  it  was  held 
that  sec.  2908,  Comp.  Laws,  providing 
that  "  in  all  -civil  actions  brought  by  or 
against  a  corporation,  it  shall  not  be  nec- 
essary to  prove  on  the  trial  of  the  cause, 
tlie  existence  of  such  corporation,  unless 
the  defendant  shall,  in  the  answer,  ex- 
pressly aver  that  the  plaintiff  or  defendant 
is  not  a  corporation,  "  does  not  avoid  the 
necessity  of  pleading  corporate  existence 
in  the  complaint.  Such  defect  can  be 
reached  only  by  general  demurrer. 

"That  the  defendant  the  Pacific  Dredg- 
ing Company  is  a  corporation,  organized 
and  existing  by  virtue  of  the  law,  aud 
doing  business  in  Lemhi  county,"  held  a 
sufficient  allegation  of  incorporation : 
Jones  V.  Pacific  Dredging  Co.  (1903), 
Idaho,  72  Pac.  956. 

Custojn. 

"  A  custom,  special  to  a  particular 
class  of  business  operations,  to  be  availed 
of,  must  be  pleaded,  and.  if  put  in  i.'isue, 
proved  : "  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Farmers' 
&  Merchants'  Bank  (1898),  56  Neb.  149, 
77  N.  W.  50. 

Damages. 

Under  a  general  allegation  of  damages, 
evidence  was  admitted  as  follows:  pro- 
spective damages  for  tlie  l)reach  of  an 
executory  contract,  in  Pathbone,  etc.  Co. 
V.  Wheelihan  (1900),  82  Minn.  30,  84  N.  W. 
638 ;  the  amount  of  wages  received  by 
plaintiff  before  and  after  the  injury  com- 
plained of,  in  Palmer  ?>.  Winona  Hy.  & 
Light  Co.  (1901),  83  Minn.  85,  85  N.'W. 
941  ;  all  damages  which  n.aturally  and 
proximately  result  from  tlie  act  com- 
plained of,  in  City  of  Harvard  r.  Stiles 
(1898),  54  Neb.  26,  74  N.  W.  399,  and  in 
North  Point  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Canal  Co. 
(1900),  23  Utah,  199,  63  Pac.  812. 

Special  allegations  of  damage  were 
held  in  the  following  cases  to  be  necessary 
to  let  in  evidence :  in  an  action  for  per- 
sonal injuries,  the  amount  paid  for  med- 
ical services:  Macon  v.  Paducah  St.  Ry. 
Co.  (1901),  110  Ky.  680,  62  S.  W.  496;  in 
an  action  on  an  open  account,  the  amount 
claimed:  McClendon  v.  Hernando  (1896), 
100  Ga.  219,  28  S.  E.  152;  in  an  action 
for  personal  injury,  the  amount  claimed 


FORM    OF    TIIH    COMPLAINT    OR    rETITION. 


675 


for  future  paiu  and  surfcring  :  Schultz  v. 
(iriffitl;  (1897),  103  la.  150,  72  N.  \V.  445  ; 
in  au  action  for  damages  to  Ijuildiugs  re- 
moved from  laud  coudemueil  for  jjublic 
use,  the  cost  of  raisiug  the  huildiuLTs  after 
removal:  Lamb  v.  Elizabeth  City  (1902), 
131  N.  C.  241,  42  S.  E.  G0.'3 ;  iu  an  action 
for  personal  injuries,  an  allegation  that 
the  i)laintiff  has  been  permanently  dis- 
abled from  labor,  held  insulHcient  to  admit 
proof  of  such  loss  of  earnings  ;  Coontz  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  Ky.  Co.  (1893),  115  Mo.  669, 
22  S.  W.  572 ;  in  an  action  for  breach  of 
a  contract  of  sale,  an  allegation  of  what 
the  profits  would  have  been  :  Singer  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Potts  (1894),  59  Minn.  240,  61  N.  W. 
23 ;  in  an  action  to  set  aside  a  conveyance 
cf  real  property  on  account  of  fraud,  an 
allegation  tliat  the  defrauded  party  was 
damaged:  Srader  v.  Srader  (1898),  151 
Ind.  339,  51  N.  E.  479;  eacli  item  of 
damage  sought  to  be  recovered  :  Negley 
V.  Cowell  (1894),  91  la.  2,56,  59  N.  W.  48  ; 
in  an  action  for  personal  injuries,  an  al- 
legation that  the  bi-each  of  dut}-  was  the 
cause  of  the  injury :  Bodah  v.  Town  of 
Deer  Creek  (1898),  99  Wis.  509,  75  N.  W. 
75;  consequential  damages :  Omaha  Coal, 
Coke  &  Lime  Co.  v.  Fay  (1893),  37  Neb. 
68,  55  N.  W.  211  ;  in  an  action  for  wrong- 
ful levy,  special  damages  for  loss  of  pi'ofits  : 
Bradley  v.  Borin  (1894),  53  Kan.  628,  3G 
Pac.  977  ;  in  an  action  for  ])ersonal  inju- 
ries, diseases  not  naturally  resulting  from 
the  nervous  shock  alleged :  Kleiner  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  (1900),  162  N.  Y. 
193,  56  N.  E.  497. 

Special  damages,  which  must  be  spe- 
cially pleaded,  were  defined  to  be  all  such 
damages  or  elements  of  damage  as  do  not 
naturally  and  necessarily  flow  from  the 
wrongful  acts  constituting  a  trespass,  and 
such  as  the  trespasser  and  wrongdoer  is 
not  bound  to  know  must  necessarily  and 
inevitably  result  from  his  acts:  Rauma  v. 
Bailey  (1900),  80  Minn.  336,  83  N.  VV.  191. 
"  Special  damage  "  has  a  technical  mean- 
ing when  used  in  respect  to  the  rules  of 
pleading,  and  merely  distinguishes  the 
damages  which  must  be  pleaded  from 
those  which  need  not  be  pleaded :  Piatt  r. 
Town  of  Milford  (1895),  66  Conn.  320,  34 
Atl.  82. 

In  an  action  for  tort,  where  the  alleged 
wrongful  act  does  not  in  itself  imply  mal- 
ice, the  plaintiff   must,  if  he  intends   to 


claim  cxcmj)lary  tlamages,  allege  in  his 
complaint  facts  entitling  him  tliereto :  Vine 
V.  Casmey  (1902),  86  Minn.  74,  90  N.  W. 
158.  And  when  both  actual  and  exem- 
plary damages  are  claimed,  defendant  is 
entitled  to  know  how  mucli  is  claimed  for 
each:  Lamb  v.  Ilarbaugh  (1895),  105 
Cal.  680,  39  Pac.  56. 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  petition 
should  allege  the  measure  of  damages,  as 
that  is  a  matter  to  be  regulated  by  the 
court  iu  its  instructions  :  St.  Louis  Trust 
Co.  V.  Bambrick  (1899),  149  Mo.  560,  51 
S.  W.  706. 

Where  it  is  sought  to  recover  liqui- 
dated damages,  it  is  necessary  to  both  plead 
and  prove  that  the  case  falls  within  the 
terms  of  the  exception  in  Civ.  Code, 
§§  1670,  1671,  declaring  all  contracts  for 
liquidated  damages  void  except  iu  certain 
cases :  Long  Beach,  etc.  l^istrict  v.  Dodge 
(1902),  135  Cal.  401,  67  Pac.  499. 

Where  plaintiff  avers,  in  his  petition  in 
an  action  to  recover  personal  property, 
that  the  property  is  worth  at  least  a  cer- 
tain amount,  and  this  is  admitted  by  the 
answer,  the  pleadings  fix  the  amount  for 
the  j)urposes  of  the  case :  State  Bank  v. 
Felt  (1896),  99  la.  532,  68  N.  W.  818.  In 
an  action  to  recover  damages  for  the 
wrongful  detention  of  personal  property, 
it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  unusual  con- 
ditions which  increased  its  value,  where 
the  gross  value  is  alleged  :  Hill  r.  Wilson 
(1899),  8  N.  D.  309,  79  N.  W.  150. 

"  In  a  civil  action  for  assault  and  bat- 
tery it  is  unnecessary  to  specially  allege 
such  damages  as  are  the  necessary  and 
usual  consequence  of  the  act  complained 
of:"  Harshman  v.  Rose  (1897),  50  Neb. 
113,  69  N.  W.  755.  In  au  action  to  fore- 
close a  mortgage,  taxes  cannot  be  recov- 
ered where  plaintiff  does  not  allege  that 
he  paid  them,  but  merely  alleges  that  de- 
fendant neglected  to  pay  them  and  prayed 
judgment  for  principal,  interest  and  costs: 
Williams  v.  Williams  (1903),  117  Wis. 
125,  94  N.  W.  24.  Loss  of  time  in  an 
action  for  illeg'al  arrest  is  sufficiently 
pleaded  by  an  allegation  that  plaintiff  was 
deprived  of  his  liberty  :  Young  r.  Gormley 
(1903),  120  la.  372,  94  N.  W.  922. 

Debt  Due. 

A  complaint  in  an  action  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  should  expressly  allege  that  the 


676 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


debt  is  due.  But  where  facts  are  ])leadcd 
and  sup[>lied  in  an  exiiibit  which  show 
that  tlie  debt  was  due  before  the  action 
was  instituted,  the  iutinnity  of  the  plead- 
ing in  this  respect  is  thereby  cured  :  Bald- 
win r.  Boyce  (1898),  152  Ind.  46,51  N.  E. 
.•J.34. 

Delivery. 

An  allegation  that  an  instrument  was 
executed  includes  the  idea  of  delivery, 
aud  it  is  not  necessary  to  allege  delivery 
in  terras:  Smith  v.  Wait.-  (1894),  103  Ca'l. 
372,  37  Pac.  232 ;  Jacobs  v.  Hogan 
(1900),  73  Conn.  740,  49  Atl.  202;  Top- 
ping v.  Clay  (1896),  65  Minn.  346,  68 
N.  W.  34. 

Demand. 

Where  defendant,  in  his  answer,  de- 
nies plaintiff's  title,  it  is  not  necessary  for 
plaintiff  to  allege  and  prove  demand  pre- 
vious to  bringing  an  action  for  conversion : 
Kosenau  v.  Syriug  (1894),  25  Ore.  386,  35 
I'ac.  845;  Buffkins  i'.  Eason  (1893),  112 
N.  C.  162,  16  S.  E.  916;  Rich  v.  Hobson 
(1S93),  112  N.  C.  79,  16  S.  E.  931.  See 
also  Gross  v.  Scheel  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  93 
N.  W.  418. 

An  allegation  of  defendant's  refusal  to 
pav  is  equivalent  to  an  allegation  of  de- 
mand, for  he  could  not  refuse  unless  he 
had  been  asked  to  pay :  Worth  v.  Whar- 
ton (1898),  122  N.  C.  376,  29  S.  E.  370  ; 
Brossard  c  Williams  (1902),  114  Wis.  89, 
89  N.  W.  832. 

Description.' 

The  descri[)tion  of  land  in  a  complaint 
should  be  such  that  the  land  can  be  ascer- 
tained and  located  from  the  allegations 
alone:  Kiernan  v.  Terry  (1894),  26  Ore. 
494,  38  Pac.  671  ;  Scheffer  v.  Hines  (1897), 
149  Ind.  413,  49  N.  10.  348;  Swatts  v. 
Bowen  (1894),  141  Ind.  322,40  N.  E.  1057  ; 
Tracy  v.  Harmon  (1895),  17  Mont.  465,  43 
Pac.  500. 

In  Shefferr.  Hines  (supra),  a  description 
employing  solely  the  numbers  of  the  sec- 
tions, townships  and  ranges,  without  ref- 
erence to  any  object  from  which  a  location 
in  the  state  could  be  inferred,  was  held 
bad.  But  see  Citizen's  Bank  v.  Stewart 
(1894),  90  la.  467,  57  N.  W.  957,  where 
Buch  a  description  in  a  decree  was  held 
sufficient.  A  particular  description  by 
courses  and  distances  must  control  the 
general   description  when  the  two  are  in 


conflict:    Ilaggia    r.    Lorenz    (1895),    15 
Mont.  309,  39  Pac.  285. 

In  actions  of  trover  for  the  conversion 
of  money  it  is  not  necessary  to  describe 
the  money,  but  it  is  sufficient  to  state  the 
aggregate  amount  taken :  Salem  Traction 
Co.  V.  Anson  (1902),  41  Ore.  562,  69  Pac. 
675. 

Doing  Equity. 

In  an  action  for  equitable  relief,  a  com- 
plaint is  demurrable  which  does  not  allege 
facts  showing  that  plaintiff  has  done  or  is 
ready  to  do  equity :  Buena  Vista,  etc.  Co. 
r.  Tuohy  (1895),'  107  Cal.  243,  40  Pac. 
386. 

Dutii. 

The  averment  of  duty  is  but  a  legal 
conclusion,  and  is  therefore  improper  aud 
unavailing:  City  of  Ft.  Wayne  v.  Christie 
( 1 900) ,  1 56  Ind.  1 72,  59  N.  E.  385  ;  McPeak 
V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ky.  Co.  (1895),  128  Mo.  617, 
30  S.  W.  170;  Lang  v.  Urady  (1900),  73 
Conn.  707,  49  Atl.  199  ;  Martin  v.  Sher- 
wood (1902),  74  Conn.  475,  50  Atl.  564. 

In  some  ca.ses,  however,  an  allegation  of 
duty  has  been  considered  an  allegation  of 
fact:  Berry  v.  Dole  (1902),  87  Minn.  471, 
92  N.  W.  334 ;  Burnett  v.  Atlantic  Coast 
Line  Ry.  Co.  (1903),  132  N.C.  261,43  S.  E. 
797. 

In  Iowa  it  is  held  that  in  an  action  for 
negligence  the  particular  duty  neglected 
must  be  declared  upon :  Humpton  v.  Un- 
terkircher  (1896),  97  la.  509,  66  N.  W. 
776 ;  citing  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stark,  38 
Mich.  714. 

This  rule  seems  to  obtain  also  in  Wis- 
consin. See  Greenman  v.  Cliicago  North- 
western R.  R.  Co.  (1898),  100  Wis.  188, 
75  N.  W.  998;  Lago  v.  Walsh  (1898),  98 
Wis.  348,  74  N.  W.  212.  But  see,  how- 
ever, Jones  V.  Burtis  (1894),  88  Wis.  478, 
60  N.  W.  785. 

Election   Contest. 

In  an  action  to  contest  an  election  the 
complaint  must  set  forth  specifically  the 
particular  facts  counted  upon  as  invali- 
dating the  election :  Borders  v.  Williams 
(1900),  155  Ind.  36,  57  N.  E.  527. 

Estoppel. 

An  estoppel  must  be  pleaded  if  it  is  to 
be  available:  Cloud  r.  Malvin  (1899),  108 
la.  52,  75  N.  W.  G45,  78  N.  W .  791  , 
Nickum  r.  Uurckhardt  (1897),  30  Ore.  464, 


FOKM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT    OU    PETITION. 


677 


47  Pac.  888.  See  also  note  4,  p.  815,  where 
many  cases  are  cited  to  tliis  proposition. 
Hut  "  a  party  is  not  bound  to  plead  au  es- 
toppel where  lie  is  without  knowledge  that 
liis  demand  must  ultimately  rest  upon 
it:"  Donnelly  v.  San  Francisco  Bridge 
Co.  (1897),  117  Cal.  417,  49  Pac.  .5.59. 

See  Plumb  v.  Curtis  (1895),  ttG  Conn. 
154,  33  Atl.  998,  for  interesting  discussion 
of  estoppel  as  a  substantial  ground  of 
recovery. 

Exception  to  Rule  of  Law. 
Where  a  party  relies  upon  an  exception 
to  the  rule  that  a  servant  assumes  tlie  risk 
of  defective  machinery,  he  must  first  plead 
the  exception  :  Malm  v.  Thelin  (1896),  47 
Neb.  086,  66  N.  W.  650. 

Exceptions  in  Statutes. 

In  stating  a  cause  of  action  arising  upon 
an  enacting  clause  of  a  statute  containing 
an  exception,  such  exception  should  be 
negatived ;  but  where  the  proviso  is  con- 
tained in  another  clause  it  need  not  be 
negatived:  Rowell  i'.  Janvriu  (1896),  151 
N.Y.  60,  45  N.  E.  398 ;  Walker  v.  Chester 
County  (1893),  40  S.  C.  342,  18  S.  E.  936; 
Cleveland,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gray  (1897),  148 
Ind.  266,  46  N.  E.  675  ;  City  of  Kansas  City 
V.  Garnier(1896),57  Kan.  41 2,  46  Pac.  707  ; 
Larson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1902),  —  Neb. 
— ,  92  N.  W.  729  ;  Hale  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  (1893),  36  Neb.  266,  54  N.  W.  517  ; 
Central  Kentucky  Asylum  i\  Penick 
(1898),  102  Ky.  533,  44  S.  W.  92.  In 
Wolff  V.  Lamann  (1900),  108  Ky.  343.  56 
S.  W.  408,  it  was  held  that  in  alleging 
a  statutory  cause  of  action  for  injuries  due 
to  the  bite  of  a  dog,  it  is  not  necessarv  to 
negative  the  exceptions  of  the  statute,  viz., 
tliat  the  injury  did  not  occur  upon  the 
premises  of  the  owner  after  night  or  that 
plaintiff  was  not  engaged  in  some  unlaw- 
ful act  in  the  daytime.  These  are  matters 
of  defence. 

Execution  of  Instrument. 
An  allegation  that  a  mortgage  was  made, 
executed,  and  delivered  includes  the  sign- 
ing, sealing,  attesting,  and  acknowledging  : 
Laurent  v.  Banning  (1897),  32  Ore.  11,  51 
Pac.  80. 

Execution,  Issuance  and  Return  of. 

A  sufficient  showing  that  a  legal  execu- 
tion was   issued  on   a  judgment  and  re- 


turned unsatisfied  is  made  by  au  allegatlDn 
that  on  a  day  named  an  execution  was,  in 
due  form  of  law,  issued  upon  a  certain 
judgment,  to  the  slieriff,  and  that  such 
execution  was  duly  returned  by  saiil  slieriff 
wholly  unsatisfied:  I'ierstoff  )•.  Jorges 
(1893),  86    Wis.   128,  56  N.   W.  735. 

Forcible  Entrij  and  Detainer. 

A  complaint  in  the  words  of  tlie  statute 
is  sufficient:  Locke  i;.  Skow  (1902),  Neb., 
91  N.  W.  572.  The  rule  requiring  the 
pleader  to  state  the  facts  constituting  his 
cause  of  action  or  defence  should  not  be 
applied  to  this  action :  Blachford  v.  Fren- 
zer  (1895),  44  Neb.  829,  62  N.  W.  1101. 
For  complaint  held  sullicient,  see  Moore  v. 
Parker  (1899),  59  Neb.  29,  80  N.  W.  43. 

Foreclosure. 

In  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage 
plaintiff  need  not  set  out  the  nature  of,  or 
facts  constituting,  the  claim  of  another 
lien  holder,  but  may  allege  generally  that 
such  defendant  claims  some  interest  in 
the  mortgaged  premises,  advising  him  that 
his  lien  will  be  barred  if  lie  fails  to  appear 
and  disclose  it :  Winemiller  v.  Lauglilin 
(1894),  51  0.  St.  421,  38  N.  E.  111.  A 
complaint  in  a  suit  to  enforce  a  mortgage 
on  a  widow's  dower  interest  must  show 
the  facts  from  which  the  portion  of  the 
mortgage  debt  properly  chargeable  to 
such  dower  interest  can  be  ascertained  : 
Fowle  V.  House  (1896),  29  Ore.  114,  44 
Pac.  692. 

For  the  construction  of  a  complaint  in 
an  action  to  foreclose  a  mechanic's  lien 
upon  several  pieces  of  property,  not  con- 
tiguous and  not  of  similar  character,  see 
Big  Blackfoot  Co.  r.  Bluebird  Co.  (1897), 
19  Mont.  454,  48  Pac.  778. 

But  one  action  may  be  maintained  for 
the  recovery  of  any  debt  secured  iiy  mort- 
gage, under  C.  L.  1888,  §  3460 :  Salt  Lake 
Loan  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Millspaugh  (1898),  18 
Utah,  283,  54  Pac.  893. 

Foreign  Laws. 
A  foreign  law  must  be  pleaded  like  any 
other  fact:  Lowry  v.  Moore  (1897),  16 
Wash.  476,  48  Pac.  238  ;  Thompson- Hous- 
ton Elec.  Co.  V.  Palmer  (1893),  52  Minn. 
174,  53  N.  W.  1137  ;  Dunham  v.  Holloway 
(1895),  3  Okla.  244,  41  Pac.  140;  Myers  r. 
Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1897),  69  Minii.  476, 


678 


CIVIL   llEMEDIES. 


72  N.  W.  694 ;  McDonald  v.  Bankers'  Life 
Ass'u  (1900),  154  Mo.  618,  55  S.  W.  999; 
Showaher  i\  Uickert  (1902),  64  Kau.  82, 
67  Pac.  454;  Smith  v.  Mason  (1895),  44 
Neb.  610,  63  N.  W.  41.  A  foreign  statute 
should  be  set  out,  not  pleaded  by  its  legal 
effect:  Lowry  n.  Moore  (1897),  16  Wash. 
476,  48  Pac.  238.  In  pleading  a  foreign 
statute  it  is  sufficient  to  allege  its  sub- 
stance :  Minneapolis  Harvester  Works  r. 
Smith  (1893),  36  Neb.  616,  54  N.  W.  973; 
Showalter  v.  Rickert  (1902),  64  Kan.  82, 
67  Pac.  454.  The  law  of  another  State 
cannot  he  pleaded  by  chapter  only,  but  the 
terms,  tenor,  and  effect  of  the  statute  are 
to  be  set  out:  McDonald  v.  Bankers'  Life 
Ass'n  (1900),  154  Mo.  618,  55  S.  W.  999. 

In  pleading  the  common  law  of  another 
State  it  is  sufficient  to  state  as  a  fact  what 
the  law  is,  without  setting  out  decisions  of 
the  courts  :  Crandall  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.  (1901),  83  Minn.  190,86  N.  W.  10. 

In  the  absence  of  allegations  to  the  con- 
trary, the  laws  of  a  foreign  state  will  be 
presumed  the  same  as  those  of  the  State  of 
the  forum  :  Greenville  Nat.  Bank  r.  Evans 
Co.  (1900),  9  Okla.  353,  00  Pac.  249  ;  Man- 
.•^ur-Tebbetts  Co.  i-.  Willet  (1900),  10  Okla. 
383,  61  Pac.  1066;  Smith  v.  Mason  (1895), 
44  Neb.  610,63  N.  W.  41. 

F}-atid. 

Fraud  is  never  presumed,  and  must 
he  alleged  and  proved  to  be  available : 
Hampton  v.  Webster  (1898),  56  Neb.  628, 
77  N.  W.  50;  Nat.  State  Bank  v.  Nat. 
Bank  (1895),  141  lud.  3.52,  40  N.  E.  799. 
And  in  order  to  be  available  it  must  have 
resulted  in  injury  or  damage  to  the  party 
pleading  it :  Carrington  r.  Omaha  Life 
Ass'n  (1899),  59  Neb.  116,  80  N.  W.  491. 

A  general  allegation  of  fraud  is  not 
sufficient,  but  the  facts  constituting  the 
fraud  must  be  alleged  :  Murray  v.  Shoudy 
(1896),  13  Wash.  33,  42  Pac."  631;  Cade 
V.  Head  Camp  W.  0.  W.  (1902),  27 
Wash.  218,  67  Pac  603;  Crowley  r. 
Hicks  (1898),  98  Wis.  566,  74  N.  W.  348; 
New  Bank  v.  Kleiner  (1901),  112  Wis. 
287,  87  N.  W.  1090;  James  v.  Kelley 
(1899),  107  Ga.  446,  33  S.  E.  425  ;  Keni- 
per  V.  Renshaw  (1899),  58  Neb.  513,  78 
N.  W.  1071  ;  Johnston  v.  Spencer  (1897), 
51  Neb.  198,  70  N.  W.  982;  Crosby  v. 
Ritchey  (1896),  47  Neb.  924,  66  N.  W. 
1005;  Rockford  Watch   Co.  v.  Manifold 


(1893),  36  Neb.  801,  55  N.  W.  236;  Knox 
V.  Pearson  (1902),  64  Kan.  711,  68  Pac. 
613;  Ladd  v.  Nystol  (1901),  63  Kan.  23, 
64  Pac.  985;  Gem  Chemical  Co.  v.  Young- 
blood  (1900),  58  S.  C.  56,  36  S.  E.  437; 
Beaman  v.  Ward  (1903),  132  N.  C.  68,  43 
S.  E.  545;  Leasure  v.  Forquer  (1895),  27 
Ore.  334,  41  Pac.  665;  Schiffnian  v. 
Schmidt  (1900),  154  Mo.  204,  55  S.  W. 
451  ;  Goodson  v.  Goodson  (1897),  140  Mo. 
206,  41  S.  W.  737;  Burnham  v.  Boyd 
(1902),  167  Mo.  185,  66  S.  W.  1088; 
Clough  V.  Holden  (1893),  115  Mo.  336,  21 
S.  W.  1071  ;  County  of  Cochise  i".  Copper 
Queen  Min.  Co.  (1903),  Ariz.,  71  Pac. 
946;  Guy  v.  Blue  (1896),  146  Ind.  629,  45 
N.  E.  1052;  Stroup  i-.  Stroup  (1894),  140 
Ind.  179,  39  N.  E.  864;  Tolbert  r.  Cale- 
donian Ins.  Co.  (1897),  101  Ga.  741.  28 
S.  E.  991  ;  Peckham  v.  City  of  Watson- 
vi!le(1902),138Cal.  242,  71  Pac.  169;  Mor- 
rill r.  Little  Falls  Co.  (1893),  53  Minn. 
371,  55  N.  W.  547. 

But  in  Pelly  v.  Naylor  (1893),  139  N.  Y. 
598,  35  N.  E.  317,  it  seems  to  be  held  that 
the  facts  constituting  the  fraud  need  not 
be  set  out. 

A  complaint  is  good  which  alleges 
facts  constituting  fraud  whether  fraud  is 
alleged  in  terms  or  not :  Worth  v.  Stewart 
(1898),  122  N.  C.  263,  29  S.  E.  413; 
Rathbone  v.  Frost  (1894),  9  Wash.  162,  37 
Pac.  298.    • 

While  an  intent  to  deceive  is  a  nec- 
essary ingredient  of  fraud,  it  need  not 
be  alleged  directly  if  facts  are  stated 
from  which  it  is  necessarily  implied : 
Schoellhamer  v.  Rometsch  (1894),  26  Ore. 
394,  38  Pac.  344.  But  see  McKibbin  r. 
F.llingson  (1894),  58  Minn.  205,  59  N.  W. 
1003,  where  it  is  held  that  allegations  of 
facts  tending  to  show  a  fraudulent  intent 
are  not  equivalent  to  an  allegation  of  such 
intent.  As  to  necessity  of  alleging  fraudu- 
lent intent,  see  Nortliwestern  Steamship 
Co.  V.  Dexter  Horton  &  Co.  (1902),  29 
Wash.  565,  70  Pac.  59,  holding  that  such 
allegation  is  necessary,  and  Cameron  v. 
Mount  (1893),  80  VVis.  477,  56  N.  W. 
1094,  holding  iJuch  allegation  unnecessary. 

In  the  following  cases  the  allegations  of 
fraud  were  passed  ujjon  by  the  court,  and 
sustained  or  condemned,  as  indicated  :  Selz 
V.  Tucker  (1894),  10  I'tah,  132,  37  Pac.  249 
(held  insufficient)  ;  Wenning  v.  Teeple 
(1895),  144  Ind.  189,  41  N.  E.  600  (held 


FORM    OF    THE    COMPLAINT    Oil    PETITION. 


679 


sufficient);  Leasure  i'.  Forquer  (1895), 
27  Ore.  334,  41  I'ac.  663  (held  insutii- 
cient)  ;  Schiffman  v.  Schmidt  (1900),  154 
Mo.  204,  55  S.  W.  451  (held  insufficient)  ; 
Kuh,  Njvthan  &  Fisher  Co.  v.  Glucklick 
(1903),  120  la.  504,  94  N.  W.  1105. 

The  general  rules  as  to  pleading  fraud 
do  not  apply  to  ejectment  and  replevin : 
Phoenix  Iron  Works  v.  McEvouy  (1896), 
47  Neb.  228,  66  N.  W.  290. 

Injur  I/. 

A  formal  allegation  of  injury  is  not 
necessary  when  facts  are  stated  from 
which  loss  or  injury  is  implied:  Green 
Bay,  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Kaukauna,  etc.  Co. 
(1901),  112  Wis.  323,  87  N.  W.  864. 

The  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  aver 
all  the  physical  injuries  which  he  has  sus- 
tained or  which  may  have  resulted  from 
the  wrongful  act  complained  of,  if  they 
are  such  as  may  be  traced  to  or  naturally 
follow  from  the  act :  Williams  v.  Oregon 
Short  Line  11.  K.  Co.  (1898),  18  Utah 
210,  34  Pac.  991  ;  Croco  i-.  Oregon  Short 
Line  R.  R.  Co,  (1898),  18  Utah,  31 1 ,  .34  Pac 
985;  Youngblood  v.  Railroad  Co.  (1901) 
•60  S.  C.  9,  38  S.  E.  232;  Curniu  v.  A.  H 
Stauge  Co.  (1898),  98  Wis.  598,  74  N.  W, 
,377  ;  Hanson  v.  Anderson  (1895),  90  Wis 
195,  62  N.  W.  1055. 

A  claim  made  in  a  complaint  for  a  spe 
-cific  injury  and  "other  injuries"  is  indefi 
iiite  and  uncertain,  but  is  sufficient  to 
admit  evidence  of  what  the  other  injuries 
were  :  Mauch  v.  Hartford  (1901),  112  Wis. 
40,  87  N.  W.  816. 

Injury  to  the  Person. 

The  court  held,  in  Hutcherson  v.  Bur- 
den ( 1901 ),  1 13  Ga.  987,  39  S.  E.  495,  that 
the  expression  "  injuries  to  the  person," 
as  used  in  the  statute  of  limitations,  was 
not  confined  to  physical  injuries,  but  em- 
braced all  actionable  injuries  to  the  in- 
dividual himself,  as  distinguished  from 
injuries  to  his  property. 

Innocent  Purchaser. 
Where  a  plaintiff  is  required  to  allege 
that  he  is  an  innocent  purchaser,  he  must 
aver  the  facts,  showing  all  the  elements 
necessary,  viz.,  that  he  is  a  purchaser  in 
good  faith,  without  notice,  and  for  a  valu- 
able consideration,  and  each  of  these  ele- 


ments must  be  apjjropriately  amplified  : 
Young  V.  Schofield  (1895),  132  Mo.  G50, 
34  S.  W.  497. 

Interest. 

Where  debts  or  claims  bear  interest  as 
a  matter  of  law,  interest  may  be  recovered 
upon  them  under  a  general  prayer  for  the 
amount  of  the  debt  or  claim  and  interest, 
without  any  allegation  that  it  is  due: 
Peterson  v.  Mannix  (1902),  Neb.,  90  N.  W. 
210.  In  Ormond  v.  Sage  (1897),  69  Minn. 
523,  72  N.  W.  810,  it  was  held  unneces- 
sary to  demand  interest  where  a  party  is 
entitled  to  it  by  way  of  damages  on  money 
due  on  contract,  and  in  Brown  v.  Doyle 
(1897),  69  Minn.  543,  72  N.  W.  814,  the 
court  said  that  it  need  not  be  specially 
pleaded. 

In  suing  on  a  promissory  note  it  is  not 
necessary  to  state  how  much  interest  is 
due,  if  the  rate  from  a  given  day  is  al- 
leged, yet  if  a  certain  sura  is  named  a 
larger  sum  cannot  be  recovered  :  King  v. 
Westbrooks  (1902),  116  Ga.  753,  42  S.  E. 
1002.  The  exhibit  being  part  of  the 
complaint,  a  prayer  asking  for  interest 
according  as  the  same  may  appear  to  be 
due  from  the  items  of  said  exhibit  at  seven 
per  cent  per  annum  is  sufficient  to  support 
a  verdict  for  such  interest :  Dunham  v. 
Holloway  (1895),  3  Okla.  244,  41  Pac. 
140. 

Invalidit)/  of  Statute  or  Ordinance. 

"  When  it  is  claimed  that  a  statute  or 
ordinance  is  invalid  because  it  is  in  its 
substance  violative  of  the  fundamental 
law,  the  inference  of  invalidity  being  one 
following  from  the  fundamental  law  as 
compared  with  the  act  in  question,  it  is 
sufficient  to  generally  allege  that  it  is  in- 
valid. When  the  claim  is  that  such  act 
or  ordinance  is  invalid,  not  because  of 
jts  substance,  but  because  not  regularlv 
passed  or  adopted,  the  defect  in  the  pro- 
ceedings must  be  specifically  pleaded.  It 
is  insufficient  to  allege  generally  that  it 
was  not  legally  adopted :  "  City  of  York 
V.  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  (1898),  56 
Neb.  572,  76  N.  W.  1065.  Where  it  is 
claimed  that  a  statute  is  unconstitution- 
al, a  general  allegation  to  that  effect  is 
not  sufficient,  but  che  specific  provision  of 
the  constitution  infringed  ujjon  must  be 
pointed  out  in  the  pleadings  :  Ash  v.  City 


680 


CIVIL    EEMEDIKS. 


of  Indepeiulence  (1902),   169  Mo. 
S.  W.  888. 


68     jurisdiction  of  a  justice's  court:  Willits  v. 
Walter  (1898),  32  Ore.  411,  52  Pac.  24. 


Irreparable  Ivjury. 

A  mere  allejrJition,  in  a  complaint,  of 
great  or  irreparable  injury  to  the  j)laintiff 
and  his  property,  without  the  facts  show- 
ing,' it,  is  not  sufficient  in  an  action  for  an 
injunction:  Brass  i'.  Kathbone  (1897),  153 
N.  V.  435,  47  N.  E.  905  ;  Wabaska  Elec- 
tric Co.  r.  City  of  Wyraore  (1900),  60  Neb. 
199,  82  N.  "W.  62C;  Burrus  v.  City  of 
Columbus  (1898),  105  Ga.  42,  31  S.  E.124; 
Schuster  v.  Myers  (1899),  148  Mo.  422, 
50  S.  W.  103.  See  al.so  Placke  v.  Union 
Depot  R.  R.  Co.  (1897),  140  Mo.  634,  41 
S.  W.  915. 

A  stockholder's  allegation  that  he  "  has 
{rood  reason  to  fear  and  does  fear"  that 
the  directors  will  sell  the  franchise,  with- 
out any  averment  that  they  threaten  to 
do  so,  is  not  sufficient :  Qnin  v.  Havenor 
(1903),  .53  \Vi.s.  118,  94  X.  W.  642. 

Judgment. 

In  an  action  npon  a  judgment  of  an- 
other State  rendered  by  a  court  of  general 
jurisdiction,  it  is  unnecessary  to  allege 
jurisdictional  facts.  Want  of  jurisdiction 
is  matter  to  be  set  up  by  answer:  Trow- 
bridge V.  Spinning  (1900),  23  Wash.  48, 
62  Pac.  125;  Kunze  v.  Kunze  (1890),  94 
Wis.  54,  68  N.  W.  391  ;  Bennett  v.  Bennett 
(1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W.  409.  In 
Gude  V.  Dakota  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1895),  7 
S.  I).  644,  65  N.  W.  27,  a  complaint 
alleging  jurisdictional  facts  relative  to  a 
foreign  judgment  was  considered  and  lield 
sufficient.  But  see  Angle  i'.  Manchester 
(1902).  —  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W.  501. 

In  ])leadiug  a  judgment  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  follow  §  456  of  the  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure,  and  aver  that  the  judgment 
was  "duly  given:"  Edwards  v.  Hellings 
(1893),  99  Cal.  214,  33  Pac.  799;  Buck- 
man  V.  Hatch  (1903),  139  Cal.  53,  72  Pac. 
445.  Same  holding  in  Wisconsin,  in  Pier- 
stoff  V.  Jorges  (1893),  86  Wis.  128,  56 
N.  W.  735,  as  to  judgment  of  a  court  of 
limited  jurisdiction.  Same  holding  in 
Oregon,  in  Fisher  v.  Kelly  (1896),  30  Ore. 
1,  46  Pac.  146,  also  as  to  judgment  of 
court  of  limited  juri.sdiction. 

But  ill  pleading  a  judgment  of  a  jus- 
tice's court  it  is  essential  to  show  that  the 
cause  of  action  was  one  f;!!!!!!!;  under  the 


Jurisdiction. 

A  court  will  rever.<e  a  judgment  for 
want  of  jurisdiction,  not  only  ui  cases 
where  it  is  shown  negatively  that  jurisdic- 
tion does  not  exist,  but  even  wlien  it  does 
not  appear  affirmatively  that  it  does  exist : 
Myers  c.  Berry  (1895),  3  Olda.  612,  41 
Pac.  580. 

Libel  and  Slander. 

See  the  following  cases  dealing  with 
vari(jus  phases  of  the  subject :  Sharpe  v. 
Larson  (1897),  70  Minn.  209,  72  N.  W. 
961;  Richmond  v.  Post  (1897),  69  Minn. 
457,  72  N.  W.  704 ;  Fredrick.son  v.  John- 
son (1894),  60  Minn.  337,  62  N.  W.  388; 
American  Book  Co.  v.  Kingdom  Publish- 
ing Co.  (1898),  71  Minn.  363,  73  N.  W. 
1089 ;  Heeney  v.  Kilbaue  (1899),  59  0.  St. 
499,  53  N.  "e.  262;  Grand  v.  Dreyfus 
(1898),  122  Cal.  58,  54  Pac.  389;  Schubert 
V.  Richter  (1896),  92  Wis.  199,  66  N.  W. 
107;  Davis  v.  Hamilton  (1902),  85  Minn. 
209,  88  N.  W.  744;  Williams  v.  Fuller 
(1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W.  118;  Grubb 
V.  Elder  (1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  72  Pac.  790. 

Names  of  Parties. 

Parties  should  sue  and  be  sned  in  their 
full  Christian  names,  and  not  by  initial 
letters:  Small  v.  Sandall  (1896),  48  Neb. 
318,  67  N.  W.  156  ;  Scarborough  v.  My  rick 
(1896),  47  Neb.  794,  66  N.  W.  867  ;  Ene- 
wold  V.  OLsen  (1894),  39  Neb.  59,  57  N.  W. 
765;  Richardson  v.  Opelt  (1900),  60  Neb. 
180,  82  N.  W.  377  ;  Nebraska  Loan  & 
Tru.st  Co.  c.  Kroener  (1901),  63  Neb.  289, 
88  N.  W.  499 ;  Gillian  r.  McDowell  (1902), 
—  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  991  ;  Twine  v.  Kil- 
gore  (1895),  3  Okla.  640,  39  Pac.  388; 
Turner  r.  Gregory  (1899),  151  Mo.  100,  52 
S.  W.  234.  But  in  a  suit  upon  an  instru- 
ment describing  the  parties  by  their  initials, 
suit  may  be  brought  by  or  against  them 
in  that  form:  Richardson  v.  Opelt  (1900), 
60  Neb.  180,  82  N.  W.  377.  But  see  the 
contrary  view  held  in  Gillian  v.  McDowell 
(1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  991.  Where 
liefendant  (the  Louisville  and  Nashville 
Railroad  Company)  was  sued  as  the 
"  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.,"  its  plea  in  abate- 
ment   ought     to    have    been    sust:\ined : 


FOIJM    OF    THE    COMPLAINT    OR    PETITION. 


6S1 


Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rloyd  (1900), 
—  Ky.  — ,  5.5  K.  W.  G94. 

The  objectiou  that  the  full  name  is  not 
given  may  be  made  at  any  time  before 
judgment:  Small  v.  Sandall  (1896),  48 
Neb.  318,  67  N.  W.  l.')6;  but  not  there- 
after: Shoemaker  i\  Goode  (1902),  Neb., 
92  N.  W.  629 ;  Scarborough  v.  Myrick 
(1896),  47  Neb.  794,  66  N.  W.  867  ;  Schrci- 
ner  v.  Stanton  (1901),  26  Wash.  563,  07 
Pac.  219 ;  Fisk  v.  GuUiford  (1903),  —  Neb. 
— ,  95  N.  W.  494.  Demurrer  is  not  the 
proper  remedy  :  McColgan  v.  Territory  of 
Oklahoma  (1897),  5  Okla.  567,  49  Pac. 
1018.  But  where  an  action  was  brought 
by  "  Heath,  Morrow  <&  Co.,"  and  this  is 
the  only  description  given  of  the  plaintiffs 
in  tlie  summons  or  complaint,  a  demurrer 
w^as  held  proper:  Heatli  r.  Morgan  (1895), 
117  N.  C.  504,  23  S.  E.  489.  Such  objec- 
tion is  waived  by  pleading  to  the  merits: 
Bell  V.  Peterson  (1900),  105  Wis.  607,  81 
N.  W.  279. 

It  is  sufficient  to  correctly  state  the 
names  of  the  parties  in  tlie  title,  and  they 
may  thereafter  be  referred  to  merely  as 
plaintiff  or  defendant :  Chicago,  etc.  R.  H. 
Co.  V.  Thomas  (1896),  147  Ind.  35,  46 
N.  E.  73;  Eisely  v.  Taggart  (1897),  52 
Neb.  658,  72  N.  W.  1039;  First  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Hattenbach  (1900),  13  S.  D.  365,  83 
N.  W.  421. 

"  Where  the  petition  or  complaint 
states  a  cause  of  action  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff  personally,  superadded  words, 
such  as  'agent,'  'executor,'  or  'trustee,' 
will  be  regarded  as  descriptio  persona. 
merely:"  Thomas  v.  Carson  (1896),  46 
Neb.  765,  65  N.  W.  899.  Where  a  peti- 
tion states  facts  constituting  a  cause  of 
action  against  the  defendant  individually, 
a  general  demurrer  should  not  be  'sus- 
tained because  in  the  caption  of  the 
petition  the  defendant  is  designated  as 
guardian:  Clift  v.  Newell  (1898),  104  Ky. 
396,  47  S.  W.  270.  "A  defendant  known 
indiscriminately  by  either  of  two  names 
may  properly  be  designated  by  both  in 
the  title  of  the  action,  if  they  are  used  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  indicate  clearly  that 
but  one  person  i.s  sued : "  O.  L.  Packard 
Machinery  Co.  r.  Laev  (1898),  100  Wis. 
644,  76  N.  W.  596.  "  Where  the  caption 
of  the  petition  gives  the  individual  names 
of  the  members  of  a  copartnersliip  as  de- 
fendants, and  references  in  the  pleadings, 


finding,'*,  and  judgment  to  the  defendants 
are  generally  in  tlie  plural,  the  action  will 
be  held  to  be  one  against  the  individuals 
nameil,  even  tliough  the  petition  charges 
that  the  plaintiff  contracted  with  the  de- 
fendants as  jiartners :  "  Burke  v.  Unique 
Printing  Co.  (1901),  63  Neb.  264,  88  N.  W. 
488. 

In  Turner  v.  Gregory  (1899),  151  Mo. 
100,  52  S.  W.  2.34,  the  court  said :  "  In  all 
proceedings  the  Christian  and  surname  of 
botli  the  jilaintiff  and  defendant  should  be 
set  forth  in  the  pleadings  and  process 
with  accuracy.  .  .  .  One  general  rule  has 
been  to  hold  the  first  ChVistian  name  a.'j 
essential,  and  to  hold  that  the  middle 
name  is  no  part  of  a  man's  name,  or  at 
least  not  necessary  to  his  designation." 
Citing  Missouri  cases. 

Negative  Averments. 

"  A  negative  allegation  is  to  be  proved 
only  where  it  constitutes  a  part  of  the 
original  substantive  cause  of  action  upon 
which  the  plaintiff  relies,  and  this  is  an 
exception  to  the  general  rule  that  a  party 
is  not  called  upon  to  prove  his  negative 
averments,  although  they  may  be  neces- 
sary in  his  pleading :  "  Dirks  v.  California 
Safe  Deposit  Co.  (1902),  136  Cal.  84,  68 
Pac.  487. 

Negligence. 

Negligence  cannot  be  presumed  but 
must  be  pleaded  and  proved  :  Vansyoc  r. 
Freewater  Cemetery  Ass'n  (1901),  63  Neb. 
143,  88  N.  W.  162;  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Zeims  (1894),  93  la.  140,  61   N.  W.  483. 

A  general  allegation  of  negligence  is 
sufficient  to  repel  a  demurrer  for  want  of 
facts:  House  v.  Meyer  (1893),  100  Cal. 
592,  35  Pac.  308 ;  Stephenson  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.  (1894),  102  Cal.  143,  36  Pac.  407  ; 
Omaha  &  R.  V.  Co.  v.  Wright  (1896),  49 
Neb.  456,  68  N.  W.  618  (overruling  same 
case,  47  Neb.  886,  66  N.  W.  842) ;  Omaha 
&  R.  V.  Co.  V.  Crow  (1898),  .54  Neb.  747, 
74  N.  W.  1066;  Collett  v.  Northern  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  (1900),  23  Wash.  600,  63  Pac.  225  ; 
Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  Ry.  Co.  (1901),  25 
Wash.  225.  65  Pac.  284;  Conrad  ;'.  De 
Montcourt  (1896),  138  Mo.  311,  39  S.  W. 
805 ;  Foster  ik  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co. 
(1893),  115  Mo.  165,21  S.  W.  916;  Connell 
V.  Chesapeake,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1900),  Ky.,  58 
S.  W.  374;  Baltimore,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Young  (1896),  146  Ind.  374,  45  N.  E.  479  : 


682 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


Sale  V.  Aurora,  etc.  Co.  (1896),  147  Ind. 
324,  46  N.  E.  669  ;  Cleveland,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Berry  (1898),  132  Ind.  607,  .53  N.  E.  41.5  ; 
Rodgers  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1897), 
150  Ind.  397,  49  N.  E.  453;  Citizens'  St. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Sutton  (1897),  148  Ind.  169, 
46  N.  E.  462  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bates  (1896),  146  Ind.  564,  45  N.  E.  108; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Berkey  (1893), 
136  lud.  181,  35  N.  E.  3  ;  Rogers  v.  Trues- 
dale  (1894).  37  Minn.  126,  38  N.  W.  688; 
McGonigle  v.  Kane  (1894),  20  Colo.  292,  38 
Pac.  367;  Walker  v.  McCauU  (1900),  13 
S.  I).  312,  83  N.  W.  378;  .lones  v.  City  of 
Portland  (1899),  35  Ore.  312,  38  Pac.  637  ; 
Chaperon  c.  Portland  Electric  Co.  (1902), 
41  Ore.  39,  67  Pac.  928;  Pittsburgh,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  I'.  Wilson  (1903),— lud. —,  66 
N.  E.  899 ;  Cederson  v.  Oregon  Nav.  Co. 
<1900),  38  Ore.  343,  62  Pac.  637  ;  Chicago, 
B.  &Q.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Oyster  (1899),  58  Nel). 
1,  78  N.  W.  359. 

The  rule  that  a  general  allegation  of 
negligence  is  sufficient  to  repel  a  demurrer 
for  want  of  facts,  ''  means,  not  that  the 
pleadinj;  is  good  by  charging  that  the 
plaintiff  was  injured  '  by  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant,'  but  that  it  is  sufficient  if 
the  act,  .stated  us  the  cause  of  t!ie  injury, 
is  alleged  to  have  been  '  negligently ' 
done : "  Cleveland,  etc.  Ky.  Co  v.  Berry 
<1898),  152  Ind.  607,  .33  N.'  E.  415. 

Negligence  is  an  ultimate  fact,  and  not 
illegal  conclusion  :  House  v.  Meyer  (1893), 
100  (";al.  592,  33  Pac.SOS;  Stephenson  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.  (1894),  102  Cal.  143,  36 
Pac.  407  ;  McGonigle  v.  Kane  (1894),  20 
Colo.  292,  38  Pac.  367  ;  Chaperon  v.  Port- 
land Elec.  Co.  (1902).  41  Ore.  39,  67  Pac. 
923;  Rogers  v.  Truesdale  (1894),  37  Minn. 
126,  58  N.  W.  688  ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R. 
Co.  !•.  Grablin  (1893),  38  Neb.  90,56 
N.  W.  796;  Hill  v.  Fairhaven,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1902),  73  Conn.  177,  32  Atl.  725  (hold- 
ing it  a  mi.xed  question  of  law  and  fact) ; 
Doolittle  V.  Laycock  (1899),  103  Wis.  334, 
79  N.  W.  408  (mixed  question  of  law  and 
fact). 

Where  a  petition  contains  but  a  general 
allegation  of  negligence  it  is  subject  to  a 
motion  to  make  more  definite  and  certain  : 
Price  V.  Water  Co.  (1897),  .38  Kan.  551,  .50 
Pac.  450  ;  Jones  v.  City  of  Portland  (1899), 
,35  Ore.  312,  58  Pac.  657  ;  Walker  v.  Mc- 
Caull  (1900) ,  13  S.  D.  512,  83  N.  W.  378 ; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Berkey  (1893), 


136  Ind.  181,  33  N.  E.  3;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Bates  (1896),  146  Ind.  364,45 
N.  E.  108;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lynch  (1896),  147  Ind.  163,  44  N.  E.  997  ; 
Conrad  v.  De  Montcourt  (1896),  138  Mo. 
311,  39  S.  W.  805 ;  Omaha  &  R.  V.  Co.  v. 
Crow  (1898),  54  Neb.  747,  74  N.  W.  1066. 

Where  a  general  averment  of  negli- 
gence in  a  petition  is  followed  by  an  enu- 
meration of  specific  facts  of  negligence, 
the  j)laintiff  will  l)e  restricted  to  proof  o£ 
the  facts  so  specified  :  McManamee  i'.  Mo. 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1896).  135  Mo.  440,  37 
S.  W.  119;  Dlauhi  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  (1897),  139  Mo.  291,  40  S.  W.  890; 
McCarty  v.  Rood  Hotel  Co.  (1898),  144 
Mo.  397,  46  S.  W.  172;  Chitty  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1899),  148  Mo.  64,  49 
S.  W.  868;  Rogers  v.  Truesdale  (1894),  57 
Minn.  126,  58  N.  W.  688  ;  Pierce  v.  Great 
Falls,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1899),  22  Mont.  445, 
56  Pac.  867 ;  Telle  v.  Rapid  Transit  Ry. 
Co.  (1893),  50  Kan.  435.  31  Pac.  1076. 
Contra :  Traver  v.  Spokane  St.  Ry.  Co. 
(1901),  23  Wash.  225,  63  Pac.  284.  Held 
in  Stendal  v.  Boyd  (1897),  67  Minn.  279, 
69  N.  W.  899,  that  where  a  general  charge 
of  negligence  is  made  as  to  specific  acts 
which  could  not  be  negligent  un<lcr  any 
evidence  admissible  under  the  allegations 
of  the  complaint,  the  complaint  is  denmr- 
rable. 

Negligence  need  not  be  charged  in 
terms  if  the  facts  alleged  show  a  prima 
facie  case  of  negligence  :  Baltimore  &  Ohio 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Kreager  (1899),  61  O.  St.  312,  56 
N.  E.  203 ;  City  of  Geneva  v.  Burnett 
(10O2),  — Neb.— ,  91  N.  W.  275.  "  If  the 
complaint  is  found  to  be  sufficient  in  the 
statement  of  negligence  in  one  respect,  it 
is  good,  as  against  a  general  demurrer, 
even  if  deficient  in  the  statement  of  another 
instance  of  want  of  care ; "  Hough  i". 
Grant's  Pass  Power  Co  (1902),  41  Ore. 
.531.  69  Pac.  653. 

In  an  action  again.'st  a  common  carrier 
it  is  sufficient  to  allege  that  the  goods 
were  delivered  to  him  and  were  injured  by 
his  default  while  in  liis  custody  and  care 
as  a  common  carrier :  Lang  v.  Brady 
(1900),  73  Conn.  707,  49  Atl.  199. 

A  complaint  in  an  action  for  negligence 
is  bad  which  does  not  allege  facts  re- 
quiring the  inference  that  the  negligence 
of  the  defendant  was  the  proximate  cause 
of  the  injury.      Haltimore,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 


FORM   OF   THE    COMPLAINT   OR    PETITION. 


68' 


YouDg  (1896),  14G  IikI.  374,  45  N.  E.  470  ; 
Chicago,  B.  &  (.1  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg 
(IS98),  55  Neb.  "48,  76  N.  W.  462  ;  Kelly 
V.  Town  of  Darlington  (1893),  86  Wis. 
432,  57  N.  W.  51. 

lu  an  action  for  damages  based  on  Lord 
Caniphell's  Act,  the  coni])laiut  must  show 
that  the  persons  for  whose  benefit  the  suit 
was  instituted  had  a  pecuniary  interest  in 
the  life  of  the  deceased;  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  r.  Young  (1899),  58  Neb. 
678,  79  N.  W.  556 ;  Orgall  v.  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  (1895),  46  Neb.  4,  64  N.  W. 
450;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Roeser  (1903), 
—  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W.  68.  But  in  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Thomas  (1900).  155  Ind. 
634,  58  N.  E.  1040,  it  was  held  that  an 
averment  that  decedent  left  surviving  him 
a  wife  and  infant  son  carried  with  it  the 
presumption  that  both  were  entitled  to  his 
services,  and  that  such  seryiceswere  valu- 
able, and  a  failure  to  allege  that  actu.al 
damages  were  sustained  was  not  fatal 
against  a  demurrer. 

It  is  not  necessary  for  plaintiff  to  allege 
that  he  has  suffered  pecuniary  loss  :  Haug 
v.  Railway  Co.  (1898),  8  N.  D.  23,  77 
N.  W.  97." 

"  A  petition  under  Lord  Campbell's 
Act  should  disclose  the  names  of  all  the 
beneficiaries,  but  if  the  names  of  the  sur- 
viving minor  children  of  the  decedent  who 
were  dependent  upon  him  for  support  are 
averred,  the  omissi(^n  to  allege  whether  or 
not  he  left  a  widow  will  not  render  the 
pleading  bad  on  demurrer :  "  Chicago,  B. 
&  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  V.  Oyster  (1899),  58  Neb.  1, 
78  N.  W.  359. 

In  the  following  cases  the  allegations 
of  negligence  were  passed  upon  by  the 
court  and  held  sufficient  or  insufficient,  as 
indicated  :  Redford  v.  Spokane  St.  Ry.  Co. 
(1894),  9  Wash.  55,  36  Pac.  1085  (insuffi- 
cient) ;  Washington  v.  Spokane  St.  Ry. 
Co.  (1895),  13  Wash.  9,  42  Pac.  628  (suffi- 
cient) ;  Croft  V.  Northwestern  Steamship 
Co.  (1898),  20  Wash.  175,  55  Pac.  42 
(sufficient);  Hanson  i'.  Anderson  (1895),  90 
Wis.  195,  62  N.  W.  1055  (sufficient)  ;  Ean 
V.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (1897),  95 
Wis.  70,  69  N.  W.  997  (insufficient)  ; 
Borchsenius  v.  Chicago,  St.  P.,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
<1897),  96  Wis.  448,  71  N.  W.  884  (suffi- 
cient); Anderson  v.  Haves  (1899),  101  Wis. 
519,  77  N.  W.  903  ("sufficient)  ;  City  of 
Aurora   r.   Cox    (1895),  43   Neb.   727,   62 


N.  W.  66  (sufficient) ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q. 
Ry.  Co.  V.  Grablin  (1893),  38  Neb.  90,  56 
N.  W.  796  (insufficient  to  admit  certain  evi- 
dence) ;  liunnell  v.  Berlin  Iron  Bridge  Co. 
(1895),  66  Conn.  24,  .33  Atl.  5.33  (sufficient). 

It  was  held  in  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v. 
O'Bryan  (1900),  I12(Ja.  127,  37  S.  E.  161, 
that  a  i)laiuti£E  "  m.ay  bring  suit  in  the 
county  where  the  failure  on  the  part  of  tlie 
railroad  company  to  discharge  its  duty  to 
the  passenger  originated,  and  use  tlie  trans- 
actions occurring  in  the  other  counties  as 
mere  matters  of  aggravation."  And  in 
Senn  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  135  Mo. 
512,  36  S.  W.  367,  which  was  an  action  to 
recover  for  the  death  of  a  person  due  to 
the  negligence  of  a  street  car  driver,  re- 
citals in  the  petition  of  a  city  ordinance 
regulating  the  running  of  street  cars  and 
prescribing  the  duties  of  those  in  charge 
of  them,  with  an  allegation  that  the  death 
of  the  deceased  was  caused  by  a  failure  to 
oliserve  such  ordinance,  do  not  constitute 
a  separate  cause  of  action  on  the  violation 
of  the  ordinance,  but  are  to  be  considered 
merely  as  affording  evidence  of  the  negli- 
gence of  the  driver. 

Where  plaintiff  predicates  t'le  action- 
able negligence  on  which  he  relies  on  a 
course  of  conduct  in  the  progress  of  which 
are  several  acts,  all  closely  connected  to- 
gether, and  leading  up  to  and  culminating 
in  the  accident,  the  allegation  as-  to  each 
act,  that  it  was  improperly  and  negligently 
done,  does  not  make  each  act  a  separate 
cause  of  action,  which  must  be  sufficient 
in  itself :  Hill  v.  Fairhaven,  etc.  R.  R.  Co. 
(1902),  75  Conn.  177,  52  Atl.  725. 

New  Promise. 
Where  an  action  is  brought  upon  a  new 
promise  to  pay  a  debt  barred  by  the  statute 
of  limitations,  the  petition  should  allege 
every  fact  necessary  to  a  recovery  on  the 
original  liability  and  in  addition  thereto  a 
promise  to  pay  :  Meyer  v.  Zotel's  Adm'r 
(1895),  96  Ky.  362,  29  S.  W.  28. 

Non-pai/ment. 
"  Where  the  plaintiff  has  proved  the 
existence  of  a  debt  sued  on  —  at  least 
within  the  period  of  statutory  limitation,  — 
the  burden  of  proving  payment  is  on  the 
defendant.  .  .  .  The  averment  of  non-pay- 
ment, while  necessary  to  make  the  com- 
plaint perfect  upon  its  face,  need  not  be 
proved  by  the  plaintiff  :  "   Hurley  v.  Ryan 


684 


CIYIL   REMEDIES. 


(1902).  137  Cal.  461,  70  Pac.  292.  See 
also  Hurley  r.  Ryan  (1897),  119  Cal.  71, 
51  Pac.  20,  au<i  Dodge  c.  Kimple  (1898), 
121  Cal.  580,  54  Pac.  94,  where  the  want 
of  allegation.?  of  non-payment  in  actions 
on  contract  for  money  demands,  were  held 
fatal  on  general  demurrer.  See,  to  the 
same  effect,  Stanton  r.  Keurick  (1893), 
135  Ind.  382,  35  N.  E.  19,  citing  Smythe  i: 
Scott,  106  Ind.  245,  Higert  v.  Trustees,  53 
Ind.  326;  Wheeler,  etc.  Co.  v.  Worrall,  80 
Ind.  297;  and  Brickey  v.  Irwin,  122  Ind. 
51.  In  Baldwin  v.  Boyce  (1898),  152  Ind. 
46.  51  X.  E.  334,  facts  alleged  were  held 
to  constitute  an  inferential  showing  of 
non-payment,  and  were  held  sufficient. 
See  also  Hudelson  r.  First  Nat.  Bank 
(1897),  51  Neb.  557,  71  N.  W.  304.  for  an 
excellent  discussion  of  the  subject,  holding 
tliat  non-payment  must  be  alleged,  altiiough 
payment  is  an  affirmative  defence. 

Ortlimmces. 
A  municipal  ordinance  may  be  pleaded 
by  stating  its  substance  and  legal  effect, 
without  referring  to  its  title  or  the  date  of 
its  passage:  Decker  v.  McSorley  (1901), 
111  Wis.  91,  86  N.  W.  554;  Moberly  v. 
Hogan  (1895),  131  Mo.  19,  32  S.  W.  1014; 
Hirst  /•.  Kingeu  Keal  Estate  Co.  (1902), 
169  Mo.  194,  69  S.  W.  368;  Seattle  v. 
Pearson  (1896),  15  Wash.  575,  46  Pac. 
1053.  In  Village  of  Fairmont  v.  Meyer 
(1901),  83  Minn.  456,  86  N.  W.  457,  held 
sufficient  to  describe  the  ordinance  by  its 
title  and  date  of  passage. 

Partneiship. 

Where  an  action  is  brought  in  the  name 
of  the  partners,  and  it  is  alleged  that  they 
jointly  furnished  the  goods,  it  is  not  neces- 
sary to  allege  tlie  partnership :  Clark  r. 
Wick  (1894),  25  Ore.  446,  36  Pac.  165. 

In  an  action  by  or  against  partners, 
it  is  not  necessary  that  the  title  describe 
the  parties  as  partners,  and  give  the  part- 
nership name,  if  the  facts  appear  in  the 
complaint :  Van  Brunt  &  Co.  v.  Harri- 
gan  (1895),  8  S.  T).  96,  65  N.  W.  421.  A 
statement  in  the  bill  of  particulars  that 
plaintiff  is  a  partnership  is  sufficient: 
Biddle  V.  Spatz  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95 
N.  W.  357. 

Under  G.  S.  1894,  §  5177,  an  action  will 
lie  against  the  partners  by  their  common 
name,  though  this  statute  does  not  author- 
ize &  salt  to  be  brought  6//  the  partners  in 


their  common  name  nor  against  the  part- 
nership by  the  common  name  :  Dimond  v. 
Minnesota  Sav.  Bank  (1897),  70  Minn.  298, 
73  N.  W.  182. 

An  allegation  that  a  certain  firm  is  a 
partnership  organized  and  doing  business 
in  the  State  of  Nebraska,  is  sufficient  to 
authorize  carrying  the  action  under  the 
firm  name,  under  §  24  of  the  Code,  and  it 
need  nut  be  alleged  that  it  is  a  Nebraska 
firm:  Chamberlin  Banking  Mouse  v.  Noyes 
(1902),  —Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  175.  See 
also  Winters  v.  Means  (1897),  50  Neb.  209, 
69  N.  W.  753. 

Where  suit  is  brought  in  the  partner- 
ship name,  under  H.  .S.  §5011,  an  aver- 
ment as  to  who  the  partners  are  is  mere 
surplusage :  Pha-nix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carnahan 
(1900),  63  O.  St.  258,  58  N.  E.  805,  citing 
Winters  v.  Means,  50  Neb.  209;  Dimond 
V.  Bank,  70  Minn.  298. 

Passenger,  Relation  of. 
An  allegation  in  a  petition  against  a 
street  railway  company  for  injuries,  that 
plaintiff  boarded  a  car  witli  the  intention 
of  becoming  a  passenger,  is  not  equivalent 
to  an  allegation  that  he  was  a  passenger, 
since  the  law  does  not  concern  itself  with 
mere  intent  not  evidenced  by  an  outward 
act:  Kaming  v.  Metropolitan  St.  Ry.  Co. 
(1900),  157  Mo.  477,  57  S.  W.  268.'  See 
also  Southern  Ry.  Co.  v.  ])yson  (1899), 
109  Ga.  103,  34  S.  E.  997,  which  holds  that 
the  ticket  should  be  set  out  with  sufficient 
fulness  to  show  that  plaintiff  was  lawfully 
a  passenger. 

Penalties,  Actions  for. 
A  complaint  in  an  action  for  a  statutory 
penalty,  in  the  words  of  the  statute,  is  suf- 
ficient. The  court  said  :  "  To  test  the  com- 
plaint in  question  in  order  to  determine 
whether  it  states  a  cause  of  action,  we  must 
look  to  the  statute  creating  the  remedy, 
and  not  to  the  rules  under  the  code  which 
control  pleadings  in  actions  of  common 
law  origin:"  Latshaw  v.  State  (1900),  156 
Ind.  194,  59  N.  E.  471.  In  .sucii  an  action 
the  complaint  should  at  least  contain  a 
reference  to  tlie  statute  creating  and  fix- 
ing such  penalty  :  Kirby  v.  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  (1894)",  6  S.  D."  1,  60  N.  W.  152. 

Performance. 
In  an  action  on  a  contract,  a  complaint 
which  sets  out  the  contract  must  allege 


FORM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT    OR    PETITION. 


685 


plaintiff's  performance  of  its  conditions: 
Ball  r.  Doud  (1894),  26  Ore.  14,  37  Pac. 
70.  But  a  general  allegation  of  j)erforra- 
ance  is  sufficient :  Culbert.son,  etc.  Power 
Co.  V.  Wildman  (1895),  45  Neb.  663,  63 
N.  W.  947. 

Possession. 

In  an  action  of  forcible  entry  and  de- 
tainer, au  allegation  that  plaintiff  was  the 
owner  of  the  fee  of  the  property  is  not  a 
sufficient  allegation  that  plaintiff  was  in 
actual  possession  :  McGrew  v.  Lamb  (1903), 
31  \Vash.485,  72  Pac.  100.  An  allegation 
that  plaintiff  and  defendant  were  tenants 
in  common  of  certain  property  is  not  an 
averment  that  they  were  in  possession : 
Sterling  v.  Sterling  (1903),  43  Ore.  200,  72 
Pac.  741. 

An  allegation  "  that  the  plaintiff  is  now, 
and  for  more  than  fifteen  years  next  prior 
to  the  date  of  this  complaint  has  been,  the 
owner  in  fee  simple  absolute,  and  in  the 
actual,  notorious  and  open  possession  of 
the  following  lands  "  (describing  them),  is 
a  sufficient  allegation  of  actual  possession : 
Maggs  V.  Morgan  (1903),  30  Wash.  604,  71 
Pac.  188. 

Quieting  Title. 

Plaintiff  must  allege  that  he  is  in  actual 
possession  of  the  laud,  the  title  to  which 
is  sought  to  be  quieted :  Cornelisou  v. 
Foushee  (1897),  101  Ky.  257,  40  S.  W. 
680.  A  complaint  was  construed  in 
Deacon  v.  Central  la.  Inv.  Co.  (1895), 
95  la.  180,  63  N".  W.  673,  and  held  to 
state  a  cause  of  action  to  quiet  title. 

Facts  must  be  alleged  showing  that 
title  is  m  the  plaintiff  :  Chapman  v.  Jones 
(1897),  149  Ind.  4.34,  47  N.  E.  1065; 
Cooper  V.  Birch  (1902),  137  Cal.  472,  70 
Pac.  291.  In  the  last  case  it  was  held 
that  an  allegation  that  plaintiff  is  the 
owner  of  a  right  to  purchase  is  not  equiv- 
alent to  an  allegation  that  plaintiff  is 
owner  of  the  laud. 

Ratification. 
"  We  are  of  the  opinion  that,  when  the 
unauthorized  agreement  of  an  agent  has 
been  ratified  by  his  principal,  an  action 
may  be  brought  thereon,  as  though  origi- 
nally made  by  due  authority,  and  that  it 
is  not  necessary,  in  the  first  instance,  to 
allege  in  the  pleading  the  ratification,  but 
that  it  may  be  shown  in  proof  of  the 
agreement  :"  Long  v.  Osborn  (1894),  91 


la.  160,  59  N.  W.  14.  See  also  Smith  v. 
Des  Moines  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  107  la.  620 
78  N.  W.  238. 

Receiver,  Cajiacitij  of. 

An  averment  "  that  said  Luther  Cum- 
miugs  was  duly  appointed  and  (jualified  as 
receiver  of  said  association,  and,  among 
other  things,  was  then  and  there,  by  said 
court,  duly  empowered,  ordered,  and  di- 
rected to  collect  by  suit,  if  necessary,  all 
the  claims  due  said  association,"  was  held 
a  sufficient  averment  of  the  authority  of 
tiie  receiver  to  sue:  Hatfield  v.  Cummings 
(1898),  152  Ind.  280,  50  N.  E.  217.  See 
also  Hagerman  v.  Thomas  (1901),  —  Neb. 
— ,  96  N.  W.  631. 

Where  a  receiver  brings  an  action  in 
his  own  name,  he  must  show  by  direct  and 
positive  averments  that  leave  of  court  to 
iustitute  and  prosecute  tiie  action  was  first 
obtained:  Hatfield  v.  Cummings  (supra). 
See  also  Rhorer  v.  Middlesboro,  etc.  Co. 
(1898),  103  Ky.  146,  44  S.  W.  448. 

Reformation  of  Written  Instrument. 

In  a  suit  to  reform  a  written  instru- 
ment, the  plaintiff  must  set  forth  the 
terms  of  the  original  agreement,  and  also 
the  agreement  as  reduced  to  writing,  and 
point  out  clearly  wherein  there  was  a  mis- 
take :  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Judy  (1896), 
146  Ind.  322,  43  N.  E.  259;  Osborn  v. 
Ketchum  (1894),  25  Ore. 352,  35  Pac.  972; 
Sellwood  V.  Henueman  (1900),  36  Ore.  575, 
60  Pac.  12. 

A  general  averment  of  mistake  is  insuf- 
ficient: Knox  ('.  Pearson  (1902),  64  Kan. 
711,  68  Pac.  613. 

Replevin. 
This  action  is  not  controlled  by  the  or- 
dinary rules  of  pleading:  Woodbridge  v. 
De  Witt  (1897),  51  Neb.  98,  70  N.  W. 
506.  As  to  allegations  of  ownership  in 
this  action  see  subject  "Title,"  infra,  in 
this  note.  Replevin  is  a  local  action  and 
the  place  should  be  alleged  :  Byers  v.  Fer- 
guson (1902),  41  Ore.  77,  68  Pac.  5.  An 
averment  of  wrongful  possession  implies  an 
averment  of  right  to  possession  :  Grever 
&  Sons  V.  Taylor  (1895),  53  0.  St,  621,  42 
N.  E.  829.  It  is  not  necessary  to  allege  a 
right  to  immediate  possession  :  Smith  v. 
Wis,  Inv.  Co.  (1902),  114  Wis.  151,  89 
N.  W.  829.     Special  damages  must  be  al- 


686 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


leged:  Kosecrans  r.  Asay  (189G),  49  Neb. 
512.  68  N.  W.  627;  Armagost  v.  Rising 
(1898),  54  Neb.  763.  75  N.  W.  534.  lu 
Bridges  c  Thomas  (1899),  8  Olila.  620, 
58  Pac.  955.  the  court  said  :  "  While,  un- 
der certain  conditions,  replevin  will  lie  to 
recover  possession  of  a  building,  a  peti- 
tion in  replevin  for  the  recovery  of  a 
building,  in  order  to  state  a  good  cause  of 
action,  should  specifically  aver  such  a  state 
of  facts  as  will  clearly  show  that  sucli 
building  is  personal  property,  and  that 
the  plaintiff  has  a  right  to  maintain  the 
action.  It  is  not  suilicient  to  aver  gen- 
erally that  such  building  is  personal  prop- 
erty."    Syllabus  by  the  court. 

Seduction. 
In  Anthony  v.  Norton  (1899),  60  Kan. 
341,  56  Pac.  529,  it  was  lield,  that  under 
the  general  code  provisions  abolisliing  the 
old  system  of  pleading,  \vith  its  fictions 
and  feigned  issues,  "  a  parent  may  main- 
tain an  action  for  the  seduction  of  the 
daughter  without  averment  or  proof  of 
loss  of  services  or  e.xpenses  of  sickness." 
See  also  Snider  i:  Newell  (1903),  132  N.  C. 
614,  44  S.  E.  354. 

Statute  of  Frauds,  Contracts  within. 

It  is  not  necessary,  in  suing  on  a  cou- 
tract  within  the  statute  of  frauds,  to  al- 
lege that  it  is  in  writing,  as  it  will  be 
presumed  to  be  written  :  Sowards  r.  Moss, 
(1899),  58  Neb.  119,  78  N.  W.  37.3  ;  Dra])cr 
V.  Macon  Dry  Goods  Co.  (1898),  103  Ga. 
661,30  S.  E.  566;  Bluthenthal  r.  Moore 
(1898),  106  Ga.  424,  32  S.  E.  344  ;  Walker 
V.  Edmundson  (1900),  111  Ga.  454,  36 
S.  E.  800  ;  Taliaferro  v.  Smiley  (1900),  112 
Ga.  62,  37  S.  E.  106;  Sundback  v.  Gilbert 
(1896),  8  S.  D.  359,  66  N.  W.  941 ;  Kuth 
V.  Smith  (1901),  29  Colo.  154,68  Pac.  278  ; 
Kilpatrick-Koch  Dry  Goods  Co.  v.  Box 
(1896),  13  Utah,  494,  45  Pac.  629  ;  Brad- 
ford luv.  Co.  (.'.  Joo.st  (1897),  117  Cal. 
204,  48  Pac.  1083;  Suber  v.  Eichards 
(1901),  61  S.  C.  393,  39  S.  E.  .540;  Mat- 
thews V.  Matthews  (1897),  154  N.  Y.  288, 
48  N.  E.  531  ;  York  Park  Bldg.  A.ss'n  v. 
Barnes  (1894),  39  Neb.  834,  58  N.  W.  440. 

But  see,  for  the  contrary  doctrine, 
Lowe  V.  Turpie  (1896),  147  Ind.  652,  44 
N.  E.  25;  Horner  v.  McConnell  (1902), 
158  Ind.  280,  63  N.  E.  472;  Morgan  v. 
Wickliffc  (1901),  no  Ky.  215,  61  S.  W. 
13  ;  Graves  i-.  Clark  (1897),  101  la.  738,  69 


N.  W.  lOJG;  Powder  River  Live  Stock 
Co.  V.  Lamb  (1893),  38  Neb.  339,  56  N.  W. 
1019. 

Statnl(s. 

Public  .statutes  need  not  be  pleaded,  as 
courts  are  bouml  to  take  judicial  notice  of 
them:  Ervin  v.  State  ex  rel.  (1897),  150 
Ind.  332,  48  N.  E.  249.  But  private 
statutes  must  be  pleaded  :  Nichols  v. 
Bardwell  Lodge  ^1898),  105  Ky.  168,  48 
S.  W.  426. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  formally  con- 
clude a  complaint  with  the  words,  "  against 
the  form  of  the  statute  in  such  case  made 
and  provided,"  in  case  of  a  general  stat- 
ute:  State  V.  Owsley  (1895),  17  Mont.  94, 
42  Pac.  105. 

In  McCullou<^h  v.  Colfax  County 
(1903),  —  Neb.  —  ,  95  N.  W.  29,  tlie  court 
said:  "  Wjiere  the  statutes  give  a  new 
remedy  and  prescribe  prerequisite  condi- 
tions, or  if  an  action  of  a  certain  class 
against  certain  parties  be  authori^.ed  only 
after  the  performance  of  similar  condi- 
tions, the  performance  of  these  conditions, 
whether  the  right  of  action  exists  at  com- 
mon law  or  is  created  by  statute,  must  be 
alleged  in  the  complaint  and  proved  at 
the  trial.  And  where  the  )>laintiff  wishes 
to  avail  himself  of  a  statutory  privilege  or 
right  founded  upon  particular  facts,  be 
must  state  those  facts  in  his  complaint. 
.  .  .  Pleading  the  statute  is  .stating  the 
facts  which  bring  the  case  within  it,  and 
counting  upon  it,  in  the  strict  language 
of  pleading,  is  making  express  reference 
to  it  by  apt  terms  to  show  the  source  of 
right  relied  on.  ...  A  general  averment 
of  the  performance  of  conditions  prece-- 
dent  is  sufficient  in  case  of  contract,  but 
in  all  otiier  cases  the  facts  showing  a  per- 
formance must  be  specially  pleaded." 

Stockholders,  Action  against. 

For  essential  allegations  see  Hirshfeld 
r.  Bopp  (1895),  145  N.  Y.  84,  39  N.  E. 
817. 

Surgeon,  Qualifications  of. 

A  veterinary  surgeon,  in  suing  for 
services,  need  not  allege  that  he  was 
licensed  as  a  veterinary  surgeon :  Lyford 
?•.  Martin  (1900),  79  Minn.  243,  82  N.  W. 
479. 

Tender. 

In  an  action  to  restrain  the  colbn-lion 
of  taxes  on  the  ground  tliat  thov  are  ex- 


FOKM    OF    TIIK    COMn.AIXT    OR    rETlTIOX. 


687 


ceasive,  aii  allec;ation  that  plaintiff  ten- 
dered to  the  tax  collector  a  certain  amount 
conceded  by  him  to  be  due,  which  the  col- 
lector refused  to  receive,  is  insuflScieut 
without  a  further  allepjation  that  such 
tender  was  kept  good  by  depositing  the 
money  in  court:  Welch  v.  City  of  Astoria 
(1894),  26  Ore.  89,  37  Pac.  66.  See,  to 
same  effect,  Jacobs  v.  Oren  (1897),  30 
Ore.  .593,  48  Pac.  431.  See  also  Angier 
V.  Equitable  Bldg.  Ass'n  (1899),  109  Ga. 
625,  35  S.  E.  64  ;  Underwood  v.  Tew 
(1893),  7  Wash.  297,  34  Pac.  1100. 

Time. 

"  Generally,  the  time  at  which  a  ma- 
terial fact  occurred  is  unimportant,  and 
therefore  need  not  be  averred.  In  sucli 
cases  the  fact  only  is  essential,  and  the 
date  of  no  importance ;  but  there  are 
cases  where  time  is  vital  to  the  right  to 
recover,  and  in  such  exceptional  cases  the 
fact  is  unimportant,  unless  cou])led  with  a 
statement  of  the  date  of  its  occurrence. 
In  such  cases  it  is  elementary  that  an 
averment  of  time  is  essential,  and  the 
time  must  be  truthfully  stated  :  "  Clyde  r. 
Johnson  (1894),  4  N.  D.  92,  58  N.  W.  512. 

For  cases  where  it  was  held  that  the 
time  was  immaterial,  and  need  not  be 
proved  as  laid,  see  p.  569,  note  1. 

Title. 

A  general  allegation  of  ownership  is 
sufficient  as  against  a  general  demurrer : 
Fisher  v.  Bouisson  (1893),  3  N.  D.  493,  57 
N.  W.  505;  Shannon  v.  Grind.staff  (1895), 
11  Wash.  536,  40  Pac.  123;  Reedy. 
McRlll  (1894),  41  Neb.  206,  59  N.  W.  775  ; 
Kavanaugh  v.  Oberfelder  (1893),  37  Neb. 
647,  56  N.  W.  316  ;  Bennett  i:  Lathrop 
(1899).  71  Conn.  613,  42  Atl.  634;  Carter 
V.  Wakenmn  (1902).  42  Ore.  147,  70  Pac. 
393  ;  Hague  v.  Niphi  Irrigation  Co.  (1898), 
16  Utah,  421,  52  Pac.  765;  0.sborne  &  Co. 
V.  Stevens  (1896),  15  Wash.  478,  46  Pac. 
1027  ;  Peoria,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Attica,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1899),  154  Ind.218,  56  N.  E.  210; 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ragsdale  (1900),  158 
Mo.  668,  59  S.  W.  987 ;  Duzan  r.  Meserve 
(1893),  24  Ore.  523,  34  Pac.  548  ;  Atwater 
V.  Spalding  (1902),  86  Minn.  101,  90  N.  W. 
370;  McA^-thur  v.  Clark  (1902),  86  Minn. 
165,  90  N.  W.  369. 

While  a  plaintiff  in  ejectment  need  not 
plead  her  title,  if  she  chooses  to  do  so  she 


is  hound  by  her  pleading  and  cannot  prove 
a  title  from  a  different  source  :  Utassy  v. 
Giediughagcn  (1895),  132  Mo.  53,33  S.  W. 
444. 

An  allegation  that  at  a  certain  past  time 
plaintiff  was  the  owner  of  certain  prop- 
erty, is  not  equivalent  to  an  allegation  of 
present  ownership:  Ryan  v.  Spieth  (1896), 
18  Mont.  45,  44  Pac.  403;  Irish  v.  Sunder- 
haus  (1898),  122  Cal.  308,  54  Pac.  1113. 
In  the  last  case  it  was  held  that  the  pre- 
sumption of  continuance  is  a  rule  of  evi- 
dence and  not  of  pleading. 

An  allegation  that  ]daintiff  owns  the 
right  to  purchase  certain  lauds  is  not 
equivalent  to  an  allegation  that  he  is  the 
owner  of  the  lands :  Cooper  v.  Birch 
(1902),  137  Cal.  472,  70  Pac.  291.  In  an 
action  by  the  indorsee  of  a  promissory  note 
payable  to  order,  an  allegation  that  tiie 
note  was  "sold,  assigned  and  delivered" 
to  plaintiff  w-as  held  sufficient  to  admit 
evidence  that  it  was  indorsed  to  him  :  Red 
River  Valley  Investment  Co.  v.  Cole 
(1895),  62  Minn.  457,  64  N.  W.  1149.  An 
allegation  "  that  the  store  or  place  of 
business  of  plaintiffs  is  situated  on"  a 
named  street,  held  a  sufficient  allegation 
of  ownership  .is  against  a  general  demur- 
rer :  Brunswick  &.  Western  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hardey  (1900),  112  Ga.  604,  37  S.  E.  888. 
An  allegation  that  plaintiff  "  has  lawful 
title  "  to  the  described  premises,  is  an  alle- 
gation of  fact  and  not  a  conclusion : 
Livingstone  v.  Ruff  (  1903),  —  S.  C.  — , 
43  S.  E.  678.  An  allegation  that  county 
warrants  were  issued  and  delivered  to  a 
certain  person,  is  sufficient  to  show  that 
he  is  the  present  owner  of  them  :  Dorothy 
V.  Pierce  (1895),  27  Ore.  373,  41  Pac.  668. 
An  allegation  that  certain  land  on  a  cer- 
tain date  "  was  the  property  of  0.  D. 
Parry,"  is  a  sufficient  averment  of  owner- 
ship in  fee  simple :  Grace  ;;.  Ballou  ( 1 893), 
4  S.  D.  333,  56  N.  W.  1075.  An  allega- 
tion that  certain  land  "  is  held  and  claimed 
by  her  as  her  own,  and  was  so  held  and 
claimed  by  her  prior  to  the  institution  of 
this  action  "  is  not  a  sufficient  allegation 
of  title :  DeHaven  v.  DeHaven's  Adm'r 
(1898),  104  Ky.  41,  46  S.  W.  215. 

"  Where  a  note  has  passed  through  the 
hands  of  several  successive  transferees,  a 
plaintiff  may  ignore  all  intermediate 
transfers  not  necessary  to  show  his  title, 
and  allege  a  transfer  by  the  payee  directly 


688 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


to  himself:"  Crosby  v.  Wright  (1S97),  70 
Minn.  251,  73  N.  w".  162. 

Defect  of  title  is  not  sufficiently  alleged 
by  the  statement  that  the  grantors  ''  were 
not  seized  in  fee  or  possessed  of  the  right 
to  sell  and  convey  "  the  premises  in  con- 
troversy :  Decker  v.  Schulze  (1895),  11 
Wash.  47,  39  Pac.  261. 

In  an  action  on  a  promissory  note  pay- 
able to  the  order  of  a  third  party,  a  mere 
allegation  that  the  plaintiff  "  is  now  the 
owner  and  holder"  is  not  a  sufHcient  alle- 
gation of  title  in  the  plaintiff.  The  court 
said :  "  We  have  frequently  held  that, 
where  a  party  does  not  attempt  to  set  up 
the  source  of  his  title  to  chattel  or  real 
proi)erty,  a  general  allegation  of  owner- 
ship is  sufficient,  and  will  be  deemed  an 
allegation  of  an  ultimate  fact,  and  not  of 
a  mere  conclusion  of  law.  Bnt  we  have 
never  held  that,  if  he  alleged  title  to  have 
been  in  a  third  party,  it  would  be  sufficient 
to  then  allege  that  he  was  now  the  owner, 
witliout  alleging  a  transfer  from  such 
partv  to  himself :  "  Topping  i-.  Clay  (1895), 
62  Minn.  3,  63  N.  W.  1038. 

'•  Where  a  party  relies  upon  his  title,  as 
obtained  by  prescription,  he  must  allege 
the  facts  showing  the  existence  of  the 
right,  or  plead  the  prescriptive  right,  aver- 
ring that  the  existence  of  the  right  was 
under  a  claim  of  right,  was  peaceable,  with- 
out interruption,  and  open,  notorious  and 
exclusive:"  Larsen  v.  Onesite  (1900),  21 
Utah,  38,  59  Pac.  234  ;  Coleman  v.  llines 
(1902),  24  Utah,  360,  67  Pac.  1122. 

The  word  "  owner  "  includes  any  person 
who  has  usufruct,  control  or  occupation  of 
real  estate,  and  such  a  person  may  prop- 
erly allege  himself  to  be  the  owner  of  the 
property  in  an  action  of  ejectment :  Par- 
ker I'.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1900), 
79  Minn.  372,  82  N.  W.  673. 

Where  plaintiff  in  replevin  relies  upon 
a  special  ownership,  the  facts  showing  it 
must  be  alleged  :  II ill  v.  Campbell  Coni- 
mi.ssion  Co.  (1898),  54  Neb.  .59,  74  N.  W. 
388;  Raymond  v.  Miller  (1897),  50  Neb. 
506,  70  N.  W.  22  ;  Thompson  &  Sons  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  NichoUs  (1897),  .52  Neb.  312,  72 
N.  W.  217;  Paxton  v.  Learn  (1898),  55 
Neb.  459,  75  N.  W.  1090;  Meyer  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank  (1902),  63  Neb.  679,  88  N.  W. 
867  ;  Mus.ser  v.  King  (1894),  40  Neb.  892, 
59  N.  W.  744;  Sharp  i-.  John.son  (1895), 
44  Neb.  105,  02  N.  W.  466;  Camp  v.  Pol- 


lock (1895),  45  Neb.  771.  04  N.  W.  231  > 
Strahle  r.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  47  Neb. 
319,  66  N.  W.  415;  Norcross  r.  Baldwin 
(1897),  50  Neb.  885,  70  N.  W.  511  ;  Griffing 
V.  Curtis  (1897),  50  Neb.  3.34,  69  N.  W. 
904;  Hudelson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1897), 
51  Neb.  557,  71  N.  W.  304;  Elliott  i\ 
First  Nat.  Bank  (1902),  30  Colo.  279,  70 
Pac.  421  ;  Lovell  v.  Hammond  Co.  (1895), 
66  Conn.  500,  34  Atl.  511;  Kennett  i\ 
Peters  (1894),  54  Kan.  119,  37  Pac.  999  ; 
Suckstorf  V.  Butterfield  (1898),  54  Neb. 
757,  74  N.  W.  1076;  Wilson  r.  City  Nat. 
Bank  (1897),  51  Neb.  87,  70  N.  W.  501. 

Under  Code  Civ.  Pro.  §  129  (similar  to  the 
statutes  of  several  other  States,  for  which 
see  p.  438,  note  2),  no  averment  of  title  is 
necessary :  Pollock  r.  Stanton  County 
(1899),  57  Neb.  399,  77  N.  W.  1081. 

lu  an  action  by  a  creditor  to  reach  land 
conveyed  by  one  other  than  the  debtor,  on 
the  ground  that  the  debtor  owns  the  equi- 
table title,  the  facts  showing  the  debtor's 
ownershi[)  should  be  alleged :  Bevins  v. 
Eisman  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W.  410. 

Title  by  adverse  possession  may  be 
pleaded  by  alleging  that  plaintiff  "  occu- 
pied "  the  land  for  the  necessary  time, 
without  alleging  "  actual  possession."  Hall 
V.  Roberts  (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W.  199. 

A  petition  claiming  that  j)laintifC  is  heir 
of  W.  and  as  such  entitled  to  certain  land, 
is  insufficient  unless  facts  are  stated  show- 
ing the  heirship :  Craig  v.  Welch-IIackley 
Coal  &  Oil  Co.  (1903),  Ky.,  74  S.  W. 
1097. 

Trespass. 

As  to  who  may  maintain  an  action  for 
trespass,  see  Casey  v.  Mason  (1899),  8 
Okla.  665,  59  Pac.252;  Chicago,  R.  I.  & 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Shepherd  (1894),  39  Neb. 
523,  58  N.  W.  189. 

In  Meyers  v.  Menter  (1902^,  63  Neb. 
427,  88  N.  W.  662,  the  allegations  of  the 
petition  were  considered  and  held  to  state 
a  cause  of  action  for  wilful  trespass. 

In  an  action  to  enjoin  the  commission 
of  trespasses,  it  is  not  sufficient  to  jilead 
the  tresi)asses  in  general  terms  :  Wilkeson, 
etc.  Co.  0.  Driver  (1894),  9  Wash.  177,  37 
Pac.  307. 

"  In  an  action  for  trespass  tlie  plaintiff 
may  charge  and  prove  all  the  circum- 
stances accomi)anying  tlie  act,  and  which 
were  a  jtart  of  the  res  (jcsUp,,  in  order  to 
sliow  the  temper  and  purpose  with  which 


FOKM    OF   THE    COMPLAINT   OR   TETITIOX. 


689 


the  trespass  was  committed,  and  the  ex- 
tent ol'  the  injury,  under  the  rule  that  a 
series  of  uuhxwful  acts,  all  aimed  at  a  sin- 
gle result,  and  contributing  to  the  injury 
complained  of,  may  be  averred  in  the 
complaint  without  violating  the  rule 
against  duplicity :  "  Bingham  i:  Lipinan 
(1902),  40  Ore.  363,  67  Pac.  98. 

Value. 

Allegations  of  value  are  not  considered 
true  by  failure  of  defendant  to  deny  them  : 
Derrick  v.  Cole  (1894),  60  Ark.  394,  30 
S.  W.  760;  Campbell  v.  Brosius  (1893), 
36  Neb.  792,  55  N.  W.  215. 

In  a  petition  to  recover  the  value  of 
shares  of  stock,  an  allegation  that  the 
cori)oration  stock  "is  divided  into  100,000 
shares  of  the  par  value  of  one  dollar  each," 
is  not  an  allegation  of  the  value  of  the 
stock:  Mining  Co.  v.  Huff  (1901),  62 
Kan.  405,  63  Pac.  442.  And  the  allega- 
tion "that  the  actual  cost  of  making  such 
wharf  was  82,745,  said  sum  being  the 
value  thereof  as  contemplated  by  the 
contract,"  is  not  a  sufficient  allegation 
of  value,  the  words  "  as  contemplated  by 
the  contract "  rendering  it  defective :  Hart 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Everett  Land  Co.  (1898), 
20  Wash.  71,  .54  Pac.  767.  See  also  Plumb 
V.  Griffin  (1901),  74  Conn.  132,  50  Atl.  1. 

Waiver. 

Waiver  of  conditions  precedent  must 
he  specially  pleaded  iu  order  to  be  avail- 
able :  Burlington  Ins.  Co.  v.  Campbell 
(1894),  42  Neb.  208,  60  N.  W.  599;  An- 
ders V.  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  62  Neb.  585, 
87  N.  W.  331";  Hartford  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Landfare  (1902),  63  Neb.  559,  88  N.  W. 
779;  Gillett  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  53  Kan. 
108,  36  Pac.  52;  Hannan  v.  Greenfield 
(1899),  36  Ore.  97,  58  Pac.  888;  Long 
Creek  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  State  Ins.  Co.  (1896), 
29  Ore.  569,  46  Pac.  366 ;  Closz  v.  Miracle 
(1897),  103  la.  198,  72  N.  W.  502;  Hen- 
sinkveld  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Ins.  Co.  (1895), 
96  la.  224,  64  N.  W.  769;  Heusinkveld 
V.  Capital  Ins.  Co.  (1895),  95  la.  504,  64 
N.  W.  594. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  in  some 
States  that  waiver  need  not  be  pleaded, 
but  may  be  shown  under  an  allegation  of 
full  performance :  Foster  v.  Fidelity,  etc. 
Co.  of  New  York  (1898),  99  Wis.  447,  75 
N.  W.  69;  Stephens  r.  Union   Assurance 


Co.  (1897),  16  Utah,  22,  50  Pac.  626  ;  Duff 
V.  Fire  As.s'n  (1895),  129  Mo.  460,  .30  S.  W. 
1034;  James  v.  Mutual  Life  Ass'n  (1899), 
148  Mo.  1,  49  S.  W.  978 ;  Nickell  v.  Plianix 
Ins.  Co.  (1898),  144  Mo.  420,  46  S.  W.  435  ; 
McCullough  V.  Plioenix  Ins.  Co.,  113  Mo. 
606 ;  West  v.  Norwich  Union  Fire  Ins. 
Co.  (1894),  10  Utah,  442,  37  Pac.  685. 

See  also  Reisz  v.  Supreme  Council 
(1899),  103  Wi.s.  427,  79  N.  W.  430,  hold- 
ing that  the  introduction  of  evidence  of 
waiver  where  same  is  not  pleaded  is  not 
material  error.  Also  Deuster  v.  Mittag 
(1900),  105  Wis.  459,  81  N.  W.  643. 

It  is  proper  to  plead  a  waiver  as  such 
rather  tium  to  set  up  the  matters  which 
give  rise  to  it  by  way  of  est()p[)el :  Hughes 
V.  Lansing  (1898),  34  Ore.  118,  55  Pac.  95. 
A  general  allegation  is  sufficient  if  not 
objected  to  seasonably :  Barrett  v.  Des 
Moines,  etc.  Ins.  Co.  (1903),  120  la.  184, 
94  N.   W.  473. 

Wantonness. 

This,  as  distinguished  from  negligence, 
must  be  alleged  in  order  to  admit  proof 
of  it :  Holwerson  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1900),  157  Mo.  216,  57  S.  W.  77o";  Mc- 
Clellan  v.  Chippewa  Valley  Elec.  Ry.  Co. 
(1901),  110  Wis.  326,  85  n!«W.  1018."  See 
Ullrich  V.  Cleveland,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1898), 
151  lud.  358,  51  N.  E.  95,  for  a  full  discus- 
sion of  the  facts  necessary  to  constitute  a 
good  complaint  on  the  ground  of  wilful 
killing.  See  also  Proctor  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.  (1901),  61  S.  C.  170,  39  S.  E.  351; 
Schumpert  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1903), 
—  S.  C.  — ,  43  S.  E.  813;  Stembridge  r. 
Southern  Ry.  Co.  (1903),  —  S.  C.  — ,  43 
S.  E.  968;  all  of  which  are  based  on  the 
act  of  1898,  which  allows  the  commingling 
in  one  count  of  acts  of  negligence  and 
wilful  wrong. 

In  Stembridge  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co. 
(1903),  —  S.  C.  — ,  43  S.  E.  968,  the 
court  said :  "  A  cause  of  action  for  puni- 
tive or  exemplary  damages  does  not  at  all 
consist  in  claiming  such  damages  eo  nomine, 
but  consists  in  a  statement  of  such  acts  of 
wanton  or  wilful  wrongs  as  would  justify 
the  imposition  of  such  damages  withiu 
the  sum  demanded  in  the  complaint." 

Written  Instrument. 

"  If  the  written  statement  was  the  basis 
of  the  appellant's  rights,  as  contended  iu 
his  behalf,  we  know  of  no  reason  for  ad- 


44 


690 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


mittiug  it  without  pleading  it,  either  in 
the  form  in  which  it  was  written,  or  fur 
enforcenieut  iu  a  reformed  condition  :  " 
Durrtinger  v.  Baker  (1897),  149  Ind.  375, 
49  N.  E.  276. 

"  Where  a  contract  consists  of  an  oral 
agreement,  a  part  of  which  only  has  been 
reduced  to  writing,  it  is  proper  to  allege 
iu  the  complaint,  as  a  basis  for  the  re- 
covery of  damages  resulting  from  its 
breach,  the  execution  of  a  parol  agree- 
ment :  "  American  Contract  Co.  f.  Bullen 


Bridge  Co.  (189G),  29  Ore.  549,  46  Pac. 
138. 

"  Where  the  allegations  in  a  pleading 
vary  from  the  provisions  of  the  instru- 
ment upon  wiiich  it  is  founded,  the  pro- 
visions of  such  instrument  control,  and 
such  allegations  will  be  disregarded  : " 
Citing  Stengel  i-.  Boyce,  143  Ind.  642; 
Harrison  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Lackey  (1897),  149 
Ind.  10,  48  N.  E.  254. 

See  cases  cited  under  Statute  of  Frauds, 
supra,  in  this  note. 


PKOVISIONS    KELATINa   TO    THE    ANSWER.  691 


CHAPTER  FOURTH. 

THE  DEFENSIVE  SUBJECT-MATTER  OF  THE  ACTION:  THE 
FORMAL  PRESENTATION  OF  HIS  DEFENCE,  OR  OF  HIS 
CLAIM  FOR  AFFIRMATIVE  RELIEF,  BY  THE  DEFENDANT. 

SECTION   FIRST. 
STATUTORY  PROVISIONS   CONCERNING   MATTERS   OF   DEFENCE. 

§472.  *581.  Statutory  Provisions  Relating  to  Answers.  I  CoUect 
together  in  one  group  all  the  sections  of  the  various  codes  relating 
to  the  nature  and  contents  of  the  answer,  including  denials, 
new  matter,  counter-claims,  set-offs,  affirmative  relief,  and  cross- 
complaints.  The  clause  defining  the  answer,  and  describing  its 
contents,  is  substantially  the  same,  Avith  some  unimportant  varia- 
tions, in  all  the  codes ;  the  principal,  and  indeed  only,  material 
differences  are  found  in  the  provisions  relating  to  counter-claims 
and  cross-demands  generally.  The  following  are  the  sections 
which  determine  generally  the  nature  of  the  answer  as  a  pleading. 

"  The  answer  of  the  defendant  must  contain,  1.  A  general  or 
specific  denial  of  each  material  allegation  of  the  complaint  con- 
troverted by  the  defendant,  or  of  any  knowledge  or  information 
thereof  sufficient  to  form  a  belief ;  2.  A  statement  of  any  new 
matter  constituting  a  defence  or  counter-claim  in  ordinary  and 
concise  language,  without  repetition."  In  a  few  States  the 
foregoing  description  is  employed,  with  slight  verbal  changes, 
and  to  it  is  added  another  subdivision.  The  sections,  as  found 
in  these  codes,  are  given  at  large  in  the  foot-note.^ 

1  [^Arizona.      "The   defendant   in    his  sue,    (7)  Denying   the   facts   constituting 

answer  may  plead  as  many  defences  as  he  the  cause  of  acti(jn,  (8)  Set-off  and  coun- 

may  have;  but  such  pleas  must  be  sepa-  ter-claiin."     Rev.  St.,  1901,  §  13.50. 
rately  stated  in  one  answer,  filed  at  the  Arkansas.    "  The  answer  shall  contain: 

same  time  and  in   the   following   order:  (1)  The  style  of  the  court  and  the  style  of 

(1)  Denying  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  the  action,  followed  by  the  word  '  answer.' 

(2)  In  abatement  of  the  suit,  (3)  To  But  where  there  are  several  plaintiffs  and 
strike  from  the  complaint  irrelevant,  re-  defendants,  it  shall  only  be  necessary  to 
dundant  or  uncertain  matter,  (4)  To  give  the  one  first  named  of  each  class,  with 
make  the  complaint  definite  and  certain,  the  words  '  and  others.'  (2)  A  denial  of 
(5)  Demurrer,     (6)  In  bar  of  the  right  to  each  allegation  of  the  complaint  coutro- 


692 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


^  473.     *  582.    Statutory  Provisions  Respecting  Union  of  Defences. 

The  provisions  relating  to  the  union  of  various  defences,  legal 


verted  by  the  defendant,  or  of  any  knowl- 
edge or  information  tliereof,  sutiicieiit  to 
form  a  belief.  (3)  A  statement  of  any 
new  matter  constituting  a  defence,  coun- 
ter-claim or  set-off,  in  ordinary  and  concise 
language,  without  repetition.  (4)  The  de- 
fendant may  set  forth  in  his  answer  ;is 
many  grounds  of  defence,  counter-claim 
and  set-off,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  as 
he  siiall  have.  Each  shall  be  distinctly 
stated  in  a  separate  paragraph,  and  num- 
bered. The  several  defences  must  refer 
to  the  causes  of  action  which  tliey  are  in- 
tended to  answer  in  a  manner  by  which 
they  may  be  intelligibly  distinguished." 
Sand.  &  kill's  Dig.,  §  .')7"22. 

CalifoiHin.  "  The  answer  of  the  de- 
fendant shall  contain:  (1)A  general  or 
specific  denial  of  the  material  allegations 
of  the  complaint  controverted  by  the  de- 
fendant, (i)  A  statement  of  any  new 
matter  cmistituting  a  defence  or  counter- 
claim. If  the  complaint  be  verified,  tlie 
denial  of  each  allegation  controverted 
must  he  specific,  and  be  made  positively, 
or  according  to  the  information  and  belief 
of  the  defendant.  If  the  defendant  has  no 
information  or  belief  upon  the  subject  suffi- 
cient to  enable  him  to  answer  an  allegation 
of  the  complaint,  he  may  so  state  iu  his 
answer,  and  jilace  his  denial  on  that 
ground.  If  the  complaint  be  not  verified, 
a  general  denial  is  sufficient,  but  only  puts 
in  issue  tiie  material  allegations  of  the 
complaint."     Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  4.37. 

Colorado.  "  The  answer  of  the  defend- 
ant shall  contain :  First,  a  general  or 
specific  denial  of  each  material  allegation 
in  the  complaint  intended  to  be  contro- 
verted by  the  defendant;  second,  a  state- 
ment of  any  new  matter  constituting  a 
defence,  or  counter-claim,  in  ordinary  and 
concise  language,  without  unnecessary 
repetition.  In  denying  any  allegation  in 
the  complaint  not  presumptively  witliin 
the  knowledge  of  the  defendant,  it  shall 
be  sufficient  to  put  sucli  allegations  in 
issue,  for  the  defendant  to  state,  as  to  such 
allegation,  that  he  has  not  and  cannot 
obtain  sufficient  knowledge  or  information 
upon  which  to  base  a  belief."  Code,  1890, 
§  •'•)6. 


Connertiad,  "  The  defendant  in  his  an- 
swer shall  specially  deny  such  allegations 
of  the  complaint  as  he  intenils  to  contro- 
vert, admitting  the  truth  of  the  other 
allegations,  unless  he  intends,  in  good 
faith,  to  ccmtrovert  all  the  allegations,  in 
wliich  case  he  may  deny  them  generally, 
as  follows :  '  The  defendant  denies  the 
truth  of  the  matters  contained  in  the 
plaintiff's  complaint.'  He  may  also,  iu 
his  answer,  state  special  matters  of  de- 
fence, and  shall  not  give  in  evidence  matter 
in  avoidance,  or  of  defence,  consistent  with 
the  truth  of  the  material  allegations  oftiie 
complaint,  unless  in  his  answer  he  states 
such  matter  specially.  Under  a  general 
denial  the  jdaiutiff  shall  be  bound  to  prove 
the  material  facts  alleged  in  the  complaint. 
If  the  defendant  intends  to  controvert  the 
right  of  the  ]daiiitiff  to  sue  as  an  executor, 
or  as  trustee,  or  in  any  other  representa- 
tive capacity,  or  as  a  corporation,  or  to  con- 
trovert the  execution  or  delivery  of  any 
written  instrument  or  recognizance  sued 
upon,  he  shall  deny  the  same  in  his  answer 
specifically."     Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  609. 

(leorijiu.  "A  defendant  may  either  de- 
mur, plead  or  answer  to  the  petition,  or 
may  file  one  or  more,  or  all  of  these  de- 
fences at  once,  without  waiving  the  benefit 
of  either,  or  he  may  file  two  or  more  pleas 
to  the  same  action.  In  all  cases  demurrer, 
pleas  and  answer  shall  be  disposed  of  in 
the  order  named ;  and  all  demurrers  and 
pleas  shall  be  filed  and  determined  at  the 
first  term,  unless  continued  by  the  court, 
or  by  consent  of  parties."  "  In  all  cases 
when  the  defendant  desires  to  make  a  de- 
fence by  plea  or  otherwise  he  shall  therein 
distinctly  answer  each  paragraph  of  plain- 
tiff's petition,  and  shall  not  file  a  more 
general  denial,  commonly  known  as  the 
plea  of  '  general  issue.'  He  may  in  a 
sin^rle  jiaragraph  deny  any  or  all  of  the 
allegations,  or  in  a  single  j)aragraph  admit 
any  or  all  of  the  allegations  in  any  or  all  of 
the  paragraphs  of  the  })etition."  "  Under 
a  denial  of  the  allegations  of  tlie  plaintiff's 
declaration,  no  other  defence  is  admissiblo 
except  such  as  disproves  the  ])laintiff's 
cause  of  action  ;  all  otlier  matters  in  satis- 
faction  or   avoidance    must   be   specially 


rROVlSIONS   RELATING    TO    THE    ANSWER. 


693 


or  equitable,  or  botli,  and  of  various  counter-claims,  in  the  same 
answer,  are  similar  in  all  the  codes,  with  unimportant  variations, 


pleaded."  Code,  1895,  §§  5047,  5051, 
5053. 

Idaho.  Identical  with  the  California 
Statute.     Code  Civ.  Pro.,  I'.lOl,  §  3211. 

Indiana.  "  The  an.swer  .shall  contain  — 
First.  A  denial  of  each  allegation  of  the 
complaint  controverted  by  tlie  defendant. 
Second.  A  statement  of  any  new  matter 
constituting  a  defence,  counter-claim  or 
set-off,  in  plain  and  concise  language. 
Third.  The  defendant  may  set  forth  in 
his  answer  as  many  grounds  of  defence, 
counter-claim,  and  set-off,  whether  legal 
or  equitable,  as  he  shall  have.  Each  shall 
be  distinctly  stated  in  a  separate  para- 
graph, and  numbered,  and  clearly  refer 
to  the  cause  of  action  intended  to  be  an- 
swered."    Burns'  St ,  1901,  §  350. 

Iowa.  "  The  answer  shall  contain : 
(1)  The  name  of  the  court  and  county, 
and  of  the  plaintiffs  and  defendants,  but 
when  there  are  several  plaintiffs  and  de- 
fendants it  sliall  only  be  necessary  to  give 
the  first  name  of  each  class,  with  the  words 
'  and  others ; '  (2)  A  general  denial  of 
each  allegation  of  the  petition,  or  of  any 
knowledge  or  information  thereof  sutH- 
cient  to  form  a  belief  ;  (3)  A  special  denial 
of  each  allegation  of  the  petition  contro- 
verted by  the  defendant,  or  of  any  knowl- 
edge or  information  thereof  suthcient  to 
form  a  belief;  (4)  A  statement  of  any  new 
matter  constituting  a  defence;  (5)  A  .state- 
ment of  any  new  matter  constituting  a 
counter-claim.  The  defendant  may  set 
forth  in  his  answer  as  many  causes  of  de- 
fence or  counter-claim,  whether  legal  or 
equitable,  as  he  may  have.  "  Code,  1897, 
§  3566. 

Kansas.  "  The  answer  shall  contain  : 
First,  A  general  or  specific  denial  of  each 
material  allegation  of  the  petition  con- 
troverted by  the  defendant.  Second,  A 
statement  of  any  new  matter  constituting 
a  defence,  counter-claim  or  set-off,  or  a 
right  to  relief  concerning  the  subject  of 
the  action,  in  ordinary  and  concise  lan- 
guage, and  without  repetition.  Third, 
When  relief  is  sought,  the  nature  of  the 
relief  to  which  the  defendant  supposes 
himself  entitled.  The  defendant  may  set 
forth  in  his  answer  as  many  grounds  of 


defence,  counter-claim,  set-off,  and  for  re- 
lief, as  he  may  have,  whetiier  they  be  sucli 
as  have  been  heretofore  denominated  legal 
or  equitable,  or  both.  Each  must  be  sep- 
arately stated  and  numbered,  and  they 
must  refer  in  an  intelligible  manner  to  the 
causes  of  action  wliicli  they  are  intended 
to  answer.  "     Code,  1901,  §  94. 

Kentucki/.  "  The  answer  may  contain 
—  (1)  A  traverse.  (2)  A  statement  of  facts 
which  constitute  an  estoppel  against,  or 
avoidance  of,  a  cause  of  action  stated  in 
the  petition.  (3)  A  statement  of  facts 
which  constitute  a  set-off  or  counter-claim. 
(4)  A  cross-petition. "  Code,  1895,  §95. 

Minnesota.  "  The  answer  of  the  de- 
fendant shall  contain :  First.  A  denial  of 
each  allegation  of  the  complaint  contro- 
verted by  the  defendant,  or  of  any  knowl- 
edge or  information  thereof  sutiicient  to 
form  a  belief;  Second.  A  statement  of  any 
new  matter  constituting  a  defence  or 
counter-claim,  in  ordinary  and  concise  lan- 
guage, without  repetition.  Third.  All 
equities  existing  at  the  time  of  the  com- 
mencement of  any  action,  in  favor  of  a 
defendant  therein,  or  discovered  to  exist 
after  such  commencement,  or  intervening 
before  a  final  decision  in  such  action. 
And  if  the  same  are  admitted  by  the 
plaintiff,  or  the  issue  thereon  is  determined 
in  favor  of  the  defendant,  he  shall  be  en- 
titled to  such  relief,  equitable  or  other- 
wise, as  the  nature  of  the  case  demands, 
by  judgment  or  otherwise."  St.,  1894, 
§5236. 

Missouri.  Same  as  the  provisions 
quoted  in  the  text.     Rev.  St.,  1899,  §604. 

Montana.  "The  answer  of  the  de- 
fendant must  contain:  (1)  A  general  or 
specific  denial  of  each  material  allegation 
of  the  complaint  controverted  by  the  de- 
fendant, or  of  any  knowledge  or  informa- 
tion thereof  sufficient  to  form  a  belief,  or 
a  specific  admission  or  denial  of  some  of 
the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  and  also 
a  general  denial  of  all  the  allegations  of 
the  complaint  not  specifically  admitted  or 
denied  in  the  answer.  (2)  A  statement 
of  any  new  matter  constituting  a  defence 
or  counter-claim."     Code,  1895,  §690. 

Nebraska.    "  The  answer  shall  contain : 


694 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


and  are  as  follows :  "  The  defendant  may  set  forth,  b}-  answer,  as 
many  defences  and  counter-claims  as  he  may  have,  \Yhethcr  they 


First  —  A  general  or  specific  denial  of 
each  material  allegation  of  the  petition 
controverted  by  the  defendant.  Second  — 
A  statement  of  any  new  matter  constituting 
a  ilefeuce,  counter-claim  or  set-off,  in  or- 
dinary and  concise  language,  and  without 
repetition."  "The  defendant  may  set 
forth  in  his  answer  as  many  grounds  of 
defence,  counter-claim  and  set-off  as  he 
may  have.  Each  must  be  separately 
stated  and  numbered  and  they  must  refer 
in  an  intelligil)le  manner  to  the  cause  of 
action  which  they  are  intended  to  answer." 
Code,  1901,  §§99,  100. 

Nevadn.  "  The  answer  of  the  defendant 
shall  contain:  First — If  the  complaint 
be  verified,  a  special  denial  of  each  alle- 
gation of  the  complaint,  controverted  by 
the  defendant,  or  a  denial  thereof  accord- 
ing tolas  information  and  belief;  if  the 
complaint  be  not  verified,  then  a  general 
denial  to  each  of  such  allegations ;  but  a 
general  denial  shall  only  put  in  issue  the 
material  and  express  allegations  of  tlie 
complaint.  Second  —  A  statement  of  any 
new  matter  or  counter-claim,  constituting 
a  defence,  in  ordinary  and  concise  lan- 
guage."    Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §3141. 

New  York.  Identical  with  the  provis- 
ions quoted  in  the  text.  Code  Civ.  Fro., 
§500. 

North  Carolina.  Identical  with  the 
provisions  quoted  in  the  text.  Code,  §  100. 

North  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
visions quoted  in  the  text.  Rev.  Codes, 
1899,  %:y2-3. 

Ohio.  "  The  answer  shall  contain  — 
(I)  A  general  or  specific  denial  of  each 
material  allegation  of  the  petition  contro- 
verted by  the  defendant.  (2)  A  statement 
of  any  new  matter  constituting  a  defence, 
counterclaim,  or  set-off,  in  ordinary  and 
concise  language.  (3)  When  a  defendant 
seeks  affirmative  relief  therein,  a  demand 
for  the  relief  to  which  he  suppo.ses  him.self 
entitled."  "The  defendant  may  set  forth 
in  his  answer  iis  many  grounds  of  defence, 
counter-claim,  and  set-off  as  he  may  have, 
whether  tliey  are  such  as  have  heretofore 
ticen  denominated  legal  or  equitable,  or 
both ;  but  tlie  several  defences  nmst  be 
consistent  with  each  other,  and  each  must 


refer  in  an  intelligible  manner  to  the 
cause  of  action  which  it  is  intended  to  an- 
swer." "  When  tiie  answer  contains  more 
tlian  one  defence,  counter-claim,  or  set-off, 
they  must  be  separately  stated  and  consecu- 
tively numbered."  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §§  50GG, 
5067,  5068. 

Oklahoma.  Identical  with  the  Kansas 
statute.     St.,  1893.  §3972. 

Oregon.  "  The  answer  of  the  defendant 
shall  contain,  —  (I)  A  specific  denial  of 
each  material  allegation  of  the  complaint 
controverted  by  the  defendant,  or  of  any 
knowledge  or  information  thereof  suffi- 
cient to  form  a  belief.  (2)  A  statement  of 
any  new  matter  constituting  a  defence  or 
counter-claim,  in  ordinary  and  concise  lan- 
guage without  repetition."  Hill's  Laws, 
§72. 

South  Carolina.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
vi.sions  quoted  in  the  text.  Code,  1893, 
§  ITO. 

Soutli  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
visions quoted  in  the  text.  Ann.  St.,  1901, 
§  6120. 

Utah.  Identical  with  the  Montana 
statute.     Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2968. 

Washington.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
visions quoted  in  the  text.  Bal.  Code, 
§  4912. 

Wisroiixin.  Identical  with  tlie  provis- 
ions quoted  in  the  text.     St.,  1898,  §  2655. 

Wgoming.  "The  answer  shall  contain  : 
(1)  A  general  or  specific  denial  of  each 
material  allegation  of  the  petition  con- 
troverted by  the  defendant  ^  (2)  a  state- 
ment of  any  new  matter  constituting  a 
defence,  counter-claim  or  set-off,  in  ordi- 
nary and  concise  language."  "  The  defend- 
ant may  set  forth  in  his  answer  as  many 
grounds  of  defence,  counter-claim  and  set- 
off, as  he  has,  whether  they  are  such  as 
have  been  heretofore  denominated  legal  or 
e(mitab]e,  or  both  ;  he  may  claim  therein 
relief  toucliing  the  matters  in  question  in 
the  ])etition  against  the  plaintiff,  or  against 
other  defendants  in  the  same  action  ;  ami 
each  must  be  separately  stated  and  num- 
bered, and  they  must  refer  in  an  intelligibh- 
manner  to  the  causes  of  action  which  tliey 
are  intended  to  answer."  Rev.  St.,  1899, 
§§  3543,  3544.] 


PROVISIONS   RELATING   TO   THE    ANSWER. 


695 


be  such  as  have  been  heretofore  denominated  legal  or  equitable, 
or  both.  They  must  each  be  separately  stated,  and  refer  to  the 
causes  of  action  which  they  are  intended  to  answer,  in  such 
manner  that  they  may  be  intelligibly  distinguished."  Another 
form  found  in  several  codes  is,  "  Tlie  defendant  may  set  forth,  by 
answer,  as  many  grounds  of  defence,  counter-claim,  or  set-off,  as 
he  may  have,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  or  both."  ^ 


1  \^Arizona.     See  note  to  §  *  581 ,  supra. 

Arkansas.     See  note  to  §  *  581,  supra. 

California.  "  The  defendant  may  set 
forth  by  answer  as  many  defences  and 
counter-claims  as  he  may  have.  They 
must  be  separately  stated,  and  the  several 
defences  must  refer  to  the  causes  of  action 
which  they  are  intended  to  answer,  in  a 
manner  by  which  they  may  be  intelligibly 
distinguished.  The  defendant  may  also 
answer  one  or  more  of  the  several  cau.ses 
of  action  stated  in  the  complaint  and  de- 
mur to  the  residue."  Code  Civ.  Pro., 
§441. 

Colorado.  "  The  defendant  may  set 
forth  by  answer  as  many  defences  and 
counter-claims  as  he  may  have,  whether 
the  subject  matter  of  such  defences  be 
such  as  was  heretofore  denominated  legal 
or  equitable,  or  both,  they  sliall  be  sep- 
arately stated,  and  the  several  defences 
shall  refer  to  the  causes  of  action  which 
they  are  intended  to  answer  in  a  manner 
by  which  they  may  be  intelligibly  distin- 
guished."    Code,  1890,  §  59. 

Connecticut.  See  note  to  §  *  b%l,  supra. 
Also  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  612.  These  pro- 
visions differ  widely  from  those  in  most 
of  the  code  States  ;  Georgia.  See  note  to 
§  581,  s«/)ra,-  Idaho.  Identical  with  the 
California  statute.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901, 
§  3215;  Indiana.  See  note  to  §  *581, 
supra. 

Iowa.  See  note  to  §*581,  supra. 
"Each  affirmative  defence  shall  be  stated 
in  a  distinct  division  of  the  answer,  and 
must  be  sufficient  in  itself,  and  must  intel- 
ligibly refer  to  that  part  of  the  petition  to 
which  it  is  intended  to  apply."  Code, 
1897.  §  .3568. 

Kansas.     See  note  to  §  *581,  supra. 

Kentnckij.  "  (2)  A  pleading  may  con- 
tain statements  of  as  many  causes  of  ac- 
tion, legal  or  equitable,  and  of  as  many 
matters   of  estoppel    and    of    avoidance. 


legal  or  equitable,  total  or  partial ;  and 
may  make  as  many  traverses ;  and  may 
present  as  many  demurrers,  as  there  may 
be  grounds  for  in  behalf  of  the  pleader. 

(3)  If  there  be  more  than  one,  eacli  must 
be  distinctly  stated  in  a  separate,  num- 
bered paragraph;  and  either,  which  is 
intended  to  respond  to  part  only  of  an 
adverse  pleading,  must  show  to  what  part 
it  is  responsive.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
court,  upon  or  without  motion,  to  enforce 
these  provisions ;  and  for  that  purpose,  to 
dismiss  an  action  without  prejudice,  or  to 
strike  a  pleading,  or  any  part  thereof, 
from  the  case,  or  to  allow  a  new  pleading. 

(4)  If,  however,  a  party  file  a  pleading 
which  contains  inconsistent  statements,  or 
statements  inconsistent  with  those  of  a 
pleading  previously  filed  by  him  in  the 
action,  he  shall,  upon  or  without  motion, 
be  required  to  elect  which  of  them  shall 
be  stricken  from  his  pleading.  But  a 
party  may  allege,  alternatively,  the  ex- 
istence of  one  or  another  fact,  if  he  state 
that  one  of  them  is  true,  and  that  he  does 
not  know  which  of  them  is  true.  .  .  . 
(7)  A  traverse  is  a  denial,  by  a  party,  of 
facts  alleged  in  an  adverse  pleading,  if 
they  be  presumptively  within  his  knowl- 
edge ;  or  a  denial  of  them,  or  a  denial 
that  he  has  sufficient  knowledge  or  infor- 
mation to  form  a  belief  concerning  them, 
if  they  be  not  presumptively  within  his 
knowledge."     Code,  1895,  §  113. 

Minnesota.  Identical,  with  very  slight 
verbal  changes,  with  the  California  stat- 
ute.    St.,  1894,  §  5239. 

3Iissouri.  "The  defendant  may  set 
forth  by  answer  as  many  defences  and 
counter-claims  as  he  may  have,  whether 
they  be  such  as  have  been  heretofore  de- 
nominated legal  or  equitable,  or  both. 
They  must  each  be  separately  stated,  in 
such  manner  that  they  may  be  intelligibly 
distinguished,  and  refer  to  the  cause  of  ac 


696 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


§  474.  *  583.  Same  Subject.  Most  of  the  cocles  are  in  substan- 
tial agreement  as  to  the  nature  and  object  of  the  counter-claim. 
In  a  few,  however,  there  is  a  departure  from  this  common  type ; 
and  in  some  there  are  special  clauses  relating  to  set-off  as  a  form 
of  defence  different  from  the  counter-claim.  All  these  statutory- 
provisions  are  collected  in  the  text  or  in  the  notes.  The  following 
definition  has  been  adopted  in  a  majority  of  the  States :  "  The 
counter-claim  mentioned  in  the  last  section  must  be  one  existing 
in  favor  of  a  defendant  and  against  a  plaintiff  between  whom  a 
several  judgment  might  be  had  in  the  action,  and  arising  out  of 
one  of  the  following  causes  of  action:  1.  A  cause  of  action  aris- 
ing out  of  the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint 
as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action;  2.  In  an  action  arising  on  contract,  any 
other  cause  of  action  arising  also  on  contract,  and  existing 
at  the  commencement  of  the  action."'  The  corresponding 
sections  in  the  codes  of  Indiana  and  of  Iowa  are,  however, 
quite  different,  and  are  given  at  length  in  the  foot-note.  It 
will  be  seen  that  they  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  counter-claim, 


tion  which  they  are  intended  to  answer." 
Part  of  §  605,  Rev.  St.,  1899. 

Montana.  "  A  defendant  may  set 
forth,  in  his  answer,  as  many  defences  or 
counter-claims,  or  both,  as  he  has,  whether 
they  are  such  as  were  formerly  denomi- 
nated legal  or  equitable.  Each  defence  or 
counter-claim  must  be  separately  .stated 
and  numbered.  Unless  it  is  interposed  as 
an  answer  to  the  entire  complaint,  it  must 
distinctly  refer  to  the  cause  of  action 
wbich  it  is  intended  to  answer."  Code, 
1895,  §  699. 

Nebraska.     See  note  to  §  *581,  su/ira. 

Nevada.  Identical  with  the  first  two 
sentences  of  the  California  statute.  Comp. 
Laws,  1900,  §  3144. 

New  York.  Identical  with  the  Montana 
statute.     Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  507. 

North  Carolina.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
vision first  quoted  in  the  text.    Code,  §  102. 

North  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
vision first  quoted  in  the  text.  Rev.  Codes, 
1899,  §  5274,  subdiv.  2. 

Ohio.     See  note  to  §  *581,  supra. 

Oklahoma.     See  note  to  §  *581,  supra. 

Oretjon.  Iilentical,  except  for  very  slight 
verbal   changes,    with    the    first  two  sen- 


tences of  the  California  statute.      Hill's 
Laws,  §  73,  subdiv.  2. 

South  Carolina.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
vision first  quoted  in  the  text.  Code,  1893, 
§171,  subdiv.  2. 

South  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
vision first  quoted  in  the  text.  Ann.  St., 
1901,  §  6121,  subdiv.  2. 

Utah.  "  The  defendant  may  set  forth 
b}'  answer  as  many  defences  and  counter- 
claims, legal  or  equitable,  or  both,  as  he 
may  have.  They  must  be  separately 
stated,  and  the  several  defences  mnst  re- 
fer to  the  causes  of  action  whicii  they  are 
intended  to  answer  in  a  manner  by  which 
they  may  be  intelligibly  distinguished. 
Thedefendant  mayalso  answer  one  or  more 
of  the  several  causes  of  action  stated  in 
the  complaint  and  demur  to  the  residue, 
or  may  demur  and  answer  at  the  same 
time."     Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2972. 

Wnshinfjton.  Identical  with  the  pro- 
vision first  quoted  in  the  text.  Bal.  Code, 
§  4913a. 

Wisconsin.     Identical,  except  for  a  very 
slight  verbal  change,  with  the  provision  first 
quoted  in  the  text.     St.,  1898,  §  2657. 
Wijoviing.     See  note  to  §  *  581,  sapra.~\ 


PEOVISIONS   EELATING    TO   THE   ANSWER. 


697 


and  that,   in  Iowa,  the  restriction   as   to   parties    is  very  much 
inoditied.  ^ 


1  l^Arlzona.  See  Rev.  St.,  1901,  §§  1360, 
13(j3,  1365,  1366,  which  relate  to  couuter- 
claiins,  but  differ  radically  fi'oiu  tiie  pro- 
visiou.s  quotetl  iu  tlie  te.xt. 

Aikimsus.  "  Tiie  counter-claim  meh- 
tioucd  iu  this  chapter  must  be  a  cause  of 
actiou  iu  favor  of  the  defendants,  or  some 
of  them,  against  the  plaintiffs,  or  some  of 
tiiem,  arising  out  of  the  contract  or  trans- 
action set  forth  in  the  complaint,  as  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim  or  con- 
nected with  the  .subject  of  the  action." 
Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §'  5723. 

California.  Identical  with  the  provis- 
ions ([uoted  in  the  text.  Code  Civ.  Pro., 
§  438. 

Colorado.  "  The  counter-claim  men- 
tioned in  the  last  .section  .sliall  be  one  ex- 
isting in  favor  of  the  defendant  or  plaintiff, 
and  against  a  plaintiff  or  defendant  be- 
tween whom  a  several  judgment  might  be 
had  in  the  action,  and  arising  out  of  one 
of  the  following  causes  of  action  :  First,  a 
cause  of  actiou  arising  out  of  the  transac- 
tion set  forth  in  the  complaint  or  answer, 
as  the  foundation  of  tlie  plaintiff's  claim 
or  the  defendant's  defence,  or  connected 
with  tlie  subject  of  the  action.  Second 
[|same  as  subdivision  2  of  text]"  Code, 
1890,  §57. 

Connecticut.  "  In  cases  where  the  de- 
fendant has  either  in  law  or  in  equity,  or 
in  both,  a  counter-claim,  or  right  of  set- 
off, agaiust  the  plaintiff's  demand,  he  may 
have  the  benefit  of  any  such  set-offs  or 
counter-claims  by  pleading  the  same,  as 
such,  in  his  answer,  and  demanding  judg- 
ment accordingly ;  and  the  .same  shall  be 
pleaded  and  replied  to,  according  to  tlie 
rules  governing  complaints  and  answers ; 
provided  that  no  counter-claim,  set-off,  or 
defense,  merely  equitable,  shall  be  available 
in  actions  before  justices  of  the  peace." 
Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  612. 

Idaho.  Identical  with  the  provisions 
set  out  in  the  text.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901, 
§  3212. 

Indiana.  "  A  counter-claim  is  any  mat- 
ter ari.sing  out  of  or  connected  with  the 
cause  of  action  which  might  be  the  subject 
of  au  action  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  or 
whicii  woulil  tend  to  reduce  the  plaintiff's 


claim  or  demand  for  damages."     Burns' 
St.,  1901,  §  353. 

Iowa.  "  Kach  counter-claim  must  be 
stated  in  a  distinct  count  or  division,  and 
must  be  :  (I)  When  the  action  is  founded 
on  contract,  a  cau.se  of  action  also  arising 
on  contract,  or  ascertained  by  the  decision 
of  a  court;  (2)  A  cause  of  action  in  favor 
of  the  defendants,  or  some  of  them,  against 
the  plaintiff's,  or  some  of  them,  arising  out 
of  the  contracts  or  transactions  set  forth 
in  the  petition  or  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject of  the  actiou  ;  (3)  Any  new  matter 
constituting  a  cause  of  action  in  favor  of 
the  defendant,  or  all  of  the  defendants  if 
more  than  one,  against  the  plaintiff,  or  all 
of  the  plaintiffs  if  more  than  one,  and 
which  the  defendant  or  defendants  might 
have  brought  when  suit  was  commenced, 
or  which  was  then  held,  either  matured  or 
not,  if  matured  when  so  plead."  Code, 
1897,  §  3570. 

Kansas.  "  The  counter-claim  mentioned 
in  the  last  section  must  be  one  existing  in 
favor  of  a  defeiuiant  and  against  a  plain- 
tiff between  whom  a  several  judgment 
might  be  had  in  the  action,  and  arising 
out  of  the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth 
in  the  petition  as  the  foundation  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim,  or  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action.  The  right  to  relief 
concerning  the  subject  of  the  action  men- 
tioned in  the  same  section  must  be  a  right 
to  relief  necessarily  or  properly  involved 
in  the  action  for  a  complete  determination 
thereof,  or  settlement  of  the  question  in- 
volved therein."     Code,  1901,  §  94. 

Kentuckij.  "  A  counter-claim  is  a  cause 
of  action  in  favor  of  a  defendant  against 
a  plaintiff,  or  against  him  and  another, 
which  arises  out  of  the  contract,  or  trans- 
action, stated  in  the  petition  as  the  foun- 
dation of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  which  is 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action." 
Code,  1895,  §  96. 

Minnesota.      Identical  with  the   provi- 
sions quoted  in  the  text.     St.,  1894,  §  5237. 
Missouri.     Identical  with  the  provisions 
quoted  in  the  text.     Rev.  St.,  1899.  §  605. 

Montana.  "  The  counterclaim  speci- 
fied in  the  last  section  must  tend,  in  some 
way,  to  diminish  or  defeat  the  plaintiff's 


698 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§475.  *  584.  Statutes  Providing  for  Set-off.  The  "  Set-off,"  well 
known  prior  to  the  new  system  of  procedure,  and  which  had  been 
defined  and  regulated  by  previous  statutes,  English  and  Ameri- 
can, is  clearly  embraced  within  the  second  subdivision  of  the  sec- 
tion, as  stated  in  the  text,  and  as  found  in  the  codes  of  New  York 
and  of  the  States  which  have  closely  followed  that  original  type. 
In  certain  States,  however,  a  special  provision  is  inserted  in  the 
codes  defining  the  "set-of¥,"  of  which  the  following  is  the  common 
form :  "  A  set-off  can  only  be  pleaded  in  an  action  founded  on 
contract,  and  must  be  a  cause  of  action  arising  on  contract,  or 


recovery,  and  must  he  one  of  the  following 
causes  of  action  against  the  plaintiff,  or, 
in  a  proper  case,  against  the  person  whom 
he  represents,  and  iu  favor  of  the  defend- 
ant, or  of  one  or  more  defendants,  between 
•whom  and  the  plaintiff  a  separate  judg- 
ment may  lie  had  in  the  action.  [^The  re- 
mainder practically  identical  with  the  two 
subdivisions  quoted  iu  the  text.]"  Code, 
1895,  §  691. 

Nebrask-a.  "  The  counter-claim  men- 
tioned in  the  last  section  must  be  one  e.x- 
istiiig  in  favor  of  a  defendant,  and  against 
a  plaintiff,  between  whom  a  several  judg- 
ment might  be  had  in  the  action,  and 
arising  out  of  the  contract  or  transaction 
set  forth  in  the  petition  as  the  foundation 
of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  connected  with 
the  subject  of  the  action."  Code,  1901^ 
§  101. 

Nevada.  Identical  with  the  statute 
set  out  in  the  text.  Comp.  Laws,  1900, 
§3142. 

New  York.  Identical  with  the  Mon- 
tana statute.     Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  .'iOl. 

North  Carolina.  Identical  with  the 
statute  set  out   in  the  text.     §   101. 

North  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  stat- 
ute set  out  in  the  text.  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
§  5274. 

Ohio.  "  A  counter-claim  is  a  cause  of 
action  existing  in  favor  of  a  defendant,  and 
against  a  plaintiff  or  another  defendant,  or 
both,  between  whom  a  several  judgment 
might  be  had  in  the  action,  and  arising  out 
of  the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in 
the  petition  as  the  foundation  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim,  or  connected  with  the  subject 
of  the  action."     Bates'  St.,  1903.  §  5069. 

Oklahoma.  Identical  with  the  Kansas 
statute.     St.,  1893,  §  3973. 


Oregon.  "  The  counter-claim  mentioned 
in  section  72  must  be  one  existing  in  favor 
of  a  defendant,  and  against  a  plaintiff, 
between  whom  a  several  judgment  might 
be  had  in  the  action,  and  arising  out  of 
one  of  the  following  causes  of  action : 
(1)  A  cause  of  action  arising  out  of  the 
contract,  or  transaction  set  forth  in  the 
complaint  as  the  foundation  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim;  (2)  In  an  action  arising  on 
contract,  any  other  cau.se  of  action  arising 
also  on  contract,  and  existing  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  action."  Hill's  Laws, 
§  73. 

South  Carolina.  Identical  with  the 
.statute  set  out  in  the  text.  Code,  1893, 
§  171. 

Sonth  Dakota.  Identical  with  the  stat- 
ute set  out  in  the  text.  Ann.  St.,  1901' 
§  6121. 

Utah.  Identical  with  the  statute  set 
out  in  the  text.     Kev.  St.,  1898,  §  2969. 

Washington.  Identical  with  the  statute 
set  out  in  the  text.     Bal.  Code,  §  4913. 

Wisconsin.  Identical  with  the  statute 
set  out  in  the  text,  with  the  following 
clauses  added:  "3.  Where  the  plaintiff 
is  a  non-resident  of  the  State  any  cause  of 
action  whatever,  arising  within  the  State 
and  existing  at  tlie  commencement  of  the 
action,  except  that  no  claim  assigned  to 
the  defendant  shall  be  jdeaded  by  virtue 
alone  of  this  subdivision.  But  each  coun- 
ter-claim' sliall  be  pleaded  as  such  and  be 
so  denominated,  and  the  answer  shall  con- 
tain a  demand  of  the  judgment  to  which 
the  defendant  supposes  himself  to  be 
entitled  by  reason  of  the  counter-claim 
therein."     St.,  1898,  §  2656. 

Wjiomiiiij.  Identical  with  the  Nebraska 
statute.     Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  3545-3 


PKOVISIONS    KELATING   TO    THE   ANSWER. 


699 


ascertained  by  a  decision  of  tlie  court."  ^  There  are  additional 
special  clauses  in  several  of  these  codes  regulating  the  procedure 
in  respect  to  "  set-off  "  and  "  counter-claim,"  particularly  in  their 
relations  with  the  parties  to  the  action.  These  sections  provide 
for  the  bringing  in  of  new  parties  found  necessary  to  the  deter- 
mination of  the  issues  raised  by  the  defendant's  aflfirmative  plead- 
ing, or  for  the  extending  the  benefits  of  a  set-off  or  counter-claim 
existing  in  favor  of  a  principal  debtor,  to  his  sureties,  or  existing 
in  favor  of  one  of  two  or  more  joint  debtors,  to  the  others.  These 
sections  are  copied  in  the  note.^ 


1  {^Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig., 
§  5725;  Indiana,  Burns'  St.,  1901,  §  351  : 
"  A  set-off  .shall  be  allowed  only  in  actions 
for  money -demands  upon  contract,  and 
must  consist  of  matter  arising  out  of  debt, 
duty,  or  contract,  liquidated  or  not,  held 
by  the  defendant  at  the  time  the  suit  was 
commenced,  and  matured  at  or  before  the 
time  it  is  offered  as  a  set-off; "  Kentucky, 
Code,  1895,  §  96,  subdiv.  2 :  "A  set-off 
is  a  cause  of  action  arising  upon  a  con- 
tract, judgment  or  award  in  favor  of  a 
defendant  against  a  plaintiff,  or  against 
him  and  another ;  and  it  cannot  be 
pleaded  except  iu  an  action  upon  a  con- 
tract, judgment  or  award ; "  Kansas, 
Code,  1901,  §  98;  Nebraska,  Code,  1901. 
§  104;  Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5071  :  "  A 
set-off  is  a  cause  of  action  e.xisting  in  favor 
of  a  defendant,  and  against  a  plaintiff,  be- 
tween whom  a  several  judgment  miglit  be 
had  in  the  action,  and  arising  on  contract 
or  ascertained  by  the  decision  of  a  courti 
and  can  only  be  pleaded  iu  an  action 
founded  on  contract."  Oklahoma,  St.,  1893, 
§  3976  ;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §§4258-4264, 
where  the  subject  of  set-off  is  treated 
•with  considerable  detail ;  Wyoming,  Rev. 
St.,  1899,  §  3548.] 

^  \_Arkansas.  "  When  it  appears  that 
a  new  party  is  necessary  to  a  final  decision 
upon  the  counter-claim,  the  court  may 
either  permit  the  new  party  to  be  made 
by  a  summons,  to  reply  to  the  counter- 
claim in  the  answer,  or  may  direct  that  it 
be  stricken  out  of  the  answer  and  made 
the  subject  of  a  separate  action."  Sand.  & 
Hill's  Dig.,  §  5724.  "  Where  it  appears 
that  a  new  party  is  necessary  to  a  final 
decision  upon  the  set  off,  the  court  shall 


permit  the  new  party  to  be  made,  if  it  also 
appears  that,  owing  to  the  insolvency  or 
non-residence  of  the  plaintiff,  or  other 
cause,  the  defendant  will  be  iu  danger  of 
losing  his  claim,  unless  permitted  to  use  it 
as  a  set-off."     §  5729. 

Indiana.  "  In  all  actions  upon  a  note 
or  other  contract  against  several  defend- 
ants, any  one  of  whom  is  principal  and 
the  others  sureties  tlierein,  any  claim  u])on 
contract  in  favor  of  the  principal  defend- 
ant, and  against  the  plaintiff  or  any  former 
holder  of  the  note  or  other  contract,  may 
be  pleaded  as  a  set-off  by  the  principal  or 
any  other  defendant."  Burns'  St.,  1901, 
§  352. 

Iowa.  "  When  a  new  party  is  necessary 
to  a  final  decision  upon  a  counter-claim, 
the  court  may  either  permit  such  party  to 
be  made,  or  direct  that  it  be  stricken  out 
of  the  answer  and  made  the  subject  of  a 
separate  action  :  "  Code,  1897,  §  3573.  "  A 
co-maker  or  surety,  when  sued  alone,  may, 
with  the  consent  of  his  co-maker  or  prin- 
cipal, avail  himself  by  way  of  counter- 
claim of  a  debt  or  liquidated  demand  due 
from  the  plaintiff  at  the  commencement 
of  the  action  to  such  co-maker  or  prin- 
cipal, but  the  plaintiff  may  meet  such 
counter-claim  in  the  same  way  as  if  made 
by  the  co-maker  or  principal  himself :  " 
Code,  §  3572. 

Kansa.f.  Code,  1901,  §§  97,  99,  iden- 
tical, respectively,  to  the  Arkansas  statutes, 
§§  5724,  5729. 

Montana.     The  provisions  of  this  code, 

which   were   taken    from   the  New   York 

Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  are  very  detailed 

respecting  counter-claims.    See  §§  692-697. 

Nebraska.      Code,    1901,    §§    103,    105. 


700 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§  476.  *  585.  Statutory  Provisions  as  to  Cross-Complaints  and 
Sham  Answers.  A  cross-petitioii  or  complaint  is  expressly  au- 
thorized and  its  purposes  defined  [in  several  of  the  State  codes]  ;^ 
as,  for  example,  in  that  of  Iowa.  A  section  found  in  most  of  the 
codes  provides  that  "  sham  and  irrelevant  answers  and  defences 
may  be  stricken  out  on  motion,  and  upon  such  terms  as  the  court 
may  in  their  discretion  impose."  ^ 


identii-al,  respectively,    to   the   Arkansas 
statutes,  §§  5724,  5729. 

Aeic  Yurk.  See  Code  Civil  Procedure, 
§§  502-506,  for  very  detailed  statutory 
provisions  relative  to  counter-claims. 

Ohio.  Bates'  St.,  §§  5070,  5072,  iden- 
tical, respectively,  except  for  sli<^ht  verbal 
ciianges,  with  the  Arkansas  statutes, 
§§  5724,  5729. 

Oklahoma.  St.,  1893,  §§  3975,  3977, 
identical,  respectively,  except  for  a  slight 
verbal  change  in  the  former,  with  the 
Arkansas  statutes,  §§  5724,  5729. 

Wisconsin.  See  St.,  1898,  §§  4258- 
4264,  for  detailed  statutory  provisions 
relative  to  set-off. J 

1  \_Arkansiis.  "  When  a  defendant  has 
a  cause  of  action  against  a  co-det'eudaut  or 
a  person  not  a  party  to  tlie  action,  and 
affecting  the  suhjectinatter  of  the  action, 
he  may  make  his  answer  a  cross-complaint 
against  the  co-defendant  or  other  person." 
Two  other  subdivisions  provide  how  the 
defendant  to  such  cross-coin])laint  shall 
be  summoned,  how  defence  shall  be  made 
thereto,  and  that  the  trial  shall  not  be 
delaved  thereby.  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig., 
§  5712. 

California.  "  Whenever  the  defendant 
seeks  affirmative  relief  against  any  party 
relating  to  or  depending  upon  the  contract 
or  transaction  upon  which  the  action  is 
brought,  or  affecting  the  property  to  whicii 
the  action  relates,  he  may,  in  addition 
to  his  answer,  file  at  the  same  time,  or 
by  permission  of  the  court  subsequently, 
a  cross-complaint.  The  cross-complaint 
must  be  served  upon  the  parties  affected 
thereby,  and  such  parties  may  demur  or 
answer  thereto  as  to  the  original  com- 
plaint."    Code  Civ.  Pro  ,  §  442. 

Idaho.  Identical  with  the  California 
statute.     Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  §  3216. 

Iowa.  "  When  a  defendant  has  a  cause 
of  action  affecting  tlie  subject-matter  of 
the   action   against  a  co-defendant,   or  a 


person  not  a  party  to  the  action,  he  may, 
in  the  same  action,  file  a  cross-petition 
against  the  co-defendant  or  other  person." 
The  remainder  of  the  section  provides  for 
notifying  the  defendants,  and  that  the 
trial  shall  not  be  delayed.  Code,  1897, 
§  3574. 

Kentackij.  "  A  cross-petition  is  the 
commencement  of  an  action  by  a  defend- 
ant against  a  co-defendant,  or  a  person 
who  is  not  a  party  to  the  action,  or  against 
both;  or  by  a  ])laiutiff  against  a  co-plain- 
tiff, or  a  person  who  is  not  a  party  to  the 
action,  or  against  both  ;  and  is  not  allowed 
to  a  defendant,  except  uj)oii  a  cause  of  ac- 
tion which  affects,  or  is  affected  by,  the 
original  cause  of  action  ;  nor  to  a  plaintiff 
except  upon  a  cause  of  action  which  affects, 
or  is  affected  by,  a  set-off  or  counter-claim." 
Code,  1895,  §  96,  subdiv.  3. 

Utah.  "  When  a  defendant  has  a  cause 
of  action  affecting  the  sulijec^-inatter  of 
the  action  against  a  co-defendant,  he  may, 
in  the  same  action,  file  a  cross-complaint 
against  the  co-defendant."  The  remainder 
of  the  section  provides  for  serving  the  de- 
fendant and  that  the  trial  shall  not  be 
delayed.     Kev.  St.,  1898,  §  2974. 

Wiisconsin.  "  A  defendant  or  a  per- 
son interpleaded  or  intervening  may  have 
affirmative  relief  ag;uust  a  co-defendant, 
or  a  co-defendant  and  the  plaintiff,  or  a 
part  of  the  plaintiffs,  or  a  co-defendant  and 
a  person  not  a  party,  or  against  such  per- 
son alone,  upon  his  being  brought  in  ;  but 
in  all  such  cases  such  relief  must  involve 
or  in  some  manner  affect  the  contract, 
transaction,  or  property  whicli  is  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  action.  Such  relief  may 
be  demanded  in  the  answer,  which  must 
be  served  upon  the  ])arty,"  etc.,  providing 
rules  of  practice  in  respect  thereto.  St., 
1898,  §  2656  a.] 

2  New  York,  §  152  (.538) ;  Oregon,  §  74  ; 
California,  §  453;  North  Carolina.  §  104; 
l^.Vrizona,   Kev.    St.,    1901,  §1355;    Colo- 


PKOV-ISIONS    RELATING   TO   THE   ANSWER.  701 

§  477.  *  586.  Statutes  Allowing  Demurrer  to  Entire  Answer  or 
to  Separate  Defence  or  Counter-Claim.  All  the  codes  permit  the 
plaintiff  to  demur  to  the  entire  answer,  or  to  any  separate  defence, 
therein  containing  new  matter,  or  to  any  counter-claim  therein,  on 
the  ground  that  the  same  is  insufficient,  or  that  the  facts  therein 
stated  do  not  constitute  a  defence  or  a  counter-claim.^ 

§  478.  *  587.  Code  Provisions  Respecting  Reply.  In  respect  to 
the  mode  of  raising  an  issue  of  fact  upon  the  allegations  of  the 
answer  which  are  not  mere  denials,  the  codes  are  .separated  into 
two  classes,  —  those  which  require  an  additional  pleading  by  the 
plaintiff  in  order  to  raise  such  issues  in  all  instances,  and  those 
which  require  such  additional  pleading  only  in  response  to  counter- 
claims. In  the  first  class,  a  reply  by  the  plaintiff  is  needed  to  all 
answers  or  defences  that  set  up  new  matter,  whether  as  counter- 
claims or  as  defences  simply,  which  reply  may  consist  either  of 
denials  or  of  other  new  matter  by  way  of  avoidance.  As  a  conse- 
quence of  this  requirement,  every  allegation  of  new  matter  in  the 
answer,  whether  by  way  of  defence  or  of  counter-claim,  not  contro- 
verted by  a  reply,  is,  in  such  States,  admitted  to  be  true.  The  reph^ 
is  the  last  pleading  of  fact ;  the  defendant  may  demur  to  it,  but  not 
rejoin  any  defence  of  fact.  ^ 

rado,  Code,  1890,  §  60  ;  Idaho,  Code  Civ.  1893,  §  174  ;  South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901, 

Pro.,  1901,  §  3224;   Indiana,  Burns'   St.,  §6124;    Utah,    Rev.  St.,    1898,    §§    2976, 

1901,  §  385,  in  quite  different  form;  Iowa,  2977;    Washington.   Bal.    Code,   §    4916; 

Code,  1897,  §  3618  ;  Kentucky,  Code,  189.5,  Wisconsin,   St.,  1898,  §§  2658,  2659;   Wy- 

§   113,    subdiv.    8;    Minnesota,   St.,    1894,  oming.  Rev.  St.,  1899,  §§  3.541,  3542.] 

§  5240;  Missouri,    Rev.  St.,  1899,  §  611;  2  ["Colorado,  Code,  1890,  §60;  Connecti- 

Montana,  Code,  1895,   §   742;  North  Da-  cut.  Gen.  St.,  1902,  §  610 ;  Indiana,  Burns' 

kota.    Rev.  Codes,    1899,  §   5276;    South  St.,  1901,  §  360  ;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §  3576. 

Carolina,   Code,  1893,  §  173  ;    Soutli  Da-  requires  a  reply  in  case  of  counter-claim, 

kota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6123;  Utah,  Rev.  and  also  when  plaintiff  wishes  to  avail  him- 

St.,  1898,  §  2987  ;  Washington,  Bal.  Code,  self  of  matter  in  avoidance  ;  Kansas,  Code, 

§  4915  ;  Wisconsin,  St.,  1898,  §  2682.]  1901,  §  4536;  Kentucky,  Code,  189.5,  §  98; 

1  New  York,   §   153   (494,   514,    516);  Minnesota,    St.,    1894,    §5241;    Missouri, 

Kansas,  §102;  Nebraska,  §  109  ;  Oregon,  Rev.   St.,   1899,   §607;    Nebraska,  Code, 

§    76:    California,   §§   443,   444;     North  1901,  §109;    New  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro., 

Carolina,  §§  105,  176  ;  [^Arkansas,  Sand.  §§514,516,  provides  for  a  reply  in  case 

&    Hill's  Dig.,   §  5730 ;    Colorado,  Code,  of  a  counter-claim  and  also,  in  the  discre- 

1890,  §  60;   Idaho,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  1901,  tion  of  the  court,  on  defendant's  applica- 

§§  3217,  3218;  Indiana,  Burns' St.,  1901,  tion,  where  new  matter  in  defence  is  set 

§360;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §3575;   Minne-  up  in  the  answer;    North   Dakota,   Rev. 

sota,  St.,  1894,  §  5241  ;  Missouri,  Rev.  St.,  Codes,  1899,  §  5277,  .same  as  New  York ; 

1899,  §  607  ;  Montana,  Code,  1895,  §  710 ;  North  Carolina,  §  105,  same  as  New  York  ; 

Nevada,  Comp.  Laws,  1900,  §3145;  North  Ohio,  Bates'  St.,  1903,  §  5078;  Oklahoma, 

Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899,  §  5277;  Ohio,  St.,  1893,  §3980;  Oregon,  Hill's  Laws,  §  76; 

Bates' St.,  1903,  §§  5076,  5077  ;  Oklahoma,  South  Carolina,  Code,   1893,  §  174,  same 

St.,  1893,  §  3980;   South  Carolina,  Code,  as  New  York;    South  Dakota,  Ann.  St., 


702 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


§  479.  *  588.  Same  Subject.  Ill  the  secoiicl  class  of  codes,  a 
reply  is  only  necessary  to  a  comiter-claim,  ^Vlienever  an  answer 
contains  new  matter  by  way  of  defence,  and  not  constituting  a 
counter-claim,  an  issue  of  fact  is  raised  by  operation  of  law,  and 
the  plaintiff  may  prove,  in  response  thereto,  any  facts  by  way  of 
denial  or  of  confession  and  avoidance.  If  a  counter-claim  is 
pleaded,  the  plaintiff  must  reply  thereto  either  by  denials  or  by 
confession  and  avoidance  ;  and  in  the  absence  of  such  reply,  the 
allegations  of  the  counter-claim  are  admitted  to  be  true.  Xo  plead- 
ing is  permitted  in  response  to  the  reply  except  a  demurrer,  which 
mav  be  used  to  raise  an  issue  of  law.^ 


1901,  §6124,  same  as  New  York;  "Wash- 
ingtou,  Bal.  Code,  §  4917  ;  Wyoraiug,  Rev. 
St.,  1899,  §3553. 

Cases  Concerning  these  Provisions. 

See  Nat.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Ashby  (1894), 
41  Neb.  292,  59  N.  W.  913;  Burnet  v. 
Cavanagh  (1898),  56  Neb.  190,  76  N.  W. 
578;  Peaks  -•.  Lord  (1894),  42  Neb.  15, 
60  N.  W.  349;  Sullivan  v.  Traders'  Ins. 
Co.  (1901),  169  N.  Y.  213,  62  N.  E.  146; 
Solt  V.  Anderson  (1901),  62  Neb.  153,  86 
N.  W.  1076  ;  Grant  v.  Bartholomew  (1S99), 
57  Neb.  673,  78  N.  W.  314 ;  Beagle  v. 
Smith  (1897),  50  Neb.  446,  69  N.  W.  956; 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bachelder  (1894),  39 
Neb.  95,  57  N.  W.  996 ;  Mollyneaux  v. 
Wittenberg  (1894),  39  Neb.  547*,  58  N.  W. 
205;  Meeh  v.  Railway  Co.  (1900),  61  Kan. 
630,  60  Pac.  319  ;  Davis  v.  Crookston,  etc. 
Co.  (1894),  57  Minn.  402,  .59  N.  "W.  482; 
Smith  V.  L.  &  N.  R.  R.  Co.  (1893),  95  Ky. 
11,  23  S.  W.  652;  Stapleton  v.  Ewell 
(1900),  Ky.,  55  S.  W.  917  ;  Girard  v.  St. 
Louis  Car  Wheel  Co.  (1894),  123  Mo. 
358,  27  S.  W.  648;  Wade  v.  Strever 
(1901),  166  N.  Y.  251,  59  N.  E.  825  ;  Kear- 
ney Stone  Works  c  .  McPherson  (1894), 
5  Wyo.  178,  38  Pac.  920 ;  Sexton  v.  Shriver 
(1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W.  594;  Hib- 
bard  v.  Trask  (1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  67 
N.  E.  179.]  See  Kimberlin  v.  Carter,  49 
Ind.  HI;  Payne  v.  Briggs,  8  Neb.  75 ; 
Scofield  V.  State  Nat.  Bk.  of  Lincoln,  9 
id.  499;  Williams  v.  Evans,  6  id.  216; 
Ridenour  v.  Mayo,  29  Ohio  St.  138  ;  Titus  v. 
Lewis,  33  id.  .304  ;  Hixon  y.  Gurge,  18  Kan. 
253;  Netcott  v.  Porter,  19  id.  131  ;  Kirk 
V.  Woodbury  Cy.,  55  Iowa,  190;  Clapp 
V.    Cunningham,   50   id.  307 ;    Cassidy  v. 


Caton,  47  id.  22;  Davis  v.  Payne,  45  id. 
194. 

1  [Arkansas,  Sand.  &  Hill's  Dig.,  §  5732  ; 
California  provides  for  no  reply  in  any 
case.  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  422  ;  Idalio  provides 
for  no  reply  in  any  case.  Code  Civ.  Pro.. 
1901,  §3202;  Iowa,  Code,  1897,  §3576, 
requires  a  reply  in  case  of  counter-claim 
and  also  when  plaintiff  wishes  to  avail 
himself  of  matter  in  avoidance;  Montana, 
Code,  1895,  §720;  Nevada  provides  for 
no  reply  in  any  case,  Comp.  Laws,  1900, 
§  3133  ;  New  York,  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §§514, 
516,  provides  for  a  reply  in  case  of  coun- 
ter-claim and  also,  in  the  discretion  of 
court,  on  defendant's  application,  where 
new  matter  in  defence  is  set  up  in  the  an- 
swer; North  Carolina,  §  105,  same  as  New 
York;  North  Dakota,  Rev.  Codes,  1899, 
§  5277,  same  as  New  York  ;  South  Caro- 
lina, Code,  1893,  §  174,  same  as  New  York  ; 
South  Dakota,  Ann.  St.,  1901,  §  6124,  same 
as  New  York;  Utah,  Rev.  St.,  1898, 
§  2980;  Wi-scousiu,  St.,  1898,  §  2661. 

Cases  Concerning  these  Provisions. 

See  Sterling  v.  Smith  (1893),  97  Cal. 
343,  32  Pac.  320 ;  Alspaugh  v.  Reid  ( 1 898), 
6  Idaho,  223,  55  Pac.  300;  Higley  v.  Bur- 
lington, etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  99  la.  503,  68 
N.  W.  829 ;  O.skaloosa  St.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Oska- 
loosa  (1896),  99  la.  496,  68  N.  W.  808; 
Kinkead  v.  McCormick,  etc.  Co.  (1S98), 
106  la.  222,  76  N.  W.  663;  Ashland  v. 
W.  C.  R.  R.  Co.  (1902),  114  Wi.s.  104,  89 
N.  W.  888;  Babcock  v.  Maxwell  (1898), 
21  Mont.  507,  54  Pac.  943;  Cornwall  v. 
McKinney  (1896),  9  S.  D.  213,  68  N.  W. 
3.33;  Levister  v.  Railway  Co.  (1899).  56 
S.  C.  508,  35  S.  E.  207 ;    Stubbs  v.   Motz 


PROVISIONS    RELATING   TO    THE   ANSWER. 


7o: 


§  480.    *  589.     Miscellaneous    Statutory    Provisions.      Tlie    fore- 
going is  the  genenil  scheme  of  pleading  as  set  forth,  with  sHght 


(1893),  113N.  C.  4.58,  18S.  E.  387;  Askew 
V.  Koonce  (1896),  118  N.  C.  526,  24  S.  E. 
218;"  James  v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  li.  Co. 
(1897),  121N.  C.530,  28S.  E.  .537;  Strause 
V.  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  128  N.  C.  64,  38  S.  E. 
256;  Parno  v.  Iowa,  etc.  Ins.  Co.  (1901), 
114  la.  132,  86  N.  W.  210;  Parsons  v. 
Grand  Lodge,  etc.  (1899),  108  la.  6,  78 
N.  W.  676 ;  Trezona  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry. 
Co.  (1898),  107  la.  22,  77  N.  W.  486; 
Rowe  V.  Barnes  (1897),  101  la.  302,  70 
N.  W.  197;  Runkle  v.  Hartford  Ins.  Co. 
(1896),  99  la.  414,  68  N.  W.  712;  Smith 
V.  Griswold  (1895),  95  la.  684,  64  N.  W. 
624 ;  Nichols  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1895),  94  la.  202,  62  N.  W.  769;  Schulte 
V.  Coulthurst  (1895),  94  la.  418,  62  N.  W. 
770;  McQuade  v.  Collins  (1894),  93  la.  22, 
61  N.  W.  213 ;  Brown  v.  Baker  (1901),  39 
Ore.  66,  65  Pac.  799 ;  Sims  v.  Mutual  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  (1899),  101  Wis.  .586,  77  N.  W. 
908;  'Coleman  v.  Perry  (1903),  28  Mont. 
— ,  72  Pac.  42. 

General  Rules  as  to  Reply.  '■ 
It  is  not  the  office  of  a  reply  to  intro- 
duce a  new  cause  of  action:  Merrill  v. 
Suing  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  618; 
Plummer,  Perry  &  Co.  v.  Rohman  (1900), 
61  Neb.  61,  84  N.  W.  600;  Wigton  v. 
Smith  (1895),  46  Neb.  461,  64  N.  W.  1080; 
Piper  V.  Woolman  (1895),  43  Neb.  280,  61 
N.  W.  588;  Collins  v.  Gregg  (1899),  109 
la.  506,  80  N.  W.  562 ;  Ellis  v.  Soper  ( 1 900), 
110  la.  631,  82  N.  W.  1041;  Olmstead  c. 
City  of  Raleigh  (1902),  130  N.  C.  243,  41 
S.  E.  292;  Osten  v.  Winehill  (1894),  10 
Wash.  333,38  Pac.  1123. 

New  matter  in  a  reply  constituting  a 
departure  will  be  stricken  out  on  motion  : 
Merrill  v.  Suing  (1902),  — Neb. —,  92 
N.  W.  618;  Maddox  f.  Teague  (1896),  18 
Mont.  512,  46  Pac.  535 ;  Hunt  v.  Johnston 
(1898),  105  la.  311,  75  N.  W.  103;  Wil- 
liams V.  Ninemire  (1901),  23  Wash.  393,  63 
Pac.  534;  Snyder  v.  Johnson  (1903), — 
Neb.— ,95  N.  W.  692.  The  objection 
may  be  raised  by  demurrer :  Brown  v. 
Baker  (1901 ),  39  Ore.  66,  65  Pac.  799. 

But  a  departure  may  be  waived :  Farm- 
ers' &  Merchants'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dobney 
(1901 ),  62  Neb.  213,  86  N.  W.  1070 ;  Con- 


solidated Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v.  Osborne 
(1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  71  Pac.  838;  Asplund  v. 
Mattsou  (1896),  15  Wash.  328,  46  Pac. 
341  ;  Gregory  c.  Kaar  (1893),  36  Neb.  .533, 
54  N.  W.  859.  Or  it  may  be  avoided  by 
an  amendment  of  the  complaint :  Whitney 
V.  Priest  (1901),  26  Wasli.  48,  66  Pac.  108. 

As  to  what  constitutes  a  departure,  see 
Shaw  V.  Jones  (1900),  156  Ind.  60,  59 
N.  E.  166;  Wilcke  i'.  Wilcke  (1897),  102 
la.  173,  71  N.  W.  201  ;  Hunt  v.  Johnston 
(1898),  105  la.  311,  75  N.  W.  103 ;  Minne- 
apolis, etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (1896), 
64  Minn.  61,  66  N.  W.  132 ;  James  v.  City 
of  St.  Paul  (1898),  72  Minn.  138,  75  N.  W. 
5;  Hoxsie  v.  Kempton  (1899;,  77  Minn. 
462,  80  N.  W.  353 ;  Van  Bibber  f.  Fields 
(1894),  25  Ore.  527,  36  Pac.  526;  Mayes  v. 
Stephens  (1901),  38  Ore.  512,  63  Pac.  760; 
Crown  Cycle  Co.  v.  Brown  (1901),  39  Ore. 
285,  64  Pac.  451  ;  Hammer  v.  Downing 
(1901),  39  Ore.  504,  64  Pac.  651  ;  Kiernan 
V.  Kratz  (1902),  42  Ore.  474,  69  Pac.  1027; 
Orient  Ins.  Co.  v.  Clark  (1900),  Ky.,  59 
S.  W.  863  ;  Massillou  Engine  &  Thresher 
Co.  V.  Carr  (1903),  Ky.,  71  S.  W.  859; 
Coombs  Commission  Co.  v.  Block  (1895), 
130  Mo.  668,  .32  S.  W.  1139;  St.  Joseph 
Union  Depot  Co.  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1895),  131  Mo.  291,  31  S.  W.  908;  Com. 
Elec.  Light  &  Power  Co.  v.  Tacoma  (1897), 
17  Wash.  661,  50  Pac.  592  ;  Ross  v.  Howard 
(1901),  25  Wash.  1,  64  Pac.  794  ;  McCorkle 
V.  Mallory  (1903),  30  Wash.  632,  71  Pac. 
186;  Dudley  v.  Duval  (1902),  29  Wash. 
528,  70  Pac.  68;  Browu  v.  Baruch  (1901), 
24  Wash.  572,  64  Pac.  789;  Fulton  v. 
Ryan  (1900),  60  Neb.  9,  82  N.  W.  105; 
Foley  V.  Holtry  (1894),  43  Neb.  133,  61 
N.  W.  ]  20 ;  Union  Casualty  &  Surety  Co. 
V.  Bragg  (1901 ),  63  Kan.  291,  65  Pac.  272  ; 
Johnson  v.  Bank  (1898),  59  Kan.  250,  52 
Pac.  860;  Rainsford  ;>.  Massengale  (1893), 
5  Wyo.  1,  35  Pac.  774;  Union  St.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1903),  42  Ore.  606,  72 
Pac.  586;  Childs  Lumber  Co.  v.  Page 
(1902),  28  Wash.  128,  68  Pac.373;  Gleckler 
V.  Slavens  (1894),  5  S.  D.  364,  59  N.W.  323. 

The  reply  may  be  waived  by  proceed- 
ing to  trial  as  though  it  had  been  filed : 
Killmanr.  Gregory  (1895),  91  Wis.  478,  65 
N.  W.  53  ;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Palmer 


704 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


variations  of  form,  and  with  no  real  variations  of  principle,  in 
all  the  codes.  A  few  additional  provisions  are  found  in  some  of 
the  codes  which  do  not  in  any  manner  affect  the  common  theory, 
but  which  were  evidently  inserted  for  purposes  of  exactness,  or 
to  put  at  rest  some  doubts  as  to  the  construction  of  the  statute. 
These  clauses  I  have  collected  in  the  note.^ 

§  481.  *  590.  Liberality  of  the  Codes  in  Furtherance  of  Justice. 
While  the  very  central  principle  of  the  reformed  ^jrocedure  is, 
that  all  causes  of  action,  and  all  defences,  except  those  of 
general  denial,  must  be  specially  pleaded,  —  that  is,  pleaded 
in  accordance  with  the  actual  facts,  —  and  while,  as  a  neces- 
sary consequence,  there  must  be  .  an  agreement  between  the 
facts  proved  and  the  facts  alleged,  yet  the  codes  are  careful  to 
prevent  any  failure  of  justice  by  reason  of  a  mere  failure  to 
comply  with  this  rule.     Ample  means  of  correcting  mistakes  are 


(1898),  55  Neb.  559,  76  N.  W.  169;  Mer- 
chants' Nat.  Bauk  v.  Barlow  (1900),  79 
Minn.  2.34,  82  N.  W.  .364 ;  Lvford  v.  Mar- 
tin (1900),  79  Minn.  243,  82  N.  W  479; 
Minard  v.  McBee  (1896),  29  Ore  225,  44 
Pac.  491  ;  North  St.  Louis  Bl.lo-.  Ass'n  v. 
Obert  (1902),  169  Mo.  507,  69  S.  W.  1044; 
Ferguson  v.  Davidson  (1899),  147  Mo.  664, 
49  S.  VV.  879  ;  Turner  r.  Burler  (1894),  126 
Mo.  131,  28  S.  W.  77  ;  Chicago,  R.  L  & 
Pac.  Rv.  Co.  r.  Frazier  (1903),  — Kan. —, 
71  Pac.  831;  Elder  v.  Webber  (1902),  — 
Neb.  — ,  92  N.  W.  126. 

Complaint  and  repl_v  are  to  be  construed 
too;ether  when  not  repugnant :  Molino  v. 
Blake  (1898),  Ariz.,  52  Pac.  366.  A  bad 
reply  is  good  enough  for  a  bad  answer : 
Peden  v.  Cavins  (1892)  134  Ind.  494,  34 
N.  E.  7.  It  is  not  error  to  strike  out  so 
much  of  a  reply  as  has  already  been  al- 
leged in  the  petition :  West  v.  West 
(1898),  144  Mo.  119.  46  S.  W.  139.  In 
Connecticut  a  pleading  entitled  a  "  Reply 
and  demurrer  "  may  be  filed,  raising  issues 
of  law  as  to  part  of  a  defence  and  issues 
of  fact  as  to  the  residue  :  Church  r.  Pearne 
(1 903 ),  75  Conn.  350, 53  Atl.  955.  See  Davis 
V.  Ford  (1896),  15  Wa.sh.  107,  45  Pac.  739, 
for  a  reply  which  was  held  to  constitute 
what  at  common  law  was  designated  a  new 
assignment.]  See  Johnson  v.  White,  6 
Hun,.  587;  Dambman  v.  Schulting,  4  id. 
50  ;  Claflin  v.  Taussig,  7  id.  223  ;  Metrop. 
L.    Ins.    Co.    V.    Meeker,   85  N.    Y.    614; 


Colton  L.  &  W.  Co.  V.  Raynor,  57  CaL 

588. 

1  Missouri,  R.  S.,  1899,  §  613:  '' Dnpli- 
cili/  is  a  substantial  objection  to  the  peti- 
tion or  other  pleading,  and  shall, on  motion, 
be  stricken  out."  §  624  :  "  In  all  actions 
founded  on  contract,  and  instituted 
against  several  defendants,  the  plaintiff 
shall  not  be  nonsuited  by  reason  of  his 
failure  to  prove  that  all  the  defendants 
are  parties  to  the  contract,  but  may  have 
judgment  against  such  of  tliem  as  he  shall 
prove  to  be  parties  thereto."  Kansas, 
§  104  :  "  When  the  answer  contains  new 
matter  constituting  a  right  to  relief  against 
a  co-defendant,  concerning  the  subject  of 
the  action,  such  co-defendant  may  demur 
or  reply  to  such  matter  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  if  he  were  plaintiff,  and  subject  to 
the  same  rules  so  far  as  applicable." 
Iowa,  §  3578  :  "  Any  number  of  defences, 
negative  or  affirmative,  an;  pleadable  to 
a  counter-claim  ;  and  each  affirmative  mat- 
ter of  defence  in  the  reply  shall  be  suffi- 
cient in  itself,  and  must  intelligibly  refer 
to  tlie  part  oi  the  answer  to  which  it  is 
intended  to  apply."  Indiaiui.  §  359  :  "  All 
defences,  except  the  mere  denial  of  the 
facts  alleged  by  the  plaintiff,  shall  be 
pleaded  specially."  §380:  "  Under  a  mere 
denial  of  any  allegation,  no  evidence  shall 
be  introduced  which  does  not  tend  to 
negative  what  the  party  making  the  alle- 
gation is  bound  to  prove." 


GENERAL   REQUISITES    OF   THE    ANSWER.  705 

provided.  Tlie  utmost  liberality  in  this  respect  runs  through 
them  all,  and  the  provisions  are  the  same  in  substance,  and 
almost  identical  in  language.  As  these  clauses  apply  alike  to 
the  pleadings  by  the  plaintiff  and  by  the  defendant,  they  have 
already  been  stated  in  the  preceding  chapter.' 

§  482.  *  591.  Outline  of  Treatment  of  Code  Theory  of  Defence. 
Upon  the  basis  of  the  foregoing  citations,  I  am  prepared  to  pre- 
sent the  theory  of  the  defence  as  formulated  in  tlie  codes,  and  as 
w^rought  out  by  the  judicial  interpretation  thereof.  The  funda- 
mental principles  of  pleading  adopted  by  the  reformed  American 
system,  and  applicable  alike  to  the  allegations  made  by  the  plain- 
tiff and  by  the  defendant,  have  already  been  discussed  in  the 
preceding  chapter;  and  I  shall,  therefore,  confine  myself  to 
matters  purely  defensive.  Following  an  order  suggested  alike 
by  the  mode  of  arrangement  pursued  in  the  statute,  and  by  the 
logical  development  of  the  subject-matter  itself,  the  chapter  will 
be  separated  into  sections,  which  will  treat  respectively,  I..  Of 
the  general  requisites  of  an  answer,  and  of  the  general  rules 
applicable  to  all  answers;  II.  Of  answers  or  defences  consist- 
ing of  denials  either  general  or  specific;  III.  Of  answers  or 
defences  consisting  of  new  matter;  IV.  Of  the  union  of  differ- 
ent defences,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  in  one  answer;  V.  Of 
counter-claims,  and  other  affirmative  relief.  - 


SECTION   SECOND. 

THE   GENERAL   REQUISITES   OF    AN   ANSVfER,  AND   THE  GENERAL 
RULES   APPLICABLE   TO   ALL   ANSWERS. 

§  483.  *  592.  Introductory.  Before  examining  the  different 
kinds  of  defence  possible  under  the  codes,  and  the  particular 
rules  relating  to  each,  I  shall  state  and  explain  the  few  doc- 
trines and  rules  which  apply  to  all  forms  of  answer,  and  which 
have  not  been  already  embraced  in  the  discussion  of  the  general 
principles  of  pleading  contained  in  the  preceding  chapter.  There 
are  a  few  doctrines,  practical  rather  than  theoretical,  pertaining 
to  the  answer  considered  as  an  independent  pleading,  which 
should  be  investigated  before  proceeding  with  the  mass  of  detail 
which  will  make  up  the  bulk  of  the  present  chapter. 

1  Supra,  §  *  435. 
45 


706  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

§  484.  *  593.  Tw^o  Kinds  of  Ans-wer  —  Denials  and  New  Matter. 
Answers  are  separated  by  the  codes  into  two  classes,  —  those 
which  consist  of  denials,  and  therefore  serve  the  sole  purpose 
of  raising  a  direct  issue  upon  the  plaintiff's  allegations ;  and 
those  which  state  what  the  codes  call  "new  matter,"  —  that  is, 
facts  different  from  those  averred  by  the  plaintiff,  and  not  em- 
braced within  the  judicial  inquiry  into  their  truth.  The  latter 
class  is  again  subdivided  into  those  in  which  the  "  new  matter  " 
is  simply  defensive,  and,  if  true,  destroys  or  bars  the  plaintiff's 
right  of  action;  and  those  in  which  the  "new  matter"  is  the 
statement  of  an  independent  cause  of  action  in  favor  of  the 
defendant  against  the  plaintiff,  which  is  to  be  tried  at  the  same 
time  with  that  set  up  by  the  plaintiff,  to  the  end  that  a  re- 
covery upon  it  may  be  used  in  opposition  to  the  recovery  upon 
the  plaintiff's  demand,  by  either  diminishing,  equalling,  or  ex- 
ceeding the  same.  It  is  plain,  from  this  brief  description,  that 
the  answers  included  in  the  latter  subdivision  are  not,  in  any 
true  sense  of  the  word,  defences;  they  do  not  defeat  or  bar  the 
plaintiff's  right  of  action.  They  are,  in  truth,  independent  causes 
of  action  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  —  cross-demands,  —  which, 
for  purposes  of  convenience  merely,  are  tried  and  determined  at 
one  and  the  same  time.  There  are  two  suits,  to  neither  of  which, 
perhaps,  exists  any  defence,  litigated  and  decided  in  the  one  judi- 
cial proceeding;  and  the  final  balance  in  favor  of  one  party  is 
awarded  to  him  by  the  single  judgment  of  the  court.  This  is 
the  true  theory  of  the  answers  embraced  in  the  last  subdivision  ; 
and  it  is  fully  approved  and  adopted  by  decisions  of  authority 
which  will  be  cited  in  the  subsequent  section,  which  treats  of  the 
"counter-claim." 

§  485.  *  594.  Two  Kinds  of  Questions.  Those  of  Form.  Two 
kinds  of  questions  may  arise  in  reference  to  all  answers,  — 
namely,  (1)  those  of  substance  and  (2)  those  of  form.  The 
first  class  relates  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  pleading,  assuming 
that  its  allegations  are  correct  in  respect  to  their  merely  formal 
character;  the  second  class  relates  exclusively  to  the  form  and 
external  mode  of  setting  forth  the  facts,  assuming  that,  if  prop- 
erly stated,  they  would  be  sufficient  to  constitute  a  valjxl  answer. 
It  is  difhcult  to  conceive  that  a  question  of  substance  should 
arise  upon  an  answer  consisting  only  of  denials.  Such  an  an- 
swer might  be  insufficient:  it  might  raise  no  complete  issue, 


DEFECTIVE    ANSWERS.  707 

because  its  denials  were  too  liniitetl,  and  were  interposed  to  a 
part  only  of  the  plaintiff's  allegations,  thus  admitting  by  their 
silence  other  averments  to  such  an  extent  that  a  cause  of  action 
in  his  favor  was  conceded  upon  the  record;  but  here  the  question 
of  substance  would  not  arise  from  the  matter  contained  in  the 
answer,  but  from  the  absence  of  matter  therein.  The  questions 
that  can  arise  upon  an  answer  of  denials  must,  therefore,  be 
those  of  form,  —  questions  whether  the  denials  themiSelves  are 
in  such  a  form  that  the  averments  of  the  complaint,  or  some  of 
them,  are  sufiiciently  negatived  in  order  to  ],)resent  an  issue  or 
issues  for  trial  and  decision.  If  the  answer  falls  within  the 
second  class,  —  that  is,  if  it  sets  up  new  matter,  either  by  way 
of  defence,  or  by  way  of  counter-claim,  set-off,  or  cross-demand, 
—  the  questions  arising  upon  it  may  be  either  of  substance  or 
of  form. 

§  486.  *  595.  Questions  of  Substance.  What  Can  be  the  pos- 
sible nature  of  these  questions  of  substance  ?  The  section  of  the 
codes  enumerating  the  grounds  of  demurrer  to  the  complaint  or 
petition  contains  a  complete  list  of  such  questions.  As  found  in 
most  of  the  codes,  they  are  six  in  number,  —  namely,  (1)  want 
of  jurisdiction  in  the  court  over  the  person  of  the  defendant,  or 
the  subject-matter  of  the  action;  (2)  want  of  legal  capacity  to 
sue  in  the  plaintiff;  (3)  the  pendency  of  another  action  between 
the  same  parties  for  the  same  cause ;  (4)  defect  of  parties  plain- 
tiff or  defendant;  (5)  a  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action;  (6)  failure 
to  state  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action.  To  these  there  is 
added,  in  one  or  two  codes,  (7)  a  misjoinder  of  parties  plaintiff 
or  defendant.  It  is  very  plain  that,  except  in  a  special  case  to 
be  mentioned  hereafter,  only  one  of  these  species  of  substantial 
questions  can  possibly  arise  in  respect  to  the  answer,  namely, 
the  sixth,  whether  the  facts  stated  are  sufficient  to  constitute 
a  defence.  Objections  as  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court,  the 
legal  capacity  of  the  plaintiff  to  sue,  the  pendency  of  another 
action,  and  the  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  must  necessarily 
be  confined  to  and  be  decided  by  the  complaint  or  petition.  If 
the  plaintiff's  pleading  is  free,  the  answer  can  in  no  manner  be 
exposed  to  any  of  them.  It  may,  of  course,  set  up  these  objec- 
tions as  matters  of  defence;  but  the  objection  would  still  inhere 
in  tlie  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  pleading,  and  would  not 
be  involved  in  the  answer  itself.     The  same  is  true  in  respect  to 


708  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

the  nonjoinder  or  misjoinder  of  parties  in  all  cases  where  the 
answer  is  simply  defensive.  It  may  certainly  aver  a  nonjoinder 
or  a  misjoinder  as  a  defence ;  but  the  question  thus  raised  would 
still  depend  upon  the  complaint  or  petition ;  the  answer  could 
not  by  itself,  as  the  initiative,  create  a  nonjoinder  or  misjoinder 
of  parties.  There  is  one  special  case,  however,  in  which  the 
answer  may,  for  the  first  time,  involve  the  question  as  to  the 
proper  joinder  of  parties.  Where  it  sets  up  a  counter-claim  or 
set-off,  and  the  defendant  thus  makes  himself,  in  respect  to  such 
demand,  a  plaintiff  in  fact,  though  not  in  name,  the  answer  may 
be  governed  by  the  same  rules  which  govern  the  complaint  or 
petition.  The  cause  of  action  thus  alleged  may  be  of  such  a 
character  that  the  original  parties  to  the  record  are  either  too 
few  or  too  many.  An  answer  of  this  class  may  therefore,  in 
itself,  and  by  means  of  its  own  averments,  independently  of 
the  plaintiff's  pleading,  raise  and  involve  questions  of  sub- 
stance relating  to  the  proper  joinder  of  parties  to  the  action. 
The  codes  of  several  States  recognize  this  fact,  and  expressly 
provide  for  the  bringing  in  of  additional  parties  made  neces- 
sary by  the  allegations  of  a  counter-claim  or  set-off.  With  this 
single  exception,  it  is  plain  that  the  only  questions  of  substance 
which  can  arise  in  respect  to  any  answer  must  relate  to  the  suffi- 
ciency of  the  facts  alleged  to  constitute  a  defence,  or  counter- 
claim, or  set-off.  Upon  this  assumption,  the  language  employed 
by  the  legislature  in  some  of  the  States  permits  a  demurrer  to 
the  answer  on  the  ground  of  "insufficiency;"  in  others,  "where, 
upon  its  face,  it  does  not  constitute  a  counter-claim  or  defence ; " 
and,  in  others  still,  "  where  the  facts  alleged  do  not  constitute 
a  defence  or  counter-claim."  And  recognizing  the  further 
fact,  that  these  questions  of  substance  cannot  arise  upon  an- 
swers which  consist  only  of  denials,  the  language  of  several 
codes  confines  the  demurrer  to  "new  matter,"  set  up  in  the 
answer  by  way  of  defence  or  counter-claim, 

§  487.    *  596.     Purpose    of    Demurrer.^      Special   Demurrer   Abol- 
ished.    Motion   Substituted.     Under   the   common-law  system    of 

1  ^^Oeneral  Hales  as  to  Demurrers.         Centerville  Light  Co.  (1896),  100  la.  245, 

jrr,    ,      n  J    v  C9  N.  W.  541  ;  Graham  v.  Marks  (1895), 

Wnat  a  Demurrer  admits.  ^  '  v  /. 

98  Ga.  67,  25  S.  E.  931  ;   Smith  v.  Usher 

A  demurrer  to  a  pleading  admits  all     (1899),  108  Ga.  2.31,  3^  S.  E.  876;  Crew  v. 

facts   well    pleaded    therein:   Good.son    (•.      Hutcheson  (1902),  115  Ga.  511.  42  S.  E. 

Goodson  (1897),  140  Mo.  206;  Peatman  v.     16;  Stedman  v.  City  of  Berlin  (1897),  97 


DEFECTIVE    ANSWERS. 


709 


procedure,  the  questions  of  substance  in  the  defendant's  pleas, 
if  the  objection  a[)peared  on  their  face,  were  raised  by  a  gen- 
eral demurrer,  while  those  of  form  were  raised  by  a  "special 
demurrer."  The  reformed  procedure  retains  the  general  de- 
murrer for  the  same  purpose  which  it  subserved  at  the  common 
law.  Where  the  answer,  as  in  some  States,  or  the  new  matter 
in  the  answer,  as  in  others,  does  not  state  facts  constituting 
a  defence,  or  counter-claim,  or  set-off,  as  the  case  may  be,  a 
demurrer,  on  the  ground  of  insufficiency,  is  the  proper  mode 
of  raising  and  presenting  the  question  for  decision  to  the  court. 
Special  demurrers,  however,  are  utterly  abolished.  If  the  defect  is 
one  merely  of  form ;  if  the  denials,  for  example,  —  although  suffi- 
ciently addressed  to  the  plaintiff's  allegations  to  indicate  the  in- 


Wis.  505,  73  N.  W.  57 ;  Allen  v.  Chicago 
&  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.  (1896),  94  Wis.  93,  68 
N.  W.  873;  Hand  v.  City  of  St.  Louis 
(1900),  158  Mo.  204,  59  S.  "w.  92 ;  Shields 
V.  John.son  County  (1898),  144  Mo.  76,  47 
S.  W  107  ;  Blaine  v.  Kuapp  &  Co.  (1897), 
140  Mo.  241,  41  S.  W.  787;  McArthnr  v. 
Clarke  Drug  Co.  (1896),  48  Neb.  899,  67 
N.  W.  861  ;  State  v.  Porter  (1903),  —  Neb. 
— ,  95  N.  W.  769. 

But  the  demurrer  admits  the  truth  of 
the  allegations  of  the  pleading  attacked 
oul\'  for  the  purpose  of  determining  their 
legal  effeft:  Jacobs  v.  Vaill  (1903),  — 
ivan.  — ,  72  Pac.  530. 

A  demurrer  does  not  admit  conclusions 
of  law :  Longshore  Printing  Co.  v.  Howell 
(1894),  26  Ore.  527,  38  Pac.  547;  Kankin 
r.  Railroad  Co.  (1900),  58  S.  C.  532,  36 
S  E.  997  ;  American  Water  Works  Co.  v. 
State  (1895),  46  Neb.  194,  64  N.  W.  711  ; 
State  ex  rel.  v.  Aloe  (1899),  152  Mo.  466, 
54  S.  W.  494 ;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Withrow 
(1900),  154  Mo.  397,  55  S.  W.  460;  John 
D.  Park  &  Sons  Co.  v.  Druggists'  Ass'n 
(1903),  175  N.  Y.  1,  67  N.  E.  136. 

A  demurrer  does  not  admit  the  con- 
clusions of  the  pleader  :  Southern  Hy.  Co.  y. 
Covenia  (1896),  100  Ga.  46,  29  S.  E.  219; 
Eliot's  Appeal  (1902),  74  Conn.  586,  51 
Atl.  558;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Archibald  (1894), 
52  O.  St.  1,  38  N.  E.  314. 

But  see  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Hoese 
(1899),  57  Neb.  665,  78  N.  W.  292,  where 
a  demurrer  was  held  to  admit  a  conclusion 
reasonably  inferable  from  the  facts  alleged. 


In  passing  upon  a  demurrer  for  mis- 
joinder of  causes  of  action,  it  will  be  as- 
sumed that  the  facts  alleged  in  each  count 
constitute  a  cause  of  action :  Vaule  v. 
Steenerson  (1895),  63  Minn.  110,  65  N.  W. 
257. 

Searching  the  Record. 
A  demurrer  searches  the  record,  and 
should  be  carried  back  to  the  first  pleading 
which  is  insufficient:  Tribune  Printing  Co. 
i:  Barnes  (1898),  7  N.  D.  591,  75  N.  W. 
904;  Barr  v.  Little  (1898),  54  Neb.  556,  74 
N.  W.  850;  State  ex  rel.  v.  Stuht  (1898), 
52  Neb.  209,  71  N.  W.  941;  State  v. 
Moores  (1897),  52  Neb.  770,  73  N.  W,  299; 
West  Point  Water,  etc.  Co.  v.  State  (1896), 
49  Neb.  223,  68  N.  W.  507  ;  Hawthorne  v. 
State  (1895),  45  Neb.  871,  64  N.  W.  359; 
Oakley  v.  Valley  County  (1894),  40  Neb. 
900,  59  N.  W.  368  ;  Johnson  v.  Wynne 
(1902),  64  Kan.  138,  67  Pac.  549;  Baxter 
I'.  McDonnell  (1897),  154  N.  Y.  432,  48 
N.  E.  816;  Alkire  v.  Alkire  (1892),  134 
Lid.  350,  32  N.  E.  571  ;  Gilreath  v.  Fur- 
man  (1898),  .53  S.  C.  463,  31  S.  E.  291  ; 
Chesapeake,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Riddle's  Adm'x 
(1903),  Ky.,  72  S.  W.  22;  Hoskins  v. 
Southern  Nat.  Bank  (1903),  Ky.,  73  S.  W. 
786. 

See  Goldsmith  v.  Chipps  (1899),  154 
Ind.  28,  55  N.  E.  855,  where  the  court 
said  :  "  A  demurrer  to  an  answer  in  abate- 
'  ment  does  not  search  the  record,  and  can- 
not be  carried  back  and  sustained  to  the 
complaint." 


710 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


tended  issues,  —  are  so  formally  defective  that  it  is  a  question 
whether  the  denial  or  denials  attempted  to  be  made  do  in  fact  ac- 
complish the  purpose  for  which  they  were  designed ;  or  if  the  aver- 
ments of  new  matter  in  some  sort  embrace  or  refer  to  facts  which, 
if  properly  pleaded,  would  amount  to  a  defence  or  counter-claim, 
but  are  stated  in  such  an  uncertain,  ambiguous,  inferential  man- 
ner, that  it  is  a  question  whether  they  can  avail  to  the  defendant, 
—  in  such  cases  it  is  settled  that  the  demurrer  is  not  the  proper 
mode  of  reaching  the  defect.  Instead  of  the  special  demurrer, 
the  codes  have  substituted  the  motion  to  make  the  pleading 
more  definite  and  certain.^     If   no  such  motion   is   made,   and 


Where  au  answer  purports  to  auswer 
only  a  part  of  a  complaint,  a  demurrer  to 
such  answer  cau  only  be  carried  back  and 
sustained  to  so  much  of  the  comphiint  as 
it  assumes  to  answer :  State  ex  rel.  v. 
Halter  (1897),  149  Ind.  292,  47  N.  E.  665. 

Ruling  on  Demurrer  as  Res  Judicata. 

If  a  demurrer  is  sustained  on  the  ground 
that  a  complaint  fails  to  state  a  cause  of 
action,  a  judgment  of  dismissal  thereon  is 
no  bar  to  a  subsequent  action  in  which 
there  is  a  good  complaint :  Swausou  v. 
Great  Northern  Ry.  Co.  (1898),  73  Minn. 
103,  7.1  N.  W.  1033;  Watson  v.  St.  Paul 
City  Ry.  Co.  (1899),  76  Minn.  358,  79 
N.  W.  308;  Potter  v.  Beuge  (1902),  Ky., 
67  S.  W.  1005,  citing  Pepper  v.  Donnelly, 
87  Ky.  260;  Taylor  v.  Matteson  (1893), 
86  Wis.  113,  56  N.  W.  829;  State  ex  rel. 
V.  Cornell  (1897),  52  Neb.  25,  71  N.  W. 
961;  O'Hara  v.  Parker  (1895),  27  Ore. 
156,  39  Pac.  1004. 

If  the  judgment  determined  the  merits 
of  the  case,  it  is  res  judicata :  Wilson  v. 
Lowry  (1898),  Ariz.,  52  Pac.  777;  Klein- 
schmidt  v.  Binzel  (1893),  14  Mont.  31,  35 
Pac.  460;  Fain  v.  Hughes  (1899),  108  Ga. 
.537,  33  S.  E.  1012;  Plant  v.  Carpenter 
(1898),  19  Wash.  621,53  Pac.  1107;  Day 
V.  Mountin  (1903),  89  Minn.  297,  94  N.  W. 
887. 

A  judgment  on  the  sole  ground  tliat 
the  action  is  premature  is  not  a  bar  to  a 


1  ^Conversely,  a  motion  cannot  be  used 
to  raise  questions  of  substance  :  Armstead 
V.  Neptune  ( 1 896),  56  Kan.  750, 44  Pac.  998 ; 
Wattels  V.  MincJien  (1895),  93  la.  517,  61 
N.    W.    915;    Gjerstadengen    c.    Hartzcll 


subsequent  suit  for  the  same  cause  :  Peck  v. 
Easton  (1902),  74  Conn.  456,  51  Atl.  134. 

A  demurrer  on  the  ground  that  a  com- 
plaint does  not  state  a  cause  of  action, 
having  been  once  made  and  overruled, 
cannot  be  renewed  at  any  subsequent  trial 
on  the  same  or  auy  other  specifications: 
Turner  v.  Interstate  Ass'n  (1897),  51  S.  C. 
33,  27  S.  E.  947;  Burrows  v.  McCalley 
(1897),  17  Wash.  269,  49  Pac.  508.  But 
see  Roche  v.  Spokane  County  (1900),  22 
Wash.  121,  60  Pac.  59. 

The  court  is  not  bound  by  its  own  rul- 
ing, and  when  a  demurrer  has  been  sus- 
tained to  a  petition,  and  an  amended 
petition  is  filed  essentially  like  tlie  origi- 
nal, to  which  also  a  demurrer  is  filed,  the 
court  may  sustain  or  overrule  it  as  it  sees 
fit.  If  the  defendant  wished  to  hold  the 
court  to  its  first  ruling,  he  should  have 
moved  to  have  the  amended  petition 
stricken  from  the  files :  Van  Werden  ;•. 
E(juitable  Assurance  Society  (1896),  99 
la.  621,  68  N.  W.  892.  See  also  Noyes  v. 
Longhead  (1894),  9  Wash.  325,  37  Pac. 
452;  Hoyty.  Beach  (1897),  104  la.  257,  73 
N.  W.  492 ;  Schoenleber  v.  Burkhart 
(1896),  94  Wis.  575,  69  N.   W.  343. 

Where  a  demurrer  is  filed  on  several 
grounds,  and  it  is  sustained  generally,  it 
will  be  presumed  to  have  been  sustained 
oil  the  ground  not  affecting  the  merits  : 
Kleinsclimidt  v.  Binzel  (1893),  14  Mont. 
31,  35  Pac.  460,  citing  and  differing  from 

(1899),  8  N.  D.  424,  79  N.  W.  872.  But  in 
McQuade  v.  Collins  (1894),  93  la.  22,  61 
N.  W.  213,  it  was  held  that  where  affirma- 
tive matter  is  pleaded  which  constitutes  no 
defence  it  may  be  stricken  out  on  njotion.] 


DEFECTIVE    ANSWERS.  711 

the  plaintiff  goes  to  trial  upon  the  answer  as  it  stands,  he  will 


People  V.  Stevens,  51  How.  Pr.  235,  whicli 
held  the  presumption  to  be  that  the  de- 
murrer was  sustained  upoti  all  the  grounds. 

lu  Gregory  v.  Woodwortli  {189'J),  107 
la  151,  77  N.  W.  837,  it  was  held  that 
where  a  plaintiff  failed  to  amend  his  peti- 
tion by  adding  a  material  averment,  and  a 
demurrer  thereto  had  heen  sustained  by 
the  lower  court  and  by  the  Supreme  Court, 
the  judgment  on  the  demurrer  was  a  final 
adjudication  which  bars  another  action  for 
the  same  cause,  under  Code,  1873,  §  26,54, 
■which  provides  that  on  the  decision  of  a 
•demurrer,  if  the  unsuccessful  party  fails 
to  amend  or  plead  over,  the  same  conse- 
quences shall  ensue  as  though  a  verdict 
had  passed  against  the  plaintiff,  or  the  de- 
fendant had  made  default.  Given  J.  dis- 
sented on  the  ground  that  the  omission  of 
the  averment,  being  in  fact  a  doubtful 
question,  was  not  negligence,  and  hence 
plaintiff  ought  to  be  allowed  to  commence 
a  second  suit  under  Code  §  2537,  which 
provides  that  "  If,  after  the  commence- 
ment of  an  action,  the  plaintiff  shall  fail 
therein  for  any  cause,  except  negligence 
in  its  prosecution,  and  a  new  suit  shall  be 
brought  within  six  moutlis  thereafter,  the 
second  suit  shall,  for  the  purpose  herein 
contemplated,  be  deemed  a  continuation  of 
the  first." 

Error  in  overruling  a  demurrer  for  mis- 
joinder of  causes  of  action  is  harmless : 
Coddington  v.  Canaday  (1901),  157  Ind. 
243,  61  N.  E.  567. 

The  statute  providing  tliat  "  but  one 
motion  and  one  demurrer  assailing  such 
pleading  shall  he  filed,  unless  such  plead- 
ing be  amended  after  the  filing  of  a  mo- 
tion thereto,"  does  not  prohibit  filing  a 
demurrer  after  a  motion  to  the  same  plead- 
ing, even  though  the  pleading  has  not 
been  amended  in  the  mean  time :  Gross  i'. 
Miller  (1894),  93  la.  72,  61  N.  W.  385. 

Demurrer  as  ''  Answer." 

A  demurrer  is  a  sufficient  "answer"  to 
warrant  the  granting  of  relief  not  prayed 
for,  under  R.  S ,  §  2886 :  Viles  v.  Green 
(1895),  91  Wis.  217,  64  N.  W.  856.  See 
also  Wagener  v.  Boyce  (1898),  Ariz.,  52 
Pac.  1122.  But  there  is  no  such  pleading 
a,s   a    "  demurrer    by   way   of    answer : " 


Smith  V.  Kibling  (1897),  97  Wis.  205,  72 
N.  W.  869.  See  also  Quayle  v.  Bayfield 
Co.  (1902),  114  Wis.  108,  89  N.  W.  892, 
where  an  answer  contained  a  demurrer 
but  the  defect  was  held  to  be  waived. 

Predicating  Error  on  Ruling. 

Where  a  demurrer  is  sustained  generally, 
the  ruling  will  be  sustained  if  any  of  the 
grounds  of  the  demurrer  are  well  taken  : 
Krause  v.  Lloyd  (1897),  100  la.  666,69 
N.  W.  1062  ;  Crittenden  v.  Southern  Home 
Ass'n  (1900),  111  Ga.  266,  .36  S.  E.  643. 

An  order  su.staininga  demurrer,  if  right, 
will  be  sustained,  even  if  the  reasons 
given  by  the  trial  court  were  erroneous  : 
Hughes  V.  Hunner  (1895),  91  Wis.  116,  64 
N.  W.  887. 

Error,  if  any,  in  ruling  upon  a  demurrer 
will  not  be  considered  on  appeal  where 
the  alleged  defect  has  been  obviated  by  an 
amendment  on  the  trial :  Maris  v.  Cleven- 
ger  (1902),  29  Wa.sli.  395,  69  Pac.  1089; 
Ivingman  v.  Pixley  (1898),  7  Okla.  351, 
54  Pac.  494.  Contra,  Corcoran  v.  Sonora 
Min.  &  Mill.  Co.  (1902),  Idaho,  71  Pac.  127. 

When  a  demurrer  has  been  sustained  to 
a  complaint,  and  plaintiff  fails  to  apply 
for  an  amendment,  he  must  be  held  to 
have  elected  to  stand  on  his  pleading : 
Iowa,  etc.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Schamber  (1902),  15 
S.  D.  588,  91  N.  W.  78. 

Pleading  over  is  a  waiver  of  any  error 
in  overruling  a  demurrer:  Wheeler  v. 
Barker  (1897),  51  Neb.  846,  71  N.  W.  750; 
Citizens'  Bank  v.  Pence  (1900),  59  Neb. 
579,  81  N.  W.  623 ;  Lederer  r.  Union  Sav. 
Bank  (1897),  52  Neb.  1.33,  71  N.  W.  954; 
Hardin  v.  Emmons  (1898),  24  Nev.  329,  53 
Pac.  854;  Shroeder  v.  Webster  (1893),  88 
la.  627,  55  N.  W.  569  ;  Fir.st  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Farmers'  &  Merchants'  Bank  (1903), 
Neb.,  95  N.  W.  1062.  Contra,  Mechan- 
ics Bank  i\  Woodward  (1902),  74  Conn. 
689, 51  Atl.  1084 ;  Thelin  v.  Stewart  (1893), 
100  Cal.  372,  34  Pac.  861 ;  Hunter's  Ap- 
peal (1898),  71  Conn.  189,  41  Atl.  557. 

A  party  cannot  complain  of  a  ruling  in 
his  own  favor :  Pritchett  v.  McGaughev 
(1898),  151  Ind.  638,  52  N.  E.  397. 

A  general  demurrer  to  a  complaint  put 
in  by  stipulation  after  answer  and  treated 
by  the  parties  and  the  trial  court  as  an 


■12 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


not  be  suffered  to  raise  the  objection  there  for  the  first  time,  and 


ordinary  demurrer  will  be  so  treated  on 
appeal :' McCord  v.  Hill  (1899),  104  Wis. 
437,  80  N.  VV.  735. 

"  A  judgment  will  not  be  reversed  on 
account  of  the  sustaining  of  an  informal 
<lenmrrer  to  an  answer  that  does  not  state 
facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  de- 
fence:" BoUraan  v.  Gemmill  (1900),  1.53 
Ind.  33,  57  N.  E.  542 ;  Hanson  v.  Cruse 
(1900),  155  Ind.  176,  57  N.  E.  904. 

An  order  sustaining  a  demurrer  is  ap- 
pealable although  no  final  judgment  was 
entered  or  rendered  by  the  court :  Brad- 
ley V.  Miller  (1896),  100  la.  169,  69  N.  \V. 
426. 

An  appeal  will  lie  wherever  a  writ  of 
error  could  be  sustained  :  O'Donnell  v. 
Sargent  &  Co.  (1897),  69  Conn.  476,  38 
Atl.  216. 

The  overruling  of  a  demurrer  to  one 
paragraph  of  a  complaint  will  not  be  re- 
viewed on  appeal  when  the  case  was  tried 
and  judgment  rendered  for  plaintiff  on 
another  paragraph  :  Robinson  v.  Dickey 
(1893),  143  Ind.  205,  42  N.  E.  679. 

Nor  can  error  be  predicated  on  the 
court's  action  in  sustaining  a  demurrer 
to  an  answer  when  the  facts  averred  in 
the  answer  were  admissible  under  a  gen- 
eral denial  pleaded :  Troxel  v.  Thomas 
(1900),  155  Ind.  519,  58  N.  E.  725;  Xow- 
lin  ('.  State  ex  rel.  Board  of  Commission- 
ers (1903),  — Ind. —  ,  66  N.  E.  .54;  Smith 
V.  Pinnell  (1895),  143  Ind.  485,  40  N.  E. 
798.  See  Clause  Printing  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  Bank  (1896),  145  Ind.  682,  44  \.  E. 
256,  where  same  rule  was  announced  in 
respect  to  a  counter-claim  and  answer  in 
bar. 

Where  two  defences  are  pleaded,  one 
good  and  the  other  bad,  the  error  in  over- 
ruling a  demurrer  to  the  latter  defence  is 
not  available,  the  former  constituting  a 
complete  bar  to  the  action :  Fire  Extin- 
guisher Co.  V.  City  of  Perry  (1899),  8 
Okla.  429,  58  Pac.  635. 

Where  it  clearly  appears  that  no  injury 
resulted  to  defendant  by  rea.son  of  tlie 
in  proper  overruling  of  a  demurrer  for 
misjoinder,  the  judgment  sub.sequently 
rendered  npon  the  complaint  will  not  be 
reversed;  Theliu  r.  Stewart  (1893),  100 
Cal.  372.  34  Pac.  861  ;  A.sevado  v.  Orr 
(ISO.)).  UK)  r-.d    liM,  34  Pac.  777. 


"  Wliere  a  demurrer  to  a  petition  which 
states  no  ground  for  substantial  damages 
is  sustained,  this  court  will  not  reverse 
the  decision  merely  because  tiie  facts 
stated  would  entitle  plaintiff  to  nominal 
damages:  "  Cook  v.  Smith  (190'5),  —  Kan. 
—  ,72  Pac.  524. 

Scope  of  Demurrer. 

A  demurrer  will  not  lie  to  a  portion  of 
a  statement  of  a  cause  of  action  :  McCana 
V.  Penniell893),  100  Cal.  547,  33  Pac.  138; 
Lewis  V.  Town  of  Brandenburg  (1898), 
105  Ky.  14.  47  S.  W.  862;  Sloan  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  (1902),  64  S.  C.  389,  42  S.  E.  197  ; 
Buist  v.  Salvo  (1894),  44  S.  C.  143,  21 
S.  E.  615  ;  Steenerson  v.  Great  Northern 
Ry.  Co.  (1896),  6+  Minn.  216.  66  N.  W. 
723;  Nelson  i-.  Merced  County  (1898), 
122  Cal.  644,  55  Cal.  421.  But"  see  Free- 
man's Appeal  (1899),  71  Conn.  708,43 
Atl.  185. 

"  Where  a  pleading  is  tested  by  de- 
murrer it  must  stand  or  fall  by  its  own 
averments.  It  can  find  neither  weakness 
nor  strength  from  otiier  parts  of  the 
record : "  Pittsburgh,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Moore  (1898),  152  Ind.  .34.5.  SSN.  E.  290. 
See  also  Davidson  v.  Gregory  (1903),  132 
N.  C.  389,  43  S.  E.  916;  Strawhacker  r. 
Ives  (1901),  114  la.  661,  87  N.  W.  669  ; 
Anderson  v.  Hilton  &  Dodge  Co.  (1899), 
110  Ga.  263,  34  S.  E.  365. 

But  see  Chicago  Bldg.  Co.  v.  Cream- 
ery Co.  (1898),  106  Ga.  84,  31  S.  E.  809. 
Held  in  Douglas  v.  Coonley  (1898  ),  156 
N.  Y.  521,  51  N.  E.  283,  tbat  where  an 
answer  is  demurred  to,  all  the  allegations 
of  the  complaint  referred  to  in  the  answer 
are  to  be  taken  as  incorporated  in  it. 

Where  a  tlemurrer  is  specifically  di- 
rected to  the  second  cause  of  action  con- 
tained in  a  cross-bill,  and  the  other  causes 
of  action  therein  are  substantially  the 
same  as  the  second,  the  demurrer  will  be 
considered  as  if  it  went  to  the  entire  cross- 
bill :  Hughes  V.  Pratt  (1900),  37  Ore.  45,  60 
Pac   707. 

Form  of  Demurrer. 

A  demurrer  in  the  words  of  the  statute 
is  sufficient:  O'Rourke  i'.  City  of  Sioux 
Falls  (1893),  4  S.  D.  47,  .54  N.  W.  1044; 
Van  Dyke  v.  Doherty  (1896),  6  N.  D.  263, 
69  N.  W.  200.     The  section  of  the  code 


DEFECTIVE    ANSWERS. 


713 


to  exclude  evidence  of  the  defence  or  counter-claim  on  the  ground 
that  it  is  informally  pleaded.^ 


requiring  that  tho  demurrer  sliall  dis- 
tinctly specify  the  grounds  of  the  objection 
to  the  complaint  held  to  mean  only  that 
"  when  the  first  ground  is  relied  on  the 
demurrer  must  specify  whether  the  want 
of  jurisdiction  is  as  to  the  person  or  sub- 
ject-matter ;  and  when  the  fourth  is  relied 
on  the  parties  must  specify  whether  the 
defect  is  in  parties  plaintiff  or  defendant,  " 
but  in  other  cases  it  is  sutiicieut  to  specify 
which  ground  is  relied  ou  as  the  statute 
names  them  :  Hudson  v.  Archer  (1893),  4 
S.  D.  1 28,  55  N.  VV.  1 099. 

A  demurrer  to  au  answer  generally 
on  the  ground  that  it  "  does  not  state 
facts  sufficient  to  show  that  the  ])laintiff 
is  estopped  from  maintaining  the  said 
action,"  does  not  state  a  ground  for  de- 
murrer under  the  code,  and  should  be  dis- 
regarded :  Hill  V.  Walsh  (1894),  6  8.  D. 
421,  61  N.  W.  440.  See  also  Tootle  v. 
Berkley  (1896),  57  Kan.  lll,45Pac.  77, 
where  the  demurrer  was  held  iusufficient, 
not  stating  a  ground  for  a  demurrer  under 
the  code. 

But  in  Iowa  a  general  demurrer  in  the 
words  of  the  statute  is  not  sufficient  in  a 
law  action  under  Code  §  3562,  which  pro- 
vides that  "  A  demurrer  must  specify  and 
number  the  grounds  of  objection  to  the 


1  This  general  rule  is  illustrated  by  the 
following  cases,  which  also  furnish  exam- 
ples of  insufficient  aud  imperfect  allega- 
tions:  Becker  v.  Boon,  61  N.  Y.  317; 
West  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Fenton,  52  Ind.  1 ; 
Jones  V.  Frost,  51  id.  69;  Langsdale  r. 
Girton,  51  id.  99  ;  Ready  v.  Sommer,  37 
AVis.  265  ;  Bushey  v.  Keynolds,  31  Ark. 
657 ;  Simpson  Cent.  Coll.  i'.  Bryan,  50 
Iowa,  293  ;  Penn.  Coal  Co.  v.  Blake,  85 
N.  y.  226,  235;  Holcraft  v.  Mellott,  57 
Ind.  539;  State  v.  Newlin,  69  id.  108; 
White  V.  San  Rafael,  etc.  R.  Co.,  50  Cal. 
417  ;  Spiers  v.  Duane,  54  Cal.  176  ;  exam- 
ples of  defective  answers,  Indianapolis, 
B.  &  W.  R.  Co.  V.  Risley,  50  Ind.  60; 
Shipman  v.  State,  43  Wis.  381  ;  Nys  v. 
Biemeret,  44  id.  104;  Elmore  d.  Hill,  46 
id.  618  ;  Coltzhauser  v.  Simon,  47  id.  103  ; 
nature  and  effect  oisham  answeis,  Womble 


pleadings,  and  it  shall  not  be  sufficient  to 
state  the  objection  in  the  terms  of  the 
preceding  sectiou,  except  that  a  demurrer 
to  an  equital)le  petition  for  the  fifth  reason 
of  said  section  may  be  stated  in  the  terms 
thereof."  See  Stokes  r.  Sprague  (1899), 
110  la.  89,  81  N.  W.  195.  Held,  in  In  re 
Estate  of  McMurray  (1899),  107  la.  648, 
78  N.  W.  691,  that  a  demurrer  in  a  sjiecial 
proceeding  must  specify  the  grounds  of 
objection.  And  in  Miller  v.  Cross  (1900), 
73  Conn.  538,  48  Atl.  213,  a  demurrer 
which  did  not  point  out  the  insufficiency 
was  held  radically  defective. 

In  South  Carolina,  by  Circuit  Court 
Rule  18,  the  demurrant  must  state  in  writ- 
ing "wherein  the  pleading  objected  to  is 
insufficient ;  "  and  it  was  held  a  sufiicient 
compliance  with  this  rule  to  demur  in  tiie 
words  of  the  statute  and  on  the  hearing 
submit  the  specific  grounds  of  objection 
in  writing:  Riggs  r.  Home  Fire  Ass'n 
(1901),  61  S.  C.  448,  39  S.  E.  614. 

A  demurrer  to  an  answer  in  these 
words,  "  It  does  not  state  facts  sufficient 
to  make  a  good  answer  to  the  con)plaint," 
is  not  sufficient  to  present  any  question 
upon  the  answer.  The  demurrer  should 
state  that  the  answer  does  not  state  facts 
sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  defence. 


V.  Fraps,  77  N.  C.  198;  Ranson  v.  Ander- 
son, 9  S.  C.  438 ;  Greenbaum  v.  Turrill, 
57  Cal.  285  ;  oi  frivolous  answers,  Munger 
V.  Shannon,  61  N.  Y.  251  ;  Cottrell  v 
Cramer,  40  Wis.  555 ;  Hemme  i-.  Hays, 
55  Cal.  337;  Fay  v.  Cobb,  51  id.  313; 
Dail  V.  Harper,  83  N.  C.  4  ;  Hull  v.  Carter, 
83  id.  249 ;  Brogden  v.  Henry,  83  id.  274  ; 
Larimore  v.  Wells,  29  Ohio  St.  13  ;  Sar- 
gent V.  Steubenville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  id. 
449  ;  Ross  V.  Ross,  25  Hun,  642 ;  Lerdall 
V.  Charter  Oak  Ins.  Co..  51  Wis.  426. 

[^Where  a  defence  is  irrelevant  it  may 
be  stricken  out  on  motion  :  Nat.  Distilling 
Co.  V.  Cream  City  Co.  (1893),  8G  Wis. 
352,  56  N.  W.  864.  A  motion  does  not 
reach  back,  like  a  demurrer,  to  the  first 
defective  pleading:  Smith  v.  Kibling 
(1897),  97  Wis.  205,  72  N.  W.  869.3 


7U 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§  488.    *  597.    Conflict  of  Decisions.    This  general  rule  is  well 
settled;    Ijut  there   has    been    some   conflict  of   decisions  in  its 


Citing  Tliomas  v.  Goodwine,  88  Ind.  458 ; 
Dawson  v.  Eads  (1894).  140  Ind.  208,  39 
N.  E.  919. 

Issues  which  may  be  raised  by  Demurrer. 

Whether  the  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint entitle  the  plaintiff  to  equitable  re- 
lief :  Devereux  i:  McCrady  (1895),  46 
S.  C.  133,  24  S.  E.  77  ;  Meyer  v.  Gar- 
thwaite  (1896),  92  Wis.  571,  66  N.  W. 
704  ;  Glover  r.  Hargadiue-McKittrick  Co. 
(1901),  62  Neb.  48.'J,  87  N.  W.  170  (gen- 
eral demurrer)  ;  GuUickson  v.  Madsen 
<1894),  87  Wis.  19,  57  N.  W.  965  (general 
demurrer). 

But  tiiis  issue  cannot  be  raised  by  de- 
murrer ore  tfiius  at  the  trial :  Meyer  r. 
Garthwaite  (1806),  92  Wi.-;.  571,  66  N.  W. 
704;  Picrstoff  v.  .Jorges  (1893),  86  Wis. 
128,  56  N.  W.  735;  Bigelow  v.  Town  of 
Washburn  (1898),  98  Wis.  553,  74  N.  W. 
362  ;  Lederer  v.  Union  Sav.  Bank  (1897), 
52  Neb.  133,  71  N.  W.  954. 

Whether  a  claim  is  too  stale  for  equity 
to  recognize  it:  Wilson  v.  Wilson  (1902), 
41  Ore.  459,  69  Pac.  923.  Whether  an 
action  is  prematurely  brought :  Dicker- 
mau  V.  New  York,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (J899), 
72  Conn.  271,  44  Atl.  228  ;  Fiore  v.  Ladd 
(1896),  29  Ore.  528,  46  Pac.  144. 

Whether  suit  is  brought  in  the  name 
of  the  real  party  in  interest :  J.  I.  Case 
Threshing  Co.  ;;."Pederson  (1894),  6  S.  D. 
140,  60  N.  W.  747  ;  Smith  v.  Security  Co. 
<1899),  8  N.  D.  451,  79  N.  W.  981  ;  Meyer 
V.  Barth  (1897),  97  Wis.  352,  72  N.  W.  748. 

Jurisdiction.  Cannot  be  raised  by 
general  demurrer :  Woods  v.  Sheldon 
(1896),  9  S.  D.  392,  69  N.  W.  602. 

Corporate  capacity,  when  plaintiff  fails 
to  allege  it :  Calnan  Construction  Co.  r. 
Brown  (1899),  110  la.  37,  81  N.  W.  163, 
citing  Sweet  v.  Ervin,  54  la.  101,  and 
Andre  v.  Railway  Co.,  30  la.  107.  But  a 
general  demurrer  will  not  raise  this  issue  : 
Sly  V.  Palo  Alto  Mining  Co.  (1902),  28 
Wash.  485,  68  Pac.  871. 

Authority  to  sue.  Cannot  be  raised  by 
denmrrer :  Milwaukee  v.  Zoehrlaut  Co. 
(1902),  1 14  Wis.  276,  90  N.  W.  187. 

Whether  the  facts  stated  entitle  the 
plaintiff  to  any  relief:  George  v.  Eduey 


(1893),  36  Neb.  604,  54  N.  W.  986;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  MuUins  (1895),  44 
Neb.  732,  62  N.  W.  880. 

Statute  of  frauds  :  Wiseman  v.  Thomp- 
son (1895),  94  la.  607,  63  N.  W.  346; 
Powder  River  Live  Stock  Co.  v.  LamI) 
(1893),  38  Neb.  339,  56  N.  W.  1019; 
Graves  r.  Clark  (1897),  101  la.  738,  69 
N.  W.  1046;  Crane  v.  Powell  (1893),  139 
N.  Y.  379,  34  N.  E.  911  ;  Tyuou  r.  Des- 
pain  (1896),  22  Colo.  240,  43  Pac.  1039; 
Mendelsohn  i-.  Bauov  (1900),  57  S.  C  147, 
35  S.  E.  499.  Contra,  Hemmings  v.  Doss 
(1899),  125  N.  C.  400,  34  S.  E.  511. 

In  Wi'tzteiu  v.  Boston  &  M.  Min.  Co. 
(1903),  28  Mont.  451,  72  Pac.  865,  the  court 
said:  "Section  680  of  the  Code  of  Civil 
Procedure  provides  that  a  demurrer  may 
be  interposed  to  a  complaint  upon  the 
following  ground:  '(3)  That  there  is  an- 
other action  pending  between  the  same 
parties  for  the  same  cause.'  In  order  to 
invoke  successfully  this  ground  of  demur- 
rer, it  must  apjtear  from  the  face  of  tiie 
complaint  (1)  that  anotlier  action  is  pend- 
ing, (2)  that  it  is  l)etweeu  tlie  same  par- 
ties, and  (3)  that  it  is  for  the  same  cause." 
Each  one  of  these  requisites  is  carefully 
considered  in  relation  to  the  pleadings  in 
the  case." 

Demurrer  Ore  Tenus. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  in 
discussing  this  subject,  said  in  Smith  v. 
Kibling  (1897),  97  Wis.  205,  72  N.  W. 
869,  —  "  No  practice  is  known  whereby  it 
was  competent  for  the  defendant  to  chal- 
lenge the  sufficiency  of  the  complaint  by 
an  oral  demurrer.  Under  the  present 
practice  all  pleadings  are  re(iuired  to  be 
in  writing.  The  time  was  when  all  plead- 
ings were  oral.  Then  it  was  competent 
to  demur  ore  tenus,  or  orally.  It  is  now 
familiar  practice  to  raise  the  question  of 
the  sufficiency  of  the  complaint  at  the 
trial  by  an  objection  to  the  reception  of 
evidence  under  the  complaint.  This  ob- 
jection is  something  like  the  demurrer 
ore  tenus  of  the  ancient  ]>ractice,  and  some 
of  its  con.scquences  are  the  same  ;  and  be- 
cause of  this  similarity  it  is,  for  conven' 
ience,  called  a  demurrer  ore  tenus.  But  it 
is  not  a  demurrer  at  all,  witliiu  the  con- 


DEFECTIVE   ANSWERS. 


715 


practical  application,  and  judges  have  occasionally  made  use  of 
very  inaccurate  language  while  invoking  it,  which  has  tended  to 
add  confusion  to  a  matter  which  should  be  kept  clear  and  certain. 
Thus,  judges  of  great  learning  and  ability,  and  who  are  usually 
guarded  in  their  choice  of  expressions,  in  discussing  the  char- 
acter of  pleadings,  both  complaints  or  petitions  and  answers, 
when  the  objection  to  them  was  presented  for  the  first  time  at 
the  trial,  and  evidence  in  support  of  the  cause  of  action  or 
defence  was  opposed  on  the  ground  then  first  stated,  that  the 
allegations  were  insufficient,  have  said,  that  although  the  plead- 
ing was  in  fact  defective,  and  even  though  it  zvas  so  defective  as  to 
be  demurrable^  yet,  as  the  adverse  party  had  not  demurred,  nor 
moved  to  make  it  more  certain,  but  had  gone  to  trial  upon  it,  he 
had  thereby  waived  all  objection  to  its  sufficiency.^     This  lan- 


templation  of  the  statute.  lu  practice, 
this  objectiou  is  properly  made  upon  tlie 
trial  when  evidence  under  the  coin{)laint 
is  first  offered.  The  ruling  upon  the  ob- 
jection is  a  mere  ruling  upon  the  trial,  to 
be  preserved  in  the  bill  of  exceptions." 

Speaking  Demurrer. 

A  demurrer  which  introduces  a  new 
averment  or  assumes  that  the  ])leadiug 
demurred  to  contains  an  allegation  which 
it  does  not  contain,  is  a  speaking  demur- 
rer, and  should  be  overruled :  Clarke  v. 
East  Atlanta  Land  Co.  (1901),  11-3  Ga. 
21,  38  S.  E.  323;  Mathis  r.  Fordham 
(1901),  114  Ga.  364,  40  S.  E.  324;  Woods 
V.  Colony  Bank  (1901),  114  Ga.  683,40 
S.  E.  720;  Teasley  v.  Bradley  (1900),  110 
Ga.  497,  35  S.  E.  782  ;  Beckner  v.  Beckner 
{1898),  104  Ga.  219,  30  S.  E.  622. 

Demurrer  Exclusive. 

Defects  which  appear  on  the  face  of 
the  pleading  and  which  are  grounds  for 
demurrer,  cannot  be  raised  by  answer: 
Bender  v.  Zimmerman  (1896),  135  Mo.  53, 
36  S.  W.  210;  Medland  v.  Walker  (1895), 
96  lia.  175,  64  N.  W.  797  ;  Clark  v.  Ross 
(1895),  96  la.  402,  65  N.  W.  340;  Griffith 
V.  Cromley  (1900),  58  S.  C.  448,  36  S.  E. 
738. 

A  plaintiff  may  demur  to  an  answer  on 
the  ground  that  it  does  not  state  a  de- 
fence, and  also  move  to  have  it  struck 
out  as  frivolous :    Badhaiu    v.    Brabham 


(1899),  54  S.  C.  400,  32  S.  E.  444.  A  de- 
murrer and  motion  to  dismiss  are  in  legal 
effect  the  same,  and  proceed  upon  sub- 
stantially the  same  grounds :  Cofer  v. 
Riseling  (1900),  153  Mo.  633,  55  S.  W. 
235.  A  demurrer  on  the  ground  of  an- 
other action  pending  cannot  be  sustained 
where  there  is  nothing  in  the  complaint 
indicating  the  pendency  of  such  other 
action:  Jackson  v.  McAuley  (1895),  13 
Wash.  298,  43  Pac.  41. 

Frivolous  Demurrer. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota,  in 
Olsen  V.  Cloquet  Lumber  Co.  (1895),  6i 
Minn.  1 7,  63  N.  W.  95,  said  :  "  A  demur- 
rer should  not  be  struck  out  as  frivolous 
unless  it  is  manifest,  without  argument, 
from  a  mere  inspection  of  the  pleading, 
that  there  was  no  reasonable  ground  for 
interposing  it.  It  should  not  be  struck 
out  where  there  is  such  room  for  debate 
as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  pleading  de- 
murred to  that  an  attorney  of  ordinary 
intelligence  might  have  interposed  a  de- 
murrer in  entire  good  faith."  See  also, 
Littlefield  v.  Wm.  Bergenthal  Co.  (1894), 
87  Wis.  394,  58  N.  W.  743  ;  Geilfus  v. 
Gales  (1894),  87  Wis.  395,  58  N.  W.  742.] 

1  QIu  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Zeims  (1894), 
93  la.  140,  61  N.  W.  483,  the  court  said  : 
"  If  matter  pleaded  as  a  defence  is  not  at- 
tacked by  motion  or  demurrer,  and  there 
is  testimony  to  sustain  it,  it  will  defeat  the 
action,  although  it  may  not  have  amounted 


716  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

giiage  is  certainly  inaccurate,  and  unnecessarily  confuses  a  subject 
wliicli  is  in  itself  not  free  from  difficulty.  It  is,  beyond  a  doubt, 
true,  that  if  the  answer  or  other  pleading  is  defective  in  such  a 
manner,  and  to  such  an  extent  only,  that  the  proper  method  of 
correction  is  a  motion  to  make  it  more  definite  and  certain,  and  if 
the  adverse  party  omits  to  make  the  motion,  but  goes  to  trial,  lie 
therebv  waives  the  objection,  and  cannot  raise  it  by  attempting 
to  shut  out  evidence  of  the  cause  of  action  or  defence.  But  if 
the  defect  is  of  such  a  nature  that  a  denuirrer  is  pro})er,  and  the 
pleading  would  be  held  insufficient  upon  a  demurrer,  it  is  equally 
certain  that  the  adverse  party  does  not  waive  the  objection  by 
going  to  trial  without  demurring.^  If  the  pleading  was  a  com- 
plaint or  petition,  the  ground  of  demurrer  would  necessarily  be, 
that  it  did  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute  a  cause  of  action ; 
and,  by  an  express  provision  of  all  the  codes,  this  ground  is  not 
waived  by  answering  and  going  to  trial.  If  the  pleading  was 
an  answer,  the  ground  of  demurrer  would  still  be  that  the  facts 
stated  did  not  constitute  a  defence  or  counter-claim;  and  if  it  did 
not,  in  fact,  allege  a  defence  or  counter-claim  none  could  be 
proved  under  it  at  the  trial. ^  The  rule,  with  its  proper  limita- 
tions, is  a  correct  one,  and  operates  in  the  interests  of  justice 
and  good  faith:  but  if  acted  upon  in  the  broad  manner  as  above 
recited,  it  would  tend  to  destroy  all  certainty  and  accuracy  in 
pleading.  If  the  deficiencies  are  such  that  a  motion  is  the  proper 
mode  of  cure,  they  are  necessarily  of  form,  and  not  of  substance ; 
the  adverse  party  is  not  in  fact  misled ;  and  a  neglect  on  his  part 
to  apply  the  remedy  in  an  early  stage  of  the  cause  ought  to  be 
and  is  a  waiver  of  all  objection,  so  that  the  cause  of  action  or 
defence,  as  the  case  may  be,  can  be  proved,  notwithstanding  the 
ambiguity  and  indefiniteness  of  the  averments. 

§  489.  *  598.  Same  Subject.  Adopting  the  rule  in  this  re- 
stricted scope,  there  are  still  cases  of  doubt  and  of  conflict  in 
its  application.     In  some  answers  a  defect  of  substance  is  plain ; 

to  a  legal  defence."    CitingConger  i-.  Cral)-  2  [^See  Wintrode  v.  Reiibarger  (1898), 

tree,  83  la.  53G,  .5.')  N.  W.  335;   Linden  r.  L50  Ind.  5.50,  50  N.  E.  570,  where  it  was 

Green,  81  la.  365,  46  N.  W.  1108  ;  Benja-  held  that  a  demurrer  on  the  ground  that 

niin  V.  Veith,  80  la.  149,  45  N.  W.  731.]  facts  were  not  stated  "  sufficient  to  cousti- 

'  [^See  note  on  Waiver  of  Defects  of  tute  a  good  answer  to  the  complaint  of  the 

Suhstance,  p.  605.     But  see  also  Wilson  c  jdaintifF"  does  not  raise  the  question  of 

Abenleen   (1901),  25  Wash.  614,  66  I'ac.  tlie  sufficiency  of  the  answer   to  state  a 

9.-. ;   Klcjtz  V.  James  (1896),  97  la.  337,  66  defence.] 
N.  W.  190.] 


DEFECTIVE   ANSWERS.  717 

the  facts  alleged  clearly  constitute  no  defence:  in  others  the 
delicicncies  are  as  plainly  formal;  the  necessary  facts  are  all 
mentioned;  no  doubt  can  exist  as  to  the  actual  intent  and  mean- 
ing, hut  still  some  requirements  as  to  form  and  method  have 
not  been  complied  with.  Between  tliese  two  extremes  there  are 
cases  bordering  upon  the  dividing-line,  in  which  it  is  difhcult 
to  determine  with  certainty  whether  the  defect  is  one  of  form 
merely,  or  whether  it  passes  the  limit,  and  is  one  of  substance. 
In  such  instances  we  shall  naturally  find  a  conflict  of  decision 
among  different  judges,  and  we  shall  even  discover  the  same 
court  vacillating,  in  one  case  applying  the  liberal  doctrine  and 
holding  the  objection  waived,  and,  in  another  not  essentially 
different,  enforcing  the  stricter  rule,  pronouncing  the  answer 
entirely  bad,  and  wholly  rejecting  it.  In  some  of  the  decisions 
to  which  I  shall  refer,  it  would  seem  that  able  courts  have  neg- 
lected their  own  precedents,  and  forgotten  the  rule  imposed  upon 
them  by  the  statute,  which  abrogates  the  inequitable  common- 
law  doctrine  of  an  interpretation  adverse  to  the  pleader,  and 
requires  a  liberal  construction  with  a  view  to  substantial  justice 
between  the  parties.  It  is  only  by  a  comparison  and  analysis  of 
these  decisions  that  a  practical  result  can  be  reached,  and  a  gen- 
eral principle  deduced ;  and  I  shall  therefore  cite,  either  in  the 
text  or  in  the  notes,  the  leading  cases  which  have  passed  upon 
this  important  question. 

§  490.  *  599.  Defects  of  Form  are  Curable  by  Motion.  The 
authorities  are  uniform  that  a  mere  defect  of  form,  as  it  has 
been  already  described,  must  be  cured  by  a  motion,  and  not  by 
a  demurrer.^     In  an  action  to  foreclose  a  purchase-money  mort- 


1  ^General  Rules  as  to  Motions.  appealable.     If  to  the  latter,  it  can  only 

The  determination  of  a  motion  is  not  be   considered  on   appeal  from  the   final 

res  judicata,  so  as  to  prevent  parties  from  judgment.  "  Allen  v.  Church  (1897),  101 

drawing   the   same    matters    in  question  la.  116,  70  N.  W.  127.     A  motion  to  strike 

again   in  an   action :    Heidel  v.  Benedict  out  a  pleading  and  the  ruling  of  the  court 

(1894),  61  Minn.  170,  63  N.  W.  490.     The  thereon  can  only  be  made  a  part  of  the 

test  as  to  whether  the  ruling  on  a  motion  record  by  bill  of  exce])tions  or  by  order  of 

is    appealable    before   judgment    is    this:  court:  Allen  v.  Hollingshead   (1900),  15.5 

"Does  the  part  of  the  pleading  assailed  Ind.  178,  57  N.  E.  917.     A  pleading  which 

show    a    distinct   cause   of  action,   or  is  sets  up  the  proper  facts  will  be  considered 

it   a   mere  incident   thereto  ?      Does  the  as  a  motion  although  not  so  designated : 

ruling   go  to  the  plaintiff's   right  to  re-  Waldo  v.  Thweatt  (1897),  64  Ark.  126,  40 

cover,  or  merely  to  the  amount  of  his  re-  S.  W.  782. 

covery  on  a  ground  otherwise  pleaded  ^  Pleading  over  after  a  motion  has  been 

If  the  order  relates  to  the  former,  it  is  overruled  waives  objection  to  tlie  ruling  : 


718 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


gage  of  land  convej^ed  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant,  the  an- 
swer set  up  covenants  in  the  deed  of  conveyance,  and  a  breach 
of  them,  namely,  "that  the  plaintiff  was  not  seised  of  the 
premises,  as  of  a  good  and  indefeasible  estate  in  fee,"  etc., 
negativing  all  the  covenants.  To  this  the  plaintiff  replied, 
and  instead  of  averring  "that  he  was  seised,"  etc.,  said,  "And 
the  i)laintiff  denies  that  at  the  time,  etc.,  he  was  not  seised  in 
fee  of  the  said  premises,"  etc.,  and  in  this  manner  met  all  the 
allesrations  of  the  answer.  The  defendant  demurred  for  insuffi- 
ciency.  It  was  held  by  the  court  that  "  insufficiency  "  as  a  ground 
of  demurrer  implies  that  the  allegations  do  not  constitute  any 
defence  or  denial  to  the  adverse  pleading.  The  insufficiency 
relates  to  the  substance  of  the  averments  as  a  whole,  rather 
than  to  the  form  of  the  expression.  The  reply  in  this  case 
was  defective  in  form,  but  the  substiince  thereof  was  good; 
that  is,  it  stated  a  denial  in  an  improper  manner,  and  the 
remedy  therefor  was  not  by  demurrer,  but  by  motion  to  render 
the  allegations  more  definite  and  certain. ^  Although  this  de- 
cision was  made  in  reference  to  a  reply,  the  principle  applies 
equally  to  an  answer. 


Walser  v.  Wear  (1897),  141  Mo.  443,  42 
S.  W.  928 ;  Sprinfrfield,  etc.  Co.  v.  Dono- 
van (1899),  147  Mo.  622,  49  S.  W.  500; 
Buugenstock  v.  Nishnabotna  Drainage 
Dist.  (1901),  163  Mo.  198,  64  S.  W.  149. 

A  motion  which  cannot  be  sustained 
substantially  as  made  must  be  overruled  : 
Palmer  v.  Bank  of  Ulysses  (1899),  59 
Neb.  412,  81  N.  W.  303  ;  First  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Engelbercht  (1899),  58  Neb.  639,  79 
N.  W.  556 ;  Dobry  r.  Western  Mfg.  Co. 
(1899),  58  Neb.  667^79  N.  W.  559  ;  Draper 
V.  Taylor  (1899),  58  Neb.  787,  79  N.  W. 
709;  lludelson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (189S), 
56  Neb.  247,  76  N.  W.  570;  Beebe  v.  Lati- 
mer (1899),  59  Neb.  305,  80  N.  W.  904. 

A  motion  to  strike  another  motion  is 
not  proper  practice  :  German  Savings 
Bank  v.  Cady  (1901),  114  la.  228,  86 
N.  W.  277;  Long  v.  Ruch  (1897),  148 
Ind.  74,  47  N.  E.  156;  Bonfoy  r  Goar 
(1894),  140  Ind.  292,  39  N.  E.  56.  Nor  is 
it  proper  to  demur  to  a  motion :  Bonfoy 
I'.  Goar  (1894),  140  Ind.  292,  39  N.  E.  56.] 

'  Flanders  i^.  McVickar,  7  Wis.  372, 
377.  See,  to  the  same  effect,  Speuce  r. 
Spence,  17  Wis.  448,  454;  Hart  i;.  Craw- 


ford, 41  Ind.  197;  Snowden  v.  Wilas,  19 
lud.  10  ;  Fultz  V.  Wycoff,  25  Ind.  321  ; 
l'h(enix  v.  Lamb,  29  Iowa,  352,  354;  First 
Nat.  Bk.  of  New  Berlin  v.  Church,  3 
N.  Y.  S.  C.  10.  The  answer  averred  that 
defendant  "  had  no  knowledge  or  infor- 
mation thereto,"  which  was  held  to  be  an 
improper  form  of  denial :  but  the  plain- 
tiff'.s  remedy  was  by  motion,  and  the  de- 
fect liad  been  waived.  Seeley  v.  Engell, 
13  N.  Y.  .542,  548,  per  Denio  J.:  "The 
alleged  mistake  was  set  up  in  the  answer, 
and  denied  by  the  reply.  If  the  allegation 
in  that  respect  was  too  general  in  its 
terms,  the  remedy  of  the  plaintiff  was  by 
motion,  under  §  160,  to  compel  the  de- 
fendant to  make  it  more  certain."  See 
also  Stringfellow  r.  Alderson,  12  Kan. 
112;  Lathrop  i-.  Godfrey,  6  N.  Y.  S.  C.  96  ; 
Hutchiugs  i".  Castle,  48  Cal.  152  ;  Jackson 
Sharp  Co.  v.  Holland,  14  Fla.  384,  389  ;  a 
fortiori  such  an  answer  cannot  be  objected 
to  for  the  first  time  on  appeal.  Green  i-. 
Lake  Sup.  &  Pac.  Fuse  Co.,  46  Cal.  408. 
See  also  McCown  v.  McSween,  29  S.  C 
130 ;  Hagely  v.  Hagely,  68  Cal.  348. 


DEFECTIVE   ANSWKRS.  719 

§  491.  *  600.  Defects  of  Form  are  v/aived  by  Neglect  to  move, 
and  Going  to  Trial.  Test  of  Formal  Defects.  That  all  objections  of 
mere  form  to  the  answer  are  waived  by  a  neglect  to  move,  and 
by  going  to  trial  thereon,  is  sustained  by  numerous  cases ;  ^  and 
some  of  them  apply  the  rule  to  answers  in  which  the  deficien- 
cies were  very  considerable,  even  so  great  as  to  have  rendered 
the  pleading  demurrable  in  the  opinion  of  the  court  pronouncing 
the  decision.  In  White  v.  Spencer,  ^  which  was  an  action  for 
flowing  plaintiff's  lands,  the  answer  set  up  facts  showing  a 
user  and  enjoyment  by  defendant  of  the  easement  for  more  than 
twenty  years,  but  did  not  aver  that  this  user  was  adverse.  The 
plaintiff  replied  a  general  denial,  and  on  his  objection  all  evi- 
dence in  support  of  the  answer  was  excluded  at  the  trial.  On 
appeal  from  the  judgment  rendered  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff, 
the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  the  user  must  be 
adverse,  and  that  the  plaintiff  might  have  successfully  de- 
murred to  the  answer,  because  an  averment  of  such  adverse 
user  was  omitted;  but  that,  by  replying,  and  going  to  trial,  he 
had  waived  the  objection.  Denio  J.  said:  "I  am  of  opinion 
that  the  plaintiff,  having  treated  the  allegation  in  the  answer  as 
a  sufficient  statement  of  defence  by  replying  to  it,  and  by  going 
to  trial  without  objection,  is  precluded  from  objecting  to  evi- 
dence to  sustain  it."  He  cited  cases  showing  that  the  same  rule 
prevailed  under  the  old  system,^  and  added:  "We  have  decided, 
it  is  true,  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  judge  on  the  trial  to  reject 
evidence  offered  in  support  of  immaterial  issues.^  But  an  issue 
is  not  immaterial,  within  the  meaning  of  this  rule,  on  account  of 
the  omission  of  some  averment  in  a  pleading  which  is  essential  to 
the  full  legal  idea  of  the  claim  or  defence  which  is  attempted  to 
be  set  up.  If  the  court  can  see,  as  in  this  case,  what  the  matter 
really  attempted  to  he  pleaded  is,  the  issue  is  not  immaterial, 
though  it  may  be  defectively  stated."  In  this  last  sentence 
Mr.  Justice  Denio  has  given  a  very  clear  and  accurate  descrip- 
tion of  mere  defects  in  form,  which  are  waived  by  a  neglect  to 

1  [^See  note  on  Imperfect,  Incomplete,  -  White  v.  Spencer,  14  N.  Y.  247,  249, 

and  Informal  Allegations,  p.  599.    See  also  251. 

Barrett  v.   Baker  (1896),  136  Mo.  512,37  3  Meyer  v.  McLean,  1   Johns.  509;  2 

S.  W.  130.  "  A  bad  answer  is  good  enough  id.  183;  Reynolds  v.   Lounsbury,  6   Hill, 

for    a  bad  complaint :   Hiatt    c.    Town  of  534. 

Darlington  (1898),  152  Ind.  570,  53  N.  E.  *  Corning  v.  Corning,  6  N.  Y.  97. 

825.3 


720  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

correct  them  by  motion.  Whether  the  principle  was  properly- 
applied  to  the  case  before  him,  is,  as  it  seems  to  me,  more  than 
questionable.  The  answer  did  not  attempt  to  state  an  adverse 
user,  and  simply  fail  to  state  it  with  accuracy;  it  omitted  any 
such  averment  entirely;  it  therefore  set  up  no  defence  at  all. 
When  it  is  said  that,  if  the  court  can  plainly  see  what  the  matter 
really  attempted  to  be  pleaded  is,  the  deficiency  is  formal,  it  is 
not  intended  that  the  court  may  be  able,  from  their  knowledge 
as  lawyers  and  their  experience  as  judges,  to  guess  with  reason- 
able certainty  what  the  pleader  designed ;  they  must  be  able  to 
gather  from  the  legal  import  of  the  facts  which  are  alleged  — 
although  improperly  alleged  —  the  nature  of  the  defence  relied 
on;  in  other  words,  the  substantial  facts  which  constitute  that 
defence  must,  in  some  manner,  appear  on  the  record.  A  defence 
of  fraud  could  hardly  be  considered  sufficient  at  the  trial,  from 
which  all  averments  of  the  scienter  had  been  omitted ;  and  yet  a 
fact  was  here  wholly  left  out  of  the  answer  which  was  as  essen- 
tial in  making  up  the  defence  as  the  guilty  knowledge  is  to  con- 
stitute the  fraud.  Although  the  reasoning  of  Mr.  Justice  Denio 
is  admirable  in  its  definition  of  the  general  rule,  his  conclusion 
cannot  be  reconciled  with  some  subsequent  decisions  of  the  same 
court. 

§  492.  *  601.  Case  of  Simmons  v.  Sisson.  In  Simmons  v. 
Sisson,  the  subject  was  discussed  at  large  both  upon  principle 
and    upon    authority. ^     The   reasoning    of    the    court,    and    the 

1  Simmons   v.    Sisson,    26    N.   Y.  264,  in    his   own   wrong.      On  the   trial,    the 

271.      The   action    was    brought   by  the  referee  held   that    this    answer   admitted 

plaintiff,     treasurer     of     a     corporation,  the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  that  the 

against  the    defendants,    as  stockholders,  plaintiff  had  expended  the  sum  mentioned 

The  complaint  alleged  that  the  plaintiff  over   and    above  the   earnings,   and    had 

had.  by  order  of  the  directors,  advanced  done  this  by  order  of  the  directors.     On 

and  e.xpended  a  certain   sura  more  than  :ippeal  from   the   judgment   rendered    in 

he  had  received  from  its  funds,  and  that  favor  of  the  plaintiff,  Selden  J.,  who  de- 

the    corporation    was    indebted    to     him  livered  the  opinion  of  the  court,  declared 

therefor.     The  answer  contained  two  de-  that  the  fir.st  defence  was  the  exact  equiv- 

fences,  —  1.  It   denied    that  the   corpora-  alent  of  «// (/e/)ef  at  the  common  law,  and 

tion  was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  in  said  was   a   good    general   denial    under    the 

sum,  or  in  any  other  sum ;  2.  It  alleged  code,   and    tlien    proceeded    as    follows : 

that  the  plaintiff  had    been  directed    by  "  But  whether  the  preceding  position   ia 

the   corporation   to   expend  the  earnings  correct  or  not,  it  was  too  late  to  object  at 

thereof,  and   no  more ;  that  with  knowl-  the  clo.se  of  the  trial  that  this  divi.sion  of 

edge  of  such  direction,  and  of  the  amount  the  answer  did  not  put  the  fact  of  indebt- 

of  such  earnings,  he  had  expended  more  edne.ss  in  issue.     Under  the  former  sy.s- 

than  said  amount,  contrary  to  the  wishes  tem  of  pleaiiing,  nil  (lelmt  to  an  action  of 

and  instructions  of  the  corporation,  and  debt    on    bond   or  judgment  was  bad  ou 


DEFECTIVE    ANSWERS. 


721 


decision  upon  it,  are,  in  the  main,  in  perfect  accord  with  the 
spirit  and  letter  of  the  codes,  and  well  express  the  liberal  design 
of  the  reformed  procedure.  The  only  criticism  which  must  be 
made  upon  the  opinion  —  and  it  is  a  most  important  one  —  is 
upon  that  portion  which  draws  analogies  from  the  common-law 
system.  Certainly  none  of  the  special  common-law  rules  which 
distinguished  the  cases  in  which  a  particular  form  of  general 
issue  could  be  used,  and  which  defined  the  office  of  a  demurrer 
either  general  or  special  as  applied  to  such  pleas,  are  preserved ; 
they  have  all  been  swept  away,  and  any  trace  of  them  only  serves 
to  obscure  the  clear  principles  which  find  an  expression  in  the 
codes.  1 

§  493.  *  602.  Additional  Cases.  In  an  action  upon  a  promis- 
sory note,  the  defendant,  an  accommodation -maker,  pleaded  the 
defence  of  payment  by  the  payee,  and  on  the  trial  proved,  under 
objection,  a  delivery  of  lumber  by  said  payee  to  the  plaintiff,  and 
the  receipt  thereof  by  him  in  full  satisfaction  of  the  demand. 


general  demurrer ;  but  if,  instead  of  de- 
murring, tlie  plaintiff  went  to  trial  on  that 
issue,  it  was  always  held  to  put  him  to 
proof  of  his  cause  of  actiou.  Starkie  on 
Ev.  140;  2  Phil.  Ev.  Cow.  &  H.'s  ed. 
168;  I  Ch.  PI.  (Springfield  ed.  1844) 
4.33;  Meyer  v.  McLean,  2  Johns.  183; 
Push  V.  Cobbett,  2  Johns.  Cas.  256,  per 
Radcliff  J.  ...  I  think,  therefore,  that 
under  the  strictest  rules  of  special  plead- 
ing, the  first  defence  of  the  answer,  if  not 
objected  to  as  insufficient  before  trial  by 
demurrer,  would  always  have  been  held 
sufficient,  ou  tlie  trial,  to  put  in  issue  the 
cause  of  action  ;  and  that,  in  view  of  the 
provisions  of  the  code  in  reference  to 
the  construction  of  pleadings,  tlie  referee 
erred  in  holding  that  the  defendants  had 
admitted  the  indebtedness  of  tlie  corpo- 
ration, when  they  expressly  denied  it. 
There  are,  I  think,  much  stronger  rea- 
sons now  for  holding  such  an  answer  suf- 
ficient, on  the  trial,  to  put  the  question  of 
indebtedness  in  issue  than  there  were 
when  the  decisions  were  made  to  which 
I  have  referred.  Parties  are  now  pro- 
vided with  short  and  cheap  methods  by 
motion  to  compel  defective  pleadings  to 
he  amended,  stricken  out,  or  that  judg- 
ment be  pronounced  upon  them  summa- 
rily ;    and  they  can  have  no   excuse  fur 


reserving  such  objections  until  the  close 
of  the  trial.  I  am  of  opinion,  that,  when 
that  course  is  taken,  the  party  must 
stand  u])on  the  pleadings  and  evidence 
together  ;  that  the  judgment  must  be  such 
as  tlie  whole  case,  pleadings  and  evidence 
united,  demands;  and  tliat  it  would  be 
the  duty  of  the  court,  under  §  176,  to  dis- 
regard defects  in  the  pleadings  not  before 
noticed,  or  to  order  the  required  amend- 
ments under  §§  170,  173.  If,  however, 
the  case  should  be  such  as  to  satisfy  tlie 
court  tliat  neither  party  had  been  misled 
by  defects  in  the  pleadings,  it  should  be 
disposed  of  under  §  169." 

1  Even  though  the  general  issue  nil 
debet,  when  improperly  pleaded  in  debt 
upon  a  specialty,  might  be  reached  by, a 
general  demurrer,  it  is  very  clear  that  the 
first  defence  in  the  case  above  mentioned 
was  not  demurrable  upon  any  true  con- 
struction of  the  provisions  found  in  the 
codes.  It  was  an  attempted  denial,  and  it 
actually  contained  denials :  its  real  de- 
fect was  that  it  denied  the  legal  conclu- 
sion from  the  facts  alleged  by  the  plaintiff, 
and  not  the  facts  themselves.  The  only 
proper  mode  to  correct  it  would  have 
been  a  motion.  All  that  was  said  of  its 
resemblance  to  nil  debet  wns  utterly  out- 
side of  the  questions  before  the  court. 
46 


722  CIVIL    KEMEDIES,. 

The-  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  after  holding  that  the  answer 
was  good,  and  that  under  a  defence  of  payment  the  defendant 
may  prove  a  payment  in  cash  or  in  any  other  manner,  added: 
"  If  the  particulars  of  the  transaction  between  the  payee  and  the 
plaintiff  were  not  sufficiently  disclosed  b}'  the  answer,  the  plain- 
tiff's remedy  was  a  motion  under  §  IGO  of  the  code.  He  could 
not  accept  the  plea,  and  go  to  trial  upon  it,  and  then  interpose 
the  objection  for  the  first  time  that  it  was  not  sufficiently  de- 
scriptive of  the  particulars  relied  on  as  constituting  payment."^ 
In  Chamberlain  c.  Painsville,  etc.  R.  R.,-  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Ohio  applied  the  rule  sanctioned  by  Simmons  v.  Sisson  to  an 
answer  equally  faulty  with  the  one  in  the  latter  case  in  its  denial 
of  legal  conclusions  rather  than  of  issuable  facts.  The  action 
being  upon  a  promissory  note,  the  answer  was,  "  That  the  said 
note  in  said  petition  mentioned  was  and  is  wholly  without  con- 
sideration, and  void."  No  motion  was  made  to  compel  more 
specific  averments,  and  the  parties  went  to  trial.  The  court, 
after  saying  that  the  defendant  might  have  been  required  to 
make  the  defence  more  definite  and  certain,  added :  "  Under 
the  broad  issue  thus  chosen  by  the  parties,  any  evidence  would 
have  been  admissible  which  tended  to  impeach  or  sustain  the 
consideration  of  the  note."'  The  answers  in  this  case  and  in 
Simmons  v.  Sisson  closely  resembled  each  other  in  their  defects 
and  in  their  violation  of  the  principles  of  pleading  introduced  by 
the  codes.  In  both,  the  defendants  designed  to  raise  an  issue  of 
fact  which  would  go  to  the  whole  cause  of  action.  The  defect 
was  not  a  misconception  of  the  defence,  nor  a  reliance  on  matters 
which  constituted  no  defence ;  it  was  only  an  imperfect  manner 
of  stating  a  defence  which  was  in  itself  perfect.  Under  a  true 
construction  of  the  codes,  neither  of  these  answers  was  demur- 
rable. If  the  plain  distinction  established  by  the  statutes  is 
to  be  preserved,  it  is  clear  that  a  motion  to  make  the  plead- 
ing more  definite  and  certain  is  the  only  mode  of  curing  defects 
of  this  kind.  I  am  aware  that  demurrers  have  been  sustained 
to  such  defences,  on  the  ground  tliat  they  were  conclusions 
of  law,  and  not  allegations  of  fact;  but  the  courts  have  some- 
times overlooked  the  distinctions  in  this  respect  created  by  the 
legislature. 

1  Farmfirs'  &,  Cit.  Bk.  v.  Sherman,  33  -  Chamberlain  i.-.  Painesville  &  H.  R. 

N.  V.  69,  79.  Co.,  15  Ohio  St.  2'->5,  251. 


DEFECTIVE   ANSWERS.  723 

§  494.  *  G03.  Doctrine  that  Defects  of  Substance  are  Tvaived  by- 
Failure  to  demur.  I  repeat,  the  doctrine  would  be  an  anomaly  that 
an  answer  may  be  demurrable  because  it  fails  to  set  up  any  defence 
or  counter-claim,  and  still  become  a  sufficient  pleading  so  as  to 
admit  proof  of  the  defence  or  counter-claim  from  the  plaintiff's  neg- 
lect to  demur  or  to  object  in  some  other  manner  prior  to  the  trial. 
This  proposition  has,  nevertheless,  been  expressly  sanctioned  b}' 
the  courts  in  certain  cases,  although  it  is  not  supported  by  the 
weight  of  judicial  authority,  and  is  certainly  not  sustained  by 
principle.^  Roback  v.  Powell  ^  is  an  example  of  these  decisions. 
This  case  goes  farther  than  any  of  those  before  cited,  and  cer- 
tainly farther  than  the  rule  invoked  will  warrant.  A  counter- 
claim is  an  independent  cause  of  action,  in  which  the  defendant 
becomes  the  actor,  and  assumes  the  character  of  a  plaintiff.  The 
occasions  and  purposes  in  and  for  which  it  may  be  set  up  are 
carefully  prescribed,  and  it  was  conceded  that  this  answer  did 
not  come  within  the  statutory  definition.  If  the  decision  be 
correct,  on  the  same  principle  it  ought  to  be  held  that  a  de- 
fendant waives  all  objection  to  the  sufficiency  of  a  complaint  or 
petition  which  does  Jiot  state  facts  constituting  a  cause  of  action, 
when  he  answers  it  and  goes  to  trial. 

§  495.  *  604.  Liberal  Rule  of  Construction  not  always  Follow^ed. 
Notwithstanding  this  array  of  cases  in  which  the  liberal  rule  of 
construing  the  pleadings  has  been  sometimes  pushed  even  to  an 
unwarrantable  extreme,  there  are  others  in  which  the  courts  have 
entirely  disregarded  the  doctrine,  have  overlooked  their  own 
precedents,  and  have  gone  to  as  great  a  length  in  the  opposite 
direction.  In  Manning  i\  Tyler,  an  action  was  brought  upon 
a  promissory  note  against  R.    as  maker,  and   T.   as  indorser.^ 

1  ^See  note  on  Waiver  of  Defects  of  ter-claim  having  been  excluded,  the  Su- 
Substance,  p.  605.J  prenie  Court  of   Indiana  held,  upon  the 

2  Roback  v.  Powell,  36  Ind.  51.5,  516.  defendant's  appeal,  that  as  the  action  was 
The  action  was  upon  an  injunction  bond  on  a  contract,  and  the  counter-claim  was 
given  by  Mrs.  Roback.  The  injunction  for  an  alleged  tort,  the  latter  was  in  every 
had  restrained  the  plaintiff  from  taking  way  improper,  and  could  not  be  sustained 
down  a  house  which  stood  upon  her  land,  had  it  been  j>roperly  objected  to ;  but 
She  pleaded,  1,  a  general  denial,  and,  2,  as  that  all  objection  to  it  had  been  waived 
a  counter-claim,  that  Powell  entered  upon  by  the  replying  and  going  to  trial,  and 
her  land  in  her  possession,  and  tore  down  therefore  the  evidence  in  its  support 
her  house,  and  carried  the  same  away,  to  should  have  been  received. 

iier  damage  $2,000,  for  which   sum   she  ^  Manning  v.  Tyler,  21  N.  Y.  567.     See 

demanded   judgment.     The   plaintiff    re-  also  Gaston  v.  McLeran,  3  Ore.  389,  391  ; 

plied  by  a   general  denial,  and  went  to  Taggart  r.  Risley,  3  Ore.  306;  Freitag  i'. 

trial.    All  evidence  in  support  of  thecoun-  Burke,  43  lud.  38.  40. 


724  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

Althougli  the  answer  of  the  defendants  was  held  to  be  frivolous, 
yet  the  dissenting  opinion  of  ]\Ir.  Justice  Denio,  rather  than  that 
of  the  court,  seems  to  express  the  rule  established  by  the  code. 
The  deficiencies  in  this  answer  were  certainly  no  greater  than 
those  in  other  pleadings  to  which  the  liberal  mode  of  construc- 
tion had  been  applied  by  the  same  court.  The  pleader  did 
allege  something  more  than  the  broad  conclusion  that  the  note 
was  usurious,  and  the  criticism  of  the  court  in  this  respect  was 
without  foundation  in  fact:  he  detailed  the  issuable  facts  with 
such  minuteness  and  certainty,  that  no  one  could  be  misled  as  to 
the  exact  nature  of  the  defence.  The  narrative  was  undoubtedly 
incomplete,  and  it  should  have  been  perfected  upon  the  plaintiff's 
motion;  but  this  is  all  that  can  be  objected  to  it.  Tlie  court 
may  have  been  unconsciously  influenced  in  their  decision  by  a 
feeling  of  distaste  for  the  defence  of  usury,  and  thus  led  to 
apply  a  stricter  rule  of  coiistruction  than  they  would  have 
enforced  in  respect  to  other  defences. 

§  496.  *  60.5.  Case  of  Lefler  v.  Field.  The  case  of  Lefler  V. 
Field  ^  is  in  yet  stronger  contrast  with  the  general  course  of 
authorities,  and  with  the  express  requirement  of  the  codes  that 
the  pleadings  must  be  construed  liberally  with  a  view  to  substan- 
tial justice  between  the  parties,  and  not  adversely  to  the  pleader. 
The  action  was  for  the  price  of  barley  bargained  and  sold.  The 
lanswer  set  up  that  the  barley  was  contracted  for  by  an  agent  of 
the  defendants,  who  agreed  to  buy  it  if  it  was  good  and  mer- 
chantable; that  the  plaintiff  represented  said  barley  to  be  a 
good,  first  quality,  merchantable  article;  that  the  agent  relied 
on  such  representations ;  that  the  barley  was  not  merchantable, 
which  fact  was  known  to  the  plaintiff,  and  therefore  the  defend- 
ants refused  to  accept  the  same.  No  demurrer  was  interposed, 
nor  i_iOtion  made ;  and  the  parties  went  to  trial  on  the  pleadings 
as  they  stood.  The  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  no  evidence 
was  admissible  to  establish  the  defence ;  that  the  answer  did 
not  allege  a  defence  of  fraud,  since  it  omitted  to  state  two  neces- 
sary elements  thereof:  (1)  that  the  plaintiff  made  the  representa- 
tion with  the  intent  to  deceive,  and  (2)  that  the  defendants  or 
their  agent  were  in  fact  deceived. 

§  497.  *  606.  Pleadings  by  Joint  Defendants.  When  two  or 
more  defendants  are  sued  and  unite  in  one  responsive  pleading, 

1  Lefler  v.  Field,  52  N.  Y.  621.     Compare  Hutching  v.  Castle,  48  Cal.  152. 


PARTIAL    DEFENCES.  725 

it  must  be  good  as  to  each  and  all  of  these  parties,  or  it  will  be 
wholly  bad.^  This  is  the  rule  which  prevails  almost  universally. 
Thus,  if  the  defendants  join  in  an  answer  which  on  demurrer 
proves  to  be  insufficient  as  to  one,  it  will  be  adjudged  bad  as  to 
all;  but  the  result  will,  of  course,  be  otherwise  if  they  plead  the 
same  answer  separately.^  On  the  same  principle,  if  two  or  more 
defendants  unite  in  a  demurrer  to  the  complaint  or  petition,  and 
a  good  cause  of  action  is  stated  against  one  or  some  of  them,  the 
demurrer  will  be  wholly  overruled.^  The  rule  is  extended  by 
analogy  to  pleadings  containing  two  or  more  separate  defences  or 
causes  of  action.  If  a  demurrer  is  interposed  to  an  entire  answer 
containing  two  or  more  separate  defences,  or  to  an  entire  com- 
plaint containing  two  or  more  causes  of  action,  it  will  be  over- 
ruled if  there  is  one  good  defence  or  one  good  cause  of  action.'* 
In  an  action  for  a  joint  and  several  tort  against  several  defend- 
ants, where  the  answer  of  one  is  a  complete  justification  of  the 
alleged  wrong  as  to  all,  and  the  others  either  suffer  a  default  or 
plead  different  defences,  if  the  issues  raised  by  this  answer  are 
found  against  the  plaintiff,  the  verdict  will  operate  for  the 
benefit  of  all  the  defendants,  and  he  cannot  recover  a  judg- 
ment against  those  even  who  made  default.^ 

§  498.  *  GOT.  Partial  Defences.  It  was  an  inflexible  rule 
under  the  common-law  system  that  every  plea  in  bar  must  go 
to  the  whole  cause  of  action,  and  must  be  an  entire  answer 
thereto  on  the  record:  with  pleas  in  abatement  the  rule  was 
different,  for  they  did  not  purport  to  answer  the  cause  of 
action.  The  spreading  of  a  partial  defence  upon  the  record 
was  unknown.  Whenever  such  defences  were  to  be  relied 
upon,  —  as,  for  example,  mitigating  circumstances,  —  they  were 
either  proved  under  the  general  issue,  or  under  a  special  plea 
setting  up  a  complete  defence  which  the  pleader  knew  did  not 

1  [[Wliitcomb     r.    Hardy     (1897),    68  Washington  Tp.  v.  Bonney,  45  Ind.   77; 

Minu.  2G5,  71   N.  W.  26.3.J  Silvers  v.  Junction    R.  Co.,   43   lud.  435, 

'■^  Morton  i'.  Morton,  10  Iowa,  58.  442-445.     See  also  Bruce  v.  Benedict,  31 

3  McGonigal  v.  Colter,  32  Wis.  614  ;  Ark.  301  ;  Everett  v.  Waymire,  30  Ohio 
Webster  r.  Tib  bits,  19  Wis.  438.  St.  308;    Nichol  v.   McCallister,    52  Ind. 

4  Jeffersonville,  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Van-  586;  Roberts  v.  Johauuas,  41  Wis.  616. 
cant,  40  Ind.  233;  McPhail  v.  Hyatt,  29  See  also  §  *  577,  ante. 

Iowa,  137  ;  Modlin  v.  N.  W.  Turnp.  Co.,  ^  Williams   v.  McGrade,  13  Minn.  46. 

48   Ind.  492;  Excelsior   Draining  Co.  v.  See   also,    to   the   same    effect,  Devyr  v. 

Brown,  47  Ind.  19;  Towell  ;•.  Pence,  47  Schaefer,  55  N.  Y.  446. 
Ind.  304;  Davidson  v.  King,  47  Ind.  372; 


726  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

exist.  The  code  has  certainly  abolished  this  doctrine  and  the 
practice  based  upon  it.  Several  features  of  the  new  procedure 
are  utterly  inconsistent  with  it.  In  the  first  place,  the  general 
or  special  denials  of  the  code  are  not  so  broad  as  the  general 
issues  of  the  common  law  most  in  use  had  become ;  and,  as  will 
be  particularly  shown  in  the  following  section,  they  admit  of  no 
evidence  not  in  direct  answer  to  the  plaintiff's  allegations.  In 
the  second  place,  the  verification  of  pleadings  introduced  by  the 
codes  cuts  off  all  averment  of  tictitious  defences.  In  the  third 
place,  the  statute  expressly  authorizes  the  defendant  to  set  forth 
"as  many  defences  as  he  may  have;"  and  this  has  been  very 
properly  construed  as  a  direct  permission,  and  even  requirement, 
to  plead  partial  as  well  as  complete  defences.^  Notwithstand- 
ing this  express  statutory  provision,  there  has  been  some  conflict 
of  opinion  among  the  courts  in  respect  to  the  pleading  of  miti- 
gating facts  and  circumstances.  Certain  judges  have  found  it 
impossible  to  forget  the  technical  methods  of  the  old  procedure, 
and  have  seemed  determined  to  treat  them  as  still  existing  in 
full  force  and  effect ;  while  others  have  readily  adopted  the  spirit 
as  well  as  the  letter  of  the  reformed  system.  I  shall  therefore 
postpone  the  discussion  of  this  particular  subject  —  the  plead- 
ing of  mitigating  circumstances — •until  the  sections  are  reached 
which  treat  of  the  "general  denial  "  and  of  "new  matter." 

§  499.  *  608.  Partial  Defences  should  be  pleaded  as  such. 
While  partial  defences  are  to  be  pleaded,  it  is  well  settled  that 
they  must  be  pleaded  as  such.  If  a  defence  is  set  up  as  an  an- 
swer to  the  whole  cause  of  action,  while  it  is  in  fact  only  a  partial 
one,  and  even  though  it  would  be  admissible  as  such  if  properly 
stated  on  the  record,  it  will  be  bad  on  demurrer:  the  facts  al- 
leged will  not  constitute  a  "  defence ;  "  which  word,  when  thus 
used  alone,  imports  a  complete  defence. ^  The  practical  result 
of  this  doctrine  is,  simply,  that  the  pleader  must  be  careful  to 
designate  the  defence  as  partial ;  he  must  not  content  himself 
with  simply  averring  the  facts  as  in  an  ordinary  case,  as  if 
they  constituted  a  full  answer  to  the  cause  of  action,  but  he 
must  expressly  state  that  the  defence  is  partial.     In  the  absence 

1   QCovle    V.  Ward    (1901),   167    N.  Y.  Saving  Co.  v.  Harris  (1895),  142  Ind.  22o, 

240,  60  N.  ?:.  596.]  40  N.  E.  1072.     See  al.-io  Bowman  v.  Fur 

•^  HBreyfoglei-.  Stotsenburg  (1897),  148  Mfg.  Co.  (1895),  96  la.  188,  64  N.  W.  775, 

lud.  552,  47   N.   E.  1057 ;   United    States  construing  the  Code,  §  2682.] 


PARTIAL   DEFENCES.  727 

■of  such  statement,  it  will  be  assumed  that  he  intended  the  de- 
fence to  be  complete.^ 

§  500.  *  609.  Criticism  of  Foregoing  Rule.  This  rule  Seems  tO 
be  well  established,  but  it  is  certainly  one  which  may  often  work 
injustice.  It  is  a  remnant  of  the  old  system,  and  does  not  har- 
monize with  the  central  design  of  the  new,  which  is  to  elicit  the 
truth  and  to  decide  controversies  upon  all  the  actual  facts.  When 
the  defendant  has  set  up  a  defence  as  if  to  the  entire  cause  of 
action,  which  is,  however,  only  partial,  and  when,  if  described 
as  partial,  it  would  have  been  perfectly  regular,  the  plaintiff 
could  not  be  prejudiced  by  allowing  it  to  stand  for  what  it  is 
worth  as  a  partial  defence.  He  knows  that  it  is,  in  fact,  par- 
tial, for  the  very  objection  assumes  that  knowledge.  If  accurately 
named,  he  would  be  obliged  to  meet  and  answer  it  on  the  trial ; 
and  he  would  only  be  compelled  to  make  the  same  preparation  if 
it  were  suffered  to  remain  on  the  record,  and  to  fulfil  its  intended 
purpose.  In  short,  the  plaintiff  could  not  be  misled  by  such  a 
proceeding;  and  to  strike  out  the  pleading  altogether  would,  if 
its  allegations  were  true,  be  depriving  the  defendant  of  certain 
relief  to  which  he  was  in  justice  entitled.  I  repeat,  the  rule  is 
nothing  but  a  remnant  of  the  ancient  technicalit}',  the  old  devo- 

1  Fitzsimmons  v.  City  F.  Ins.  Co.  of  the  code.  If  a  party  has  a  partial  defence 
New  Haven,  18  Wis.  234  ;  Tra.ster  v.  Snel-  to  an  action,  he  should  set  it  up,  and  rely 
son's  Adm.,  29  Ind.  96  ;  Sayres  v.  Link-  on  it  as  .such,  and  not  as  a  complete  and 
hart,  25  Ind.  14.5;  Conger  v.  Parker,  29  entire  defence."  See  also,  to  the  same 
Ind.  380;  Stone  v.  Lewman,  28  Ind.  97;  effect,  Adkins  v.  Adkins,  48  Ind.  12,  17; 
Sanders  r.  Sanders,  39  lud.  207  ;  Yancy  Allen  v.  Randolph,  48  Ind.  496 ;  Alvord 
V.  Teter,  39  Ind.  305 ;  Bouslog  v.  Garrett,  v.  Essner,  45  Ind.  156 ;  Curran  v.  Curran, 
39  Ind.  338  ;  Summers  i;.  Vaughan,  35  Ind.  40  Ind.  473;  Jackson  v.  Fosbender,  45 
•323,  and  cases  cited.  In  Fitzsimmons  v.  Ind.  305  ;  Beeson  v.  Howard,  44  Ind.  413, 
City  F.  Ins.  Co.,  supra,  it  was  said  by  416;  Gulick  i;.  Conndy,  42  Ind.  134,  136. 
Cole  J.,  at  p.  240:  "The  appellant  con-  But  this  rule  does  not  extend  to  an  an- 
tends  that,  if  this  answer  is  not  good  as  swer  .simply  pleading  a  set-off  le.ss  than 
a  total  defence,  it  is  good  as  a  partial  de-  the  pLiiutiff's  demand,  since  a  set-off  is 
fence  to  the  action.  The  difficulty  with  not  strictly  a  defence.  Mulleudore  v. 
this  position  is  that  this  answer  professes  Scott,  45  Ind.  1 13  ;  Dodge  v.  Dunham, 
and  assumes  to  answer -the  entire  cause  41  Ind.  186.  See  also,  as  examples  of  the 
of  action.  It  is  not  relied  on  as  a  partial,  rule  stated  in  the  text,  Jones  v.  Frost,  51 
but  as  a  complete  defence,  and  we  have  Ind.  69  ;  McMahan  v.  Spinning,  51  id. 
seen  that  for  this  purpose  it  is  insufficient.  187  ;  Keller  v.  Boatman,  49  id.  104;  Put- 
Now,  under  the  old  system,  when  a  plea  nam  v.  Tennyson,  50  id.  456 ;  Peet  i\ 
professed  in  its  commencement  to  answer  O'Brien,  5  Neb.  360;  Peck  v.  Parchin,  52 
the  whole  cause  of  action,  and  afterwards  Iowa,  46;  McDaniel  v.  Pressler,  3  Wash, 
answered  only  a  part,  the  whole  plea  was  636  ;  Thompson  v.  Halbert,  109  N.  Y.  329  ; 
bad.  This  rule  was  elementary;  and,  Shortle  v.  Terre  Haute  &  I.  Ry.  Co.,  131 
upon  general  principles,  we  do  not  see  Ind.  338 ;  Indianapolis,  E.  R.  &  S.  W.  R. 
why  it  is  not  applicable  to  pleadings  under  Co.  v.  Hyde,  122  Ind.  188. 


728  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

tion  to  external  forms  of  logical  precision  which  marked  the 
common-law  procedure,  and  which  made  it  anything  but  a 
practical  means  of  eliciting  and  applying  the  truth  in  judicial 
controversies. 

SECTION   THIRD. 

THE   DEFENCE   OF   DENIAL. 

§  501.  *  610.  Species  of  Denial.  The  various  species  of  denial 
provided  for  in  the  codes  are  "general"  or  "specific,"  and  posi- 
tive or  a  denial  of  "  knowledge  or  information  of  the  matter  suffi- 
cient to  form  a  belief."  In  most  of  the  codes,  it  is  expressly 
permitted  that  the  denials  may  be  either  "general"  or  "specific." 
In  a  few,  no  provision  is  in  terms  made  for  the  general  denial, 
and  only  those  that  are  "specific  ''  or  "special"  are  mentioned. 
In  one  or  two,  the  language  simply  speaks  of  "a  denial."^ 
According  to  a  large  majority  of  the  codes,  the  denial,  whether 
general  or  specific,  may  be  either  positive,  or  a  denial  of  "knowl- 
edge or  information  thereof  sufficient  to  form  a  belief;"  but  in  a 
very  few  of  them  the  latter  form  is  omitted.  The  defendant  is 
universally  allowed  to  deny  only  such  allegations  of  the  com- 
plaint or  petition  as  he  controverts,  and  this  permission  is  usually 
given  whether  he  employs  the  "general"  or  the  "specific"  form 
of  denial;  but  in  the  latest  revision  of  the  Iowa  Code  [1897],  it 
is  said  with  more  accuracy  that  the  general  denial  must  be  "  of 
each  allegation  of  the  petition,"  while  the  specific  denial  is  to  be 
"of  each  allegation  of  the  petition  controverted  "  by  him. 

1  In   Minnesota,  although   the  code  is  the  same  as  that  in  New  York,  expressly 

silent  respecting  the  general  denial,  and  authorizes  the  general  denial,  the  general 

speaks  only  of  "a  denial  of  each  allega-  denial  in   the  ordinary  form,  as    used  in 

tion,"  it  is   settled  by  repeated  decisions  other  States,  is  held  to  be  a  nullity,  and 

that   the   ordinary    form   of    the  general  an  answer  containing  it  will  be  struck  out 

denial   is  a  compliance  with  the  statute,  as  sham  :  an  altogether  different  constrnc- 

and  is  entirely  proper:  hence  the  general  tion  is  placed  upon  the  language  of  the 

denial   is  in  constant    use   in  that   State  ;  statute  from  that  given  in  any  other  State, 

and  such,  I  believe,  is  the  practice  in  most  Schelian   v.  Malone,   71    N.  C.  440,  443  ; 

of  the  States.     Leyde  v.  Martin,  16  Minn.  Flack  r.  Dawson,  69  N.  C.  42  ;  Woody  v. 

38;  Becker  f.  Sweetzer,  15  Minn.  427,  434  ;  Jordan,  69  N.  C.  189,  195.     In  California 

Kingsley  v.  Oilman,   12  Minn.  515,  517;  and  a  few  other  States,  the  general  denial 

Bond  V.  Corbet,  2  Minn.  248 ;    Caldwell  v.  is  not  permitted   when  the  complaint  or 

Bruggerman,  4    Minn.  270 ;    Starbuck   v.  petition  is  verified  ;  in  such  a  case,  there- 

Dunklee,  10  Minn.  173  ;  Montour  d.  Purdy,  fore,  a  general  denial  raises  no  issue,  and 

11    Minn.   401.     On    the   other   hand,  in  will  be  struck  out  on  motion.     People  r. 

North  Carolina,  notwithstanding  that  the  Ilagar,  52  Cal.  171. 
language   of  the  code,  which  is   exactly 


DIFFEKENT    KINDS    OF   DENIALS.  729 

§  502.  *  611.  Outline  of  Proposed  Treatment.  In  actual  prac- 
tice, the  "general  denial,"  wherever  permitted,  is  only  employed 
when  the  defendant  desires  to  put  the  whole  complaint  or  peti- 
tion in  issue,  and  "  specific  "  denials  when  he  wishes  to  take  issue 
merely  with  certain  allegations  thereof.  It  is  very  plain,  that  in 
the  former  case  the  "general  denial,"  in  its  brief  and  comprehen- 
sive form,  is  as  efficacious  as  a  particular  traverse  of  each  aver- 
ment separately.  Nothing  is  gained  by  filling  the  record  with 
specific  denials,  when  one  sweeping  denial  of  the  entire  pleading 
will  answer  the  same  purpose  and  admit  the  same  proofs.  I 
shall  distribute  the  subject-matter  of  this  section  under  the  fol- 
lowing heads,  assuming  in  the  first  instance,  for  convenience  of 
the  discussion,  that  the  denial  is  "  positive :  "  I.  The  form  of  the 
"general  denial,"  and  of  the  "specific  denials;  "  II.  The  nature 
of  "specific  denials,"  and  what  issues  they  raise;  III.  Allega- 
tions admitted  by  omitting  to  deny ;  IV.  Denials  in  the  form  of 
negatives  pregnant;  V.  Argumentative  denials,  and  specific  de- 
fences equivalent  to  the  general  denial;  VI.  General  denial  of 
all  allegations  not  otherwise  admitted  or  explained;  VII.  What 
allegations  must  be  denied,  —  issuable  facts,  and  not  conclusions 
of  law;  VIII.  Denials  of  information  or  belief,  when  proper, 
and  their  effect;  IX.  What  can  be  proved  under  denials  either 
general  or  specific ;  X.  Some  special  statutory  rules  in  reference 
to  denials. 

§  503.  *  612,  Same  Subject.  The  discussion  which  follows,  and 
the  practical  rules  deduced  therefrom,  are  based  in  the  first  place 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  denials,  whether  general  or  specific, 
are  positive  in  their  nature.  The  conclusions  which  are  reached 
apply,  however,  with  equal  force  and  effect,  to  those  cases  in 
which  the  denials  are  of  information  or  belief.  The  only  object 
of  the  latter  form  is,  that  the  defendant  may  be  enabled  to  put 
the  plaintiff's  allegations  in  issue  when  he  is  obliged  to  verify  his 
answer,  and  cannot  do  so  from  his  own  personal  knowledge: 
the  effect  and  efficacy  of  the  traverse  are  not  diminished  nor  in 
any  manner  altered  by  the  use  of  this  method  when  it  is 
properly  employed. 

§  504.  *  613.  External  Form  of  Denials,  General  and  Specific. 
Under  the  common-law  system  there  were  several  distinct  species 
of  the  "general  issue"  and  of  particular  traverses,  each  appro- 
priate to  and  only  to  be  used  in  some  one  of  the  different  forms 


730 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


of  action,  or  to  put  in  issue  certain  classes  of  allegations;  but  all 
these  have  been  abolished  in  the  reformed  procedure.  One  form 
of  the  general  denial  is  sufficient  for  all  actions  and  for  all  issues ; 
and  although  it  may  undergo  slight  and  unimportant  variations, 
it  is  substantiall}'  the  same  in  all  the  States,  and  in  the  hands  of 
all  members  of  the  bar.  The  material  averment,  modified  doubt- 
less in  its  phraseology,  is  that  the  defendant  "denies  each  and 
every-  allegation  of  the  complaint  or  petition."  The  form  in 
common  use  is,  "  The  defendant,  for  answer  to  the  complaint 
herein,  denies  each  and  every  allegation  thereof."^  It  is  of 
course  impossible  to  describe  the  forms  of  any  specific  denial. 
From  its  very  name  and  nature,  it  is  the  special  traverse  of  some 
particular  averment  found  in  the  plaintiff's  pleading,  and  must 
therefore  depend  to  a  very  great  degree  upon  the  matter  and 
shape  of  the  statement  which  is  thus  controverted.  How  far  it 
should  merely  follow  and  negative  the  exact  language  of  the 
allegation  to  which  it  is  directed,  will  be  considered  under  the 
subsequent  head  of  the  section  which  treats  of  denials  in  the  form 
of  a  negative  pregnant. ^     It  will  there  be  shown  that  such  an 


1  This  form  is  slightly  varied  in  the 
standard  text-books  upon  pleading,  and 
in  the  actual  practice  of  the  bar  :  but  this 
is  entirely  sufficient ;  any  additional  mat- 
ter would  be  superfluous.  Examples  of 
irregular  forms  held  to  be  sufficient, 
Moen  V.  Eldred,  22  Minn.  538;  Jones 
I'.  Ludlum,  74  N.  Y.  61  ;  Brothington 
V.  Downey,  21  Hun,  436;  Hoffman  v. 
Eppers,  41  Wis.  251  ;  but  an  answer 
"  that  no  allegation  of  the  complaint  is 
true,"  is  wholly  nugatory,  —  raises  no 
issue. 

^The  following  variations  have  been 
held  sufficient.  A  denial  of  "  each  and 
every  allegation  of  new  matter : "  City  of 
Crete  v.  Hendricks  (1902),  Neb.,  90  N."\V. 
215;  a  denial  of  "all  the  allegations  of 
each  paragraph  of  both  counts  of  the  peti- 
tion :"  Ocean  Steamship  Co.  v.  x\nderson 
(1900),  112  Ga.  835,  38  S.  E.  102;  an  an- 
swer that  defendant  "states  and  alleges 
that  he  denies  each  and  every  allega- 
tion of  the  petition  :"  lieiss  v.  Argubright 
(1902),  Neb..  92  N.  W.  988;  an  answer 
that  defendants  "say  that  they  deny  each 
and  every  allegation:"  Town  of  Denver 
V.  Spokane  Falls  (1893),  7  Wash.  226,  34 
Pac.  926. 


In  State  ex  rel.  v.  Butte  Water  Co. 
(1896),  18  Mont.  199,  44  Pac.  966,  the 
court  said :  "  We  shall  follow  the  Cali- 
fornia cases,  and  hold  that  the  statutory 
form  of  denial  was  the  only  one  to  be 
sustained."  To  the  same  effect  see  Ro.ssi- 
terv.  Loeber  (1896),  18  Mont.  372, 45  Pac. 
560. 

The  alleged  insufficiency  of  a  general 
denial  cannot  be  raised  for  the  first  time 
on  appeal :  King  r.  Pony  Gold  Miu.  Co. 
(1903),  28  Mont.  74,  72  Pac.  309. 

A  general  denial  is  not  rendered  bad  by 
immaterial  matter  alleged  in  connection 
therewith:  Ralya  r.  Atkins  (1901),  157  Ind. 
331,  61  N.  E.  726.3 

-  [_"  A  denial  of  the  very  words  of  the 
allegations  of  the  petition,  without  deny- 
ing their  substance  and  effect,  tenders  no 
issue:"  Knight  r.  Denman  (1902),  64 
Neb.  814,  90  N.  W.  863.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  a  traverse  should  be  expressed 
in  negative  words :  Stetson  v.  Briggs 
(1896),  114  Cal.  511,  46  Pac.  603;  Glen- 
cross  V.  Evans  (1894),  Ariz.,  36  Pac.  212. 
See  also  State  ex  rel.  v.  Adams  (1901), 
161  Mo.  .349,  61  S.  W.  894. 

Where  suit  is  brouglit  on  a  note  paya- 
ble conditionally,  and  the  defendant  denies 


DIFFERENT    KINDS    OF   DENIALS.  731 

exact  adherence  to  the  text  of  the  adverse  averment  may  be 
dangerous,  as  the  result  may  be  an  admission  of  the  substantial 
fact  intended  to  be  put  in  issue. 

§  505.  *  614.  Issuable  Facts  as  Distinguished  from  Evidentiary 
Facts  and  from  Conclusions.  The  object  of  all  denials  is  to  put 
in  issue  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  or  petition.  As  will  be 
shown  hereafter  under  the  head  of  the  proofs  which  may  be  ad- 
mitted in  support  of  a  simple  denial,  it  is  only  the  issuable  facts 
which  need  to  be  controverted,  and  which  are  in  fact  controverted, 
by  the  defendant's  traverse.  It  frequently,  and  indeed  generally, 
happens  that  the  cause  of  action  depends  upon  the  existence 
of  a  succession  or  group  of  facts.  Each  of  these  must  be  es- 
tablished in  order  to  make  out  the  right  of  action,  and  all  are 
therefore  "issuable  facts."  In  addition  thereto,  the  plaintiff's 
pleading  will  often  contain  other  averments  which  must  be 
stated,  but  which  need  not  be  proved  as  stated,  among  which  are 
those  of  time,  place,  number,  quantity,  value,  and  the  like. 
Finally,  it  happens  too  frequently,  that  besides  the  statements 
of  these  strictly  "issuable  facts,"  which  are  all  that  the  plead- 
ing should  comprise,  the  plaintiff  has  unnecessarily,  and  in 
a  certain  sense  improperly,  introduced  averments  of  matters 
which  are  really  the  details  of  evidence  from  which  the  ex- 
istence of  the  "issuable  facts"  is  to  be  inferred  by  the  jury 
or  the  court.  It  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  in  a  com- 
plaint or  petition  between  the  main  conclusions  of  fact,  — 
the  issuable  or  material  facts,  —  all  and  each  of  which  are  indis- 
pensable to  create  the  right  of  action,  and  the  mere  details  of  evi- 
dence which  must  be  proved  at  the  trial  in  order  to  establish  the 
essential  "issuable  facts;  "  and  the  careless  mode  of  pleading 
which  has  grown  up  in  some  States,  contrary  to  the  true  intent 
and  spirit  of  the  reformed  procedure,  results  chiefly  from  a  dis- 
regard of  the  distinction  here  mentioned,  and  is  shown  in  a  con- 
fused admixture  of  evidentiary  matter,  allegations  of  substantial 
facts,  and  conclusions  of  law,  in  the  same  complaint  or  petition. 

§  506.  *  615.  Function  of  the  Specific  Denial.  When  the  Series 
of  issuable  facts 'which  would  make  up  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 

that  the  conditions  have  been  performed,  S.  W.  212.     "A  denial,   though  coupled 

and  specifies  tlie  particulars  in  regard  to  with    an    allegation    showing    a    lack    of 

■which  there  has  been   non-compliance,  the  knowledge  of   the  matters  denied,  is  suflB- 

defendant  waives  all  grounds  not  specified  :  cient  to  raise  an   issue:"  Smith  v.  Allen 

Coffin   V.   Black   (1899),  07   Ark.   219,  54  (1901),  63  Neb.  74,  88  N.  W.  155.] 


732  CIVIL  REMEDIES. 

action  are  properly  stated,  it  will  frequently  happen,  especially 
if  the  pleadings  are  verified,  that  the  defendant  cannot  deny  them 
all.  Some  of  them  may  be  true,  so  that  an  issue  upon  them  is 
impossible.  But  if  one  or  more  are  not  true,  and  can  therefore 
be  controverted,  and  if  tlie  existence  of  all  is  indispensable  to 
the  right  of  action,  a  denial  of  that  particular  allegation,  or  of 
those  particular  ftllegations,  may  be  as  complete  a  defence  as 
though  the  entire  series  was  traversed  and  disproved.  The 
forming  such  an  issue  upon  some  one  or  more  particular  aver- 
ments out  of  the  whole  number  contained  in  the  complaint  or 
petition  is  the  legitimate  and  proper  office  of  the  "special 
denial,"  and  by  its  use  in  this  manner  an  ample  defence  may 
be  placed  upon  the  record.  A  "specific  denial  *' is  therefore  a 
denial  of  some  particular  averment  in  the  complaint  or  petition  ; 
and  whether  or  not  it  alone  raises  a  material  issue,  and  consti- 
tutes a  sufficient  defence,  depends  upon  the  question,  whether 
the  particular  allegation  thus  traversed  is  in  itself  essential  to 
the  maintenance  of  the  cause  of  action.^  There  may,  of  course,  be 
several  such  specific  denials  inserted  in  the  same  answer,  directed 
to  distinct  averments  of  the  adverse  pleading,  and  together  con- 
stituting a  defence  differing  from  that  raised  by  the  "general 
denial  "  in  the  single  circumstance,  that  by  the  latter  all  the 
issuable  facts  are  put  in  issue,  while  by  the  former  only  a  portion 
of  them  are  controverted.  As  each  specific  denial  is  aimed  at  a 
particular  averment,  it  should  expressly  and  unmistakably  point 
out  the  statement  of  fact  intended  to  be  traversed ;  it  should 
deny  that  allegation  fully  and  explicitly,  so  that  the  plaintiff 
may  be  forced  to  establish  it  by  proofs ;  and  it  should  leave  no 
doubt  as  to  the  matter  at  which  it  is  aimed,  and  as  to  the  issue 
intended  to  be  made.^ 

^  QWhere  the  deuial  in  an  answer  re-  ground, itissaid, thatmere  matterof  aggra- 

lates  solely  to  an  averment  which  presents  ration,  not  froing  to  tlie  cause  of  action,  or 

no  ground  for  relief,  such  denial  will  be  niereinducenicntorexplanatory matter, not 

treated  as  surplusage :  Chicago,  etc  Ry.  Co.  in  itself  essential  to,  or  the  substance  of,  the 

r.  Phillips  (1900),  111  la.  377,  82  N.  W.  787.  case,  should  not  be  traversed. "3 

In    Bowman  v.  Bowman    (1899),    153  ~  QTo   deny  an   averment  specifically 

Ind.  498,  5.5  N.  E.  422,  the  court  .said  :  "If  it  must  be  singled  t)Ut  and   denied  apart 

an  allegation   in  the  opposite  pleading  be  from  others  in  the  same  paragraph  with 

altogether  immaterial,  it  cannot  be  trav-  which  it  is  connected  :  Woronieki  v.  Paris- 

ersed ;  otherwise  the  object  of  pleading,  kiego  (1901),  74  Conn.   224,  50  Atl.   562. 

viz.,  the  bringing  the  parties  to  an  issue  See  also  Boyle  i'.  McWilliaras  (1897),  69 

upon  a  matter  or  point   decisive   of   the  Conn.  201,  37  Atl.  501. 
merits,  would  be  defeated.    And,  upon  this  Where  an  answer  contains  a  ilenial  of 


SPECIFIC   DENIALS. 


733 


§  507.  *  616.  Illustrative  Case.  The  object  of  this  kind  of 
denial,  cand  the  rules  which  govern  its  use,  were  accurately 
stated  in  a  recent  case :  "  To  determine  whether  an  allegation 
has  been  properly  denied  or  not,  we  must  examine  the  answer 
to  the  particular  allegation  which  it  is  designed  to  controvert. 
If,  taken  by  itself,  an  issue  is  fairly  made,  and  there  is  no 
admission  inconsistent  with  the  answer,  the  denial  is  suffi- 
cient. .  .  .  Each  denial  must  be  regarded  as  applying  to  the 
specific  allegation  it  purports  to  answer,  and  not  as  forming 
part  of  an  answer  to  some  other  specific  and  entirely  independ- 
ent allegation."^  A  single  case,  an  abstract  of  which  is  placed  in 
the  foot-note,  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  object  and  effect  of  the 
specific  denial.^  As  the  defendant  in  this  action  could  not  con- 
trovert his  signature  to  the  instrument,  the  pleader  evidently 
supposed  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  deny  the  execution 
in  the  answer  since  the  pleadings  were  verified;  he  therefore 
traversed  but  one  issuable  fact,  —  the  delivery.  Success  in 
this  issue  was  as  complete  a  defence  as  though  the  execution 


any  material  allegation,  a  general  de- 
murrer to  the  entire  answer  cannot  be 
sustained:  Hill  v.  Walsh  (1894),  6  S.  D. 
421,  61  N.  W.  440;  Lee  v.  Mehew  (1899), 
8  Okla.  136,  56  Pac.  1046;  City  of  Guthrie 
V.  Lumber  Co.  (1897),  5  Okla.  774,  50 
Pac.  84.3 

1  Racouillat  v.  Rene,  32  Cal.  450,  453, 
455,  per  Sawyer  J. ;  and  see  AUis  v. 
Leonard,  46  K  Y.  688. 

2  Sawyer  r.  Warner,  15  Barb.  282,  285. 
The  complaint,  in  an  action  upon  a  prom- 
issory note,  alleged  the  making  of  the 
note  by  the  defendant,  the  delivery  thereof 
by  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff,  the 
present  ownership  of  the  plaintiff,  non- 
payment, and  indebtedness  of  the  de- 
fendant thereon  in  the  amount  specified 
therein.  The  answer  merely  denied  that 
the  defendant  ever  "  gave  "  the  said  note 
or  any  other  note  to  the  plaintiff,  and 
denied  all  indebtedness.  On  the  trial,  the 
plaintiff  proved  the  signature  of  the  note 
to  be  in  the  defendant's  handwriting,  and 
his  own  possession.  The  body  of  the  in- 
strument was  in  the  plaintiff's  handwrit- 
ing. The  defendant  then  proved  facts 
tending  to  show  that  he  never  executed 
the  instrument  as    a  note,  and  never  de- 


livered it  to  the  plaintiff,  but  that  he  had 
some  time  written  and  left  his  name  on  a 
blank  paper,  and  the  plaintiff  had  fraud- 
ulently added  the  body  of  the  note  over 
such  signature.  The  jury  rendered  a 
verdict  for  the  defendant ;  and,  upon  the 
plaintiff's  appeal,  the  court  said:  "TJie 
allegation  in  tlie  answer  that  the  defend- 
ant never  gave  the  note  to  the  plaintiff  is 
a  denial  of  the  allegation  in  the  complaint 
that  the  defendant  made  the  note,  so  far 
as  making  includes  delivery  ;  and  also  of 
the  further  allegation,  that  the  defendant 
delivered  the  note  to  the  plaintiff.  The 
question  to  be  tried  on  the.se  allegations 
was,  whether  or  not  the  note  was  delivered 
to  the  plaintiff  as  alleged  by  him.  .  .  . 
The  plaintiff  made  out  this  fact  prima 
facie.  .  .  .  But  the  defendant  was  at  lib- 
erty, in  support  of  his  side  of  the  issues, 
independent  of  other  modes,  to  prove  facts 
inducing  a  contrary  presumption,  and,  in 
that  way,  overcome  the  presumption  from 
the  plaintiff's  proof ;  and  he  was  entitled 
to  give  in  evidence  any  facts  calculated  to 
satisfy  the  jury  by  fair  and  direct  infer- 
ence that  the  note  was  never  delivered  by 
him." 


734 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


had  also  been  disproved.  It  is  plain,  however,  that  the  "gen- 
eral denial"'  might  have  been  pleaded;  for,  if  the  defence  was 
true,  there  had  never  been  any  execution  or  delivery  of  the  note 
in  the  legal  sense  of  these  terms.  ^ 

^  508.  *  G17.  Allegations  Admitted  by  Failure  to  deny.  All 
the  codes  provide  that  material  allegations  in  the  complaint  or 
petition,  not  controverted  by  a  general  or  specific  denial,  are 
admitted  to  be  true  for  the  purposes  of  the  action. ^     It  follows 


1  See  Higgins  v.  Germaine,  1  Mont. 
230 ;  also  Van  Dyke  r.  Maguire,  57  N.  Y. 
429  (denial  of  value  alone  in  action  for 
labor  and  materials)  ;  Dunning  !•.  Rum- 
baugh,  36  Iowa,  566,  568  (denial  of  exe- 
cution only  in  an  action  on  a  note).  For 
further  illustrations  of  the  text,  see  Trap- 
nail  v.  Hill,  31  Ark.  346  ;  Rabbage  v.  Sec. 
Bap.  Church  of  Dubuque,  54  Iowa,  172; 
Koberts  v.  Johannas,  41  Wis.  616;  Miller 
V.  Brigham,  50  Cal.  615  ;  Lowell  v.  Lowell, 
55  id.  316. 

^Denials  of  specific  allegations  :  Juris- 
dictional facts,  Aultman  v.  Mills  (1894), 
9  Wash.  63,  36  Pac.  1046 ;  consideration, 
Frank  v.  Jenkins  (1895),  11  Wash.  611, 
40  Pac.  220 ;  seizin  and  po8se.«<sion,  Ray- 
mond V.  Morrison  (1894),  9  Wash.  156, 
37  Pac.  318;  signification  of  alleged  slan- 
derous words,  Barr  v.  Birkner  (1895),  44 
Neb  197,  62  N.  W.  494;  corporate  exist- 
ence, Davis  V.  Nebraska  Nat.  Bank  (1897), 
51  Neb.  401,  70  N.  W.  963;  ownership. 
Central  City  Bank  v.  Rice  (1895),  44 
Neb.  594,  63  N.  W.  60 ;  execution  of 
promissory  note,  Topeka  Capital  Co.  r. 
Remington  (1900),  61  Kan.  6,  59  Pac. 
1062;  same,  Kimble  v.  Bunny  (1900),  61 
Kan.  665,  60  Pac.  746;  partnership,  Craig 
r.  Chipman  (1900),  Ky.,  57  S.  W.  244; 
title,  Sprigg  v.  Am.  Cent.  Ins.  Co.  (1897), 

101  Ky.  185,  40  S.  W.  575;  execution, 
Marshall  Field  Co.  v.  Oren  Ruffcorn  Co. 
(1902),  117  la.  157,  90  N.  W.  618  ;  corpo- 
rate existence.  Law  Trust  Society  v.  Hogue 
(1900),  37  Ore.  544,  62  Pac.  380;  that 
money  is  due,  Parsons  r.   Wright  (1897), 

102  la.  473,  71  N.  W.  351;  that  defend- 
ants were  and  still  are  doing  business 
under  the  name  of  the  C.  agency,  Nolan  v. 
Hentig  (1903).  138  Cal.  281,  7rPac.  440. 

Evidence  admissible  under  specific 
denials  :  A  denial  that  a  note  had  been 
materially  altered  dues  not  raise  tlie  i.^sue 


that  the  note  was  so  negligently  drawn 
that  the  alteration  could  be  made  without 
exciting  the  suspicions  of  an  ordinarily 
prudent  business  man  :  Bank  of  Com- 
merce c.  Ilaldeman  (1900),  109  Ky.  222,  58 
S.  W.  5S7.  In  an  action  to  recover  for 
value  of  services  rendered,  tlie  defendant 
cannot,  under  a  denial  of  tlieir  value, 
prove  that  the  services  were  not  rendered, 
but  is  confined  to  proof  of  value  :  Buddress 
V.  Sciiafer  ^1895),  12  Wash.  310,  41  Pac. 
43.  To  .same  effect  see  Galliers  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1902),  116  la.  319,  89  N.  W. 
1109.  Under  a  denial  of  title  evidence  of 
abandonment  may  be  given :  Trevaskis 
V.  Peard  (1896),  111  Cal.  599,  44  Pac.  246. 

In  Law  Trust  Society  v.  Hogue  (1900), 
37  Ore.  544,  62  Pac.  380,  the  court  said  : 
''  A  plea  of  nul  iiel  corporation  imposes 
upon  the  plaintiff  the  burden  of  proving 
its  corporate  existence,  but  whether  it 
should  be  considered  a  pica  in  abatement 
or  in  bar  has  been  the  subject  of  much 
controversy.  .  .  .  Such  plea  docs  not  sug- 
gest a  better  writ,  thereby  lacking  one  of 
the  essential  elements  of  a  plea  in  abate- 
ment ;  and  as  it  tends  to  defeat,  and  not 
postpone,  the  action,  we  think  the  better 
reason  supports  the  theory  that  a  plea  of 
nul  tiel  corporation  <roes  to  the  merits,  and 
is  a  plea  in  bar,  and,  this  beinsj  so,  Hogue 
and  his  wife  did  not  waive  such  defence  by 
joining  it  with  a  j)lea  to  the  merits." 

The  execution  and  delivery  of  a  bond 
sued  on  can  only  be  denied  by  a  plea  of 
non  est  factum  :  English  v.  Grant  (1897), 
102  Ga.35,  29  S.  E.  157.] 

-  [^Stork  V.  Supreme  Lodge  (1900),  113 
la.  724.  84  N.  W.  721  ;  Kent  ;•.  Muscatine, 
etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1902),  115  la.  383,  88  N.  W. 
935;  Kellar  v.  Pagan  (1899),  54  8.  C. 
255,  32  S.  E.  352  ;  McMillan  i'.  Gambill 
(1894),  115  N.  C.  352,  20  S.  E.  474; 
Peterson';'.  Bean   (1900),  22  Utah,  43,  61 


WHAT   IS    ADMITTED    BY    A   FAILURE   TO    DENY. 


73f 


that  the  plaintiff  need  not  prove  any  material  allegations  so  con- 
ceded to  be  true;  evidence  in  contradiction  of  them  cannot  be 
received;  and  a  finding  of  fact  in  opposition  to  such  admission 
will  be  disregarded  or  set  aside  on  appeal. i  The  important 
question  is,  What  facts  or  allegations  are  "materiar"?  The 
answer  has  already  been  indicated.  The  allegations  of  the 
"  issuable  facts  "  mentioned  in  the  last  preceding  subdivision, 
and  described  at  large  in  Chapter  Third,  are  the  material  alle- 
gations, which  are  admitted  by  a  neglect  to  deny  them.  It 
follows  that  the  two  other  classes  of  averments  found  in  com- 
plaints and  petitions,  viz.,  those  of  time,  place,  quantity,  value, 
amount,  and  the  like,  and  those  of  unnecessary  evidentiary  mat- 
ter, or  of  legal  conclusions,  are  not  thus  admitted.  They  need 
not  be  denied,  and  are  not  the  subject-matter  of  proper  issues 
upon  the  pleadings.  The  allegations  of  time,  place,  amount, 
value,  amount  of  damages,  and  the  like,  are  not,  except  in 
very  special  cases,  matters  of  substance  so  as  to  require  a 
denial;  and  they  may,  in  general,   be  contradicted  or  modified 


Pac.  213;  Merguire  v.  O'Donnell  (1894), 
103  Cal.  50,  36  Pac.  1033  ;  Pitzer  v.  Terri- 
tory of  Oklahoma  (1896),  4  Okla.  86,  44 
Pac.  216;  Boles  v.  Bennington  (1896), 
136  Mo.  522,  38  S.  W.  306  ;  Parke  v. 
Boulware  (1901),  Idaho,  63  Pac.  1045; 
Capitol  Lumbering  Co.  j;.  Learned  (1899), 
36  Ore.  544,  59  Pac.  454 ;  Harlan  County 
V.  Hogsett  (1900),  60  Neb.  362,  83  N.  W. 
171  ;  Davis  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1899),  57 
Neb.  373,  77  N.  W.  775  ;  Baker  v.  Peter- 
sou  (1899),  57  Neb.  375,  77  N.  W.  774; 
Lonergan  v.  Lonergan  (1898),  55  Neb. 
641,  76  N.  W.  16  ;  Equitable  Trust  Co.  v. 
O'Brien  (1898),  55  Neb.  735,  76  N.  W. 
417  ;  Hartzell  v.  McClurg  (1898),  54  Neb. 
313,  74  N.  W.  625;  Stewart  v.  Am.  Ex. 
Bank  (1898),  54  Neb.  461,  74  N.  W.  865; 
Rohman  v.  Gaiser  (1898),  53  Neb.  474,  73 
N.  W.  923  ;  Van  Etten  v.  Kosters  (1896), 
48  Neb.  152,  66  N.  W.  1106;  Scofield  v. 
Clark  (1896),  48  Neb.  711,  67  N.  W.  754  ; 
Maxwell  v.  Higgins  (1893),38  Neb.  671, 
57  N.  W.  388;  Smith  v.  Coe  (1902),  170 
N.  Y.  162,  63  N.  E.  57;  Bouscaren  v. 
Brown  (1894),  40  Neb.  722,  59  N.  W.385  ; 
Douglas  County  v.  Bennett  (1901),  61 
Neb.  660,  85  N.  W.  833  ;  White  v.  Costi- 
gan  (1903),  138  Cal.  564,  72  Pac.  178  ;  Her- 
ring-IIall-:Marviu   Co.  y.  Smith  (1903),  43 


Ore.  315,  72  Pac.  704.  But  allegations  of 
value  and  damages  are  not  admitted  by 
failure  to  deny  them  :  Baker  v.  Peterson 
(1899),  57  Neb.  375,  77  N.  W.  774  ;  Hart- 
zell V.  McClurg  (1898),  54  Neb.  313,  74 
N.  W.  625;  Grant  v.  Clarke  (1899),  58 
Neb.  72,  78  N.  W.  364. 

Admissions  in  pleadings  are  conclu- 
sive: Nugent  V.  Powell  (1893),  4  Wyo. 
1 73,  33  Pac.  23  ;  Gadsden  v.  Thrush  (1898), 
56  Neb.  565,  76  N.  W.  1060.  Facts  ad- 
mitted in  the  pleadings  need  not  be 
proved  :  Johnson  v.  Reed  (1896),  47  Neb. 
322,  66  N.  W.  405;  Bradfield  v.  Sewall 
(1899),  58  Neb.  637,  79  N.  W.  615;  Knight 
t'.  Finney  (1899),  59  Neb.  274,  80  N.  W. 
912.  But  a  party  is  not  bound  by  admis- 
sions in  abandoned  pleadings:  Mahoney  v. 
Hardware  Co.  (1897),  19  Mont.  377,  48 
Pac.  545.  But  they  must  be  proved  as 
against  infant  defendants,  under  Code» 
§  126:  Leslie  v.  Maxey  (1902),  Ky.,  67 
S.  W.  839.] 

1  Morton  v.  Waring's  Heirs,  18  B. 
Mon.  72,  82 ;  Bradbury  v.  Cronise,  46 
Cal.  287  ;  Howard  i'.  Throckmorton,  48 
Cal.  482,  490. 

[^Goldwater  v.  Burnside  (1900),  22 
Wash.  215,  60  Pac.  409.] 


73G 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


without  a  denial.  Thus,  in  actions  of  trover,  trespass,  or 
replevin,  it  was  not  necessary  to  traverse  the  averments  as  to 
the  value  of  the  chattels,  and  as  to  the  amount  of  damages; 
and  the  same  rule  prevails  in  all  actions  brought  for  a  similar 
purpose  under  the  new  system.^  "The  defendant  is  not  bound 
to  answer  all  matters  of  evidence  which  the  plaintiff  chooses  to 
allege.  The  office  of  the  complaint  is  to  aver  the  material,  issu- 
able facts  which  constitute  the  cause  of  action,  and  not  the  evi- 
dence to  prove  these  facts.  It  is  only  material  allegations  that 
are  admitted  when  not  specifically  controverted  by  the  answer.  "^ 
"  The  scope  of  the  general  denial  is  merely  to  put  in  issue  such 
averments  of  the  complaint  as  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  prove  in 
order  to  maintain  his  action:  it  does  not  controvert  redundant 
allesrations."^ 


1  Jenkins  v.  Steanka,  19  Wis.  126. 

2  Racouillat  r.  Kene,  32  Cal.  4.50,  4.5.5, 
per  Sawyer  J. ;  Siter  v.  Jewett,  33  Cal.  92. 

[[Gattisf.  Kilgo  (1901),  128  N.  C.  402, 
38  S.  E.  931.  And  only  such  facts  are 
admitted  as  are  properly  pleaded  :  Doud 
r.  Duluth  Milling  Co.  (1893),  55  Minn.  53, 
56  N.  \V.  463-3 

^  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Darnell,  31  Ind. 
20,  22,  per  Prazer  J. ;  Baker  v.  Kistler,  13 
Ind.  63.  For  an  example  of  immaterial 
denial,  see  Newman  v.  Springfield  F.  & 
M.  Ins.  Co.,  17  Minn.  123,  133.  Further 
illustrations  of  the  text,  Bounellf.  Jacobs, 
36  Wis.  59  ;  Katzhausen  v.  Koehler,  42  id. 
232  ;  State  v.  Russell,  5  Neb.  211;  Cook  v. 
Smith,  54  Iowa,  636  ;  Fargo  v.  Ames,  45 
id.  494;  Stair  v.  Cragin,  24  Hun.  177; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  52  Cal.  154. 

^^Miscellaneous  Rules  Respecting 
Admissicms. 

"Imperfect  and  defective  denials,  if 
acted  upon  as  sufficient  at  the  trial,  are  in 
no  sense  admissions  of  the  allegations  of 
a  pleading  which  are  attempted  to  be 
denied:"  Loftus  v.  Fischer  (1895),  106 
Cal.  616,  39  Pac.  1064.  Where  a  defend- 
ant admits  a  bond  pleaded  by  plaintiff,  his 
denial  of  certain  of  its  plain  and  specific 
provisions  is  unavailing:  Aikens  v.  Frank 
(1898),  21  Mont.  192,  53  I'ac.  538.  In  an 
action  of  ejectment  by  a  tenant  in  com- 
mon against  liis  co-tenant,  a  denial  in  the 
answer  of  the  plaintiff's  title  and  right  of 


entry  is  equivalent  to  an  ouster,  as  of  the 
date  of  tlie  commencement  of  the  action, 
and  the  ouster  is  therefore  admitted  on 
the  pleadings:  Plass  v.  Plass  (1898),  121 
Cal.  131,  53  Pac.  448.  In  an  action  to  ob- 
tain an  accounting  of  a  partnership,  where 
plaintiff  alleges  that  no  settlement  of  tiie 
partnership  affairs  has  been  had  and  tiie 
defendants  specifically  deny  this  allega- 
tion, an  admission  in  the  answer  that  an 
error  was  made  in  preparing  the  balance 
sheet  on  which  the  settlement  was  founded, 
is  pro  tanlo  a  limitation  upon  tlie  denial 
that  there  had  been  no  settlement ;  Rankin 
i:  Newman  (1895),  107  Cal.  602,40  Pac. 
1024.  "  Where  the  answer  admits  ma- 
terial allegations  of  the  complaint,  but  ac- 
com])anies  the  concession  with  a  state- 
ment of  affirmative  matter  in  explanation 
by  way  of  defence,  '  the  plaintiff  may 
avail  himself  of  the  admissions  without 
the  qualifications  : ' "  Cook  v.  Guirkin 
(1896),  119  N.  C.  13,25  S.  E.  715.  "If 
during  the  trial  of  an  action,  new  matter 
pleaded  in  the  answer  is  treated  by  the 
parties  as  denied  or  placed  in  issue,  it  will 
be  so  considered  in  this  court,  .although  no, 
or  an  imperfect,  reply  was  filed  :  "  Minzer 
V.  Will m.an -Mercantile  Co.  (1899),  59  Neb. 
410,  81  N.  W.  307.  While  a  party  may 
withdraw  his  pleadings,  he  cannot  by  such 
withdrawal  avoid  the  effect  of  the  ad- 
missions made:  Cooley  r.  Abbey  (1900), 
111  Ga  439,  36  S.  E.  786. 

But  where  allegations,  not  denied,  are 


NEGATIVES    PREGNANT.  737 

§  509.  *  618.  Negatives  Pregnant.  How  they  may  arise.  Such 
a  denial  is  one  pregnant  with  an  admission  of  the  substantial  fact 
which  is  apparently  controverted ;  or,  in  other  words,  one  which, 
although  in  the  form  of  a  traverse,  really  admits  the  important 
fact  contained  in  the  allegation.  As  an  illustration:  If  the  aver- 
ment was  that  the  defendant  on  the  first  day  of  January  made  a 
note,  and  the  answer  should  deny  that  the  defendant  on  the  first 
day  of  January  made  the  note,  this  might  be  construed  as  an 
admission  that  he  made  the  note  on  some  other  day:  or  if  the 
complaint  stated  that  "  the  defendant  wrongfully  and  forcibly 
entered  the  plaintiff's  close,"  and  the  answer  should  deny  "that 
the  defendant  wrongfully  and  forcibly  entered  the  plaintiff's 
close,"  the  fact  of  entering  the  close  might  be  considered  as 
admitted.  Of  course,  a  denial  to  produce  this  result  must  of 
necessity  be  specific ;  for  the  general  denial  of  "each  and  every 
allegation  in  the  complaint "  cannot  be  pregnant  with  any  admis- 
sion.^ Denials  in  the  form  of  a  negative  pregnant  arise  (1)  when 
the  allegation  is  of  a  single  fact  with  some  qualifying  or  modify- 
ing circumstance,  and  the  traverse  is  in  ipsis  verbis,  using  exactly 
the  same  language,  and  no  more ;  and  (2)  when  the  allegation  is 
of  several  distinct  and  separate  facts  or  occurrences  connected  by 
the  copulative  conjunction,  and  the  traverse  is  in  ipsis  verbis  of 
the  same  facts  and  occurrences  also  connected  by  the  same  con- 
junction. In  most  of  the  reported  decisions,  the  courts  have  held 
such  forms  of  denial  to  be  insufficient,  and  have  declared  that 
they  raised  no  issues,  treating  the  statements  of  the  complaint  or 
petition  as  actually  admitted.  This  was  the  universal  rule  under 
the  old  system ;  and  as  it  was  not  based  upon  any  merely  techni- 
cal reasons,  or  doctrine  of  pleading,  the  same  rule  is  properly 
followed  under  the  codes. ^ 

treated  as  in  issue  on  the  trial,  the  omis-  194;  Dean  v.  Leonard,  9  Minn.  190.     The 

sion  of  a  denial  will  be  deemed  waived  :  following    cases    furnish    illustrations   of 

Albion   Milling  Co.    v.    First  Nat.  Bank  the  text :  Dole  v.  Burleigh,  1  Dak.  227  ; 

(1902),  64  Neb.  116,  89  N.  W.  638;  Cross-  Hanning  v.  Bassett,  12  Bush,  .361  ;  Mor- 

land  V.  Admire  (1899),  149   Mo.  6.50,51  gan    v.   Booth,    13    id.    480;    Harden    v. 

S.  W.  463;  Conant  v.  Jones  (1893), '.Idaho,  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4  Neb.  321 ;  Crane 

32   Pac.    2.50  ;  Missoula  Co.  v.  O'Donnell  v.   Morse,  49  Wis.  368 ;  Norris  v.  Glenn, 

(1900),  24  Mont.  65,  60  Pac.  594.]  1  Idaho,  590;  Lorney  i'.  Cronan,  50  Cal. 

1  German    Am.    Bk.   of    Hastings    v.  610;  Prior  v.   Madigan,  51    id.   178;   Le- 

White,  38   Minn.  471,  overruling  earlier  roux  v.  Murdock,  51   id.  541  ;  Argard  ?•. 

Minnesota  cases.  Parker,  81  Wis.  581 ;  Pullen  v.  Wrigiit,  34 

'^  See  Pottgieser  v.  Dorn,  16  Minn.  Minn.  314;  James  w.  McPhee,  9  Colo.  486. 
204,  209;   Ljnd  v.  Picket,  7  Minn.   184,  QCurnow  r.  Phcenix  Ins.  Co.  (1895),  46 

47 


738  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  510.  *  619.  Illustrations.  A  few  examples  will  illustrate  the 
nature  of  these  denials,  and  the  decisions  of  the  courts  thereon. 
In  an  action  upon  a  promissory  note  against  the  indorser,  the 
answer,  copying  the  exact  language  of  the  complaint,  said:  "That 
whether  or  not,  upon  the  maturity  of  the  said  note,  the  same  was 
duly  presented  to  the  makers  for  payment,  and  payment  thereof 
demanded  and  refused,  and  thereupon  said  note  was  duly  pro- 
tested for  non-payment  and  notice  of  such  presentment,  refusal, 
and  protest,  given  to  the  defendant,  the  defendant  has  no  knowl- 
edge or  information  sufficient  to  form  a  belief. "  This  denial  was 
pronounced  bad  as  a  negative  pregnant,  and  was  disregarded.^ 
In  an  action  upon  a  fire  policy  against  the  insurers,  the  defend- 
ants moved  for  leave  to  file  an  amended  answer.  In  denying 
this  motion,  the  court  said:  "The  denials  are  all  liable  to  the 
objection  that  they  are  negatives  pregnant.  The  complaint  avers 
that  on  a  particular  day  the  property  was  all  destroyed  by  fire. 
The  answer  denies  this  in  the  very  words  of  the  complaint.  Such 
a  denial  is  a  negative  pregnant  with  the  admission  that  it  may 
have  been  destroyed  on  some  other  day,  or  that  a  part  may  have 
been  destroj^ed  on  the  day  named.  Such  denials  have  always 
been  held  insufficient. "^  A  complaint  alleging  that  "the  proofs 
of  loss  were  filed  with  the  secretary  of  the  defendant  on  the  31st 
of  March,  1866,"  the  denial  was,  that  the  proofs  were  filed  "as 
alleged  in  the  comjjlciint."  This  was  declared  to  be  pregnant  with 
the  admission  that  they  were  filed  on  another  day  within  the  time 
required.^ 

§  511.  *  620.  Illustrations.  When  a  verified  complaint  con- 
tained many  distinct  allegations  conjunctively  stated,   and  the 

S.  C.  79,  24   S.  E.  74,  quoting  the  text ;  the  'defendant,   an   answer   denying   that 

Columbia  Nat.  Bank  v.  Western  Iron  &  he   performed   such   work    and    labor   at 

Steel  Co.  (1896),   14  Wash.   162,  44   Pac.  the    request   of    the   defendant    admitted 

145.     But  a  negative  pregnant  does  not  the  performance  of  the   services   by  the 

operate  to  prevent  an  expre.is  denial  of  plaintiff. 

the  same  fact  from  putting  it  in  issue:  ■*  Schaetzel   v.    Germantown,  etc.  Ins. 

Kennedy  v.  Dickie  (1902),  27  Mont.  70,  69  Co.,  22    Wis.  412.     See   also  Robbins  v. 

Pac.  672.]  Lincoln,    12    Wis.    1.      In    McMurphy   v. 

1  Young  V.  Catlett,  6  Duer,  4.37,  44.3,  Walker,  20  Minn.  382,  384,  the  complaint 
per  Woodruff  J.  on  a  note  alleging  that  it  was  delivered  on 

2  Baker  v.  Bailey,  16  Barb.  54;  Salin-  the  10th  of  September,  1868,  an  answer 
ger  V.  Lusk,  7  How.  Pr.  430.  See  Brad-  stating  that  it  "was  not  delivered  until 
bury  V.  Cronise,  46  Cal.  287,  where,  the  after  Sept.  10,  1868,"  was  held  to  raise  no 
complaint  alleging  that  the  plaintiff  did  issue. 

certain  work  and  labor  at  the  request  of 


NEGATIVES    PREGNANT.  739 

mswer  consisted  of  denials  of  these  averments  m  ipsis  verbis 
ilso  conjunctively  stated,  following  in  this  manner  the  exact 
anguage  of  tlie  entire  complaint,  the  court  ordered  a  judgment 
or  the  plaintiff  on  the  pleadings,  saying:  "This  mode  of  an- 
iwering  is  in  violation  of  the  principles  of  common-law  pleading, 
md  not  less  so  of  the  statute  which  provides  that  the  defendant's 
mswer  to  a  verified  complaint  shall  contain  a  specific  denial  of 
;ach  allegation  controverted,  or  a  denial  thereof  according  to 
;he  defendant's  information  and  belief."^  The  complaint  in 
m  action  to  recover  possession  of  chattels  alleged  that  "de- 
'endant  unlawfully  and  wrongfully  seized  and  took  said  prop- 
erty into  his  possession  from  said  plaintiff;"  and  the  answer 
lenied  "  that  he  wrongfully  and  unlawfully  seized  and  took 
said  property,"  etc.  This  answer,  it  Avas  held,  admitted  the 
making. 2  It  is  the  settled  rule  in  California  that  conjunctive 
lenials,  in  the  very  language  of  conjunctive  allegations,  raise 
10  issues.^ 

§  512.  *  621.  Illustrations.  In  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mort- 
gage given  to  secure  a  bond,  the  complaint  alleged  the  execution 
)f  the  bond  for  SI, 000,  with  a  provision  in  it,  that,  if  default 
should  be  made  in  the  payment  of  interest  for  thirty  days,  the 
ivhole  principal  sum  should  become  due  at  the  option  of  the 
plaintiff;  and  set  out  the  mortgage,  averring  that  it  contained 
:he  same  provision,  that  interest  had  been  due  more  than  thirty 
lays,  and  that  plaintiff  made  his  election  to  regard  the  whole 
principal  as  due.  The  defendant  in  his  answer  admitted  the 
execution  of  the  bond  and  mortgage,  "but  he  denies  that  the 
said  bond  and  mortgage  contained  any  condition  or  clause 
whereby,  in  case  of  a  default  in  payment  of  interest  for  the 
space  of  thirty  days,  the  principal  sum  was  to  become  due  and 
payable  immediately,  as  alleged  in  said  complaint,  as  by  refer- 
ence to  said  mortgage  will  more  fully  wppear.''''     This  defence  was 

1  Fish  V.  Redington,  31  Cla.  185,  194.  to  pay,  the  words  "assume"  and  "agree" 

-  Woodworth    v.    Knowlton,     22     Cal.  being  synonymous,  and  a  denial  that  they 

164.     See  also  Feeley  v.  Shirley,  43  Cal.  "assumed  and  agreed"  to  pay  the  debt 

369;  Harris  v.  Shoutz,  1  Mont.  212,  216;  was  sufficient. 

Toombs  V.  Hornbuckle,  1  Mont.  286.  On  s  Blankman  v.  Vallejo,  15  Cal.  638 ; 
the  other  hand,  it  was  held  in  Jones  v.  Kuhland  v.  Sedgwick,  17  Cal.  123;  Caul- 
Eddy,  90  Cal.  147,  that  an  allegation  in  field  v.  Sanders,  17  Cal,  569;  Landers  v. 
the  complaint  that  defendants  "  assumed  Bolton,  26  Cal.  393 ;  Busenius  v.  Coffee, 
and  agreed"  to  pay  a  debt,  amounted  14  Cal.  91. 
merely  to  an  allegation  that  they  "  agreed  " 


i40 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


struck  out  as  frivolous,  the  court  saying :  "  This  is  a  denial  that 
both  of  the  instruments  contained  the  clause  in  question.  It  is 
not  a  denial  that  one  of  them  contained  it.  The  bond  and  the 
raortsrasre  tosrether  constituted  but  one  instrument.  The  latter 
refers  to  the  former  as  affording  particular  evidence  of  the 
terms  of  payment.  Such  reference  incorporates  into  the  mort- 
gage all  the  terms  and  conditions  of  the  bond.  The  only  denial 
was  of  their  joint  effect.  This  was  an  admission  as  to  the  bond." 
The  defence,  therefore,  did  not  put  in  issue  the  allegation  of  the 
complaint,  tliat  the  whole  amount  was  due.^ 


'  Kay  v.  Whittaker,  44  N.  Y.  565, 
571. 

^Examples  of  Negatives  Pregnant 
Held  to  raise  no  Issue. 

A  denial  "that  for  a  great  number  of 
years,  previous  to  the  time  alleged  in  the 
plaintiff's  complaiut,  it  had  laid  out  and 
maintained,  and  used  as  a  highway,  the  road 
described  in  the  plaintiff's  complaint:" 
Grimm  v.  Town  of  Washburn  (1898),  100 
Wis.  2-29.  75  N.  W.  964.  A  denial  that  de- 
fendant directed  decedent  "  to  go  down  and 
do  certain  work  in  an  excavation  which  the 
defendant  had  caused  to  be  made  :  "  Stuber 
V.  McEntee  (1894),  142  N.  Y.  200,  36 
N.  E.  878.  A  denial  that  plaintiff  "  is  a 
corporation  duly  organized  as  a  national 
bank  under  the  Act  of  Congress  of  June  3, 
1864,  or  any  other  act:  "  First  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Gibsou  (1900),  60  Neb.  767,  84  N.  W. 
259.  A  denial  that  plaintiff's  testatrix  on 
a  date  named  "  was  the  owner  in  fee 
simple  and  entitled  to  the  possession  "  of 
the  land  in  controversy :  Knight  r.  Den- 
man  (1902),  64  Neb.  814,  90  N.  W.  863. 
A  denial  that  notes  were  lost  "  as  alleged 
in  })laintiff's  |)etition : "  Storey  v  Kerr 
(1902),  Neb.,  89  N.  W.  601.  An  allega- 
tion "  that  whether  said  warrant  came 
into  the  hands  of  plaintiff  as  alleged,  this 
defendant  has  no  knowledge,  etc. : "  Se- 
attle Nat.  Bank  v.  Meerwaldt  (1894)  8 
Wa.sh.  630,  36  Pac.  763.  The  allegation, 
"  further  answering  said  complaiut  as  to 
paragraph  VIII.  thereof,  these  defendants 
and  neither  of  them  have  knowledge  or 
information  sufficient  to  form  a  belief  as 
to  the  truth  of  the  allegations  therein 
contained  and  therefore  deny  the  same 
and  each  and  every  part  thereof:"  Cole 
I'    Noerdl'iugiir   (1900),  22  Wash.   51,  60 


Pac.  57.  An  allegation  of  want  of  knowl- 
edge or  information  to  form  a  belief  as  to 
whether  the  road  was  a  legally  laid  out 
liighwav,  or  whether  defendant  was  in 
duty  bound  to  keep  it  in  repair,  and 
therefore  a  denial  of  the  same  :  Carpenter 
r.  Town  of  Rolling  (1900),  107  Wis.  559, 
83  N.  W.  953.  A  denial  that  defendant 
took  and  carried  away  the  goods  :  Bach  v. 
Montana  Co.  (1894),  15  Mont.  345,  39 
Pac.  291.  A  denial  that  "the  amount  of 
stock"  sold  by  plaintiff  to  defendant  was 
ever  delivered  :  EdgerCon  v.  Power  (1896), 
13  Mont.  3r,0,  45  Pac.  204.  A  denial 
tiiat  plaintiff's  claim  "was  assigned  to 
defendant  for  collection  as  alleged  in 
the  answer :  "  Maliouey  v.  Hardware  Co. 
(1897).  19  Mont.  377,  48  Pac  545.  A 
denial  of  a  wrongful  or  unlawful  taking 
or  withholding:  Proctor  i;.  Irvin  (1899), 
22  Mont.  547,  57  Pac.  183.  A  denial  of 
certain  allegations  "as  alleged  in  the 
petition : "  Board  of  Education  i'.  Prior 
(1898),  11  S.  D.  292,  77  N.  W.  103.  A 
denial  that  sucli  conveyances  were  exe- 
cuted "as  operated  to  convey  perpetual  or 
non-assessable  water  rights  :  "  Grand  Val- 
ley Irrigation  Co.  v.  Lesher  (1901),  28  Col. 
273,  65  Pac.  44.  A  denial  that  plaintiff 
is  a  corporation  organized  "  under  or  by 
virtue  of  the  laws  of  the  State  of  Illinois ;  " 
McCormick  Mach.  Co.  v.  Hovey  (1899), 
36  Ore.  259,  59  Pac.  189.  A  denial  that 
the  defendants  "still  continue  to  hold  or 
occupy  said  premises,  or  any  portion 
thereof,  as  tenants  of  C.  P.  Lolor : " 
Knowles  v.  Murphy  (1895),  107.  Cal.  107, 
40  Pac.  111.  A  copulative  denial  of  four 
di.stinct  matters:  Wise  ;>.  Rose  (1895),  110 
Cal.  159,  42  Cal.  569.  An  allegaticm 
"  that  said  defendant  did  not  execute  and 


NEGATIVES    PREGNANT.  741 

§  513.  *  622.  Conflict  of  Authority  as  to  whether  a  Negative 
Pregnant  raises  an  Issue.  There  is  not,  however,  an  absolute 
unanimity  among  the  decided  cases.  In  some  instances  the 
courts,  avowedly  rejecting  the  common-law  rule  of  strict  con- 
struction, and  applying  the  requirement  of  the  codes  that  plead- 
ings must  be  liberally  construed  with  a  view  to  substantial  justice, 
have  held  that  such  denials  did  raise  an  issue,  although  their 
character  as  negatives  pregnant  was  fully  acknowledged.  It 
will  be  seen  from  the  decisions  to  be  cited,  that  no  line  of  dis- 
tinction can  be  drawn  which  separates  them  from  those  which 
precede,  and  reconciles  their  conflicting  results :  different  courts 
have  simply  pronounced  in  an  opposite  manner  upon  substan- 
tially the  same  facts  or  circumstances.  A  petition  stated  the 
cause  of  action  in  the  following  manner:  "Plaintiff  claims  of 
defendant  sixty-four  dollars,  and  for  a  cause  of  action  states  that 
on  the  15th  day  of  October,  1867,  the  defendant  set  fire  to  prairie 
land,  and  allowed  the  fire  to  escape  from  his  control,  whereby 
said  fire  spread  to  and  consumed  sixteen  tons  of  hay,  the  prop- 
erty of  the  plaintiff,  to  his  damage,"  etc.  The  answer  denied 
"  that  defendant  did  on  the  15th  day  of  October,  1867,  set  fire 
to  prairie  land  by  which  the  hay  of  the  plaintiff  was  consumed." 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa,  in  pronouncing  judgment,  said  that 
defendant's  denial  "  was  perfectly  consistent  with  his  doing  the 
act  on  the  14th  or  the  16th,  or  on  any  other  day  than  the  15th." 
Yet,  in  view  of  the  rule  of  liberal  construction  imposed  upon  the 
judges  by  the  code,  it  held  that  this  answer,  though  conceded  to 
be  a  negative  pregnant,  was  not  a  nullity,  but  raised  an  issue.-' 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  applied  a  like  lenient  method  in 
an  action  upon  a  bill  of  exchange  executed  by  the  National 
Insurance  Company.  The  petition  alleged  that  the  company, 
"by  its  draft  in  writing  signed  by  its  secretary,"  made  the  obli- 

deliver  at  Fairfield,  Iowa,  to  the  plaintiffs,  S;  W.  405.     A  denial  that  an  execution 

or  either  of  them,  the  note,  etc. : "  Spencer  was  duly  returned  :   St.  Paul  Fire  Ins.  Co. 

r.    Turney   (1897),   5   Okla.   683,   49   Pac.  v.  Dakota  Land  Co.  (1897),  10  S.  D.  191, 

1012.      A   denial   that  defendant   "  negli-  72  N.  W.  460.   An  allegation  "  that  Helen 

gently    and    carelessly    set    fire    to    the  V.  W.  Knight  on  and  prior  to  the  25th  of 

depot:"    Cincinnati,    etc.    R.    R.    Co.    v.  April,  1898,  was  the  owner  in  fee  simple 

Barker  (1893),  94  Ky.  71,21  S.  W.  347.    A  and   entitled    to   the   possession"   of   the 

denial  "  that  the  killing  was  done  through  premises  in  controversy :  Knight  v.  Den- 

the  carelessness  or  negligence  of  defend-  man  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W.  622. ^ 
ant    to   the    damage    of   the    plaintiff:"  i  Doolittle   v.    Greene,   32    Iowa,   123, 

Rogers  v.  Felton  (1895),  98   Ky.  148,  32  124. 


742  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

gation;  and  the  answer  in  turn  denied,  "that  the  compan}-,  by 
its  draft  in  writing  signed  by  its  secretary,"  made  the  obli- 
gation. This  answer,  it  was  held,  raised  an  issue.  Construing 
it  freely  and  favorably  to  the  pleader,  it  could  not  be  treated 
as  a  nullity,  although  its  character  as  a  negative  pregnant  was 
undoubted.^ 

§  514.  *  623.  The  Better  Doctrine.  If  the  requirements  of  the 
codes  as  to  the  mode  of  forming  issues  by  specific  denials  are  not 
to  be  a  dead  letter,  the  doctrine  supported  by  the  series  of  deci- 
sions first  above  cited  is  clearly  correct,  and  the  practical  rule 
drawn  from  them  is  in  every  respect  superior  to  the  slipshod 
method  of  treatment  adopted  by  the  other  class  of  cases.  To 
say  the  least,  a  denial  in  the  form  of  a  negative  pregnant  is 
such  a  glaring  violation  of  logical  and  legal  principles,  that  it 
exhibits  on  the  part  of  the  pleader  either  the  ignorance  which 
does  not  comprehend  the  nature  of  an  issue,  or  the  astute  cun- 
ning which  is  able  to  conceal  the  want  of  a  defence  under  the 
appearance  of  a  direct  answer.  In  either  instance  it  should  be 
condemned  by  the  courts. 

§  515.  *  62-1.  Denials  cannot  properly  contain  Ne-w  Matter.  It 
has  been  shown  that  all  defences  are  either  (1)  denials  of  all, 
some,  or  one  of  the  plaintiff's  allegations ;  or  (2)  afiirmative  new 
matter  which  assumes  that  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  or 
petition  cannot  be  disproved,  but  at  the  same  time  establishes 
other  facts  which  defeat  the  right  of  action.  The  general  denial, 
we  have  seen,  is  a  brief  and  comprehensive  formula,  denying 
'•  each  and  every  allegation  of  the  complaint  or  petition ; "  and 
the  special  denial  is  based  upon  and  negatives  the  single  aver- 
ment against  which  it  is  directed.  It  is  utterly  impossible, 
therefore,  that  a  denial,  either  general  or  special,  if  properly 
framed,  should  contain  any  affirmative  matter,  any  allegation 
of  facts  in  a  positive  and  direct  manner  as  though  they  consti- 
tuted new  matter  and  a  defence  by  way  of  confession  and  avoid- 
ance.    A  defence  consisting  in  the  narrative  of  facts,  stated  under 

1  First    Nat.   Bank  v.  Ilogan,  47   Mr).  [In  Feldmann  ?'.  Shea  (1899),  Idaho,  59 

472.     See  also  EIl.s  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  55  Pac.  5.37,  it  was  lield  that  the  words  "sold 

Mo.  278,  286 ;  and  Wall  v.  Buffalo  Water  and  delivered"  as  used  in  a  complaint  for 

Co.,  18  N.  Y.   119,  in  whicli  it  wa.s  held  goods  sold  and   delivered,  constitute  but 

that   the   answer   should    have   been  cor-  one  act,  and  a  denial  of   that  act  in  the 

rected  on  motion,  and  that,  in  the  absence  conjunctive  raises  an  issue.^ 
of  such  motion,  an  issue  was  raised. 


ARGUMENTATIVE    DENIALS.  743 

the  form  of  "new  matter,"  which  were  not,  liowever,  new  matter, 
but  could  all  be  properly  proved  under  a  denial,  would  be  a  vio- 
lation of  the  true  theory  of  pleading,  and  of  tlie  classification  and 
description  of  defences  contained  in  all  the  codes. 

§  516.  *  625.  Pleading  New  Matter  Equivalent  to  a  Denial.  It 
sometimes  happens  that  the  pleader,  either  mistaking  the  nature 
of  the  facts  which  will  be  proved  by  the  defendant,  and  thinking 
them  to  be  new  matter  when  in  truth  they  are  only  the  evidence 
which  can  be  offered  in  support  of  a  denial,  or  supposing  for  some 
reason  that  his  case  will  be  strengthened  by  spreading  all  these 
details  upon  the  record,  sets  up  a  defence  either  alone  or  joined 
vrith  others  which  is  in  form  "new  matter."  It  consists  of 
affirmative  allegations,  stated  as  though  they  confessed  and 
avoided  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action:  and  yet  the  facts  thus 
averred  are  not  new  matter;  they  are  simply  the  evidence  which 
can  be  offered  in  support  of  a  denial.  The  defence  altogether  is 
therefore  the  same  as  a  denial :  if  it  goes  to  the  whole  complaint 
or  petition,  it  is  equivalent  to  the  general  denial;  if  it  goes  to 
some  particular  allegation  or  allegations,  it  is  equivalent  to  one 
or  more  specific  denials.  It  is  plain  that  the  defendant  has 
gained  nothing  by  such  a  mode  of  pleading;  he  has  not  added 
anything  to  his  case ;  he  has  not  stated  a  fact  which  he  could 
not  have  proved  under  a  simple  answer  of  denial.  On  the 
contrary,  in  limiting  the  scope  of  his  proofs  at  the  trial  to  the 
particular  matter  which  he  has  pleaded,  he  may  have  weakened 
his  defence  by  shutting  out  the  consideration  of  other  facts  which 
he  could  have  given  in  evidence  under  a  proper  denial.  At  all 
events,  he  has  unnecessarily  disclosed  his  case  to  the  adverse 
party. 

§  517.  *  626.  Same  Subject.  This  is  clearly  an  unpractical  as 
vv^ell  as  unscientific  mode  of  pleading.  Such  a  defence  is  an 
"argumentative  denial."  The  same  fault  which  I  have  thus 
indicated,  sometimes  existed  under  the  old  procedure.  A  plea 
in  the  form  of  a  special  plea  by  way  of  confession  and  avoid- 
ance, which  contained  no  matter  of  that  character,  but  only 
matter  which  could  be  proved  under  a  traverse,  and  which  was 
therefore  equivalent  to  a  traverse,  —  to  the  general  issue  perhaps, 
—  was  generally  bad  on  demurrer.  The  objection  was,  not  that 
the  facts  thus  set  up  constituted  no  defence  at  all,  —  for  the 
very  assumption  was  that  they  did  constitute  a  defence  by  way 


744  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

of  traverse,  —  but  the  external  forms  of  the  system  were  con- 
sidered to  be  of  such  importance,  and  this  faulty  pleading  so 
completely  violated  them  all,  that  it  was  held  to  be  worthless  for 
any  purpose. 

§  518.  *  627.  Remedy  for  such  a  Denial  is  by  Motion  under  the 
Codes.  The  same  rules  of  order  and  classification  are  violated 
by  such  defences  at  the  present  day ;  but  as  the  new  procedure 
looks  rather  to  the  substance  than  to  the  form,  and  as  a  demurrer 
to  the  answer  is  only  allowed  on  the  ground  of  insufficiency,  — 
that  is,  when  the  facts  stated  do  not  constitute  a)iy  defence,  —  the 
pleading  which  I  have  described  as  an  "  argumentative  denial  " 
is  not  considered  bad  on  demurrer.^  The  plaintiff's  remedy  is 
by  motion  to  make  the  defence  more  certain  and  definite,  and  to 
strike  out  redundant  and  superfluous  matter.^  If  such  motion 
was  more  frequently  resorted  to,  and  was  favored  by  the  courts, 
it  would  soon  produce  the  effect  of  working  a  marked  improve- 
ment in  pleadings.  It  is  not  merely  a  scientific  blemish,  but  a 
great  practical  evil,  to  have  the  record  incumbered  by  a  mass  of 
unnecessary  allegations,  and  matters  purely  evidentiary,  when  a 
short  and  comprehensive  denial  would  the  better  subserve  the 
rights  of  the  parties,  and  more  clearly  bring  out  and  exhibit  the 
issues  designed  to  be  raised  by  the  answer.*^ 

§  519.  *  628.  Illustrations  of  Argumentative  Denials.  An  ex- 
ample or  two  from  among  the  decided  cases  will  be  sufficient 
to  illustrate  the  kind  of  defence  which  is  equivalent  to  the 
denial  and  the  rulings  of  the  courts  thereon.  An  action  was 
brought  by  the  University  of  Vincennes  against  one  Judah  to 
recover  certain  bonds  alleged  to  be  the  property  of  the  institu- 

1  QOren  v.  Board  of  Commissioners  denial  by  defendant  is  sufficient  to  give 
(1901),  157  Ind.  158,  60  N.  E.  1019;  Hiatt  the  plaintiff  the  right  to  open  and  close: 
V.  Town  of  Darlington  (1898),  152  Ind.  570,  Sorensen  v.  Sorensen  (1903),  —  Keb.  — , 
53  N.  E.  825;  Boos  i;.  Morgan  (1896),  146  94  N.  W.  540] 

Ind.   Ill,  43   N.   E.  947;  State  ex  rel.  v.  »  n  has  been  held  in  New  York   that 

Osborn  (1895),  143  Ind.  671,  42  N.  E.  921 ;  an   affirmative  defence   inconsistent  with 

Childers  i;.  First    Nat.  Bank   (1896),  147  the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  but  not 

Ind.  430,  46  N.  E.  825  ;  Nat.  Wall  Paper  coupled  with  a  denial  of  such  allegations, 

Co.  V.  Mcl'herson    (1897),  19  Mont.  355,  raises  no  issue,  under  the  provision  of  the 

48  Pac.  550.]  code  that  material  allegations  in  the  com- 

2  QOren  v.  Board  of  Commissioners  ))laint  not  controverted  bv  the  answer, 
(1901),  157  Ind.  158,  60  N.  E.  1019.  But  must  be  taken  as  true.  Beard  v.  Tilgh- 
see  LuiKixshire  Ins  Co.  v.  Monroe  (1897),  man  (Supreme,  1892),  20  N.  Y.  Suppl. 
101  Ky  12,  39  S.  W.  434,  where  theallega-  736;  Fleischman  v.  Stern,  90  N.  Y.  110; 
tions  were  held  not  to  amount  even  to  an  QSmith  v.  Coe  (1902),  170  N.  Y.  162,  63 
argumentative  denial.    An  argunientative  N.  K.  57.] 


ARGUMENTATIVE   DENIALS.  745 

tion,  which  the  defendant  had  converted  to  his  own  use.  His 
answer  set  up,  that  the  university  was  indebted  to  him  in  a  large 
amount  for  professional  services,  and  that  the  board  of  trustees 
had  passed  a  resolution  allowing  him  to  retain  and  have  these 
bonds  as  compensation  for  his  services  and  in  settlement  of  his 
claim.  The  reply,  instead  of  denying  this  answer,  averred  that 
Judah  had  been  secretary  of  the  board  of  trustees;  that  he  fraud- 
ulently entered  this  resolution  in  the  books  of  record  of  the  uni- 
versity; that  no  such  resolution  was  ever  passed;  and  it  set  out 
the  resolution  which  was  actually  passed,  and  which  was  very 
different  from  that  alleged  in  the  answer.  To  the  paragraph  of 
the  reply  containing  this  matter  the  defendant  demurred ;  the 
demurrer  was  overruled,  and  he  appealed.  In  disposing  of  the 
question  thus  raised,  the  court  said :  "  Now,  this  reply  is  simply 
a  denial  of  so  much  of  the  answer  as  alleges  the  adoption  of  the 
resolution,  or,  in  other  words,  the  making  the  contract  by  the 
trustees.  It  is  argumentative,  and  it  needlessly  explains  how  a 
resolution  never  made  by  the  trustees  comes  to  be  found  on  their 
records.  This  is  surplusage.  But  neither  argumentativeness 
nor  surplusage  justifies  a  demurrer  under  our  system  of  plead- 
ing. There  was,  therefore,  no  error  in  overruling  the  appellant's 
demurrer  to  the  second  paragraph  of  the  reply."  ^  It  is  plain 
that  a  general  denial  of  this  answer  would  have  admitted  in 
evidence  all  the  facts  specially  pleaded  in  the  reply  under  the 
form  of  new  matter;  and  the  reply  was,  in  fact,  nothing  more 
than  a  denial. 

§  520.  *  629.  "Where  Answer  contains  General  Denial  and  also  a 
Special  Defence  of  New  Matter  Equivalent  to  General  Denial.  When 
the  answer  contains  two  or  more  defences,  viz.,  1st,  a  general 
denial,  and,  2d,  a  special  defence  in  the  form  of  new  matter,  but 
in  fact  equivalent  to  the  general  denial,  and  a  demurrer  to  the 
latter  has  been  sustained,  no  material  error  is  thus  committed, 
and  the  judgment  will  not  be  reversed ;  for  the  same  facts  which 
were  averred  in  the  special  defence  could  be  fully  proved  under 
the  general  denial,  and  the  defendant's  whole  case  would  thus 
be  available  under  the  issue  which  remained  upon  the  record.^ 
In  an  action  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  the  answer  in  each  of 

1  Judah  V.  University  of  Vincennes,  23  ^  Chicago,  Cin.  &  L.  R.  Co.  r.  West,  37 

Ind.  272,  277.  See  also  Clink  u.  Thurston,  Ind.  211,  215;  Waggoner  t'.  Liston,  37 
47  Cal.  21,  29.  Ind.  357. 


746  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

three  separate  defences  set  up  the  same  facts  with  immaterial 
variations:  viz.,  that  the  goods  were  sold  to  the  defendant's 
wife  without  his  knowledge  or  consent;  that  she  had  at  the 
time  wrongfully  abandoned  him,  and  was  living  apart  from 
him,  and  for  these  reasons  he  was  not  liable  for  the  price.  A 
demurrer  to  these  defences  having  been  sustained  in  the  court 
below,  the  Supreme  Court  on  appeal  held  that  they  were  all 
argumentative  general  denials:  "  their  effect  was  simply  to  aver 
that  the  goods  were  not  sold  to  the  defendant,  and  all  the  matters 
relied  upon  could  have  been  proved  under  a  general  denial."  It 
was  further  said,  that  a  motion  was  the  proper  remedy  to  correct 
such  faulty  pleading,  and  the  demurrer  was  irregular;  but  the 
irregularity  in  this  instance  was  merely  technical,  and  the  error 
committed  was  immaterial,  and  had  not  prejudiced  any  rights  of 
the  defendant;  for,  as  he  had  pleaded  the  general  denial  in  addi- 
tion to  the  special  defence  mentioned,  his  entire  case  was  prov- 
able under  that  part  of  the  answer. ^ 

§  521.  *  G30.  Combination  of  General  and  Argumentative  De- 
nials. This  leads  me  to  the  second  branch  of  the  present 
subdivision;  namely,  the  combination  of  the  general  denial 
with  other  defences  equivalent  thereto  in  the  same  answer. 
The  argumentative  denial  described  above  is  frequently  in  prac- 
tice used  in  connection  with  the  general  denial  inserted  in  the 
same  answer.  It  would  seem  as  though  the  pleader,  after  he 
had  written  the  brief  general  denial,  could  not  be  satisfied  with 
its  efficacy,  and  considered  it  necessarj^  to  add  in  separate  divi- 
sions of  the  answer  a  further  statement  of  the  very  facts  which 
he  knew  would  constitute  the  defence,  and  which  could  all  be 
proven  under  the  general  denial.  This  mode  of  pleading  is 
faulty  in  the  extreme ;  it  has  not  a  single  reason  in  its  favor, 
not  an  excuse  for  its  existence;  it  overloads  the  record  with 
superfluous  matter,  and  produces  nothing  but  confusion  and 
uncertainty.  In  a  few  States  the  courts  have  struggled  to 
correct  this  vicious  departure  from  the  true  theory  of  pleading, 
and  have  enforced  the  rules  and  remedies  which  the  codes  amply 
provide.     It  is  unnecessary  to  argue  that  this  species  of  answer 

1  Day  V.  Wamslev,  .33  Ind.  145.  true,  necessarily  shows  that  the  allegation 

£ln  Burris  v.  People's  Ditch  Co.  (1894),  of  the  complaint  as  to  the  same  matter  is 

104  Cal.  248,  37  Pac.  922,  the  court  said :  untrue,  is  a  good  traverse,  and  sufficient  as 

•'  It  may  be  said,  generally,  that  any  alle-  a  denial."      See   also   Phillips   v.  Hagart 

gation  in  an  answer  which,  if  found  to  be  (1896),  1 13  Cal.  552,  45  Pac.  843.] 


AKGUMENTATIVE    DENIALS.  747 

is  in  direct  conflict  with  tlie  plainest  principles  and  the  most 
express  requirements  of  the  codes.  Those  statutes  permit  only 
"denials  "  and  statements  of  "new  matter,"  that  is,  matter  whicli 
is  truly  a  coiifeasion  and  avoidance ;  they  do  not  authorize  aver- 
ments of  matter  which  is  not  new,  but  which  is  simply  a  detail 
of  evidence  going  in  support  of  a  denial.  While  this  reformed 
system  constructed  by  the  codes  is  perfect  in  its  scientific  char- 
acter, —  far  surpassing  in  that  respect  the  loose  notions  intro- 
duced by  the  common-law  courts  in  relation  to  the  function  of 
the  ordinary  "general  issues"  of  the  old  procedure, — it  is  at 
the  same  time  in  the  highest  degree  practical.  If  the  advantages 
which  ought  to  be  derived  from  the  great  reform  are  to  be  ob- 
tained, it  is  clearly  the  duty  of  all  the  courts  to  insist  upon  a 
return  to  the  simple  methods  which  the  codes  so  clearly  prescribe, 
concerning  which,  indeed,  they  do  not  leave  the  slightest  doubt 
or  uncertainty. 

§  522.  *  631.  Practice  in  Indiana  in  Respect  to  Argumentative 
Denials.  In  Indiana,  a  practice  has  become  settled,  which  might 
well  be  borrowed  by  the  courts  of  all  the  other  States.  I  know 
of  no  single  rule  of  procedure,  which,  if  uniformly  adopted  and 
rigidly  enforced,  would  work  out  a  happier  result  in  bringing  the 
forms  and  modes  of  pleading  back  to  the  simple  and  scientific 
theory  embodied  in  the  codes,  than  the  rule  which  prevails  in 
Indiana,  and  which  I  shall  now  explain  and  illustrate.  I  dwell 
on  it  at  some  length,  not  because  it  can  now  be  regarded  as  pan 
of  the  universal  practice  throughout  the  States  in  which  the  new 
system  has  been  established,  but  because  it  ought  to  become  so ; 
and  I  hope  that,  by  introducing  it  to  the  attention  of  the  bench 
and  bar  in  other  commonwealths,  its  merits  may  be  at  once  rec- 
ognized, and  its  methods  followed. 

§  523.  *  632.  Same  Subject.  When  the  answer  contains  the 
general  denial,  and,  in  addition  thereto,  a  separate  defence  or 
separate  defences  equivalent  to  the  general  denial,  —  that  is, 
mere  argumentative  denials  as  above  described,  — such  addi- 
tional defences,  it  is  settled,  are  irregular,  and  will  be  over- 
ruled and  expunged  from  the  record.  The  remedy  is  not  by 
demurrer,  for  the  reasons  already  given,  but  by  motion  to  strike 
out  as  redundant  and  superfluous.  If,  however,  a  plaintiff,  in- 
stead of  moving  to  strike  out,  should  demur  to  the  vicious 
defences,  and  that  demurrer  should  happen  to  be  sustained  by 


748  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

the  lower  court,  no  material  error  would  have  been  committed, 
for  the  same  result  would  have  been  reached  which  would  be 
attained  by  a  motion :  the  record  would  be  cleansed  of  its  re- 
dundancy, and  the  general  denial  would  remain,  under  which 
all  the  facts  constituting  the  defence,  and  which  had  been  set 
forth  at  large  in  the  rejected  paragraphs,  could  be  given  in  evi- 
dence at  the  trial.  This  practice,  I  say,  is  thoroughly  settled 
in  Indiana ;  and  the  result  is  a  system  of  pleading  in  that  State 
which  far  surpasses,  in  its  brevity  and  its  adherence  to  the  spirit 
of  the  codes,  that  prevailing  in  any  other  State.  The  cases  col- 
lected in  the  notes  illustrate  many  forms  of  pleading  to  which 
the  rule  has  been  applied,  and  exhibit  its  practical  workings  in 
a  very  complete  manner.^  The  same  doctrine  and  practice  has 
been  occasionally  followed  in  other  States. ^  This  subject  will 
be  again  referred  to  in  the  subsequent  section  which  deals  with 
the  union  of  defences.  It  is  very  plain  that  the  faulty  method 
described  and  criticised  proceeds  in  a  very  great  measure  from 
an  uncertainty  in  the  mind  of  the  pleader  as  to  the  matter  which 
may  be  given  in  evidence  under  the  "general  denial:"  what- 
ever, then,  will  remove  that  uncertainty,  will  aid  in  producing 
a  reform  in  the  manner  of  stating  defences  in  the  answer. 

§  524.  *  633.  General  Denials  of  all  Allegations  not  otherw^iae 
Admitted  or  Referred  to.  A  practice  has  recently  grown  up  of 
framing  an  answer  in  the  following  manner  :  To  admit  such  of 

1  Adams  Ex.   Co.  v.  Darnell,  31   Ind.  ern  Union    Tel.  Co.  v.  Meek,  49  id.  53; 

20  ;  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rutherford,  Smith  r.  Denman,  48  id.  65,  70;    Milford 

29  Ind.  82;  Jeffersonville.  etc.  R.   Co.  v.  Sch.  T.  v.  Powner,  126  Ind.  528;  Wallace 

Dunlap,  29  id.  426;  Rhode  v.  Green,  26  r.  Exch.  Bk.   of  Spencer,  126  lud.  265; 

id.  83;  Bondurant  v.  Bladen,  19  id.  160;  Craig  v.  Frazier,  127  Ind.  286;  Wickwire 

Butler  I'.  Edgerton,  15  id.  15;    Westcott  r.  Angola  (lud.  App.,  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep. 

r.  Brown,  13  id.  83;  Garrison  v.  Clark,  11  917;  Hoosier  Stone  Co.  r.  McCain  (Ind. 

id.  369;  Cain   v.  Hunt,  41   id.  466,   471;  Snpr.,  1892),  31  N.  E.  956. 
Ferguson    i\    Ramsey,   41    id.    511,    513;  2  i^ggt  v.  Harris,  12  Abb.  Pr.  446,  per 

Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  r.  West,  37  id.  211;  Bosworth    J.;    Radde    i-.   Ruckgaber,    3 

Urton  V.  State,  37  id.  339;  Port  i-.   Rus-  Duer,  684 ;  Simpson  r.  Mc  Arthur,  16  Abb. 

RcU,  36  id.  60;  Day  v.  Wnmsley,   33  id.  Pr.   302    (n.),   per    Brady   J.;    Bruck   v. 

145  ;  Allen  i-.  Randolph,  48  id.  496  ;  Trog-  Tucker,  42  Cal.  345  ;   Page  v.  Merwin,  54 

den  r.  Deckard,  45  id.  572 ;  Wolf  v.  Bcho  Conn.  426.     It  is  held  iu  Florida  that  the 

field,  38  id.  175;  Widener  f.  State,  45  id.  court  may  strike   out  such  a  special   de- 

244 ;    Sparks    v.    Heritage,    45    Ind.    66 ;  fence  or   not   as  it   pleases,  and   neither 

Lewis    V.  Edwards.  44  id.  3.33;    Ohio  &  ruling  will  be  error.     Davis  i.  Shuler,  14 

Miss.  R.  Co.  r.  Hemberger.43  id.  462,  464  ;  Fla.  438,  445.     See   also  Colorado  Cent. 

Wilson  v.  Root,  43  id.  486,  493.     See  also  R.  Co.  i-.  Mollanden,  4  Colo.  154.    A  denial 

Lowry    i-.  Megee,   52    id.    107;    Watts  r.  which  is  a  mere  inference  from  facts  al- 

Coxen,  52  id.    155;    Bannister  i-.  Grassy  leged    is  not   a  good   denial.     Wright  v. 

Fork  Ditch  A.ss'n,  52  id.  178,  184;  Wes^  Schmidt,  47  Iowa,  233. 


PARTIAL    GENKKAL   DENIALS.  749 

the  plaintiff's  averments,  if  any,  as  the  facts  of  the  case  require  ; 
to  deny  others  wholly  or  partially ;  to  explain  and  modify  others 
if  thought  necessary  ;  in  short,  to  unite  in  one  answer  or  division 
thereof  a  mass  of  special  admissions,  denials,  explanations,  and 
aflirmative  statements,  and  to  conclude  the  whole  with  a  sweeping 
clause  somewhat  in  this  form :  "  As  to  each  and  every  other  alle- 
gation in  said  complaint  not  herein  expressly  admitted  or  denied 
or  mentioned,  the  defendant  hereby  denies  the  same  ;  "  or,  "  And 
the  defendant  denies  each  and  every  other  allegation  in  said 
complaint  not  hereinbefore  expressly  admitted  or  denied  or  men- 
tioned." Although  a  somewhat  similar  mode  of  putting  in  issue 
the  averments  of  a  bill  in  equity  was  occasionally  resorted  to  by 
chancery  pleaders  under  the  former  system,  the  codes  give  no 
countenance  to,  nor  authority  for,  such  a  mongrel  form  of  answer. 
The  true  spirit  and  intent  of  the  theory  introduced  by  the  re- 
formed procedure  plainly  demand  certainty,  precision,  and  defi- 
niteness  in  the  allegations  of  both  parties,  and  especially  in  the 
denials  by  which  the  defendant  places  on  the  record  the  exact 
issues  intended  to  be  tried.  In  this  respect  the  new  method  was 
to  be  a  complete  departure  from  the  vagueness  and  uncertainty 
resulting  from  the  broad  effect  given  to  the  general  issues  in  "  as- 
sumpsit," "debt,"  and  "trover"  by  the  common-law  courts,  and 
also  from  the  loose  and  incomplete  manner  of  presenting  the 
issues  which  necessarily  characterized  the  answer  in  chancery. 
This  design  of  the  codes  would,  however,  be  utterly  defeated  if 
the  vicious  style  of  defence  thus  described  should  become  com- 
mon ;  and  the  courts,  it  is  submitted,  ought  to  have  pronounced 
most  emphatically  against  it  when  it  first  made  its  appearance. 

§  525.  *  634.  Proper  Distinction  to  be  observed  between  General 
and  Specific  Denials.  The  codes  require  either  a  general  denial, 
or  specific  denials,  or  defences  in  confession  and  avoidance  ;  and 
also  that  each  defence  must  be  separately  stated,  so  that  the  issue 
raised  by  it  may  be  perceived  at  once.  The  "general  denial  "  is 
evidently  intended  to  be  an  answer  to  the  entire  complaint  or  pe- 
tition, —  to  negative  all  its  averments.  The  design  of  the  legis- 
lature and  the  understanding  of  the  bar  upon  this  point  were 
shown  by  the  immediate  adoption  of  the  form  in  use  through- 
out all  the  States.  The  code  of  Iowa  expressly  enacts  that  the 
general  denial  is  interposed  to  the  whole  petition ;  and  this 
provision  is  plainly  a  statutory  construction   of  the   universally 


750  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

prevailing  doctrine  :  a  specific  denial,  on  the  other  hand,  must 
be  addressed  to  some  single,  particular  allegation,  and  must 
distinctly  indicate  the  portion  intended  to  be  controverted  by  it. 
I  am  of  opinion  that  each  specific  denial  ought  to  be  a  single  and 
separate  defence  by  itself,  so  that,  if  the  issue  upon  it  should  be 
decided  in  favor  of  the  defendant,  the  cause  of  action  would  be 
defeated.  In  this  respect,  I  think,  the  specific  denials  of  the 
codes  were  intended  to  be  analogous  to  the  special  traverses  pro- 
vided for  by  the  English  judges  in  their  new  rules  of  pleading 
adopted  in  1834.  Certain  it  is  that  the  codes  do  not,  by  any 
stretch  of  their  language,  contemplate  an  answer  consisting  of 
a  general  denial  directed  to  a  part  only  of  the  complaint  or  peti- 
tion, and  connected  with  other  admissions,  partial  denials,  and 
explanations. 

§  526.  *  635.  DifiBculty  Arising  from  this  Form  of  Answer. 
Again  :  this  form  of  answer  makes  it  extremely  difficult,  and 
often  impossible,  to  determine  what  allegations  are  denied,  and 
what  are  passed  by  in  silence,  and  therefore  admitted.  If  the 
complaint  or  petition  contains  numerous  averments,  and  the  an- 
swer is  such  a  mass  of  express  admissions,  partial  explanations, 
and  statements  of  matter  which  is  merely  evidentiary,  and  con- 
cludes with  the  formula  above  quoted,  we  have  all  the  evils 
which  can  result  from  the  most  vicious  system  or  no-system  that 
can  possibly  be  conceived.  The  object  of  pleading  is  to  ascertain 
and  present  the  issues  of  fact  between  the  litigants,  so  that  they 
can  be  readily  perceived  and  decided  by  the  court  and  jury.  The 
special  boast  of  the  common-law  methods  was,  that  they  brought 
out  these  issues  singly  and  clearly.  I  am  confident  that  the  the- 
ory of  the  reformed  procedure,  when  lived  up  to  and  accurately 
followed,  will  give  much  better  practical  results  than  were  ever 
obtained  as  a  whole  from  the  former  system.  The  kind  of  an- 
swer which  I  have  described  violates  every  principle  of  this 
theory,  and  is  a  contrivance  of  ignorance  or  indolence. 

§  527.  *  636.  This  Form  Sanctioned  by  some  Courts.  Notwith- 
standing the  foregoing  considerations,  which  appear  to  be  such 
plain  and  necessary  inferences  from  the  language  as  well  as  the 
intent  of  the  codes,  the  courts  of  New  York  and  of  some  other  States 
liave  given  a  seeming  approval  to  this  most  slovenly  manner  of 
stating  the  defence  of  denial.  So  far  as  their  decisions  have 
passed  upon  tlie  sul)ject,  they  seem  either  to  approve  such  an- 


PARTIAL    GENERAL    DENIALS. 


751 


swers,  or  at  most  to  hold  that,  if  improper,  the  only  mode  of  cor- 
rection is  by  a  motion  to  make  them  more  definite  and  certain; 
in  other  Avords,  they  are  sufficient  to  raise  the  intended  issues. 
It  cannot  be  said,  however,  that  the  question  has  been  settled  by 
authority,  or  that  this  species  of  denial  has  become  an  establislied 
method  of  pleading  wherever  the  reformed  procedure  prevails. 
The  few  cases  which  touch  upon  the  matter  will  now  be  cited. 
In  an  action  upon  a  policy  of  life  insurance,  the  answer  was  of 
the  kind  mentioned,  and  concluded  as  follows :  that  "  the  defend- 
ant denied  each  and  every  allegation  of  the  complaint  not  therein 
expressly  admitted  or  denied."  The  Court  of  Appeals  said  of 
this  answer:  "  It  is  clear,  both  upon  principle  and  authority,  that 
under  a  general  or  sj)ecific  denial  of  any  fact  which  the  plaintiff 
is  required  to  prove  to  maintain  the  action,  the  defendant  may 
give  evidence  to  disprove  it.^  If  an  answer  containing  denials  of 
the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  except  as  thereinafter  stated,  is 
rendered  indefinite,  uncertain,  or  complicated,  the  remedy  is  by 
motion  to  make  the  answer  more  definite,  and  not  by  exclusion 
of  evidence  on  the  trial."  ^  A  similar  answer,  endinor  with  a  de- 
nial  of  "  each  and  every  allegation  of  the  complaint  except  as 
herein  admitted  or  stated,'"  was  held  by  the  same  court  to  be 
good  and  to  raise  an  issue.^ 


1  Wheeler  v.  Billings,  38  N.  Y.  263. 

2  Greenfield  v.  Mass.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co., 
47  N.  y.  430,  437,  per  Grover  J.  An 
expression  in  this  quotation  indicates  a 
certain  misconception  on  the  part  of  the 
learned  judge.  A  general  denial  of  a  fact 
is  something  unknown  in  the  system  of 
pleading  established  by  the  codes.  See 
also  Leyde  v.  Martin,  16  Minn.  38;  Becker 
V.  Sweetzer,  15  Minn.  427,  434  ;  Kingsley 
V.  Gilman,  12  Minn.  515,  517,  518,  which 
show  that  this  form  of  denial  is  fully 
approved  by  the  Minnesota  court. 

3  youngs  V.  Kent,  46  N.  Y.  672  ;  and 
see  AUis  v.  Leonard,  46  N.  Y.  688.  That 
this  form  of  denial  is  proper,  and  suffi- 
ciently raises  issues  upon  the  allegations 
not  admitted,  seems  to  be  now  settled,  at 
least  in  several  of  the  States.  Walsli  v. 
Mehrback,  5  Hun,  448 ;  Calhoun  v.  Hal- 
len,  25  id.  155;  Pen n.  Coal  Co.  v.  Blake, 
85  N.  Y.  226,  235  ;  St.  Anthony  Falls  Co. 
V.  King  Bridge  Co.,  23  Minn.  186;  Ingle 
V.  Jones,  43    Iowa,  286 ;   Barley  v.  Ger- 


man-Am. Bk.,  Ill  U.S.  21 6;  Griffin  r.  L.I. 
R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  348;  Crane  v.  Crane,  43 
Hun,  309 ;  Owens  ?•.  R.  Hudnot's  Phar- 
macy, 20  Civ.  Pro.  Rep.  145  ;  see  Clark  v. 
Dillon,  97  N.  Y.  370;  Davenport  v.  Ladd, 
38  Minn.  545. 

[[The  following  forms  of  general  denial 
have  been  held  sufficient :  "  lilach  and 
every  material  allegation,  statement, 
matter,  fact,  and  thing  in  said  complaint 
contained,  and  not  hereinafter  admitted  :" 
Althouse  V.  Town  of  Jamestown  (1895), 
91  Wis.  46,  64  N.  W.  423.  "  Every  alle- 
gation in  the  complaint  not  admitted  in 
the  answer  :  "  Childers  v.  First  Nat.  Bank 
(1896),  147  lud.  430,46N.  E.  825.  "Each 
and  every  allegation  and  averment  con- 
tained in  ]>laintifrs  complaint  herein  wliich 
is  not  hereinafter  specifically  admitted  or 
qualified  :  "  Mattoou  v.  Fremont,  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.  (1894),  6  S.  D.  301,  60  N.  W.  69. 
"  Each  and  every  allegation  therein  con- 
tained, and  not  hereinafter  specifically 
denied,   admitted    or   explained : "    State 


752 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


§  528.  *  637.  Facts,  not  Conclusions  of  Law,  should  be  denied. 
The  complaint  or  petition,  in  addition  to  the  facts  from  which  the 
right  of  action  arises,  sometimes  contains  the  conclusions  of  law 
which  result  from  those  facts,  such  as  the  indebtedness  of  the  de- 
fendant, his  liability  in  damages,  and  the  like.  It  is  a  fundamen- 
tal principle  of  the  pleading  authorized  by  the  codes,  that  these 
averments  of  fact  must  be  denied,  and  not  merely  the  legal  con- 
clusion therefrom  ;  a  traverse  of  the  latter  without  one  of  the 
former  is  a  nullity,  and  creates  no  issue.^  When  the  issuable 
facts  are  denied,  a  denial  of  the  conclusions  of  law  is  unnecessary, 
but  would  certainly  be  harmless.  In  this  respect,  the  reformed 
procedure  has  introduced  a  new  feature  into  the  science  of  plead- 
ing. It  is  often  said,  I  am  aware,  by  writers  of  authority  even, 
that,  under  the  common-law  methods,  the  facts  were  always,  and 
the  legal  conclusions  were  never,  to  be  traversed.     But  this  state- 


ex  rel.  V.  City  of  Pierre  (1902),  15  S.  I). 
559,  90  N.  W.  1047.  "  Each  and  every 
material  allegation  :  "  Nix  v.  Gilmer 
(1897),  5  Okla.  740,  50  Pac.  131. 

In  Hardy  v.  Purington  (1894),  6  S.  D. 
382,  61  N.  W.  158,  the  court  said:  "An 
answer  [in  maudamu.s],  which  denies 
'  each  and  all  the  alle<,'ations  in  the  affi- 
davit contained,  except  such  as  are  here- 
inafter admitted  or  qualified, '  though 
not  a  form  of  pleading  to  he  encouraged, 
has  grown  into  such  frequent  use  that  it 
would  be  unwise  and  unfair  to  litigants  and 
attorneys  for  this  court  to  hold,  without 
premonition,  that  such  an  answer,  unas- 
.«ailed  by  motion  or  otherwise,  constitutes 
no  denial.  If  such  an  answer  leave  the 
plaintiff  in  doubt  as  to  what  allegations  of 
Ills  complaint  are  intended  to  be  denied  and 
what  admitted,  the  answer  is  subject  to  a 
motion  to  make  more  definite  and  certain." 

A  reply  denying  "each  and  every 
allegation  of  new  matter "  is  good  after 
verdict :  Western  Mattress  Co.  v.  Potter 
(1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  VV.  841. 

A  reply  denying  "  each  and  every  al- 
legation of  new  matter  set  up  in  defend- 
ant's answer  "  and  "  each  and  every  other 
part  of  same,  except  such  allegations 
of  such  answer  as  may  be  admissions  of 
plaintiff's  petition,"  unless  attacked  by  mo- 
tion to  strike  out  or  to  make  more  definite 
and  certain,  is  gooil :  I'echa  v.  KastI 
(1902j,  64  Neb.  380,  89  N.  W.  1047. 


"  Where  a  general  denial  in  an  answer 
is  qualified  by  the  pleading  of  special 
defences  in  the  nature  of  confession  and 
avoidance,  evidence  of  other  defences  of  a 
like  nature  is  inadmissible,  although,  in 
the  absence  of  such  pleading,  such  evi- 
dence would  have  been  admissible  under 
the  general  denial :  "  Ball  c  Beaumont 
(1901),  63  Neb.  215,  88  N.  W.  173. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  following  forms 
have  been  held  insufficient :  "  Every 
material  allegation  of  the  complaint : " 
Mead  y.  Pettigrew  (1899),  11  S.  U.  529, 
78  N.  W.  945  ;  Burke  v.  Inter-State  Sav- 
ingsAss'n  (1901),  25  Mont.  315,  69  Pac. 
879;  Hamilton  v.  Huson  (1898),  21  Mont. 
9,  53  Pac.  101.  "  Each  and  every  allega- 
tion and  statement  therein  which  is  and 
are  in  any  way  inconsistent  with  the  alle- 
gations in  the  petition"  and  "especially 
denies  all  new  matter  pleaded  "  in  the 
answer:  Young  v.  Schofield  (1895),  132 
Mo.  650,  34  S.  W.  497.  "  Each  and  every 
allegation  contained  in  the  answer  incon- 
sistent with  the  statementie  in  plaintiff's 
petition  :  "  Gross  i-.  Scheel  (1903),  —  Neb. 
—,93  N.  W.  418;  Dezell  v.  Fidelity  & 
Casualty  Co.  (1903),  176  Mo.  253,  75  S.  W. 
1102:  an  answer  denying  "each  and 
every  other  allegation  in  said  petition  not 
specifically  admitted."] 

1  [Hevdenfeldt  v.  Jacobs  (1895),  107 
Cal.  373,  40  Pac.  492.] 


DENIALS   OF  LEGAL   CONCLUSIONS.  753 

ment  is  clearly  inaccurate.  In  some  of  the  most  common  forms  of 
declaration  in  constant  use,  the  leading  averment  was  that  "  the 
defendant  is  indebted,''  a  mere  inference  of  law ;  and  the  general 
issue  might  be,  "  he  is  not  indebted,"  or  "  he  was  never  indebted," 
which  was  certainly  nothing  but  the  denial  of  a  legal  conclusion. 
All  this  has  been  swept  away  by  the  codes,  and  every  trace  of  it 
left  in  the  modern  practice  is  in  direct  opposition  both  to  the 
spirit  and  to  the  letter  of  the  statute.  A  denial  of  indebtedness 
or  of  liability,  without  denying  the  allegations  of  fact  from  which 
the  indebtedness  or  liability  is  claimed  to  have  arisen,  is  a  nullity  ; 
it  raises  no  issue,  and  will  be  held  bad  on  demurrer,  as  is  shown 
by  the  subjoined  cases  :  In  an  action  upon  a  promissory  note,  the 
answer  admitted  the  execution  of  the  note,  and  denied  that  the 
defendant  owed  the  debt  to  the  plaintiff.  A  demurrer  to  this  an- 
swer was  sustained,  the  court  saying :  "  This  answer  under  the 
former  mode  of  pleading  would  have  amounted  to  a  plea  of  nil 
debet,  and  would  not  have  been  good,  as  the  suit  was  brought 
upon  a  note  in  wiiting  having  the  dignity  of  a  specialty  ;  and  we 
are  of  opinion  that  the  answer  was  not  sufficient  under  the 
present  practice.  It  was  not  sufficient  to  state  that  defendant 
did  not  owe  the  debt."  ^  All  the  cases,  with  hardly  an  exception, 
are  to  the  same  effect :  as  in  an  action  on  a  note,  an  answer  saying 
that  "  the  defendants  do  not  owe  and  ought  not  to  pay  the  note, 
for  they  do  not  admit  the  regular  protest  thereof  and  notice," 
raised  no  issue ;  ^  also  where,  in  an  action  for  goods  sold  and  de- 
livered, the  answer  "  denies  that  the  defendant  is  indebted  to  the 
plaintiff  as  stated  in  the  petition ;  "  ^  and  where,  in  an  action  on 
a  note,  the  answer  simply  denied  indebtedness  to  the  plaintiff  as 
claimed  in  the  petition,  or  in  any  other  sum  or  amount  whatever.^ 

1  Haggard  i;.  Hay's  Adm.,  13  B.  Mon.  monwealth,  13  Bush,  435  ;  Louis  v.  Brown 
175.  7  Ore.  326  ;  Indianapolis,  B.  &  W.  K.  Co. 

2  Clark  V.  Finnell,  16  B.  Mon.  329,  335.  v.  Ilisley,  50  Ind.  60;  Hunter  i;.  Martin, 

3  Francis  v.  Francis,  18  B.  Mon.  57 ;  57  Cal.  365 ;  Hintrager  I'.  Richter  (Iowa, 
and  see  Nelson  v.  Murray,  33  Cal.  338;  1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  188;  Carpenter  v. 
Curtis  v.  Richards,  9  Cal.  33 ;  Wells  v.  Ritchie,  2  Wash.  512.  Denials  of  in- 
McPike,  21  Cal.  215  ;  Higgins  v.  Germain,  debteduess:  Bullert-.  Siddell,  43  Fed.  Rep. 
1  Mont.  230;  Skinner  v.  Clute,  9  Nev.  342,  116;  Callanan  v.  Williams,  71  Iowa,  363  ; 

*  Morton  v.  Coffin,  29  Iowa,  235,  238.  Watson  v.  Lemen,  9  Colo.   200;  Gale  v. 

For  further  illustrations  of  the  rule  stated  James,   11   Colo.  540;  Heath  y.  White,  3 

in  the  text,  see  Man.  Nat.  Bank  r.  Russell,  Utah,  474.     See  McLaughlin  i;.  Wheeler 

€  Hun,  375  ;  Starr  v.  Cragin,  24  id.  177  ;  (S.  Dak.  1891),  47  N.  W.  816,  818. 

Murray  r.  N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  85  N.  Y.  236,  [Spencer     v.   Turney   (1897),  5  Okla. 

239;  Kentucky  River  Nav.   Co.  v.   Com-  683,  49  Pac.  1012;  Aultman  &  Taylor  Co 

48 


754  CIVIL    RE.MEWES. 

§  529.  *  638.  Illustrations.  The  same  is  true  of  any  other 
denials  of  raere  inferences  or  conclusions  of  law.  Thus,  in  a  suit 
upon  a  note  given  to  the  plaintiff,  a  married  woman,  and  made 
expressly  payable  to  her  on  its  face,  a  defence  that  the  "  note  is 
not  her  separate  property,"  and  a  denial  that  she  is  the  legal 
owner  and  holder  thereof,  were  both  held  nullities,  and  struck 
out  on  motion. 1  The  defence,  in  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mort- 
gage, "that  D.  [the  mortgagor]  was  regularly  and  duly  dis- 
charged from  all  his  debts,  including  that  to  the  plaintiff,  under 
proceedings  in  insolvency,"  was  held  not  to  be  new  matter  re- 
quiring a  reply,  "  but  only  a  conclusion  of  law  and  not  of  fact," 
and  not  to  create  an  issue.^  In  an  action  to  recover  for  injuries 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  the  complaint,  after 
stating  the  necessary  facts  showing  the  negligent  omissions,  and 
the  consequent  destruction  of  the  plaintiff's  property,  concluded, 
"  to  his  great  damage,  to  wit,  in  the  sum  of  $800."  The  answer 
simply  denied  "  that  the  plaintiff  had  suffered  damage  in  the  sum 
of  S800."     This  denial  raised  no  issue. ^ 

§  530.  *  639.  Denial  of  Conclusions  of  Law  is  Unnecessary.  The 
converse  of  the  rule  illustrated  by  the  foregoing  cases  is  also  true. 
If  the  answer  denies  the  material  facts  averred  by  the  plaintiff,  or 
alleges  material  facts  constituting  a  defence  of  new  matter,  it 
need  not  deny  the  plaintiff's  conclusions  of  law,  or  state  any  con- 
clusions of  law  as  the  inference  from  the  facts  which  it  has 
pleaded.*     Thus,  in  an  action  upon  a  contract,  the  answer  alleged 

V.  Mead  (1901 ),  109  Ky.  583,  60  S.  W.  294  ;  owner  and  holder  of  the  note  and  mort- 

'lavlor  V.  Furcell  (1894),  60  Ark.  606,  31  gapes  creates  no  issue:  Clemens  v.  Luce 

S.  W.  .567.]  (1894),  101  Cal.  432,  35  Pac.  1032.     A  de- 

1  Frost  r.  Haford,  40  Cal.  165,  166-  nial  by  defendant  in  an  action  of  eject- 
Felch  V.  Beaudry,  40  Cal.  439.  ment  that  his  possession  is  wrongful  raises 

2  Christy  f.  Dana,  42  Cal.  174,  178.  noissue:  Rhoades    v.    Higbee    (1895),    21 

3  Huston  V.  Twin  &  C.  C.  Turnp.  Co.,  45  Colo.  88,  39  Pac.  1099.  A  vali.l  denial  is 
Cal.  550;  Higgins  r.  Wortel,  18  Cal.  330.  not  vitiated  by  conclusions  of  law  alleged  in 
In  an  action  to  enforce  a  lieu  upon  defeml-  connection  therewith  :  Fitzpatrick  v.  Si- 
ant's  land,  an  answer  which,  without  con-  nionson  Bros.  Co.  (1902),  86  Minn.  140,  90 
trovertingany  of  the  facts  alleged,  simply  N.  W.  378. 

denied  that  the  plaintiff  had  any  lien,  was  A  denial  that  the  set-off  constituted  a. 

held  to  raise  no  issue.     Bradbury  v.  Cro-  defence,   raises   no   issue:    Richardson    v. 

nise,  46Cal.  287.     See,  however,  Simmons  Doty  (1895),  44  Neb.  73,  62  N.  W.  254. 

V.  Si.^son,  26  N.  Y.  264,  270,  273.  One  who  in  his  pleading  has  stated  a  le- 

QA  mere  denial  of  competency  to   sue  gal  conclusion  cannot  object  to  a  denial 

raises  no  issue  of  fact:  Chamberlin  Bank-  thereof   in  the  same  terms:    Baldwin   r. 

ing  House  v.  Noyes  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  92  Burt  (1895),  43  Neb.  245,  61  N.  W.  601. 3 

N.    W.    175.       in   a   foreclosure   suit  an  *  (] Abbott  v.  Caches  (1899),  20  Wash, 

answer  denying  that  the  plaintiff  is  the  517,  56  Pac.  28.] 


DENIALS    OF   INFORMATION    AND    BELIEF.  755 

all  the  facts  necessary  to  show  that  the  agreement  was  illegal  as 
being  in  restraint  of  trade ;  but  the  illegality  was  not  expressly 
averred,  nor  relied  upon  as  a  defence  by  means  of  any  clause 
drawing  such  a  conclusion  from  the  facts  which  were  stated. 
The  defence,  however,  was  hel^  to  be  sufficient,  both  in  form  and 
substance :  the  facts  constituting  it  were  all  pleaded ;  and  that  was 
enough,  without  adding  the  legal  inferences  from  them.^ 

§  531.  *  640.  Denials  of  Kno-wledge  or  Information.  Formula 
Prescribed  by  Statute  should  be  followed.  All  the  denials,  either 
general  or  specific,  to  which  the  rules  stated  in  the  foregoing  sub- 
divisions apply,  may  be  either  positive,  or  denials  of  knowledge 
or  information  in  respect  to  the  matters  alleged  by  the  plaintiff. 
When  the  latter  mode  is  adopted,  the  formula  prescribed  by  the 
statute  should  be  exactly  followed,  not  because  there  is  an}-  value 
in  the  form  simply  as  such,  but  because  in  no  other  manner  can 
the  defendant  satisfy  the  demands  of  the  code,  and  raise  a  sub- 
stantial issue,  —  an  issue  which  is  not  a  subterfuge  and  pretence. 
When  the  denial  is  positive,  the  defendant  is  required  to  negative 
directly  each  and  every  allegation  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  or 
the  particular  ones  controverted  by  him  if  less  than  all.  If  this 
cannot  be  done  by  reason  of  the  defendant's  ignorance,  and  he  is 
therefore  permitted  to  choose  the  other  alternative,  he  must  deny 
that  he  has  any  knowledge  or  information  concerning  the  matters 
alleged  sufficient  to  enable  him  to  form  a  belief  respecting  them.^ 
Any  other  form  must  of  necessity  be  evasive.  And  so  the  cases 
all  hold ;  but  a  single  illustration  will  suffice.  The  complaint  in 
an  action  to  recover  the  price  of  gas  furnished  to  a  city  being 
verified,  the  answer  was  as  follows  :  "  And  this  defendant  says 
that  the  defendant  has  no  knowledge  or  information  in  relation  to 
the  allegations  of  the  second  count  of  the  said  complaint,  and 
therefore  denies  the  same."  On  the  trial,  the  averments  of  the 
second  count  were  treated  by  the  court  as  not  denied,  and  as 
therefore  admitted  to  be  true ;  and  this  ruling  was  sustained  on 
appeal.  The  answer  was  held  to  be  a  nullity :  the  only  denials 
permitted,  it  was  said,  are  those  positive  in  form,  and  those  which 
deny  any  knowledge  or  information  sufficient  to  form  a  belief; 
any  others  raise  no  issue. ^     The  same  conclusion  was  reached  in 

1  Frost  V.  More,  40  CaL  347.  ^  San  Francisco  Gas  Co.  v.  San  Fran- 

2  nCoIby  V.  Spokane  (1895)    12  Wash,     cisco,  9  CaL  453. 
690,  42  Pac.  112.] 


756 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


respect  to  an  answer  which  stated  that  "  the  defendant  has  not 
sufficient  knowledge  or  information  to  form  a  belief  whether 
[certain  allegations]  are  true,  and  therefore  denies  the  same."  ^ 


1  Curtis  1-.  Richards,  9  Cal.  3.3;  Ste- 
venson V.  Flournoy,  89  Ky.  561  ;  contra, 
Cumins  v.  Lawrence  Cy.  (S.  Dak.  1890), 
46  N.  W.  Rep.  182.  As  to  the  proper 
form  of  such  denials,  and  their  effect  in 
raising  issues  when  thus  j)roper,  see  also 
Kentucky,  etc.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth,  13 
Bush,  436 ;  Farmers'  &  Merch.  Bk.  of 
Baltimore  v.  Charlotte  Bd.  of  Aid.,  75 
N.  C.  45 ;  Sherman  v.  Osborn,  8  Ore.  66 ; 
Ninde  v.  Oskaloosa,  55  Iowa,  207 ;  Claflin 
I'.  Reese,  54  id.  544 ;  Ncuberi^er  r.  Webb, 
24  Hun,  347  ;  Meehan  v.  Harlem  Sav.  Bk., 
5  id.  439  ;  Grocers'  Bank  v.  O'Rorke,  6  id. 
18;  Wiltmau  v.  Watry,  37  Wis.  238  ;  Peo- 
ple i;.  Curtis,  1  Idaho,  753.  For  further 
examples  of  such  denials  improper  in 
form,  see  Bidwell  ',■.  Overton,  26  Al)b.  N. 
Cas.  402;  Sheldon  r.  Sabin,  12  Daly,  84; 
Lay  Gas  Machine  Co.  v.  Neuse  Falls  Mfg. 
Co',  91  N.  C.  74  ;  Land,  etc.  Co.  of  G.  U.  (•. 
Williams  (S  C.  1892),  14  S.  E.  Rep.  821, 
15  id.  453;  Greer  r.  Covington,  83  Ky. 
410;  Haney  v.  People,  12  Colo.  345; 
Moody  V.  Belden,  60  Hun,  582. 

QThe  following  forms  have  been  held 
sufficient:  —  "Whether  the  matters  and 
thiu<js  set  forth  [in  said  paragraph]  are 
true  or  false,  defendant  has  no  knowledge 
or  information  sufficient  wliereof  to  form 
a  belief  and  he  therefore  denies  the  same  :  " 
Seattle  Nat.  Bank  v.  Mecrwaldt  (1894),  8 
Wash.  630,  36  Pac.  763.  A  denial  of  any 
knowledge  or  information  sufficient  "  to 
enable  it  to  form  a  belief,"  although  the 
statute  uses  the  words,  "  sufficient  to  form 
a  belief :  "  Wilson  i».  Commercial  Union 
Ins.  Co.  (1902),  15  S.  D.  322,89  N.  W. 
649.  Plaintiff  "  denies  that  it  has  any 
knowledge  or  information  sufficient  to 
form  a  belief  as  to  the  truth  of  the  alle- 
gations contained  in  said  answer,"  held 
good,  as  against  the  objection  that  it 
was  a  negative  pregnant,  when  objec. 
tion  was  first  made  after  trial  and  verdict ; 
Trnstees  v.  Nesbitt  (1896),  65  Minn.  17,  67 
N.  W.  652.  A  denial  that  plaintiff  •'  has 
knowledge  or  information  snflicient,  etc.," 
is  sufficient  without  the  word  "any  "before 
knowledge,  as  the  statute  reads  :  Gilreath 
I'.  Furnian  (1900),  57  S.  C  289,  35S.E.516. 


The  following  forms  have  been  held  in- 
sufficient :  —  "  Defendant  says  that  be  has 
not  information  sufHcient  to  form  a  be- 
lief:" Sigmund  r.  Rank  of  Minot  (1894), 
4  N.  1).  164,  59  N.  W.  966.  An  averment 
that  defendant  has  no  knowledge  or  infor- 
mation sufficient  to  form  a  belief,  since 
there  must  be  a  direct  denial  and  not 
merely  an  affirmation  of  a  negative :  Law 
Trust  Society  r.  Hogue  (1900),  37  Ore. 
544,  63  Pac.  690.  A  denial  that  defend- 
ant has  "any  knowledge  or  information 
sufficient  to  form  a  belief,"  since  under 
the  statute  he  must  deny  also  that  he 
could  obtain  sufficient  knowledge :  Junes  ;•. 
Perot  (1893),  19  Colo.  141,  34  Pac.  728. 
"This  defendant  has  not  and  cannot  ob- 
tain information  sufficient  upon  which  to 
base  a  belief,"  defective  in  not  stating  the. 
same  as  to  both  knowledge  and  informa- 
tion :  Grand  Valley  Irr.  Co.  v.  Leslicr 
(1901),  23  Colo.  273,  65  Pac.  44.  An  alle- 
gation that  defendant  "  has  no  knowledge 
of  the  facts  "  alleged  in  one  paragraph  of 
the  complaint,  and  "  has  no  information  " 
respecting  the  truth  of  the  allegations  in 
another  jiaragraph  :  Woodcock  v.  Bostic 
(1901),  128  N.  C.  243,38  S.  E.  881.  An 
allegation  "  that  defendant  has  not  suffi- 
cient knowledge  or  information  as  to  the 
claim  of  the  plaintiff,  and  therefore  de- 
mauds  and  calls  for  strict  legal  proof  there- 
of:"  National  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Martin(1899), 
57  Neb.  350,  77  N.  W.  769.  An  allegation 
that  defendant  has  no  knowledge  or  in- 
formation concerning  the  matter  alleged 
in  the  petition:  Wilson  v.  Neu  (1901), 
—  Neb.   — ,  95  N.  W.  502. 

"  To  authorize  the  denial  of  an  allega- 
tion in  a  petition,  a  want  of  belief  is  suffi- 
cient ;  and  it  is  not  improper  to  accompany 
the  denial  with  a  statement  that  the  party 
making  it  has  no  knowledge  or  informa- 
tion on  which  to  form  a  belief :  "  Mcintosh 
V.  City  of  Omaha  (1902).  Neb.,  91  N.  W. 
527.  A  denial  of  knowledge  or  informa- 
tion sufficient  to  form  a  belief  as  to  tlie 
e.\istence  of  an  alleged  fact  must  be  spe- 
cific as  to  such  fact :  Ward  v.  Edge  (1897), 
100  Ky.  757,  39  S.  W.  440.  Other  cases 
dealing  with  the  subject :  Banks  i-.  Moshier 


THE    ISSUES    FORMED    BY    DENIALS. 


757 


§  532.  *  641.  When  a  Denial  of  Knowledge  or  Information  is  not 
allowed.  Although  the  denial  of  knowledge  or  information  may 
be  used  in  respect  to  every  form  of  traverse,  whether  general  or 
specific,  yet  it  cannot  be  resorted  to  under  all  circumstances. 
There  are  occasions  in  which  the  defendant  will  not  be  permitted 
to  say  that  he  has  no  knowledge  or  information  of  the  matter 
sufficient  to  form  a  belief,  because  such  a  statement  would  be  a 
palpable  falsehood,  a  plain  impossibility.  When  the  allegation 
in  the  complaint  or  petition  is  of  a  fact  which  must  of  necessity 
be  within  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  defendant;  when  it 
avers  an  act  done  or  an  omission  suffered  by  him  personally ; 
when,  for  example,  it  states  a  contract  entered  into,  or  a  deliber- 
ate wrong  perpetrated,  by  himself,  —  he  must  know  whether  the 
averment  is  true  or  false. ^     He  will  not  be  suffered  to  assert  a 


(1900),  7.3  Conn.  448,  47  Atl.  6.56  ;  Savle.s 
V.  FitzGerald  (1899),  72  Conn.  391,  44  Atl. 
733;  Smith  v.  Allen  (1901),  63  Neb.  74, 
83  N.  W.  1.55;  Jacobs  u.  Ilognn  (1900),  73 
Conn.  740,  49  Atl.  202.  The  Georc^ia 
statute  is  somewhat  different  from  that 
found  in  most  of  the  code  States :  Code, 
§4961  (1895),  "Anj  averment  distinctly 
and  plainly  made  therein  [in  the  petition], 
which  is  not  denied  by  the  defendant's 
answer,  shall  be  taken  as  prima  facie  true, 
unless  the  defendant  -states  in  his  answer 
that  he  can  neither  admit  nor  deny  such 
averment  because  of  the  v/ant  of  sufficient 
information."  For  cases  construing  it  see 
Lester  v.  Mcintosh  (1897),  161  Ga.  675,  29 
S.  E.  7  ;  English  v.  Grant  (1897),  102  Ga. 
35,  29  S.  E.  157 ;  Smith  v.  Champion 
(1897),  102  Ga.  92,  29  S.  E.  160;  Angier 
V.  Equitable  Bldg.  Ass'n  (1899),  109  Ga. 
625,  35  S.  E.  64. 

Denials  upon  Information  and  Belief:  — 
"  The  better  rule  is  that  a  denial  made 
upon  'information  and  belief  is  sufficient 
when  made  in  a  certain  class  of  cases.  In 
Btrictne.ss.itistheoiily  proper  form  of  denial 
in  a  case  where,  with  reference  to  the  fact 
sought  to  be  denied,  defendant  has  certain 
information  which  induces  him  to  believe 
that  such  facts  are  untrue,  and  yet  has  not 
absolute  knowledge  that  such  facts  are  un- 
true. Having  information  inducing  a 
belief  which  falls  short  of  knowledge, 
defendant  cannot  truthfully  deny  that  he 
7ias  neither   knowledge   nor  information 


sufficient  to  form  a  belief  as  to  the  fact." 
Ku.ssell  V.  Amundson  (1894),  4  N.  D.  112, 
59  N.  W.  477.  See  also  Warburton  v. 
Ralph  (1894),  9  Wash.  537,  38  Pac.  140; 
Seattle  Nat.  Bank  v.  Meerwaldt  (1894),  8 
Wash.  630,  36  Pac.  763.] 

1  [_Raymond  u.  Johnson  (1897),  17  Wash. 
232,49  Pac.  492;  Sweet  v.  Davis  (1895), 
90  Wis.  409,  63  N.  W.  1047  ;  Bartow 
V.  Northern  Assurance  Co.  (1897),  10 
S.  D.  132,  72  N.  W.  1135;  Nashville,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  V.  Carrico  (1894),  95  Ky.  489,  26 
S.  W.  177;  Sioaue  t-.  Southern"  CaL  Ry. 
Co.  (1896),  111  Cal.  668,  44  Pac.  320; 
Gribble  v.  Columbus  Brewing  Co   (1893), 

100  Cal.  67,  34  Pac.  527 ;  Wickersham  v. 
Comerford  (1S94),   104  Cal.  494,  38  Pac. 

101  ;  Mills'  Estate  (1902),  40  Ore.  424,  67 
Pac.  107. 

Matters  of  public  record  are  presump- 
tively within  the  knowledge  of  the  par- 
ties, and  denials  of  information  and  be- 
lief are  insufficient :  Thompson  v.  Skeen 
(1896),  14  Utah,  209,  46  Pac.  1103;  Mul- 
lally  V.  Townsend  (1897),  119  Cal.  47,  50 
Pac.  1066;  First  Nat.  Bank  r.  Martin 
(1898),  Idaho,  55  Pac.  302;  Simpson  v. 
Remington  (1899),  Idaho,  59  Pac.  360; 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Watt  (1901),  Idaho,  64 
Pac.  223;  Van  Dyke  v.  Doherty  (1896),  6 
N.  D.  263,  69  N.  W.  200;  Oakes  r.  Ziemer 
(1901),  62  Neb.  603,  87  N.  W.  350;  s.  c. 
(1900),  61  Neb.  6,  84  N.  W.  409. 

A  denial  of  knowledge  or  information 
that  plaintiff  is  a  corporation,  is  not  suffi- 


758  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

defective  memory,  for  such  a  forgetfulness  is  contrary  to  the  gen- 
eral experience  of  mankind.  If  his  recollection  is  at  fault,  the 
law  affords  him  ample  opportunity  and  means  of  refreshing  it 
during  the  interval  between  the  service  of  the  adverse  pleading 
and  the  time  for  answering.  A  denial,  therefore,  of  the  form 
described,  pleaded  in  answer  to  allegations  of  a  nature  purely 
personal  to  the  defendant,  will  be  treated  as  sham  and  evasive, 
and  will  be  struck  out  on  motion.  A  demurrer  would  not  be  the 
proper  remedy  ;  because  the  objection  is  not  to  the  sufficiency  as 
a  defence^  but  to  the  bad  faith  of  the  party  in  interposing  a  plead- 
ing of  such  a  character.  The  rule  was  accurately  stated  by  Mr. 
Justice  Field  of  the  California  Supreme  Court  substantially  as 
follows :  "  If  the  facts  alleged  are  presumptively  within  the 
knowledge  of  the  defendant,  he  must  deny  positively,  and  a 
denial  of  information  or  behef  will  be  treated  as  an  evasion. 
Thus,  for  example,  in  reference  to  instruments  in  writing  alleged 
to  have  been  executed  by  the  defendant,  a  positive  answer  will 
alone  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  statute.  If  the  defendant 
has  forgotten  the  execution  of  the  instruments,  or  doubts  the  cor- 
rectness of  their  description,  or  of  the  copies  in  the  complaint,  he 
should,  before  answering,  take  the  requisite  steps  to  obtain  an 
inspection  of  the  originals.  If  the  facts  alleged  are  not  such  as 
must  be  within  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  defendant,  he  may 
answer  according  to  his  information  and  belief."  ^ 

cient  to  pat  in  issue  the  question  of  the  D.  Bank,  12  id.  333;  Barret  v.  Godshaw 

plaintiff's  corporate  existence:    Stoddard  12  id.  592;  Goodell  r.  Bloomer,  41    Wis 

Mfg.  Co.  V.  Mattice  (1897),  10  S.  D.  253,  436;  Union  Lumb.  Co.  v.  Chippewa  Cy 

72  N.  W.  891;  Board  of  Education  v.  Sup.,  47  id.  24.5;  Collart  v.  Fisk,  38  id 
Prior  (1898),  II  S.  D.  292,  77  N.  W.  106 ;  238;  Hathaway  v.  Baldwin,  17  id.  616 
Iowa  Savings,  etc.  Ass'u  v.  Selby  (1900),  see  Brotherton  v.  Downey,  21  Hun,  436 
111  la.  402,  82  N.  W.  968.  Nor  will  such  Further  instances  of  such  denials  disal 
a  denial  put  in  issue  the  execution  of  a  lowed,  as  concerning  matters  presump 
written  instrument :  Wiuterfield  r.  Cream  tively  within  the  knowledge  of  the 
City  Brewing  Co.  (1897),  96  Wis.  239,  defendant:  Buller  y.  Sidell,  43  Fed.  Rep. 
71  N.  W.  101;  Garland  v.  Gaines  (1900),  116;    Sherman    v.  Boehm,  13    Daly,  42; 

73  Conn.  662,  49  Atl.  19;  Moore  v.  Wheaton  r.  Briggs.  3.5  Minn.  470;  Love- 
Holmes  (1897),  68  Minn.  108,  70  N.  W.  laud  v.  Garner,  74  Cal.  298.  Instances  of 
872.]  such  denials  which  did   not  come  within 

1  Curtis  i>.  Richards,  9  Cal.  33,  38.    See  the  operation  of  the  rule,  and  were  thero- 

also,  to  the  same  effect,  Wing  v.  Dugan,  fore  allowed  :  Martin  v.  Erie  Preserving 

8   Bush,   583.  586;  Jackson  Sharp  Co.  r.  Co.,    48    Hun,    81;    Harvey    v.    Walker, 

Holland,  14  Fla.  384,386.    The  rule  stated  59    Hun,    114;    Hall   v.    Woodward,   30 

in  the  text  is  also  sustained  by  the  follow-  S.  C.  564  ;  Ilagman  v.  Williams,  88  Cal. 

ing  cases  :   Muffaker  v.  Nat.  Bk.  of  Monti-  146. 
cello,  12  Bush,  287  ;  Gridler  v.  Farmers'  & 


THE    ISSUES    FORMED    T.Y    DEXIALS.  759 

§  533.  *  642.  Outline  of  Proposed  Treatment  of  Issues  Raised 
by  Denials.  Ill  discussing  the  topics  embraced  within  this  subdi- 
vision, the  same  doctrines  apply  both  to  general  and  to  specific 
denials.  The  only  difference  is  in  respect  to  the  extent  of  their 
effect  and  operation.^  The  general  denial  raises  an  issue  witli 
the  entire  complaint  or  petition,  and  admits  evidence  in  contra- 
diction to  all  the  plaintiff's  material  allegations ;  while  the  spe- 
cific denial  raises  an  issue  with  the  particular  allegation  alone  to 
which  it  is  directed,  and  only  admits  evidence  in  contradiction 
thereto.  The  same  rules  as  to  the  effect  of  the  general  denial 
upon  the  issue  raised  with  the  whole  complaint,  and  the  proofs 
admissible  under  it,  apply  with  equal  force  to  the  specific  denial 
in  respect  to  the  narrower  issue  which  it  creates  and  the  evidence 
which  it  admits.  It  will  only  be  necessary,  therefore,  to  discuss 
the  objects  and  functions  of  the  general  denial,  since  the  results 
■of  this  discussion  will  be  true  of  specific  denials  within  their 
hmited  operation.  In  pursuing  this  discussion,  I  shall  inquire 
into  the  nature  and  effect  of  the  general  denial  and  the  issues 
formed  by  it ;  the  general  nature  of  the  evidence  which  may  be 
admitted,  and  the  defences  which  may  be  set  up  under  it ;  and  I 
shall  state  and  classify  a  number  of  particular  defences,  and  matters 
of  defence,  which  have  been  held  admissible  or  not  admissible, 
or,  in  other  words,  a  number  of  particular  defences  which  have 
been  determined  to  be  defences  by  way  of  denial,  or  to  be  new 
matter. 

§  534.  *  643.  Importance  of  Questions  Suggested.  No  topic 
connected  with  the  whole  subject  of  pleading  is,  I  think,  more 
important  than  the  questions  thus  suggested.  Undoubtedly, 
much  of  the  confusion,  redundancy,  and  unscientific  character 
of  pleadings  under  the  codes  is  the  result  of  ignorance  or  uncer- 
tainty as  to  the  power  of  the  general  denial  to  admit  defences 
upon  which  the  defendant  relies.  In  very  many  instances  the 
answer  is  made  a  long  and  rambling  mass  of  purely  evidentiary 
details,  when  the  simple  general  denial,  not  exceeding  two  or 
three  lines  in  length,  would  be  fully  as  efficacious,  and  would 
present  the  issue  in  a  sharper  and  clearer  manner.  The  general 
denial  is  in  some  respects  broader  in  its  scope,  and  in  some  re- 
spects narrower,  than  the  general  issues  as  a  whole  at  the  com- 
mon law.     But  little  aid  can  be  obtained  from  the  rules  which 

1  See  Coles  v.  Soulsbj,  21  Cal.  47,  50,  per  Field  C.  J. 


760  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

governed   the   use   of    the   latter   traverses,    except  by   way   of 
contrast. 

§  535.  *  657.  The  General  Denial.  McKyring  v.  Bull.  In  pur- 
suing this  inquiry,  I  shall  rely  upon  the  judicial  opinions  found 
in  decisions  which  are  universally  regarded  as  authoritative,  even 
using  their  language  instead  of  my  own  wherever  practicable. 
The  case  of  McKyring  v.  Bull  ^  is  conceded  to  be  the  leading  one. 
The  opinion  of  Mr.  Justice  S.  L.  Selden  is  so  full,  accurate,  and 
able  an  exposition  of  the  subject, .  that  other  judges  have  done 
little  more  than  repeat  his  conclusions.  The  action  was  brought 
to  recover  compensation  for  work  and  labor.  The  complaint 
alleged  that  the  plaintiff  entered  into  the  employment  of  the 
defendant  at  a  certiiin  date,  and  continued  in  such  employment 
at  defendant's  request,  doing  work  and  labor  until  another  speci- 
fied date,  and  that  the  services  so  rendered  were  worth  the  sum 
of  $650  ;  and  concluded  as  follows :  "  That  there  is  now  due  to 
this  plaintiff,  over  and  above  all  payments  and  offsets  on  account 
of  said  work,  the  sum  of  $134;  which  said  sum  defendant  refuses 
to  pay :  wherefore  the  plaintiff  demands  judgment  for  the  last- 
mentioned  sum,  and  interest  from  the  4th  day  of  May,  1854." 
The  answer  was  only  a  general  denial.  On  the  trial,  the  defend- 
ant offered  to  prove  payment  as  a  defence  to  the  action  ;  but  the 
evidence  was  excluded,  on  the  ground  that  the  defence  should 
have  been  pleaded.  He  then  offered  to  prove  part  payment  in 
mitigation  of  damages  ;  but  this  was  also  rejected  for  the  same 
reason.  The  case  thus  presented  two  questions  to  the  Appellate 
Court  for  decision  :  (1)  Whether  payment  could  have  been  proved 
as  a  defence  under  the  general  denial ;  (2)  whether  it  could  have 
l)een  proved  in  mitigation  of  damages.  If  the  action  had  been 
assumpsit  or  debt,  the  evidence  would  have  been  admissible  in 
either  aspect.^ 

[§§  *  658,  *  659.  These  sections  of  the  author's  text,  con- 
sisting of  quotations  from  McKyring  v.  Bull,  will  be  found  in 
the  note.^] 

^  McKyring  v.  Bull,  16  N.  Y.  297,  de-  in  any  case  be  given  in  evidence  as  a  de- 
cided in  1857.  fence  under  an  answer  containing  simply 

2  McKyring  v.  Bull,  16  N.  Y.  297,  299.  a  general  denial  of  the  allegations  of  the 

The  opinion  concludes  as  follows:    "My  complaint." 

conclusion,  therefore,  is.  that  neither  pay.  •''  §  658.    The  discussion  of  the  second 

ment  nor  any  other  defence  which  con-  question  presented  in  this  case  is  so  com- 

fesses  and  avoids  the  cause  of  action  can  plete  and  instructive,  that  I  adopt  it  as 


ISSUES   FORMED    BY    THE   GENERAL    DENIAL. 


■Gl 


Further  Illustrations.    The  Supreme  Court  of  New 
York,  in  an  early  case,  described  the  office  of  the  general  denial 


a  portiou  of  the  text.  "  The  next  ques- 
tion is,  wliether  evidence  of  payment, 
either  iu  whole  or  in  part,  is  adniissihle 
in  mitigation  of  damages.  As  the  code 
contain.s  no  express  rule  ou  the  subject 
of  mitigation,  except  in  regard  to  a  single 
class  of  actions,  this  (luestion  cannot  be 
properly  determined  without  a  recurrence 
to  the  jirinciples  of  the  common  law.  By 
these  principles,  defendants  in  actions 
sounding  in  damages  were  permitted  to 
give  in  evidence,  in  mitigation,  not  only 
matters  having  a  tendenc^y  to  reduce  the 
amount  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  but,  in 
many  cases,  facts  showing  that  the  plain- 
tiff had  in  truth  no  claim  whatever.  It 
was  not  necessarily  an  objection  to  matter 
offered  in  mitigation,  tliat,  if  properly 
pleaded,  it  would  have  constituted  a  com- 
plete defence.  Thus,  in  Smithies  v.  Harri- 
son, 1  Ld.  Raym.  727,  the  truth  of  the 
charge  was  received  iii  mitigation  in  an 
action  of  slander,  although  not  pleaded. 
Again :  in  the  case  of  Abbott  v.  Chap- 
man, 2  Lev.  81,  which  was  an  action  of 
assumpsit,  the  defendant  having  given  iu 
evidence  a  release.  Lord  Holt  said  that '  he 
should  have  pleaded  exoneravit,  but  that 
the  evidence  was  admissible  in  mitigation 
of  damages.'  So  too,  in  the  modern  case 
of  Nicholl  (;.  Williams,  2  M.  &  W.  758, 
which  was  assumpsit  for  use  and  occu- 
pation, the  defendant,  having  pleaded 
payment  to  a  part  of  the  demand,  and  non- 
(is^umpsit  to  the  residue,  was  j)ermitted, 
upon  the  trial,  to  prove  payment  in  full; 
but  it  was  held  that  the  evidence  could 
only  go  in  mitigation,  and  that  the  plain- 
tiff was  entitled  to  judgment  for  nominal 
damages.  It  is  obvious  that  this  practice 
was  open  to  serious  objections.  It  enabled 
defendants  to  avail  themselves  of  their 
defences  for  all  substantial  purposes  with- 
out giving  any  notice  to  the  j)laintiff.  .  .  . 
But  in  regard  to  payment,  release,  etc.,  so 
long  as  they  were  received  in  evidence 
under  the  general  issue  in  bar,  no  objection 
could  be  made  to  allowing  them  in  mitiga- 
tion. As  soon,  however,  as  this  practice 
was  abrogated  by  the  rules  of  Hilary 
Term,  4th  WiUiam  IV.,  the  question  as  to 
the  admissibility  of  payment  iu  mitigation 


at  once  arose."  The  learned  judge  here 
traces  the  course  of  English  decisions  upon 
this  (juestion,  citing  and  reviewing  a  num- 
ber of  cases,  and  referring  to  certain  addi- 
tional legislation  (Lediard  v.  Boucher,  7 
C.  &  P.  1,  per  Lord  Denman  ;  Shirley  v. 
Jacobs,  7  C.  &  P.  3,  per  Tindal  C.  J. ; 
Henry  v.  Earl,  8  M.  &  W.  228  ;  Rule  of 
Trinity  Term,  1st  Vict.  4  M.  &  \V.  4),  and 
concludes  this  discussion  as  follows  :  "  The 
matter  is  now  placed,  therefore,  in  the 
English  courts,  upon  a  footing  of  perfect 
justice.  If  the  demand  for  which  an  action 
is  brought  has  once  existed,  and  the  defend- 
ant relies  upon  its  having  been  reduced  by 
payment,  he  must  appear  and  plead. 

§  6.59.  "  It  is  to  be  determined  in  this 
case  whether  we  have  kept  up  with  these 
courts  in  our  measures  of  reform.  The 
rules  of  Hilary  Term  (4  William  IV.)  and 
the  system  of  pleading  prescribed  by  the 
code  have,  in  one  respect,  a  common 
object;  viz.,  to  prevent  parties  from  sur- 
prising each  other  by  proof  of  what  their 
]deadings  give  no  notice.  •  These  rules, 
according  to  the  construction  put  upon 
them  by  the  courts,  were  found  inade- 
quate, so  far  as  proving  payment  iu  miti- 
gation is  concerned,  to  accomplish  the  end 
in  view  ;  and  it  became  necessary  to  adopt 
the  rule  of  Trinity  Term  (1st  Vict.)  to 
remedy  the  defect.  If  the  provisions  of 
the  code  are  to  receive  in  this  respect  a 
construction  similar  to  that  given  to  the 
rules  of  Hilary  Term,  then  an  additional 
provision  will  be  required  to  place  our 
practice  upon  the  same  basis  of  justice 
and  convenience  with  that  in  England. 
But  is  such  a  construction  necessary  ? 
Section  149  of  the  code  provides  that  the 
answer  of  the  defendant  must  contain,  1. 
A  general  or  specific  denial  of  the  mate- 
rial allegations  of  the  complaint;  and,  2. 
A  statement  of  any  new  matter  constitut- 
ing a  defence  or  counter-claim.  The  lan- 
guage here  used  is  imi)erative,  —  'must 
contain.'  It  is  not  left  optional  with  the 
defendant  whether  he  will  plead  new  mat- 
ter or  not ;  but  all  such  matter,  if  it  con- 
stitutes 'a  defence  or  counter-claim,'  must 
be  pleaded ;  and  this  is  in  entire  accord- 
ance with  the  general  principles  of  plead- 


762 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


in  the  following  brief  but  veiy  accurate  manner :  "  Under  a 
denial  of  the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  the  defendant  may 
introduce  any  evidence  which  goes  to  controvert  the  facts  which 
the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  establish  in  order  to  sustain  his  action."  ^ 
'•  Under  the  general  denial  of  the  code,  evidence  of  a  distinct 
affirmative  defence  is  not  admissible.  The  only  evidence  which 
the  defendant  is  entitled  to  give  is  limited  to  a  contradiction 
of  the  plaintiff's  proofs,  and  to  the  disproval  of  the  case  made 
by  him."  ^ 


iu^.  The  word  'defence,'  as  here  used, 
must  include  partial  as  well  as  complete 
defences;  otherwise  it  would  be  uo  longer 
possible  to  plead  pavineut  in  part  of  the 
plaintiff's  demand,  except  in  connection 
•with  a  denial  of  the  residue  ;  since  section 
153  provides  that  '  the  plaintiff  may  in  all 
cases  demur  to  an  answer  containing  new 
matter,  when,  upon  its  face,  it  does  not 
constitute  a  couuter-claiia  or  defence.'' 
Such  a  restriction  would  be  not  only  con- 
trary to  the  general  spirit  of  the  code  in 
regard  to  pleading,  but  would  obviously 
couriict  with  §  244,  subdivision  5,  which 
provides  that '  where  the  answer  expressly, 
or  by  not  denying,  admits  part  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim  to  be  just,  the  court  may, 
on  motion,  order  such  defendant  to  satisfy 
that  part  of  the  claim,'  etc.  The  question 
to  be  determined,  then,  is,  whether  these 
provisions  are  limited  in  their  operation 
to  cases  where  the  defendant  seeks  to 
avail  himself  of  new  matter  strictly  as 
a  defence  either  in  full  or  pio  ianto,  or 
whether  they  extend  to  the  use  of  such 
matter  in  mitigation.  Were  there  nothing 
in  the  code  to  indicate  the  intention  of  the 
legislature  on  this  subject,  we  might  feel 
constrained  to  follow  the  construction  put 
bv  the  English  courts  upon  the  rules  of 
Hilary  Term.  But  §  246  provides  that  in 
all  actions  founded  upon  contract  brought 
for  the  recovery  of  money  only,  in  which 
the  complaint  is  sworn  to,  if  the  defendant 
fails  to  answer,  the  plaintiff  is  entitled 
absolutely  to  judgment  for  the  amount 
mentioned  in  the  summons  without  any 
assessment  of  damaires.  It  is  plain,  that, 
in  this  class  of  actions,  defendants  who 
have  paid  part  only  of  the  plaintiff's  de- 
mand must  appear  and  plead  such  part 
paymrmt,  or  they  will  lose  the  benefit  of  it 


altogether.  Tlie  provisions  of  §  385  afford 
no  adecjuate  remedy  in  such  cases,  because 
the  offer  to  allow  judgment  for  a  part  does 
not  relieve  the  defendant  from  the  ueces- 
sitv  of  controverting  the  residue  by  an- 
swer. Section  246  could  never  iiave  been 
adopted,  therefore,  without  an  intention 
on  the  part  of  the  legislature  that  §  149 
should  be  so  construed  as  to  require  de- 
fendants, at  least  in  this  class  of  cases,  to 
set  up  part  payment  by  answer ;  and  it  is 
difficult  to  suppose  that  they  intended  the 
section  to  receive  one  construction  in  one 
class  of  actions,  and  a  different  one  in 
another.  My  conclusion,  therefore,  is, 
that  §  149  should  be  so  construed  as  to 
require  defendants  in  all  cases  to  plead 
any  new  matter  constituting  either  an  en- 
tire or  partial  defence,  and  to  prohil)it 
them  from  giving  such  matter  in  evidence 
upon  the  a.ssessment  of  damages  when  not 
set  up  in  the  answer.  Not  only  payment, 
therefore,  in  whole  or  in  part,  but  release, 
arbitrament,  accord  and  satisfaction,  must 
here  be  pleaded.  In  this  respect,  our  new 
svstem  of  pleading  under  the  code  is  more 
symmetrical  than  that  prescribed  by  the 
rules  adopted  by  the  English  judges." 

1  Andrews  v.  Bond,  16  Barb.  633,  641. 
per  T.  A.  Johnson  J. 

[;in  Milbank  v.  .Jones  (1894),  141  N.  Y. 
340,  36  N.  E.  388,  it  was  held  that  the  de- 
fendant might  introduce  evidence  to  con- 
trovert anything  that  plaintiff  is  bound  to 
prove  or  is  permitted  to  prove.  See  also 
Whitney  v.  Whitney  (1902),  171  N.  Y. 
176,  63  N.  E.  834,  reaffirming  the  rule 
quoted  in  the  text.] 

2  Beaty  i;.  Swarthout,  32  Barb.  293- 
294,  per  E.  Darwin  Smith  .1. ;  and  see 
Wheeler  r.  Billings,  38  N.  Y.  263,  264. 
per  G  rover  .1. 


ISSUES    FORMED    BY    THE    GENERAL   DENIAL.  763 

§  537.  *  661.  Necessity  of  Reply  depends  upon  Nature  of  Defence. 
Whenever  a  reply  is  made  necessary  to  all  new  matter  contained 
in  the  answer,  the  question  as  to  tlie  nature  of  a  defence  has  often 
arisen  upon  the  plaintiff's  failure  to  reply  to  allegations  which 
the  defendant  insisted  were  new  matter,  and  therefore  admitted 
to  be  true  by  means  of  the  omission,  but  which  the  plaintiff 
claimed  to  be  mere  argumentative  denials,  or,  in  other  words,  un- 
necessary averments  of  evidentiary  facts  which  could  be  proved 
under  a  denial.  In  passing  upon  such  a  question,  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Minnesota  fully  approved  and  adopted  the  general  doc- 
trine which  has  been  stated  in  the  text.^  In  another  case  before 
the  same  court,  the  question  was  examined  with  great  care  and 
marked  ability.  The  action  was  upon  a  contract  of  sale:  the 
answer  consisted  of  specific  denials  of  each  allegation  in  the  com- 
plaint ;  and  the  defendant  offered  to  prove  that  the  contract  was 
entered  into  on  Sunday,  and  was  therefore  illegal  and  void.  [The 
conclusion  of  the  court  is  given  in  the  note.]  ^ 

§  538.  *  662.  Anything  Tending  directly  to  controvert  Allega- 
tions in  Complaint  Admissible  under  General  Denial.  In  an  action 
to  recover  possession  of  chattels  where  the  complaint  alleged 
property  in  the  plaintiff,  and  the  answer  was  a  general  denial, 
evidence  tending  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  was  not  the  owner 
was  excluded  on  the  trial.  This  ruling  was  disapproved  on 
appeal,  the  court  saying :  "  The  answer  is  a  denial  of  each  and 
every  allegation  of  the  complaint.  The  allegation  of  owner- 
ship is  therefore  denied.  In  Bond  v.  Corbett,'^  it  was  held 
that  anything  which  tends  to  directly  controvert  the  allega- 
tions in  the  complaint  may  be  shown  under  the  general  denial. 
The  defendant  might,  therefore,  introduce  evidence  to  show 
that  plaintiff  was   not  the  owner,  nor  entitled  to  possession."^ 


1  Nash  V.  St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174,  178  ;  upon  to  be  either  void  or  voidable  must  be 
Finley  v.  Quirk,  9  Minn.  194.  affirmatively  pleaded. " 

2  Finley   v.  Quirk,  9  Minn.   194,   200,  ^   Bond  r.  Corbett,  2  Minn.  248. 

per  Wilson   C.  J. :    "  We  hold,  therefore,  *  CaldvveU    v.    Bruggerman,  4    Minn. 

(1)   that  an    answer    merely  by  way  of  270,  276,  per  Atwater  J. 
denial  raises  an  issue  only  ou  the  facts  [^The  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota,  in 

alleged  in  the  complaint;     (2)    that  the  Dodge  v.  McMahan  (1895),  61   Minn.  175, 

denial  of  the  sale  in  this  case  only  raised  63  N.  W.  487,  stated  the  rule  as  follows : 

an  issue  on  the  sale  in  point  of  fact,  and  "  Authorities  may  be  found,  even  in  some 

not  on  the  question  of  the  legality  of  such  of  the  code  States,  to  the  effect  that,  under 

sale;  (.3)    that   all  matters  in  confession  a  mere  denial,  evidence  of  any  fact  may 

and  avoidance  showing  the  contract  sued  be  given  in  evidence  that  would  go  to  the 


764 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES, 


The  same    doctrine    is    maintained    by    the    Supreme    Court  of 
Indiana.^ 

^  539.  '  GGo.  Same  Subject.  The  doctrine  thus  stated  has  also 
been  approved  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri. ^  "It  is  clear, 
both  upou  principle  and  authority,  that,  under  a  general  or  spe- 
cific denial  of  any  fact  which  the  plaintiff  is  required  to  prove 
to  maintain  the  action,  the  defendant  may  give  evidence  to  dis- 
proA'^e  it."  ^  The  true  scope  of  and  limitations  upon  this  form  of 
traverse  were  well  illustrated  in  a  very  recent  case  decided  by 
the  New  York  Court  of  Appeals.  The  complaint  alleged  that 
the  plaintiff  was  owner  of  certain  shares  of  stock  in  a  corpora- 
tion; that  the  stock  had  been  transferred  to  one  W.  to  hold  for 
the  plaintiff;  that  W.,  without  the  plaintiff's  knowledge,  had 
transferred  the  same  to  the  defendant,  in  payment,  as  defendant 
claimed,  of  a  debt  due  from  him  to  defendant;  and  prayed  that 
defendant  might  be  compelled  to  re-transfer  and  deliver  the  same 
to  the  plaintiff.  The  answer  was  a  general  denial.  The  nature 
and  extent  of  the  issues  thus  presented  were  discussed,  and  the 


original  validity  of  the  contract  sued  on, 
—  that  is,  which,  altiiough  admitting  the 
making  of  the  contract,  wouUl  show  that, 
wlien  made,  it  was,  for  some  reason  in- 
valid ;  as,  for  example,  that  it  was  made 
on  Sunday,  or  that  it  was  a  gambling  or 
wagering  contract.  But  this  rule  is  not 
in  accordance  with  either  the  spirit  of  the 
reformed  ])rocedure  or  the  decisions  of 
this  court.  The  correct  rule  is  that,  under 
a  denial,  the  defendant  is  at  liberty  to 
give  only  such  evidence  as  tends  to  dis- 
prove the  e.xistence  of  facts,  as  facts,  al- 
leged by  the  plaintiff,  but  not  of  any 
matter  aliunde,  which,  although  admitting 
such  facts,  would  tend  to  avoid  their  legul 
effect  anil  operation."  See  also  Iselin  r. 
Simon  (1895),  62  Minn.  128,  64  N.  W. 
143;  Fort  Dearborn  Bank  i*.  Security 
Bank  (1902),  87  Minn.  81,  91  N.  W.  257.] 

1  Wood   V.  Ostram,  29  Ind.  177,  186. 

^  Northrup  i'.  Miss.  Vail.  Ins.  Co.,  47 
Mo.  435,  443. 

[^Jones  1-.  Rush  (1900),  156  Mo.  364,  57 
S.  W.  118  :  "  Under  a  general  denial  any 
legal  evidence  is  admissible  which  tends 
to  show  that  the  statements  in  the  petition 
constituting  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action 
are  not  true,  and  to  that  end  he  may  affirra- 
ativelv  show   facts  inconsistent  with    the 


plaintiff's  statements  tending  to  prove 
them  to  be  false."  In  Cunningham  v. 
I?oush  (1900).  157  Mo.  336,  57  S.  W .  769, 
the  rule  was  stated  as  follows  :  —  "  Where 
a  cause  of  action  which  once  existed  has 
been  determined  by  some  matter  which 
subsequently  transpired,  such  new  matter 
must,  to  comply  with  the  statute,  be  spe- 
cially pleaded ;  but  where  the  cause  of 
action  never  existed,  the  appropriate 
defence  under  the  law  is  a  denial  of  the 
material  allegations  of  the  petition  ;  and 
such  facts  as  tend  to  disprove  the  contro- 
verted allegations  are  pertinent  to  the 
issue."  See  also"  Pattou  j\  Fox  (1902), 
169  Mo.  97,  69  S.  W.  287,  containing  a  list 
of  special  defences  which  have  been  held 
admissible  under  the  general  denial  in 
Missouri.  And  in  Bolton  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  (1903),  172  Mo.  92,  72  S.  W.  .53,  the 
court  said  :  "  Any  fact  the  effect  of  which 
is  to  show  that  an  essential  statement  in 
the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  untrue  may 
be  proven  under  the  general  denial,  and, 
therefore,  should  not  be  specially  pleaded 
and  if  so  pleaded  should  be  stricken  oat 
as  redundant.  "] 

8  Greenfield  v.  Mass.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co., 
47  N.  Y.  4.30,  437,  per  Grover  J.;  Wheeler 
V.  Billinjrs,  38  N.  Y.  263. 


ISSUES   FORMED    BY   THE    GENERAL   DENIAL.  765 

principle    which   controlled   thera    was   stated    by    Mr.    Justice 
Grover,   who  pronounced  the  defence  inadmissible.^ 

§  540.  *  664.  Same  Subject.  A  general  denial  being  pleaded 
in  an  action  on  a  non-negotiable  note  brought  against  the  maker 
thereof,  evidence  designed  to  show  a  want  of  consideration  was 
rejected  at  the  trial.  The  New  York  Supreme  Court,  in  review- 
ing this  ruling,  very  properly  held  that  this  defence  may  be  proved 
under  an  answer  of  denial  in  actions  upon  all  contracts  which  do 
not  import  a  consideration. ^  While  the  very  point  decided,  that 
evidence  of  a  want  of  consideration  could  be  admitted,  is  un- 
doubtedly correct,  the  opinion  as  a  whole  is  very  careless  and 
inaccurate,  and  the  general  criterion  which  it  lays  down  is 
clearly  erroneous.  There  are  many  classes  of  defences  which 
show  that  a  cause  of  action  never  existed,  and  which  cannot 
be  proved  under  the  general  denial,  but  must  be  pleaded;  as, 
for  example,  illegality,  fraud,  duress,  and  the  like.  The  learned 
judge  was  entirely  misled  by  the  analogies  drawn  from  the 
ancient  practice.  The  general  denial  puts  in  issue  the  facts, 
which,  if  true,  constitute  a  prima  facie  cause  of  action.  A 
consideration  is,  in  general,  one  of  these  facts  in  actions  upon 
contract.  When  these  facts  are  admitted,  but  by  reason  of  some 
extraneous  features  or  elements  affecting  them  they  do  not  pro- 
duce the  otherwise  necessary  result,  that  element  which  consti- 
tutes the  defence,  and  which  destroys  the  prima  facie  legal  aspect 
of  the  facts,  is  certainly  not  put  in  issue  by  the  general  denial : 
it  is  new  matter,  and  must  be  specially  pleaded. 

1  Weaver    v.   Barden,    49   N.  Y.  286,  bona  fde  purchaser  from  W.     To  meet 

297  :  "  To  establish  a  cause  of  action,  the  tiiis  case,  the  defendaut  offered  to  prove 

plaintiff  was  bound  to  prove  that  he  was  in  substance  that  he  was  a  bona  Jide  pur- 

the    legal    owner    of     the  stock,  or   was  chaser  from  W.     The  special  term  held, 

equitably   entitled  to  it    as    against    the  against    plaintiff's     objection,    that    this 

defendant.      Under    this  answer   the  de-  was  admissible  under  the  answer.     This 

fendant    had    a   right   to   give    evidence  was  error.     Under  the  geperal  denial,  the 

controverting   any    fact    necessary   to  be  defendant  could   not    introduce    evidence 

established  by  the  plaintiff  to  authorize  a  tending  to  show  a  defence  founded  upon 

reconveyance,  but  not  to  prove  a  defence  new  matter,  but  such  only  as  tended  to 

founded  upon  new  matter. "     Recapitulat-  disprove  any  fact  that  the  plaintiff  must 

ing    the    facts    actually    proved    by    the  prove  to   sustain  his  case. "     The  court, 

plaintiff,  —  namely,  those  alleged  in  the  however,  did  not  pass  upon  the  question 

complaint  as  above  stated,  and  that  W.  thus  discussed  by  Grover  J. :  the  decision 

held  the  stock  as  a  trustee  for  the  plain-  was  placed  upon  a  different  ground ;  viz., 

tiff,  —  he  continued :    "  This   established  that  defendant  was  not  a  bona  Jide  pur- 

the     plaintiff's    right     to    the    stock    as  chaser, 

against  the   defendant,  unless  he   was   a  2  Evans  i-.  Williams,  60  Barb.  346 


766  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

§  541.  *  665.  Construction  Adopted  in  California.  The  courts 
of  one  State  alone  dissent  from  this  course  of  judicial  decision, 
and  give  to  the  general  denial  of  the  code  something  of  the  com- 
prehensive operation  which  belonged  to  the  general  issues  of  7ion- 
assumpsit  and  yiil  debet  at  the  common  law.  The  construction 
adopted  in  California  seems  to  regard  the  general  denial  —  cer- 
tainly in  actions  upon  contract  —  as  admitting  any  defences  which 
show  that  there  is  no  subsisting  cause  of  action  at  the  time  of  the 
commencement  of  the  suit.  At  least  the  defence  of  payment  is 
thus  held  admissible ;  and,  if  it  be  so,  other  similar  defences,  such 
as  release,  accord  and  satisfaction,  and  the  like,  cannot  with  con- 
sistency be  rejected.  This  doctrine  of  the  California  courts  is 
stated  and  illustrated  in  the  following  cases :  In  an  action  upon 
contract  the  complaint  contained  three  counts,  each  in  the  form  of 
the  common-law  indebitatus  assumpsit.  The  answer  was  a  general 
denial.  Upon  these  issues  the  court  said:  '"In  each  count  of  the 
complaint  there  is  an  averment  that  on,  etc.,  the  defendant  was 
indebted  to  the  plaintiff  in  a  specified  sum,  and  promised  to  pay 
it,  but  therein  has  made  default.  The  answer  contained  a  gen- 
eral denial,  which  made  it  incumbent  on  the  plaintiff  to  prove  a 
subsisting  indebtedness  from  the  defendant  to  the  plaintiff  at  the 
time  of  the  institution  of  the  suit.  Under  this  denial,  it  would 
have  been  competent  for  the  defendant  to  prove  payment.  ^  For 
the  same  reason,  it  is  competent  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  had 
transferred  the  demand,  and  that  the  defendant,  therefore,  was 
not  indebted  to  him."  ^  In  another  case  upon  a  promissory  note 
the  complaint  was  in  the  usual  form,  setting  out  the  note,  and 
alleging  that  it  had  not  been  paid,  and  that  there  was  due  upon 
it  a  specified  sum,  for  which  judgment  was  demanded.  The 
answer  was  the  general  denial.  '"The  question  is,"  said  the 
court,  "  whether  the  general  denial  presents  any  issue  of  fact. 
In  Frisch  v.  Caler,  this  question  was  fully  considered.  The 
statute  then  in  force  required  a  replication  to  new  matter  in  the 
answer.  The  answer  averred  that  the  note  in  suit  had  been  paid 
by  the  defendant:  and  it  was  contended  that  that  averment  was 
admitted  because  of  the  failure  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  to  file 

1  Frisch  v.  Caler,  21  Cal.  71  ;  Brown  294,  299,  300,  per  Crockett  J.:  ami  see 
I'.  Orr,  29  Cal.  120;  Davanay  v.  Eggen-  especially  Fairchild  v.  Anisihaugli,  22 
hoff,  43  Cal.  395.  Cal.  572,  574;  Brooks    i-.  Chilton,  6  Cal. 

2  Wetmore  v.  San  Francisco,  44   Cal.  040. 


ISSUES   FOEMED    BY    THE    GENERAL   DENIAL.  767 

a  replication  denying  it.  But  the  court  held  that  it  was  not  new 
matter;  that  the  failure  to  pay  the  note  constituted  the  breach, 
and  must  be  alleged ;  and  that  the  allegation  in  the  answer  — 
that  it  had  been  paid  —  was  only  a  traverse  of  the  allegation  in 
the  complaint  that  it  had  not  been  paid.  (See  also  Brown  v. 
Orr.)i  The  doctrine  then  laid  down  has  not  since  been  departed 
from,  so  far  as  we  are  aware,  except  in  the  case  of  Hook  v. 
White ;  ^  and  that  case,  so  far  as  it  liolds  that  the  allegation  in 
the  complaint  that  the  note  remains  unpaid  is  immaterial,  and 
that  a  denial  of  the  allegation  does  not  put  any  fact  in  issue, 
ought,  in  our  opinion,  to  be  overruled.  The  general  denial  in 
this  case  puts  in  issue  the  averment  of  the  complaint,  that  the 
promissory  note  remained  due  and  unpaid.  "^  This  decision 
falls  far  short  of  sustaining  the  sweeping  doctrine  of  Mr.  Jus- 
tice Crockett,  in  the  preceding  case  of  Wetmore  v.  San  Francisco, 
as  to  the  eiTect  of  the  general  denial.  When  the  opinion  of  Mr. 
Justice  Rhodes  is  analyzed,  it  does  not  in  fact  lay  down  any  prin- 
ciple different  from  that  maintained  by  the  cases  cited  from  the 
courts  of  other  States.  It  simply  asserts  that  the  general  denial 
puts  in  issue  the  allegations  of  the  complaint,  and  that  the  nega- 
tive averment  of  non-payment,  when  traversed  in  this  manner, 
produces  a  complete  issue,  under  which  evidence  of  payment 
may  be  offered.  This  is  very  far  from  holding,  with  Crockett  J., 
that  the  defence  of  payment  is  admissible  under  the  general  denial 
in  all  cases. 

§  542.  *  666.  Twofold  Office  of  General  Denial.  No  Exact 
Statement  Possible  of  Particular  Defences  Admissible  under  it. 
The  foregoing  extracts  from  the  judgments  of  so  many  courts 
leave  little  room  and  little  need  for  any  addition  by  way  of  com- 
ments. The  unanimity  of  opinion  in  respect  to  the  fundamental 
principles  of  pleading  embodied  in  the  codes  is  almost  absolute ; 
and  this  principle  has  been  so  clearly  formulated  by  several  of 
the  judges,  that  no  difficulty  ought  to  arise  in  its  practical  appli- 
cation. The  office  of  the  general  denial,  like  that  of  the  old 
traverses,  is  twofold:  it  forces  the  plaintiff  to  prove  all  the 
material  allegations  of  fact  contained  in  his  complaint  or  peti- 
tion, and  constituting  his  cause  of  action,  by  sufficient  evidence 
at  least  to  make  out  a  prima  facie  case ;  it  also  permits  the  de- 

1  Brown  v.  Orr,  29  Cal.  120.  3  Davanay  v.  Eggenboff,  43  Cal.  395, 

2  Hook  i;.  White,  36  Cal.  299.  397,  per  Rhodes  J. 


768  CIVIL    IlEMEDIES. 

fenclant  to  offer  any  and  all  legal  evidence  which  controverts 
those  averments,  and  contradicts  the  plaintiff's  proofs.^  It  is 
clear  that  no  exact  statement  can  be  made  defining  with  uni- 
versal precision  what  particular  issues  the  general  denial  raises 
in  all  possible  cases,  and  what  particular  defences  it  admits ;  and 
in  this  respect  it  dil^ers  from  the  general  issue.  As  a  result  of 
the  common-law  methods  of  pleading,  and  the  uniformity  of 
averment  necessarily  used  in  all  actions  of  the  same  class,  the 
operation  of  the  general  issue  in  every  suit  was  exactly  defined ; 
and  this  was  especially  so  after  the  rules  made  in  4th  William 
IV.  (1834).  Certain  averments,  and  none  others,  of  the  decla- 
ration, were  put  in  issue  by  it;  certain  defences,  and  none  others, 
were  admissible  under  it.  This  precise  rule  cannot  be  laid  down 
in  respect  of  the  general  denial,  because  there  is  no  necessary 
uniformity  in  the  averments  of  complaints  or  petitions  in  actions 
of  the  same  kind  brought  on  the  same  substantial  facts,  and  seek- 
ing the  same  relief.  As  the  general  denial  puts  in  issue  all  the 
material  allegations  made  by  the  plaintiff,  and  admits  all  evi- 
dence contradicting  them,  what  issues  it  actually  raises,  and 
what  defences  it  actually  admits,  in  a  given  case,  must  depend 
upon  the  frame  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  and  upon  the  num- 
ber and  nature  of  the  allegations  which  the  plaintiff  has  inserted 
therein.  It  could  be  said  of  the  general  issue  in  all  actions  upon 
contract,  — •  assumpsit,  debt,  covenant,  —  after  the  rules  of  Hilary 
Term,  1834.  that  the  defence  of  payment  was  never  admissible 
under  it.  If  we  would  speak  with  perfect  accuracy,  such  lan- 
guage cannot  be  adopted  as  the  expression  of  a  universal  rule  in 
respect  of  the  general  denial ;  for  the  plaintiff  may  so  shape  his 
pleading,  and  introduce  into  it  such  a  negative  averment  of  non- 
payment, that  the  proof  of  payment  would  be  simply  supporting 
the  general  denials  of  the  answer.  Several  cases  already  cited 
sufficiently  sustain  the  correctness  of  this  position ;  and  others, 
to  be  hereafter  more  particularly  referred  to  in  a  subsequent  por- 
tion of  this  section,  and  in  the  next  section  under  the  head  of 
Payment,  will  furnish  various  examples  of  this  feature  of  dis- 

1  ^Graves  y.  Norfolk  Nat.  Bank  (1890),  (1900),  23  Wiisli.  615,63  Pac.  539.     "A 

49  Neb.  437,  68  N.  W.  612  ;  Am.  Bldg.  superfluous    plea   does   not  render  irrele- 

&    Loan     Ass'n     v.    Rainbolt  (1896),    48  vant  to    a  general  denial    matter    wliieh 

Neb.    434,  67  N.  W.  493  ;  Wiedeman    v.  would  have  been  relevant  in  the  ali.sorico 

Hedge.s    (1901),    63  Neb.   103,  88  N.  W.  of  a   special    plea:"  Horkey   v.  Kendall 

)"0;    Peterson    v.    Seattle   Traction    Co.  (1898),  53  Neb.  522,  73  N.  W.  953.] 


ISSUES    FORMED   BY    THE    GENERAL   DENIAL.  769 

tinction  between  the  general  denial  and  the  general  issue. ^  Ad- 
ditional cases,  bearing  upon  the  nature  and  effect  of  the  general 
denial,  are  collected  in  the  foot-note. ^ 

§  543.  *  667.  Only  Material  Averments  Put  in  Issue  by  General 
Denial.  As  the  general  denial  forms  an  issue  upon  the  entire 
cause  of  action  set  up  by  the  plaintiff,  and  forces  him  to  prove 
the  same  substantially  as  alleged,  tlie  question  becomes  one  of 
great  practical  importance :  What  are  the  averments  in  the  com- 
plaint or  petition  which  are  thus  negatived,  and  which  must  be 
established  by  sufficient  proof  on  the  trial  ?  The  full  answer  to 
this  question  belongs  rather  to  a  discussion  of  the  requisites  of 
the  plaintiff's  than  of  the  defendant's  pleading,  and  will  be 
found  in  Chapter  Third.  The  universally  accepted  rule  is, 
that  only  those  averments  of  the  complaint  or  petition  which 
are  material  and  proper  are  put  in  issue  by  a  denial  either 
general  or  specific  in  its  form.  Neither  "  material  "  nor  "  proper  " 
is,  however,  synonymous  with  "necessary."  A  plaintiff  may  in- 
sert in  his  pleading  allegations  which  are  unnecessary  in  that 
position,  and  which  are  not  in  conformity  with  the  perfect 
logic  of  the  system,  but  which,  when  once  introduced,  be- 
come "material,"  so  that  an  issue  is  formed  upon  them  by  a 
general  or  a  specific  denial.^  The  instance  just  mentioned,  of 
an  allegation  of  non-payment  in  the  complaint  met  by  a  denial 

1  See    Quin    v.  Lloyil,  41    N.  Y.  349;  of  Brouklyii,  63   Barb.  610,  616;    Catlin 

Marley  v.  Smith,  4   Kan.  183;  Frisch  r.  v.  Guuter,  1     Duer,    253,   26.5;  Robinson 

Caler,    21    Cal.    71;  White  r.  Smith,  46  v.  Frost,    14     Barb.  536,  541;    Texier  v. 

N.  Y.  418;  Van  Gieson  v.  Van  Gieson,  10  Gouin,  5  Duer,  389,  391  ;  Dyson  v.  Ream, 

N.  Y.  316.  9   Iowa,  51;    Scheer  v.   Keown,  34    Wis. 

-  Button  V.  McCauley,  38  Barb.  413;  349,  35S.  The  conclusions  of  the  text 
Schular  v.  Hudson  Riv.  R.  Co.,  38  Barb,  as  to  what  allegations  in  the  plaintiff's 
653  ;  Schermerhorn  v.  Van  Allen,  18  Barb,  pleading  the  general  denial  puts  in  i.ssue 
29;  Hendricks  v.  Decker,  35  Barb.  298;  and  compels  him  to  prove,  and  wiiat  evi- 
Perkins  v.  Ermel,  2  Kan.  325  ;  Adams  dence  it  admits  on  the  part  of  the  defend- 
Exp.  Co.  V.  Darnell,  31  Ind.  20;  Lafayette  ant,  are  further  illustrated  by  Paris  v. 
&  I.  R.  Co.  V.  Ehman,  30  id.  83;  Watkina  Strong,  51  Ind.  339;  Stafford  v.  Nutt,  51 
V.  Jones,  28  id.  12;  Frybarger  v.  Coke-  id.  535;  Bate  v.  Sheets,  50  id.  329  ;  Mor- 
fair,  17  id.  404;  Bingham  u.  Kimball,  17  gan  v.  Wattles,  69  id.  260;  Mc Williams 
id.  396;  Norris  v.  Amos,  15  id.  365;  v.  Bannister,  40  Wis.  489;  Moulton  i-. 
Hawkins  V.  Borland,  14  Cal.  413;  God-  Thompson,  26  Minn.  120;  School  Dist.  v. 
dard  f.  Fulton,  21  CaL430;  Evansville  r.  Shoemaker,  5  Neb.  36;  Jones  v.  Seward 
Evans,  37  id.  229,  236;  Hier  y.  Grant,  47  Cy.  Com'rs,  10  id.  1.54;  Scott  v.  Mor.se, 
N.  Y.  278 ;  Schaus  v.  Manhattan  Gasl.  54  Iowa,  732 ;  Amador  Cy.  v.  Butter- 
Co.,  14  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  371;  Hunter  v.  field,  51  Cal.  526;  Elder  r.  Spinks,  53  id. 
Mathis,    40     Ind.    356;     Ammerman    v.  293. 

Crosby,   26  id.  451  ;  Johnson  v.  Cudding-  s  [;Dillon  v.  Lee  (1899),  110  la.  156,  81 

ton,  35   id.  43  ;  Brett  v.   First  Univ.   Soc.  N.  W.  245.^ 

49 


770  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

in  the  answer,  is  a  familiar  example  of  such  averments,  material, 
although  not  necessary. ^ 

S  544.  *  668.  Only  Issuable  Facts  are  Material.  Test  to  distin- 
guish them  from  Evidentiary  Facts.  It  is  au  elementary  doctrine 
of  pleading  under  the  new  system,  that  only  the  issuable  facts  — 
that  is,  the  conclusions  of  fact  which  are  essential  to  the  exist- 
ence of  the  cause  of  action,  or  upon  which  the  right  to  relief 
wholly  or  partially  depends  in  equitable  suits  —  are  material, 
and  are  therefore  put  in  issue  by  the  denial;  and  the  converse 
of  the  proposition  is  true,  that  the  averments  of  mere  eviden- 
tiary facts,  if  inserted  in  the  pleading,  are  not  thus  controverted.  • 
Although  this  doctrine  is  elementary,  and  appears  so  simple  in 
the  statement,  it  is  nevertheless  sometimes  exceedingly  difficult 
of  application  in  practice ;  and  the  difficulty  is  enhanced  by  the 
frequent  inconsistencies  of  courts  in  dealing  with  it.  While  the 
general  principle,  as  just  stated,  is  constantly  affirmed,  yet  there 
are  numerous  instances  of  particular  causes  of  action  in  which 
the  plaintiffs  are  required  to  set  out  in  detail  matter  which  is 
plainly  evidentiary,  and  which  is  only  of  value  as  leading  the 
mind  to  a  conviction  that  the  final  or  issuable  fact,  which  is  one 
necessary  element  of  the  right  of  action,  exists.  In  other  words, 
the  courts  have  often,  while  dealing  with  particular  cases,  vio- 
lated the  elementar}'  principle  which  applies,  or  should  apply,  to 
all  cases ;  and  the  result  is  confusion  and  uncertainty.  It  is  pos- 
sible, however,  to  distinguish  between  issuable,  material  facts, 
and  evidentiary  facts,  by  an  unfailing  criterion.  In  all  par- 
ticular instances  of  the  same  cause  of  action  based  upon  the 
same  circumstances,  —  that  is,  arising  from  the  same  primary 
right  in  the  plaintiff,  broken  by  the  same  delict  or  wrong  on 
the  part  of  the  defendant,  —  the  material  or  issuable  facts  which 
are  the  essential  elements  of  the  right  of  action  must  be  the  same : 
immaterial  circumstances,  the  time,  place,  amounts,  values,  extent 
of  damages,  parties,  and  the  like,  will  be  different;  but  the  sub- 
stantial elements  of  the  cause  of  action,  the  facts  which  constitute 
it,  must  in  every  instance  of  the  same  species  be  the  same.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  evidentiary  matter,  the  mass  of  subordinate 
facts  and  circumstances  which  must  be  actually  proved,  and  from 

1  [^Riner  )-.  New  Hampshire  Fire  Ins.     62  Pac.  377;  Ball  u.  Putnam   (1898),  123 
Co.  (1899),  9  Wyo.  81,  CO  Pac.  262  ;  Rob-     Ciil.  134,  55  Pac.  773.] 
ertson  v.  Robertson   (1900),  37   Ore.  339, 


ISSUES   FORMED    BY   THE    GENERAL   DENIAL.  77  L 

which  the  above-described  essential  elements  result  as  inferences 
more  or  less  direct,  may  vary  with  each  particular  instance  of 
the  same  species  of  cause  of  action.  The  former  class  of  facts 
are  material,  issuable,  and,  when  the  theory  of  pleading  in  legal 
actions  is  strictly  observed,  they  alone  should  be  averred,  and 
they  alone  should  be  treated  as  put  in  issue  by  the  denials, 
general  or  specific :  the  second  class  of  facts  —  the  proper  evi- 
dentiary matter  —  should  not  be  pleaded,  and,  if  improperly 
averred,  should  not  be  regarded  as  put  in  issue  by  the  denials  of 
the  defendant.  This  is  the  true  theory,  and  is  again  and  again 
commended  by  the  courts ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  is  constantly 
violated  by  the  same  courts  in  their  requirements  in  respect  to 
the  pleading  in  certain  species  of  causes  of  action.  Another 
source  of  difficulty  in  applying  the  elementary  doctrine  is  found 
in  the  circumstance,  that  not  infrequently  the  material,  issu- 
able fact  which  must  be  averred,  and  which  is  put  in  issue, 
is  identical  with  the  fact  which  must  be  actually  given  in  evi- 
dence. In  respect  of  such  matters  there  are  no  steps  and 
grades,  and  processes  of  combination  and  deduction,  by  which 
the  issuable  fact  alleged  is  inferred  from  the  evidentiary  fact 
proved.  The  two  are  one  and  the  same ;  and  thus  matter  which 
is  truly  evidence  must  in  such  case  be  alleged,  and  matter 
which  is  the  proper  subject  of  allegation  must  be  directly  given 
in  evidence. 

§  545.  *  669.  Allegations  of  Legal  Conclusions  not  Controverted 
by  General  Denial.  Another  and  the  final  element  which  should 
belong  to  the  averments  in  the  complaint,  in  order  that  an  issue 
may  be  raised  thereon  by  the  denial,  is,  that  they  must  be  of  fact, 
and  not  of  law.  This  particular  topic  has  already  been  treated 
of  in  a  former  subdivision  of  the  present  section.  The  reformed 
system  of  pleading,  unlike  that  of  the  common  law,  authorizes 
no  issues  to  be  raised  by  allegations  of  legal  conclusions,  and 
denials  of  the  same.  Although  there  are  traces  to  be  found  in 
some  of  the  cases  of  the  ancient  forms  of  averment  in  indebitatus 
assumpsit  and  in  debt,  and  of  answers  resembling  the  plea  of  nil 
debet,  yet  all  the  decisions  of  present  authority  unite  in  theoreti- 
cally condemning  such  a  mode  of  pleading.  I  need  not,  how- 
ever, dwell  upon  this  particular  rule,  nor  again  refer  to  cases 
which  have  been  so  recently  cited.  An  allegation  of  law,  in  the 
plaintiff's  pleading  is  not  controverted  by  the  defendant's  denial: 


1 1'l  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

no  issue  is  formed  thereby  under  which  evidence  can  be  admitted 
from  either  party. 

§  546.  "  670.  General  Nature  of  Evidence  Admissible  under 
Denials.  The  judicial  opinions  quoted  under  the  preceding 
head  sufficiently  establish  the  principle  which  controls  all  the 
questions  embraced  under  the  present,  and  the  cases  to  be 
cited  in  the  following  one  will  illustrate  the  application  of  that 
principle.  In  fact,  it  is  so  intimately  bound  up  with  the  subject 
last  discussed,  that  it  has  already  been  stated  and  explained.  I 
shall,  however,  recapitulate  and  restate  this  fundamental  doc- 
trine. The  material  allegations  of  the  complaint  or  petition, 
when  denied  either  generally  or  specifically,  determine  in  each 
case  what  evidence  and  what  defences  may  be  given  and  estab- 
lished by  the  defendant.  It  is  impossible  to  say  of  any  class  of 
cases,  that  such  or  such  evidence  can  or  cannot  be  offered  as  a 
matter  of  certain  rule,  or  that  such  or  such  a  defence  can  or  can- 
not be  set  up.  As  the  plaintiff  is  bound  by  no  inflexible  rule 
as  to  the  form  of  his  pleading,  and  as  to  the  averments  he  may 
choose  to  introduce  into  it,  so  he  can  widen  or  contract  within 
distant  extremes  the  extent  and  nature  of  the  evidence  and  de- 
fences which  may  be  interposed  by  the  defendant  under  a  denial.^ 
As  the  denial  puts  in  issue  all  the  material  allegations  of  fact 
made  by  the  plaintiff,  whether  originally  necessary  or  not,  he 
is  at  liberty  to  introduce  all  and  ixnj  legal  evidence  which  tends 
to  sustain  those  allegations.  On  the  other  hand,  under  the  same 
issue,  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  offer  any  evidence  which  tends 
to  contradict  that  of  the  plaintiff,  and  to  deny,  disprove,  and  over- 
throw his  material  averments  of  fact.^  This  is  the  fundamental 
and  most  comprehensive  doctrine  of  pleading  embraced  in  the 
new  procedure,  and  it  of  course  determines  the  nature  of  the 
defences  which  may  be  set  up  under  a  general  denial.  It  is 
to  be  observed  —  although  the  remark  is  perhaps  unnecessary 
—  that  the  defendant  may  in  this  manner  attack  any  material 
allegation  of  fact,  and  thus,  if  possible,  defeat  the  recovery, 
while  the  others  are  left  unanswered  or  unassailed.  ^ 

1  SeeCliicagi),  Ciu.  &L.  R.Co.  i-.  West,  154;  Scott  v.  Morse,  54  Iowa,  7.32  ;  Roe 
37  Iml  21 1,  215.  v.     Angevine,   7    Hun,    679;    Manning    v. 

2  QBay  View  Brewing  Co.  v.  Gruhb  Winter,  7  id.  482;  Boomer  v.  Koon,  6  id. 
(1901),  24  Wash.  16.3,  63   Pac.  lO'JIJ  645;     Andrews    v.    Bond,  16    Barb.    r).33 ; 

*  As  further  illustrations  of  the  te.xt,  Beaty  v.  Swarthout,  32  id.  293  ;  Scher- 
Bee  Jones  i'.  Seward  Cy.  Com'rs,  10  Neb.      merhorn    i\  Van  Allen,  18  id.  29;  Siharz 


DEFENCES   ADMITTED    UNDER    A    DENIAL.  773 

§  547.  *  G71.  Evidence  Proper  under  Denials  may  be  Affirmative 
or  Negative.  As  the  allegations  of  the  complaint  or  petition 
controverted  by  the  denials  of  the  answer  determine  the  nature 
and  extent  of  the  evidence  admissible  under  such  denials,  it 
follows  that  this  evidence  may  be  sometimes  negative  and  some- 
times affirmative.  Herein  lies  the  source  of  much  confusion  and 
uncertainty  as  to  the  character  of  the  defendant's  proofs  and  de- 
fences, and  as  to  their  admissibility  under  the  general  denial. 
Evidence  in  its  nature  affirmative  is  often  confounded  with 
defences  which  are  essentially  affirmative  and  in  avoidance  of 
the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  and  is  therefore  mistakenly  re- 
garded as  new  matter  requiring  to  be  specially  pleaded,  although 
its  effect  upon  the  issues  is  strictly  negative,  and  it  is  entirely 
admissible  under  an  answer  of  denial.  In  other  words,  in  order 
that  evidence  may  be  proved  under  a  denial,  it  need  not  be  in  its 
own  nature  negative :  affirmative  evidence  may  often  be  used  to 
contradict  an  allegation  of  the  complaint,  and  may  therefore  be 
proved  to  maintain  the  negative  issue  raised  by  the  defendant's 
denials.^  One  or  two  familiar  examples  will  sufficiently  illus- 
trate this  proposition.  In  certain  actions,  property  in  the  plain- 
tiff, in  respect  of  the  goods  which  are  the  subject-matter  of  the 
controversy,  is  an  essential  element  of  his  claim.  His  complaint, 
therefore,  avers  property  in  himself:  the  allegation  is  material, 
and  is,  of  course,  put  in  issue  by  the  general  or  specific  denial. 
To  maintain  this  issue  on  his  part,  the  plaintiff  may  give  evidence 
tending  to  show  that  he  is  the  absolute  owner,  or  has  the  requi- 
site qualified  property.  The  defendant  may  controvert  this  fact 
in  two  modes.     He  may  simply  contradict  and  destroy  the  effect 

r.  Oppold,  74  N.  Y.  307,  309;  Hier  r.  See  also  Hess  r.  Union  State  Bank  (1900). 
Grant,  47  id.  278  ;  Dunham  v.  Bower,  77  156  Ind.  523,  60  N.  E.  305  ;  Jones  v.  Rush 
id.  76;  Brown  v.  College  Cor.  Gt.  Co.,  56  (1900),  156  Mo.  364,  57  S.  W.  118;  Alpert 
Ind.  110.  V.  Bright  (1902),  74  Conn.  614,  51  Atl. 
1  [In  Jeffersonville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Riter  521  ;  Van  Skike  v.  Potter  (1897),  53  Neb. 
(1896),  146  Ind.  521,  45  N.  E.  697,  the  28,  73  N.  W.  295;  Phelps  v.  Skinner 
court  .said:  "  A  defendant,  under  the  (1901),  63  Kan.  364,  65  Pac.  667. 
general  denial,  is  not  confined  to  negative  This  rule  was  approved  by  the  Su- 
proof  in  denial  of  the  facts  .stated  in  the  preme  Court  of  South  Carolina  in  Wil- 
comjilaint  as  a  cause  of  action,  hut  may,  son  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897),  51  S.  C.  79,  28 
upon  the  trial,  introduce  proof  of  facts  S.  E.  91,  where  it  was  held  that  the  de- 
independent  of  those  alleged  in  the  com-  fence  that  an  injury  was  caused  by  a 
plaint,  but  which  are  inconsistent  there-  fellow  servant  w.as  admissible  under 
with,  and  tend  to  meet  and  break  down  the  general  denial,  quoting  the  text  at 
or  defeat  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action."  length. J 


774  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

of  the  plaintiff's  proofs,  and  in  this  purely  negative  manner  pro- 
cure, if  possible,  a  decision  in  his  own  favor  upon  this  issue. 
The  result  would  be  a  defeat  of  the  plaintiff's  recovery  by  his 
failure  to  maintain  the  averment  of  his  pleading:  but  the  jury 
or  court  would  not  be  called  upon  to  find  that  the  property  was 
in  any  other  person;  the  decision  would  simply  be,  that  the 
plaintiff  had  not  shown  it  to  be  in  himself.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  defendant,  not  attempting  directly  to  deny  the  testimony  of 
the  plaintiff's  witnesses,  and  to  overpower  its  effect  by  directly 
contradictory  proofs,  may  introduce  evidence  tending  to  show 
that  the  property  in  the  goods  is,  in  fact,  in  a  third  person. 
This  evidence,  if  convincing,  would  defeat  the  plaintiff's  recov- 
ery. It  would  be  affirmative  in  its  direct  nature ;  but  its  ultimate 
effect,  in  the  trial  of  the  issue  raised  by  the  answer,  would  be 
to  deny  the  truth  of  the  plaintiff's  averment.  Such  evidence, 
although  immediately  affirmative,  would  still,  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  the  issue  presented  by  the  pleadings,  be  negative. 
Again:  in  an  action  on  a  promissory  note  against  the  maker  or 
indorser,  the  complaint  might  allege  title  in  the  plaintiff,  and 
the  fact  that  he  was  the  owner  and  holder  thereof.  The  answer 
of  denial  would  put  this  averment  in  issue,  as  it  would  be  mate- 
rial, and  its  truth  essential  to  the  recovery.  Proof  by  the  de- 
fendant, that,  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  action,  the 
plaintiff  had  assigned  the  note  to  a  third  person,  would  be 
affirmative  in  its  immediate  nature,  but  negative  in  its  effect 
upon  the  issue;  for  it  would  controvert  the  truth  of  the  plain- 
tiff"s  allegation.  Cases  cited  under  the  next  subdivision  hold 
that  the  evidence  which  I  have  thus  described  in  both  of  these 
examples  is  admissible  under  the  general  denial. 

§  548.  *  672.  Distinction  bet^veen  General  Issue  and  Plea  of 
Confession  and  Avoidance  at  Common  Law  not  the  same  as  that 
between  General  Denial  and  New  Matter  under  the  Code.  The 
theory  of  the  general  denial  is  completed  by  considering  what 
evidence  cannot  be  given,  and  what  defences  cannot  be  set  up, 
under  it.  This  subject  will  be  discussed  at  large  in  the  follow- 
ing section:  but  some  reference  to  it  is  appropriate  in  the  present 
connection.  The  codes  divide  defences  into  denials  and  new 
matter.  New  matter  must  be  speciall}'  j)leaded.  Defences  at 
the  common  law  were  separated  into  traverses  general  and 
special,  and  j)leas   by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance.     The 


DEFENCES   ADMITTED    UNDER    A    DENIAL.  (  t  D 

general  traverses  were  the  general  issues,  and  special  traverses 
were  denials  of  some  particular  allegation.  The  common-law 
distinction  between  these  classes  of  defences  was  generally  stated 
by  the  text-writers  as  follows :  The  general  issue,  when  used  in 
accordance  with  the  original  theory  in  those  actions  which  ad- 
mitted its  full  efficacy,  put  in  issue  the  entire  cause  of  action, 
and  under  it  the  defendant  was  permitted  to  offer  any  evidence 
and  set  up  any  defence  which  showed  that  the  right  of  action 
never,  in  fact,  existed.  The  plea  by  way  of  confession  and  avoid- 
ance, on  the  other  hand,  did  not  deny  the  facts  from  which  the 
cause  of  action  arose.  It  admitted  or  "  confessed  "  that  a  cause 
of  action  once  existed  as  averred,  and  set  up  other  and  subse- 
quently occurring  facts  which  showed  that  the  right  after  it  had 
occurred  had  been  in  some  manner  discharged,  satisfied,  or  de- 
feated. Is  it  possible  to  draw  the  same  distinction  between  the 
general  denial  and  the  new  matter  of  the  code?  I  answer,  It  is 
not.  Such  a  distinction,  although  correct  in  many  instances,  is 
not  true  absolutely.  One  reason  for  this  is,  that  the  plaintiff  may 
so  frame  his  complaint  or  petition,  may  insert  in  it  allegations  of 
such  a  sort,  that  a  general  denial  will  admit  proof  of  facts  which 
would  be  strictly  matter  by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance 
under  the  former  procedure.  Certain  passages  in  judicial  opin- 
ions which  have  identified  the  "new  matter"  of  the  codes  with 
the  pleas  by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance  of  the  common  law, 
are,  therefore,  inaccurate :  they  were  written  by  their  authors  in 
forgetfulness  of  the  inherent  difference  between  the  fixed  forms 
of  the  common-law  declarations,  and  the  varying  forms  of  the 
complaints  and  petitions  which  may  properly,  though  not  perhaps 
scientifically,  be  used  under  the  new  system.  To  illustrate :  Pay- 
ment after  breach  of  a  contract,  and  therefore  after  a  cause  of 
action  arose,  is  certainly  matter  by  way  of  confession  and  avoid- 
ance ;  and  yet  a  complaint  may  be  so  drawn  that  payment  will 
not  be  new  matter,  but  will  be  provable  under  a  general  denial. 
Other  examples  might  be  given ;  but  this  single  one  suffices. 

§  549.  *  673.  Same  Subject.  The  result  is,  that  the  new 
matter  of  the  code  does  not,  like  the  matter  in  confession  and 
avoidance  of  the  common  law,  depend  upon  the  essential  nature 
of  the  cause  of  action  and  of  the  defence,  but,  like  the  effect  of  the 
general  denial,  it  depends  primarily  upon  the  nature  of  the  mate- 
rial allegations  which  are  embraced  in  the  complaint.     Any  facts 


7/b  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

which  tend  to  disprove  some  one  of  these  allegations  may  be 
given  in  evidence  under  the  denial :  any  fact  which  does  not  thus 
directly  tend  to  disprove  some  one  or  more  of  these  allegations 
cannot  be  given  in  evidence  under  the  denial.  It  follows,  that  if 
such  fact  is  in  itself  a  defence,  or,  in  combination  with  others, 
aids  in  establishing  a  defence,  this  defence  must  be  based  upon 
the  assumption,  that,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  all  the  material 
allegations  made  by  the  plaintiff  are  either  admitted  or  proven 
to  be  true.  The  facts  which  constitute  or  aid  in  constituting 
such  a  defence  are  "new  matter."  In  this  respect  the  new 
matter  of  the  codes  is  analogous  to  the  pleas  by  way  of  confes- 
sion and  avoidance  of  the  common  law,  since  it  does,  in  truth, 
confess  and  avoid.  The  two  definitions  may  now  be  given,  and 
their  contrast  will  be  plain.  A  plea  by  way  of  confession  and 
avoidance  admitted  that  the  cause  of  action  alleged  did  once  exists 
and  averred  subsequent  facts  which  operated  to  discharge  or  sat- 
isfy it.  The  new  matter  of  the  codes  admits  that  all  the  material 
allegations  of  the  complaint  or  petition  are  true,  and  consists  of 
facts  not  alleged  therein  which  destrog  the  right  of  action,  and 
defeat  a  recovery.  To  sum  up  these  conclusions,  the  classifica- 
tion of  and  distinction  between  defences  at  the  common  law 
depended  upon  the  intrinsic,  essential  nature  of  the  causes  of 
action  and  of  the  defences.  The  analogous  classification  and 
distinction  Ijetween  defences  admissible  under  a  denial,  and 
those  which  are  new  matter,  in  the  new  procedure,  depend, 
primarily  upon  the  structure  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  and 
the  material  averments  of  fact  which  it  contains.  All  facts 
which  directly  tend  to  disprove  any  one  or  more  of  these  aver- 
ments may  be  offered  under  the  general  denial:  all  facts  which 
do  not  thus  directly  tend  to  disprove  some  one  or  more  of  these 
averments,  but  tend  to  establish  a  defence  independently  of 
them,  cannot  be  offered  under  the  denial;  they  are  new  matter, 
and  must  be  specially  pleaded.^  I  shall  now  apply  these  general 
principles  to  some  particular  instances. 

§  550.  *  674.  Particular  Defences  Admissible  under  the  General 
Denial.  In  Actions  for  Compensation  for  Services.  I  shall  in  this 
subdivision  classify  and  discuss  only  those  cases  in  which  defences 
have  been  held  admissible :  those  which  have  been  pronounced 
inadmissible,  for  the  reason  that  they  fell  within  the  denomina- 

1  [IvffMis  '•.  Ilohertson  (1896),  46  Neb.  837,  65  N.  W,  897.] 


DEFENCES   ADMITTED    UNDER    A    DENIAL.  777 

tion  of  "new  matter,"  will  be  given  in  the  next  succeeding  sec- 
tion. ^  In  an  action  b}'  an  attorney  and  counsellor  to  recover 
compensation  for  professional  services,  the  complaint  stating  the 
retainer,  the  services  and  their  value,  and  the  answer  being  a 
general  denial,  the  plaintiff  proved  the  services,  and  gave  evi- 
dence showing  their  reasonable  value.  It  was  held  that  the 
defendant  might,  under  his  denial,  show  that  the  services  were 
rendered  upon  a  special  agreement  to  the  effect  that  the  plaintiff 
would  look  to  the  recover}-  of  costs  from  the  adverse  part}-  as  his 
sole  mode  of  compensation,  and  Avould  make  no  personal  claim 
against  the  defendant.^  And  in  a  similar  action  under  the  same 
answer  the  defendant  may  prove  the  plaintiff's  negligence  and 
want  of  skill,  by  which  the  value  of  the  services  was  diminished 
or  destroyed."^  In  general,  in  actions  to  recover  compensation 
for  work  and  labor  upon  a  quantum  vuruit  the  defendants  may, 
under  the  general  denial,  prove  that  the  work  was  negligently  or 
unskilfully  done,  and  thus  contest  its  value;  *  and  may  prove  that 
the  plaintiff  had  assigned  and  transferred  the  demand  before  suit 
brought,  for  this  controverts  the  defendant's  indebtedness  to  him.^ 
§  551.  *  675.  In  Actions  for  Negligent  Injuries.  In  actions  for 
injuries  to  person  or  property  alleged  to  have  resulted  from  the 

1  For  a  summary  of  recent  decisions.  The  defendant  was  at  lil)erty  to  prove 
see  the  additions  to  the  hxst  note  under  any  circumstances  tending  to  show  that 
§*682.  he  was  never  indebted  at  all,  or  that  he 

2  Schermerhorn  v.  Van  Allen,  18  Barb,  owed  less  than  was  claimed." 

29,  per  Parker  ,1.:  "The  evidence  was  s  Bridges  i'.  Paige,  13  Cal.  640,  641. 
improperly  excluded.  Under  a  general  *  Kaymond  v.  Hichardson,  4  E.  D. 
allegation  of  indebtedness,  the  plaintiff  Smith,  171.  But  under  a  mere  deuial  of 
had  proved  certain  services  rendered  and  the  value,  the  defendant  cannot  show  that 
their  value.  It  was  surely  competent  for  the  services  were  not  rendered.  Van 
the  defendant,  under  a  denial  of  such  in-  Dyke  v.  Maguire,  57  N.  Y.  429. 
debtedness,  to  prove  that  he  never  in-  ^  Wetniore  ;;.  San  Francisco,  44  Cal. 
curred  or  owed  the  debt.  He  had  a  right  294,  299.  And  in  an  action  for  goods  sold 
to  prove  that  the  services  were  rendered  and  delivered,  the  defendant  may  show 
as  a  gratuity,  or  that  the  plaintiff  himself  that  the  jdaintiff  acted  as  agent  for  an- 
had  fixed  a  less  price  for  their  value  than  other  person,  whose  name  was  disclosed, 
he  claimed  to  recover.  The  services  and  who  wa.s  the  actual  vendor.  Merritt 
being  proved,  the  defendant  might  show  v.  Briggs,  57  N.  Y.  651. 
that  they  were  rendered,  not  fur  him,  but  j^But  evidence  showing  a  contract  for 
on  the  credit  of  some  other  jierson,  or  a  smaller  sum  than  that  alleged  by  plain- 
that  the  plaintiff  himself  undertook  to  run  tiff  is  not  admissible  :  Scholey  i\  Demattos 
the  risk  of  the  litigation.  It  was  not  an  (1898),  18  Wash.  .504,  52  Pac.  242.  Nor 
attempt  to  show  an  extinguishment  of  can  it  be  shown  that  the  appropriation  foi 
the  indebtedness  by  payment,  release,  or  the  purpose  is  exhausted  :  McNnlty  r. 
otherwi.se;  but  it  was  an  offer  to  show  City  of  New  York  (1901),  168  N.  Y.  117 
that    such    indebtedness    never    existed.  6lN.  E.  111.] 


78 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


defendant's  negligence,  he  may  prove  under  a  general  denial 
that  the  wrong  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  third  persons 
not  agents  of  the  defendant,  and  for  whom  he  was  not  respon- 
sible;^ or  may  prove  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff. ^ 
In  accordance  with  the  principle  of  these  decisions,  the  defence 
of  non  superior  is  always  admissible  under  a  general  denial  cf 
complaints  which  allege  the  commission  of  injuries  by  means  of 
defendant's  servants,  employees,  or  agents.  ^ 

§  552.  *  676.  Assignment,  Want  of  Consideration,  etc.  In  an 
action  upon  a  promissory  note  or  other  security,  the  defendant 
may  under  the  general  denial  show  an  assignment  of  the  thing  in 
action  to  a  third  person  before  the  suit  was  commenced,  since 
this  directly  controverts  the  averment  of  title  in  the  plaintiff;* 


1  Schular  v.  Hudson  Kiver  R.  Co.,  38 
Barb.  653 ;  Schaus  v.  Manhattan  Gasl. 
Co.,  14  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  371  ;  Jackson  v. 
Feather  Riv.  &  G.  W.  Co.,  14  Cal.  18  ; 
Adams  Exp.  Co.  v.  Darnell,  31  lud.  20. 
In  this  case,  proof  that  the  goods  were 
stolen  was  admitted  in  an  action  against 
a  common  carrier.  [^Roemer  v.  Striker 
(1894),  142  N.  Y.  134,  36  X.  E.  808.] 

-  Schaus  V.  Manhattan  Gasl.  Co.,  14 
Abb.  Pr.  N.  s.  371  ;  New  Haven  &  N.  Co. 
V.  Quintard,  6  Abb.  Pr.  x.  s.  128;  Indian- 
apolis, etc.  R.  Co.  V.  Rutherford,  29  Ind.  82  ; 
Jeffersonville,  M.  &  I.  R.  Co.  r.  Dnnlap, 
29  Ind.  426  ;  Hathawa}'  v.  Toledo,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.,  46  Ind.  25,  27.  This  decision  is 
placed  upon  the  ground  that  in  Indiana 
the  plaintiff  must  allege  and  prove  the 
absence  of  negligence  on  his  part.  See 
also  McDoneU  v.  Buffum,  31  How.  Pr. 
154;  Evansville  &  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiatt,  17 
Ind.  102 ;  Jonesboro'  &  F.  Turnp.  Co.  v. 
Baldwin,  57  Ind.  86  ;  Jones  v.  Sheboygan, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Wis.  306;  McQuade  c 
Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  68  Wis.  616. 
Contra,  Watkins  v.  So.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  38 
Fed.  Rep.  711  ;  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  79  Ky.  164;  Stone  i-.  Hunt,  94 
Mo.  475 ;  Donovan  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  .1. 
Ry.  Co.,  89  Mo.  147  ;  Hudson  v.  Wabash 
W.  Ry.  Co.,  101  Mo.  13  ;  Keitel  v.  St.  Lonis 
Cable'  &  W.  Ry.  Co.,  28  Mo.  App.  657  ;  St. 
Clair  v.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  29  Mo.  App. 
76 ;  South  Omaha  v.  Cunningham,  31 
Neb.  316;  Grant  v.  Baker,  12  Ore.  .329. 

Qlndiana  Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  O'Brien 
(1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  66   N.  E.  742.     It  was 


held  in  Kennedy  v.  Railway  Co.  (1901), 
59  S.  C.  535,  38  S.  E.  169,  that  under  a 
general  denial  defendant  may  show  that  the 
injury  was  caused  solely  by  plaintiff's  negli- 
gence, since  this  goes  to  controvert  the 
allegations  of  defendant's  negligence  con- 
tained in  the  complaint.  Otherwise  in 
case  of  contributory  negligence,  since  that 
admits  plaintiff's  allegations  of  negli- 
gence and  avoids  the  effect  of  the  same. 
Quoting  §  *  671  of  the  text.] 

3  [[The  defence  that  the  injury  was 
caused  by  a  fellow  servant  is  admissible 
under  a  general  denial :  Wilson  v.  Rail- 
way Co.  (1897).  51  S.  C.  79,  28  S.  E.  91  ; 
Kaminski  v.  Tudor  Iron  Works  (1902 J, 
167  Mo.  462,  67  S.  W.  221.  But  see  note 
2,  p.  817.  And  under  this  issue  the  de- 
fendant may  show  that  it  exercised  due 
care :  Hunter  r.  Grande  Ronde  Lumber 
Co.   (1901),  39  Ore.  448,  65  Pac.  598.] 

*  Andrews  r.  Bond,  16  Barb.  633.  And 
see  Wetmore  v.  San  Francisco,  44  Cal.  294, 
299.  The  exact  contrary  is  held  in  Brett 
r.  First  Univ.  Soc,  63  Barb.  610,  618,  per 
Leonard  J.  The  opinion  in  this  case  is, 
however,  manifestly  incorrect.  Under  the 
denial  of  "  execution  "  in  an  action  on  a 
note  or  other  written  contract,  the  defend- 
ant may  prove  that  his  signature  w.as  ob- 
tained by  fraud  :  Corby  v.  Weddle,  57  Mo. 
452,  459 ;  or  that  the  instrument  was  not 
delivered  :  Fisher  v.  Hamilton,  48  Ind.  239. 
But  .see  Dunning  v.  Ruml)augh,  36  Iowa, 
566,  568.  In  an  action  upon  an  account 
stated  for  services,  the  defendant  cannot, 
under  the  general  denial,  attack  any  of  the 


DEFENCKS    ADMITTED    UNDKK    A    DENIAL.  779 

and  where  the  note  is  non-negotiable,  a  want  of  consideration 
may  be  shown. ^  The  general  denial  to  a  complaint  in  the  oidi- 
nary  form,  for  goods  alleged  to  have  been  sold  and  delivered  by 
the  plaintiff,  admits  the  defence  that  a  third  person  who  actually 
made  the  sale  was  himself  the  owner  of  the  goods,  and  was  not 
acting  in  the  transaction  as  agent  for  the  plaintiff ;  for  this  proof 
contradicts  the  allegation  of  a  sale  by  the  plaintiff  ;2  and  that 
the  person  who  actually  bought  the  goods  in  the  name  of  the 
defendant  was  not  the  latter's  agent,  but  that  his  prior  au- 
thority had  been  revoked,  and  the  plaintiff  had  been  notified 
thereof;  for  this  proof  contradicts  the  allegation  of  a  sale  to 
the  defendant.'^ 

§  553.  *  677.  In  Actions  for  Conversion.  In  an  action  for  the 
conversion  of  chattels,  the  complaint  of  course  averring  propert}' 
in  the  plaintiff,  the  general  denial  permits  the  defendant  to  show 
that  the  property  is  not  in  the  plaintiff;*  as,  for  example,  by 
proving  that  a  third  person  is  owner  of  the  goods  either  by  an 
absolute  or  qualified  title. "^  This  latter  proposition  is,  however, 
denied  by  some  of  the  cases,  which  hold  that  the  defence  of 
property  in- a  third  person,  or  in  the  defendant,  must  be  specially 

items  in  the  account:  Warner  r.  Myrick,  Day  v.  Wamsle}-,  3.3  Ind.  14.5,  in  whicli  tlie 

16  Minn.  91.   The  defence  of  alteration  can  defence  was  admitted  that  the  goods  were 

be  shown  under  the  general  denial  in  an  sold  to  defendant's  wife,  who  had  left  him 

action  upon  a  written  contract :  Boomer  without   cause,  against   his  consent,  and 

V.  Koon,   6    Hun,  64.5  ;    National  Bk.   of  without  his  knowledge. 

Paris  V.  Nickell,  34  Mo.  App.  295 ;  Walton  •*  Robinson  v.  Frost,  14  Barb.  536. 

Plow    Co.   V.  Campbell    (Neb.    1892),   52  [;Kervvood   v.   Avers    (1898),    59   Kan. 

N.  W.  Rep.  883.  343,    53    Pac.    134 ;    Hopkins    v.    Dipert, 

[^The  defence  of  no  assignment  can  also  (1901),  11  Okla.  630,  69  Pac.  883.     So  in 

be  set  up:   Brown    v.  Curtis  (1900),  128  an  action  for  money  had  and  received,  it 

Cal.  193,  60  Pac.  TTS.^]  may  be  shown  under  a  general  denial  that 

1  Evans  V.  Williams,  60  Barb.  346 ;  the  claim  was  for  money  lost  by  plaintiff 
Bondurant  v.  Bladen,  19  Ind.  160;  Butler  at  the  game  of  ])oker:  Frank  r.  I'ennie 
v.  Edgerton,  15  Ind.  15.     But   not  when  (1897),  117  Cal.  254,  49  Pac.  208  3 

the   consideration    is   presumed,   as   in   a  ^  Davis  v.  Iloppock,  6  Duer,  254.     He 

sealed   instrument   or    negotiable   paper:  may  show  title   in    himself  or  in  a  third 

Dubois  V.  Hermance,  56  N.  Y.  673,  674 ;  person,   Sparks  v.   Heritage,  45  Ind.   66  ; 

Eldridge  v.  Mather,  2  N.  Y.  157  ;  Weaver  Kennedy  v.  Shaw,  38  Ind.  474  ;  Farmer  r. 

ij.  Barden,  49  N.  Y.  286.  Calvert,"  44  Ind.  209,  212;    Thomp.son  v. 

QBut   an    illegal    consideration   for  a  Sweetser,  43  Ind.  312  ;  Davis  y.  Warfield, 

promissory  note  cannot  be  shown  under  38  Ind.  461.     See  also  Jones  i-.  Ilahilly,  16 

this  issue  :  Dillon  r.  Darst  (1896),  48  Neb.  Minn.  320,  325  ;  Schoenrock  v.  Farley,  49 

803,  67  N.  W.  783.]  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  302  ;  Johnson  v.  Oswald, 

2  Hawkins  !;.  Borland,  14  Cal.  413  ;  and  38  Minn.  550  (the  plaintiff  claiming 
see  Ferguson  v.  Ramsey,  41  Ind.  511,  through  a  sale  by  the  defendant,  the  latter 
513.  ina,y,  under  a  denial,  show  fraud  to  avoid 

3  Hier  v.  Grant,  47  N.  Y.  278 ;  and  see  the  sale,  and  a  rescission  of  it). 


78.0 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


pleaded.^  Under  a  general  denial  in  the  same  action,  or  a  specific 
denial  of  the  conversion,  any  facts  may  he  proved  in  defence 
which  go  to  sliow  that  there  was  no  conversion ;  ^  as,  for  ex- 
ample, that  the  goods  were  lost  without  fault  of  the  defendant,^ 
or  were  taken  under  an  execution  against  the  plaintiff.^ 

§  554.  *  078.  In  Actions  to  recover  Possession  of  Goods. 
When  the  action  is  brought  to  recover  possession  of  goods,  the 
complaint  alleging  title  or  right  of  possession  in  the  plaintiff,  the 
defendant  may,  under  the  general  denial,  introduce  evidence  to 
show  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  owner  nor  entitled  to  posses- 
sion of  the  chattels,^  but  cannot  show  that  the  plaintiff's  title  is 
fraudulent  and  void  as  asfainst  his  creditors.^     Nor  can  the  de- 


1  Dyson  c.  Ream,  9  Iowa,  51  ;  Patter- 
son V.  Clark,  20  Iowa,  429.  The  doctrine 
of  these  cases  is  clearly  o])posed  to  the 
true  theory  of  tlie  general  denial. 

2  [^Nichols  &  Sliejjard  Co.  v.  Minnesota 
Thresher  Co.  (1897),  70  Minn.  528,  73 
N.  W.  415.] 

3  Willard  v.  Giles,  24  Wis.  319,  324. 

*  McGrew  v.  Armstrong,  5  Kan.  284  ; 
or  that  the  goods  were  taken  with  the 
plaintiff's  consent.  Wallace  v.  Robb,  37 
Iowa,  192,  195  ;  and  see  Phcenix  Mut.  L. 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Walrath,  53  Wis.  669  ;  and 
the  defendant  in  such  action  may  prove 
any  facts  in  reduction  of  damages ;  as, 
for  instance,  that  the  maker  was  insolvent 
in  an  action  for  the  conversion  of  a  note 
made  by  a  third  person,  and  owned  by  the 
plaintiff,  Booth  r.  Powers,  56  N.  Y.  22,  27, 
31,  33 ;  Quin  v.  Lloyd,  41  N.  Y.  349. 

*  Caldwell  v.  Bruggerman,  4  Minn. 
270;  Woodworth  c.  Knowlton,  22  Cal. 
164.  In  this  case,  defendant  proved  that 
the  goods  were  the  jiroperty  of  a  third 
person.  See  also  Sparks  i\  Heritage,  45 
Ind.  66 ;  Kennedy  v.  Shaw,  38  Ind.  474  ; 
Farmer  v.  Calvert,  44  Ind.  209,  212; 
Thompson  ».  Sweetser,  43  Ind.  312;  Sie- 
denboch  v.  Riley,  111  N.  Y.  560;  Griffin  r. 
L.  I.  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  348;  Lane  v.  Sparks, 
75  Ind.  278;  Pulliam  v.  Burlingame,  81  Mo. 
Ill;  Oe.ster  r.  Sitlington  (Mo.  1893),  21 
N.  W.  Rep.  820 ;  Deford  v.  Hutchin.son, 
45  Kan.  318,  .332;  Gandy  v.  Pool,  14 
Neb.  98;  Aultman  v.  Stichler,  21  Neb. 
72  ;  Towne  v.  Sparks,  23  Neb.  142 ;  Mer- 
rill I'.  Wedgwood,  25  Neb.  283  ;  Staley  v. 
Housel   (Neb.    1892),  52  N.  W.    Roj).  888; 


Chamberlin  v.  Winn,  1  Wasli.  501.  Under 
a  general  denial  of  ])laintiff"s  title,  the 
defendant  may  show  that  the  chattel  mort- 
gage, upon  which  the  plaintiff  relies  to 
establish  his  title,  is  void  for  usury  :  Adam- 
son  V.  Wiggins,  45  Minn.  448. 

[^Webster  c.  Long  (1901),  63  Kan.  876, 
66  Pac.  1032;  Street  v.  Morgan  (1902), 
64  Kan.  85,  67  Pac.  448 ;  Payne  v.  Mc- 
Cormick  Co.  (1901),  11  Okla.  318,  66  Pac. 
287  ;  Gila  Valley,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Gila 
County  (1903),  Ariz.,  71  Pac.  913;  Cum- 
bey  r.  Lovett  (1899),  76  Minn.  227,  79 
N.  W.  99;  Pitts  Agricultural  Works  v. 
Young  (1895),  6  S.  D.  557,  62  N.  W.  432  ; 
Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Daley  (1897),  6  N.  I). 
330,  70  N.  W.  277  ;  Iowa  Sav.  Bank  r. 
Frink  (1902),  Neb.,  92  N.  W.  916  ;  Jenkins 
V.  Mitchell  (1894),  40  Neb.  664,  59  N.  W. 
90.] 

^  Frisbee  v.  Langworthy,  1 1  Wis.  375. 
Contra,  see  Young  v.  Glascock,  79  Mo. 
574 ;  Stern  Auction,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mason, 
16  Mo.  App.  473;  Sopris  v.  Truax,  1 
Col.  89. 

QSeeleman  v.  Iloagland  (1893),  19  Col. 
231,  34  Pac.  995.  Contra,  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Barkalow  (1894),  .53  Kan.  68,  35  Pac.  796; 
Jones  V.  McQueen  (1896),  13  Utah,  178, 
45  Pac.  202;  Munns  r.  Lovelund  (1897), 
15  Utah,  250,  49  Pac.  743;  Gallick  r.  Ror 
deanx  (1899),  22  Mont.  470,  56  Pac.  961. 
I'sury  m.iy  be  shown  under  tlie  general 
denial:  Davis  r.  Culver  (1899),  58  Neb. 
265,  78  N.  W.  504.  Waiver  of  conditions 
of  sale  may  be  shown  :  Oesterf.  Sitlingtoii 
(1893),  115  Mo.  247,  21  S.  W.  820.] 


DEFENCES  ADMITTED  UNDEK  A  DENIAL. 


781 


fendaut  in  such  action,  when  the  record  presents  the  same  issue, 
justify  as  sheriff  under  process  against  A.,  and  assert  that  the 
goods  in  controversy  were  the  property  of  A.  fraudulently  trans- 
ferred to  the  plaintiff:  this  defence  is  new  matter,  and  must  be 
pleaded.^ 

§  555.  *  679.  In  Actions  to  recover  Possession  of  Laud.  In  an 
action  to  recover  possession  of  land,  if  the  complaint  is  in  the 
usual  form,  merely  averring  that  the  plaintiff  is  owner  in  fee  of 
the  premises  described  and  entitled  to  their  possession,  and  that 
the  defendant  unlawfully  withholds  the  same,  the  general  denial 
admits  proofs  of  anything  that  tends  to  defeat  the  title  which  the 
plaintiff  attempts  to  establish  on  the  trial.^  In  some  States  the 
defence  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  may  even  be  relied  upon 
in  this  action  under  a  general  denial ;  ^  but  cannot  be  in  the  other 


1  Glazer  v.  Clift,  10  Cal.  303.  Contra, 
Bailey  v.  Swain,  45  Ohio  St.  657  ;  Holm- 
berg  V.  Dean,  21  Kaa.  73 ;  Merrill  v. 
Wedgwood,  25  Neb.  283. 

[See  in  this  connection  Dobson  v.  Owens 
<1895),  5  Wyo.  325,  40  Pac.  442;  Connor 
V.  Knott  (1896),  8  S.  D.  304,  66  N.  W.  461. 
The  rules  respecting  replevin  in  Connec- 
ticut are  different  from  those  in  most  of 
the  code  States.  See  McNamara  v.  Lyon 
(1897),  69  Conn.  447,  37  Atl.  981  ;  Smith 
V.  Brockett  (1897),  69  Conn.  492,  38  Atl.  57. 

"  A  defendant  in  replevin  may,  under 
a  general  denial,  prove  and  recover  any 
items  of  damage  properly  allowable  to 
him  in  such  action  : "  Schrandt  r.  Young 
(1901),  62  Neb.  2.54,  86  N.  W.  1085;  Ul- 
rich  V.  McConaughey  (1901),  63  Neb.  10, 
88  N.  W.  150.3 

-  Lain  v.  Shepardsou,  23  Wis.  224,  228, 
per  Paine  J.  :  "  Under  such  a  complaint, 
the  plaintiff  is  allowed  to  show  any  title 
he  can  ;  and,  from  the  necessities  of  the 
case,  the  defendant,  under  a  mere  denial, 
must  be  allowed  to  prove  anything  tend- 
ing to  defeat  the  title  which  the  plaintiff 
attempts  to  establish.  He  cannot  be 
bound  to  allege  specific  objections  to  a 
title  which  the  complaint  does  not  dis- 
close, and  which  he  may  have  no  knowl- 
edge of  until  it  is  revealed  by  the  evi- 
dence at  the  tri.al."  Mather  v.  Hutchinson, 
25  Wis.  27  ;  Miles  v.  Lingerman,  24  Ind. 
385  ;  Marshall  r.  Shafter,  32  Cal.  176  ;  the 
defendant  may  prove  title  in  himself,  and 


an  allegation  to  that  effect  in  the  answer 
is  not  new  matter  ;  Bruck  r.  Tucker,  42 
Cal.  346,  351 ;  Bledsoe  v.  Simms,  53  Mo. 
305,  307  ;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cormick,  55  Fed.  Rep.  601.  In  several 
States,  by  virtue  of  the  statute,  every  de- 
fence, legal  or  equitable,  may  be  proved 
under  the  general  denial,  Vaiiduyn  v.  Hep- 
ner,  45  Ind.  589,  591  ;  Franklin  v.  Kelley, 
2  Neb.  79.  113-115  (fraud)  ;  Hickman  'v. 
Link,  97  Mo.  482. 

[]Iba  V.  Central  Ass'n  of  Wyoming 
(1895),  5  Wyo.  355,  40  Pac.  527;  Macey 
1-.  Stark  (1893),  116  Mo.  481,  21  S.  W. 
1088;  Carkeek  r.  Boston  Nat.  Bank 
(1897),  16  Wash.  399,  47  Pac.  884;  Com- 
monwealth Title  Ins.  Co.  i:  Dokko  (1898), 
72  Minn.  229,  75  N.  W.  106,  quoting  the 
text;  Cheatham  v.  Young  (1893),  113 
N.  C.  161,  18  S.  E.  92;  Sbeltou  r.  Wilson 
(1902),  131  N.  C.  499,  42  S.  E.  937  ;  Hedges 
V.  Pollard  (1899),  149  Mo.  216,  50  S.  W. 
889.  But  in  Kentucky,  under  Civ.  Code, 
§  125,  a  defendant  cannot  assert  his  title 
to  land  under  a  general  denial :  Brent  v. 
Long  (1896),  99  I^y.  245,  35  S.  W.  640.] 

3' Nelson  v.  Brodhack,  44  Mo.  596; 
Bledsoe  v.  Simms,  53  Mo.  305,  307 ;  Fulk- 
erson  r.  Mitchell.  82  Mo.  13  ;  Fairbanks  v. 
Long,  91  Mo.  628 ;  Stocker  v.  Green,  94 
Mo.  280;  Holmes  ?^  Kring,  93  Mo.  452. 
See  also  post,§  *714,  and  notes.  [^Cole- 
man V.  Drane  (1893),  116  Mo.  387,  22 
S.  W.  801.] 


732 


CIVIL   liEMEDIES. 


States,  whose  codes  expressly  require  the  statute  to  be  pleaded.^ 
An  equitable  defence  to  the  action  must,  however,  as  it  seems^ 
be  specially  pleaded;'-^  and  the  defence  that  a  deed  to  the  plain- 
tiff absolute  on  its  face,  under  which  he  claims  title,  is  only  a 
mortgage.^ 

§  556.  "  680.  In  Actions  in  which  Malice  is  an  Essential  Ingre- 
dient. In  an  action  to  recover  damages  for  a  malicious  prosecu- 
tion, the  complaint  alleging  malice  and  the  want  of  a  probable 
cause,  the  general  denial  puts  these  averments  in  issue,  and 
admits  any  evidence  going  to  show  a  want  of  malice  and  the 
existence  of  a  probable  cause ;  as,  for  example,  when  the  com- 
plaint charged  that  the  defendant  wrongfully  procured  the  plain- 
tiff to  be  indicted,  proof  on  the  part  of  the  defendant  that  he  was 
a  grand  juror,  and  that  all  the  acts  complained  of  were  done  by 


^  Orton  r.  Noonaii,  2.5  Wis.  672.  A 
defence  arising  after  the  commoncemeut 
of  the  action  cannot  be  proved,  but  must 
be  set  up  by  a  supplemental  answer. 
McLane  v.  Bovee,  .3.5  Wis.  27,  .34. 

2  Stewart  v.  Hoag,  12  Ohio  St.  623  ; 
Lombard  v.  Cowham,  34  Wis.  486,  491. 
The  court,  in  the  last  case,  held  that, 
when  tlie  deed  under  which  the  plaintiff 
claims  is  fraudulent  and  void,  tiiat  de- 
fence may  be  proved  under  the  general 
denial,  because  it  controverts  the  plain- 
tiff's lej/al  title.  To  this  effect  is  Brown 
V.  Freed,  43  Ind.  253,  254-257,  and  cases 
cited.  Under  a  general  denial,  defendant 
may  show  that  his  deed  to  the  plaintiff, 
under  which  the  latter  claims,  was  upon 
an  illegal  consideration,  and  therefore 
void,  Sparrow  v.  Rhoades,  76  Cal.  208, 
245 ;  that  an  execution  sale  which  was 
the  source  of  plaintiff's  title  was  void,  by 
reason  of  the  land  having  been  a  home- 
.stead,  Kipp  v.  Bullard,  .30  Minn.  84;  and 
see  the  similar  case  of  Motley  v.  Griflin, 
104  N.  C.  112;  and  where  the  defend.ant 
is  not  advised  by  the  complaint  as  to  the 
source  of  the  plaintiff'.s  title,  he  7nav  in- 
troduce evidence  of  an  equitable  e.stoppel 
against  the  plaintiff:  Parker  v.  Dacres, 
1  Wash.  190. 

[Anderson  r.  Rasmus.sen  (1894),  5  Wyo. 
44,  .36  Pac.  820.  But  see  Travellers'  lus. 
Co.  /;.  Walker  (1899),  77  Minn.  438,  80 
N.  W.  618,  where  the  court  said  :  "  Where 
the  complaint  in  an  action  of   ejectmeut 


merely  alleges  the  plaintiffs  title  generally, 
without  disclosing  the  source  of  liis  title 
or  right  of  possession,  if  the  defendant 
has  an  equity  wliich,  as  it  exists  and 
without  any  affirmative  relief,  defeats 
plaintiff's  claim  to  the  possession,  it  may 
be  proved  under  a  general  denial,  being 
strictly  defensive  in  its  nature.  But,  if 
the  equity  is  such  that  it  does  not  give 
the  defendant  the  right  of  possession  as 
against  the  legal  title  without  affirmative 
relief  enforcing  the  equity,  then  the  de- 
fendant must  plead  the  facts  entitling 
him  to  such  relief,  the  matter  l)eing  in 
the  nature  of  a  counter-claim."  See 
also,  to  the  same  effect,  Pinkham  v 
Pinkham  (1901),  61  Neb.  336,  85  N.  W, 
285.] 

3  Davenport  v.  Turpin,  43  Cal.  597 
Hughes  i\  Davis,  40  Cal.  117  ;  contra,  see 
remarks  in  Healy  u.  O'Brien,  66  Cal.  517 
Smith  V.  Smith,  80  Cal.  323,  329 ;  Hyde 
r.  Mangan,  88  Cal.  319  ;  in  noue  of  which 
cases,  however,  does  it  appear  to  have 
been  necessary  to  pass  upon  the  point  in 
question.  \^Contr(i.  Locke  i\  Monlton 
(1895),  108  Cal.  49,  41  Pac.  28.  Under 
this  issue  it  may  be  shown  that  a  deed  in- 
troduced as  evidence  of  title  was  executed 
by  a  grantor  wanting  in  capacity;  Caw- 
field  y.  Owens  (1902),  130  N.  c!  641,41 
S.  E.  891.  And  it  may  be  shown  that  the 
deed  was  champertous  :  O'Banion  o.  Good- 
rich (1901),  Ky.,  62  S.  \V.  1015.] 


DEFENCES    ADMITTED    UNDER   A    DENIAL. 


783 


him  in  that  capacity,  was  held  proper.^  The  same  principle  must 
apply  to  all  cases  in  which  malice  is  an  essential  ingredient  in 
the  right  of  action,  and  is  alleged  in  the  complaint  or  petition : 
all  facts  tending  to  disprove  the  malice  are  clearly  admissible 
under  the  denial. 

§  557,  *  681.  In  Actions  for  Specific  Performance.  When  the 
general  denial  is  pleaded  in  an  action  to  compel  the  specific 
performance  of  a  contract  to  convey  land,  it  is  held  in  some 
cases  that  the  defence  of  the  Statute  of  Frauds  may  be  relied 
upon,  for  the  answer  puts  the  existence  of  the  contract  in 
issue ;  ^  other  cases,  however,  hold  the  contrary,  and  require 
the  statute  to  be  pleaded. ^  And  the  Statute  of  Limitations 
may  be  set  up  under  a  general  denial  in  the  same  action,  when- 
ever it  is  not  expressly  required  by  the  codes,  as  in  certain 
States,  to  be  pleaded.* 


1  Animerman  v.  Crosby,  26  Ind.  451  ; 
Huuter  v.  Mathis,  40  lud.  356 ;  Kost  v. 
Harris,  12  Abb.  Pr.  446;  Radde  v.  Kuck- 
gaber,  .3  Duer,  684 ;  Simpson  v.  McArthur, 
16  Abb.  Pr.  302  (n.)  ;  Levy  v.  Brannan, 
39  Cal.  485 ;  Trogdea  v.  Deckard,  45  Ind. 
572;  but  see  Scheer  v.  Keown,  34  Wis. 
349,  an  action  for  false  arrest  and  im- 
prisonment. In  an  action  for  malicious 
prosecution,  under  a  general  denial  the 
plaintiff's  guilt  may  be  shown,  Bruley  v. 
Rose,  57  Iowa,  651  ;  and  that  the  defend- 
ant acted  in  good  faith,  upon  the  advice 
of  competent  counsel,  Sparling  v.  Conway, 
75  Mo.  510.  [^Maynard  w  Sigman  (1902), 
—  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W.  576 ;  Kellogg  v. 
Scheuerman  (1897),  18  Wash.  293,  51  Pac. 
344  ;  Bowman  v.  Fur  Mfg.  Co.  (1895),  96 
la.  188,  64  N.  W.  775 ;  McAllister  r. 
Johnson  (1899),  108  la.  42,  78  N.  W.  790. 
In  actions  for  libel,  privilege  is  provable 
under  a  general  denial :  Schomberg  v. 
Walker  (1901),  132  Cal.  224,  64  Pac.  290; 
also  the  truth  of  the  alleged  libellous 
statement :  Locke  v.  Chicago  Chronicle 
Co.  (1899),  107  la.  390,  78  N.  W.  49; 
Moffittw.  Chicago  Chronicle  Co.  (1899), 
107  la.  407,  78  N.  W.  45.] 

2  Hook  V.  Turner,  22  Mo.  333 ;  Wild- 
bahn  v.  Robidoux,  11  Mo.  659;  Springer 
V.  Kleinsorge,  83  Mo.  152,  156;  Bernhardt 
V.  Walls,  29  Mo.  App.  206;  Popp  v. 
Swanke,  68  Wis.  364  ;  Smith  v.  Theobald, 
86  Ky.  141. 


l^Hillhouse  v.  Jennings  (1901),  60  S.  C. 
373,  38  S.  E.  599  ;  Bean  v.  Lamprey  (1901), 
82  Minn.  320,  84  N.  W.  1016;  Williams- 
Hayward  Shoe  Co.  v.  Brooks  (1900),  9 
Wyo.  424,  64  Pac.  342 ;  Hackett  v.  Watts 
(1896),  138  Mo.  502,  40  S.  W.  113;  Hill- 
man  V.  Allen  (1898),  145  Mo.  638,  47  S.  W. 
509;  Boyd  v.  Paul  (1894),  125  Mo.  9,  28 
S.  W.  171;  Bless  v.  Jenkins  (1895),  129 
Mo.  647,  31  S.  W.  938;  Devore  u.  Devore 
(1896),  138  Mo.  181,  39  S.  W.  68;  Kleia 
V.  Liverpool  &  London  Ins.  Co.  (1900), 
Ky.,57  S.  W.  250  ;  Haun  v.  Burrell  (1896), 
119  N.  C.  544,  26  S.  E.  Ill  ;  Thompson  v. 
Frakes  (1900),  112  la.  585,  84  N.  W.  703; 
Indiana  Trust  Co.  v.  Finitzer  (1903),  — 
Ind.  — ,  67  N.  E.  520;  Riif  v.  Riibe  (1903), 
—  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W.  517.] 

3  Livesey  v.  Livesey,  30  Ind.  398 ;  Os- 
borne V.  Endicott,  6  Cal.  149 ;  Maybee  v. 
Moore,  90  Mo.  340.  QSee  cases  cited  in 
note  2,  p.  7 1 8.] 

*  Wiswell  V.  Tefft,  5  Kan.  263; 
Springer  v.  Kleinsorge,  83  Mo.  152. 

[;Coleman  v.  Drane  (1893),  11 6  Mo.  387, 
22  S.  W.  801  (ejectment).  In  Bond  v. 
Bond  (1903),  175  Mo.  1 12,  74  S.  W.  975,  in 
an  action  for  specific  performance,  defend- 
ant, under  a  general  denial,  was  allowed 
to  introduce  a  bond  for  title  executed  by 
him  to  plaintiff's  deceased  husband,  condi- 
tioned on  payment  of  certain  notes,  and 
introduce  tlie  notes,  unpaid,  to  show  a 
forfeiture.] 


784  CIVIL    KEMEDIi;S. 

^  558.  *  682.  In  Actions  on  Covenants  and  Judgments.  When 
the  complaint  in  an  action  upon  a  covenant  of  warranty,  con- 
tained in  a  deed  of  land  to  the  plaintiff,  alleged  the  conveyance, 
the  covenant,  and  a  breach  thereof  by  means  of  an  outstanding 
paramount  title  and  a  recovery  on  the  same,  the  general  denial 
put  all  these  averments  in  issue,  and  enabled  the  defendant  to 
prove  any  facts  going  to  show  that  there  was  no  such  paramount 
title.  ^  In  an  action  upon  a  judgment  recovered  in  another  State, 
the  complaint  set  out  the  recovery  of  the  judgment,  and  all  the 
other  allegations  necessary  to  constitute  the  cause  of  action. 
The  defendant  pleaded  (1)  the  general  denial;  (2)  that  there 
was  no  such  record ;  (3)  that  the  judgment  was  obtained  with- 
out any  notice  given  to  the  defendant,  without  service  of  process 
on  him  or  appearance  by  him,  he  being  all  the  time  a  non- 
resident of  the  State  in  which  the  judgment  was  recovered. 
All  the  matters  alleged  in  these  two  special  defences  were,  it 
was  held,  embraced  within  the  general  denial,  and  could  be 
proved  under  it:  the  defences  themselves,  according  to  the  well- 
settled  practice  in  Indiana,  were  struck  out  on  motion,  because 
they  were  equivalent  to  the  general  denial  and  redundant.^ 

1  Rhode  V.  Green,  26  Ind.  83.  In  a  Thompson,  8  Ore.  428;  Freser  r.  Charles- 
creditor's  suit  to  set  aside  the  debtor's  ton,  11  S.  C.  486;  Weeks  t".  Smith,  18 
fraudulent  transfer  of  land,  the  grantee  Kan.  508  ;  Clayton  v.  School  Di.st.,  20  id. 
may  prove,  under  the  general  denial,  that  206;  Emily  v.  Harding,  ^3  Ind.  102; 
the  lari<i  was  a  liomestead,  for  this  rebuts  Steeple  r.  Downing,  60  id.  368;  Webster 
the  alleged  fraud  charged  by  the  plain-  v.  Bebinger,  70  id.  9;  Over  v.  Shannon, 
tiff,  Hibben  i-.  Soyer,  .33  Wis.  319,  322;  75  id.  352;  in  actions  of  rcjilevui,  Branch 
also  any  facts  showing  absence  of  fraud,  v.  Wi.seman,  51  Ind.  1 ;  Wilier  v.  Manby, 
Summers  v.  Hoover.  42  Ind.  153,  156.  51  id.  169;  Stowell  v.  Otis,  71  N.  Y.  36; 

2  Westcott  I'.  Brown,  13  Ind.  83.  The  Staubadi  v.  Rexford,  2  Mont.  Ty.  565; 
fullowing  recent  cases  show  wliat  de-  Creighton  y.  Newton,  5  Neb.  100;  Ricii- 
fences  have  or  have  not  been  admitteil  ardson  v.  Steele,  9  id.  483;  Bailey  r. 
under  the  general  denial  in  various  ac-  Bayne,  20  Kan.  657 ;  in  actions  on  promin- 
tioQs.  Some  of  tliese  decisions  can  iiardly  son/  notes,  Casad  v.  Holdridge,  50  Ind. 
be  reconciled  witli  the  well-settled  doc-  529  (illegality  of  consideration  cannot  be 
trine  concerning  the  office  of  the  general  shown) ;  Schwarz  v.  Oppold,  74  N.  Y. 
denial,  especially  some  cases  dealing  307  (alteration  may  be  shown) ;  in  con 
with  the  actions  for  the  recovery  of  land,  tract  for  materials,  etc..  Read  v.  Decker,  5 
and  of  chattels,  ejectment,  and  replevin.  Hun,  646;  contract  for  services,  ^Wr.iArA  v. 
In  actions  for  conversion,  Ontario  Bk.  r.  Applegate,  61  Ind.  368; /'or  roif  o;i  a /ease, 
N.  J.  Steamboat  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  510;  Mc-  Mack  i-.  Burt,  5  Hun,  28;  on  an  oral  con- 
Clelland  v.  Nichols,  24  Minn.  176;  Moul-  tract.  Bush  r.  Brown,  49  Ind.  573;  to  re- 
ton  V.  Thompson,  26  id.  120;  Smith  v.  scind  a  contract  for  fraud,  Dalrymple  v. 
Hall,  67  N.  Y.  48;  in  actions  Cff  ejectment.  Hunt,  5  Hun,  111  ;  to  recover  a  deficiencif 
Tracy  v.  Kelly,  52  Ind.  535;  Freeman  v.  on  a  wortf/a/je  foreclosure,  Scofield  v.  Do.s- 
Sprague,  82  N.  C.  .346  ;  Powers  r.  Arm-  cher.  72  N.  Y.  491,  495,  490 ;  for  damages, 
Btroug,    35    Ohio    St.    357;    I'liillippi    v.  Wandell    v.    Edwards,  25  Hun,    498;    iu 


DEFENCES   ADMITTED   UNDER   A   DENIAL.  785 

§  559.  *  683.  Special  Statutory  Provisions  as  to  Denying  Exist- 
ence of  Corporation  and  Partnership.  This  discussion  will  be 
ended  by  a  brief  reference  to  some  special  statutory  rules, ,  pre- 
scribing the  effect  and  operation  of  denials  in  certain  cases,  which 
have  been  adopted  in  various  States.  These  rules  do  not  belong 
to  the  general  theory  of  pleading  embodied  in  the  new  system  ; 
they  rather  break  the  symmetry  of  that  theory  ;  but  as  they  are 
practically  important,  they  cannot  be  passed  by  without  notice. 
[In  New  York,  a  statute,  general  in  its  terms,  provides  that  the 
corporate  existence  alleged  in  the  complaint  need  not  be  proved 
"  unless  the  answer  is  verified,  and  contains  an  affirmative  alle- 
gation that  the  plaintiff,  or  defendant,  as  the  case  may  be,  is  not 
a  corporation,"]  and  the  fact  is  not  put  in  issue  by  the  general 
denial.^  In  Indiana  a  sworn  answer  is  made  necessary  to  put 
in  issue  the  legal  existence  of  alleged  corporations  in  actions 
brought  by  them  ;  but  a  general  denial  verified  complies  with  this 
statutory  requirement,  and  compels  the  plaintiff  to  prove  its  cor- 
porate character.2  In  Wisconsin,  an  answer  denying  the  partner- 
ship of  the  plaintiffs  in  an  action  by  a  firm  must  be  verified,  or  it 
forms  no  issue.  An  unverified  denial,  therefore,  either  general 
or  specific,  admits  the  partnership  as  averred.^ 

action  for  negligence,  Jones  v.  Sheboygan,  78  N.  W.  1070  ;  Kelley  v.  Nebraska  Exp. 
etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Wis.  307;  defmce  of  accord  Ass'u  (1897),  52  Neb.  355,  72  N.  W.  356. 
and  satisfaction,  Looby  v.  West  Troy,  24  Contra,  Town  of  Denver  v.  Spokane  Falls 
Hun,  78  ;  in  action  for  a  divorce,  defences  (1893),  7  Wash.  226,  34  Pac.  926.^  Water- 
in  abatement,  and  the  statute  of  liinita-  ville  Man.  Co.  v.  Bryan,  14  Barb.  182. 
tions,  Dutcher  v.  Dntcher,  39  Wis.  651,  '^  Chance  y.  Indianapolis  &  W.  G.  Road 
and  numerous  cases  cited.  Co.,  32  Ind.  472,  disapproving  a  contrary 

[|A  general  denial  raises  the  issue  of  the  doctrine  in  Cicero  Hyg.  Dr.  Co.  v.  Craig- 

right  of  a  foreign  e.xecutor  to  maintain  an  head,  28  Ind.  274,  and  approving  Wert  v. 

action:  Stoddard r.  Aiken  (1899),  57  S.  C.  Crawfordsville  &  A.  Turnp.  Co.,  19  Ind. 

134,  35  S.  E.  501.     But  this  form  of  an-  242 ;    Williams    v.    Franklin    Tp.    Acad, 

swer  does  not  put  in  issue  the  due  appoint-  Assoc,  26  Ind.  310  ;  Adams  Exp.  Co.  v. 

meut  of  a  domestic  administrator  and  his  Hill,  43  Ind.  157  ;  Indianapolis  F.  &  M. 

right  to  sue  :  llaukiuson  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  Co.    v.    Herkimer    46  Ind.    142,   144.     A 

R.  R.  Co.  (1893),  41  S.  C.  1,  19  S.  E.  206.  statute  in  Wisconsin  [;requiring  a  specific 

Nor  does  it  raise  the  issue  of  an  infant's  denial],  it  is  held,  applies  to  both  foreign 

disability  to  sue:  Hicks  r,  Beam   (1893),  and     domestic     corporations,    St.,     1898, 

112  N.  C.  642,  17  S.  E.  490.      Condonation  §  4199  ;  Williams  Mower,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

need  not  be  pleaded:  Hill  r.  Hill  (1893),  33    Wis.   530;    Central    Bk.    of    Wis.    v. 

24  Ore.  416,  33  Pac.  809.]  Knowlton,  12  Wis.  624. 

1  [^Code    Civ.  Pro.,  §   1776.     See  also  ^  j^St.,  1898,  §  4197.]     Fisk    v.  Tank, 

Standard    Sewing    Mach.    Co.   v.  Henry  12  Wis.   276,  301;    Martin  v.  Am.  Exp. 

(1894),  43  S.  C.  17,  20  S.  E.  790;  Cham-  Co.,    19  W^is.  336. 

berlin  Banking  House  y.  Kemper,  etc.  Co.  C^^ago  v.  Walsh  (1898),  98   Wis.  348, 

(1902),  Neb.,  92  N.  W.  175;  Fletcher  v.  74  N.  W.  212.     Contra,  McKasy  i-.  Huber 

Co-operative  Pub.  Co.  (1899),  58  Neb.  511,  (1896),  65  Minn.  9,  67  N.  W.  G50.] 

50 


786  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

^  560.  *  684.  Special  Statutory  Provisions  as  to  Denials  iu  Actions 
on  Written  Instruments.  In  Tnduiiia,  ill  actions  Upon  written  in- 
struments against  the  original  parties,  makers,  indorsers,  acceptors, 
obligors,  and  the  like,  an  unsworn  general  denial  puts  in  issue 
only  the  existence  of  the  writing,  and  requires  its  production ;  but 
does  not  put  in  issue  its  execution^  and  therefore  admits  no  evi- 
dence tending  to  dispute  the  signature  of  the  defendant  or  any 
other  facts  included  within  the  execution.  If  veritied,  the  denial 
puts  in  issue  both  the  execution  and  the  existence.^  The  rule  is 
different,  however,  in  actions  against  the  executors  or  admin- 
istrators of  deceased  parties  to  written  instruments :  tlie  unver- 
ilied  general  denial  pleaded  by  them  raises  a  complete  issue.^  An 
unverified  general  denial  also  admits  the  plaintiff's  legal  capacity 
to  sue  in  Indiana.^  A  statute  of  Iowa  enacts  that,  in  actions  or 
defences  on  written  instruments,  "  the  signature  or  indorsement 
thereto  shall  be  deemed  genuine  and  admitted,  unless  the  party 
w^hose  signature  it  purports  to  be  shall  deny  the  same  under  oath 
in  the  pleading."  In  an  action  upon  a  promissory  note  against 
the  maker,  the  defendant  pleaded  an  unverified  general  denial^ 
and  under  it  insisted  as  a  defence  that  he  did  not  sign  the  writing 
as  a  note,  but  executed  it  with  the  supposition  that  it  was  a  simple 
receipt.  This  defence  being  objected  to  as  inadmissible,  the  court 
held  that  the  statute  referred  only  to  the  genuineness  of  the  sig- 
nature, and  did  not  prohibit  the  defendant  from  showing  that  he 
did  not  execute  such  a  contract  as  the  one  in  suit,  but  executed  an 
entirely  different  instrument,  for  example,  a  receipt,  and  that  the 
same  had  been  altered  into  a  note.*  In  another  case  upon  a  note 
the  petition  set  it  out  in  hcec  verba,  averring  that  it  was  executed 
by  the  defendant.  The  answer  was  verified,  but  simply  denied 
knowledge  or  information  sufficient  to  form  a  belief  whether  the 
allegations  of  the  petition  were  true.  This  form  of  verified  denial^ 
it  was  held,  did  not  comply  with  the  requirements  of  the  statute 
in  question,  and  raised  no  issue  in  respect  of  the  signature.^ 

i  [^Burns'  St.,   1901,  §  .367.]     Stebbins  8  Downs   v.  McCombs,    16    Ind.    211; 

V.   Goldthwaite,    31  lud.    159;    Evans    i:  Jones  v.  Cin.  Type  Foundry,  14  Ind.  89; 

Southern  Turnp.  Co.,  18  Ind.   101  ;  Price  Ileaston  v.  Cincinnati  &  Ft.   W.  R.   Co., 

i>.  Grand   Hapids  &  Ind.   R.  Co.,  18  Ind.  16  Ind.  27.5;  Harrison  v.  Martinsville  & 

1.37  ;  Hicks  v   Reigle,  .32  Ind.  .360.  F.  K.  Co.,  16  Ind.  50.-5. 

2  Cawood's  Adm.  r.   Lee,  .32  Ind.  44 ;  ■»  Lake  r.  Cruiksliank,  .31  Iowa.  .30"). 

Riser   v.    Snoddy,    7   Ind.  442;    Mahon's  ^  Hall  i\  .Etna  Man.  Co.,  .30  Iowa,  21.'), 

Adm.  V.  Sawyer,  16  Ind.  73.  217,  218.     Sec  Lyun  r.  Bunn,  6  Iowa,  48. 


DEFENCES    ADMITTED   UNDER   A    DENIAL, 


"87 


§  561.  *  685.  General  Denial  cannot  be  struck  out  as  Sham. 
The  general  denial,  at  least  when  verified,  cannot  be  struck  out  as 
sham  on  motion.^  In  accordance  with  tlie  settled  rule  of  tlie 
former  procedure,  the  general  issue  could  not  be  struck  out  for 
such  cause ;  and  in  this  respect  the  general  denial  is  its  equivalent. 
"  It  gives  the  defendant  tlie  same  right  to  require  the  plaintiff  to 
establish  by  proof  all  the  material  facts  necessary  to  show  his 
right  to  a  recovery  as  was  given  by  that  plea  [the  general  issue]."  ^ 


1  [^See  Patterson  v.  Railway  Co.  (189G), 
12  Ohio  C.  C.  274,  and  Packet  Co.  i-. 
Fogarty  (1895),  9  Ohio  C.  C.  418,  con- 
demning the  use  of  a  verified  general 
denial  when  the  defendant  knows  tliat 
some  of  the  averments  denied  are  true.] 
State  V.  Chamberlin,  54  Mo.  .338.  See  also 
Ewen  V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  Ky.  Co.,  38  Wis. 
G13;  Sanford  v.  McCreedy,  28  id.  103; 
Wittman  v.  Watry,  37  id.  2.38 ;  Preston  »•. 
Roberts,  1 2  Bush,  570 ;  Rauson  v.  Anderson, 
9  S.C.438;  Sully  f.Goldsniith,49  Iowa,  690. 

[^Where  the  statute  requires  the  denial 
of  the  genuineness  of  the  indorsement  or 
assignment  of  a  written  instrument  to  be 
verified,  an  unverified  plea  of  denial  is  an 
admission  of  such  matters :  Daggs  v. 
Phoenix  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  Ariz.,  53  Pac. 
201.  See  also,  to  same  effect,  Hardwick 
V.  Atkinson  (1899),  8  Okla.  608,  58  Pac. 
747  ;  Lux  w.  McLeod  (1893),  19  Colo.  465, 
36  Pac.  246.  But  where  the  petition  al- 
leges ownership  of  a  note,  but  not  the 
execution  of  an  indorsement,  the  owner- 
ship is  put  in  issue  by  an  unverified  general 
denial :  Southern  Kan.  Farm,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Barnes  (1901),  63  Kan.  548,  66  Pac.  638.3 

2  VVayland  v.  Tysen,  45  N.  Y.  281,  282. 
See  also  Grocers'  Bank  v.  O'Rorke,  6  Hun, 
18;  Reynolds  v.  Craus  (Supreme,  1891), 
16  N.  Y.  Suppl.  792;  Upton  v.  Kennedy 
(Neb.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1042. 

[^Loranger  v.  Big  Missouri  Mining  Co. 
(189'5),  6  S.  D.  478,  61  N.  W.  686  ;  Green 
V.  Hughitt  School  Tp.  (1894),  5  S.  D.  452, 
59  N.  W.  224.  The  same  rule  applies  to 
any  verified  denial :  King  v.  Waite  (1897), 
10"S.  D.  1,  70  N.  W.  10.56  ;  Pfister  v.  Wells 
(1896),  92  Wis.  171,  65  N.  W.  1041  ;  Pear- 
son V.  Neeves  (1896),  92  Wis.  319,  66 
N.  W.  357. 

In  general  an  answer  may  be  stricken 
out  as  sham  when  its  falsity  and  insuffi- 
ciency are  clearly  apparent :  Dobson  v.  Hal- 


lowell  (1893),  53  Minn.  98,  54  N.  W.  939  ; 
Randall  v.  Simmons  (1902),  40  Ore.  554, 
67  Pac.  513;  Pfaender  v.  Winona,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.  (1901),  84  Minn.  224,  87  N.  W. 
618;  Fargo  v.  Vincent  (1894),  6  S.  D. 
209,  60  N.  W.  858 ;  Sweetman  v.  Ramsey 
(1899),  22  Mont.  323,  .56  Pac.  361  ;  Swee- 
ney I'.  Schlessinger  (1896),  18  .Mont.  326, 
45  Pac.  213  ;  McDonald  v.  Pincus  (1893), 
13  Mont.  83,  32  Pac.  283;  Sifton  v.  Sifton 
(1895),  5  N.  D.  187,  65  N.  W.  670;  Kidder 
County  V.  Foye  (1901),  10  N.  D.  424,  87 
N.  W.  984;  Wilson  v.  Burhans  (1897),  96 
Wis.  550,  71  N.  W.  879;  Miser  i'.  O'Shea 
(1900),  37  Ore.  231,  62  Pac  491.  Under 
the  statute  providing  that  "  sham,  frivo- 
lous and  irrelevant  replies  may  be  stricken 
out"  on  motion,  the  entire  reply  must 
be  proceeded  against:  Brown  v.  Baker 
(1901),  39  Ore.  66,  65  P^c.  799.  Under 
the  express  provision  of  R.  S.  1 898,  §  2682," 
matter  cannot  be  stricken  from  a  verified 
pleading  on  the  ground  that  it  is  sham : 
Moore  v.  May  (1903),  117  Wis.  192.  94 
N.  W.  45. 

For  other  cases  touching  sham  and. 
frivolous  answers,  see  Western  Carolina 
Bank  v.  Atkinson  (1893),  113  N.  C.  478, 
18  S.  E.  703  ;  Campbell  v.  Patten  (1893), 
113  N.  C.  481,  18  S.  E.  687;  Vass  v. 
Brewer  (1898),  122  N.  C.  226,  29  S.  E. 
352 ;  Bardwell-Robinson  Co.  v.  Brown 
(1894),  57  Minn.  140,  58  N.  W.  872;  North- 
western Cordage  Co.  v.  Galbraith  (1897), 
9  S.  D.  634,  70  N.  W.  1048;  Bank  of 
Commerce  v.  Humphrey  (1894),  6  S.  D. 
415,  61  N.  W.  444  ;  Pittsburg,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
i).  Fraze  (1898),  150  Ind.  576,  50  N.  E. 
576;  Brown  v.  Porter  (1893),  7  AVash. 
327,  .34  Pac.  1105;  Oakes  v.  Ziemer 
(1900),  61  Neb.  6,  84  N.  W.  409;  First 
Nat.  Bank  v.  Stoll  (1899),  57  Neb.  758,  78 
N.  W.  254;  Upton  v.  Kennedy  (1893),  36 
Neb.  66,  53  N.  W.  1042.] 


788  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

The  same  rule  applies  to  a  denial,  general  in  fonn,  of  certain 
specified  allegations  constituting  a  part  of  the  complaint,^  and  is 
applicable  as  well  to  equitable  as  to  legal  actions,^  and  to  all  par- 
tial denials,^  and  is  not  restricted  to  those  which  are  verified.* 


SECTION   FOURTH. 
THE   DEFENCE   OF   NEW   MATTER. 

§  562.  *  686.  Introductory.  Much  of  what  might  properly  be 
included  in  this  section  has  already  been  necessarily  dwelt  upon 
in  discussing  the  defence  of  denials.  The  two  subjects  so  cor- 
relate and  support  each  other,  that  the  one  cannot  be  explained  in 
full  without,  to  some  extent,  explaining  the  other  also.  I  shall 
not  repeat  the  propositions  and  definitions  given  in  the  last  sec- 
tion, but  shall  content  myself  with  adding  examples  and  illus- 
trations drawn  from  decided  cases.  The  subject-matter  of  this 
section  will  be  distributed  into  three  subdivisions  :  I.  How  de- 
fences of  new  matter  should  be  pleaded  ;  II.  What  is  new  matter 
in  general,  Avith  a  particular  reference  to  defences  in  mitigation 
and  those  in  abatement ;  and,  III.  Some  particular  examples  of 
new  matter  classified  and  arranged. 

I.  How  Defences  of  New  Matter  should  be  pleaded. 

§  563.  *  687.  Statemeut  of  New  Matter  in  Answer  Governed  by 
same  Rule  as  Statement  of  Cause  of  Action  in  Petition.  A  denial 
when  properly  pleaded  does  not  state  any  facts ;  it  simply  denies 
facts.^  A  defence  of  new  matter,  on  the  other  hand,  does  not 
deny  any  facts ;  it  assumes  the  averments  of  the  complaint  or 
petition  to  be  true ;  and  under  the  ancient  system  a  plea  of  con- 
fession and  avoidance  must  give  color  to  these  averments,  or  it 
would  be  fatally  defective.  The  "giving  color  "  was  simply  the 
absence  of  any  denials,  and  the  express  or  silent  admission  that 

1  ^Standard  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  ;•.  Henry  '^  Thompson  v.  Erie  R.  Co..  45  N.  Y. 

(1894),   43  S.  C.    17,  20  S.  E.  790;  State  468.  472. 

ex  rel.  v.   King  (1894),  6  S.   D.   297,   60  3  ciaflin  v.  Jaroslauski,  64  Barb.  46.3. 

N.    W.   75 ;    Gjerstaiiengen    v.    Hartzell  *  Brooks  v.  Chilton,  6.  Cal.  640. 

(1899),  8  N.  D.  424,  79  N.  W.  872 ;  Larson  6  See  Venice  v.  Breed,  65  Barb.   507, 

V.  Winder  (1896),  14   Wash.  647,  45  Pac.  603,  per  Mullin  J.,  for  a  statement  of  the 

315.     But  see  Upton  r.  Kennedy  (1893),  36  comjiarative  effects  of  denials  and  of  new 

Neb   r.c,  53  N.  W.  1012.  J  matter  in  raising  issues. 


DEFENCE  OF  KEW  MATTER.  7t9 

the  declaration,  as  far  as  it  went,  told  the  trutli.^  The  defence 
of  new  matter  consists,  therefore,  of  facts,  —  positive  facts ;  and 
these  should  be  averred  as  carefully  and  with  as  much  detail  as 
the  facts  ^\■hich  constitute  the  cause  of  action  and  are  allerjed  in 
the  complaint.  The  defence  of  new  matter  depends  upon  the 
existence  of  facts  from  which  it  results  as  truly  as  the  cause  of 
action  results  from  other  facts.^  The  rule  for  setting  forth  the 
facts  which  constitute  the  defence  is,  therefore,  the  same  as  that 
for  setting  forth  the  facts  which  constitute  the  cause  of  action.^ 
In  each  case,  all  the  material,  issuable  facts  which  make  up  the 
cause  of  action  or  the  defence  must  be  averred,  while  the  detail 
of  mere  evidentiary  matter  should  properly  be  left  to  be  used  as 
proofs  at  the  trial.  I  need  not  further  enlarge  upon  this  proposi- 
tion, but  will  illustrate  it  by  a  few  judicial  decisions.  Thus  it  is 
a  settled  rule  that,  when  fraud  is  relied  upon  as  a  defence,  a  gen- 
eral allegation  charging  fraud  or  a  fraudulent  intent  will  not 
suffice:  all  the  facts  which  the  law  requires  as  the  elements  of 
fraud,  and  all  wliicli  are  claimed  to  be  the  constituents  of  the 
fraud  in  the  particular  case,  must  be  averred  ;  and  their  absence 
may  destroy  the  intended  effect  of  the  pleading,  and  shut  out  all 
evidence  in  its  support  at  the  trial.* 

1  Under  the  new  procedure,  in  every  in  effect  a  denial  of  allegations  in  the  com- 
defence  of  new  matter  tliere  should  be,  plaint  presumptively  within  defendant's 
eitlier  expressly  or  by  implication,  a  con-  knowledge:  Uisdon  r.  Davenport  (1894), 
fession  that,  but  for  such  new  matter,  tiie  4  S.  I)  555,  57  N.  W.  482.  See  note  1, 
action  could  be  maintained ;  the  defence  p.  757.] 

must    contain    no    denial;     such     denial  *  Jenkins  t'.  Long,  19   Ind.   28,  29,  per 

should  be  pleaded  in  a  separate  defence,  Frazer  J.:    "At  the  common  law,  fraud 

if  at  all.     Moi'gan   z\  Hawkeye  Ins.   Co.,  could  be  given  in  evidence  under  the  gen- 

37  Iowa,  359  ;  Anson  v.  Dwiglit,  18  Iowa,  eral  issue,    or   under    a    general    plea  of 

241.     This  is  nothing  more  than  the  sim-  fraud.    But,  under  the  code,  fraud  must  be 

pie  rule  that  two  distinct  defences  should  specially  pleaded  ;  and  the  answer  of  fraud 

not  be  mingled  together.  must  contain  all  the  elements  necessary 

2  ^Where  an  answer  by  way  of  new  to  be  proved  to  make  out  the  fraud  :  and 
matter  alleges  conclusions  only,  it  is  sub-  these  are,  that  the  representation  must  go 
ject  to  general  demurrer:  Van  Dyke  v.  to  a  material  fact;  must  be  made  under 
Doherty  (1896),  6  N.  D.  263,  69  isf.  W.  such  circumstances  that  the  party  had  a 
200.]  right  to  rely  on  it ;  and  it  mu.st  be  false 

^  Qlnan  action  for  conversion,  an  answer  to  a  material  extent."     Keller  v.  Johnson, 

which  refers  to  the  "  property  mentioned  1 1   Ind.  337.     In    an    action   on  notes,  a 

and  described  in  the  second  paragraph  in  defence,  "  that  he  was  induced  to  execute 

plaintiff's  second  cause  of  action,"  is  suffi-  the  notes  mentioned  by  tlie  fraud,  covin, 

ciently  definite   and  not  demurrable  for  and  deceit  of  the,''  etc.,  was  held  bad  on 

want    of    certainty :    Spalding    v.  Allred  demurrer.     Capuro  v.  Builders'  Ins.  Co., 

(1901),  23  Utah,  354,  64  Pac.  1100.  39    Cal.  123;    Oroville    &   Va.  E.  Co.  v. 

New  matter  in  the  answer  may  heal-  Plumas  Cy.  Sup.,  37  Cal.    354;  Kent  r. 

leged  on  information  and  belief  where  not  Snyder,  30  Cal.  666  ;  Fankboner  v.  Fank- 


790 


CIVIL    UEMEDIES. 


§  564.  *  688.  Further  Illustrations.  Akin  tO  the  defence  of 
fraud  is  that  of  duress :  the  facts  constituting  the  duress  must  be 
stated,  and  a  mere  general  averment  will  not  suffice ;  as,  for  ex- 
ample, in  a  suit  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  given  by  a  married 
woman  upon  her  own  land,  a  defence  that  "she  was  induced  by 
the  coercion  of  her  said  husbtind  to  execute  the  said  mortgage/'  ^ 


bouer,  20  lud.  62 ;  Ham  t>.  Greve,  34  lud. 
18,  21,  a  defence  "  tliat  his  sij^nature  was 
obtained  by  the  fraud  of  the  plaintiff," 
without  stating  any  circumstances,  was 
held  a  nullity.  Hale  r.  Walker.  31  Iowa, 
344,  355,  a  defence  which  simply  stated 
tliat  the  contract  in  suit  "  was  either  false 
or  fraudulently  so  written  or  so  done  by 
mistake,"  admitted  no  proof  of  fraud. 
"  In  order  to  admit  evidence  of  fraud, 
there  should,  under  our  .system  of  plead- 
ing, be  at  least  a  general  statement  of  the 
facts  constituting  the  fraud."  Lefler  r. 
Field,  52  N.  Y.  621,  action  for  the  price  of 
barley  bargained  and  sold ;  answer,  that 
the  barley  was  bargained  for  by  defend- 
ants' agent ;  that  he  contracted  to  buy 
plaintiff's  barley,  provided  it  was  mer- 
chantable; that  plaintiff  represented  it 
good,  first  quality,  and  merchantable ; 
that  the  agent  relied  on  such  representa- 
tions ;  that  the  barley  was  not  merchant- 
al)le,  which  fact  was  known  to  the  plaintiff. 
Alth(iugh  the  plaintiff  went  to  trial  on  this 
answer  without  prior  objection,  the  Court 
of  Appeals  held  it  was  worthless,  since  it 
omitted  two  essential  elements  of  the  fraud, 
—  (1)  the  plaintiff's  intent  to  deceive,  and 
(2)  that  defendants  were  in  fact  deceived. 
See  also  Cummiugs  v.  Thompson,  18  Minn. 
246,  250,  in  which  the  rule  is  given  as  fol- 
lows :  "  A  general  statement  of  the  matters 
of  fact  constituting  the  fraud  is  all  that  is 
reiiuired  :  it  is  not  necessary  to  charge 
minutely  all  the  circumstances  which  may 
conduce  to  prove  the  general  charge." 
Dubois  r.  Ilermance,  56  N.  Y.  673,  674  ; 
Joest  u.  Williams,  42  Ind.  565,  568  ;  Curry 
V.  Keyser,  30  Ind.  214  ;  Leighton  ;;.  Grant, 
20  Minn.  345,  354.  See  also  Mills  r. 
Collins,  67  Iowa,  164;  Specht  v.  Allen, 
12  f)re.  117.  In  Prall  v.  Peters,  32  Neb. 
832,  an  action  for  false  representations  in 
the  .sale  of  a  horse,  it  was  held  that  the 
defences  that  the  plaintiff.s  sustained  no 
damage,  and  that  they  had  full  knowledge 


of  the  condition  of  the  horse  when  they 
purchased  the  same,  constituted  new 
matter. 

[Nichols  V.  Stevens  (1894),  123  Mo.  96, 
25  S.  W.  578 ;  Fire  Extinguisher  Co  v. 
City  of  Perry  (1899),  8  Okla.  429,  58  Pac. 
635;  Greiss  )'.  State  Inv.  Co.  (1893),  98 
Cal.  241,  33  Pac.  195;  Muldoon  ?•.  Brown 
(1899),  21  Utah,  121,  59  Pac.  720;  Wilson 
;•.  Sullivan  (1898),  17  Utah,  341,  53  Pac. 
994;  H.  B.  Clafiin  Co.  v.  Simon  (1898), 
18  Utah,  153,  55  Pac.  376 ;  Voorhees /•. 
Fi-sher  (1893),  9  Utah,  303,  34  Pac.  64; 
Smith  r.  Estey  Organ  Co.  (1897),  100  Ga. 
628,  28  S.  E.  392  ;  I'aving  Co.  v.  Botsford 
(1896),  56  Kan.  532,44  Pac.  3 ;  Guild  r. 
Railroad  Co.  (1896),  57  Kan.  70,  45  Pac. 
82;  Winchester  v.  Joslyn  (1903),  —  Col. 
— ,  72  Pac.  1079;  Parker  v.  Jewett  (1893), 
52  Minn.  514,  55  N.  W.  56  ;  Caplis  v.  Am. 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  60  Minn.  376,  62 
N.  W.  440 ;  JFAusl  Ius.  Co.  v.  Simmons 
(1896),  49  Neb.  811,69  N.  W.  125;Ketten- 
bach  ;;.  Omaha  Life  Ass'n  (1896),  49  Neb. 
842,  69  N.  W.  135.  See  also  Parker  i\ 
Des  Moines  Life  Ass'n  (1899),  108  la. 
117,  78  N.  W.  826,  holding  that,  under 
the  statute,  fraud  in  the  application  can- 
not be  set  up  as  a  defence  unless  the  apjdi- 
cation  was  attached  to  the  policy. 

But  see  Clough  ;;.  Ilolden  (1893),  115 
Mo.  336,  21  S.  W.  1071,  where  it  was 
held  that  while  a  general  allegation  of 
fraud  is  sufficient  in  an  answer  ( ICdgell  i\ 
Siger.son,  20  Mo.  494  ;  Snialley  )•.  Halo,  37 
Mo.  102;  Fo.\  v.  Webster,  46  Mo.  181), 
it  is  not  sufficient  in  a  petition,  a  reason 
for  which  distinction  the  writer,  Gantt  J., 
said  would  be  hard  to  give.  To  the  same 
effect  as  to  the  answer  see  Ryan  v.  Mid  - 
dle.sborough  Co.  (1899),  106  Ky.  181,  .50 
S.  W.  13.] 

1  Richardson  v.  Hittle,  31  Ind.  119; 
Conn.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McCormick.  45  ("al. 
580. 


DEFENCE  OF  NEW  MATTER.  ^  791 

A  defence  of  justification  in  an  action  for  trespasses  and  other 
torts  must  by  appropriate  averments  identify  the  wrongs  com- 
plained of  with  the  acts  described  in  the  answer  and  justified,  or 
else  it  will  fail  of  its  purpose  and  be  worthless.^  In  Indiana,  the 
defence  of  a  former  recovery  for  the  same  cause  of  action  between 
the  same  parties  must  set  out  the  record  of  such  former  suit,  or  it 
will  be  insuflicient  and  bad  on  demurrer.''^  The  following  are 
some  further  illustrations  of  the  general  rule.  A  defence  of  jet- 
tison by  a  common  carrier  on  the  water  should  allege  all  the  facts 
showing  the  jettison  to  have  been  necessary  ;  ^  a  defence  of  usury 
must  narrate  all  the  particulars  of  the  agreement  and  transac- 
tion ;  *  a  defence  of  long-continued  user  or  prescription  should 
aver  that  the  possession  or  user  by  the  defendant  was  adverse  :  ^ 
and  the  defence  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  real  party  in  interest 
must  state  all  the  facts  which  show  that  legal  conclusion.^ 

§  565.  *  689.  Averments  of  New  Matter  as  Basis  for  AfiSrmative 
Helief.  When  the  defendant  sets  out  new  matter  which  he  relies 
upon,  not  as  defensive  merely,  but  as  the  basis  of  affirmative  re- 
lief, either  in  the  form  of  a  strictly  legal  counter-claim  or  of  an 
-equitable  cross-demand,  he  becomes  in  truth  an  actor  pro  tanto  : 
his  answer  is   to  that   extent   equivalent    to  a   cause  of   action 

1  Gallimore  v.  Ammerman,  39  Iiid.  571  (contributory  negligence) ;  Klais  v. 
323;  Isley  v.  Huber,  45  Ind.  421  ;  Boaz  v.  Pidford,  36  id.  587  (justification  by  pub- 
Tate,  43  Ind.  60,  71.  lie  officers) ;  Staley   v.  Ivory,   65   Mo.   74 

2  Norris  v.  Amos,  15  Ind.  365;  2  R.  S.,  (failure  of  consideration) ;  Foy  v.  Haugh- 
p.  44,  §  78.  ton,   83   N.    C.   467    (fraud)  ;    Hendrix    v. 

3  Bentley  v.  Bustard,  16  B.  Mon.  643.       Gore,  8  Ore.  406  (payment)  ;   Wallace  v. 
*  Manning  v.  Tyler,  21  N.  Y.  567,  568,     Lark,  12  S.  C .  576  (illegality);    Kendig 

and   cases   cited;   Gaston    v.  McLeran,  3  v.  Marble,  55  Iowa,  386  (fraud);  Clayes 

Ore.  389.  v.  Hooker,  4   Hun,   231    (usury) ;   Lord   i-. 

5  White  V.  Spencer,  14  N.  Y.  247.  Lindsay,  18  Hun,  489  (duress)  ;  Jones  v. 

6  Raymond  v.  Pritchard,  24  Ind.  318,  Frost,  51  Ind.  69  (fraud) ;  Young  v.  Pick- 
and  cases  cited ;  Hereth  v.  Smith,  33  Ind.  ens,  49  id.  23  (title) ;  Mahoney  v.  Robins, 
514,  and  cases  cited  ;  Shafer  v.  Bronen-  49  id.  146  (fraud  and  failure  of  title) ;  Van 
berg,  42  Ind.  89,  90;  Harte  v.  Houchin,  50  Wy  v.  Clark,  50  id.  259  (fraud)  ;  Jones  v. 
Ind.  327.  The  following  recent  cases  give  Shaw,  67  Mo.  667  ;  Keim,  etc.  Co.  t.  Avery, 
additional  illustrations  of  the  text,  and  of  7  Neb.  54  ;  Sargent  v.  Steubenville,  etc.  11. 
various  defences  held  to  have  been  prop-  Co.,  32  Ohio  St.  449;  Stowell  ;;.  Otis,  71 
erlyor  improperly  pleaded:  Becker  (-.Boon,  N.  Y.  36  ;  McKissen  v.  .Sherman,  51  Wis. 
61  N.  Y.317  (tender);  Manufac.  Nat.  Bank  303.  When  the  defendant  must  or  need 
V.  Russell,  6  Hun,  375  (mistake) ;  Bush  v.  not  negative  the  exceptions  in  a  .statute 
Brown,  49  Ind.  573  (want  of  consideration  on  which  his  defence  is  based,  see  Ilarri.s 
and  duress)  ;  Zeidler  v.  Johnson,  35  Wis.  v.  White,  81  N.  Y.  532,  546 ;  Clark  c. 
335  (statute  of  limitations,  hypothetical)  ;  Clark,  5  Hun,  340;  Fleming  v.  People,  27 
Van  Trott  v.  Wiesse,  36  id.  439  (fraud)  ;  N.  Y.  329. 

Freeman  v.  Engelmann  Transp.  Co.,  36  id. 


792  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

asserted  in  a  complaint  or  petition,  and  is  to  be  governed  by  the 
same  rnles.  It  must  aver  all  the  material,  issuable  facts  consti- 
tutinsr  the  risrht  of  action  in  his  favor,  and  must  demand  the  re- 
lief  legal  or  equitable  which  is  sought  to  be  obtained  from  the 
plaintiff.^  The  foregoing  cases  are  given  as  illustrations  and 
examples  of  the  general  doctrine,  and  not  as  exhaustive  of  its 
scope  and  application.  The  rule  applies  to  all  defences  of  new 
matter.  The  material,  issuable  facts  which  constitute  the  defence 
must  be  averred,  so  that  its  sufficiency  in  law  may  fully  appear 
on  the  record :  the  facts  themselves,  and  not  the  legal  conclusions 
from  assumed  facts,  are  to  be  stated.^ 

II.      The  General  Nature  of  New  Matter  ;  Defences  in  Mitigation 
of  Damayes,  and  in  Abatement. 

§  566.  *  690.  Introductory.  The  cases  quoted  from  in  the  pre- 
ceding section  to  show  the  judicial  definition  of  the  general  de- 
nial exhibit  also  the  interpretation  put  by  the  courts  upon  the 
term  "  new  matter ; "  and  the  decisions  which  will  be  cited  in  the 
next  subdivision  of  this  section  will  show  how  that  interpretation 
has  been  applied  in  a  great  variety  of  particular  instances.  It 
would  be  a  needless  labor  to  repeat  the  extracts  referred  to,  or 
the  general  discussion  of  the  nature  and  properties  of  new  matter. 
It  is  elementary  that  a  defence  of  new  matter  should  be  pleaded ; 
and  as  new  matter  must  of  necessity  be  a  distinct  defence  from  a 
denial,  it  follows  that  it  cannot  properly  be  associated  or  mingled 
up  with  denials  general  or  specific  in  one  paragraph  or  plea. 
For  the  same  reason,  each  defence  of  new  matter  must  necessa- 
rily be  complete  and  single,  as  much  so  as  each  cause  of  action,  and 
should  be  separately  stated  in  a  plea  by  itself.  Tliis  subject  will 
be  treated  of  at  large  in  a  subsequent  section. 

§  567.  *  691.  Denials  and  New  Matter  Distinguished.  The 
overwhelming  weight  of  judicial  opinion  has  with  almost  complete 
unanimity  agreed  upon  the  principle  which  distinguishes  denials 

1  Rose  V.  Treadway,  4  Nev.  4.'J5  ;  Hook  fence  in  action  to  recover  land) ;  Heaston 

r.  Craighead,  32  Mo.  40.5;  White  i;.  Allen,  v.   Cincinnati  &  Ft.  W.  R.  Co.,  16  Ind. 

3  Ore.  103.  275.     But  it  was  held  in  Hunter  v.  Mc- 

-  Northrup  v.  Miss.  Vail.  Ins.  Co.,  47  Laughlin,  43  Ind.  38,  45,  that  the  following 

Mo.   435,   443,  per  Wagner  .J. ;   State  c.  wa.s  a  sufficient  averment  of   a  want  of 

Cent.  Pac.  R.  Co.,   9    Nev.   79,   87   (pay-  consideration;  that  the  notes  "were  given 

xnent) ;  Pease  v.  Hannah,  30  Ore.  301  (de-  without  any  consideration  whatever." 


GENERAL  NATURE  OF  NEW  MATTER.  793 

from  new  matter,  and  detei-mines  the  office  and  function  of  each.^ 
The  general  denial  puts  in  issue  all  the  material  averments  of  the 
complaint  or  petition,  and  permits  the  defendant  to  prove  any 
and  all  facts  wliich  tend  to  negative  those  averments  or  some  one 
or  more  of  them.  •  Whatever  fact,  if  proved,  would  not  thus  tend 
to  contradict  some  allegation  of  the  plaintiff's  first  pleading,  but 
would  tend  to  establish  some  circumstance,  transaction,  or  conclu- 
sion of  fact,  not  inconsistent  with  the  truth  of  all  those  allega- 
tions, is  new  matter.'^  It  is  said  to  be  "  new,''  because  it  is  not 
embraced  within  the  statements  of  fact  made  by  the  plaintiff ;  it 
exists  outside  of  the  narrative  which  he  has  given ;  and  proving 
it  to  be  true  does  7iot  disprove  a  single  averment  of  fact  in  the 
complaint  or  petition,  but  merely  prevents  or  destroys  the  legal 
conclusion  as  to  the  plaintiff's  rights  and  the  defendant's  duties 
which  would  otherwise  liave  resulted  from  all  those  averments 
admitted  or  proved  to  be  true.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the  new 
matter  wliich  cannot  be  presented  by  means  of  a  denial,  but  must 
be  specially  pleaded,  so  that  the  plaintiff  may  be  informed  of  its 
existence  and  of  the  use  to  be  made  of  it  by  the  defendant.^ 
Whether  it  is  "  new "  in  the  sense  described  must  of  necessity 
depend,  and  depend  alone,  upon  the  nature,  extent,  and  variety 
of  the  material  allegations  which  the  plaintiff  inserts  in  his  plead- 
ing. I  shall  not  repeat  the  observations  upon  this  point  contained 
in  the  preceding  section,  and  simply  remark  that  the  plaintiff 
may,  by  making  unnecessary  although  material  averments  in  his 
complaint  or  petition,  greatly  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  general 
denial,  and  prevent  those  defensive  facts  from  being  in  liis  case 
new  matter,  which  in  another  case,  and  from  the  operation  of  a 
more  scientific  and  correct  mode  of  pleading,  would  clearly  be 

1  [^Matter  specially  pleaded,  if  adniis-  Neb.  436 ;  Burlingtou  &  Mo.  Riv.  R.  Co. 
sible  under  the  general  deuial,  should  be  r.  Lancaster  Cy.  Com 'rs,  7  id.  33  ;  Swenson 
stricken  out  as  redundant :  Bolton  u.  Mis-     v.  Cresop,  28  Ohio  St.  668. 

souri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.   (1902),  172  Mo.  92,  72  [^See  Kingsbury  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry. 

S.  W.  530;  Kirtou  v.  Bull  (1902),  168  Mo.  Co.  (1897),  104  la.  63,  73  N.  W.  477,forau 

622,  68  S.  W.  927.     But  it  does  not  render  interesting  application  of  this  distinction.] 

the  pleading  demurrable :  Staten  Island,  °  C^ady  c.  South  Omaha  Nat.  Bank 

etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hinchliffe  (1902),  170  N.  Y.  (1896),  46  Neb.  7.56,  65  N.  W.  906;  Gran 

473,  63  N.  E.  545.]  v.  Houston  (1895),  45  Neb.  813,  64  N.  W. 

2  The  following  recent  decisions  illus-  245;  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  ii.  Berg  (1896), 
trate  the  te.xt :  Roe  v.  Angevine,  7  Hun,  46  Neb.  600,  65  N.  W.  780 ;  Medland  v. 
679 ;  Read  v.  Decker,  5  id.  646 ;  Douglas  Conuell  (1898),  57  Neb.  10,  77  N.  W.  437 ; 
;;.  Haber.stro,  25  id.  262 ;  Saunders  ?;.  Cham-  Denney  v.  Stout  (1900),  59  Neb.  731,  82 
berlaiu,  13  id.  568;  Allen  v.  Saunders,  6  N.  W.18.] 


,  'Jl  CIVIL   REMEDIES, 

new  matter.  The  criterion  under  the  code  system  is  not,  there- 
fore, in  evert/  case,  the  intrinsic,  essential  nature  of  the  defence 
itself  proposed  by  the  defendant :  it  is  to  be  found  rather  in  the 
frame  of  the  complaint  or  petition,  in  the  material  statements  of 
fact  made  by  the  plaintiff  therein.  It  cannot  then  be  said,  for 
example,  that  '•  payment  "  is  always  new  matter  ;  for  tlie  plaintiff 
may  so  construct  his  complaint  that  facts  showing  payment  will 
be  directly  contradictory  of  a  material  averment  embraced  within 
it,  and  tlierefore  plainly  admissible  under  the  general  denial.  It 
is  impossible  for  tliis  reason  to  collect,  arrange,  and  classify  a 
mass  of  different  defences,  and  sa}^  of  them,  as  could  be  said 
under  the  old  system,  that  they  are  all  necessarily  by  way  of  con- 
fession and  avoidance,  and  therefore  all  of  necessity  "  new  matter." 
§  568.  *  (>92.  New  Matter  as  Confession  and  Avoidance.  It  fol- 
lows from  the  foregoing  discussion,  tliat  considering  the  office 
and  function  of  the  general  denial,  and  the  distinction  between  it 
and  new  matter,  the  latter  confesses  and  avoids  all  the  material 
allegations  of  the  comjylaint  or  petition;  that  is,  it  admits  all  the 
material  facts  averred  therein,  and  avoids  their  legal  result  by 
means  of  the  additional  facts  which  are  relied  upon  as  constitut- 
ing the  defence.!  A  particular  defence  may  therefore,  w\\ei\  set 
up  in  answer  to  one  complaint,  be  new  matter,  and  require  to  be 
pleaded:  the  same  kind  of  defence,  when  set  up  in  answer  to 
another  complaint,  may  not  be  new  matter,  but  may  ba  proved 
under  the  general  denial  without  being  specially  pleaded.  Un- 
doubtedly the  defence  of  payment  in  its  various  phases  is  the  one 
which  most  frequently  assumes  this  double  aspect;  but  the  prin- 
ciple plainly  applies  to  other  defences,  and  is  general.  This  de- 
scription of  new  matter  and  the  discussion  of  its  nature  will  be  so 
fully  illustrated  by  the  cases  to  be  cited  in  the  following  subdivi- 
sion of  the  present  section,  that  none  need  now  be  quoted  in  sup- 
port of  the  foregoing  positions.  There  are,  however,  two  special 
classes  of  defences,  which,  though  embraced  under  the  denomina- 
tion of  new  matter,  are  so  peculiar,  and  so  radically  different 
from  all  others  of  that  name,  that  they  require  a  separate  mention, 
—  defences  in  mitigation  of  damages,  and  defences  in  abatement. 

1  QJohnson   v.   Hesser  (1901),  61  Neb.  North  Neb.  Fair,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Box  (1899), 

631,  85  N.  W.  894;  Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  57  Neb.  302,  77   N.  W.  770;  Jack.soii   r. 

•lohansen  (1899),  59  Neb.  349,  80  N.  W.  School  Dist.  (1900),  110  la.  313,  81  N.  W . 

1047;    Txiwe   r    Prospect    Hill  Cemetery  596.] 
Ass'n  (1899),  58  Neb.  94,  78  N.  W.  488; 


DEFENCES    IN    MITIGATION.  795 

§  569.  *  693.  Defences  in  Mitigation  of  Damages.  Common-Law 
Theory.  The  theory  of  the  cominoii  hiw  in  respect  of  full  and 
partial  defences  has  already  been  stated. ^  Each  defence  in  bar 
by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance  must  have  been  a  complete 
answer  to  the  whole  cause  of  action.  Facts  which  fell  short  of 
that  result,  but  which  constituted  a  partial  answer,  were  not 
regarded  as  true  "defences."  As  they  did  not  defeat  a  recov- 
ery, but  always  allowed  a  judgment  for  at  least  nominal  dam- 
ages, the  severe  logic  of  the  system  did  not  suffer  them  to  be 
pleaded  separately  in  the  form  of  a  bar.  This  logic  demanded 
a  perfect  issue  upon  the  record,  —  an  assertion  on  the  one  side, 
and  a  complete  denial  thereof  on  the  other,  —  or  else  the  record 
admitted  the  plaintiff's  right  to  recover.  If  the  defendant 
should  plead  facts  which  constituted  a  partial  defence  merely, 
there  would  be  no  issue,  and  the  common-law  devotion  to  logical 
forms  could  not  admit  such  a  violation  of  its  theory.  As  the 
partial  defences,  if  pleaded,  would  raise  no  issue,  the  rule  was 
adopted  that  they  should  not  be  pleaded,  but  that  the  general 
issue  should  be  interposed,  and  the  facts  constituting  them 
should  be  given  in  evidence  under  that  answer.  Matters  in 
mitigation  are  partial  defences,  and  it  became  the  settled  doc- 
trine of  the  former  procedure  that  they  were  to  be  proved  under 
the  general  issue.  Mitigating  circumstances  were  not  confined 
to  actions  for  torts,  to  "trespass,"  "case,"  or  "trover:"  they 
were  possible  and  proper  as  well  in  actions  upon  contract,  in 
"covenant"  and  "assumpsit."  Part  payment  was  of  course  such 
a  circumstance ;  and  even  full  payment  might  be  proved  in  miti- 
gation, reducing  the  plaintiff's  recovery  to  nominal  damages. 

§  570.  *  694.  Theory  of  the  Codes  as  to  Pleading  Matter  in  Miti- 
gation. The  common-law  logic  does  not  control  the  forms  of 
pleading  and  of  the  issues  under  the  present  system.  The  notion 
of  a  partial  defence  on  the  record  of  an  answer  which  does  not 
go  to  the  whole  cause  of  action,  is  neither  opposed  to  the  spirit 
nor  to  the  letter  of  the  codes ;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  in  full  har- 
mony with  the  spirit,  and  seems  to  be  demanded  by  the  letter. 
The  obvious  intent  of  the  system  —  the  central  conception  —  is 
not  an  observance  of  logical  forms,  but  that  the  facts  which  con- 
stitute the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  and  the  defendant's  resist- 
ance thereto,  shall  be  stated  in  a  plain  and  concise  manner,  in 

1  See  supra,  §§  *  607,  *  008. 


796  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

ordinary  language,  without  reference  to  any  technical  require- 
ments of  form  or  theory.  The  very  primary  design  of  the 
procedure  is  that  the  truth  as  it  is  between  the  parties  must 
be  first  alleged,  and  then  proved.  The  letter  carries  out  this 
spirit,  because  it  requires  that  the  answer  must  contain  (1)  the 
denials,  and  (2)  a  statement  of  ant/  new  matter  constituting  a 
defence  and  that  tlie  defendant  may  set  fortli  as  many  defences 
as  he  shall  have.  No  other  clauses  of  the  statute  limit  tlys  gen- 
eral language,  or  restrict  it  to  entire  defences.  From  the  nature 
of  the  case,  when  a  complaint  or  petition  is  in  an  ordinary  form, 
containing  only  the  averments  necessary  to  state  the  cause  of 
action,  facts  in  mitigation  of  damages  must  be  new  matter 
rather  than  denials.  It  follows  that  the  fair  and  obvious  in- 
terpretation of  the  codes  not  only  permits  but  requires  that  this 
class  of  defences,  when  they  are  new  matter,  should  be  pleaded.^ 
It  is  clearly  contrary  to  the  entire  theory  of  the  system  that  ani/ 
new  matter,  however  incomplete  may  be  its  effect  upon  the  plain- 
tiff's recovery,  should  be  proved  under  a  denial:  there  is  not  the 
slightest  warrant  for  such  a  use  to  be  made  of  the  general  denial, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  function  of  the  general  issue  in 
this  respect.  In  interpreting  the  language  of  the  codes,  all  the 
common -law  notions  as  to  the  impossibility  of  pleading  partial 
defences  should  be  wholly  rejected;  for  they  were  based  upon 
reasons  purely  technical  and  arbitrary,  —  mere  formulas  of  verbal 
logic  without  any  real  meaning.  The  statute  should  be  construed 
in  its  own  spirit  as  an  independent  creation,  and  not  in  the  light 
of  ancient  dogmas  which  it  was  designed  to  supersede.  I  need 
not  collate  and  compare  the  various  provisions  of  the  code  bear- 
ing upon  the  question  in  order  to  establish  the  textual  interpre- 
tation. Nothing  can  be  added  to  the  demonstration  which  Mr. 
Justice  Selden  has  worked  out  in  the  opinion  already  mentioned 
and  quoted  at  length  in  the  preceding  section,  and  that  opinion 
has  not  been  and  cannot  be  answered.^ 

1  [[This   rule   is  supported  by  tlie  fol-  Matter   pleaded    in    mitigation    is  not 

lowing  cases :  Reed  v.  Union  Central  Life  objectionable  because  it  would  not  justify  : 

Ins.  Co.  (1900),  21  Utah,  295,  61  Pac.  21  ;  Conley  v.  Arnold    (1894),   93  Ga.  823,  20 

Vierling  I'.  Binder  (1901),  113  la.  337,  85  S.   E.  762.     And   matter   in   justification 

N.    W.    621,   citing   the    text;    Smith    v.  cannot  be  available  in  mitigation  unless 

Bowers  (1902),  Neb.,  89  N.  W.  596;  Lati-  so  pleaded:  Jenks  v.  Lansing  Lumber  Co. 

mer  v.  York  Cotton  Mills  (1903),  66  S.  C.  (1896).  97  la.  342,  66  N.  W.  2.T1.] 

135,  44  S.  E.  559.  -'  McKvring  v.  Bull,  16  N.  Y.  304. 


DEFENCES    IN    MITIGATION.  797 

§  571.  *  695.  New  York  Doctrine  as  to  Pleading  Matter  in 
Mitigation.  On  principle,  then,  all  defences  in  mitigation  of 
damages,  when  they  consist  of  new  matter,  should  be  pleaded, 
and  cannot  be  proved,  under  the  general  denial.  How  does  the 
question  stand  upon  authority?  It  is,  of  course,  put  at  rest  in 
New  York  by  the  decision  of  the  tribunal  of  last  resort  in 
McKyring  v.  Bull.^  The  ratio  decidendi  of  that  case  is  uni- 
versal in  its  application:  it  is  not  confined  to  the  defence  of  pay- 
ment; the  argument  embraces  all  instances  of  mitigation,  for  it 
is  not  based  upon  the  particular  nature  of  any  defence,  but  upon 
an  interpretation  of  the  language  used  by  the  legislature.  This 
decision  has  been  followed  by  other  courts  and  in  other  States, 
but  the  cases  are  not  unanimous:  in  some,  the  ancient  common- 
law  dogmas  have  been  appealed  to  and  accepted  as  controlling. 
I  will  collect  the  more  important  of  these  adjudications.  A 
defence  in  mitigation  having  been  pleaded  to  an  action  for 
false  arrest  and  imprisonment,  the  Supreme  Court  of  New 
York,  in  denying  a  motion  to  strike  out  the  answer,  said:  "It 
has  been  held  in  several  cases  that  mitigating  circumstances  in 
actions  of  this  nature  may  be  proved  without  being  set  up,  if 
admissible  in  evidence  at  all.  Whatever  weight  may  be  given 
to  these  authorities,  I  am  inclined  to  think  that  the  case  of 
Foland  v.  Johnson,'-^  which  was  decided  by  the  general  term  of 
this  district,  settles  the  question  in  favor  of  the  doctrine  that 
mitigating  circumstances  may  be  set  up  by  way  of  answer  in  a 
case  like  the  present  one.  "^  In  Foland  v.  Johnson,*  which  was 
an  action  for  assault  and  battery  and  false  imprisonment,  it  was 
held  that  a  separate  defence  in  mitigation  was  proper.  McKyring 
V.  Bull  was  distinctly  recognized  as  overruling  previous  cases, 
and  as  laying  down  the  universal  rule  of  interpretation  for  all 
causes  of  action  and  defences.  It  had  been  said  in  several  early 
New  York  cases  that  matter  in  mitigation  cannot  be  pleaded, 
but  must  be  proved  under  a  general  denial :  these  decisions  were 
all  pronounced  before  that  made  in  McKyring  v.  Bull,  and  must 

1  McKyring  v.  Bull,  16  N.  Y.  304.    See  -  Foland  v.  Johnson,  16  Abb.  Pr.  235, 

supra,  §§  *6.'i8,  *659.      See  also  Wilbour  239. 

V.  Hill,  72  N.  Y.  36,  38  ;  Spooner  v.  Keeler,  ^  Beckett  v.  Lawrence,  7  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s. 

nl    id.   527;   Wachter   v.  Quenzer,  29   id.  403,405. 

547.     Compare  Wandell  r.   Edwards,  25  ^  Foland  v.  Johnson,  16  Abb.  Pr.  235, 

Hun,    498;     Jauch    v.    Jauch,    50    Ind.  239. 
135. 


798 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


therefore  be  considered  as  overruled.^  There  is  a  dictum  in 
Travis  v.  Barger,^  to  the  effect  that  circumstances  in  mitigation 
may  be  proved  under  the  general  denial ;  but  the  facts  did  not 
call  for  any  decision.  The  proposition  was  stated  by  the  judge 
arc)uendo.  and  the  opinion  itself  was  prior  to  the  announcement 
of  the  contrary  doctiine  by  the  Court  of  Appeals. 

§  572.  *  696.  Doctrine  in  Indiana  and  Kentucky.  In  Indiana 
the  common-law  dogma  is  still  adhered  to.  The  rule  as  stated 
by  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  is,  that  "  matter  in  mitiga- 
tion only  cannot  be  specially  pleaded  or  set  up  by  way  of  answer, 
but  may  be  given  in  evidence  under  the  general  denial.  We 
know  of  no  authority,  either  at  coiumon  law  or  by  statute,  allow- 
ing matters  in  mitigation  only,  except  in  actions  for  libel  and 
slander,  to  be  specially  pleaded  or  set  up  in  the  answer."^     In 


1  Saltus  V.  Kip,  .5  Duer,  646  (Sp.  Term) ; 
Kneedler  v.  Sternbergh,  10  How.  Pr.  67 
(Sp.  Term);  Dunlap  v.  Snyder,  17  Barb. 
561  ;  Anonymous,  8  How.  Pr.  434  (Sp. 
Term) ;  Gilbert  v.  Rounds,  14  How.  Pr. 
46;  Lane  /•.  Gilbert,  9  How.  Pr.  1.50. 

-  Travis  v.  Barger,  24  Barb.  614,  623, 
per  Birdseye  J.  There  are  New  York 
oases,  however,  subsequent  to  McKyring 
V  Bull,  which  utterly  disregard  it,  and 
might  be  considered  as  overruling  it, 
were  it  possible  for  a  lower  court,  an<l  a 
siugle  judge  quoting  himself  as  authority, 
to  overrule  tlie  decisions  of  a  higlier  tri- 
bunal. In  Harter  v.  Grill,  33  Barb.  283, 
per  Morgan  J.,  which  was  an  action  for 
criminal  conversation,  it  was  held  that 
facts  in  mitigation  could  be  proved  under 
the  general  denial.  McKyring  v.  Bull  was 
mentioned,  and  its  authority  was  denied 
because  the  mitigatinu  circumstances  di<l 
not  constitute  a  defence.  It  was  said 
that  the  section  requiring  new  matter  to 
be  pleaxled  (§149  of  the  New  York  Code) 
includes  only  those  cases  in  which  the 
facts  to  be  alleged  amount  to  a  complete 
defence.  In  short,  the  entire  argument, 
the  whole  cour.se  of  reasoning  approved 
by  the  court  of  la.st  resort,  was  disregarded. 
No  analysis  or  comparison  of  other  sec- 
tions and  pa.s.sages  bearing  upon  the  ques- 
tion was  made :  the  results  reached  by 
the  Court  of  Appeals,  after  a  most  careful 
examination  of  the  text  of  the  statute 
aided   by  the   light   of  experience,  were 


overturned  by  a  bare  assertion.  Finally, 
in  Tompkins'r.  Wadley,  3  N  Y.  S.  C.  424. 
430,  per  Morgan  J.,  which  was  an  action 
for  the  breach  of  a  promise  to  marry,  evi- 
dence in  mitigation  was  held  admissible 
under  tiie  general  denial.  The  same 
judge  again  delivered  the  opinion,  and 
cited  Harter  v.  Crill.  Travis  i\  Barger,  24 
Barb.  614,  623,  and  Kniffen  v.  McConnell, 
30  N.  Y.  290,  in  support  of  his  position, 
McKyring  v.  Bull  not  being  mentioned. 
The  two  former  cases  have  already  been 
commented  upon.  In  the  head-note  of 
Kniffen  v.  McConnell,  the  reporter  states 
that  " /f  seems  matter  in  mitigation  may 
be  proved  under  the  general  denial ;  "  but 
there  is  nothing  in  the  ojjiniou  of  the  court 
which  furuislies  the  slightest  warrant  for 
even  that  guarded  statement.  The  doc- 
trine of  the  text  is  therefore  fully  su.s- 
tained  by  judicial  authority  in  New  York. 
The  two  opinions  of  Mr.  Justice  Morgan 
can  hardly  be  regarded  as  overturning 
the  judgment  pronounced  by  the  tri!  unal 
of  final  resort;  and  the  argument  of  Mr. 
Ju.stice  Selden  is  certainly  unanswered 
and  unanswerable  on  principle.  See, 
however,  O'Brien  v.  McCann,  58  N.  Y. 
373,  376. 

8  Smith  r.  Lisher,  23  Ind.  500,  .502,  per 
Elliott  J. ;  and  .see  Allis  v.  Nanson,  41 
Ind.  154,  157,  158,  per  Worden  J.;  Smith 
r.  Rodecap  (Ind.  App.  1892),  31  N.  E. 
Rep.  479. 

[^See  also,  in  this  connection.  Hicks  v. 


DEFENCES    IN    MITIGATION.  799 

Kentucky  it  would  seem  that  a  partial  defence  in  mitigation 
should  be  pleaded.^  The  codes  expressly  authorize  mitigating 
circumstances  to  be  pleaded  in  actions  for  libel  or  slander. 2 

§  573.  *  697.  Defences  iu  Abatement.  Common-Law  Doctrine. 
At  the  common  law,  all  pleas  were  divided  into  two  general 
classes, — those  "in  bar '' and  those  "in  abatement."  "When- 
ever the  subject-matter  of  the  defence  is,  that  the  plaintiff  cannot 
maintain  any  action  at  any  time,  whether  present  or  future,  in 
respect  of  the  supposed  cause  of  action,  it  may  and  usually  must 
be  pleaded  in  bar ;  but  matter  which  merely  defeats  the  present 
proceeding,  and  does  not  show  that  the  plaintiff  is  forever  con- 
cluded, should  in  general  be  pleaded  in  abatement.'''  ^  The  most 
common  defences  in  the  present  system  analogous  to  the  ancient 
pleas  in  abatement  are  those  which  set  up  want  of  jurisdiction  in 
the  court,  or  a  present  want  of  legal  capacity  in  the  plaintiff  to 
sue,  or  a  defect  of  parties,  or  the  pendency  of  another  action. 
There  was  a  marked  difference  between  these  two  classes  of  pleas 
at  the  common  law,  and  certain  special  rules  regulating  the  use 
of  those  in  abatement.  Among  these  rules,  the  following  were 
important.  A  plea  in  abatement  could  not  be  joined  with  one 
in  bar  in  answer  to  the  same  subject-matter;  but  the  former  must 
be  pleaded  by  way  of  introduction,  and  must  be  disposed  of  before 
a  plea  in  bar  could  be  interposed.  As  a  consequence,  the  plead- 
ing a  defence  in  bar  waived  all  defences  in  abatement  to  the  same 
matter.  The  judgments  rendered  upon  the  two  classes  of  pleas 
were  different:  for  the  one  simply  dismissed  that  suit,  and  did 
not  prevent  the  plaintiff  from  commencing  another;  while  the 
other  ended  the  judicial  controversy  in  respect  to  the  subject- 
matter  involved. 

§  574.  *  698.  Formal  Distinctions  bet^ween  Pleas  in  Abatement 
and  in  Bar  Removed  by  the  Codes.  There  are  in  the  new  pro- 
Drew  (1897),  117  Cal.  305,  49  Pac.  189,  erty,  35  Wis.  150,  161,  162;  Wilson  v. 
holding  that  where,  hy  the  same  act  Noonan,  35  Wis.  321,  348,  349.  See 
which  causes  damage  to  the  plaintiff,  Desmond  v.  Brown,  33  Iowa,  13. 
some  benefit  also  results,  such  incidental  -  [^See  Haynes  v.  Spokane  Chronicle 

benefit  need  not  be  pleaded  by  the  Pub.  Co.  (1895),  11  Wash.  503,  39  Pac. 
defendant.]  "  969 ;  Craver  v.  Norton  (1901),  114  la.  46, 

1  Hackett  v.  Schad,  3  Bush,  353,  355,     86  N.  W.  54 ;    Fenstermaker  v.  Tribune 
per  Robertson  J.     Mitigating   facts  and     Pub.  Co.   (1895),  12  Utah,  439,  43   Pac. 
circumstances  must  be  pleaded  in  actions     112;   s.  c.  (1896)  13  Utah,   532,   45   Pat 
for  libel  or  slander,  and  cannot  be  proved     1097  ] 
under  a  general  denial.     Langtou  v.  Hag-  ^  1  Ch.  PI.  446. 


800 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


cedure  no  such  divisions  and  classes. ^  Defences  still  exist  of 
the  same  essential  nature  as  those  which  were  formerly  set  up 
l)y  means  of  a  plea  in  abatement,  and  a  judgment  thereon  in 
favor  of  the  defendant  does  not  forever  bar  the  plaintiff  from  the 
farther  prosecution  of  his  demand.  They  are  governed,  how- 
ever, by  the  same  rules  of  procedure  that  regulate  all  the  other 
defences  which  may  be  relied  upon  by  a  defendant.  There  is  no 
difference  in  the  methods  of  pleading  them,  of  trying  them,  or 
of  adjudicating  upon  them :  ^  the  only  difference  is  in  respect  to 
the  conclusive  effects  of  the  judgments  rendered  upon  them.^ 
In  other  words,  so  far  as  concerns  the  manner  of  alleging  and 
of  trial,  all  distinctions  between  these  two  classes  of  defences 
have  been  abolished,  and  both  have  been  placed  in  the  same 
category.*    All  defences  which  are  analogous  to  the  ancient  pleas 


1  Qlt  has  been  held,  however,  in  the 
followiug  cases  that  an  answer  to  the 
merits  waives  a  plea  in  abatement :  (Cham- 
berlain V.  Hibbard  (1894),  26  Ore.  428,  38 
Pac.  437  ;  Fort  v.  Penny  (1898),  122  N.  C. 
230,  29  S.  E.  362  ;  Earle'r.  Say  re  ( 1 896 ) ,  99 
Ga.  617,  25  S.  E.  943;  Moore  r.  Ilarmou 
(1895),  142  Ind.  555,  41  N.  E.  599;  Smith 
V.  Pedigo  (1896),  145  Ind.  361,  33  N.  E. 
777.  Contra,  La  Plant  v.  Firemen's  Ins. 
Co.  (1897),  68  Minn.  82,  70  N.  W.  856.] 

-  [3 Need  ham  ;•.  Wright  (1894),  140  Ind. 
190,  39  N.  E.  510.  it  was  held  that  a  plea 
in  abatement  must  be  certain  to  a  certain 
intent  in  every  particular,  and  it  re([uires 
the  utmost  fulness  and  particularity  of 
statement,  as  well  as  the  highest  at- 
tainable accuracy  and  precision,  leaving 
nothing  to  be  su])plied  by  intendment  or 
construction.  The  pleader  must  not  only 
answer  fully  what  is  necessary  to  be 
answered,  but  must  also  anticipate  and 
exclude  all  such  supposable  matter,  as 
would,  if  alleged  on  the  opposite  side, 
defeat  his  plea,  citing  Chitty,  Stephen, 
and  Gould,  and  declaring  the  doctrine  of 
those  text  writers  to  be  the  rule  in 
Indiana.  See  also  Moore  v.  Morris  (1895), 
142  Ind.  354,  41  N.  E.  796;  Miller  r. 
Cross  (1900),  73  Conn.  538,  48  Atl.  213; 
Budd  V.  Meriden  Elec.  R.  R.  Co.  (1897), 
69  Conn.  272,  37  Atl.  683. 

It  was  held  in  Coombs  Commission  Co. 
r.  Block  (1895),  1.30  Mo.  668,  32  S.  VV. 
1139,  that  a   jilea  in   abatement  may  be 


y)leaded  without  waiving  the  right  to 
j)lead  to  the  merits  also,  and  this  is  true 
whether  the  action  is  one  in  attachment 
or  an  ordinary  civil  action.  Overruling 
Fordyce  i-.  Hatliorn  (1874),  57  Mo.  120. 

^\'heu  the  same  matter  is  pleaded  both 
in  abatement  and  in  bar,  the  latter  over- 
rides the  former:  Crowns  ?•.  Forest  Land 
Co.  (1898),  99  Wis.  103,  74  N.  W.  546. 

A  plea  treated  by  the  parties  as  one 
in  abatement  is  properly  so  considered : 
Saylor  v.  Commonwealth  Banking  Co 
(1900),  38  Ore.  204,  62  Pac.  652. 

Combs  ('.  Union  Trust  Co.  (1896),  146 
Ind.  688,  46  N.  E.  16:  "An  answer  in 
abatement  is  not  required  to  state  facts 
sufficient  to  constitute  a  defence  to  the 
action,  but  it  is  sufficient  if  it  states  facts 
sufficient  to  abate  the  action." 

Matter  in  abatement  of  the  action 
should  be  determined  Ijy  proof  on  the 
trial,  and  not  upon  the  pleadings  and 
affidavits  on  a  preliminary  hearing:  Rick- 
etson  r.  City  of  Milwaukee  (1900),  105 
Wis.  591,  Si'n.  W.  864.3 

■'  [^Ro.'i.ser  V.  Georgia  Home  Ins.  Co. 
(1897),  101  Ga.  716,  29  S.  E.  286.] 

■»  Stone's  Adm.  v.  Powell,  13  B.  Mon. 
342  ;  Sweet  v.  Tuttle,  14  N.  Y.  465, 468,  per 
Comstock  J.  (defect  of  parties) ;  Gardner 
V.  Clark,  21  N.  Y.  399  (pending  of  another 
action) ;  Mayhew  v.  Robinson,  10  How. 
Pr.  162  (defect  of  parties) ;  Bridge  r. 
Payson,  5  Sandf.  210  (defect  of  parties): 
Freeman  v.  Carpenter,  17  Wis.  126  (pen- 


EXAMPLES    OF   NEW    MATTER. 


801 


in  abatement  —  that  is,  all  which  are  based  upon  the  same  facts 
—  are  evidently  new  matter:  they  cannot  be  proved  under  the 
general  denial,  but  must  be  specially  pleaded. 


III.    Some  Particular  Defences  of  Netv  Matter  Classified  and 

Arranged. 

§  575.  *  699.  Introductory.  In  all  the  following  examples  in 
which  it  has  been  held  that  the  defences  are  new  matter,  it  must 
be  understood  that  the  complaints  or  petitions  were  in  the  proper 
form,  containing  the  allegations  necessary  to  constitute  the  causes 
of  action,  and  no  more.  Wlien  the  plaintiff's  pleadings  deviated 
from  this  usual  type,  and  were  so  framed  that  the  defences  could 
be  admitted  under  the  general  denial,  this  fact  will  be  particu- 
larly mentioned. 

§  576.  *  700.  Payment.  It  is  the  settled  rule,  except  perhaps 
in  California,  that  when  the  complaint  or  petition  is  in  the  cus- 
tomary form,  not  averring  the  fact  of  non-payment  in  so  distinct 
a  manner  that  an  issue  would  be  raised  upon  it  by  a  denial,  the 
defence  of  payment  is  new  matter,  and  must  be  pleaded  as  such.^ 


dency  of  another  action) ;  Thompson  v. 
Greenwood,  28  Ind.  327  ;  Bond  v.  Wagner, 
28  Ind.  462.  The  rule  stated  in  the 
text,  that  defences  in  abatement  are  new 
matter  and  must  be  pleaded,  is  further 
illustrated  by  the  following  eases :  Alli- 
son V.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,  42  Iowa, 
274;  Plath  w.  Braunsdorff,  40  Wis.  107; 
White  r.  Miller,  7  Huu,  427 ;  Dawley  v. 
Brown,  9  id.  461  ;  Levi  v.  Haversteck,  .51 
Ind.  2.36;  Stafford  v.  Nutt,  51  id.  .5.35; 
Smith  V.  Peckham,  39  Wis.  414;  Newhall- 
House  Stock  Co  (-•.  Fliut  &  F.  M.  Ry.  Co., 
47  id.  516  ;  Dutcher  i\  Dutcher,  39  id.  651, 
and  numerous  cases  cited. 

1  McKyriiig  v.  Bull,  16  N.  Y.  297; 
Morrell  v.  Irving  Fire  Ins.  Co.,  33  N.  Y. 
429,  443,  per  Davies  J. ;  Te.xier  v.  Gouin, 
5  Duer,  389,  391,  per  Oakley  C.  .T. ;  Mar- 
tin V.  Pugh,  23  Wis.  184  ;  Phillips  v.  Jar- 
vis,  19  Wis.  204 ;  Stevens  r.  Thompson, 
5  Kan.  .305,  distinguishing  Marley  v. 
Smith,  4  Kan.  183,  on  the  ground  that 
in  the  latter  case  the  allegations  were 
nnusual ;  Baker  v.  Kistler,  13  Ind.  63  • 
Hubler  r.  Pullen,  9  Ind.  273  ;  Bassett  i\ 
Lederer,  1    Huu,  274,  an  action  for  goods 


sold  and  delivered.  The  complaint  stated 
that  defendant  "  had  not  paid  the  price, 
nor  any  part  tliereof  :"  the  answer  was  a 
general  denial.  Held,  that  proof  of  pay- 
ment under  the  issue  was  error.  This  case 
certainly  goes  further  tlian  any  other, 
and  is  inconsistent  with  those  cited  in  the 
next  following  note.  Hall  x\  Olney,  65 
Barb.  27,  an  instance  of  payment  after 
suit  brought.  Held,  that  defendant  should 
have  set  up  the  defence  in  a  supplemental 
answer.  See  also  Everett  v.  Lockwood, 
8  Hun,  356 ;  Kuapp  v.  Kunnells,  37  Wis. 
135  ;  Hegler  r.  Eddy,  53  Cal.  597  (tender)  ; 
Johnson  v.  Tyler,  1  Ind.  App.  387  ;  Hyde 
V.  Hazel.  43  Mo.  App.  668;  St.  Louis,  Ft. 
S.  &  W.  K.  Co.  V.  Grove,  39  Kan.  731 ; 
Ellison  V.  Rix,  85  .N.  C.  77  ;  and  see  Lent 
V.  N.  Y.  &  Mass.  Ry.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  504. 
[^Pai/ment :  Ferguson  v.  Dalton  (1900), 
158  Mo.  323,  59  S.  W.  88  ;  State  ex  rel.  v. 
Peterson  (1897),  142  Mo.  526,  39  S.  W.  453  ; 
Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hunter  (1899)  .35 
Ore.  188,  57  Pac.  424  ;  Hi>pper  v.  Hopper 
(1901),  61  S.  C.  124,  39  S.  E.  .366;  Mar- 
shall &  Ilsley  Bank  v.  Child  (1899),  76 
Minn.   173,    78   N.    W.   1048;    Mullen    v. 


51 


802  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

When,  however,  the  complaint  or  petition  contains  negative  aver- 
ments of  non-payment,  so  that  a  traverse  of  them  is  in  fact  equiv- 
alent to  an  allegation  of  payment,  an  issue  is  made  by  the  mere 
denial  general  or  specific,  which  admits  the  defence  of  payment 
to  be  proved  under  it.^  This  is  not  an  exception  to  the  fore- 
going rule ;  for  an  issue  upon  the  very  fact  of  payment  is  actually 
formed  by  such  assertions  and  denials.  The  decided  cases  pre- 
sent some  differences  in  respect  to  the  form  of  the  averment  in 
the  complaint  or  petition,  which,  by  being  traversed,  permits 
the  defence  to  be  interposed;  but  the  principle  upon  which  they  • 
were  decided  is  the  same  in  all.  In  an  action  to  recover  for 
work  and  labor,  the  complaint  stated  the  agreement,  the  per- 
formance of  services  at  a  stipulated  price,  and  that  on  a  certain 
day  named  the  defendant  "  was  indebted  to  the  plaintiff  in  the 
sum  of  $333,  being  the  balance  remaining  due  after  sundry  pay- 
ments made  by  defendant  to  the  plaintiff."  The  answer  was  a 
general  denial.  Evidence  offered  by  the  defendant  to  prove 
payments  made  by  him  on  account,  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals  held,  ought  to  have  been  admitted  under  this  issue, 
distinguishing  the  case  from  McKyring  v.  Bull  by  reason  of  the 
peculiar  averinents  in  the  complaint. ^     Where  a  complaint  set 

Morris  (1895),  43  Neb.  596,  62  N.  W.  74;  163,  65  N.  W.  909.      Contra,  Wortham   v. 

Cady  V.  South  Omaha  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  Sinclair  (1896),  98  Ga.  173,  25  S.  E.  414. 

46   Neb.    756,  65    N.    W.    906  ;     Ashlaud  A  plea  of  payment  cannot  be  held  bad  on, 

Land,  etc.  Co.  v.  May  (1897),  51  Neb.  474,  demurrer:  Buist  v.  Fitzsimons  (1894),  44 

71    N.    W.  67;     Hudelson   v.   First   Nat.  S.  C.  1-30,  21  S.  E.  610. 
Bank  (1897),  51  Neb.  557,  71   N.  W.  304 ;  See  the   following  cases  for  pleas   of 

Morehouse  r.   Throckmorton    (1899),    72  payment  which  were  held  sufficient :  Har- 

Conn.  449,  44  Atl.  747 ;  Culbertson  Irrig.,  din  County  v.  Wells  (1899),  108  la.  174,  78 

etc.  Co.  w.  Cox   (1897),  52   Neb.    684,   73  N.  W.  908;    Garrison  v.  Murphy  (1902), 

N.  W.  9;  Hortzell  v.  McClurg  (1898),  54  Nel).,  89  N.  W.  766.     An  insufficient  plea 

Neb.  313,  74  N.  \V.  625  ;  Barker  y.  Wheeler  of    payment,  treated  as  sufficient  by  the 

(1900),  60  Neb.  470,  83  N.  W.  678;  s.  c.  parties,  will  be  deemed  amended  so  as  to 

(1901),  62  Neb.  150,  87  N.  W.  20;  Union  properly  raise  the   issue  in    the  supreme 

Stockyards  Nat.  Bank  v.   Haskell  (1902),  court:   Mulhall  v.  Mulhall  (1895),  3  Okla. 

Neb.,  90  N.  W.  2.33  ;  Richards  v.  Jefferson,  252,  41  Pac.  577.] 

(1898),  20  Wash.  166,  54  Pac.  1123  ;  Moat-  ^  [^Bras.sell  v.  Silva  (1897),  50  S.  C.  181, 

ing  r.  Tigerton  Co.  (1902),  113  Wis.  379,  27    S.  I-:,    622;  State  e.r   rel.  v.   Peterson 

89  N.  W.  152;  Clark  i-.  Wick   (1894),  25  (1897),  142  Mo.  526,  39  S.  W.  453;  Logan 

Ore.  446,  36  Pac.  165  ;  Nat.  Bank  v.  Quin-  County  Nat.  Bank  v.  Barclay  (1898),  104 

ton  (1897),  57  Kan.  750,  48  Pac.  20.  Ky.  97,  46  S.  W.  675.     Contra,  Columbia 

A  plea  of  payment  confesses  the  cause  Nat.   Bank   v.  Western  Iron  Co.   (1896), 

of     action:     Lokken     v.     Miller    (1900),  14  Wash.    162,    44  Pac.   145;    Barker   v. 

9  N.  D.  512,  84  N.  W.  368.     "A  plea  of  Wheeler      (1901),     62      Neb.      150,     87 

payment  in  full  is  ordinarily  good,  without  N.   W.  20.] 

specifying    the    time,    jjlace    or    manner  -  (^uinn  v.  Lloyd,   41  N.   Y.  349,  352, 

thereof :  "  Fall  v.  .lolinson  (1896),  8  S.  D.  jicr  Lott  J. :  "  The  denial  involved  an  issue 


EXAMPLES    OF    NEW    MATTER.  803 

out  an  indebtedness  by  the  defendant,  and  added  "  that  the  same 
was  still  due  and  uni^aid,"  the  general  denial  was  held  a  suiili- 
cient  answer  to  allow  proof  of  payment.^  In  an  action  for  work 
and  labor,  the  complaint  alleged  the  services  to  a  specified  amount 
in  value,  and  that  there  was  a  balance  due  the  plaintiff,  "'' after 
deducting  all  payments  made  by  defendant  to  plaintiff  thereon, 
of  $175."  The  general  denial,  it  was  held,  entitled  the  defend- 
ant to  prove  all  the  payments  which  he  had  made.''^  This  special 
rule  has  been  repeatedly  acted  vipon  by  the  courts  of  California. 
Indeed,  as  has  been  before  stated,'"^  they  have  gone  much  farther, 
and  have  made  it  a  general  requisite,  in  actions  upon  promissory 
notes  at  least,  that  the  complaint  must  aver  the  non-payment  as  a 
breach  in  a  distinct  form,  or  it  will  fail  to  state  a  cause  of  action; 
and  that  the  general  denial  of  such  a  pleading  necessarily  admits 
evidence  of  payment.  In  some  of  the  cases  the  judges  have  gone 
to  the  length  of  declaring  that  the  general  denial,  like  the  gen- 
eral issue  of  nil  debet  or  non  assumpsit,  always  admits  the  defence 
of  payment.^ 

§  577.  *  701.  What  may  be  shown  under  the  Defence  of  Pay- 
ment. When  a  defence  of  payment  is  pleaded,  it  is  competent 
to  show  that  the  payment  was  actually  made  in  cash,  or  in  some 

upon  all  the  facts  above  stated  and  denied,  ^  Marley  v.   Smith,   4    Kan.    18.3,  186. 

not  only  of  the  agreement  and  of  the  time  Explained    in    Stevens    v.   Thompson,   .5 

which  the  plaintiff  worked,  but  neces.sarily  Kau.  305. 

of  the  different  payments  made,  so  as  to  ^  White  v.  Smith,  46  N.  Y.  418.     See 

determine  what  in  fact  was  the  balance  of  also  Looby  v.  West  Troy,  2t  Hun,  78  (a 

the  defendant's  debt.     That  balance  could  special  case  in  which  an  accord  and  sati.s- 

not  be  ascertained  without  an  inquiry  as  faction  was  allowed  to  be  proved  under  a 

to  the  amount  of   the  payments,  as  well  general  denial), 
as  the  value   of    the   work    performed."  ^  g  *665. 

Also  per  Woodruff  J.  (p.  354)  :  "  It  was  *  Frisch  v.  Caler,  21  Cal.  71  ;  Fairchild 

wholly  unnecessary  for  the  plaiutiff  to  sue  v.   Amsbaugh,    22    Cal.    572 ;    Wetmore 

for  a  balance  as  such.     He  might  allege  v.   San   Francisco,  44  Cal.   294,    299,  per 

the  contract,  performance  on  his  part,  and  Crockett  J. ;    Davanay  v.  Eggenhoff,    43 

(daim  payment ;  and  then,  if  the  defendant  Cal.  395,  397,  per  Rhodes  J.     See  also  unW, 

desired  to  prove  payment,  he  must  allege  §  *  665  ;  Mickle  v.  Heinlen,  92  Cal.  596. 
payment  in  his   an.swer.     But  where  the  [[In  Bank  of  Shasta  v.  Boyd  (1893),  99 

plaintiff  sues  for  a  balance,  he  voluntarily  Cal.  604,  34  Pac.  337,  the  court  said :  "  It 

invites  examination  into  the   amount   of  is  well  settled  in  this  State  that  tlie  allega- 

the  indebtedness,  and  the  extent  of  the  tion  of  non-payment,  in  a  complaint  on  a 

reduction  thereof  by  payment."     Further,  promissory  note,  is  material  to  the  cause 

Knapp  V.  Roche,   94  N.  Y.  329 ;    but  see  of  action,  as  without  such  an  allegation 

Dry  Dock,  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  Co.  v.  N.  &  E.  uo  breach  of  the  promise  would  appear, 

R.  Ry.  Co.    (Com.    PI.    1893),    22   N.  Y.  and  that  when  the  complaint  is  not  verified 

Suppl.    556.      ([Robertson    v.    Robertson  a  general  denial  puts  in  is.sue  every  ma- 

(1900),  37  Ore.  339,  62  Pac.  377,  citing  the  terial  allegation  of  the  complaint."] 
text.] 


804  CIVIL    KEMEDIIuS. 

other  manner  agreed  upon  by  the  parties:  as  that  it  was  made  by 
the  delivery  of  chattels,  which  were  received  by  the  creditor  in 
satisfaction  of  his  demand;  ^  or  by  the  giving  and  acceptance  of 
anything  that  is  received  in  the  place  of  money,  and  in  discharge 
of  the  debt."^  But  under  the  answer  of  payment  in  an  action 
upon  a  note,  the  defendant  cannot  prove  a  want  of  consideration 
for  the  note,  or  a  mistake  in  its  execution,  or  an  error  in  the 
prior  accounting  and  the  ascertaining  the  balance  for  which  it 
was  given,  or  the  execution  of  a  contemporaneous  writing  which 
modifies  or  controls  the  legal  effect  of  the  note;  and  the  same 
doctrine  is  plainly  applicable  to  actions  upon  any  species  of 
written  agreement.^ 

§  578.  *  702.  Arbitrament  and  Award.  Former  Recovery.  The 
defence  of  an  arbitrament  and  award  covering  the  same  matters 
in  controversy  as  those  stated  in  the  complaint  is  new  matter, 
and  must  be  pleaded;*  and  so  also  is  the  defence  of  a  former 
recovery  for  the  same  cause  of  action,^  and  of  a  former  partial 
recovery.® 

§  579.  *  703.  Actions  for  the  Recovery  of  Chattels.  In  an  action 
to  recover  possession  of  chattels,  the  complaint  alleging  property 
in  the  plaintiff,  and  the  answer  specifically  denying  the  wrongful 
taking  and  detention  of  the  goods,  and  no  more,  the  facts  relied 
upon  by  the  defendant  as  constituting  his  actual  defence  were, 
that  the  plaintiff"  and  one  (>.  were  partners  and  the  real  owners 

1  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Sherman,  33  N.  Y.  arbitrate  is  new  matter  :  Merchants'  Ins. 

69.     Also,    receipt    by    plaintiff   of     the  Co.  i-.  Stepliens  (1900),  Ky.,  59  S.  W.  511. 

proceeds   from   collaterals   in   his   hands,  See  also  Kahn  v.  Traders'  Ins.  Co.  (1893), 

Wolcott    V.   Ensign,    53    Ind.    70.      [;Kd-  4  Wyo.  419,  34  Pac.  1059.] 

munds  v.  Black   (1896),  13  Wash.  490,  43  »  Hendricks  v.  Decker,  35  Barb.  298  ; 

Pac.  330.]  Piercy  v.   Sabin,    10    Cal.    22 ;   Norris  v. 

-  Hart  ('.  Crawford,  41  Ind.  197.  Amos,   15    Ind.    365.     See    also    Cave  v. 

[^McLaugiilin  v.   Webster  (1894),   141  Crapto,  53  Cal.  135;  Fanning  v.  Hiberuia 

N.  Y.  76,  35   N.   P:.  1081  ;    State  Bank  v.  Ins.  Co.,  37  Ohio  St.  .344  ;  Muiss  y.  Gill,  44 

Kelly  (1899),  109  la.   544,  80  N.  W.  520  Ohio  St.  253;  Lonisville,  N.  A.  &  C.  Ry. 

(ratification    of    agent's  act   in  receiving  Co.  r.  Cauley,  119  Ind.  142.    But  see  Terry 

note)  ;   Thompson-Houston    Elec.    Co.   r.  v.  Munger,  49  lluii,  5()0. 

Palmer  (1893),    52    Minn.   174,  53  N.  W.  QMcLean  c.  Baldwin  (1902),    136   Cal. 

1137  (laws  of  another  State  as   to   legal  565,    69    Pac.    259;    Whitcomb    v.    Hardy 

effect  of  accepting  note).]  (1897),  68Minn.  265,  71  N.  W.  263;  Dixon 

3  Lowry  V.  Shane,  .34  lud.  495.  r.  Caster  (1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  70  Pac.  871  ; 

*  Brazil  ".  Isiiam,  12  N.  Y.  9,  17.  McCarty  v.  Kinsey  (1899),  154   Ind.  447, 

I^Kvideiice  tending  to  impeach  an  award  57  N.  E.  108.     See   the   la.st  three   cases 

actually  made  is  not  admi.ssible  under  a  al)ove  cited  for  methods  of  pleading  tliis 

general  denial  :    Conn.    Fire    Ins.    Co.   v.  defence.] 

O'Fallon    (18961,49    Neb.  740,  69    N.  W.  6  Mornll  c  Irving  F.  Ins.  Co.,  33  N.  Y. 

118.     The    defence  of    an   agreement  to  429,443. 


EXAMPLES    OF   NEW    MATTER.  805 

of  the  goods  in  question,  and  that  G.  had  bailed  tliem  to  the  de- 
fendant, who  retained  them  in  virtue  of  such  bailment.  This 
defence,  however,  was  held  inadmissible  under  the  pleadings, 
because,  first,  the  unqualified  ownership  of  the  plaintiff  was 
admitted  on  the  record  by  the  failure  of  the  answer  to  deny 
the  allegation  of  property  contained  in  the  complaint;  and, 
secondly,  the  authority  conferred  by  one  owner,  G.,  upon  the 
defendant,  to  take  and  retain  possession  of  the  chattels,  was  new 
matter,  and  should  have  been  pleaded.^  And,  in  a  similar  action, 
a  defence  that  the  defendant  had  loaned  money  to  the  plaintiff's 
intestate,  who  was  the  late  owner  of  the  chattels,  and  had  re- 
ceived from  him  the  possession  thereof,  and  retained  them  in  pos- 
session as  security  for  such  advances,  is  new  matter,  and  cannot 
be  proved  unless  specially  pleaded ;  ^  and  the  same  is  true  of  the 
defence,  that  the  plaintiff''s  title  is  fraudulent  and  void  as  against 
his  creditors.^ 

§  580.  *  704.  Actions  for  Tort.  In  an  action  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  the  conversion  of  chattels,  a  justification  by  the  defend- 
ant as  sheriff,  under  an  attachment,  judgment,  execution,  and 
levy  against  a  third  person,  charging  that  the  goods  were  the 
property  of  such  judgment  debtor,  and  had  been  fraudulently 
assigned  and  transferred  by  him  to  the  plaintiff,  so  that  the 
hitter's  title  was  void,  cannot  be  proved  under  an  answer  of 
denials,  but  must  be  pleaded  as  new  matter.*  There  are  cases 
which  go  to  the  extent  of  holding  that,  under  the  general  denial, 
—  which  traverses  the  indispensable  averment  of  a  sufficient  prop- 
erty in  the  plaintiff,  —  the  defendant  cannot  show  property  in 

1  Tell  V.  Beyer,  38  N.  Y.  161.  A  lien  ■*  Jacobs  v.  Remsen,  12  Abb.  Pr.  390; 
on  the  chattel  or  other  special  property  Graham  v.  Harrower,  18  How.  Pt.  144. 
therein  cannot  be  shown  nnder  a  general  In  the  latter  case,  T.  R.  Strong  J.  seems 
denial:  Guille  i\  Wong  Fook,  13  Ore.  577.  to  concede,  that,  under  a  denial  of   the 

2  Gray  v.  Fretwell,  9  Wis.  186.  allegation  of  property  in  the  plaintiff,  the 
QAnd  the  defence  of  right  of  possession      defendant  may  prove  general  property  in 

by  reason  of  a  lien  is  new  matter:  Mellott  himself,  liut  not  a  justification  under  judi- 
V.  Downing  (1901),  39  Ore.  218,  64  Pac.  cial  process.  Frisbee  v.  Langworthy,  11 
393.]  Wis.  375,  an  action  to  recover  possession, 
^  Frisbee  v.  Langworthy,  11  Wis.  375.  but  governed  by  the  same  rule  as  to  plead- 
Contra,  see  Young  v.  Glascock,  79  Mo.  ing  a  justification.  Isley  v.  Ilnber,  45 
574;  Stern  Auction,  etc.  Co.  i'.  Mason,  16  Ind.  ^21 ;  Boaz  v.  Tate,  43  lud.  60,  71,  72; 
Mo.  App.  473;  Sopris  v.  Truax,  1  Col.  89  ;  Johnson  c.  Cuddington,  35  Ind.  43  ;  Lang- 
Bailey  V.  Swain,  45  Ohio  St.  657  ;  Holm-  ton  v.  IJagerty,  35  Wis.  1,50,  161.  Contra, 
berg  0.  Dean,  21  Kan.  73;  Merrill  v.  Wedg-  see  Mason  v.  Vestal,  88  Cal.  396  ;  Tupper 
wood,  25  Neb.  283.  |[Coos  Bay  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  26  Minn.  385. 
V.  Siglin  (1894),26  0re.  387,  38Pac.  192.] 


806  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

himself:  ^  but  this  ruling  seems  opposed  to  the  weight  of  author- 
ity; and  it  is  certainl}'  contrary  to  the  plainest  principles  of 
pleading,  for  sucli  facts,  when  proved,  merely  contradict  the 
plaintiff's  averment  of  his  own  title. ^ 

§  581.  *  70;).  Same  Subject.  In  the  action  for  breaking  and 
entering  the  plaintiff's  premises  (trespass  qu.  cl.  fr.^,  with  the 
complaint  in  the  proper  form,  and  without  any  unnecessary  aver- 
ments, the  general  denial  does  not  raise  any  issue  as  to  the  title 
to  the  land,  and  no  evidence  attacking  such  title  can  be  received 
except  under  a  separate  defence ;  ^  nor  can  any  defence  of  justifi- 
cation be  proved  unless  specially  pleaded.'*  Where  two  or  more 
unite  as  plaintiffs  in  an  action  for  the  taking  and  carrying  away 
their  goods,  a  defence  that  "  the  plaintiffs  are  not  joint  owners 
of  the  goods  and  chattels  mentioned  in  the  complaint "  is  new 
matter.^  To  a  complaint  for  an  assault  and  battery  committed 
by  a  railroad  conductor  in  forcibly  ejecting  the  plaintiff  from 
the  cars,  the  general  denial  was  pleaded:  under  this  issue,  the 
defendant  was  not  permitted  to  show  the  regulations  of  the  com- 
pany, that  they  were  reasonable,  and  that  he  was  complying  with 
them  in  doing  the  act  complained  of.*^  The  defence  of  recaption, 
or  its  equivalent,  in  an  action  against  a  sheriff  for  an  escape,  is 

^  Dyson  tf.  Ream,  9  Iowa,  51.  action  for  false  arrest  and  imprisonment, 

2  See  supra,  §§  *  677,  *  678.     But  the  proof  of  tiie  plaintiff's  bad  character  in 

defence  of   title  in  a  third  person  is  new  respect  to  the  offence   for    which  he  was 

matter.     Smith  v.  Hall,  67  N.  Y.  48.  arrested  cannot  be  proved  under  the  geu- 

^  Squires  r.  Seward,   16  How.  Pr.  478 ;  eral  denial.     Scheer    v.  Keown,  34  Wis. 

Ratlibone  v.   McCounell,   20    Barb.   311;  349.     The  following  defences  are  further 

Althouse  V.  Rice,  4  E.  I).  Smith,  347.  instances   of  new  matter,  —  in  an  action 

••  Johnson  v.  Cuddington,35  Ind.  43.  against  a  sheriff  for  fal.-;e  return,  etc.,  de- 

QHauger  i-.  Beuua  (1899),  153  Ind.  642,  fence  that  the   property  was  exempt,  Kis- 

53N.  E.  942;  Myers   r.  Longstaff  (1900),  kaddeu  r.  Jones,  63   Mo.   190;    in    action 

14  S.  D.   98,  84  N.  W.  233 ;    Clifton  v.  against  husband  and  wife  for  wife's  tort, 

Lange  (1899),  108  la.  472,  79  N.  W.  276  ;  lier  defence  of  compulsion  by  her  husband, 

Raynor  v.  Wilmington    Seacoast  Ry.  Co.  Clark  v.  Boyer,  32  Ohio  St.  299;  in  action 

(1901),  129  N.  C.  195,  39  S.  E.  821;  Fen-  for  injuries  caused   by  a  hole  wrongfully 

.'itermaker  v.  Tribune  Pub.  Co.  (1895),  12  made  in  a  sidewalk,    defence   of  license 

Utah,  4.39,  43  Pac.  112;  Wilken  v.  Exter-  from  the  city  government,  Clifford  »-.  Dam, 

kamp(1897),  102  Ky.  143,  42  S.  W.  1140;  81   N.  Y.  !-)2.     See,  farther,  that  the  de- 

Stark   V.   Publisiiers,    etc.  Co.  (1901),  160  fence  of    justification  is  new  matter,   Ko- 

Mo.  529,  61  S.  W.  669:  Upchurch  i'.  Rob-  nigsberger  ?•.  Harvey,  12  Ore.  286;  Thomas 

ertson  (1900),  127  N.  C.  127,  37  S.  E.  157  ;  r.  Werremeyer,  34  Mo.  App.  665  ;  Wills.m 

Mangold  >:.   Oft  (1901),  63  Neb.  .397,88  ?-.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (Com.  PL,  1892),  20 

X.  W.  507  ;  Barr  >:  Po.st  (1898),  56  Neb.  N.   Y.   Suppl.  852  (inaction  for  false  im- 

698,  77  N.  W.  123.3  prisoninent) :    compare   State  >•.  Reckner 

^  Walrod  v.  Bennett,  6  Barb.  144.  (Ind.,  Jan.  1891),  26  N.  E.  Rep.  553. 

'''  Pier   r.  Finch,  29  Barb.  170.     In  an 


EXAMPLES    OF   NEW   MATTER.  807 

new  matter.  An  answer  setting  up  this  defence  having  been 
pleaded,  the  defendant,  at  the  trial,  offered  to  prove,  not  the 
return  or  the  retaking  of  the  prisoner,  but  that  he  would  have 
voluntarily  returned,  and  was  intending  to  do  so,  had  he  not 
been  prevented  from  accomplishing  his  purpose  by  the  fraud  of 
the  plaintiff.  This  defence  was  held  inadmissible  under  a  gen- 
eral denial,  or  under  the  special  answer  of  recaption,  because  it 
was  new  matter,  and  the  allegations  and  proofs  must  agree.  ^ 
The  defence  of  recoupment  of  damages  is  in  all  cases  new  mat- 
ter, and  must  therefore  be  pleaded,  although  it  is  often  a  partial 
defence  analogous  to  those  in  mitigation. ^ 

§  582.  *  706.  Actions  Concerning  Lands.  In  the  legal  action  tO 
recover  possession  of  land,  the  complaint  or  petition  being  in 
the  common  form,  alleging  in  general  terms  that  the  plaintiff  is 
seised  in  fee  of  the  premises,  and  the  wrongful  taking  and  with- 
holding possession  thereof  by  the  defendant,  and  the  answer 
consisting  merely  of  denials  general  or  specific,  the  defendant 
cannot,  it  has  been  held,  prove  a  prior  equitable  title  in  himself 
derived  from  the  plaintiff  or  his  grantor,  although  a  legal  title 
in  himself  may  be  proved,  as  this  would  directly  contradict  the 
averment  in  the  complaint  that  the  plaintiff  was  owner  of  the 
premises.'^     An  action  was  brought  by  a  wife  against  her  husband 

1  Richtmeyer  v.  Eemsen,  38  N.  Y.  206,  2  Crane  v.  Hardman,  4  E.  D.  Smith, 

208,  per   Grover  J.:    "  The   question    is  448. 

whether  these  grounds  of  defence  must  be  ^  Stewart  v.   Hoag,  12  Oliio  St.,  623; 

set  up  in  the  answer;  that  is.  whether  the  Lombard  v.  Cowham,  34  Wis.  486,  491  ; 

defence  offered    consists  of   new   matter,  Hartley  i".  Brown,  46  Cal.  201.    See  SM/)ra, 

or  whetlier  it  merely  disproves  any  of  the  §  *  679,  as  to  what  defences  may  be  proved 

material     allegations   of    the    complaint,  under  the  general  denial  in  this  action.    A 

All   that  the   plaintiff   must   allege    and  title  accruing  to  the  defendant  since  the 

prove    to   maintain    his  action  is  the   re-  commencement    of   the  action    must    be 

covery   of  the   judgment,  the   issue   and  pleaded  by  a  supplemental  answer.    Roper 

delivery  of  execution  to  the  sheriff,  the  v.  McFaddeu,  48  Cal.  346,  348;  McLane 

■capture  of  the  debtor  on  the  execution,  v.  Bovee,  35  Wis.  27,  34.     The  rule  as  to 

and  the  escape  from  custody  before  suic  defences  in  ejectment  is  further  illustratpd 

brought  against  the  sheriff  therefor.     We  by  Powers  v,  Armstrong,  35  Ohio  St.  357  ; 

have  seen  that  the  sheriff  may  defend  the  Emily  v.  Harding,  53  Ind.  102;  Marks  v. 

action  by  proving  a  recaption  of  the  debtor  Sayward,  50  Cal.  57;  Manly  v.  Howlitt, 

before  suit  brought,  or  facts   legally  ex-  55  id.  94,  and  see  the  recent  cases  added 

cusing  him  from  making  such  recaption,  under  §  *  682  ;  as  to  other  special  actions 

Proof  of  such  facts  does  not  controvert  concerning  laws,  .see  Morenhaut  c.  Wilson, 

any  allegations  of  the  complaint.     It  is,  52  Cal.  263    (abandonment  of  a   mining 

therefore,  new  matter,    constituting  a  de-  claim)  ;  McCreary   v.  Marstou,  56  id.  403 

fence    to     the    action,    and,    under    the  (in  action  of  unlawful  detainer  by  a  lessor, 

code,    is    inadmissible    unless   set    up    in  defence  that  the  execution  of  the  lease  was 

the  answer."  obtained    by  fraud  or  mistake) ;    Uigier 


808  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

to  establish  her  title  to  certain  lands.  The  complaint  alleged 
facts  showing  that  she  was  the  equitable  owner  of  tlie  lands, 
which  had  been  purchased  by  the  husband  with  her  money  under 
an  understanding  that  the  conveyance  was  to  be  made  directly  to 
her,  but  which  he  had,  in  fraud  of  her  rights,  procured  to  be 
made  to  himself:  it  prayed  that  she  might  be  declared  the 
owner,  and  that  a  deed  to  her  from  her  husband  might  be 
ordered.  W.,  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  husband,  was  per- 
mitted to  intervene,  and  was  made  a  party  defendant.  He 
simply  pleaded  a  general  denial.  This  answer,  it  was  held, 
put  in  issue  only  the  averments  of  the  complaint,  and  did  not 
permit  the  defendant  W.  to  set  up  and  prove  his  character  or 
rights  as  a  judgment  creditor  of  the  husband.  In  short,  he 
could  obtain  no  advantage  from  his  intervention,  because  no  al- 
lusion was  made  in  the  complaint  to  his  position  and  claims  as 
a  creditor:  that  subject-matter  was  entirely  outside  of  its  aver- 
ments.^ A  widow  sued  to  recover  her  dower  in  lands  which  the 
husband  had  conveyed  to  the  defendant  during  the  marriage  with- 
out any  release  from  herself,  and  stated  in  her  complaint  the  facts 
necessary  to  make  out  the  cause  of  action.  The  answer  set  up 
as  a  defence  that  the  husband  left  a  last  will,  in  which  he  devised 
and  bequeathed  to  the  plaintiff  certain  property  to  be  received 
by  her  in  lieu  of  dower;  that  she  had  elected  to  take  the  gift 
under  the  will,  and  had  thus  barred  her  right  of  dower.  This 
defence  was  held  to  be  new  matter,  and  to  have  been  iwlmitted 
by  the  plaintiff's  neglect  to  reply  and  controvert  its  statements.^ 
In  an  action  brought  by  the  owners  of  lots  abutting  upon  a  cer- 
tain alley  in  a  city,  to  restrain  the  corporation  from  improving 
such  alley,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  private  passage  belong- 
ing to  the  plaintiffs,  the  complaint  contained  the  averments  of 
jjroperty  in  the  plaintiffs  necessary  to  show  a  right  of  action. 
The  answer  stated  facts  showing  that  the  original  owner  of  the 
land  —  the  grantor  or  source  of  title  of  the  plaintiffs  —  had  dedi- 

V.    Edily,    53  id.    597    (tender   since   suit  reply  to   all  new  matter  was    necessary, 

brought).  In  a  creditor's  suit  to  reach  a  debt  due  to 

^IJut  see   Oregon   Ry.  &  Nav.   Co.  v.  the  judgment  debtor  as  the  vendor  of  land 

Hertzberg  (1894),  ^6  Ore.  216,  37    Pac.  from  the  vendee  thereof,    both  being  de- 

1019,    holding    that    under    Hill's    code,  fendants,  the  hitter's  an.^wer,  that  the  pur- 

§  319,  no  estate  in   defendant  or  another  clui.se-])rice   had   been   fully    paid   to   the 

can  be  proved  unless  pleaded.]  vendor,  was  held  to  be  new  matter,  and 

1   Watkins  c.  Jone.s,  28  Ind.  12.  to  require  a  reply,  in  Ohio,  Edwards  v. 

-  MtCurty  v.  Roberts,  8  Ind.  150.     A  Edwards,  24  Ohio  St.  402,  411. 


EXAMPLES    OF   NEW    MATTER.  809 

cated  this  alley  to  public  use,  and  that  it  had  thus  been  made  a 
highway.  These  facts,  it  was  held,  could  not  be  proved  under 
a  general  denial :  they  were  new  matter,  and  must  be  specially 
pleaded.^  The  defence  of  long-continued  adverse  user  or  pre- 
scription in  actions  affecting  the  title  or  possession  of  lands,  or 
involving  the  existence  of  easements,  is,  in  general,  new  mat- 
ter ;  '^  for,  in  the  usual  form  of  such  actions,  the  defence  will  be 
in  the  nature  of  a  justification  of  the  acts  complained  of.  Thus, 
for  example,  in  an  action  brought  to  remove  a  dam  maintained 
by  the  defendant,  and  to  restrain  his  diversion  of  water  from  the 
stream,  and  for  damages,  the  defence  of  a  long  adverse  user  or 
prescription,  by  which  his  right  to  the  dam  and  to  the  water  had 
become  perfect,  is  new  matter,  and  should  be  pleaded. ^ 

§  583.  *  707.  Actions  upon  Contract.  The  defence  of  Usury 
is  clearly  new  matter ;  *  and  the  facts  showing  the  usurious  agree- 
ment and  the  entire  transaction  must  be  stated  with  fulness  and 
circumstantiality.^  The  general  denial  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  the  breach  of  a  promise  to  marry  does  not  admit 
the  defence  of  the  improper  habits  and  bad  character  of  the 
plaintiif;  as,  that  she  habitually  used  intoxicating  liquors  to 
excess,  and  was  in  the  habit  of  becoming  intoxicated.  Such 
facts,  if  they  amount  to  a  defence  in  bar,  are  new  matter,  and 

^  Evansville  v.  Evans,  37  Ind.  229,  236.  ment  of  the  liomestead  must  be  pleaded : 

This  decision  seems  to  be  opposed  to  the  Bealey  y.  Blake  (1900),   153  Mo.  657,  55 

well-settled  doctrines  concerning  the  office  S.  W.  288.] 

and  effect  of  the  general  denial.    The  com-  •*  Catlin  v.  Gunter,  1  Duer,  253,  265 ; 

plaint  alleged  a  property  in  the  plaintiffs.  Fay  v.  Grimsteed,  10  Barb.  321.    Compare 

which  was  the  very  gist  of  their  action ;  Adamson  v.  Wiggins,  45  Minn.  448,  ante, 

and  a  general   denial  would    permit   the  §  *  678  note. 

defendant  to  contradict  such  allegation.  [^Brundage  y.  Burke  (1895),  11  Wash- 
Proving  a  dedication  to  the  public  is  noth-  679,  40  Pac.  343 ;  Bell  v.  Stowe  (1895),  44 
ing  more  nor  less  than  showing  title  in  Neb.  210,  62  N.  W.  456  ;  Kainbolt  v. 
the  defendant,  the  city;  and  this  directly  Strang  (1894),  39  Neb.  339,  58  N.  \V.  96; 
controverts  the  material  statements  of  the  Campbell  v.  Linder  (1897),  50  S.  C.  169, 
complaint.  27   S.  E.  648;  Bird  v.  Kendall  (1901),  62 

2[;Newcomb  v.  Crews  (1895),  98   Ky.  S.  C.  178,  40  S.  E.  142;  Maize  v.  Bradley 

339,    32    S.    W.   947;    Wilson   v.   Wilson  (1901),  Ky.,  64  8.  W.  655.] 
(1895),  117  N.  C.  351,  23  S.  E.  272.]  &  Manning  f.  Tyler,  21   N.  Y.  567,  568; 

3  Mathews  v.  Ferrea,  45  Cal.  51.  Rountree  v.  Brinson,  98  N.  C.  107  ;  Anglo- 

[^The  defence  of  homestead  must   be  Am.  Land,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brohman,  33  Neb. 

pleaded:  Marshburn  w.  Lashlie  (1898),  122  409;    Lockwood  v.   Woods,  3   Ind.  App. 

N.  C.  237,  29    S.  E.  371.     So  also  the  de-  258. 

fence  that  plaintiff,  after  acquiring  title,  QRainbolt   v.   Strang  (1894),  39    Neb. 

canveyed  it  to  a  third  party:  Kennedy  v.  339,  58  N.  W.  96;  Bell  c.  Stowe   (1895), 

McQuaid  (1894),  56  Minn.  450,  58  N.  W  44  Neb.  210,  62  N.  W.  456.] 
35.     And  in  a  partition  suit  the  abandon- 


810  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

must  be  alleged  in  the  answer. ^  The  owner  of  a  building  in- 
cumbered by  a  mortgage  procured  it  to  be  insured  against  fire, 
the  policy  being  made  payable  to  the  mortgagee.  In  an  action 
on  this  policy  brought  by  the  payee  therein,  the  defence  that 
the  mortgage  had  been  foreclosed,  the  land  sold,  and  the  mort- 
gage debt  partly  discharged  out  of  the  proceeds,  was  held  in- 
admissible under  an  answer  of  mere  denials.  These  facts 
constituted  a  partial  defence  in  the  nature  of  payment,  and 
were  clearly  new  matter.^  In  a  suit  against  a  surety,  the  de- 
fence of  his  discharge  from  liability  by  reason  of  an  extension  of 
the  time  of  payment  granted  to  the*  principal  debtor,  in  pursu- 
ance of  a  private  agreement  made  with  the  creditor,  is  new 
matter,  and  cannot  be  proved  unless  pleaded  as  such;^  and 
also  his  discharge  by  reason  of  any  other  subsequent  agreement 
between  the  principals  to  the  contract.* 

§  584.  *  708.  Defence  of  Illegality.  The  rule  is  well  settled 
in  strict  accordance  with  the  true  theory  of  pleading  under  the 
codes,  that  all  defences  based  upon  the  asserted  illegality  of  the 
contract  in  suit,  which  admit  the  fact  of  a  transaction  between 
the  parties  purporting  to  be  an  agreement,  and  apparently  bind- 
ino-,  but  which  insist  that  l)y  reason  of  some  violation  of  the  law 
the  same  is  illegal  and  void,  are  new  matter,  and  must  be  set  up 
in  the  answer  in  order  to  be  provable.^     A  few  examples  will 

1  Button  V.  McCauley,  38    Barb.  413.  defence  of  mistake  or  error  in  any  of  its 

Compare  Tompkins  v.  Wadley,  3  N.   Y.  items  is  new  matter,  and  cannot  be  proved 

S.  C.  424,  430,  which  holds  that  in  such  an  under  a  general  denial,  Warner  v.  Myrick, 

action  an  act  of  unchastity  committed  by  l(j  Minn.  91  :  and  the  facts  which  autlior- 

tlie  plaintiff  can  be  proved  in  mitigation  i/e  tlie  application  of  the  ".scaling  laws  " 

under  the  "-eneral  denial.  in  North  Carolina  to  contracts  of  indebted- 

[^Defence  by  reason  of  diseased  condi-  ness,  Hank  of  Charlotte  v.  Britton,  66  N.  C. 

tion  of  y)laintiff   held  to  be  new  matter:  se.").     That  the  defence   of    rescission  or 

Vierling  v.  Binder  (1901),  113  la.  337,  8.5  abandonment  is  new  matter,  see  Reynolds 

N.  \V.  621.]  '•   Reynolds,  4.'5  Mo.  App.  622;    l)ut  tliat 

■-  Grosvenor  v.  Atlantic  F.  Ins.  Co.,  1  it  may  be  shown  under  tlic  general  denial 

Bosw.  469.  tliat  the  contract  sued    upon   was   condi- 

8  Newell  V.  Salmons,  22  Barb.  647.  tional,  and,  by  force  of  the  condition,  has 

QBishop  ".  Hart  (1901),  114  la.  96,  86  terminated,    see    Danenbaum    v.    Person 

N.    W.   218    (action    against    guarantor);  (N.  Y.  City  Ct.  1888),  3  N.  Y.  Snppl.  129. 

Osborn  &  Co.  v.  Evans  (1894),  91   la.  13,  ^  j^Powell ,-.  Flanary  (1900),  109  Ky.  342, 

58  N.  W.  920.     So    al.so  the  renewal  of  a  .'59  S.  W.  5  ;  CuUi.son  v.  Downing  (1903),  42 

note    extending    time   beyond  day  when  Ore.  377,  71  Pac.  70;  Haddock  r.  Salt  Lake 

action    was    commenced,   is  new  matter:  City  (1901),  23   Utah,  521,  65   Pac.  491  ; 

Californi:i   State  Bank  v.  Webber  (1895),  All"  Doon  v.  Smitli  (1893),  25  Ore.  89,  .34 

110  Cal.  .5.38,  42  Pac.  1066.]  Pac.  1093;  Miller  v  llir.scbberg  (1895^27 

«  Horton  »•.  Ruhling,  3  Nev.  498.     In  Ore.  522,  40  Pac.  506  ;  Durham  Fertilizer 

an    action    ujion   an    account    stated,   the  Co.  c.  Pagett  (1893),  39   S.  C.  69,  17  S.  E. 


EXAMPLES    OF    NEW    MATTER. 


811 


illustrate  this  rule.^  In  an  action  against  a  city  upon  a  contract 
made  with  the  plaintiff  by  the  street  commissioners,  the  answer 
alleged  that  these  officers  did  not  proceed  according  to  the  statute 
defining  their  powers,  that  they  did  not  publish  the  proper  notice 
of  the  letting  the  contract  prescribed  by  the  city  charter,  and 
that  the  contract  itself  was  therefore  invalid.  To  this  answer 
there  was  no  reply;  and  as  the  code  of  Minnesota  required  a 
reply  to  all  new  matter,  the  defendant  claimed  that  these  aver- 
ments were  by  reason  of  the  omission  admitted  to  be  true.  The 
court  so  held,  pronouncing  the  defence  new  matter  which  could 
not  be  proved  under  a  general  denial. ^  The  defence  that  the 
contract  in  suit  was  entered  into  on  Sunday,  and  is  for  that 
reason  illegal  and  void  under  the  statute,  is  new  matter  ;3  and 
that  the  demand  was  for  liquors  sold  by  an  innkeeper  on  credit 
contrary  to  statute;"^  and  that  the  plaintiff  carried  on  business 
by  himself  under  a  firm  name,   there  being  no  partnership,   in 


563;  Woodbridge  v.  Sellwood  (1896),  65 
Miim.  135,  67  N.  W.  799;  Maitlaiid  v.  Zauga 
(1896),  14  Wash.  92,44  Pac.  117;  McDear- 
mott  V.  Sedgwick  (1897),  140  Mo.  172,  39 
S.  W.  776,  overruliug  Sprague  v.  "Rooney, 
104  Mo.  360;  Horton  v.  Rolieff  (1903),  — 
Neb.  —  ,  95  N.  W.  37.  lu  School  i:)istrict. 
V.  Sheidley  (1897),  138  Mo.  672,  40  S.  W. 
656,  the  court  said :  "  Tlie  rule  is  that  if 
a  plaintiff,  in  order  to  make  out  his  cause 
of  action,  is  required  to  show  that  the  con- 
tract sued  upon  is,  for  any  reason,  illegal, 
the  court  sliould  not  enforce  it,  whether 
pleaded  as  a  defence  or  not.  But  when 
the  illegality  does  not  appear  from  the 
contract  itself,  or  from  the  evidence  neces- 
sary to  prove  it,  but  depends  upon  extra- 
neous facts,  the  defence  is  new  matter  and 
must  have  been  pleaded  in  order  to  be 
available."] 

1  The  defence  of  fraud  is  new  matter, 
and  must  be  pleq,ded  in  all  actions,  whether 
brought  upon  contract  or  to  enforce  al- 
leged rights  of  property  in  the  plaintiff. 
Jenkins  v.  Long,  19  Ind.  28;  Farmer  v. 
,  Calvert,  44  Ind.  209,  212  ;  Daly  v.  Proetz, 
20  Minn.  411,  417;  Jameson  v.  Coldwell 
(Ore.),  31  Pac.  Rep.  279  (illegal  con- 
tract) ;  Buchtel  v.  Evans,  21  Ore.  315 
(same) ;  contra,  Sprague  v.  Rooney,  104 
Mo.  349  ;  compare  last  note  but  one  under 
§  *  679,  «/(/(.' ;  last  note  under  §  *  703,  ante  ; 


and  §  *  704,  with  notes.  As  to  defences 
of  fraud  and  illegality,  see  I)alryin])lo 
V.  Hillenbrand,  62  N.  Y.  5 ;  2  Hun,  488; 
Leavitt  v.  Catler,  37  Wis.  46  ;  Casad  v.  Hol- 
dridge,  50  Ind.  529;  Sharon  v.  Sharon, 
68  Cal.  29 ;  for  other  special  defences, 
see  Dalrymple  v.  Hunt,  5  Hun,  111  (a  for- 
mer recovery) ;  Riggs  v.  Am.  Tract  Soc, 
84  N.  Y.  330,  337,  338  (action  to  set  aside 
a  contract  made  by  an  insane  person  ; 
defence  that  it  was  made  in  good  faith 
and  for  his  benefit) ;  Goodwin  v.  Mass. 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  73  N.  Y.  480,  496  (in  ac- 
tion on  a  policy  of  life  insurance) ;  Hegler 
V.  Eddy,  53  Cal.  597  (tender  after  the  suit 
was  begun).  Defence  of  champerty  is 
new  matter  :  Moore  v.  Ringo,  82  Mo.  468  ; 
defence  that  the  contract  sued  upon  is  a 
wagering  contract,  is  new  matter:  Cum- 
misky  v.  Williams,  20  Mo.  App.  606 ; 
contra,  Hentz  r.  Miner,  58  Hun,  428  ;  that 
the  contract  was  an  attempt  corruptly  to 
influence  legislation :  Milbank  v.  Jones, 
127  N.  Y.  370. 

-  Nash  V.  St.  Paul,  11  Minn.  174,  178; 
and  see  Finley  v.  Quirk,  9  Minn.  194,  200, 
203. 

3  Finley  v.  Quirk,  9  Minn.  194,  200,  203. 

*  Denten  v.  Logan,  3  Met.  (Ky.)  434. 

QSee  also  Shawyer  v.  Chamberlain 
(1900),  1131a.  742,  84  N.  W.  661;  Dillon  y. 
Darst  (1896),  48  Neb.  803,  67  N.  W.  783.] 


812  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

violation  of  a  statute;  ^  and  that  the  contract  was  in  restraint  of 
trade. '- 

§  585.  *  709.  Further  Illustrations  of  New  Matter.  In  actions 
upon  instruments  which  ^;W?;i.rt  facie  import  a  consideration,  — 
that  is,  upon  notes,  bills,  and  other  negotiable  paper,  and  writ- 
ings under  seal,  —  the  defence  of  a  want  of  consideration  is  new 
matter;  ^  but  where  there  is  no  such  presumption  in  favor  of  the 
contract,  the  same  defence  may  be  proved  under  the  general 
denial.'*  Where  suit  is  brought  for  goods  sold  and  delivered,  or 
bargained  and  sold,  the  defence  of  a  warranty,  on  the  sale,  and 
a  breach  thereof,  is  clearly  new  matter.^  If  an  action  is  brought 
for  the  possession  or  for  the  value  of  securities  claimed  to  belong 
to  the  plaintiff ,  and  alleged  to  have  been  in  some  manner  wrong- 
fully transferred  to  and  detained  by  the  defendant,  the  defence 
that  the  latter  purchased  the  same  in  good  faith,  and  is  a  houa 
fide  holder  thereof,  is,  in  general,  new  matter.^  It  is  plain, 
however,  that  the  character  of  this  defence  will  largely  depend 
upon  the  form  of  the  complaint.  The  latter  might  naturally 
contain  averments  denying  the  good  faith  of  the  defendant's 
possession,  or  stating  a  want  of  consideration  in  the  transfer  to 
him,  so  that  a  mere  denial  would  raise  an  issue,  and  admit  evi- 
dence of  the  defence.  A  judgment  having  been  confessed  in 
which   the  statement  of  indebtedness  was  so  informal  and  in- 

1  O'Toole  V.    Garvin,   .3    N.  Y.    S.  C.  (1902),  158  Ind.  32.5,  63  N.  E.  572,  the  court 

118.  said  :    "  A  plea  which  in  general  terms  al- 

*  Prost  V.  More,  40  Cal.  .347.  leges  no   consideration   is  good,  but  one 

^  Frybarger  y.  Cokefair,  17  Ind.  404;  which  attempts  to  set  up  a  whole  or  partial 

Bingham  v.  Kimball,  17  Ind.  396;  Dubois  failure  of  consideration  must  state  facts 

V.  Hermance,  56  N.  Y.  673,674;  Beeson  sufficient  to  establish  .such  failure."  But  see 

?;    Howard,  44    Ind.  413,   415;    Brown    v.  Shirk  t'.  Neible  (1900),  156  Ind   66,  59  N.  E. 

Heady  (Ky.  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1036.  281.     Under  a  plea  of  no  consideration  it 

^Huntington    v.    Lombard    (1900),  22  cannot  be  shown  that  the  consideration  waa 

Wash.  202,  60  Pac.  414;  Knight  c.  Finney  illegal:    Babcock    v.    Murray   (1894),    58 

(1899),  59  Neb.  274,  80  N.  W.  912  ;  Sharp-  Minn.  385,  59  N.  W.  1038.] 

less  V.  Giffeu  (1896),  47  Neb.  146,  66  N.  W.  *  See  cases  cited  mpra,  §  *  676.    In  the 

285;  V.  L.  &  T.  Co.  r.  Siefkc  (1894),  144  latter   class   of    actions,    a    consideration 

N.  Y.  354,  39  N.    K.  35S  ;    Sams  v.  Der-  must  be  averred  in  the  complaint, 

rick    (1898),    103  Ga.   678,30  8.   E.   668.  [^Greer  r.  Latimer  (1896),  47  S.  C.  176, 

The  facts  showing  want  of  consideration  25  S.  E.136.    But  failure  of  consideration 

sliould  he  set  out :  Port  Huron,  etc.  Co.  v.  is  not  raised  by  a  general  tlenial :    Nunn  v. 

Clements  (1902).   113   Wis.  249,  89  N.  W.  Jordan  (1903)",  31  Wash.  506,  72  Pac.  124  ; 

160;  (Jriffith   (•.  Wright  (1899),  21  Wash.  Murray  ?\  Live  Stock  Co.  (1895),  12  Wash. 

494,  58  I'ac.  582  ;  Duckworth  ;;.  McKinney  259,  40  Pac.  942.] 

(1900),  58  S.  C.  418.  36  S.  E.  730.    But  see  &  Fetherly  v.  Burke,  .54  N.  Y.  646. 

Taylor  v.  Purcell  (1894),  60  Ark.  606,  31  "^  Weaver  v.  Barden,  49  N.  Y.  286,  297, 

S.   W.  567.     In  Osborne  &  Co.  v.  Ilanlin  per  Grover  J. 


EXAMPLES    OF    NEW    MATTER.  813 

complete  that  the  whole  was  prima  facie  void  as  against  other 
creditors,  an  action  was  brought  to  set  aside  the  judgment  so 
confessed.  The  answer  in  this  action  set  out  in  full  all  the  facts 
of  the  original  indebtedness,  which  tended  to  show  that  an  actual 
debt  existed,  and  that  the  confession  was  in  good  faith  and  valid. 
This  answer  the  Supreme  Court  of  California  held  to  be  new 
matter:  it  was  in  avoidance,  and  not  in  denial  of  the  case  made 
by  the  complaint.^ 

§  586.  *  710.  Nevsr  Matter  Distinguished  from  Denials  by  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri.  The  distinction  between  new  matter  and 
denials  was  clearly  stated  in  a  recent  decision  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri.  In  an  action  upon  an  attachment  bond,  the 
petition  set  out  the  bond,  and  alleged  as  a  breach  that  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  attachment  suit  had  failed  to  prosecute  the  same,  and 
that  the  attachment  had  been  abated  by  a  judgment  of  the  court 
in  that  proceeding.  The  answer  admitted  the  bond,  denied  the 
breach,  and  asserted  that  the  original  suit  was  still  pending  by 
a  motion  in  arrest  of  judgment  and  for  a  new  trial.  No  reply 
having  been  pleaded,  these  averments  of  the  answer  were  held 
at  the  trial  to  have  been  admitted.  This  ruling  was  reversed  on 
error,  and  the  answer  was  held  to  be  merely  a  denial. ^ 

§  587.  *  711.  Examples  of  Defences  in  Abatement.  The  non- 
joinder of  necessary  parties  cannot  be  proved  under  the  general 
denial;  it  is  new  matter,  and  must  be  pleaded i^  nor  can  the  mis- 
joinder of  plaintiffs  be  relied  upon  under  a  denial ;  the  question 
must  be  raised  by  a  demurrer  or  by  a  special  answer.*     The  de- 

1  Pond  V.  Daveuport,45  Cal.  225.  The  Mo.  385  ;  Northrup  v.  Miss.  Vail.  Ins.  Co., 
correctnessof  this  decisiou  may  be  doubted.  47  Mo.  435.  Tlie  allegation  in  question 
The  answer  is  rather  an  argumentative  is  merely  in  denial  of  facts  which  the 
denial.  The  complaint  in  effect  charged  plaintiff  must  prove  to  make  out  his  prima 
fraud  ;  and,  if  a  general  denial  had  been  facie  cause  of  action." 

pleaded,  the  same  facts  would  have  been  *  Abbe  c  Clarke,  31  Barb.  238. 

evidence  in  its   support   to   disprove    the  [^Johnson  v.  Gooch  (1894),  114  N.  C. 

fraud.  62,  19  S.  E.  62;  Cone  v.  Cone  (1901),  61 

2  State  V.  Williams,  48  Mo.  210,  212:  S.  C.  512,  39  S.  E.  748;  North  Powder 
"The  general  rule  is,  that  any  fact  which  Mill.  Co.  v.  Coughanour  (1898),  34  Ore. 
avoids  the  action,  and  which  the  plaintiff  9,  54  Pac.  223;  Deegan  v.  Deegan  (1894), 
is«uot  bound  to  prove  in  the  first  instance  22  Nev.  185,  37  Pac.  360.  The  above 
in  support  of  it,  is  new  matter;  but  a  fact  cases  hold  that  the  plea  must  specify  the 
which  merely  uegatives  the  averments  of  parties  who  should  have  been  joined. 3 
the  petition  is  not  new  matter,  and  need  *  Gillam  r.  Sigman,  29  Cal.  637;  Mills 
not  be  replied  to.  Moreover,  an  answer  v.  Carthage,  31  Mo.  A  pp.  141.  See  also 
setting  up  new  matter  by  way  of  defence  Dutcher  v.  Dutcher,  39  Wis.  651,  and  the 
should  confess  and  avoid  the  plaintiff's  other  additional  cases  cited  ante,  under 
cause  of   action.      Bauer   v.  Wagner,    39  §  *  698. 


814  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

fence  that  the  plaintiff  is  not  the  real  party  in  interest  is  new 
matter.  A  general  averment,  however,  to  that  effect,  is  not 
enongh:  the  facts  must  be  stated  which  constitute  the  defence, 
and  which  show  that  he  is  not  the  real  party  in  interest.^  The 
objection  that  the  plaintiff  has  not  the  legal  capacit}'  to  sue, 
unless  it  appears  on  the  face  of  the  complaint  or  petition  so  that 
it  can  be  raised  by  demurrer,  is  new  matter.  Being  in  the  nature 
of  a  dilatory  defence,  like  that  of  a  defect  of  parties,  the  facts 
which  constitute  it  must  be  stated  with  certaint}':  a  mere  gen- 
eral averment  would  raise  no  issue.-  In  application  of  this  rule, 
the  objection  that  the  plaintiff  or  the  defendant  is  a  married 
woman,  when  relied  on  as  a  defence,  cannot  be  proved  under  a 
general  denial,  but  must  be  pleaded  as  new  matter;^  and  in  an 
action  by  an  executor  or  administrator,  the  general  denial  does 
not  put  in  issue  the  plaintiff's  title  to  sue.*  The  defence  that 
the  action  was  commenced  before  the  cause  of  action  had  accrued 
cannot,  it  has  been  held,  be  proved  under  a  general  denial,  but 
must  be  set  up  in  the  answer  specially.^  Thus  in  an  action  for 
work  and  labor  on  an  open  account,  where  the  answer  was  a 
general  denial,  the  defence  that  the  account  was  not  due  at  the 
time  the   action  was  commenced    according   to   the   terms  of  a 

1  Jackson  v.  Whedon,  1  E.  D.  Siiiitli,  Joliiison  r.  Miller,  4"  Ind.  .376,  377;  Lau- 

141 ;  Savaj^e  v.  Corn  Exch.  F.  Ins.  Co.,  4  ders  v.  Doui^las,  46  Ind.  522  ;    McDaniel 

Bosw.  1  ;  Raymond  v.  Prichard,  24  Ind.  r.  Carver,  40  Ind.  250 ;  Prison  i\  O'Dowd, 

.318;    Garrison   v.    Clark,    11    Ind.   369;  40  Ind.  300  ;  Van  Metre  y.  Wolf,  27  Iowa, 

Swift  y.  Ellsworth,  10  Ind.  205;  Lamson  341;    Wagner   v.   Ewing,   44    Ind.    441; 

V.  Falls,  6  Ind.  309  ;  Curtis  v.  Gooding,  99  Kennard  v.  Sax,  3  Ore.  263,  265.     The  de- 

Ind.  45;    Hereth  v.  Smith,  33  Ind.    514;  fence  of  infanry  is  new  matter:  Prall  v. 

Giraldin  v.  Howard,  103  Mo.  40.  Peters,  32  Xeb.  832. 

QEsch  V.  White  (1901),  82  Minn.  462,  [^Fulton  v.  Ryan  (1900),  60  Xeb.  9,  82 

85  N.  W.  238,  7)3;  Lesh  v.  Meyer  (1901),  N.    W.  105;   Linton  v.  Jansen  (1903),  — 

.63  Kan.  524,  66  Pac.  245;    Wakeman  v.  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W.  675.^ 
Norton  (1897),  24  Colo.  192,  49  Pac.  283 ;  *  White  v.  Moses,  11   Cal..69.      It   is 

Nat.   Dist.  Co.  V.  Cream   City  Imp.   Co.  the   rule   in  some  States  that  a  general 

(1893),  86  Wis.  352,  56  N.  W.  864.]  denial  admits  the  corporate  existence  of  the 

■•^  Cal.  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Wright,  8  Cal.  ])hiiiitiff,  even    if    that   is  alleged  in  the 

585;  Wade  v.   State,   37    Ind.    180,    182;  complaint:  Dietriclis  r.  Lincoln  &  N.  W. 

Wright  /;.  Wright,  54  N.  Y.  437,  441,  59  R.   Co.,  13  Neb.  43;   Nat^ional    Life  Ins. 

Barb.  505  ;  Burnside  y.  Matthews,  54  N.  Y.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  8   Neb.  452;    Beatty  v. 

78,  82,  "  mnst  be  pleaded  specially  and  with  Bartholomew  Cy.  Agr.  Soc,  76  Ind.  91, 

certainty  to  a  particular  intent;"  Barclay  and  cases  cited  ;  QSparks  v.  Nat.  Accident 

V.  Quicksilver  Min.  Co.,  6  Lans.  25,30;  Ass'u  (1896),  100  la.  458,  69  N.  W.  678.] 
Plia;nix  Bk.  v.  Donnell,  40  N.  Y.  410.  ""  [^Klder  v.  Rourke  (1895),  27  Ore.  363, 

Qlnfancy  held  in  Winer  r.  Ma.st  (1896),  41    Pac.   6,    citing   the  text;   Southey    v. 

146  Ind.  177,  45  N.  E.  66,  to  be  a  defence  Dowling  (1898),  70  Conn.  153,  39  Atl.  1 13  ; 

in  bar  and  not  in  abatement.]  Goodrich  r.  Bldg.  Ass'n  (1895),  96  Ga.  803, 

3  Dillaye     v.    Parks,    31    Barb.     132;  22  S.  E.  585.] 


EXAMPLES    OF    NEW    MATTEK. 


815 


special  contract  was  excluded  on  the  ground  that  it  should 
have  been  pleaded.^  The  defence  that  another  action  is  pend- 
ing for  the  same  cause  must  be  specially  pleaded,  unless  it  is 
raised  by  demurrer. ^ 

§  588.  *  712.  Miscellaneous  Defences.  The  defence  of  license 
is  new  matter,  and  cannot  be  proved  unless  pleaded.^  Accord- 
ing to  the  decided  weight  of  authority,  an  estoppel  in  ^:)fa'-s  cannot 
be  proved  under  a  general  denial,  but  is  new  matter.*    An  accord 


1  Hagan  v.  Burch,  8  Iowa,  309;  Smith 
V.  Holmes,  19  N.  Y.  271. 

2  Walsworth  ii.  Jolinson,  41  Cal.  (il. 
QWitte  V.   Foote  (1895),  90  Wis.  2.'3.5, 

62  N.  W.  1044 ;  Lowinau  v.  West  (1894), 
8  Wash.  355,  36  Pac.  258;  Spencer  v. 
Johnston  (1899),  58  Neb.  44,  78  N.  W. 
482;  Monroe  v.  Reid  (1895),  46  Neb.  316, 
64  N.  W.  983. 

The  defence  must  be  presented  sea- 
sonably to  the  trial  court :  Glover  v.  St. 
Louis,"  etc.  Co.  (1896),  138  Mo.  408,  40 
S.  W.  110. 

Such  a  plea  cannot  prevail  unless  the 
two  causes  of  action  are  pending  in  the 
same  juri.sdiction  :  Sandwich  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Earl  (1894),  56  Minn.  390,  57  N.  W.  938; 
Rice  V.  Ashland  County  (1902),  114  Wis. 
130,  89  N.  W.  908;  Caine  v.  Seattle  & 
Northern  Ry.  Co.  (1895),  12  Wa.'^h.  596, 
41  Pac.  904. 

To  give  occasion  for  a  plea  in  abate- 
ment, tlie  prior  action  must  be  the  same 
cause,  between  the  same  parties  in  the 
same  interest,  the  same  rights  must  be 
asserted  and  the  same  relief  prayed  for : 
Richardson  v.  Opelt  (1900),  60  Neb.  180, 
82  N.  W.  377.  See  also  Dodge  v.  Corne- 
lius (1901),  168  N.  Y.  242,  61  N.  E.  244; 
Wat.'^on  V.  Richardson  (1900),  110  la.  698, 
80  N.  W.  416;  Beardsley  v.  Morrison 
(1899),  18  Utah,  478,  56  Pac.  303;  Pratt 
V.  Howard  (1899),  109  la.  504,  80  N.  W. 
546 ;  Wilson  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1902), 
115Ga.  171,41S.E.  699;  Calteauxu.  Muel- 
ler (1899),  102  Wis.  525,  78  N.  W.  1082; 
Koch  V.  Peters  (1897),  97  Wis.  492,  73 
N.  W.  25;  Tacoma  v.  Power  Co.  (1896), 
15  Wash.  515,  46  Pac.  1043. 

The  defence  of  another  action  pending 

may  be  defeated   by  a   dismissal  of  the 

other  action,  and  a  reply  to  that  effect  to 

the  said  defence  :  Carson-Rand  Co.  v.  Stern 

"(1895),  129  Mo.  381,  31  S.  W.  772. 


Matter  in  abatement  is  waived  if  not 
pleaded:  Lombard  v.  McMillan  (1897), 
95  Wis.  627,  70  N.  W.  673 ;  Webber  v. 
Ward  (1896),  94  Wis.  605,  69  N.  W. 
349.] 

'^  Beaty  v.  Swarthout,  32  Barb.  293,. 
294;  Haight  v.  Badgeley,  15  Barb.  499; 
Snowden  v.  Wilas,  19  Ind.  10;  Gilbert  r. 
Sage,  5  Lans.  287 ;  Alford  v.  Barnum,  45 
Cal.  482,  485 ;  Cliase  v.  Long,  44  Ind. 
427,^428;  [^Cone  v.  Ivinson  (1893),  4 
Wyo.  203,  33  Pac.  31.] 

*  Wood  V.  Ostram,  29  Ind.  177,  186  ; 
Davis  !'.  Davis,  26  Cal.  23 ;  Etcheborne  v. 
Auzerais,  45  Cal.  121 ;  Clark  v.  Huber, 
25  Cal.  593,  597 ;  but  see  Caldwell  v. 
Auger,  4  Minn.  217;  and  Parker  v. 
Dacres,  1  Wash.  190;  Churchill  c.  Bau- 
mann,  95  Cal.  541.  An  estoppel  by  judg- 
ment must  be  pleaded  if  there  is  or  has 
been  any  opportunity  to  do  so.  Clink  ;;. 
Thurston,  47  Cal.  21,  29  ;  Meiss  v.  Gill, 
44  Ohio  St.  253 ;  per  contra,  Larura  v. 
Wilner,  35  Iowa,  244,  247;  and  see  ante, 
§  *  702.  See  also,  as  to  defence  of  estoppel, 
Hanson  v.  Cheatovich,  13  Nev.  395  ;  Pugh 
V.  Ottenheimer,  6  Ore.  231  ;  Remillard 
V.  Prescott,  8  id.  37.  That  estoppel  is 
new  matter,  see  Central  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Dorau, 
109  Mo.  40;  Bray  v.  Marshall,  75  Mo. 
327;  De  Votie  v.  AIcGerr,  15  Colo.  467; 
Gaynor  v.  Clements,  16  Colo.  209;  and 
that  the  facts  constituting  the  estoppel 
must  be  shown,  see  Beck  v.  Milford,  90 
Ind.  291;  Stewart  i-.  Beck,  90  Ind.  458 ; 
Burlington  Indep.  Dist.  v.  Merchants'  Bk., 
68  Iowa,  343  ;  Miller  v.  Anderson,  19  Mo. 
App.  71;  Page  v.  Smith,  13  Ore.  410; 
McKeen  v.  Naughton,  88  Cal.  462.  Contra, 
that  estoppel  may  be  proved  under  the 
general  denial,  see  Towne  v.  Sparks,  23 
Neb.  142.  Statute  of  frauds,  Sherwood  v. 
Saxton,  63  Mo.  78;  Wells  v.  Monihan, 
129  N.  Y.  161  ;  May  bee  v.  Moore,  90  Mo. 


816 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


and  satisfaction  is  also  new  matter;  ^  and  a  discharge  in  Lank-^ 
ruptcy  or  insolvency  ;2    and  a   defence   based  upon  a  statutory 


340;  but  see  Unglish  v.  Marvin,  128  N.  Y. 
380 ;  Harris  v.  Frank,  81  Cal.  280.  Tender, 
liegler  v.  Eddy,  53  Cal.  597. 

[^Hardy  Implement  Co.  v.  South  Bend 
Iron  Works  (1895),  129  Mo.  222,  31  S.  W. 
599 ;  Jasper  County  Ky.  Co.  v.  Curtis 
(1900),  15-t  .\Io.  10,  55  S.  W.  222 ;  Thomp- 
son V.  Cohen  (1894),  127  Mo.  215,  28 
S.  W.  984;  Cockrill  v.  Hutchin.son  (1896), 
135  Mo.  67,  36  IS.  VV.  375;  Sanders  (•. 
Cliartraud  (1900),  158  Mo.  352,  59  8.  W. 
95;  Throckmorton  v.  Pence  (1893),  121 
Mo.  50,  25  S.  W.  843  ;  Cadematori  v. 
Gauger  (1901),  160  Mo.  352,  61  S.  W. 
195;  Seibert  v.  liloomtield  (1901),  Ky., 
63  S.  W.  584  ;  Excelsior  Coal  Co.  v  \'ir- 
giuia  Coal  Co.  (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  \V.  373; 
IJeard-sley  y.  Clem  (1902)",  137  Cal.  328,  70 
Pac.  175;  Newhall  v.  Hatch  (1901),  1.34 
Cal.  269,  66  Pac.  266  ;  Reynolds  v.  Pascoe 
(1901),  24  Utah,  219,  66  Pac.  1064;  Rio 
Grande  West.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Power  Co. 
(1900),  2.3  Utah,  22,  63  Pac.  995;  Poynter 
V  Chipman  (1893),  8  Utah,  442,  32*  Pac. 
€90;  Bruce  v.  Phcenix  Ins.  Co.  (1893),  24 
Ore.  486,  34  Pac.  16;  Bays  v.  Trulsou 
(1893),  25  Ore.  109,  35  Pac." 26;  Swank  i'. 
St.  I'aul  City  Ry.  Co.  (1895),  61  Minn.  423, 
63  N.  W.  1088;  Stephen.son  v.  Bankers' 
Life  A.ss'n  (1899),  108  la.  637,  79  N.  W. 
459;  Kahler  v.  Iowa,  etc.  Ins.  Co.  (1898), 
106  la.  380.  76  N.  W.  734;  Spencer  v. 
Papach  (1897),  103  la.  513,  70  N.  W.  748, 
72  N.  W.  665;  Sherod  v.  Ewell  (1897), 
104  la.  253,  73  N.  W.  493;  Warder  v. 
Cuthbert  (1896),  99  la.  681,  68  N.  W. 
917;  Golden  v.  Ilardesty  (1895),  93  la. 
622,  61  N.  W.  913;  Hector  Min.  Co.  v. 
Valley  View  Miu.  Co.  (1901),  28  Colo. 
315,  64  Pac.  205  ;   Adams  v.  Adams  (1903), 

—  Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  153  ;  Taylor  v.  Patton 
(1903),  —  Ind.  — ,  66  N.  E.  91  ;  Dudley  r. 
Pigg  (1897),  149  Ind.  363,  48  N.  E.  642; 
Frain  v.  Burgett  (1898),  152  Ind.  55,  50 
N.  E.  873  ;  Center  Scliool  Tp.  v.  State 
ex  rel.  (1897),  150  Ind.  168,  49  N.  E.  961  ; 
Kiefer  v.  Klinsick  (1895),  144  lud.  46,  42 
N.  E.  447;   Union  Bank  v.  Hntton  (1903), 

—  Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W.  1061 ;  Neb.  Mort- 
gage, etc.  Co.  y.  Van  Kloster  (1894),  42 
Neb.  746.  60  N.  W.  1016;  Cobbey  7-.  Bu- 
chanan (lS9fi),  48  Neb.  39!,  67  X.  W.  176  ; 


Blue  Valley  Lumber  Co.  v.  Couro  (1900), 
61  Neb.  39,"  84  N.  W.  402  ;  Burwell  Jrrig. 
Co.  t'.  Lashmett  (1900),  59  Neb.  605,  81 
N.  W.  617;  Holmes  v.  Lincoln  Salt  Lake 
Co.  (1899),  58  Neb.  74,  78  N.  W.  379; 
Henderson  v.  Keutzer  (1898),  56  Neb.  460, 
76  X.  W.  881  ;  German  Nat.  Bank  v.  First 
Nat.  Bank  (1898),  55  Neb.  86,  75  N.  W. 
.531  ;  Boales  v.  Ferguson  (1898),  55  Neb. 
565,  76  N.  W.  18;  Gayiord  i.-.  Neb.  Sav. 
Bank  (1898),  54  Neb,  io4,-74  N.  W.  415; 
City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Thomas  (1896),  46  Neb. 
861,  65  N.  W.  895;  Scroggin  v.  Johnston 
(1895),  45  Neb.  714,  64  N.  W.  236; 
Palmer  Oil  Co.  v.  Blodgett  (1899),  60 
Kan.  712,  57  Pac.  947  ;  City  of  Chippewa 
P"alls  V.  Hopkins  (1901),  109  AVis.  611,  85 
N.  W.  553;  Bank  of  Antigo  ;;.  R^au 
(1899),  105  Wis.  37,  80  N.  W.440;  Pratt  u. 
Uawcs  ( 1903),  118  Wis.  603,  95  N.  W.  965  ; 
Interstate  Savings,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Knajip 
(1898),  20  Wash.  225,  55  Pac.  48 ;  Jacobs 
V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  15  Wash.  358, 
46  Pac.  396;  Moore  v.  Brownfield  (1894), 
10  Wash.  439,  39  Pac.  113;  Schurtz  v. 
Colvin  (1896),  55  O.  St.  274,  45  N.  W. 
527  ;  Village  of  Chester  v.  Leonard  (1897), 
68  Conn.  495,  37  Atl.  397  ;  Tuells  r.  Torras 
(1901),  113  Ga.  691,  39  .S.  E.  455.] 

1  Coles  V.  S()ulsb}%  21  Cal.  47,  50. 

[^In  Carpenter  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
(1895),  7  S.  r>.  584,  64  N.  W.  1120,  the 
court  said  :  "  To  establish  a  plea  of  accord 
and  satisfaction  under  the  statute,  it  must 
not  only  appear  that  there  was  an  agree- 
ment to  accept,  in  full  settlement  of  an 
obligation,  something  different  from  or 
less  tlian  that  to  which  one  of  the  parties 
tliereto  is  entitled,  but  it  mu.st  be  shown 
that  such  agreement  has  been  fully  ex- 
ecuted, and  the  obligation  extinguished 
liy  the  creditor's  actual  acceptance  of  the 
consideration  specified  in  the  agreement 
constituting  the  accord."  See  also  Hale  v. 
Grogan  (1896),  99  Ky.  170,  35  S.  W.  282; 
Van  Housen  v.  Broelil  (1899),  '59  Neb.  48, 
80  N.  W.  260;  Long  v.  Scanlan  (1898), 
105  Ga.  424,  31  S.  E.  436;  Oil  Well  Sup- 
ply Co.  V.  Wolfe  (1894),  127  Mo.  616,  30 
S."W.  145.] 

•^  C.rnell  v.  Dakin,  38  N.  Y.  253,  256. 
See  also  Styles  v.  Fuller,  101  N.  Y.  622. 


EXAMPLES    OF   NEW    MATTER. 


817 


provision  prohibiting  banks  from  paying  ont  notes  not  received 
by  them  at  par;i  and  a  defence  founded  upon  the  plaintiff's 
failure  to  perform  a  contract  collateral  to  the  demand  set  up 
in  the  complaint,  and  upon  which  the  liability  of  the  defendant 
depended.  2 


1  Codd  V.  Rathborie,  19  N.  Y.  37. 

-  Blethen  v.  Blake,  44  Cal.  117;  aud 
the  defence  of  irregularity  on  tiie  part  of 
the  arbitrators  iu  au  action  upon  an  award, 
Day  r.  llaiiiniond,  57  N.  Y.  479,  484. 

[^Defences  of  New  Matter. 

The  following  defences  have  been 
held  to  be  new  matter : 

Act  of  God :  Pengra  v.  Wheeler  (1893), 
24  Ore.  532,  34  Pac.  354;  Chicago,  II.  I.  & 
Pac.  Py.  Co.  V.  Shaw  (1901),  63  Neb.  380, 
88  N.  W.  508. 

Alteration  of  instrument  :  Mozley  v. 
Reagan  (1899),'  109  Ga.  182,  34  8.  E.  310 ; 
JS'inman  v.  Suhr  (1895),  91  Wis.  392,  64 
N.  VV.  1035  ;  Maguire  v.  Eichmeier  (1899), 
109  la.  301,  80  N.  W.  395;  Wall  v. 
Muster's  Ex'rs  (1901),  Ky.,  63  S.  W. 
432. 

Assumption  of  risk :  Nicholaus  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  Hy.  Co.  (1894),  90  la.  85,  57 
N.  W.  694 ;  Faulkner  v.  Mammoth  Min. 
Co.  (1901),  23  Utah,  437,  66  Pac.  799; 
Dorsett  v.  Clement-Ross  Mfg.  Co.  (1902), 
131  N.  C.  254,42  S.  E.  612. 

Bona  fides:  Maxwell  v.  Foster  (1902), 
€4  S.  C.  1,41  S.  E.776. 

Champerty:  Disbrow  v.  Board  of  Super- 
visors (1903),  119  la.  538,  93  N.  W.  585  ; 
Potter  V.  Ajax  Min.  Co.  (1900),  22  Utah, 
273,  61  Pac.  990  ;  Croco  v.  Oregon  Short 
Line  Co.  (1898),  18  Utah,  311,  54  Pac. 
985. 

Collateral  securitij  held  by  plaintiff : 
Flint  >-.  Nelson  (1894),  10  Utah,  261,  37 
Pac.  479. 

Compromise :  Pullins'  Adm'r  r.  Smith 
(1899),  106  Ky.  418,  .50  S.  W.  833. 

Condition  or  exception  in  contract :  Rail- 
way Officials,  etc.  Ass'n  v.  Drummond 
(1898),  56  Neb.  235,  76  N.  W.  562;  Farm- 
ers', etc.  Ins.  Co.  V.  Wiard  (1899),  59  Neb. 
451,  81  N.  W.  312;  Joliuston  v.  North- 
western Live  Stock  Ins.  Co.  (1896),  94 
Wis.  117, 68  N.  W.868  ;  P'armers',  etc.  Ins. 
Co.  I'.  Peterson  (1896),  47    Neb.   747,   66 


N.  W.  847 ;  Smith  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co. 
(1899),  108  la.  382,  79  N.  W.  129 ;  Latimer 
v.  Woodmen  (1901),  62  S.  C.  145,  40  S.  E. 
155. 

Consent  and  connivance  in  action  for 
criminal  conversation :  Morning  v.  Long 
(1899),  109  la.  288,  80  N.  W.  390. 

Contract  limitimj  liabilitij :  Register 
Printing  Co.  v.  Willis  (1894),  57  Minn.  93, 
58  N.  W.825;  Michalitschke  Bros. i>.  Wells, 
Fargo  &  Co.  (1897),  118  Cal.  683,  50  Pac. 
847 ;  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Pace 
(1901),  69  Ark.  256,  63  S.  W.  62. 

Contributor  1)  neyliijence  :  Hughes  v.  Chi- 
cago &  Alton  R.  R.  Co.  (1894),  127  Mo. 
447,  30  S.  W.  127  ;  McFarland  v.  Mo.  Pac. 
Ry.  Co.  (1894),  125  Mo.  2.53,  28  S.  W. 
590;  Hill  v.  Meyer  Bros.  Drug  Co.  (1897), 
140  Mo.  4.33,  41  S.  W.  909;  Louisville  & 
Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Copas  (1.894),  95 
Ky.  460,  26  S.  W.  179  (even  wht-re  the 
petition  negatives  it) ;  Hunter  v.  Grande 
Ronde  Lumber  Co.  (1901),  39  Ore.  448,  65 
Pac.  598;  Martin  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897), 
51  S.  C.  150.  28  S.  E.  303;'  Ford  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1898),  106  la.  85,  75 
N.  W.  650 ;  Willis  v.  City  of  Perry  (1894), 
92  la.  297,  60  N.  W.  727  ;  Union  Stock 
Yards  Co.  v.  Conoyer  (1893),  38  Neb.  488, 
56  N.  W.  1081 ;  Ohlweiler  r.  Lohmann 
(1894),  88  Wis.  75,  59  N.  W.  678;  Holland 
V.  Oregon  Short  Line  R.  R.  Co.  (1903),  — 
Utah,  — ,  72  Pac.  940. 

But  where  contributory  negligence  is 
negatived  in  the  complaint  the  issue  is 
raised  by  a  general  denial :  Denver,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co".  V.  Smock  (1897),  23  Colo.  456, 
48  Pac.  681  ;  Long  v.  Railway  Co.  (1897), 
50  S.  C.  49,  27  S.  E.  531.  Contra,  Louis- 
ville &  Nashville  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Copas 
(1894),  95  Ky.  460,  26  S.  W.   179. 

A  general  averment  of  contributory 
negligence  is  sufficient :  Cogdell  v.  Wil- 
mington, etc.  R.  R.  Co.  (1902),  130  N.  C. 
313,  41  S.  E.  541  ;  Chesapeake  &  Ohio  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Smith  (1897),  101  Ky.  104,  42  S.  W. 
538.     But  see  Cogdell  v.  Wilmington  & 


818 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


§  589.    *  713.    Statute  of  Limitations.     Different  rules  prevail 
in   the   different  States   in  respect  to   pleading   the   Statute   of 


W.  R.R  Co.  (190.3),  132  N.C.  852,  44  S.E. 
618. 

Corporation  bi/-Iaw :  Angier  v.  Equitable 
Bldg.  Ass'n  (1899),  109  Ga.  625,35  S.  E.  64. 

Custom  :  Eller  v.  Loomis  (1898),  106 
la.  276,  76  N.  W.  686. 

Damages  sustained  by  defendaut :  Ilar- 
riugtou  V.  Folev  (1899),  108  la.  287,  79 
X.  W.  64. 

Defect  in  registration  of  official  bond  : 
Warren  v.  Boyd  (1897),  120  N.  C.  56,  26 
S.  E.  700. 

Double  agency  :  Childs  v.  Ptomey  (1895), 
17  Mont.  502,  43  Pac.  714. 

Facts  Suspending  operation  of  statute: 
West  V.  Bishop  (1900),  110  la.  410,  81 
X.  W.  696. 

Failure  to  save  insured  goods  :  Davis  r. 
Mutual  Fire  Ins.  Co.  (1895),  96  la.  70,  64 
X.  W.  687. 

Fire  set  by  insured  :  Corkery  v.  Security 
In.s.  Co.  (1896),  99  la.  382,  68  N.  W.  792; 
Heideureich  v.  Aetna  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  26 
Ore.  70,  37  Pac.  64. 

Forfeiture:  Powerv.  Sla(  1900), 24 Mont. 
243,  61  Pac.  468 ;  Pickett  v.  Fidelity  Co. 
(1901),  60S.  C.  477,38  S.  E.  160;  Bishop 
r.  Baisley  (1895),  28  Ore.  119,  41  Pac.  937. 

Injury  by  fellow  servant :  Laying  v.  Mt. 
Shasta  Mineral  Spring  Co.  (1901),  135 
Cal.  141,  67  Pac.  48,  citing  numerous 
cases:  Peters  v.  McKay  (1902),  136  Cal. 
73,  68  Pac.  478;  Bowling  Green  Stone 
Co.  V.  Capshaw  (1901),  Ky.,  64  S.  W.  507. 
See  also  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Oyster  (1899),  58  Neb.  1,  78  N.  W.  3.59. 
But  in  Missouri  it  is  lield  that  this  defence 
may  be  sliown  under  a  general  denial : 
Kaminski  v.  Tudor  Iron  Works  (1902),  167 
Mo.  462,  67  S.  W.  221.  So  in  Wilson  v. 
Railway  Co.  (1897),  51  S.C.  79,  28  S.  i:.91- 

Laches:  Gay  v.  Havermale  (1902),  27 
Wash.  390,  67  Pac.  804  ;  Town  of  Fairplay 
V.  Board  of  Comni'rs  (1901 ),  29  Colo.  57,  67 
Pac.  152;  French  v.  Woodruff  (1898),  25 
Colo.  3.39,  .54  Pac.  101.5.  It  was  held  in 
Wagner  v.  Sanders  (1901),  62  S.  C.  73,39 
S.  E.  950,  that  laches  might  be  set  up  by 
the  court  without  being  pleaded  by  the 
defendant. 

Lif/uidnlion  :  Kirkland  v.  Dryfus 
(1897),  103  (ja.  127,  29  S.  E.  612. 


Misnomer  of  defendant:  Bird  v.  St. 
John's  Episcopal  Church  (1899),  154  Ind. 
138,  56  X.  E.  129. 

Non-incorporation :  Brady  v.  Nat.  Supply 
Co.  (1901),  64  O.  St.  267,  60  N.  E.  218. 

J'rivilege  :  Gilman  v.  McCIatchy  (1896), 
111  Cal.  606,  44  Pac.  241. 

Ratification  of  altered  contract:  Erick- 
son  V.  First  Nat.  Bank  (1895),  44  Xeb. 
622,  62  N.  W.  1078. 

Release:  Rivers  v.  Blom  (1901),  16.3 
Mo.  442,  63  S.  W.  812;  Frank  f.  Cobban 
(1897),  20  Mont.  168,  50  Pac.  423;  Hale  y, 
Grogau  (1896),  99  Ky.  170,  35  S.  W.  282. 

Rescission :  Kennedy  v.  School  Dist. 
(1898),  20  Wash.  399,  55  Pac.  567. 

Security  held  by  plaintiff  in  an  action 
by  creditor's  bill :  O'Brien  v.  Stambach 
(1897),  101  la.  40,  69  N.  W.  1133. 

Settlement :  Hulbert  v.  New  Nonpareil 
Co.  (1900),  111  la.  490,  82  N.  W.  928. 

Statute  of  frauds  :  Ilillhouse  r.  Jen- 
nings (1901),  60S.  C.373,  38  S.  E.  .599 ; 
Abba  V.  Smyth  (1899),  21  Utah,  109,  59 
Pac.  756;  Bean  v.  Lamprey  (1901),  82 
Minn.  320,  84  N.  W.  1016;  Iverson  ?■. 
Cirkel  (1894),  56  Minn.  299,  57  X.  W.  800; 
Tynon  r.  Despain  (1896),  22  Colo.  240,  43 
Pac.  1039;  Crane  v.  Powell  (1893),  139 
N.  Y.  379,  34  N.  E.  911;  Matthews  v. 
Matthews  (1897),  154  N.  Y.  288,48  N.  E. 
531  ;  Sanger  v.  French  (1898),  157  N.  Y. 
213,  51  N.  E.  979  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Hall  (1903),  —  Ark.  — ,  74  S.  w!  293; 
Thomas  v.  Churchill  (1896),  48  Neb.  266, 
67  N.  W.  182.  Unless  the  defendant 
raises  the  defence  of  the  statute  of  frauds 
by  answer  or  demurrer,  he  waives  it : 
Crane  v.  Powell  (1893),  139  X.  Y.  379,  34 
N.  E.  911  ;  Tift  V.  Wight  &  Weslosky  Co. 
(1901),  113  Ga.  681,39  S.  E.  503;  Wise- 
man V.  Thompson  (1895),  94  la.  607,  63 
N.  W.  346. 

Statutory  bars:  McCann  v.  Pennie 
(1893),  100  Cal.  547,35  Pac.  158;  Fischer 
V.  Metropolitan  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1901),  167 
N.  Y.  178,  60  N.  E.  431. 

Subrogation:  Hunter  v.  Hunter (1900), 
58  S.  C.  382,  36  S.  E.  743. 

Suicide:  Latimer  v.  Woodmen  (1901), 
62  S.  C.  145,  40  S.  E.  155. 

Ultra  Vires  :   Lewis  v.  Clyde  S.  S.  Co. 


STATUTE    OF   LIMITATIONS. 


819 


Limitations.  In  some,  by  reason  of  an  express  provision  of 
their  codes,  the  defence  must  always  be  specially  set  up  in  the 
answer,  and  can  never  be  raised  by  demurrer,  even  though  the 
averments  of  the  complaint  should  show  that  the  cause  of  action 
is  barred.^  In  others  it  may  always  be  taken  advantage  of  by 
demurrer  whenever  the  complaint  or  petition  discloses  a  cause 
of  action  which  appears  to  be  barred  by  the  statute. ^     The  courts 


(1903),  — N.  C.  — ,  44  S.  E.  666;  Ferst's 
Sons  I'.  Bank  of  Waycross  (1900),  111  Ga. 
229,  36  S.  E.  773;  Hart  v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co. 
(1901),  113  Ga.  859,  39  S  E.  304;  Citi- 
zens State  Bank  v.  Pence  (1900),  59  Neb. 
579,  81  N.  W.  623 ;  Lewis  v.  Clyde  S.  S. 
Co.  (1902),  131  N.  C.  652,  42  S.  E.  969; 
United  States  Mortgage  Co.  v.  McClure 
(1902),  42  Ore.  190,  70  Pac.  543. 

Undue  Influence :  Kelly  v.  Perrault 
(1897),  Idaho,  48  Pac.  45. 

Unreasonableness  of  ordinance .'  Blue- 
dorn  V.  Mo.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (1893),  121  Mo. 
258,  25  S.  W.  943. 

Waiver:  TJasmussen  v.  Levin  (1901), 
28  Colo.  448,  65  Pac.  94 ;  Swearingen  v. 
Lahner  (1894),  93  la.  147,  61  N.  W.  431  ; 
McCoy  V.  Iowa  Ins.  Co.  (1898),  107  la.  80, 
77  N.  W.  529;  Kahler  v.  Iowa,  etc.  Ins. 
Co.  (1898),  106  la.  380,  76  N.  W.  734. 

Want  of  funds:  Netzer  v.  Crookston 
City  (1894),  59  Minn.  244,  61  N.  W.  21  ; 
McNulty  V.  City  of  New  York  (1901),  168 
N.  y.  117,  61  N.  E.  Ill  ;  Rollings  v. 
Bankers'  Union  (1902),  63  S.  C.  192,  41 
S.  E.  90. 

Want  of  jurisdiction  :  Johnson  )'.  Det- 
rick  (1899),  152  Mo.  243,53  S.  W.  891 ; 
Kahn  v.  Southern  Bldg.  Ass'n  (1902),  115 
Ga.  459,  41  S.  E.  648  ;  Kyd  v.  Exchange 
Bank  (1898),  56  Neb.  557,  75  N.  W.  524  ; 
Herbert  v.  Wortendyke  (1896),  49  Neb- 
182,  68  N.  W.  350;  Burlington  Relief 
Dep't  V.  Moore  (1897),  52  Neb.  719,  73 
N.  W.  15;  Hurlburt  v.  Palmer  (1894),  39 
Neb.  158,57  N.  W.  1019;  Anheuser-Busch 
Brewing  Ass'n  v.  Peterson  (1894),  41  Neb. 
897,  60  N.  W.  373 ;  Eel  River  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
State  ex  rel.  (1895),  143  Ind.  231,  42  N.  E. 
617. 

Objection  to  the  jurisdiction  may  be 
raised  by  answer  in  connection  with 
matters  in  bar :  Herbert  i'.  Wortendyke 
(1896),  49  Neb.  182,  68  N.  W.  350;  Baker 
r.  Union  Stock  Yards  Nat.  Bank  (1902), 


63  Neb.  801,  89  N.  W.  269;  Lowe  v.  Riley 
(1898),  57  Neb.  252,  77  X.  W.  758. 

The  sufficiency  of  the  petition  is  not  a 
test  of  jurisdiction  :  Dryden  r.  Parrotte 
(1901),  61  Neb.  339,  85  N.  W.  287  ;  Win- 
ningham  v.  Trueblood  (1899),  149  Mo. 
572,  51  S.  W.  399.] 

Work  done  Inj  mrmher  of  familij  in  an 
action  for  work  and  labor :  Schroedor  v. 
Scliroeder  (1903),  —  la.  — ,  93  N.  W.  78. 

1  nSatterlund  v.  Beal  (1903),  —  N,  D. 
— ,  95  N.  W.  518.] 

-  [Ii:verett  v.  O'Leary  (1903),  —  Minn. 
— ,  95  N.  W.  901  ;  Green's  Adm'r  v.  Ir- 
vine (1902),  Ky.,  66  S.  W.  278;  Motes  v. 
Gila  Valley,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  (1902),  Ariz., 
68  Pac.  532;  Wagener  v.  Boyce  (1898), 
Ariz.,  52  Pac.  1122;  Smith  v.  Martin 
(1901),  135  Cal.  247,  67  Pac.  779;  Bliss 
V.  Sneath  (1898),  119  Cal.  526,  51  Pac 
848;  Fullertonu.  Bailey  (1898),  17  Utah, 
85,  53  Pac.  1020;  Smith  v.  Day  (1 901), 39 
Ore.  531,  65  Pac.  1055;  Pass  v.  Pa.ss 
(1896),  98  Ga.  791,  25  S.  E.  752;  Cow- 
hick  i;.  Shingle  (1894),  5  Wyo.  87,  37 
Pac.  689;  Huckelbridge  v.  Atchison,  etc. 
Ry.  Co.  (1903),  —  Kan.  — ,  71  Pac.  814  ; 
Lewis  V.  Duncan  (1903),  66  Kan.  306,  71 
Pac.  577;  Best  v.  Zutavern  (1898),  53 
Neb.  604,  74  N.  W.  64  ;  Missouri  Pac.  Ry. 
Co.  V.  Hemingway  (1902),  63  Neb.  610,  88 
N.  W.  673  ;  Osl)orn  v.  Portsmouth  Nat. 
Bank  (1899),  61  O.  St.  427,  56  N.  E.  197. 

But  a  general  demurrer  on  the  ground 
that  no  cause  of  action  is  stated  will  not 
raise  the  issue  :  Fnllerton  v.  Bailey  (1898), 
17  Utah,  85,  53  Pac  1020;  Bliss  v.  Sneath 
(1898),  119  Cal.  526,  51  Pac.  848;  Board 
r.  First  Presbyterian  Church  (1898),  19 
Wash.  455,  53  Pac.  671  ;  Joergensou  v. 
Joergenson  (1902),  28  Wash.  477,  68  Pac. 
913.  Contra,  Cowhick  v.  Shingle  (1894), 
5  Wyo.  87,  37  Pac.  689 ;  Eayrs  v.  Nason 
(1898),  54  Neb.  14-3,  74  N.  W.  408. 

In   ruling  upon    a    demurrer   on    the 


820  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

of  still  other  States  occupj^  a  middle  ground  between  these  ex- 
tremes. If  the  provisions  of  the  statute  relied  on  are  not  abso- 
lute, but  contain  exceptions  or  provisos  within  which  the  case 
could  possibly  fall,  and  which  might,  therefore,  prevent  the  bar 
of  the  statute  from  applying  to  the  cause  of  action,  the  demurrer 
is  never  proper,  because,  although  not  so  alleged,  the  case  might 
come  within  the  exception  or  proviso :  the  answer  is  then  the 
only  mode  of  presenting  the  defence.  But  if  the  particular 
provisions  of  the  statute  are  absolute,  and  contain  no  such 
exceptions  or  provisos  within  which  the  case  could  possibly 
fall,  a  demurrer  may  be  interposed  when  the  objection  appears 
upon  the  face  of  the  plaintiff's  pleading;  but  if  it  does  not  so 
appear,   the  defence  must  be  set  up  by  answer. 

§  590.  *  714.  Same  Subject.  In  New  York  the  rule  is  set- 
tled, and  applied  to  all  actions  whether  legal  or  equitable,  that 
the  effect  of  the  Statute  of  Limitations  as  a  defence  can  only 
be  made  available  by  an  answer;  that  a  demurrer  can  under 
no  circumstances  raise  the  issue ;  ^  and  finally,  that  the  defence 
is  new  matter.^  In  Indiana,  if  the  provision  of  the  statute  in- 
voked contains  no  exceptions  or  provisos,  and  it  appears  on  the 
face  of  the  complaint  that  the  cause  of  action  is  barred,  the  de- 
fendant can  demur;  but  when  there  are  exceptions  or  provisos 
in  the  operative  clause  of  the  statute  relied  upon,  the  defence 
can  only  be  set  up  by  a  special  answer,  and  cannot  be  made 

ground   that  the  actiou  is  barred  by  the  41 ;    Hyde    v.   Lamberson,    1    Idaho,   536. 

statute  of  limitations,  the  enquiry  must  be  lu  the  following  States,  also,  the  defence 

confined  to  the  face  of  the  complaint  and  cannot   be  taken  by   demurrer :  in  North 

the  indorsement  of  the  sheriff  upon  the  Carolina,  Guthrie  v.  Bacon,  107  N.  C.  3.37  ; 

summons  cannot  be  considered:  Smith  v.  in  Arkansas,  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry.  Co. 

Day  (1901),  39  Ore.  531,  65  Pac.  1055.  v.  Brown,  49  Ark.  2.53  ;  in  Iowa,  State  v. 

Under    the     Wisconsin    statutes,    St.,  Mclntire,    58    Iowa,   572 ;    in    Colorado, 

1898,  §§  2649,  2651,  a  demurrer  on  this  Hunt   v.    Hayt,    15    Pac.    410;  Barnes  v. 

ground   must  specifically    point   out    the  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (C.  C.  A.),  54  Fed. 

particular  section  of  the  statute  of  limita-  Rep.  87.     It  may  be  taken  by  demurrer 

tions    relied   upon :    Wlicreatt   v.    Worth  in  Ohio,  Seymour  v.  Pittsburg,  C.  &  .St. 

(1900),    108    Wis.   291,   84    N.   W.    441;  L.  Ry.  Co.,'44  Ohio  St.   12;  Douglas  v. 

Crowley  f.  Hicks  (1898),  98  Wis.  566,74  Corry,   46    Ohio   St.   349;    in    Missouri, 

N.  W.  348.J  Ileffernan  v.  Howell,  90  Mo.  344  ;  in  Wis- 

1  ^To  the  same  effect  see  King  c.  cousin,  Tucker  v.  Lovejoy,  73  Wis.  66  ; 
Powell  (1900),  127  N.  C.  10,  37  S.  E.  62.]  in  Minnesota,  Humphrey  v.  Carpenter,  39 

2  .Sands  V.  St.  John,  36  Barb.  628;  Minn.  115;  in  Oregon,  Sj)aur  v.  McBee, 
Baldwin  v.  Martin,  14  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  9.  19  Ore.  76;  Davis  r.  Davis,  20  Ore.  78; 
See  also  Dezengremel  v.  Dezengremel,  24  in  Washington,  Wilt  v.  Buchtel,  2  Wash. 
Hun,  457;  Riley  v.  Corwin,   17  id.  597;  Ter.  417. 

Long  V.   Bank  of    Vanceyville,  81  N.  C 


STATUTE    OF    LIMITATIONS. 


821 


available  under  a  general  denial.^     Even  in  those  States  wlior 
the  statute  may  be  taken  advantage  of  by  demurrer,  as  well  as 
in  all  tlie  others,  it  is,  when  set  up  by  answer,  new  matter,  and 
can  never  be  proved  under  a  denial,  either  general  or  special.''^ 


1  Perkins  v.  Rogers,  35  lud.  124,  141, 
and  cases  cited ;  Hanna  v.  Jeffersouville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Ind.  113;  but  see  Matlock 
V.  Todd,  25  lud.  128,  which  seems  to  hold 
that  a  demurrer  is  never  proper  iu  lec/ul 
actions,  but  may  be  used  in  ecpiitable  ac- 
tions, according  to  the  former  practice  in 
equity.  See  McCollister  v.  Willey,  52 
Ind.  382;  Cass  Cy.  Com'rs  v.  Adams,  76 
Ind.  504 ;  Devor  v.  Rerick,  87  lud.  337 ; 
Cook  V.  Chambers,  107  Ind.  67;  Shewal- 
ter  V.  Bergman,  123  Ind.  155  ;  ]\Iedsker  v. 
Rogue,  1  lud.  App.  197.  All  these  ca.ses 
support  the  rule  stated  in  the  text. 

[^Where,  however,  the  complaint  shows 
that  the  action  is  not  within  any  of  the 
exceptions,  a  demurrer  will  lie  :  Dorsey 
Mach.  Co.  V.  McCaffrey  (1894),  139  Ind. 
545,  38  N.  E.  208  ;  Swatts  v.  Bowen  (1894), 
141  lud.  322,  40  N.  E.  1057.  Kentucky 
follows  the  same  rule :  Brandenburg  v. 
McGuire  (1898),  105  Ky.  10,  44  S.  W. 
9G ;  Spalding  v.  St.  Joseph's  School 
(1899),  107  Ky.  382,  54  S.  W.  200.^1 

-  McKinuey  v.  McKiuney,  8  Ohio 
St.  423  ;  Bacivus  v.  Clark,  1  Kan.  303 ; 
Howell  V.  Howell.  15  Wis.  55,  59.  Tliis 
last  case  holds  that  the  defeudaut  may 
elf  mar,  although  the  Wisconsiu  code  enacts 
that  '■  the  objection  that  the  action  was 
not  commencetl  within  the  time  limited 
can  only  be  taken  by  answer."  R.  S.  ch. 
138,  §  1.  The  court  said  that  "answer" 
must  be  taken  in  its  widest  sense  of  any 
defensive  pleading  including  a  demurrer. 
But  see  the  later  case  of  Tarbox  v.  Su- 
pervisors, 34  Wis.  558,  which  expressly 
holds  that  the  Statute  of  Limitations  can 
oiili/  be  taken  advantage  of  by  answer  in 
Wisconsin.  Hartson  r.  Hardiu,  40  Cal. 
264.  The  rule  is  settled  in  many  States, 
that  when  it  affirmatively  appears  on  the 
face  of  the  complaint  or  petition  that  the 
cause  of  action  is  barred  by  the  statute, 
and  only  then,  the  defendant  may  demur; 
otherwise  he  must  plead  the  defence 
specially,  since  it  is  never  admissible 
under  the  general  denial,  except  in  the 
action   to   recover  possession    of  land  in 


certain   States  by  virtue  of   express  pro- 
visions of  their  codes.     See  cnite,  §  *679; 
and  as  to  the  defence  in  actions  for  spe- 
cific performance,  see  ante,  §  *  681.     It  is 
so  held  in   Ohio,    Huston   v.    Craighead, 
23  Ohio  St.  198,  209,  210;  in  Minnesota, 
Davenport  r.    Short,   17    Minn.    24,    the 
coui't  saying  that  they  would  not  extend 
the  rule  laid  down  in  Kennedy   r.   Wil- 
liams, 11  Minn.  314  ;  McArdle  v.  McArdle, 
12  Minn.  98;    Eastman   v.  St.   Anthony's 
Falls  W.  P.  Co.,  12  Minn.  137  ;   Hoyt  i;. 
McNeil,  13  Minn.  390;  in  Kan.^as,  Parker 
1-.    Berry,    12    Kan.   351  ;    in  California, 
Brennan  v.  Ford,  46  Cal.  7,  12  ;  in  Iowa, 
Robinson    v.     Allen,    37    Iowa,    27,    29 ; 
Shearer  v.  Mills,  35  Iowa,  499 ;  Moulton 
r.  Walsh,  30  Iowa,  361  ;  Sprin';er  c.  Clay 
Cy.,  35  Iowa,  241 ;  in  Nebraska,  Mills  v. 
Rice,    3   Neb.   76,    87 ;    in    Missouri    the 
defence  can  be  proved   under  a  general 
denial,  when  the  action  is  for  the  recov- 
ery of  land,   Bledsoe   v.   Si  nuns,  53  Mo. 
305,  307  ;  see   ante,  §  *  679 ;  Fairbanks  v. 
Long,  91  Mo.  628  ;  Fulkerson  v.  Mitchell, 
82    Mo.   13;    Bird  v.  Sellers   (Mo.    Supr. 
1893),  21  S   W.  Rep.  91  ;  so  also  in  North 
Carolina,   Falls  of    Neuse   Man.    Co.    i-. 
Brooks,   106  N.  C.  107;  but   the  defence 
must  be  specially  pleaded  in  other  cases, 
Orr  V.  Rode,  101   Mo.  387  ;  Bell  v.  Clark, 
30  Mo.  App.  224 ;  Belleville  Sav.  Bk.  v. 
Winslow,   30   Fed.   Rep.    488.      See  also 
Combs    V.   Watson,    32    Ohio    St.    228; 
Dutcher  v.  Dutcher,  39  Wis.  651  ;  Orton 
V.  Noonau,  25  id.  672;  Heath  r.  Heath,  31 
id.  223  ;  Bardeu  v.  Columbia  Cy.  Sup.,  33 
id.  445  ;  Tarbox  v.  Adams  Cy.  Sup.,  34  id. 
558 ;   Ward  r.  Waters,  63  Wis.  39. 

[[Hayes  r.  Lavagnino  (1898),  17  Utah, 
185,  53  Pac.  1029;  Stoddard  County  v. 
Maloue  (1893),  115  Mo.  508,  22  S.  W. 
469;  Hawkins  v.  Douuerberg  (1901),  40 
Ore.  97,  66  Pac.  691  ;  Battery  Park  Bank 
V.  Loughran  (1898),  122  N.  C*.  668,  30  S.  E. 
17  ;  Oeverraann  r.  Loebertmauu  (1897),  68 
Minn.  162,  70  N.  W.  1084;  Easton  v. 
Somerville  (1900),  111  la.  164,  82  N.  W 
475;  Goring  I'.  Fitzgerald  (1898),  105  la. 


822 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


When  the  Statute  of  Limitations  of  another  State  or  country  is 
relietl  upon  as  a  defence,  the  answer  must  contain  all  the  aver- 


507,  75  N.  W.  358;  Jenks  v.  Lansing 
Lumber  Co.  (1896),  97  la.  342,  66  N.  W. 
231  ;  Small  v.  Cohen  (1897),  102  Ga.  248, 
29  S.  E.  430;  Coney  v.  Home  (1894),  93 
Oa.  723,  20  S.  E.  213 ;  Stringer  v. 
Stringer  (1894),  93  Ga.  320,  20  S.  E.  242  ; 
Hanna  v.  Emerson  (1895),  45  Neb.  708, 
64  N.  W.  229  ;  Blair  v.  Brown  (1897),  17 
Wasli.  570, 50  Pac.  483  ;  Malloy  v.  Chicago 
&  Northwestern  K.  R.  fco.  (1901),  109 
Wis.  29,  85  N.  W.  130  ;  Waliber  r.  Wil- 
liams  (1903),  —  Wis.  — ,  93  N.  W.  47. 

A  mere  averment  in  the  answer  that 
the  action  did  not  accrue  within  the  time 
limited  by  the  statute  of  limitations  is  not 
suflScient:  Dufrene  v.  Anderson  (1903),  — 
Neb.  — ,  93  N.  W.  139  ;  Pinkham  v. 
Pinkham  (1901),  61  Neb.  336,  85  N.  W. 
285;  Scroggin  v.  Nat.  Lumber  Co.  (1894), 
41  Neb.  195,  59  N.  W.  548  ;  Jenks  v.  Lan- 
sing Lumber  Co.  (1896),  97  la.  342,  66 
N.  W.  231  ;  Lassiter  i-.  Roper  (1894),  114 
N.  C.  17,  18  S.  E.  946;  Heyer  v.  Riven- 
bark  (1901),  128  N.  C.  270,  38  S.  E.  875  ; 
Murray  v.  Harden  (1903),  132  N.  C.  136,  43 
S.  E.  600. 

But  objection  to  an  insufficient  plea 
may  be  waived  ;  McDonald  i\  Bice  (1901), 
11.3  la.  44,  84  N.  W.  985;  Kinkead  v. 
Holmes,  etc.  Co.  (1901),  24  Wash.  216,  64 
Pac.  157. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  held  in  some 
States  that  such  an  averment,  although  a 
mere  conclusion,  is  sufficient :  Lilly  v. 
Farmers"  Nat.  Bank  (1900),  Ky.,  56  S.  W. 
722;  Snow  i;.  Rich  (1900),  22  Utah,  123,61 
Pac.  330  ;  Thomas  v.  Glendinning  (1896), 
13  Utaii.  47,  44  Pac.  652  ;  McConnell  r. 
Spicker  (1901),  15  S.  D.  98,  87  N.  W.  574  ; 
Searls  r.  Knapp  (1894),  5  S.  D.  325,  58 
N.  W.  807. 

But  see,  however,  Lloyd  v.  Rawl 
(1902),  63  S.  C.  219,41  S.  E.  312,  where 
the  court  said  :  "  It  has  been  held  in  this 
State  tliat  the  statute  of  limitations  may 
be  proved  under  the  general  denial  or  it 
may  be  pleaded  specifically."  The  rule 
was  belli  to  be  that  wlien  the  statute  is 
relied  upon  merely  ;ia  a  defence,  to  bar 
plaintiff's  recovery,  it  must  be  specially 
j)leaded ;  but  when  it  is  relied  upon  to 
show  title  to  real  property  in  defendant,  it 


may  be  showu  under  the  general  denial, 
as  going  to  controvert  plaintiff's  allega- 
tion of  title.  See  also  Sutton  v.  Clark 
(1901),  59  S.  C.  440,  38  S.  E.  150. 

The  statute  of  limitations  can  be 
pleaded  only  as  a  defence,  but  cannot  be 
used  as  tlie  basis  for  affirmative  relief: 
Johnson  v.  Wynne  (1902),  64  Kan.  138, 
67  Pac.  549  ;  Corlett  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1899),  60 
Kan.  134,  55  Pac.  844. 

Where  an  answer  pleads  a  twenty- 
year  statute  of  limitations  and  a  fifteen- 
year  statute  is  in  fact  applicable,  the 
answer  will  be  iield  good  as  a  plea  of  the 
fifteen-year  statute  :  Waymire  v.  Waymire 
(1895),"  144  Ind.  329,  43  N.  E.  267. 

"  When  any  statute  of  limitations  is 
pleaded  as  a  defence,  if  the  facts  bring  the 
case  within  any  of  the  exceptions  to  the 
statute,  tliey  may  be  set  up  in  the  reply. 
This  is  the  ])roper  practice  :  "  State  fi.r  rcl. 
V.  Parsons  (1896),  147  Ind.  579,47  N.  E.  17. 

Ordinarily  a  third  party  may  not  in- 
terpose tlie  defence  of  the  statute  :  Plum- 
mer.  Perry  &  Co.  v.  Rohmau  (1900),  61 
Neb.  01,  84  N.  W.  600. 

In  Corbey  v.  Rogers  (1898),  152  Ind. 
169,  52  N.  E.  748,  it  was  held  that  in  au 
action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  defendant 
must  aver  facts  showing  that  he  has  such 
au  interest  in  the  real  estate  as  entitles 
liim  to  plead  the  statute.  See  also  Lincoln 
Mortgage  &  Trust  Co.  v.  Parker  (1902),  65 
Kan.  81 9,  70  Pac.  892  (in  case  of  demurrer). 

Tiie  defence  is  waiveil  if  raised  neitlier 
by  answer  nor  demurrer  :  Scroggin  v.  Nat. 
Lumber  Co.  (1894),  41  Neb.  195,  59  N.  W. 
548  ;  Dufrene  v.  Anderson  (1903),  — Neb- 
— ,  93  N.  W.  139;  Hardwick  v.  Ickler 
(1897),  71  Minn.  25,  73  N.  W.  519;  Gil- 
bert V.  llewetson  (1900),  79  Minn.  326,  82 
N.  W.  655;  Schmitt  v.  Hager  (1903),  88 
Minn.  413,  93  N.  W.  110  ;  In  re  Estate  of 
McMurray  (1899),  107  la.  648,  78  N.  W. 
691  ;  Belli'.  Rice  (1897),  50  Neb.  547,  70 
N.  W.  25;  Winters  v.  Means  (1897),  .50 
Neb.  209,  69  N.  W.  753  ;  Hobson  r.  Cum- 
mins (1899),  57  Neb.  611,  78  N.  W.  295; 
McCormick  Harv.  Mach.  Co.  v.  Cum- 
mins (1899),  59  Neb.  330,  80  N.  W.  1049. 

Tiie  statute  begins  to  run  from  the 
time  tliat  llie  debtor  is  subject  to  be  sued 


UNION    OF   DEFENCES.  823 

ments  of  fact  necessary  to  bring  the  case  within  tlie  provisions  of 
such  foreign  enactment:  nothing  will  be  presumed  in  favor  of 
the  pleader.^ 

SECTION   FIFTH. 
THE   UNION   OF   DEFENCES    IN   THE   SAME   ANSWER. 

§  591.  *  715.  Introductory.  All  the  codes,  with  some  slight 
difference  in  the  language,  but  with  none  in  the  meaning  and  effect 
of  the  clause,  provide  that  the  defendant  may  set  up  in  his  answer 
as  many  defences  and  counter-claims  and  set-offs  as  he  may  liave, 
whether  they  be  such  as  have  heretofore  been  denominated  legal 
or  equitable,  or  both.^  When  defences  are  thus  united,  they  must 
each  be  separately  stated,  and  refer  to  the  causes  of  action  they 
are  intended  to  answer.  I  shall,  in  the  present  section,  collect 
the  practical  rules  which  have  been  adopted  by  the  courts  in  con- 
struing this  provision,  touching  the  mode  of  pleading  different 
defences  in  one  answer. 

I.  How  the  Separate  Defences  should  be  stated. 

§  592.  *  716.  Each  Defence  must  be  Complete  in  itself.  The  dis- 
tinction between  partial  and  full  defences  has  already  been  pointed 
out.  Assuming  that  the  defences  are  not  intended  to  be  partial, 
each  must  of  itself  be  a  complete  answer  to  the  whole  cause  of 
action  against  which  it  is  directed,  as  perfectly  so  as  though  it 

or  from  the  time  that  the  creditor  can,  by  Minneapolis  Harvester    Works   v.  Smith 

his  own  act  or  of  his  own  volition,  become  (Neb.    1893),    .53    N.    W.    973  (statute  of 

entitled  to  maintain  an  action :  Winches-  foreign    State) ;    Spanish    Fork    City    v. 

ter    Turnpike  Co.  v.  Wickliffe's    Adm'r  Hopper  (Utah,   1891),  26  Pac.  llep.  293  ; 

(1897),  100  Ky.  531,  38  S.  W.  866 ;  Os-  in    California,   Code   of   Civil  Procedure, 

borne  v.  Lindstrom  (1899),  9  N.  D.  1,  81  §  458. 

N.  W.  72.]  QValz  V.   First  Nat.    Bank   (1895),  96 

1  Gillett   c.   Hill,  32  Iowa,  220.     See,  Ky.  543,  29  S.    W.   329;    Richardson   v. 

as  to  the  degree  of  particularity  required  Mackay  (1896),  4  Okla.  328,  46  Pac.  546. 

in  pleading  the  statute.  Piper  v.  Hoard,  These  cases  hold  that  the  foreign  statute 

107  N.   Y.   67 ;    Pemberton   v.  Simmons,  must    be    pleaded.      In  the    absence    of 

100  N.  C.   316;  Turner  v.   Shuffler,   108  pleading   and  proof    the    foreign   statute 

N.  C.  642  ;  Walker  v.  Laney,  27  S.  C.  150;  will  be  presumed  the  same  as  the  domes- 

Templeton    v.   Sharp    (Ky.,   Nov.,    1888),  tic  statute :  Mowry  r.  McQueen  (1900),  SO 

9  S.  W.  Rep.   507  ;  Thomas  v.  Chamber-  Minn.  385,  83  N.  W.  348.] 
lain,  39  Ohio  St.  112  ;  Paine  y.  Comstock,  2  [[Held   in    Meugert    v.    Brinkerhuff 

57  Wis.  159;  Smith  v.  Dragert,  60  Wis.  (1903),  —  0.  St.  —  ,  66  N.  E.  530,  that  a 

139 ;    Ruggles   V.   Fond  du   Lac  Cy.,  63  defendant  must  plead  all  his  defences,  or 

AVis.  205 ;  Meade  v.  Gilfoyle,  64  Wis.  18  ;  they  are  waived.] 


824  CIVIL   r.EMEDIES. 

were  pleaded  alone.  It  is  not  necessary  that  each  defence  should 
answer  the  entire  complaint  when  that  contains  two  or  more  dis- 
tinct causes  of  action,  because  these  causes  of  action  may  depend 
upon  separate  circumstances,  and  demand  separate  answers.  If 
a  defence,  however,  is  addressed  to  the  whole  complaint,  as  such, 
it  must  completely  controvert  the  whole.^  The  rule,  as  stated  in 
its  general  form,  is,  that  each  defence  must  be  sufficient  in  itself, 
in  its  material  allegations  or  its  denials,  to  constitute  an  answer 
to. the  cause  or  causes  of  action  against  which  it  is  directed,  and 
thus  to  defeat  a  recovery  thereon.^  This  proposition  refers  to  the 
substance  of  the  ilefence.  In  reference  to  the  form  and  manner 
of  stating  this  substance,  it  must,  either  by  actual  statement  in 
full,  or  by  a  proper  reference  to  and  adoption  of  matter  in 
another  defence  found  in  the  same  answer,  contain  averments 
of  all  the  material  facts  or  denials  which  together  make  up  the 
defence.  Each  must  in  its  composition  be  complete,  sufficient, 
and  full ;  it  must  stand  upon  its  own  allegations :  it  cannot 
be  aided,  nor  its  imperfect  and  partial  statements  helped  out,  by 
matter  found  in  another  defence,  unless  such  matter  is  expressly 
referred  to,  and  in  an  express  manner  adopted  or  borrowed  from 
that  other,  and  made  a  part  of  itself.  The  reference,  however,  to 
the  former  defence,  and  the  adoption  of  its  matter,  if  permitted 
at  all,  must  be  express  ;  for  otherwise  the  allegations  of  one  can- 
not be  treated  as  incorporated  in  or  helping  out  those  of  another. 
This  rule  is  well  settled  by  the  authorities,  although  often  disre- 
garded in  practice.^     If  the  defence  is  professedly  a  partial  one, 

1  QWalker  v.  Walker  (1897),  IfiO  Ind.  tains  separate  defences,  each  defence  must 
317,  50  N.  E.  68.]  be  sufficient  in  itself:    it  cannot  be  aided 

2  ^The  code  requirement  tliat  each  de-  by  matter  in  another  defence.  If  not 
fence  must  be  distinctly  stated  in  a  sepa-  thus  complete  and  sufficient,  it  is  demur- 
rate  paragraph  is  substantial  as  well  as  ruble."  Defences  should  be  separately 
formal:  Taylor  r.  Purcell  (1894),  60  Ark.  stated  and  numbered:  but  a  failure  to 
60G,  .31  S.  \V.  h&ir\  comply  with  tliis  rule  can  only  be  taken 

3  Baldwin  v.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.,  54  Barb,  advantage  of  by  a  motion  to  correct ;  if 
505,  517:  "By  the  well-.settled  rules  of  such  motion  is  jiot  made,  the  objection  is 
pleading,  each  answer  [defence]  must  of  waived.  Truitt  v.  Baird,  12  Kan.  420, 
itself  be  a  complete  answer  to  the  whole  423.  Each  defence  must  be  complete  in 
complaint,  as  perfectly  so  a.s  if  it  stood  itself,  and  cannot  be  aided  by  reference 
alone.  Unless  it,  in  terms,  adopts  or  to  the  allegations  in  another.  Potter  v. 
raibTS  to  the  matter  contained  in  some  Earnest,  45  Ind.  416;  Mason  v.  Weston, 
other  answer,  it  must  be  tested  as  a  29  Ind.  561  ;  Day  v.  Vallette,  25  Ind.  42 ; 
pleading  alone  by  the  matter  itself  con-  Leabo  i>.  Detrick,  18  Ind.  414;  Nat.  Bk. 
tains."  Nat.  Bk.  of  Mich.  v.  Green,  .33  of  Mich.  v.  Green,  33  Iowa,  140;  Knarr  v. 
Iowa,  140,  144:  "When  the  answer  con-  Couaway,  42  Ind.  260,  264.     See  also,  as 


UNION    OF   DEFENCES. 


825 


the  foregoing  rule  applies  only  so  far  as  respects  the  manner  and 
form  of  stating  the  facts.  In  a  partial  as  well  as  in  a  full  defence, 
the  averments  cannot  be  aided  by  matter  found  in  another  de- 
fence, unless  the  same  is  expressly  referred  to  and  adopted.^  It 
should  be  observed  also,  that  in  the  case  of  answers  containing 
several  defences,  as  well  as  of  complaints  containing  several 
causes  of  action,  certain  allegations  may  be  introductory,  not 
forming  a  portion  of  either  defence  in  particular,  but  belong- 
ing alike  to  all,  so  that  they  should  be  once  made  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  answer  before  any  one  of  the  separate  defences 
is  stated.2 

§  593.  *  717.  Suggested  Method  of  Pleading  Specific  Denials. 
Common-Law  Theory.  In  this  connection  I  shall  offer  a  few  sug- 
gestions in  reference  to  the  proper  mode  of  pleading  specific 
denials ;  a  mode  which  is  perhaps  not  in  terms  prescribed  by  the 
codes,  but  which  is,  I  think,  plainly  included  within  the  spirit  of 
the  statutory  requirements,  and  which,  if  universally  adopted, 
would  do  much  to  perfect  the  practical  workings  of  the  theor}-" 
which  lies  at  the   foundation  of  the  reformed  procedure.     The 


to  completeness  of  each  defence,  Frazer 
V.  Frazer,  70  Ind.  411 ;  Lash  v.  Rendell, 
72  Ind.  475  ;  and  additional  cases  cited, 
ante,  under  §  *  608  ;  as  to  effect  of  a  de- 
fence pleaded  to  one  of  two  separate  causes 
of  action,  see  Musser  v.  Cruni,  48  Iowa,  52. 
[^But  several  breaclies  of  warranty  by 
the  insured  do  not  constitute  separate  de- 
fences, and  should  all  be  pleaded  as  a 
single  defence :  Hennessy  v.  Metropolitan 
Life  Ins.  Co.  (1902),  74  Conn.  699,  52  Atl. 
490.  The  same  is  true  where  tlie  defence 
consists  of  a  series  of  acts  which  together 
constitute  one  transaction :  Hovland  v. 
Burrows  (1893),  38  Neh.  119,  56  N.  W. 
800.] 

1  Qlackson  v.  Scliool  District  (1900),  110 
la.  313,  81  N.  W.  596;  Douglass  v.  Ins. 
Co.  (1893),  138  N.  Y.  209,  33  N.  E.  938; 
Simonds  v.  East  Windsor  Elec.  Ky.  Co. 
(1900),  73  Conn.  513,  48  Atl.  210  ;  Weston 
V.  Estey  (189G),  22  Colo.^334,  45  Pac. 
367;  Harmau  v.  Harman  (1899),  54  S.  C. 
100,  31  S.  E.  881,  quoting  the  text;  Gil- 
reath  v.  Furman  (1900),  57  S.  C.  289,  35 
S.  E.  516;  Hindman  V.  Edgar  (1888),  24 
Ore.  581,  17  Pac.  862;  Pate  v.  Alhson 
(1901),  114  Ga.  651,  40  S.  E.  715  (holding 
that  words  of  reference  are  ineffectual). 


Statements  made  in  one  defence  in  a 
verified  pleading  cannot  he  used  as  evi- 
dence against  the  party  upon  issues  ten- 
dered by  other  defences :  McDonald  v. 
Southern  Cal.  R.  K.  Co.  (1894),  101  Cal. 
206, 35  Pac. 643.  But  see  Hopkins  r.  Dipert 
(1902),  11  Okl.  630,  69  Pac.  883,  where 
the  court  said  :  "  When  a  general  denial 
is  sufficient  to  entitle  a  party  to  make  a 
complete  defence  to  an  action,  it  is  not 
good  practice  to  attempt  to  set  up  a  state 
of  facts  on  defence  by  way  of  a  second 
count,  which  can  be  proved  under  the  gen- 
eral denial;  and  unless  such  second  de- 
fence does  contain  averments  of  facts 
which  cannot  be  proven  under  the  general 
denial,  and  which  amount  to  a  defence,  it 
does  not  state  facts  sufficient  to  constitute 
a  defence  to  the  action,  and  a  demurrer 
thereto  should  be  sustained."  Where 
separate  defences  are  not  separately  stated 
the  remedy  is  by  motion :  Seaton  v. 
Grimm  (1899),  110  la.  145,  81  N.  W.  225. 
And  an  insufficient  separate  defence  may 
be  stricken  out  on  motion :  Harman  v. 
Harman  (1899),  54  S.  C.  100,  31  S.  E. 
88I.3 

-  [^Gardner  r.  McWilliams  (1902),  42 
Ore.  14,  69  Pac.  915.] 


826  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

advocates  of  the  common-law  pleading  have  never  ceased  to  urge 
that  it  served  to  bring  out  and  present  to  the  jury  for  their  de- 
cision a  single  issue,  —  the  affirmation  and  negation  of  a  single 
fact,  the  verdict  upon  which  determined  the  entire  controversy. 
This  theory  is  certainly  very  beautiful.  We  know,  however,  that 
in  practice  the  results  were  far  different.  Instead  of  this  single 
issue,  in  the  actions  of  assumpsit,  of  debt  on  simple  contract,  and 
of  trover,  the  geneiid  issue  had  come  to  be  almost  the  only  an- 
swer used,  and  under  it  nearly  ever}^  possible  defence  was  admis- 
.sible.  This  evil  produced  the  reform  of  1834  in  England.  That 
reform  consisted  in  limiting  the  effect  of  the  general  issue  in 
respect  of  the  defences  which  could  be  admitted  under  it.  All 
matters  in  confession  and  avoidance  were  required  to  be  specially 
pleaded  ;  and  many  of  the  matters  stated  in  the  declaration,  which 
went  to  make  up  the  cause  of  action,  were  required  to  be  spe- 
cifically denied  by  a  separate  traverse  to  each.  To  illustrate  :  In 
the  action  of  assumpsit,  if  the  contract  sued  on  was  express, 
the  general  issue  of  non-assumpsit  only  denied  the  making  of  the 
contract,  the  promise  ;  if  it  was  im[)lied,  the  same  general  issue 
only  denied  the  existence  of  the  facts  from  which  the  promise 
would  by  law  be  inferred.  If  the  defendant  desired  to  deny  the 
alleged  breach,  he  was  obliged  to  do  so  by  a  separate  specific 
denial,  or  "  special  traverse  "  as  it  was  called.  In  this  manner 
the  issues  were  made  and  kept  single  ;  at  least,  if  there  were 
several  issues  formed  by  the  various  traverses  and  pleas  com- 
prised in  the  same  answer,  each  was  single,  —  the  affirmation  and 
negation  of  one  material,  issuable  fact.  Each  "  special  traverse  " 
was  a  distinct  plea  by  itself,  and  denied  some  averment  in  the 
declaration  which  was  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the  action, 
so  that,  if  the  defendant  was  successful  on  any  one  traverse,  he 
defeated  the  entire  recovery  in  respect  to  that  cause  of  action. 
This  great  reform  undoubtedly  restored  the  common-law  system 
of  pleading  somewhat  to  its  original  theory. 

§  594.  *718.  Objections  to  the  Code  Answered.  While  a  sim- 
ilar condition  of  affairs  was  existing  in  this  country,  tlie  Reformed 
American  Procedure  was  introduced  with  its  radical  changes,  its 
complete  departure  from  the  ancient  notions.  Enemies  of  the 
system,  both  on  the  bench  and  at  the  bar,  have  constantly  reiter- 
ated tlie  objection  that  it  made  no  provision  for  the  development 
through  the  means  of  pleading,  and  for  the  presentiition  to  juries. 


UNION    OF   DEFENCES.  827 

of  single  and  separate  issues  of  fact.  No  objection  could  be  more 
grossly  unfounded.  The  common-law  methods,  as  wrought  out 
by  the  courts,  had  certainly  and  notoriously  failed  to  produce 
that  desired  result ;  and  these  objectors,  when  they  assailed  the 
code  and  compared  it  with  the  former  system,  obstinately  shut 
their  eyes  to  what  that  system  actually  did  in  its  every -day  work- 
ing, and  only  repeated  what  the  theorists  asserted  that  it  oiigld 
to  do.  If  the  spirit  and  design  of  the  code,  as  clearly  shown 
through  all  of  its  important  clauses  and  sections,  were  accepted 
and  carried  out  by  the  courts  and  the  profession,  and  if  its  plain 
requirements  were  obeyed  to  the  full  extent  of  their  meaning,  the 
very  same  beneficial  results  attained  in  England  by  the  legislation 
cind  judicial  action  of  1834  would  be  accomplished  wherever  the 
new  procedure  has  been  established. 

§  595.  *  719.  Same  Subject.  It  seems  to  me  to  be  the  evident 
purpose  of  the  codes  that  all  issues  of  fact  should  be  separated 
and  made  single  ;  and  that,  if  such  a  practice  has  not  yet  been 
generally  attained,  it  is  because  the  rules  prescribed  by  the  statute 
have  been  violated  or  ignored;  in  short,  the  fault  cannot  be 
charged  to  the  system  itself.  The  codes  expressly  prescribe  that 
each  defence  must  be  separate  and  distinct,  and  must  be  so 
.pleaded.  In  respect  to  defences  of  new  matter,  this  requirement 
is  as  precise  and  exacting  as  any  rule  of  the  common  law.^  It  is 
the  duty  of  courts  to  insist  upon  a  compliance  with  this  statutory 
regulation,  if  juries  are  to  be  at  all  aided  in  their  labors  by  the 
issues  as  presented  upon  the  records.  To  combine  a  defence  of 
accord  and  satisfaction,  for  example,  with  one  of  payment,  is  as 
marked  a  violation  of  the  new  procedure  as  of  the  common-law 
theory.  Is  there  any  different  principle  or  rule  in  reference  to 
defences  of  denial?  I  answer.  No.  No  such  difference  can  be 
pointed  out  in  the  statute  itself ;  and  this  fact  alone  is  sufficient 
to  show  the  correctness  of  the  answer.  But  the  proof  of  its  cor- 
rectness is  positive.  The  code  permits  a  general  denial  which 
controverts  all  the  material  allegations  of  the  complaint  or  peti- 
tion, and  thus   presents  a  broad  issue,  but  still  an  issue  which 

1  See  Rose  v.  Hurley,  39  Ind.  77,  81.  been  broken,  and  of  fraudulent  represen- 

In  an  action  upon  a  note  given  for  the  tations  in  respect  to  the  article  made  by 

price  of  an  article  sold  by  the   plaintiff  the   seller.     This  defence  was   overruled 

to  the  defendant,  one  defence  of  the  an-  on  demurrer.     The  opinion  of  Downey  J. 

swer  contained  mingled  allegations  of    a  is  valuable  and  instructive, 
warranty   given   on   the  sale,  which  had 


828  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

is  not  incumbered  with  any  mcitter  by  way  of  confession  and 
avoidance.  The  code  also  permits  specific  denials ;  that  is,  a 
separate  denial  of  some  material  allegation  of  the  complaint  or 
petition.  These  specific  denials  are  identical  in  design  and  effect 
with  the  special  traverses  j^rovided  for  hi/  the  English  rules  of  1834. 
Each  specific  denial  should  be  an  entire  defence  by  itself,  and 
should  be  so  pleaded,  because  it  should  be  the  denial  of  some 
single,  materiid,  issuable  matter  averred  in  the  complaint  neces- 
sary to  the  existence  of  the  cause  of  action,  so  that,  if  sustained, 
it  would  entirely  defeat  a  recovery  on  that  cause  of  action.  As 
the  code  requires  each  defence  to  be  separately  stated,  it  follows 
that  a  specific  denial  should  always  constitute  by  itself  a  distinct 
and  complete  defence,  and  should  be  pleaded  in  such  form,  as 
much,  so  as  any  defence  of  new  matter.  If  the  true  design  and 
intent  of  the  code  in  this  respect  were  fully  carried  out,  two  or 
more  specific  denials  could  never  be  combined  in  one  and  the 
same  defence.  The  answer  might  contain  several  such  denials, 
but  each  would  be  stated  as  one  entire,  independent  defence,  dis- 
tinct from  all  the  others,  and  thus  presenting  one  issue  of  fact, 
arising  from  the  averment  of  the  complaint  or  petition  and  its 
traverse.^ 

§  596.  *  720.  Same  Subject.  If  the  mode  of  pleading  thus  de- 
scribed should  be  generally  adopted, —and  it  seems  to  be  in 
strict  accordance  with  both  the  design  and  the  requirements 
of  the  codes,  —  the  immediate  result  would  be  the  forming  of 
single  issues  on  the  record  for  the  consideration  of  the  jury,  de- 
pending upon  one  afi&rmation  and  one  negation,  far  more  per- 
fectly in  the  actual  practice  than  was  accomplished  while  the 
ancient  procedure  remained  in  existence.  The  confused  method 
of  pleading  which  h.is  undoubtedly  become  too  common,  the  fail- 
ure to  distinguish  and  extract  the  material  issues  from  the  over- 
lying mass  of  useless  details  which  frequently  incumbers  the 
record,  is,  therefore,  no  fault  of  the  codes ;  it  is  rather  in  direct 
opposition  to  their  intent  and  their  express  enactments  ;  and  it 
has  done  far  more  than  all  other  causes  to  diminish  their  useful- 
ness, and  to  hinder  tlie  complete  reform  which  they  were  desio-ned 

1  QSee,  however,  Greenthal  v.  Liucolu,  Act   distinctly  abandoned   the    professed 

Seyms  &  Co.  (1896),  67  Conu.  .372,  35  Atl.  aim  of  the  common  law  to  bring  every 

206,    where    Baldwin    J.,   delivering    the  legal  controversy  to  an  issue  upon  some 

opinion  of  tiie  court,  says  :  "  The  Practice  single,  certain,  and  material  poiut.''^ 


UNION    OF   DEFENCES.  829 

to  consummate.  To  whatever  agency  this  partial  failure  is  to  be 
attributed,  one  thing  is  certain,  —  that  the  courts  have  ample 
power  to  remedy  it,  and  to  accomplish  all  the  beneficial  objects  of 
the  new  procedure  which  were  looked  for  by  its  authors. 

II.    What  Kinds  of  Defences  may  he  joined  in  one  Answer  ;  those 
in  Abatement,  and  those  in  Bar. 

§  597,  *  721.  Defences  in  Abatement  and  in  Bar  may  be  joined 
in  one  Answer.  It  is  now  settled,  in  direct  opposition  to  the  com- 
mon-law rule,  that  defences  which  seek  only  to  abate  the  particular 
axjtion  in  which  they  are  pleaded  may  be  united  with  those  which 
seek  to  bar  all  recovery  upon  the  cause  of  action.^  Being  joined 
in  the  same  answer,  they  are  to  be  tried  and  determined  together 
at  the  one  trial.  The  only  possible  difficulty  in  the  practical 
operation  of  this  rule  arises  from  the  different  effects  of  a  judg- 
ment in  favor  of  the  defendant,  rendered  upon  one  or  the  other 
of  these  classes  of  defences.  As  such  a  decision  upon  the  former 
class  does  not  destroy  the  plaintiff's  right  of  action,  nor  prevent 
him  from  properly  commencing  and  maintaining  another  suit  for 
the  same  cause,  while  a  similar  decision  upon  the  latter  class  does 
produce  that  final  effect  upon  the  right,  and  as  by  a  general  ver- 
dict given  for  the  defendant  upon  all  the  issues  contained  in  the 
record,  and  a  judgment  entered  thereon,  it  might  be  difficult,  and 
perhaps  impossible,  to  determine  which  of  these  results  should 
follow  from  the  judgment  thus  pronounced,  it  is  plain  that,  at 
the  trial  of  an  action  in  which  the  answer  unites  the  two  kinds  of 
defence,  the  judge  should  carefully  distinguish  the  issues  arising 
from  them,  and  should  submit  them  separately  to  the  jury,  and 
direct  a  separate  and  special  verdict  upon  each.  By  pursuing 
this  'course,  the  record  would  show  exactly  the  nature  of  the 
decision,  and  of  the  judgment  entered  thereon.  This  mode  of 
procedure  has  been  sanctioned  by  the  highest  courts. ^ 

i  QWhere  facts  are  i<et  up  which  go  to  Payson,  5  Sandf.  210;  Freeman  v.  Car- 
show  a  misjoinder  but  which  also  go  to  the  penter,  17  Wis.  126;  Thompson  v.  Green- 
merits,  the  answer  will  not  be  held  to  wood,  28  Ind.  327 ;  Bond  v.  Wagner,  28 
raise  the  objection  of  misjoinder :  Leavitt  Ind.  462  ;  Page  v.  Mitchell,  37  Minn.  368. 
V.  S.  D.  Mercer  Co.  (1902),  64  Neb.  31,  89  But  see,  per  contra,  Hopwood  v.  Pat- 
N.  W.  426.]  terson,  2   Ore.  49;    Fordyce  v.  Hathorn, 

2  Sweet  f.  Tuttle,  UN.  Y.  465,  468;  57   Mo.    120;     Cannon   v.   McMauu.s,    17 

Gardner  !:.  Clark,  21  N.  Y.  399 ;  Mayhew  Mo.  345  ;  Rippstein  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  L. 

V.  Robinson,   10  How.  Pr.  162;  Bridge  v.  Ins.    Co.,   57    Mo.    86,    wliich    retain    the 


830 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  598.  *  722.  Inconsistent  Defences.  Three  different  questions 
are  presented  under  this  head  :  (1)  Can  inconsistent  defences  be 
united  in  the  same  answer?  (2)  When  are  particular  defences 
inconsistent?  (3)  If  a  denial  and  a  defence  by  way  of  confes- 
sion and  avoidance  are  joined,  do  the  atlmissions  of  the  latter  over- 
come the  denials  of  the  former,  so  that  the  plaintiff  is  relieved 
from  the  necessity  of  proving  the  allegations  denied  ?  Although 
these  questions  are  clearly  distinct,  yet  the  two  former  have 
often  if  not  generally  been  confounded  in  the  same  decisions,  so 
that  it  will  be  difficult  to  keep  them  entirely  separate  in  the  dis- 
cussion without  much  repetition.  [Assuming  that  tlie  defences 
are  utterly  inconsistent,  the  rule  is  probably  established  b}'  the 
weight  of  judicial  authority,  that,  unless  expressly  prohibited  by 
the  statute,  they  may  still  be  united  in  one  answer.^]     It  fol- 


c'ommon-law  rule,  and  liold  that  a  defence 
in  abatement  is  waived  l>y  pleading  mat- 
ter in  bar.  The  rule  in  Missouri  is  now 
settled  in  accordance  with  the  general 
doctrine  stated  in  the  text;  Little  v.  Har- 
rington, 71  Mo.  390 ;  Byler  v.  Jones,  79  Mo. 
261 ;  Young  Men's  Chr.  Ass'n  v.  Dubach, 
82  Mo.  47.5  ;  Cohn  v.  Lehman,  9.3  Mo.  .574  ; 
Christian  v.  Williams  (Mo.  Supr.  1892),  20 
S.  VV.  Hep.  96;  Mclntire  v.  Calhoun,  27  Mo. 
App.  513.  In  Gardner  v.  Clark,  supra, 
Selden  J.  said  (p.  401 )  :  "  The  only  serious 
inconvenience  suggested  as  likely  to  result 
from  this  construction  of  the  code  is,  that 
when  an  answer  embraces  both  a  defence 
in  abatement  and  one  in  bar,  if  the  jury 
find  a  general  verdict,  it  will  be  impossible 
to  determine  whether  the  judgment  ren- 
dered upon  the  verdict  should  operate  as 
a  bar  to  another  suit  for  the  same  cause 
of  action  or  not.  It  would,  however,  be 
the  duty  of  the  judge  at  the  circuit,  in  such 
a  case,  to  distinguish  between  the  several 
defences  in  suljuiitting  the  cause  to  tlie 
jury,  and  to  require  them  to  find  sepa- 
rately upon  these.  In  that  way,  it  is 
probable  that  the  confusion  which  might 
otherwise  result  may,  in  most  cases,  be 
avoided.  At  all  events,  tlie  code  a<lmits, 
I  think,  of  no  otlier  construction."  See 
also  Dutcher  v.  Dutcher,  39  Wis.  651  ; 
Hooker  !-•.  Green,  50  id.  271.  In  Indiana, 
by  Rev.  -St.  1881,  §  365,  an  answer  in 
abatement  must  precede,  and  cannot  be 
pleaded  witii,  an  answer  in  riar. 


[[Garretson  v.  Ferrall  (1894),  92  la. 
728,  61  N.  W.  251 ;  Union  Guaranty  Co. 
V.  Craddock  (1894),  59  Ark.  593,  28  S.  W. 
424;  Trigg  r.  Kay  (1897),  64  Ark.  150,41 
S.  W.  55.  Contra,  Carmien  v.  Cornell 
(1897),  148  Ind.  83,  47  N.  E.  216.  A  plea 
to  the  jurisdiction  may  be  coupled  with  a 
plea  to  the  merits :  Johnson  v.  Detrick 
(1899),  152  Mo.  243,  53  S.  W.  891. 

It  is  lield  in  some  States  that  a  defend- 
ant may  plead  and  demur  at  the  same 
time  to  the  same  cause  of  action  :  Arizona, 
l{ev.  St.  1901,  §  1350;  Lamb  v.  Ward 
(1894),  114  N.  C.  255,  19  S.  E.  230;  Stahn 
V.  Catawba  Mills  (1898),  53  S.  C.  519,  31 
S.  E.  498.  But  .see  Fidelity  &  Deposit  Co. 
('.  Parkinson  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  94  N.  W. 
120,  holding  that  a  demurrer  is  not  a 
proper  part  of  an  answer,  and  should  be 
disregarded.] 

1  ^Inconsistent  defences  were  allowed 
in  the  following  cases  :  Burns  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  Ky.  Co.  (1900),  110  la.  385.  81  N.  W. 
794;  Thorson  v.  Baker  (1898),  107  la.  49, 
77  N.  W.  510;  Warshawky  i'.  Anchor  Ins. 
Co.  (1896),  98  la.  221,  67  N.  W.  237; 
Kerslakc  v.  Mclnnis  (1902).  113  Wis.  659, 
89  N.  W.  895;  South  Milwaukee  Boule- 
vard Co.  V.  Ilarte  (1897),  95  Wi.s.  592.  70 
N.  W.  821  ;  Societa  Italiana  r.  Sulzer 
(1893),  138  N.  Y.  468,  34  N.  E.  193  ;  Law- 
rence V.  Peck  (1893),  3  S.  D.  645,  54 
N.  W.  808 ;  Green  v.  Hughitt  School  Tp. 
(1894),  5  S.  D.  4.52,  59  N.  W.  224;  Pike 
V.    Sutton    (1895),    21    Colo.    84,   39    I'ac. 


INCONSISTENT  DEFENCES. 


831 


lows  that  the  defendant  cannot  be  compelled  to  elect  between 
such  defences,  nor  can  evidence  in  favor  of  either  be  excluded  at 
the  trial  on  the  ground  of  the  inconsistency.^  [But  a  different 
rule  prevails  in  some  States.^] 


1084;  Carlile  v.  The  People  (1899),  27 
Colo.  116,  59  Pac.  48;  Hill  v.  Groesbeck 
(1901),  29  Colo.  161,  67  Pac.  167;  Millan 
V.  Railway  Co.  (1899),  54  S.  C.  485,  32 
S.  E.  .539;  Threadgill  v.  Commission- 
ers (1895),  116  N.  C.  616,  21  S.  E.  425; 
McLamb  v.  McPhail  (1900),  126  N.  C. 
218,  35  S.  E.  426;  Upton  v.  Railroad  Co. 
(1901),  128  N.  C.  173,  38  S.  E.  736  (but 
see  Fayetteville  Waterworks  Co.  v.  Til- 
linghast  (1896),  119  N.  C.  343,  25  S.  E. 
960);  Miles  y.  Woodward  (1896),  115  Cal. 
308,  46  Pac.  1076;  Bauta  v.  Siller  (1898), 
121  Cal.  414,  53  Pac.  935  (no  difference 
between  verified  and  unverified  pleadings 
in  this  respect). 

In  Montana,  in  the  case  of  Arnold  v. 
Passavant  (1897),  19  Mont.  575,  49  Pac. 
400,  the  court  seemed  to  indicate  a  willing- 
ness to  allow  inconsistent  defences  when 
no  prejudice  would  result,  but  it  was  only 
by  way  of  dictum. 

In  De  Lissa  v.  Coal  Co.  (1898),  59  Kan. 
319,  52  Pac.  886,  the  court  said  :  "  We  are 
aware  that  in  actual  practice  objections 
are  often  made  and  sustained  to  defences 
in  answers  upon  the  ground  that  they  are 
inconsistent  with  each  other.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  validity  of  such  objections  has 
seldom  been  presented  to  this  court,  and 
no  attempt  has  ever  been  made  to  declare 
a  general  rule  upon  the  subject.  Only 
the  special  facts  of  the  cases  presented 
have  been  passed  upon.  However,  con- 
sidering the  numerical  weight  of  the 
authorities,  it  would  seem  that  the  objec- 
tion to  defences  in  an  answer  upon  the 
ground  of  their  inconsistency  with  each 
other  could  never  be  sustained."  The 
court  then  quotes  the  text  in  support  of 
this  proposition,  and  avoids  the  necessity 
of  committing  itself  by  holding  that  in 
the  case  at  bar  the  defences  pleaded  were 
not  inconsistent.  But  see  dictum  of  John- 
son J.,  in  Kansas  Nat.  Bank  v.  Quinton 
(1897),  57  Kan.  750,  48  Pac.  20,  suggesting 
the  other  rule.] 

1  Springer  v.  Dwyer,  50  N.  Y.  19; 
Buhne    v.    Corbett,   43    Cal.    264,   which 


holds  directly  that  a  defendant  may  plead 
as  many  defences  as  he  pleases.  Each 
must  be  consistent  with  itself,  but  need 
not  be  consistent  with  the  otliers ;  and 
there  is  no  distinction  in  this  respect 
between  verified  and  unverified  answers. 
Bell  V.  Brown,  22  Cal.  671  ;  Willson  v. 
Cleaveland,  30  Cal.  192;  Mott  v.  Burnett, 
2  E.  D.  Smith,  50,  52;  Hollenbeck  v. 
Clow,  9  How.  Pr.  289 ;  Butler  v.  Went- 
worth,  9  How.  Pr.  282,  17  Barb.  649; 
Smith  V.  Wells,  20  How.  Pr.  158,  167; 
Vail  V.  .Jones,  31  Ind.  467  ;  Crawford  v. 
Adams,  Stanton's  Code  (Ky.),  91 ;  Wes- 
ton V.  Lumley,  33  Ind.  486,  488.  Sec  also 
People  V.  Lothrop,  3  Call,  428,  450;  Moore 
V.  Willamette  Co.,  7  Ore.  355 ;  Barr  v. 
Hack,  46  Iowa,  308  ;  Wright  v.  Bacheller, 
16  Kan.  259;  Brace  v.  Burr,  67  N.  Y. 
237,240;  Amador  Cy.  v.  Butterfield,  51 
Cal.  526;  Billings  v.  Drew,  52  id.  565; 
Citizens'  Bank  v.  Closson,  29  Ohio  St.  78  ; 
Pavey  v.  Pavey,  30  id.  300  (defendant 
may  be  compelled  to  elect) ;  Stebbins  v. 
Lardner  (.S.  Dak.  1891),  48  N.  W.  Rep. 
847;  Hummel  v.  Moore  (Colo.),  25  Fed. 
Rep.  380;  Reed  v.  Reed,  93  N.  C.  462. 

^  Derby  V.  Gallup,  5  Minn.  119,  120, 
an  action  for  taking  and  carrying  away 
goods.  The  answer  contained  two  de- 
fences: 1.  A  general  denial.  2.  Admitted 
the  taking,  and  justified  it  under  process. 
The  opinion  of  Atwater  J.  is  very  able, 
and  difficult  to  be  answered  on  principle. 
See  also  Cook  v.  Finch,  19  Minn.  407,  411 ; 
Conway  V.  Wharton,  13  Minn.  158,  160; 
Adams  v.  Trigg,  37  Mo.  141:  "A  party 
cannot  iuterpo.se  a  denial,  and  then  avail 
himself  of  a  confession  and  avoidance ;  "" 
Atteberry  v.  Powell,  29  Mo.  429,  a  gen- 
eral denial  and  justification  in  slander 
held  inconsistent;  Fugate  v.  Pierce,  49 
Mo.  441,  449 ;  but  compare  Nelson  v. 
Brodhack,  44  Mo.  596,  which  holds  that 
denials  and  defences  of  confession  and 
avoidance  are  not  necessarily  inconsist- 
ent; Auld  V.  Butcher,  2  Kan.  135;  and 
.see  Baird  v.  Morford,  29  Iowa,  531,  534, 
535.     School  District  v.  Holmes,  16  Neb. 


832 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


§  599.    *  723.    Same    Subject.     Ill    many  instances    the   courts 
have   simply   declared    that    the    particular   defences   united   in 


486,  a  general  denial  and  a  defence 
of  part  payment,  held  inconsistent.  The 
following  New  York  ciises,  mostly  at 
Special  Term,  which  hold  that  inconsist- 
ent defences  cannot  be  permitted,  have 
been  expressly  overruled  by  the  more 
recent  ones  in  the  same  State  cited  above 
in  the  preceding  note.  Koe  v.  Rogers,  8 
How.  Pr.  356 ;  Schneider  v.  Schultz,  4 
Sandf.  664 ;  Arnold  v.  Dimon,  4  Sandf. 
680.  See  also  Mclntire  i'.  Wiegand,  24 
Abb.  N.  Cas.  312  (denial  of  the  making 
of  the  contract  sued  on,  and  defence 
that  it  was  procured  by  plaintiff's  fraud, 
inconsistent,  and  the  denial  .should  be 
stricken  out)  ;  Marx  i\  Gro.<s,  58  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  221  (same). 

[|The  following  cases  have  held  that 
inconsistent  defences  cannot  be  united  in 
the  same  answer :  Hatch  v.  Thompson 
(1895),  67  Conn.  74,  34  Atl.  770;  Fern- 
side  I\  Rood  (1900),  73  Conn.  83,  46  Atl. 
275;  Holliugsworth  v.  Waruuck  (1901), 
112  Ky.  96,  65  S.  W.  163 ;  Lane  v.  Bryant 
(1896)",  100  Ky.  138,  37  S.  W.  584;  -Mur- 
phy I'.  Russell  (1901),  Idaho,  67  Pao.  421 
(when  they  are  mutually  contradictory) ; 
Steenerson  v.  Waterbury  (1893),  52  Minn. 
211,  53  N.  W.  1146 ;  "  iJlodgett  i:  Mc- 
Murty  (1894),  39  Neb.  210.  57  N.  W.  985; 
Home  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Decker  (1898),  55 
Neb.  .346,  75  N.  W.  841 ;  Columbia  Nat. 
Bank  v.  German  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  56 
Neb.  803,  77  N.  W.  346 ;  Oakes  v.  Zienier 
(1900),  61  Neb.  6,  84  X.  W.  409;  Lam- 
berton  v.  Shannon  (1896),  13  Wash.  404, 
43  Pac.  336  ;  Allen  v.  Olympia  Light  & 
Power  Co.  (1895),  13  Wash.  307,  43  Pac. 
55;  Seattle  Nat.  Bank  ;•.  Carter  (1895), 
13  Wash.  281,  43  Pac.  331 ;  Davig  v.  Ford 
<1896),  15  Wash.  107,45  Pac.  739;  Lord 
V.  Horr  (1902),  30  Wash.  477,  71  Pac.  23  ; 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  w.  Carnahan  (1900),  63 
O.  St.  258,  58  N.  E.  805  (the  test  being 
whether  all  can  be  verified  by  oath  with- 
out swearing  fal.sely) ;  Dwelling  Hou.se 
Ins.  Co.  V.  Brewster  (1895),  43  Neb.  528, 
61  N.  W.  746 ;  State  ex  inf.  v.  Firemen's 
Fund  Ins.  Co.  (1899),  152  Mo.  1,  52  S.  W. 
595. 

Oregon  follows  the  same  rule,  and  holds 
that  where   denials   and    iifhrmative    de- 


fences, inconsistent  with  each  other,  are 
united  in  the  same  answer,  the  direct  ad- 
missions contained  in  the  affirmative  de- 
fences will  be  taken  as  true :  Baines  r. 
Coos  Bay  Nav.  Co.  (1902),  41  Ore.  135, 
68  Pac.  397  ;  Randall  r.  Simmons  (1902), 
40  Ore.  554,  67  Pac.  513  ;  Veasey  v.  Hum- 
phreys (1895),  27  Ore.  515,  41  Pac.  8; 
Maxwell  v.  BoUes  (1895),  28  Ore.  1,  41 
Pac.  661.  In  Veasey  r.  Humphreys 
(supra),  the  court  made  the  following 
suggestion  as  to  pleading  deni.ils  and 
affirmative  defences:  "It  often  happens 
that  new  matter  directly  alleged  would  be 
inconsistent  with  an  absolute  traverse,  so 
that  both  could  not  be  verified,  and,  in 
such  case,  if  the  pleader  desires  to  avail 
himself  of  both  defences,  tliat  is,  to  jiut 
the  opposing  party  to  the  proof  of  his 
plea,  and  at  the  same  time  save  to  himself 
an  aflKrmative  defence,  it  is  essential  that 
the  allegations  of  new  matter  should  be 
qualified,  or  el.se  should  be  preceded  by 
a  qualified  traverse.  These  oljservatious 
apply  to  such  defences  as  are  only  appar- 
ently inconsistent,  but  when  clearly  so  it 
is  doubtful  whether  they  can  be  pleaded 
in  the  same  answer."  Tiie  qualification 
of  the  new  matter  should  be  as  found  in 
the  old  precedents.  "  Thus,  as  found  in 
Cliitty,  the  contract  to  be  avoided  should 
be  alluded  to  as  '  the  said  supposed  con- 
tract,' etc." 

The  test  of  inconsistency  is  whether 
proof  of  one  defence  would  tend  to  dis- 
prove another:  Robinson  v.  Hill  (1902), 
Ky.,  66  S.  W.  623 ;  Smith  v.  Doherty 
(1901 ),  109  Ky.  616,  60  S.  W.  .380  ;  Cate  r. 
Hutchinson  (1899),  58  Neb.  232,  78  N.  W. 
500;  People's  Nat.  Bank  v.  Geisthardt 
(1898),  55  Neb.  232,  75  N.  W.  582;  Mur- 
phy I'.  Russell  (1901),  Idaho,  67  Pac.  421. 
A  motion  requiring  defendant  to  elect 
upon  which  defence  he  will  go  to  trial,  is 
the  proper  method  of  objecting  to  incon- 
sistent defences;  Lane  v.  Bryant  (1896), 
100  Ky.  138,  37  S.  W.  584  ;  Holliugsworth 
r.  Warnock  (1901 ),  —  Ky.  — ,  65  S.  W. 
163  ;  Dunn  r.  Bozarth  (1899),  59  Neb.  244. 
80  N.  W.  811  ;  Davis  ?•.  Ford  (1896),  15 
Wash.  107,  45  Pac.  739  (motion  to  strike 
out)  ;    De    Lissa    >:    Coal   Co.   (1898),    59 


INCONSISTENT  DEFENCES. 


833 


the  answers  before  them  were  not  in  fact  inconsistent,  and  have 
not  passed  upon  the  question  in  its  general  form.  In  many  of 
these  cases,  however,  the  defences  were  apparently  as  inconsistent 
as  those  which  have  been  rejected  by  other  courts  in  the  decisions 
last  quoted.  I  have  placed  in  the  foot-note  a  number  of  examples, 
and  have  indicated  the  nature  of  the  defences  thus  suffered  to  be 
united.! 


Kan.  319,  52  Pac.  886;  McCormick  Harv. 
Mach.  Co.  V.  Hiatt  (1903),  —  Neb.  — ,  95 
N.  W.  627. 

If  no  motion  is  made  tlie  objection  will 
be  deemed  waived :  Dunn  v.  Bogarth 
(1899),  59  Neb.  244,  80  N.  W.  811.  Such 
a  motion  comes  too  late  after  filing  a  re- 
ply :  Vernon  v.  Union  Life  Ins.  Co.  (1899), 
58  Neb.  494,  78  N.  W.  929.  "  Where  in- 
consistent defences  are  pleaded,  and  one 
is  eliminated  by  an  instruction,  plain- 
tiff cannot  complain  :  "  Green  v.  Tierney 
(1901),  62  Neb.  561.  87  N.  W.SSl.] 

1  Nelson  v.  Brodhack,  44  Mo.  596,  ac- 
tion of  ejectment,  general  denial,  and 
Statute  of  Limitations ;  holds  that  gen- 
eral denial  and  confession  and  avoidance 
are  not  necessarily  inconsistent,  and  over- 
rules Bauer  i'.  Wagner,  39  Mo.  385 ;  and 
see  McAdow  v.  Ross,  .53  Mo.  199,  202; 
Cavitt  V.  Tharp,  30  Mo.  App.  131,  action 
on  a  note,  denial  of  plaintiffs  ownership, 
and  payment ;  Schuchman  v.  Heath,  38 
Mo.  App.  280,  action  on  a  note,  denial 
of  execution,  and  Statute  of  Limitations ; 
Kelly  V.  Bernheimer,  3  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct. 
140,  the  court  will  not  compel  an  election 
between  defences  "  unless  they  are  so  far 
inconsistent  that  both  cannot  properly  co- 
exist in  the  same  transaction ; "  Kellogg 
V.  Baker,  15  Abb.  Pr.  286,  a  general  de- 
nial, Statute  of  Limitations,  and  release, 
are  not  inconsistent ;  Lansing  v.  Parker, 
9  How.  Pr.  288,  in  assault  and  battery,  a 
general  denial,  self-defence,  and  defence 
of  possession  of  land,  are  not  inconsistent ; 
Ostrom  V.  Bixby,  9  How.  Pr.  57,  denial 
and  Statute  of  Limitations ;  Ormsby  v. 
Douglas,  5  Duer,  665,  slander,  denial,  and 
justification ;  Hackley  v.  Ogmun,  10  How. 
Pr.  44,  action  to  recover  possession  of 
chattels,  general  denial,  and  a  justification 
of  the  taking;  Booth  v.  Sherwood,  12 
Minn.  426,  trespass  to  lands ;  answer, 
(1)  denies  title,  and  (2)  license;  Steener- 


son  V.  Waterbury  (Minn.  1893),  53  N.  W. 
Rep.  1146,  action  for  services  rendered; 
answer,  general  denial,  and  payment ; 
Pike  V.  King,  16  Iowa,  49,  general  denial 
and  set-off ;  Willson  v.  Cleaveland,  30  Cal. 
192,  ejectment,  denial  of  title,  and  Statute 
of  Limitations. 

[Additional  instances  of  defences  held 
not  to  be  inconsistent  are  found  in  the 
following  cases :  George  Fowler,  Sons  & 
Co.  V.  Brooks  (1902),  65  Kan.  861,  70  Pac. 
— :  general  denial  and  contributory  neg- 
ligence; Leavenworth  Light,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Waller  (1902),  65  Kan.  514,  70  Pac.  365  : 
same;  Pugh  v.  Oregon  Imp.  Co.  (1896), 
14  Wash.  331,  44  Pac.  689:  same;  Lord 
V.  Horr  (1902),  30  Wash.  477,  71  Pac.  23  : 
in  a  suit  for  reformation,  that  the  deed 
expressed  the  contract  and  that  there  was 
such  a  mutual  mistake  as  entitled  defend- 
ant to  rescind;  Gates  v.  Avery  (1901), 
112  Wis.  271,  87  N.  W.  1091:  same; 
Kline  v.  Hanke  (1894),  14  Mont.  361,  36 
Pac.  454:  in  an  action  for  rent,  eviction 
by  plaintiff  and  that  defendants  were  only 
tenants  from  month  to  month  ;  Blodgett 
V.  McMurty  (1894),  39  Neb.  210,  57  N.  W. 
985 :  general  denial  and  estoppel ;  Home 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  y.  Decker  (1898),  55  Neb. 
346,  75  N.  W.  841  :  failure  to  furnish 
proofs  of  loss  and  that  plaintiff  caused 
premises  to  be  burned ;  Gate  v.  Hutchinson 
(1899),  58  Neb.  232,  78  N.  W.  500:  gen- 
eral denial  and  unreasonable  and  unjust 
account;  Corbitt  v.  Harrington  (1896),  14 
Wash.  197,  44  Pac.  132  :  a  denial  of  knowl- 
edge or  information  as  to  the  execution 
of  a  guaranty  and  fraud  in  its  execu- 
tion, if  it  was  executed  ;  Booco  v.  Mans- 
field (1902),  66  O.  St.  121,  64  N.  E.  115: 
denial  of  execution  and  })lea  of  no  consid- 
eration ;  Smith  v.  Doherty  ( 1901),  109  Ky. 
616,  60  S.  W. 380:  same;  First  Nat.  Bank 
V.  Wisdom's  Ex'rs  (1901)  ;  111  Ky.  13.5,63 
S.  W.  461  :  same;  Spencer  r.  Society  of 
53 


834 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


^  600.  *  724.  Effect  of  Admissions  in  One  Defence  upon  Issues 
Raised  in  Another.  When  a  denial  is  pleaded  in  connection  with 
a  defence  of  new  matter,  or  two  defences  of  new  matter  are  set 
np,  the  admissions  in  the  one  can  never  be  used  to  destroy  the 
effect  of  the  other.  The  concessions  of  a  defence  by  way  of  con- 
fession and  avoidance  do  not  obviate  the  necessity  of  proving  the 
averments  contradicted  by  the  denial.^  This  rule  is  universal. 
Even  in  those  States  where  inconsistent  defences  are  not  per- 
mitted to  stand,  the  remedy  is  by  striking  out,  or  by  compelling 
an  election,  and  not  by  using  the  admissions  of  one  to  destroy  the 
issues  raised  by  the  other.^ 

§  601.  *  725.  Facts  Pleaded  as  both  Defence  and  Counter-Claim. 
When  the  facts  stated  in  an  answer  constitute  both  a  defence  and 
a  counter-claim,  and  are  not  twice  pleaded  in  separate  divisions, 
but  are  alleged  only  once  with  a  proper  demand  for  relief  as  in  a 


Shakers  (1901  ),Ky.,  64  S.  W.  468:  same; 
Hausman  v.  Mulherau  (1897),  68  Minn.  48, 
70  X.  AV.  866:  an  admission  of  rent  due 
and  a  counter-claim  for  repairs  made; 
Robinson  v.  Hill  (1902),  Kv.,  66  S.  W. 
623 :  breach  of  warranty  and  settlement ; 
Fisher  v.  Stevens  (1898),  143  Mo.  181,  44 
S.  W.  769  :  in  ejectment,  a  general  denial 
and  an  equitable  defence  that  defendant 
purchased  the  laud  at  a  trustee's  sale ;  De 
Lissa  V.  Coal  Co. :  general  denial  of  con- 
tract and  fraud  ;  Bank  of  Glencoe  v.  Cain 
(1903),  89  Minn.  473,  95  N.  W.  308;  same. 
In  the  following  cases  the  defences  were 
held  inconsistent :  Omaha  Fire  Ins.  Co.  j;. 
Dierks  (1895),  43  Neb.  473,  61  N.  W. 
745 :  that  the  policy  was  not  in  force  at 
the  time  of  tiie  loss  and  want  of  notice  of 
loss;  HoUingsworth  v.  Warnock  (1901), 
112  Ky.  96,  65  S.  W.  163  :  accidental  shoo^ 
ing  and  shooting  in  self-defence ;  Lane  v. 
Bryant  (1896),  100  Ky.  138,37  S.  W.  584  : 
denial  of  speaking  slanderous  words  and 
justification;  Baines  r.  Coos  Bay  Xav.  Co. 
(1902),  41  Ore.  135,68  Pac.  397:  denial 
of  execution  of  note  arid  allegations  that 
it  was  executed  in  pursuance  of  a  fraudu- 
lent conspiracy;  Davis  v.  Ford  (1896),  15 
Wash.  107,  45  Pac.  739:  an  affirmative 
defence  admitting  a  contract  and  a  de- 
rial  of  the  same;  Dwelling  House  Ins. 
Co.  i\  Brewster  (1895),  43  Neb.  528,  61 
N.  W.  746  :  denial  and  waiver,  estoppel  or 
avoidance.] 


1  [^See,  however,  Hamill  v.  Ct)peland 
(1899),  26  Colo.  178,  56  Pac.  901,  where  a 
defence  of  new  matter  was  held  to  relieve 
the  plaintiff  from  proving  a  contract 
Avhich  defendant  had  denied  in  another 
defence.  And  in  several  of  those  States 
where  inconsistent  defences  are  not  al- 
lowed, the  force  of  a  denial  inconsistent 
with  an  admission  is  destroyed  by  the 
latter. 

In  Lamberton  v.  Shannon  (1896),  13 
Wash.  404,  43  Pac.  336,  it  was  held  that 
a  general  denial,  "except  as  herein  ex- 
pressly admitted,  explained  or  qualified," 
will,  in  the  absence  of  anything  restricting 
the  application  of  such  qualification,  apply 
to  an  afiirmative  defence  pleaded  in  the 
same  answer,  and  the  force  of  the  denial 
will  be  limited  by  the  averments  of  new 
matter  there  contained.] 

-  Quigley  i-.  Merritt,  1 1  Iowa,  147 ; 
Shannon  v.  Pearson,  10  Iowa,  588  ;  Grash 
V.  Sater,  6  Iowa,  301  ;  Siter  v.  Jewett,  33 
Cal.  92  ;  Nudd  v.  Thompson,  34  Cal.  39, 
47  ;  Buhne  v.  Corbett,  43  Cal.  264.  See 
Venice  r.  Breed,  65  Barb.  597,  603,  per 
Mullin  J.  See  also  Amador  Cy.  v.  But- 
terfield,  51  Cal.  526;  Billings  v.  Drew, 
52  id.  565;  Lawrence  v.  Peck  (S.  Dak. 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Bep.  808. 

I3i:)ougla.ss  V.  Ins.  Co.  (1893).  138  N.  Y. 
209,  33  N.  E.  938;  Church  v.  Pearne 
(1903),  75  Conn.  350,  53  Atl.  955.] 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  835 

counter-claim,  the  defect,  if  any,  can  only  be  reached  by  motion. 
If  not  so  remedied,  the  defendant  may  at  the  trial  rely  upon  the 
answer  in  both  of  its  aspects.^ 


SECTION    SIXTH. 

COUNTER-CLAIM,  SET-OFF,  CROSS-COMPLAINT,  AND  CROSS- 
DEMAND. 

§  602.  *  726.  Statutory  Provisions.  Two  Groups.  Special  Pro- 
visions of  Indiana  and  low^a  Codes.      Similarity  of   Code  Provisions. 

A  reference  to  the  statutory  provisions  collected  at  the  com- 
niencement  of  section  first  of  this  chapter  shows  that  some  im- 
portant differences  exist  among  the  various  codes  in  respect  to 
the  matters  stated  in  the  above  title.  Most  of  the  codes  may 
be  separated  into  two  groups,  each  following  a  certain  w^ell- 
defined  type.  The  first  group  contains  those  which  provide  for 
a  "  counter-claim,"  and  for  no  other  sort  of  cross-demand,  and 
which  adopt  the  following  formula  in  defining  it :  "  The  counter- 
claim must  be  one  existing  in  favor  of  a  defendant  and  against  a 
plaintiff  between  whom  a  several  judgment  might  be  had  in  the 
action,  and  arising  out  of  one  of  the  following  causes  of  action: 
1.  A  cause  of  action  arising  out  of  tlie  contract  or  transaction 
set  forth  in  the  complaint  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim,  or  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action ;  2.  In  an 
action  arising  on  contract,  any  other  cause  of  action  arising  also 
on  contract,  and  existing  at  the  commencement  of  the  action."  ^ 

1  Lancaster,  O.,  Man.  Co.  w.  Colgate,  12  -  [[Northern  Trust  Co.  v.  Hiltgen 
Ohio  St.  344;  but  per  contra,  see  Camp-  (1895),  62  Minn.  .361,  64  N.  W.  909:  A 
bell  V.  Routt,  42  Ind.  410,  415,  which  holds  counter-claim  to  be  admi.«sible  under  G.  S. 
that  the  .same  pleading  cannot  be  both  a  1894,  §  5237,  subd.  2,  must  exist  in  favor  of 
"  defence"  and  a  counter-claim  ;  if  it  pur-  a  defendant  and  against  a  plaintiff  at  the 
ports  to  be  a  counter-claim,  and  sets  up  a  time  the  action  is  commenced.  And  fur- 
cause  of  action,  and  prays  for  relief,  the  ther,  such  demand  is  not  available  as  a 
defendant  cannot  treat  it  as  a  defence  in  counter-claim  when  it  is  acquired  by  de- 
bar merely.  fendaut  long  after  the  insolvency  of  the 

[^See  Farmers'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hunter  party  against  whom  it  exists.  Wigmore 
(1899),  35  Ore.  188,  57  Pac.  424,  where  c.  Buell  (1897),  116  Cal.  94,  47  Pac.  927: 
the  court  intimates  the  opinion  that  Hill's  In  an  action  of  ejectment  to  recover  cer- 
Ann.  Laws,  §  73,  giving  defendant  the  tain  lands,  defendant  cannot  plead  a  coun- 
right  to  set  forth  as  many  defences  as  he  ter-claim  for  damages  to  an  adjacent  tract 
may  have,  applies  to  matters  which  are  of  land  owned  by  him,  caused  by  plain- 
defensive  only,  and  does  not  sanction  join-  tiff's  cattle  running  upon  the  said  tract, 
ing  a  counter-claim  with  other  defences.]  Said  action  for  damages  neither  arises  out 


836  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

The  second  group  embraces  those  in  which  the  "  counter-claim  " 
is  substantially  identical  with  the  first  subdivision  of  the  section 
just  quoted,  and  in  which  a  "set-off"  is  also  defined  in  substan- 
tial agreement  with  the  second  subdivision.  The  following  are 
the  formulas  adopted  in  this  group :  "  The  counter-claim  must 
be  one  existing  in  favor  of  a  defendant  and  against  a  plaintiff 
between  whom  a  several  judgment  might  be  had  in  the  action, 
and  arising  out  of  the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in  the 
complaint  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  action."  "  A  set-off  can  only  be 
pleaded  in  actions  founded  on  contract,  and  must  be  a  cause 
of  action  arising  upon  contract,  or  ascertained  by  a  decision  of 
the  court."  The  codes  of  Indiana  and  of  Iowa  cannot  be  re- 
ferred to  either  of  these  two  general  groups :  their  provisions 
are  quite  different  in  language  from  the  common  type,  and  much 
broader  in  meaning.  They  will  be  found  quoted  at  large  in  sec- 
tion first  of  this  chapter.^  In  several  of  the  States  a  special  pro- 
vision is  made  for  the  introduction  of  new  parties  made  necessary 
by  the  pleading  of  a  "  counter-claim  "  or  "  set-off."  ^  The  counter- 
claim in  the  ordinary  form  must  be  in  favor  of  a  defendant  and 
against  a  plaintiff  between  whom  a  several  judgment  on  the  ac- 
tion is  possible.  This  requirement,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  sequel, 
may  sometimes  fail  of  working  complete  justice  between  the  par- 
ties. Thus,  for  example,  when  a  surety  is  sued,  and  a  cross- 
demand  against  the  plaintiff  exists  in  favor  of  the  principal  debtor, 
the  surety  cannot  interpose  this  claim  because  it  is  not  in  his  own 
favor.  To  obviate  this  and  similar  difficulties,  the  codes  of  In- 
diana and  of  Iowa  have  added  special  provisions  covering  the  class 
of  cases  described,  and  authorizing  one  defendant,  under  certain 
specified  circumstances,  to  avail  himself  of  a  counter-claim  or  set- 

of  the  transaction  nor  is  it  connected  with  N.  C:  561,  32  S.  E.  889.     See  also  Kirby 

the  subject  of  the  action.  v.  Jameson  (1896),   9  S.  D.   8,67  N.  W. 

The   counter-claim   is  the  creature  of  854;  Gurske   v.  Kelpin    (1901),    61    Neb. 

the  code,  and  the  code  provides  for  it  in  517,  85  N.  W.  557  ;  Bank  of  Arkansas  City 

two  cases,  (1)  a  cause  of  action  arisinpj  v.  Hasie  (1897),  57  Kan.  754,  48  Pac.  22.] 
out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  by  plaintiff  ^  See  su}>ra,  §§  *  583,  *  584. 

or  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  ac-  ^  gee  supra,  §  *  584  (n.),  where  these 

tioii,  (2)    in  an    action  on   contract,  any  sections  of  the  statutes  are  given  in  full, 

other  contract  existing  at  the  commence-  The  New  York  Code  of  Civil  Procedure 

ment  of  the  action.     This  limitation  as  to  provides  (§501)  that  "the  counter-claim 

existence   at   the   commencement  of    the  mu.st   tend,  in  .some  way,  to  diminish  or 

action  applie.s   only  to  the  second  class  :  defeat  the  plaintiff's  recovery." 
Piedmout    Bank   v.    Wilson    (1899),    124 


COUNTEIi-CLAIM.  837 

off  existing  in  favor  of  a  co-defendant,  when  the  liability  of  both 
to  the  plaintiff  is  joint,  or  one  is  a  surety  for  the  other.^  From  a 
comparison  of  the  various  clauses  above  quoted  or  referred  to,  it 
is  plain  that  the  judicial  decisions  giving  a  construction  to  the 
sections  of  the  codes  embraced  in  the  first  and  second  groups  can 
all  be  used  in  constructing  the  full  theory  of  the  "  counter-claim  " 
which  forms  so  marked  and  important  an  element  in  the  new  pro- 
cedure. In  all  these  States,  the  "  counter-claim  "  singly,  or  the 
"  counter-claim  "  and  "  set-off "  taken  together,  are  not  only  the 
same  in  substance,  but  are  defined  in  almost  exactly  the  same 
language,  so  that  the  interpretation  given  by  the  courts  of  one 
State  can  aid  in  determining  the  questions  which  may  arise  in 
another.  The  decisions  made  in  Indiana  and  Iowa,  however, 
must  to  a  certain  extent  stand  by  themselves;  for  they  are  based 
upon  statutes  which  are  in  many  respects  special  in  their  terms, 
and  different  in  their  meaning. 

§  603.  *  727.  Arrangement  of  Subject-Matter  for  Discussion. 
The  subject-matter  of  this  section  will  be  arranged  in  the  fol- 
lowing order,  and  distributed  into  the  following  subdivisions: 
I.  A  general  description  of  the  "counter-claim,"  its  nature, 
objects,  and  uses.  II.  The  parties  in  their  relations  with  the 
counter-claim ;  including  the  requirements  that  the  demand  must 
be,  1.  In  favor  of  the  defendant  who  pleads  it;  and  2.  Against 
the  plaintiff;  and,  3.  When  it  may  be  set  up  in  favor  of  one  or 
some  of  several  defendants  or  against  one  or  some  of  several 
plaintiffs ;  that  is,  when  a  several  judgment  may  be  had  in  the 
action  between  such  defendant  and  plaintiff.  III.  The  subject- 
matter  of  the  counter-claim,  or,  in  other  words,  the  nature  of  the 
causes  of  action  which  may  be  pleaded  as  counter-claims.  This 
most  important  subdivision  will  include  several  heads:  viz., 
1.  Whether  a  counter-claim  must  be  a  legal  claim  for  damages, 
—  like  the  set-off  or  the  recoupment  of  the  former  system,  —  or 
whether  it  may  be  for  equitable  or  other  special  relief;  2.  When 
the  counter-claim  is,  or  is  alleged  to  be,  a  cause  of  action  arising 
out  of  the  contract  set  forth  in  the  complaint  or  petition  as  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim ;  3.  When  it  is,  or  is  alleged 
to  be,  a  cause  of  action  arising  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth 
in  the  complaint  or  petition  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim ;  4.    When  it  is,   or  is  alleged  to  be,  a  cause   of  action 

1  See  supra,  §  *584  (n.),  for  these  sections  in  full. 


838  CIVIL    EEMEDIES. 

connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action.  The  discussion  of  these 
topics  will  require  the  special  examination  and  interpretation  of 
certain  phrases  and  clauses  of  the  statute,  upon  the  true  meaning 
of  which  they  all  to  a  great  extent  depend :  namely,  («)  the  in- 
terpretation of  "the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,"  or  when 
is  a  contract  or  transaction  "the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim  "?  (6)  interpretation  of  "arising  out  of,"  or  when  does  a 
cause  of  action  "arise  out  of"  a  contract  or  transaction?  (c) 
interpretation  of  "transaction,"  (c?)  and  of  "subject  of  the 
action;"  (e)  and  of  "connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action," 
or  when  is  a  cause  of  action  "connected  with  the  subject  of 
the  action"?  Resuming  the  statement  of  subordinate  heads: 
5.  In  actions  founded  on  contract,  a  counter-claim  founded  on 
another  contract,  which  embraces  in  particular  (a)  the  power  of 
electingf  between  actions  in  form  founded  on  contract  and  those 
in  form  founded  on  tort ;  and  (h}  the  requirement  that  the  cause 
of  action  must  exist  at  the  time  when  the  suit  was  commenced. 
IV.  Set-off  as  defined  in  several  of  the  codes.  V.  Certain  mis- 
cellaneous rules  applicable  to  all  counter-claims  and  set-offs. 
VI.  The  special  provisions  found  in  the  codes  of  certain  States, 
and  especially  in  those  of  Indiana  and  of  Iowa.  VII.  The  reply. 
This  arrangement,  although  perhaps  not  strictly  scientific,  is  in 
exact  conformity  with  the  order  pursued  by  the  statute,  and  is, 
therefore,  the  one  best  adapted  for  our  present  purpose.  A  full 
discussion  of  all  the  topics  mentioned  will  certainly  cover  the 
whole  ground,  and  will  develop  the  complete  theory  of  the 
"counter-claim"  as  it  appears  in  the  codes. 

§  604.  *  728.  Couuter-Claim  to  be  compared  -with  Cross-Demands 
of  Former  System.  It  will  materially  aid  in  determining  the  exact 
province  and  scope  of  the  counter-claim  if  we  compare  it  with 
the  cross-demands  in  legal  actions  permitted  by  the  former 
system  of  procedure.  I  shall  therefore,  by  way  of  preface, 
and  without  going  into  unnecessary  details,  state  the  funda- 
mental principles  upon  which  those  cross-demands  were  based, 
and  the  general  rules  which  governed  their  use. 

§  605.  *  729.  The  Cross-Demands  Allowed  by  the  Former  Pro- 
cedure. The  cross-demands  in  legal  actions  allowed  by  the  former 
procedure  were  "set-off  "  and  "  recoupment  of  damages."  Origi- 
nally the  common  law  acknowledged  no  such  defence  or  pro- 
ceeding on  the  part  of  a  defendant:  the  primitive  notion  of  an 


SET-OFF.  839 

action  did  not  admit  the  possibility  of  a  defendant  being  an  actor 
and  interposing  a  claim  against  the  plaintiff  to  be  tried  in  the 
one  suit.  The  legislature  effected  the  change,  and  invented  the 
*' set-off."^  Being  entirely  of  statutory  origin,  the  "set-off," 
when  used  in  actions  at  law,  was  necessarily  kept  within  the 
limits  prescribed  by  the  terms  of  the  enactment,  and  was  not 
extended  beyond  their  fair  import.  The  court  of  chancery,  not 
acting  directly  in  pursuance  of  this  legislation,  but  being  guided 
rather  by  its  analogies,  was  never  restricted  to  its  exact  provi- 
sions, and  created  an  "equitable  set-off  "  broader  and  more  com- 
prehensive than  that  administered  by  the  courts  of  law.  The 
original  English  statute  permitted  a  set-off  only  in  the  case  of 
mutual  "debts."  As  this  word  had  a  well-known  technical 
meaning  in  the  legal  procedure,  it  served  to  restrict  the  use 
of  the  set-off  to  the  single  class  of  demands  which  were  at  the 
common  law  described  by  the  term  "debt;  "  namely,  those  which 
arise  from  contract,  and  are  fixed  and  certain  in  their  amount. 
There  could  not,  therefore,  be  a  set-off  of  general  "  damages  " 
resulting  from  the  breach  of  contracts,  but  only  of  those  claims, 
the  amount  of  which  had  been  ascertained  and  settled  by  the 
promise  itself,  so  that  there  could  be  no  discretion  in  the  jury, 
and  no  "assessment"  by  them.  Tliis  original  notion  of  the  set- 
off was  generally  perpetuated  in  the  legislation  of  the  various 
States  prior  to  the  Codes  of  Procedure;  although  in  some  its 
scope  had  been  enlarged,  and  made  to  embrace  any  pecuniary 
demand  arising  from  contract,  whether  "debt"  or  "damages." 
Where  the  original  notion  was  preserved,  the  exact  language 
of  the  English  statute  was  not  always  retained;  but  its  force 
and  effect  were  not  materially  changed.  I  have  given  in  the 
note  an  abstract  of  the  New  York  statute  as  an  example  of  the 
legislation,  since  it  does  not  substantially  differ  from  that  of 
other  States.^ 

1  (^Gen.  Elec.  Co.  v.  Williams  (1898),  own  right,  as  being  the  original  creditor 

123  N.  C.  51,  31  S.  E.  288-3  or  ^^  being  the  assignee  and  owner.    3.  It 

-  2  R.  S.  p.  354,  §  18,  p.  335,  §§  21,  must   be  for  the  price  of   real  estate  or 

22;   2  Edm.  Stat,  at  Large,  p.  3G5,  §  18,  personal    property   sold,    or    for    money 

p.  367,  §§  21,   22.     The   defendant   may  paid,  or  for  services  done;  or,  if  not  one 

set  off  demands  which  he  has  against  the  of  these,  the  amount  must  be  liquidated, 

plaintiff  in  the  following  cases :  1.  It  must  or   be   capable   of  being   ascertained   by 

arise  upon  a  judgment  or  upon  a  contract,  computation.      4.    It   mu.st   have   existed 

express   or   implied,  sealed    or   unsealed,  at  the  time  of  the  commencement  of   the 

2.  It  must  be  due  to  the  defendant  in  his  suit,  and  must  then  have  belonged  to  the 


840 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


§  606.  *  730.  Discussion  of  New  York  Statute  of  Set-ofiF.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  discuss  this  statute,  nor  to  cite  cases  illustrat- 
ino-  its  meaning.  It  has  been  dispLaced  by  the  more  compre- 
hensive provisions  of  the  code.  It  is  clear  that  if  the  plaintiff's 
action  was  on  a  contract  and  for  a  "debt,"  —  for  the  more  ex- 
tended language  of  the  statute  describes  only  a  "debt,"  —  and 
the  defendant  held  another  "  debt "  due  from  the  plaintiff  per- 
sonally, and  existing  in  his  own  favor,  and  which  did  so  erist  at 
the  commencement  of  the  action,  he  could  plead  such  demand  as 
a  set-off;  and  if  it  exceeded  the  amount  of  the  plaintiff's  claim, 
he  could  have  judgment  against  the  plaintiff  for  the  surplus. 
Also  in  an  action  for  the  same  kind  of  demand,  brought  by  a 
plaintiff  who  had  really  assigned  the  claim,  and  was  therefore  a 
nominal  party  only,  or  brought  by  a  plaintiff  who  was  a  trustee, 
or  sued  on  behalf  of  another  person,  or  brought  by  an  assignee  of 
negotiable  paper  transferred  after  it  became  due,  the  defendant 


defendant.  5.  The  action  itself  must  be 
founded  upon  a  similar  demand  wliicli 
could  itself  be  a  set-off.  6.  If  there  are 
several  defendants,  the  demand  must 
be  due  to  them  jointly.  7.  It  must  be  a 
demand  existing  against  the  plaintiff  in 
the  action,  unless  the  suit  be  brought  in 
the  name  of  a  plaintiff  who  has  no  real 
interest  in  the  contract  upon  which  the 
suit  is  founded ;  in  which  case  no  set-off 
of  a  demand  against  tlie  plaintiff  shall  be 
allowed,  unless  as  hereinafter  specified. 
It  will  be  remembered,  that,  when  this 
statute  was  passed,  things  in  action  were 
not  generally  assignable,  so  that  an  ac- 
tion could  be  maintained  by  the  assignee 
as  plaintiff :  if  actually  transferred,  the 
action  was  brought  in  the  name  of  the  as- 
signor as  nominal  plaintiff;  while  the 
real  owner  —  the  assignee  —  was  not  a 
party  to  the  record.  But  full  transfers 
were  permitted  in  the  case  of  negotiable 
paper  :  the  succeeding  subdivisions  pro- 
vide for  the  special  circumstances  arising 
when  there  has  been  an  assignment. 
8.  In  an  action  on  a  contract  not  negoti- 
able, which  has  been  assigned  by  the 
plaintiff  (the  plaintiff,  therefore,  being  a 
nominal  party,  and  having  no  real  in- 
terest), a  demand  existing  against  such 
plaintiff,  or  against  the  a.ssignee,  at  the 
time  of  tlie  assignment,  and  belonging  to 
the  defendant  before  notice  of  tlie  a.ssigu- 


ment,  may  be  set  off  to  the  amount  of  the 
plaintiff's  demand  (that  is,  the  demand 
sued  upon).  9.  If  the  action  is  on  negoti- 
able paper,  assigned  to  the  plaintiff  after 
it  became  due,  the  defendant's  demand 
against  tlie  assignor  thereof  may  be  set 
off  to  the  amount  of  the  claim  in  suit. 
10.  If  the  plaintiff  is  a  trustee,  or  if  he  has 
no  real  interest  in  the  suit,  the  defendant's 
demand  against  the  person  beneficially 
interested  may  be  set  off  to  the  amount  of 
the  claim  in  suit.  In  all  of  these  latter 
cases,  the  defendant's  demand,  in  order 
to  be  a  set-off,  must  fall  within  the  de- 
scription given  in  the  former  subdivisions. 
If  the  amount  of  the  set-off  as  established 
equals  the  plaintiff's  demand,  the  judg- 
ment shall  be  rendered  that  the  plaintiff 
take  nothing  by  his  action  ;  if  it  be  less, 
the  plaintiff  shall  have  judgment  for  the 
residue  only.  K  there  be  found  a  balance 
due  to  the  defendant,  judgment  shall 
be  rendered  for  the  defendant  for  the 
amount  thereof ;  except  that  no  such 
judgment  shall  be  rendered  against  the 
plaintiff  when  the  contract  upon  which 
the  suit  is  founded  shall  have  been  as- 
signed before  the  commencement  of  the 
suit,  nor  when  the  balance  is  due  from  any 
other  person  than  the  plaintiff  in  the 
action.  QSteck  r.  C.  F.  &I.  Co.  (1894).  142 
N.  Y.  2.36,  ^7  N.  E.  1  ;  Bennett  v.  Edisou 
Elec.  Co.  (1900),  1G4  N.  Y.  131,  58  N.  E.  7. 


RECOUPMENT   OF   DAMAGES.  841 

might  set  off  a  similar  kind  of  demand  which  he  had  against 
either  the  assignor  or  the  assignee  in  the  first  case  before  notice 
of  the  assignment,  or  against  the  beneficiary  in  the  second  case^ 
or  against  the  assignor  in  the  third  case;  but  he  could  not  by 
such  set-off  do  more  than  defeat  the  plaintiff's  recovery:  he 
could  not  have  a  judgment  for  any  balance  due  to  himself.  The 
reason  for  this  latter  rule  is  very  plain ;  for  in  neither  of  these 
cases  was  the  plaintiff  the  real  ]party  in  interest  and  the  debtor  at 
the  same  time. 

§  607.  *  731.  Origin  of  Set-off  and  Recoupment.  Resemblances 
and  Dissimilarities.  While  set-off  was  entirely  of  statutory  origin, 
the  doctrine  and  practice  of  "  recoupment  of  damages  "  had  their 
inception  in  the  law  of  judicial  decision.  From  the  notion  of 
absolute  non-performance  as  a  total  defence,  the  progress  w^as 
easy  and  natural,  through  the  partial  defences  of  a  part  per- 
formance and  a  reduction  of  damages  by  means  of  unskilful  or 
negligent  performance,  to  the  admission  of  a  cross-demand  in 
favor  of  the  defendant  for  damages  resulting  from  the  acts  or 
omissions  of  the  plaintiff  that  amounted  to  a  breach  of  the  con- 
tract sued  upon.  In  this  manner  the  doctrine  of  recoupment 
took  its  rise,  and  it  was  developed  by  decision  after  decision 
until  it  became  established  in  the  courts  of  England  and  of 
the  American  States,  —  a  defence  as  well  known  and  as  widely 
admitted  within  its  scope  as  the  statutory  set-off.  There  were 
resemblances  and  dissimilarities  between  these  two  defences. 
Both  were  confined  to  actions  upon  contract,  and  must  them- 
selves arise  from  contract;  but  here  the  resemblance  ends.  A 
set-off  must  be  for  a  debt,  a  fixed  certain  sum,  at  least  capable 
of  being  ascertained  by  computation:  recoupment  was  of  dam- 
ages, often  entirely  unliquidated,  and  depending  upon  an  assess- 
ment by  a  jury.  A  set-off  was  necessarily  a  demand  arising  upon 
a  different  contract  from  the  one  in  suit :  recoupment  was  neces- 
sarily of  damages  resulting  from  a  breach  of  the  very  same  contract 
sued  upon.  In  set-off  the  defendant  might  sometimes  recover  a 
balance  from  the  plaintiff:  in  recoupment  this  could  never  be 
done.-'  The  doctrine  may  be  summarily  stated.  In  an  action 
upon  a  contract  to  recover  either  liquidated  or  unliquidated 
damages  or  a  debt,  the  defendant  might  set  up  by  way  of  de- 
fence and  recoup  the   damages  suffered   by  himself   from    any 

1  nSt.  Louis  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gay  (1894),  101  Cal.  2SC,  35  Pac  87G.] 


842  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

breach  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  same  contract.  At  an  early  period 
it  was  supposed  that  only  damages  arising  from  the  plaintiff's 
fraud  in  inducing  the  defendant  to  enter  into  the  contract,  or  in 
executing  the  same,  could  be  recouped ;  but  it  was  subsequently 
settled  that  fraud  was  not  a  necessary  element,  and  that  any 
breach  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  same  contract  which  he  makes  the 
basis  of  his  action  would  admit  the  defence  of  recoupment.  The 
rule  was  stated  in  the  following  manner  in  a  case  which  arose  a 
short  time  before  the  new  system  of  procedure  was  adopted :  "  It 
cannot  be  denied,  consistently  with  the  doctrine  now  well  estab- 
lished, but  that,  in  an  action  for  a  breach  of  contract,  the  de- 
fendant may  show  that  the  plaintiff  has  not  performed  the  same 
contract  on  his  part,  and  may  recoup  his  damages  for  such  breach 
in  the  same  action,  whether  they  were  liquidated  or  not,  or  may 
at  his  election  bring  a  separate  action."  ^  Recoupment  was,  how- 
ever, used  solely  as  a  defence :  it  could  do  no  more  than  defeat 
the  plaintiff's  recovery;  even  though  the  defendant's  damages 
should  exceed  those  proved  by  the  plaintiff,  he  could  have  no 
judgment  for  the  surplus. ^ 

§  608.  *  732.  Illustrations  of  Recoupment.  The  nature,  scope, 
and  intent  of  the  doctrine  may  be  illustrated  by  a  statement  of 
some  familiar  instances  in  which  recoupment  was  used;  and  it 
will  be  readily  seen  in  all  of  thera  that  the  defendant's  demand 
was  based  upon  a  breach  of  the  contract  which  was  the  founda- 
tion of  the  action,  although  often  of  other  stipulations  or  cove- 
nants in  that  agreement  than  the  one  which  it  was  alleged  he 
himself  had  broken.  Thus,  in  an  action  brought  to  recover  the 
price  of  land,  the  defendant  could  recoup  the  damages  arising 
from  the  plaintiff's  fraudulent  representations  concerning  the 
land,  by  which  he  had  been  induced  to  enter  into  the  con- 
tract ;  ^  and  in  an  action  for  the  price  of  goods  sold,  damages 
resulting  from  the  plaintiff's  breach  of  a  warranty  on  the  sale ;  "* 
and  in  an  action  for  services,  damages  from  the  negligent  or  un- 
skilful manner  of  their  performance ;  ^  and  in  an  action  on  a  lease 
for  rent  or  use  and  occupation,  damages  from  the  plaintiff's  breach 

1  Mayor,  etc.  of    N.  Y.  v.   Mabie,   1-3  *  Reab  «.  McAlister,  8  "Wend.  109. 

N.  Y.  151,  153,per  Denio  J. ;  and  seeBat-  «  Rlanchard   v.   Ely,    21    Wend.  342; 

terman  u.  Pierce,  3  Hill,  171 ;  Murden  v.  Sickels  r.  Patti.son,  U  Wend.  257  ;  Still  >: 

Priment,  1  Hilt. 75.  Hall,  20  Wend.  51  ;  Ives  i-.  Van  Epps,  22 

2  Sickels  V.  Patti.«on,  14  Wend.  257.  Wend.  155. 
*  Van  Kpi)s  v.  Harrison,  5  Hill,  63. 


KECOUPMEXT   OF    DAMAGES.  843 

of  a  covenant  to  repair,  or  covenant  for  quiet  enjoyment;^  or 
damages  from  the  plaintiff's  fraud  in  inducing  defendant  to  enter 
into  the  lease. '^^  But  recoupment  is  confined  to  damages  from  a 
breach  of  the  contract  sued  on.^  The  same  doctrine,  which  has 
thus  far  been  illustrated  exclusively  from  New  York  cases,  pre- 
vailed in  the  other  States  to  the  same  extent,  and  perhaps,  in 
some  of  them,  had  even  a'  wider  application.  A  very  few  ex- 
amples will  suffice.  In  an  action  upon  a  promissory  note,  the 
answer  alleging  that  the  note  was  given  by  the  defendant  for 
the  price  of  the  plaintiff's  services  in  constructing  and  mounting 
a  water-wheel,  and  that  the  work  was  done  and  the  wheel  made 
and  mounted  in  a  very  negligent  and  unskilful  manner,  to  the 
defendant's  damage,  was  held  to  state  a  proper  case  for  a  re- 
coupment of  defendant's  damages ;  *  and  in  an  action  upon  a 
sealed  agreement  to  recover  an  amount  due  for  certain  sawing 
done  by  the  plaintiff  in  pursuance  thereof,  and  also  damages 
from  the  defendant's  failure  to  furnish  the  stipulated  number  of 
logs  to  be  sawed,  damages  arising  from  the  plaintiff's  breach  of 
other  covenants  were  recouped;^  and  damages  from  the  plain- 
tiff's failure  to  build  according  to  the  specifications  were  per- 
mitted to  be  recouped  in  an  action  for  the  price. ^  In  Indiana, 
where  the  defendant  had  given  a  note  for  the  purchase-price  of 
land  sold  him  by  the  payee,  and  the  latter  had  afterwards  wrong- 
fully entered  upon  the  land  and  taken  and  converted  the  growing 
crops,  it  was  held  in  an  action  upon  the  note  that  the  damages 
resulting  from  these  wrongful  acts  of  the  plaintiff  could  not 
be  recouped,  since  they  were  independent  trespasses,  and  not 
breaches  of  the  contract."  The  doctrine  was  applied  in  Missouri 
to  the  following  facts :  The  action  was  brought  to  recover  rent 
of  a  farm  leased  to  defendant  by  a  verbal  agreement:  the  an- 
swer set  up,  that,  by  further  provisions  of  the  same  contract, 
the  plaintiff"  stipulated  to  build  and  maintain  a  fence  between  the 
premises  leased  and  other  land  occupied  by  himself;  that  he  neg- 
lected to  build  the  fence,  and,  by  reason  of  his  neglect,  his  cattle 

1  Whitbeck  v.  SkiDner,  7  Hill,  53;  Dor-  Deming  v.  Kemp,  4  Saudf.   147;  Terrell 

•win  I'.  Potter,    5  Denio,   306;   Mayor  o.  v.  Walker,  66  N.  C.  244,  251. 
Mabie,  13  N.  Y.  151.  i  Butler  y.  Titus,  13  Wis.  429. 

2  Allaire    v.    Whitney,   1     Hill,    484;  ^  Morrison  v.  Lovejoy,  6  Minn.  319. 

Whitney  v.  Allaire,  1  N.  Y.  305  ;  4  Denio,  ^  Mason  v.  Hey  ward,  3  Minn.  182. 

554.  7  Slayback  v.  Jones,  9  Ind.  470. 

^  Seymour    v.    Davis,   2    Sandf.    239 ; 


844  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

came  upon  defendant's  farm,  and  destroyed  crops  thereon.  The 
damages  thus  sustained  were  held  to  be  the  proper  subject  of 
recoupment.^ 

§  609.    *  733.     Mere  Defences   Distinguished  from   Set-off  or  Re- 
coupment,   Counter-claim    or    Cross-Demand.      Another    species    of 

defence,  which  existed  at  the  common  law  and  still  exists,  is 
sometimes  confounded  with  recoupment  or  with  coiniter-claim, 
although  it  bears  no  real  resemblance  to  either,  and  should  be 
carefully  distinguished  from  both ;  namely,  the  reduction  of  the 
amount  claimed  to  be  due  in  suits  for  the  price  of  goods  sold  or 
of  services  rendered  in  most  instances  when  the  action  is  on  a 
quantum  meruii  or  quantum  valebant.  In  set-off  and  in  recoup- 
ment, the  essence  of  the  defence  consists  in  a  cause  of  action 
against  the  plaintiff  or  some  other  person:  whether  a  judgment 
is  recovered  or  not  is  immaterial,  but  a  right  of  action  always 
lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  legal  notion.  In  the  defence  referred 
to,  there  is  no  such  right:  it  is  simply  a  process  of  subtracting 
from  the  amount  of  the  adverse  claim,  and  therefore  operates 
directly  upon  that  demand.  Set-off  and  recoupment,  on  the 
other  hand,  do  not  attack  the  adverse  claim  itself;  and  for  that 
reason  it  is  often  said  that  they  are  not  true  defences :  they 
admit  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  and  set  up  an  affirmative 
cross-demand,  so  that  the  sums  awarded  for  each  may  satisfy 
one  another,  leaving  only  a  surplus  to  be  received  by  the  party 
who  obtains  the  larger  amount.  The  distinction  is  very  plain ; 
but  it  has  sometimes  been  overlooked.  One  example  will  be  a 
sufficient  illustration.  In  an  action  for  the  price  of  goods  sold 
and  delivered,  and  of  work  and  labor  done  amounting  as  alleged 
to  $197,  the  answer  set  up  that  the  goods  furnished  and  the 
work  done  were  worth  no  more  than  $173,  and  as  to  that  sum 
averred  payment.  On  the  trial,  the  defendant  offered  evidence 
tending  to  show  that  the  articles  were  to  be  of  a  certain  kind  and 
quality ;  that  they  were,  on  the  contrary,  very  inferior  in  quality ; 
and  the  consequent  diminution  in  value  and  price.  This  evi- 
dence was  rejected  on  the  ground  that  the  reduction  sought 
could  only  be  claimed  by  way  of  "recoupment  of  damages  or 
of  set-off."  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  reversing  this 
ruling,  pronounced  the  defence  admissible,  since  it  was  in  no 

1  Hay  V.  Short,  49  .Mo.  139,  142.     QFoote  &  Davis  Co.  v.  Malony  (1902),  115  Ga. 
985,42  S.  E.  41.3.] 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  845 

sense  a  claim  for  damages  against  the  plaintiff,  but  simply  a 
diminution  of  the  value  of  the  goods  and  the  labor,  as  that 
had  been  established  prima  facie  by  the  plaintiff.^  The  same 
principle  applies  through  the  whole  range  of  possible  defences, 
under  whatever  forms  they  may  be  set  up:  if  they  simply  attack 
the  cause  of  action,  and  show  that  by  virtue  thereof  tlie  plaintiff 
ought  not  to  recover  at  all,  or  recover  all  that  he  demands,  they 
are  not,  and  cannot  be,  answers  in  the  nature  of  "set-off"  or 
"  recoupment  "  under  the  old  system,  or  of  "  counter-claim  "  or 
"cross-demand"  under  the  new.  Thus  the  defence  of  payment 
cannot,  by  any  mode  of  averment,  be  made  a  counter-claim ;  ^ 
nor  that  of  usury.  ^  And  generally,  whenever  the  facts  pleaded 
are  merely  in  bar  of  the  action,  and  the  relief  demanded  by  the 
defendant  is  only  what  would  be  the  legal  judgment  in  his 
favor  upon  those  facts,  the  answer  is  not  a  counter-claim,  nor, 
a  fortiori,  a  cross-complaint,  although  it  may  be  in  the  form  of 
the  latter  species  of  pleading.*  From  this  preliminary  statement 
of  the  former  defences  which  contained  some  of  the  elements 
that  are  found  in  the  modern  counter-claim,  and  of  others  which 
have  nothing  in  common  with,  but  are  sometimes  mistaken  for, 
the  counter-claim,  I  now  proceed  to  a  direct  discussion  of  the 
latter  as  it  is  defined  and  authorized  by  the  codes,  and  shall 
follow  the  order  of  treatment  already  indicated.^ 

I.   A  General  Description  of  the  Counter-Glaim ;  its  Nature,  Objects 

and  Uses. 

§  610.  *  734.  Scope  of  Inquiry  herein.  Under  this  subdivision 
I  shall  collect  from  leading  judicial  decisions  such  opinions,  and 
portions  of  opinions,  as  have  in  the  clearest  and  most  accurate 
manner  described  the  general  nature,  objects,  and  uses  of  the 
counter-claim,  and  shall  add  the  comments  and  explanations 
that  seem  necessary  to  a  full  development  of  the  subject.  The 
discussion  is  here  confined  to  the  general  properties  of  the 
counter-claim,   and  does  not  descend  to  its  various  special  ele- 

1  Moffet  V.  Sackett,  18  N.  Y.  522.  *  Bledsoe  v.  Rader,  30  Ind.  354;  Bel- 

2  Burke  v.  Thome,  44  Barb.  363.  leau  v.  Thompson,  33  Cal.  495. 

2  Prouty   V.  Eaton,  41   Barb.  409,  412,  ^  QFor  a  history  of  legislation  upon  the 

per  T.  A.  Johnson  J.  subject  of  set-off,  and  references,  see  Steck 

nSmith  V.  Building    Ass'n  (1896),  119  v.  Colorado  Fuel  &  Iron  Co.  (1894),  142 

N.  C.  257,  26  S.  E.  40;  Gen.  Elec.  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  236,  31  N.  E.  V.^j 
Williams  (1898),  123  N.C.  51,31  S.E.  288.] 


846  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

ments  and  features,  which,  depending  upon  the  particular  terms 
of  the  statutes,  demand  a  more  critical  examination. 

Sell.  *  735.  One  Class  of  Cases  Included  in  Term  ''Set-off'^ 
under  Former  Procedure  not  Included  in  Counter-CIaim.  Mere  De- 
fence not  a  Counter-Ciaim.  There  are  certain  conclusions  which  are 
evident  upon  the  mere  reading  of  the  statute.  Under  the  former 
procedure,  the  term  "set-off"  included  two  quite  distinct  classes 
of  cases:  namely,  (1)  those  in  which  the  defendant  might  recover 
an  affirmative  judgment  for  a  "debt"'  against  the  plaintiff;  and 
(2)  those  in  which  the  demand  in  his  favor  could  only  be  used 
defensively  to  diminish,  or  perhaps  defeat,  the  recovery  by  the 
plaintiff.  The  codes  provide  for  both  these  classes  of  eases. 
Those  sections  which  permit  the  action  to  be  brought  by  an 
assignee  of  a  thing  in  action,  and  allow  under  certain  circum- 
stances the  same  matters  to  be  interposed  as  a  defence  against 
him  which  would  have  been  available  against  the  assignor,  and 
those_  sections  which  permit  the  action  to  be  brought  b}'  a  trustee 
of  an  express  trust,  and  allow  the  same  matters  to  be  set  up  as  a 
defence  against  him  which  would  have  been  available  against  the 
party  beneficially  interested,  —  these  sections  plainly  embrace  the 
second  class  of  "set-offs"  above  mentioned;  namely,  those  in 
which  the  demand  could  be  used  as  a  defence^  but  not  as  the  basis 
of  an  affirmative  recovery  against  the  plaintiff.  On  the  other 
hand,  these  cases  are  not  included  within  the  description  given 
of  a  counter-claim.  1  A  defence,  even  though  it  consists  of  a 
claim  for  relief  against  some  person^  but  does  not  permit  a  recov- 
ery against  the  plaintiff,  is  not  a  counter-claim.  The  first  class 
of  "set-offs"  above  mentioned  is  embraced  within  the  definition 
of  the  counter-claim  as  given  by  those  codes  which  constitute  the 
first  group  according  to  the  division  made  in  a  former  paragraph.  ^ 
In  the  codes  which  constitute  the  second  group,  the  same  class 
of  "  set-offs  "  is  substantially  described  under  the  original  name 
which  belonged  to  that  species  of  answer  in  the  old  procedure.^ 

§  612.  *  736.  Recoupment  a  Species  of  Counter-Claim.  How- 
Modified  and  Enlarged.  The  "  recoupment  of  damages  "  has  un- 
dergone a  most  important  modification.     It  is  confessedly  covered 

1  ^Piedmont  Bank  v.  Wilson    (1899),  2  See§*726. 

124  N.  C.  ."iGl,  .32  S.  E.  889;    Lindsay,  etc.  »  [  St.  Louis  Nat.  Bank  v.  Gay  (1894), 

Co.   V.   Carpenter  (1894),  90  la.  529,   58  101  Cal.  286,  35  Pac.  87G.] 
N.  W.  900  ] 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  847 

b}'  the  definition  of  counter-claim  given  in  all  the  codes  without 
exception.  In  those  forming  the  two  principal  groups  according 
to  the  classification  heretofore  made,  it  is  described  by  the  ex- 
press language,  "a  cause  of  action  arising  out  of  the  contract 
set  forth  in  the  complaint  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim;"  in  that  of  Indiana  it  is  described  by  the  language, 
''  any  matter  arising  out  of  or  connected  with  the  cause  of  action 
which  might  be  the  subject  of  an  action  in  favor  of  the  defend- 
ant, or  which  would  tend  to  reduce  the  plaintiff's  claim  or 
demand  for  damages;"  and  in  that  of  Iowa  by  the  language,  "a 
cause  of  action  in  favor  of  the  defendants,  or  some  of  them,  against 
the  plaintiffs,  or  some  of  them,  arising  out  of  the  contract  set 
forth  in  the  petition."  ^  It  is  beyond  dispute,  then,  that  the  re- 
coupment of  damages,  as  the  same  was  authorized  by  the  courts 
under  the  old  practice,  is  made  a  species  of  counter-claim  by  all 
the  codes.  But  its  effects  have  been  greatly  enlarged.  As  it 
has  been  transferred  into  a  counter-claim,  it  partakes  of  all  the 
essential  features  conferred  upon  that  kind  of  defence  by  the 
statute.  For  this  reason,  the  defendant,  who  would  formerly 
have  set  up  the  facts  in  recoupment  of  damages,  and  who  now 
pleads  the  same  facts  as  a  species  of  counter-claim,  may  upon 
the  basis  of  those  facts  obtain  a  judgment  for  damages  in  his 
favor  against  the  plaintiff,  if  the  proofs  upon  the  trial  warrant 
such  a  result. 

§  613.  *  737.  Counter- Claim  Broader  than  Set-off  and  Recoup- 
ment. Kinds  of  Causes  of  Action  that  may  be  interposed  as 
Counter-claims.  The  two  classes  of  affirmative  relief  mentioned 
in  the  foregoing  paragraphs,  important  as  they  are,  do  not  ex- 
haust the  scope  and  efficacy  of  the  counter-claim.  The  causes 
of  action  which  were  the  basis  of  a  "  recoupment  of  damages  " 
or  of  a  "  set-off, "  as  those  terms  were  legally  defined,  all  neces- 
sarily arose  from  a  breach  of  contract.  The  language  employed 
by  the  codes  speaks  of  causes  of  action  as  constituting  a  counter- 
claim, which  do  not  arise  out  of  contract.  It  mentions  three 
alternatives,  —  causes  of  action  (1)  arising  out  of  the  contract 
set  forth  in  the  complaint,  or  (2)  arising  out  of  the  transaction 
set  forth  in  the  complaint,  or  (3)  conriected  with  the  subject  of 
the  action.  Unless  we  would  accuse  the  legislature  of  tlie  most 
absurd  and  misleading  tautology,  tins  language  was  intended  to 

^  See  p.  G97,  ante,  where  statutes  are  given  in  full. 


848  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

affirm  that  there  may  be  counter-claims  which  do  not  arise  out 
of  contract.  Arising  out  of  the  "transaction,"  and  "connected 
•with  the  subject  of  the  action,"  are  pUiced  in  opposition  to  "aris- 
ing out  of  contract."  As  "recoupment  of  damages"  and  "set- 
off "  must  be  based  upon  the  non-performance  of  a  contract,  it 
follows  that  the  counter-claim  was  designed  to  include  other 
demands  to  which  neither  of  these  two  terms  can  apply.  What 
are  these  other  demands  ?  I  do  not  now  attempt  to  answer  this 
question  in  detail :  it  is  enough  to  point  out  the  general  nature 
of  all  such  possible  cases.  If  causes  of  action  are  for  the  recov- 
ery of  money  only,  they  must  either  be  upon  contract  or  for  a 
tort.  Is  there  any  possible  cause  of  action  upon  contract,  which 
is  neither  a  "set-off  "  nor  a  "recoupment  of  damages,"  and  which 
may  be  embraced  within  the  definition  of  a  counter-claim?  There 
is :  a  cause  of  action  for  the  breach  of  a  contract  other  than  the 
one  sued  upon,  when  the  demand  is  for  damages  merely,  to  be 
assessed  by  the  jury,  and  not  for  a  debt,  is  neither  a  "set-off" 
nor  a  "recoupment,"  and  yet  is  plainly  described  by  the  second 
subdivision  of  the  definition  found  in  all  the  codes  which  form 
the  first  group,  and  by  the  definition  of  "  set-off  "  found  in  all 
those  which  make  up  the  second  group.  As  the  word  "  trans- 
action "  seems  to  imply  causes  of  action  not  necessarily  upon 
contract,  those  arising  from  tort  may  perhaps,  under  proper  cir- 
cumstances, be  the  subject  of  counter-claim ;  but  the  discussion  of 
this  particular  question  will  be  deferred  to  a  subsequent  part 
of  this  section.  I  will  now  sum  up  the  possible  cases,  or  classes 
of  cases,  which  may  be  included  within  the  broad  definition  of 
the  counter-claim  as  given  in  the  codes  of  the  first  group :  if  we 
pass  to  the  second  group,  certain  of  these  classes  would  fall 
within  the  term  "  set-off  "  rather  than  counter-claim.  Of  the 
causes  of  action  which  terminate  in  a  recovery  of  money  alone, 
the  counter-claim  expressly  embraces  (1)  the  matters  which 
under  the  former  procedure  gave  rise  to  a  recoupment  of  dam- 
ages; (2)  the  cases  of  "set-off"  in  which  a  judgment  for  debt 
against  the  plaintiff  was  possible ;  (3)  demands  to  recover  un- 
liquidated damages  for  the  breach  of  a  contract  not  the  founda- 
tion of  the  plaintiff's  suit,  and  possibly  (-4)  demands  to  recover 
damages  for  torts,  if  the  same  arose  out  of  the  "  transaction  "  set 
forth  in  the  complaint  or  petition,  or  are  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject of  the  action.     These  exhaust  all  the  possible  instances  of  a 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  849 

mere  pecuniary  recovery.  Counter-claim  may  also  embrace  cases 
of  an  equitable  nature  in  which  affirmative  relief  is  granted  to 
the  defendant.^  Such  cases  are  as  plainly  described  by  the  gen- 
eral language  of  the  codes  as  those  of  a  purely  legal  character 
which  seek  only  a  pecuniary  judgment.  In  order  to  shut  out 
these  claims  for  equitable  relief,  and  to  limit  the  counter-claim 
to  causes  of  action  for  the  recovery  of  money,  the  terms  of  the 
statute  must  be  read  with  restrictions  interpolated  into  their 
midst  which  were  not  placed  there  by  the  legislature.  Were 
it  not  that  the  ancient  set-off  and  recoupment  could  only  be 
used  in  legal  actions  brought  to  recover  money,  no  judge  would 
have  thought  that  a  like  limitation  must  be  put  upon  the  lan- 
guage of  the  codes.  How  far  the  counter-claim  includes  equi- 
table relief  will  be  fully  discussed  in  the  sequel.  Finally,  the 
only  other  cases  which  could  possibly  come  within  the  definition 
of  counter-claim  are  legal  causes  of  action  to  recover  possession 
of  lands,   or  to  recover  possession  of  chattels. 

§  614.  *  738.  Essential  Elements  and  Test  of  Counter-Claim. 
Must  be  a  Cause  of  Action.  Having  thus  enumerated  the  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  causes  of  action  and  of  relief  which  may  be  used 
by  the  defendant  as  counter-claims,  I  shall  proceed  to  point  out 
some  essential  features  and  elements  which  must  exist  in  each  of 
these  cases ;  that  is,  some  essential  elements  which  enter  into  the 
very  notion  of  the  counter-claim.  (1)  It  must  be  a  cause  of 
action.  2  In  other  words,  the  facts  must  be  such  that  they  would 
constitute  the  entire  matter  proper  and  necessary  to  be  set  forth 
in  the  complaint  or  petition,  if  the  defendant  had  chosen  to  insti- 

1  [Kollock  V.  Scribner  (1897),  98  Wis.  Helmer  v.  Yetzer  (1894),  92  la.  627,  Gl 

104,  73  N.  W.  776.3  ^-  W.  206;  Bardes  v.  Hutchinson  (1901), 

•^  [llichardsy.  Am.  Desk  &  Seating  Co.  113  la.  610,  85  N.  W.  797;  Ruinbou^^h  v. 

(1894),  87  Wis.  503,  58  N.  W.  787;  Union  Young  (1896),  119N.  C.  567,  26  S.  E.  143; 

Mercantile  Co.  v.  Jacoljs  (1897),  20  Mont.  Kahrs  v.   Kahrs  (1902),   115  Ga.   288,  41 

270,   50   Pac.    793;  Waller   v.  Deranleau  S.  E.  649;  Gulliver  y.  Fowler  (1894),  64 

(1903),  — Neb.  —,94  N.  W.   1038;  Bab-  Conn.   556,  30  Atl.  852;  Rhea  ?•.  Bagley 

cock  V.  Maxwell  (1898),  21   Mont.  507,  54  (1899),  66  Ark.  93,  49  S.  W.  492;  Giirske 

Pac.    943;  Askew    v.  Koonce  (1896),  118  r.  Kelpin   (1901),  61   Neb.  517,  85  N.  W. 

N.  C.  526,  24  S.  E.   218;    Stotsenburg  v.  557;  Lacey  v.  Lacey   (1893),  95  Ky.  110, 

Fordice  (1895),142lnd.  490,  41  N.  E.313;  23    S.  W.   673;     Arthurs    v.    Thompson 

Nicholls   V.   Hill   (1894),  42  8.  C.    28,    19  (1895),  97  Ky.   218,   30  S.  W.  628;  Far- 

S.   E.    1017;    Tron  v.   Yohn   (1896),    145  rell  v.  Burbank  (1894),  57   Minn.  395,  59 

Ind.  272,  43  N.  E.  437:  Harris   v.   Ran-  N.  W.  485;  White  v.  Blitch  (1900),  112 

dolph  County  Bank   (1901),  157  Ind.  120,  Ga.  775,  38  S.  E.  80;  Center  Creek  Water 

60  N.  E.   1025;  Lindsixy,  etc.   Co.  v.  Car-  Co.  r.   Lindsay  (1900),  21   Utah,   192,  60 

penter   (1894),  90  la.   529,  58  N.  W.  900;  Pac.  559.^ 

54 


S50 


CIVIL   EE.MEDIES. 


tute  an  independent  action  between  himself  as  plaintiff  and  the 
plaintiff  as  defendant.^  When  a  counter-claim  is  pleaded,  the 
defendant  becomes,  as  far  as  respects  the  matters  alleged  therein, 
an  actor:  there  are  substantially  two  simultaneous  actions  pend- 
ing between  the  same  parties,  each  of  whom  is  at  the  same  time 
a  plaintiff  and  a  defendant.  Since  the  counter-claim '  states  a 
cause  of  action,  it  is  to  be  governed  and  judged  by  the  rules 
which  apply  to  the  complaint  or  petition  r^  the  facts  alleged 
must  be  sufficient  to  constitute  the  cause  of  action,  and  the 
relief  to  which  the  defendant  is  entitled  should  be  properly 
demanded.  In  short,  the  pleader  should,  for  the  time  being, 
regard  himself  as  acting  for  a  plaintiff",  and  as  drawing  a  com- 
plaint or  petition.  This  rule  is  so  simple  and  so  plain,  that  it 
seems  almost  impossible  to  mistake  it;  and  yet  the  books  of 
reports  are  full  of  cases  in  which  facts  have  been  set  up  as 
counter-claims,  which,  if  admitted  to  be  true,  would  not  have 
entitled  the  party  pleading  them  to  any  relief.  The  test  thus 
suggested  is  of  universal  application.  Would  the  facts  averred 
taken  by  themselves,   if   admitted,   entitle    the    defendant   to   a 


^  Q"  An  answer  setting  up  a  counter- 
claim must  contain  the  substantial  requi- 
sites of  a  complaint,  and  allege  facts  which 
legally  entitle  the  defendant  to  recover  in 
a  suit  instituted  by  him  for  tliat  purpose 
against  the  plaintiff ;  and,  if  his  pleading 
omits  any  allegation  tliat  would  he  neces- 
sary to  state  a  cause  of  suit,  it  will  he  vul- 
nerable to  a  demurrer  interposeil  ou  that 
ground:  "  Le  Clare  (■.  Thihault  (1902),  41 
Ore.  601,  69  Pac.  552.  "A  counter-claim 
must,  to  be  good,  contain  every  allegation 
which  would  be  needed  in  a  complaint 
founded  on  the  same  cause  of  action  :  " 
Daggs  V.  Phceni.K  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  Ariz., 
5.3  Pac.  201. 

"  To  constitute  a  counter-claim,  the 
facts  stated  must  amount  to  an  independ- 
ent cause  of  action ;  when  they  merely 
serve  to  defeat  plaintiff's  cause  of  action, 
they  amount  to  a  defence,  not  a  counter- 
claim :  "  Walker  v.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  143 
N.  Y.  167,  38  N.  IC.  106.  "A  counter- 
claim, as  our  decisions  affirm,  is  not  a  de- 
fence to  a  plaintiff's  action,  but  it  is  a 
cross-action  by  the  defendant;  and  it  must 
state  facts  sufhcient  in  law  to  constitute  a 
cause  of  action  ;  otherwise  it  will  Ije  iield 


bad  on  demurrer : "  Indiana,  etc.  A.ss'n 
V.  Crawley  (1898),  151  Ind.  413,  51  X.  E. 
466. 

"  A  counter-claim  is  an  action,  and  to 
be  properly  pleaded  it  must  be  set  forth 
with  all  the  allegations  necessary  to  up- 
hold an  original  petition  founded  on  the 
same  cause  of  action  :  "  Prichard's  Execu- 
trix V.  Peace  (1895),  98  Ky.  99,  32  S.  W. 
296.  "  An  answer  is  a  statement  of  defence. 
It  is  not  its  office  to  demand  affirmative 
relief,  unless  upon  a  counter-claim ;  nor 
can  it  pro])erly  be  made  to  take  tlie  place 
of  a  motion  to  cite  in  new  parties.  So  far 
as  used  for  such  purposes  it  may  he  dis- 
regarded by  the  trial  court :  "  Russell  v. 
Easterbrook  (1898),  71  Conn.  50,  40  Atl. 
905.  A  counter-claim  which  cliarges 
fraud  and  misconduct  in  general  terms, 
without  specifying  particular  acts,  does 
not  state  a  cause  of  action :  Alden  v. 
Christianson  (1901),  83  Minn.  21,  85 
N.  \V.  824.] 

-  It  is  within  the  discretion  of  the 
court  to  allow  iiim  to  amend  his  pleading 
by  adding  another  count :  Veuable  r. 
Dutch,  37  Kan.  515. 


COUNTEK-CLALM.  851 

judgment  in  his  favor   against  the  plaintiff?      If   not,   they  do 
not  constitute  a  counter-chiim. 

§  615.  *  739.  Implies  an  Opposing  Claim.  Limitation  herein.  It 
has  sometimes  been  said  that  "counter-claim,"  ex  vi  termini^  im- 
plies a  claim,  and  also  an  opposing  claim;  and  that,  therefore, 
there  cannot  be  a  valid  counter-claim  unless  there  is  a  demand 
on  behalf  of  the  plaintiff.  This  is  no  doubt  true  within  certain 
limits.  The  counter-claim  as  well  as  the  defence  assumes  that 
the  plaintiff  sets  up  a  claim  in  his  complaint.  There  could  be 
no  answer  of  any  kind,  defensive  or  affirmative,  unless  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  first  instance  filed  or  served  a  pleading  containing  some 
demand.  But  a  counter-claim  does  not  necessarily  imply  that 
the  demand  is  a  valid  one.  The  term,  if  not  invented,  was  applied 
by  the  legislature  to  thi-;  species  of  answer,  which  is  allowed  to 
be  used  in  cases  where  the  plaintiff  sets  up  certain  specified  causes 
of  action ;  but  the  code  nowhere  requires  that  the  cause  of  action 
thus  alleged  sliould  be  a  good  one.  To  interpolate  any  such  limi- 
tation into  the  language,of  the  statute  would  be  giving  an  unnec- 
essary meaning  to  a  very  simple  epithet  chosen  by  the  lawmakers 
to  designate  a  particular  kind  of  pleading.  The  plaintiff  must 
file  a  complaint  averring  facts  which  are  said  to  constitute  a  cause 
of  action  in  his  favor.  The  defendant  is  expressly  permitted  to 
unite  in  his  answer  as  many  defences  and  counter-claims  as  he 
may  have.  Suppose  that  he  pleads  some  defence  either  by  way 
of  denial  or  of  new  matter,  and  also  a  counter-claim.  On  the  trial 
he  establishes  his  defence,  and  thus  defeats  the  plaintiff's  I'ecov- 
ery  upon  the  alleged  cause  of  action.  Does  this  success  cut  off 
his  power  to  go  on  and  prove  the  facts  constituting  his  counter- 
claim, and  to  obtain  the  judgment  thereon?  Such  a  conclusion 
would  be  a  monstrous  perversion  of  the  statute,  and  would  be  a 
virtual  repeal  of  its  express  provisions  which  permit  the  defend- 
ant to  unite  as  many  defences  and  counter-claims  as  he  may  have. 
When  the  legislature  authorized  him  to  join  defences  and  counter- 
claims in  this  manner,  it  certainly  intended  that  he  should  use 
them  all,  and  did  not  mean  that  he  should  go  through  the  empty 
form  of  pleading  them,  and  afterwards  abandoning  those  which 
are  affirmative  in  their  nature  because  successful  in  those  which 
are   negative.^     This   conclusion    is   self-evident :    it   necessarily 

1  QLe  Chire  '?.  Thibault  (1902).  41  Ore.  can  be  permitted  to  jilead  a  couuter-claiiu 
601,   69  Pac.   .552:  "Before  a  defendant     as  a  defence   to  ]ilaintiff's  cause  of   suit, 


852 


CIVIL    KEMEDItS. 


results  from  the  positive  provisions  of  the  codes,  and  cannot  be 
avoided  without  their  virtual  repeal.  I  have  dwelt  upon  this 
subject  at  some  length,  not  because  there  can  be  any  legitimate 
and  well-founded  doubt  concerning  it,  but  because  there  are  cer- 
tain judicial  dicta  in  a  few  cases  which  are  supposed  to  convey  a 
different  meaning.^ 

^  616.  *  7-40.  Cause  of  Action  Alleged  must  exist  in  Favor  of 
Defendant  'who  pleads  it.  Exception  hereto  in  Codes  of  Indiana 
and  Iowa.  (2)  The  cause  of  action  thus  alleged  must  exist  in 
favor  of  the  defendant  who  pleads  it.  As  the  counter-claim  is  de- 
fined in  nearly  all  the  codes,  a  defendant  is  not  permitted  to  set  up 
facts  which  entitle  any  other  person,  defendant  or  otherwise,  to 
relief.  He  himself  must  be  the  party  entitled  to  the  judgment  de- 
manded, so  that  he  would  be  the  proper  plaintiff,  or  one  of  the 
proper  plaintiffs,  if  the  cause  of  action  had  been  made  the  basis  of 
an  independent  suit.  It  is  not,  of  course,  to  be  understood  that  a 
counter-claim  must  always  exist  in  favor  of  a  single  defendant : 
two  or  more,  when  sued  jointly,  may  have  a  joint  cause  of  action 


he  must  admit  the  existence,  at  least, 
of  a  part  of  his  adversary's  demands." 
Syduer  Pump  Co.  v.  Rocky  Mount  Ice  Co. 
(1899),  125  N.  C.  80,  34  S.E.  198:  When 
a  non-suit  has  been  entered,  it  is  too  late 
to  file  a  supplemental  answer  containing 
a  counter-claim,  since  when  there  is  no 
action  pending  there  can  be  no  counter- 
claim. Davis  V.  Seattle  National  Bank, 
(1898),  19  Wash.  65,  52  Pac.  526:  "A  de- 
fendant may  deny  liability  and  at  the 
same  time  plead  a  counterclaim  or  offset, 
without  subjecting  himself  to  the  charge 
of  pleading  inconsistent  defences,  if  there 
is  no  direct  contradiction  in  the  special 
facts  pleaded."] 

1  See  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  i-.  Parker 
Vein  Stp.  Co.,  12  Abb.  Pr.  300;  8  Bosw. 
300;  Bellinger  v.  Craigue,  31  Barb.  534; 
Prouty  V.  Eaton,  41  Barb.  409.  See  also 
Schenectady  v.  Furman,  61  Hun,  171, 
post,  §  *  744,  note.  It  is  settled,  however, 
in  Minnesota,  that  a  counter-claim  must 
of  necessity  admit  the  cause  of  action  set 
up  by  the  plaintiff,  and  that  the  defendant 
cannot  deny  this  cause  of  action,  and  at 
the  same  time  plead  a  counter-claim.  In 
one  case  the  court  said :  "  The  nature  of 
a  counter-claim  would  seem  to  render 
necessary  the  admission   by  defendant  of 


a  claim  against  him  in  favor  of  the  plain- 
tiff arising  out  of  the  contract  or  the  trans- 
action, as  the  case  may  require,  which  is 
the  cause  of  action,  or  the  ground  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim  set  forth  in  the  com- 
j)laint. "  All  claim  of  the  plaintiff  being 
denied,  it  was  held  there  could  be  no 
counter-claim.  Steele  v.  Etheridge,  15 
Minn.  501,  509;  Mason  i'.  Hey  ward,  3 
Minn.  182;  Whalon  v.  Aldrich,  8  Minn. 
346,  348;  Koempel  v.  Shaw,  13  Minn. 
488;  Morrison  v.  Lovejoy,  6  Minn.  319. 
I  add  here  the  more  recent  cases  which 
illustrate  the  general  nature  and  requi- 
sites of  the  counter-claim,  with  respect  to 
all  the  features  described  in  the  para- 
graphs of  the  text.  Nothing  in  these 
decisions  requires  any  modification  of  the 
views  stated  in  the  text ;  in  fact,  my  dis- 
cussion of  the  counter-claim  in  all  its 
bearings  is  sustained  by  the  current  of 
authority.  Davis  v.  Toulmin,  77  N.  Y. 
280,  and  cases  cited  ;  Francis  v.  Edwards, 
77  N.  C.  271 ;  Quebec  Bk.  v.  Weygand, 
30  Ohio  St.  126;  Schee  v.  McQuilken,  59 
Ind.  269;  Blakely  v.  Boruff,  71  id.  93; 
Thompson  v.  Tookey,  71  id.  296;  Stock- 
ton r.  Stockton,  73  id.  510;  liuckcr  r. 
Stcelman,  73  id.  396  ;  Exlino  v.  Lowery,  46 
Iowa,  556;  Town  r.  Bringolf,  47  id.  133. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  853 

against  the  plaintiff;  in  which  case  it  might  be,  and  properly 
should  be,  pleaded  as  a  counter-claim  by  them  all.  To  the  gen- 
eral lule  above  stated  there  is  an  exception  already  pointed  out  in 
the  codes  of  Indiana  and  of  Iowa,  which  permits  a  surety  when 
sued  to  take  advantage  of  a  demand  against  the  plaintiff  in  favor 
of  his  principal,  and  a  joint  debtor,  when  sued,  to  interpose  one  in 
favor  of  another  joint  debtor. 

§  617.  *  741.  Cause  of  Action  must  exist  against  the  Plaintiff. 
(3)  The  cause  of  action  must  exist  against  the  plaintiff  in  the 
suit,  so  that  a  judgment  for  the  relief  demanded  can  be  rendered 
against  him.  This  feature  of  the  counter-claim  is  evident  upon 
the  most  cursory  reading  of  the  statutory  provision ;  and  yet  the 
books  are  full  of  cases  in  which  matters  have  been  set  up  as 
counter-claims  that  showed  no  cause  of  action  whatever  against 
the  plaintiff,  but  one  (if  at  all)  existing  against  some  other  per- 
son not  a  party  to  the  suit.^  This  error  is  most  likely  to  arise  in 
actions  brought  by  an  assignee  of  a  demand,  where  the  defendant 
has  a  claim  which  would  be  valid  against  the  assignor.  Such 
claim  may,  under  some  circumstances,  constitute  a  perfect  defence 
to  the  suit,  and  it  may  be  a  set-off  according  to  the  provisions  of 
statutes  prior  to  the  code  ;  but  it  cannot  be  a  counter-claim,  for 
the  simple  but  most  cogent  reason  that  it  does  not  entitle  the 
defendant  to  any  possible  recovery  against  the  plaintiff.^ 

§  618.  *  742.  Subject-Matter  of  Counter-Claini.  General  Classes, 
^atutory  Restrictions  as  to  Scope  and  Character.  Analysis  of  Statu- 
tory Provisions.  (4)  In  reference  to  their  subject-matter,  the  codes 
which  form  the  first  group  separate  counter-claims  into  two  gen- 
eral classes :  namely,  firsts  those  which  arise  out  of  a  cause  of 
action  different  from  the  one  alleged  by  the  plaintiff;  and  sec- 
ondly^ those  which  arise  out  of  or  are  connected  with  the  same 
cause  of  action  as  the  one  alleged  by  the  plaintiff.     In  the  iirst  of 

1  [[U.  S.  T.  Co.  V.  Stanton  (1893),  139  maker,  existing  at  the  date  of  tlie  transfer 
N.  Y.  531,  34  N.  E.  1098;  Dolbeer  v.  of  the  note,  is  not  a  counter-claim,  but  a 
Stout  (1893),  139  N.  Y.  486,  34  N.  E.  defence:  Lynch  y.  Free  (1896),  64  Minn. 
1102;  Trester  v.  City  of  Sheboygan  277,  66  N.  W.  277.  Where  an  agent  sues 
(1894),  87  Wis.  496,  58  N.  W.  747  •  Mom-  in  his  own  name,  defendant  may  set  up  as 
sen  V.  Atkins  (1900),  105  Wis.  557,  81  a  partial  defence  a  demand  against  the 
N.  W.  647;  Smith  v.  Dawley  (1894),  92  principal,  but  this  "is  not  really  a  couu- 
la.  312,  60  N.  W.  625.]  ter-claiin,"  since    it    is    not    "a   demand 

2  [^Walker  f.  Ins.  Co.  (1894),  143  N.  Y.  which  may  be  the  basis  of  a  judgment 
167,  38  N.  E.  106.  In  an  action  by  the  against  the  plaintiff:"  Bliss  v.  Sueath 
indorsee  after  maturity    of  a  promissory  (1894),  103  Cal.  43,  36  Pac.  1029-3 

note,  iin  indebtedness  of  the  payee  to  the 


854  CIVIL    KE.MEDIES. 

these  classes  the  cause  of  action  stated  by  the  plaintiff  must  spring 
from  contract,  and  the  counter-claim  must  arise  out  of  another 
contract.  These  counter-claims  are  identical  with  tlie  "set-off" 
of  the  codes  which  belong  to  the  second  group,  and  they  embrace, 
but  are  not  restricted  to,  the  ''  set-offs  "  used  in  the  former  proce- 
dure. They  include  that  ancient  "set-off,"  and  also  much  more  ; 
for  they  cover  all  cases  of  damages  as  well  as  of  debt  resulting 
from  the  non-performance  of  contracts  ;  and,  according  to  the 
construction  supported  by  the  overwhelming  weight  of  authoritv, 
they  also  extend  to  cases  of  equitable  relief  arising  from  contract. 
In  the  second  of  these  classes  the  cause  of  action  that  may  be  set 
forth  by  the  plaintiff  is  not  defined  or  limited  in  any  manner,  and 
may  therefore,  unless  limitations  not  contained  in  the  statute  are 
to  be  interpolated  by  the  courts,  be  of  any  kind  and  nature.  The 
counter-claim,  however,  is  restricted  in  its  scope  and  character, 
and  must  conform  to  one  or  the  other  of  three  requisites:  (a)  If 
a  contract  is  set  forth  in  the  complaint  or  petition  as  the  founda- 
tion of  the  plaintiff's  demand,  the  counter-claim  must  arise  out  of 
that  same  contract ;  and  this  plainly  eml)races  the  ancient  recoup- 
ment of  damages,  although  far  broader  in  its  operation  than  that 
species  of  defence,  (i)  If  a  "  transaction  "  is  set  forth  as  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  demand,  the  counter-claim  must  arise 
out  of  that  "  transaction ;  "  and,  so  far  as  "  transaction  "  is  some- 
thing different  from  or  additional  to  "contract,"  this  is  a  provision 
not  identical  in  its  effect  with  either  "set-off"  or  "recoupment:  " 
it  clearly  embraces  many  instances  of  equitable  cross-demand  and 
relief  in  favor  of  the  defendant;  and  the  only  real  doubt  is, 
whether  it  extends  also  to  legal  causes  of  action,  (c)  Whatever 
be  the  nature  of  the  claim  asserted  by  the  plaintiff, —  for  the 
codes  contain  no  restriction  in  respect  to  this  matter,  —  any 
counter-claim  may  be  pleaded  '•'  which  is  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject of  the  action."  ^  I  have  thus  given  a  simple  analysis  of  the 
statutory  provision,  taking  the  language  as  the  legislature  has 
used  it  without  modification,  neitiier  adding  to  nor  subtracting 
from  it.  If  the  courts  have  at  any  time  placed  further  limitations 
upon  the  scope  and  operation  of  the  counter-claim,  if  they  have 
ever  refused  to  admit  the  broad  and  comprehensive  classification 
here  made,  they  have  done  so  by  narrowing  the  general  language 
of  the  statute,  and  restricting  its  obvious   import.      How  far  judi- 

1  QWarren  i-.  Hall  (1895),  20  Colo.  .508,  38  Puc.  707.] 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  855 

€ial  decisions  have  gone  in  this  process  of  limitation,  and  how 
much  authority  shoukl  be  conceded  to  their  interpretation,  I  shall 
attempt  to  ascertain  and  to  determine  in  subsequent  portions  of 
this  section.  My  sole  object  now  is  to  let  the  statute  speak  for 
itself  by  presenting  an  analysis  and  arrangement  of  its  various 
clauses.  It  is  certain,  from  this  inspection  of  its  very  language, 
that  there  is  no  express  restriction  upon  the  nature  and  effect  of 
the  relief  which  may  be  demanded  and  obtained  by  means  of  a 
counter-claim,  —  no  express  requirement  that  it  must  be  legal 
Tather  than  equitable,  nor  that  it  must  be  confined  to  a  money 
judgment  in  the  form  of  debt  or  damages.  Nor  is  tliere  any  ex- 
press provision  that  the  counter-claim  must  be  something  essen- 
tially aijitagonistic  to,  or  tending  to  defeat  or  lessen,  the  cause  of 
action  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff  in  his  complaint  or  petition.  It 
will  be  seen,  in  the  further  discussions  of  this  section,  that  the 
incident  last  mentioned  is  declared  by  several  carefully  considered 
decisions  to  be  a  necessary  element  or  feature  of  the  counter- 
claim, implied  in  its  very  nature  and  in  the  name  given  to  it  by 
the  legislature.  I  do  not  question  the  correctness  of  this  conclu- 
sion :  I  merely  call  attention  to  the  fact,  that,  in  reaching  it  or  any 
similar  result,  the  courts  have  added  to  or  taken  from  the  express 
terms  of  the  codes. 

§  619.  *  743.  Illustrative  Opinions.  I  shall  now  collect  the 
opinions  of  several  eminent  and  able  judges,  selected  from  a 
number  of  leading  cases,  in  order  that  the  reader  may  be  able  to 
compare  their  conclusions  with  the  results  of  the  foregoing  analy- 
sis, and  to  ascertain  the  general  principles  upon  which  the  courts 
have  proceeded  in  constructing  the  theory  of  the  counter-claim  as 
it  is  now  understood  and  accepted  in  the  various  States.  These 
selections  and  quotations  will  be  found  in  the  foot-notes.^     The 

1  Leaveuworth    v.    Packer,    .52    Barb,  it   must   be  something    which  resists   or 

132,  1.36,  per  Potter  J. :  "A  counter-claim  modifies  the  plaintiff's  claim."     See  also 

is  a   kind   of  equitable  defence  which  is  Clinton  v.   Eddy,  1  Lans.  61,  62 ;  Boston 

permitted,   under    the   provisions  of   the  Mills  v.  EuU,  6  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  319,  321 

code,  to  be  set  up,  when  it  arises  out  of  Pattison  v.  Richards,  22  Barb.    143,  146 

the  contract  set  forth  in  the   complaint.  Ogden  v.  Coddington,  2  E.  D.  Smith, 317 

It   is   broader  and    more   comprehensive  Gleason  v.  Moen,  2  Duer,  639,  642 ;  Schu- 

than    recoupment,    though    it     embraces  bart  v.  Harteau,  34  Barb.  447 ;  Lignot  v. 

both    recoupment   and  .set-off ;    and  it   is  Redding,  4  E.  D.   Smith,  285  ;  Carrie  c. 

intended  to  secure  to  a  defendant  all  the  Cowles,  6  Bosw.  453  ;  Wolf  v.  H.,  13  How. 

relief  which  either  an  action  at  law,  or  a  Pr.  84  ;  Davidson  v.  Remington,  12  How. 

bill  in  equity,  or  a  cross-suit,  would  have  Pr.  310. 
secured  on  the  same  state  of  facts.     But 


856 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


assignee  of  a  demand  liaving  brought  suit  upon  it,  the  defend- 
ant alleged  as  a  -counter-claim  a  contract  with  the  assignor,  a 
breach  thereof  by  him,  and  resulting  damages,  and  prayed  judg- 
ment for  the  amount  of  such  damages  aganist  the  defendant. 
No  reply  being  served  to  this  answer,  the  defendant  urged  that 
its  averments  were  admitted,  and  that  he  was  entitled  to  judgment 
on  the  record.  In  rejecting  his  claim,  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals  described  the  counter-claim  at  large,  and  stated  prin- 
ciples of  universal  application.^ 

§  620.  *  744.  Doctrine  that  Counter-Claim  must  be  Antagonistic 
to,  and  tend  to  defeat,  lessen,  or  modify,  the  Claim  of  Plaintiff. 
The  doctrine  is  maintained  in  several  cases,  that,  as  an  essential 
feature  or  element  of  every  counter-claim,  the  cause  of  action 
which  it  sets  up  must  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  relief  obtained 
by  its  means  will  necessarily  interfere  with,  defeat,  lessen,  or 
modify  the  relief  granted  to  the  plaintiff  in  virtue  of  the  cause  of 
action  alleged  in  his  complaint  or  petition.  In  other  words,  the 
two  demands  must  be,  to  some  extent  at  least,  antagonistic,  and 
tending  to  destroy  or  limit  each  other.^     In  an  action  brought  to 


1  [jDolbeer  v.  Stout  (1893),  139  N.  Y. 
486,  34  N.  E.  1102.]  Vassear  v.  Living- 
ston, 13  N.  Y.  248,  per  Deuio  J. :  "There 
is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a  counter- 
claim stated  in  the  answer.  There  was 
never  any  contract  between  the  plaintiff 
and  the  defendant ;  and  although  the  new 
matter  was,  if  true,  very  pertinent  to  pre- 
clude the  plaintiff  from  recovering  upon 
the  demand  assigned  to  him,  it  had  no 
tendency  to  show  an  independent  cause  of 
action  in  favor  of  the  defendant  against 
the  ])laintiff.  Section  150  of  the  code  de- 
fines a  counter-claim.  It  must  be  a  claim 
existing  in  favor  of  the  defendant  against 
the  plaintiff,  arising  either  out  of  the  con- 
tract or  transaction  sued  upon,  or  some 
other  contract.  Here  tlie  defendant  had 
no  claim  against  the  plaintiff.  If  the 
facts  were  truly  stated,  he  had  grounds 
for  defending  himself  against  the  plain- 
tiff's suit,  but  none  whatever  for  an 
independent  recovery  against  him.  A 
counter-claim  must  contain  the  substance 
necessary  to  sustain  an  action  on  behalf 
of  tlie-  defendant  against  the  plaintiff,  if 
the  plaintiff  had  not  sued  the  defendant. 
It   is  (juite  obvKjus  that  nothing  of  that 


nature  is  stated  in  this  answer."  In  the 
same  case,  the  court  below,  after  stating 
the  doctrine  in  a  similar  manner,  added  : 
"  A  counter-claim  which  is  not  also  a  set- 
off is  not  a  defence.  It  is  a  distinct  and 
independent  cause  of  action,  which  is  not 
used  sinij)ly  to  repel  the  claims  of  the 
plaintiff,  but  for  which  a  judgment  against 
him  is  in  all  events  demanded.  Previous 
to  the  code,  it  could  not  be  set  up  by  the 
defendant  at  all ;  and  the  permission  to 
set  it  up  in  an  answer,  although  with  a 
change  of  its  name,  assuredly  has  not 
changed  its  legal  character.  A  recoup- 
ment or  a  set-off  is  a  defence  ;  but  a  de- 
fendant who  avails  himself  of  such  a 
defence  admits,  in  whole  or  in  part,  the 
demand  of  the  plaintiff  as  alleged  in  the 
complaint :  "  s.  c.  4  Duer,  285,  293,  per 
Duer  J.  See  also  Merrick  r.  Gordon,  20 
N.  Y.  93,  97,  per  Comstock  J. 

2  QStolze  V.  Torrison  (1903),  —  Wis. 
— ,  95  N.  W.  114;  Kaukauna  Co.  r. 
Kaukauna  (1902),  114  Wi.s.  327,  89  N.  W. 
542;  Ajjpleton  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fox  River 
Paj)er  Co.  (1901),  111  Wis.  465,  87  N.  W. 
45'! :  "  A  counter-claim,  when  established, 
must   in   some   way  qualify  or  defeat  in 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


857 


foreclose  a  mortgage  upon  land,  the  holder  of  the  legal  title,  to 
whom  the  premises  had  been  conveyed  by  the  mortgagor,  was 
made  a  defendant ;  but  no  personal  judgment  for  the  debt  was 
demanded  against  him  in  the  complaint,  and  he  was  notified  to 
that  effect  in  the  usual  manner.  He  pleaded  a  counter-claim, 
setting  up  the  following  facts :  that  the  plaintiff  conveyed  the 
land  to  the  mortgagor  by  a  deed,  with  full  covenants  of  title ; 
that  the  mortgagor  conveyed  the  same  premises  to  the  defendant 
by  a  similar  deed,  and  also  assigned  the  plaintiff's  covenants  and 
all  rights  of  action  for  their  breach ;  that  said  covenants  had 
been  broken  by  the  existence  of  an  outstanding  paramount  title 
and  prior  incumbrances,  and  the  defendant  had  been  evicted 
under  the  same,  to  his  great  damage,  for  which  damages  judg- 
ment was  demanded  against  the  plaintiff.  Evidence  in  support 
of  this  answer  was  excluded  at  the  trial,  and  the  defendant  ap- 
pealed. The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals,  sustaining  the  ruling 
below,  announced  the  doctrine  that  the  demands  of  the  plaintiff 
and  of  the  defendant  must  be  reciprocal,  in  order  that  there  can 
be  any  place  for  a  counter-claim.^     In  an  action  to  recover  the 


whole  or  in  part  the  phiiii tiff's  claim  for 
judgment.  ...  It  must  be  a  claim  exist- 
ing in  favor  of  the  defendant  and  against 
the  ])laintiff  between  whom  a  several 
judgment  may  be  had  in  the  action." 
Miser  v.  O'Shea  (1900),  37  Ore.  231,  62 
Pac.  491;  Peterson  v.  Bean  (1900),  22 
Utah,  43,  61  Pac.  213,  citing  the  text.] 

1  National  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McKay,  21 
N.  y.  191,  195,  per  Com.stock  J.:  "Upon 
the  defendant's  own  statement,  I  do  not 
see  tliat  anything  was  in  litigation  be- 
tween him  and  the  ])]aiutiff,  or  that  any 
judgment  could  be  rendered  against  him 
except  one  for  costs  for  interposing  a 
groundless  defence  to  the  action.  No 
cause  of  action  existed  against  him.  The 
complaint  claimed  nothing  against  him 
personally,  and  stated  no  facts  as  the 
foundation  of  such  a  decree.  The  an- 
swer showed  that  he  had  no  title  or 
interest  in  the  mortgaged  premises  to  be 
affected  by  the  decree.  His  defence  must 
therefore  be  deemed  to  have  been  put  in 
for  the  mere  purpose  of  establishing  a  le- 
gal cause  for  an  independent  suit  on  the 
plaintiff's  covenants,  without  any  demand 
against  himself  being  at  all   involved  in 


the  controversy.  Witliout  undertaking  at 
tills  time  to  expound  the  provisions  of  the 
code  which  relate  to  the  counter-claim,  I 
am  satisfied  that  they  do  not  apply  to  such 
a  case  as  this.  Of  course  the  claim  could 
only  be  enforced  in  this  case  by  a  judg- 
ment in  the  defendant's  favor  for  the 
damages  sustained  in  consequence  of  the 
eviction.  But  the  plaintiff  might,  not- 
witiistanding  such  a  judgment,  be  entitled 
to  a  decree  for  a  foreclosure  and  sale.  The 
alleged  counter-claim  does  not  impair  or 
affect  the  right  to  that  relief.  I  appre- 
hend that  a  counter-claim,  when  estab- 
lished, viust  in  some  way  qualify,  or  must 
defeat,  the  judgment  to  which  the  plaintiff  is 
otherwise  entitled.  In  a  foreclosure  suit,  a 
defendant  who  is  personally  liable  for  the 
debt,  or  whose  land  is  burdened  by  the 
lien,  may  probably  introduce  an  offset 
to  reduce  or  e.xtinguisli  the  claim.  But 
where  his  personal  liability  is  not  in  ques- 
tion, and  where  he  disclaims  all  interest  in 
the  mortgaged  premises,  I  do  not  see  how 
he  can  demand  a  judgment  against  the 
plaintiff  on  a  bill,  or  a  note,  or  a  bond,  or 
a  covenant.  Such  is  virtually  this  case. 
The  defendant  has,  as  he  insists,  a  cause 


858 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


price  of  goods  sold  and  delivered,  the  answer  contained  a  so-called 
counter-claim  which  purported  to  show  that  the  plaintiff  held  lands 
under  a  deed  of  trust,  which  he  was  m  equity  bound  to  convey  to 
the  defendant,  and  prayed  a  judgment  directing  such  conveyance. 
The  Supreme  Court  in  New  York  decided  that  these  facts,  if  prop- 
erly pleaded,  would  not  constitute  a  counter-claim  in  opposition 
to  the  cause  of  action  stated  in  the  complaint ;  and  directly  held 
the  doctrine  that  a  counter-claim  must  in  some  sort  defeat  the 
plaintiff's  recovery,  or  interfere  with  the  judgment  that  would 
otherwise  be  rendered  in  his  favor.^ 


of  action  against  the  plaintiff  upon  a  bru- 
ken  covenant ;  but  that  cause  of  action, 
if  it  exists,  does  not  enable  him  to  resist 
or  modify  the  relief  to  which  the  plaintiff 
is  entitled."  See  also  Agate  v.  King,  17 
Abb.  Pr.  159  (Gen.  Term,'  1862).  An  ac- 
tion to  foreclose  a  mortgage  against  K. 
and  others.  K.  owned  the  land,  but  was 
not  personally  liable  for  the  (lel)t,  and  uo 
personal  judgment  against  him  was  de- 
•  inanded.  Hu  set  np,  as  a  counter-claim,  a 
<lemand  for  §6,000  damages  arising  from 
a  breach  by  the  plaintiff  of  a  distinct  con- 
tract to  convey  land.  This  was  held  not 
to  be  a  counter-claim  :  it  clearly  did  not 
fall  under  the  first  subdivision  :  it  did 
not  fall  under  the  second  subdivision,  be- 
cause, in  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mort- 
gage as  against  all  the  defendants  e.xcept 
tlie  one  personally  liable,  the  cause  of  ac- 
tion does  not  arise  out  of  contract ;  and 
also  because  no  judgment  was  asked 
against  K.  Some  portions  of  the  opijiion 
do  not  agree  with  the  reasoning  of  Com- 
stocic  J.  quoted  above:  while  the  decision 
reached  is  in  harmony  with  that  case,  tiie 
dicta  of  the  judge  are  not  entirely  so. 
And  see  Carpenter  i\  Leonard,  .5  Minn. 
1.').5.  In  an  action  to  foreclose  a  mort- 
gage where  the  plaintiff  asked  for  a  jnd<r- 
ment  upon  the  bond  for  a  deficiency,  tiie 
defendant's  counter-claim  of  damages  was 
allowed:  Hunt  v.  Chapman,  51  N.  Y.  555. 
The  doctrine  of  Nat.  V.  Ins.  Co.  v.  McKay 
has  been  enacted  in  the  New  York  C. 
C.  P.,  §  501.  "The  counter-claim  must 
tend,  in  some  way,  to  diminish  or  defeat 
the  plaintiff's  rectivery ; "  Lipmau  r. 
Jackson  Arch.  Iron  Works,  128  N.  Y. 
58.  Under  this  pnivision  it  was  held, 
in  Schenectady  i-.  Furinan,  61    Hun,  171, 


that  a  counter-claim  which  is  entirely  in- 
consistent witli  any  cause  of  action  on 
the  plaintiff's  part  and  which  cannot  be 
j)roved  as  a  claim  until  it  is  decided  that 
the  plaintiff  has  no  claim,  does  not  'tend 
to  diminish  or  defeat  the  plaintiff's  re- 
covery.' This  rule,  if  established,  will 
evidently  limit  materially  the  principle 
stated  in  §*  739,  «n/f>,-  but  it  is  difficult 
to  see  why  the  result  necessarily  follows 
from  the  code  provision  cited.  Tl;e 
learned  judi;e  seems  to  admit  that  iiis 
decision  is  inconsistent  with  Glen  &  Hail 
iManuf.  Co.  v.  Hall,  61  N.  Y.  220  ;  y  -•', 
§  *765  ;  but  the  doctrine  now  embodied  in 
§  501  of  the  code  was  firmly  estaldisiu-d 
wlien  the  latter  case  was  decided.  In 
Schenectady  v.  Fiirman,  the  action  was 
brought  to  recover  for  work  done,  under 
resolutions  of  the  common  council  of  a 
city,  in  .removing  certain  alleged  obstru.- 
tions  in  a  stream  running  throngli  the 
defendant's  land ;  the  counter-claim  was 
for  the  injury  done  to  the  land  ;  the  reso- 
lutions being  held  invalid,  the  counter- 
ilaiiii  was  disallowed,  for  the  reason  given 
above. 

1  Mattoon  v.  Raker,  24  How.  Pr.  32'.i, 
331  (Gen.  Term),  per  Bockes  J.  After 
reciting  the  allegations  as  given  above, 
the  opinion  proceeds  :  "  Would  this  con- 
stitute a  defence  to  the  plaintiff's  action 
for  goods  sold  ?  Clearly  not.  Nor  would 
it  be  such  a  counter-claim  as  the  defend- 
ant would  have  a  right  to  interpose  by 
way  of  answer  to  the  ])laintiff's  alleged 
grounds  of  action.  Such  equitable  claim 
for  relief  would  afford  no  answer  to  the 
plaintiff's  claim  for  judgment.  He  would 
still  b(!  entitled  to  recover  according  to 
tlie  allegations  of  his  complaint,  without 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


859 


§  621.  *  745.  Application  of  Doctrine.  Limitation  Established 
by  New  York  Courts.  Purely  Judicial.  Criticism.  These  ea.ses 
must  be  considered  as  establishing  the  doctrine  that  the  defend- 
ant's cause  of  action,  in  order  to  constitute  a  valid  counter-claim, 
must  to  some  extent  defeat,  modify,  qualify,  or  interfere  with,  the 
relief  which  would  othei'wise  bo  obtained  by  the  plaintiff.  The 
sweeping  statements  and  broad  generalities  of  the  opinions  ought, 
however,  to  be  limited  within  their  proper  bounds,  by  pointing 
out  the  only  possible  instances  in  which  the  principle  can  apply. 


any  deduction  even  on  account  of  the 
matters  stated  in  the  answer.  A  coun- 
ter-claim, to  be  available  to  a  part}',  must 
afford  to  him  protection  in  some  way 
against  the  plaintiff's  demand  for  judg- 
ment, either  in  whole  or  in  part.  It  must 
therefore  consist  in  a  set-off,  or  claim  hy 
way  of  recoupment,  or  be  in  some  way 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action 
stated  in  the  complaint.  It  must  present 
an  answer  to  the  plaintiff's  demand  for  re- 
lief; must  show  that  he  is  not  entitled, 
either  at  law  or  under  the  applications  of 
just  principles  of  equity,  to  judgment  in 
his  favor,  as,  or  to  the  extent,  claimed  in 
the  complaint.  It  must  therefore  con- 
tain not  only  the  substance  of  what  is 
necessary  to  sustain  an  action  in  favor  of 
the  defendant  against  the  plaintiff,  but  it 
must  also  operate  in  some  way  to  defeat, 
in  whole  or  in  part,  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  recover  in  the  action.  An  answer 
which  does  not  meet  this  requirement  is 
insufficient,  whether  regarded  as  a  de- 
fence or  as  a  counter-claim.  If  a  person 
be  sued  on  a  promissory  note,  he  cannot 
set  up,  by  way  of  defence  or  counter- 
claim, a  contract  with  the  plaintiff  for  the 
purchase  of  lands,  aud  allege  payment  of 
the  purchase-price,  aud  claim  a  decree  in 
the  action  for  a  specific  performance ; 
nor  could  he,  in  such  an  action  on  a  prom- 
i.-isury  note,  have  a  foreclosure  of  a  mort- 
gage against  the  plaintiff,  especially  if  the 
latter  were  not  personally  liable  for  the 
mortgage  debt."  The  same  principle  was 
again  approved  by  the  New  York  Court 
of  Appeals  in  a  recent  decision.  "  Coun- 
ter-claim," it  was  said,  "is  a  new  term 
introduced  into  the  code,  and  which  is 
limited  and  defined  therein.  When  the 
action  is  upon  contract,  unless  the  coun- 


ter-claim arises  out  of  the  contract  or 
transaction  set  forth  in  t!ie  complaint  as 
the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or 
be  connected  witii  the  subject  of  the  ac- 
tion, it  must  be  a  legal  or  e(juitable  cause 
of  action  against  the  plaintiff  arising  upon 
contract,  and  existing  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  action.  It  is  manifest,  how- 
ever, that  every  cause  of  action  e.xisting 
in  favor  of  the  defendant  against  the 
plaintiff,  arising  upon  contract,  cannot  be 
the  subject  of  a  counter-claim.  It  must 
be  a  cause  of  action  upon  which  some- 
thing is  due  the  defendant  which  can  be 
applied  in  diminution  of  the  plaintiffs 
claim.  For  instance,  a  cause  of  action  for 
the  specific  performance  of  a  contract  in 
reference  to  real  estate  arises  upou  con- 
tract, and  yet  cannot  be  set  up  as  a  coun- 
ter-claim, unless  it  grew  out  of,  or  is 
connected  with,  the  cause  of  action  alleged 
in  the  complaint.  .  .  .  The  object  of  in- 
troducing counter-claims  into  the  prac- 
tice under  the  code  was  to  enable  parties 
to  settle  and  adjust  all  their  cro.ss-cbiims 
in  a  single  action  as  far  as  they  could." 
Waddell  v.  Darling,  51  N.  Y.  327,  3.30. 
See  also  Pattison  v.  Richards,  22  Barb. 
143,  145.  This  doctrine  was  fully  ap- 
proved and  adopted  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Wisconsin  in  the  very  recent 
case  of  Dietrich  v.  Koch,  35  Wis.  618, 
626.  In  the  case  of  Cavalli  v.  Allen,  .57 
N.  Y.  508,  which  was  an  action  to  recover 
the  possession  of  land,  brought  by  a  ven- 
dor against  the  vendee  in  possession,  on 
the  ground  that  a  balance  of  the  pur- 
chase-price remained  unpaid,  the  de- 
fendant was  permitted  to  set  up  as  a 
counter-claim  a  note  which  he  held  against 
the  plaintiff,  and  thus  to  extinguish  the 
amount  due  ou  the  land  contract. 


860  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

It  is  said  by  one  of  the  judges  that  the  counter-claim  "  must  con- 
sist in  a  set-off  or  claim  by  way  of  recoupment,  or  be  in  some  way 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action  stated  in  the  complaint." 
This  rule  could  only  be  broken  by  counter-claims  belonging  to  the 
second  subdivision.  In  respect  to  all  those  falling  within  the 
fii-st  subdivision,  they  all,  by  the  very  terms  of  the  definition, 
arise  out  of  the  same  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in  the  com- 
plaint, or  they  are  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action. 
There  is,  therefore,  in  this  class,  no  room  for  a  possible  violation 
of  the  rule  laid  down  by  the  learned  judge.  The  counter-claim- 
must,  from  its  very  nature,  be  connected  with  the  subject  of  the 
action ;  and  therefore  the  relief  demanded  by  it  and  that  prayed 
for  by  the  plaintiff  cannot  be  entirely  independent  of  each  other. 
It  is  in  counter-claims  of  the  second  subdivision  alone  that  the 
doctrine  can  be  employed  and  applied  with  any  practical  results. 
And,  of  these  cases,  it  is  plain  that  all  those  in  which  the  com- 
plaint and  the  counter-claim  both  demand  a  money  judgment 
comply  with  the  rule.  It  is  only  when  one  or  the  other  seeks  to 
recover  some  equitable  relief  that  its  violation  becomes  possible. 
The  limitation  thus  established  by  the  New  York  courts  may  be, 
and  probably  is,  correct;  but  at  the  same  time  it  is  a  judicial  in- 
terpolation into  the  statutor}-  language,  which  contains  no  such 
restriction.  The  legislature  has  said :  "  When  the  action  arises 
on  a  contract,  ariy  other  cause  of  action  also  arising  on  a  contract 
may  also  be  a  counter-claim."  What  grant  of  authority  could  be 
clothed  in  more  general  terms  than  this  ?  The  courts,  liowever, 
say,  "  It  is  not  true  that  any  other  cause  of  action  arising  on 
contract  may  be  a  counter-claim :  it  must  be  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action,  and  must  operate  in  some  way  to  defeat,  in 
whole  or  in  part,  the  plaintiffs  right  of  recovery."  This  mode  of 
interpretation,  when  carried  beyond  very  narrow  limits,  becomes 
a  usurpation  of  the  law-making  function,  and  an  actual  repeal  of 
statutory  provisions. 

§  622.  *  746.  Decisions  in  other  States.  The  decisions  matle  by 
the  coui'ts  of  other  States  present  the  same  general  notions  in 
respect  to  the  nature  and  scope  of  the  counter-claim.^  In  Wis- 
consin the  counter-claim  is  recognized  to  the  fullest  extent  as  in- 
cluding relief  of  an  equitable  nature,  and  as  being  available  in 

1  See  Allen  r.  Shackelton,  15  Ohio  St.  U.5,  147,  per  Wilder  J. ;  Hill  v.  Butler,  6 
Ohio  St.  207,  21 C,  jier  Swan  J. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  861 

actions  brought  to  obtain  specific  remedies,  such  as  those  affecting 
or  establishing  the  plaintiff's  title  to  land.  In  a  suit  to  quiet  title 
to  land,  the  plaintiff  alleged  his  possession  and  claimed  his  title 
■under  a  certain  tax-deed,  which,  with  all  the  proceedings  in  rela- 
tion thereto,  was  pai'ticularly  described.  The  defendant  answered 
by  way  of  counter-claim  that  he  was  in  possession  and  asserted  his 
title  under  another  tax  sale  and  deed,  which,  with  the  proceedings, 
was  sufficiently  set  forth.  He  prayed  judgment  tliat  the  title 
might  be  decreed  to  be  in  himself.  This  answer  was  held  to  be  a 
good  counter-claim,  the  court  declaring  that  it  conformed  in  every 
particular  with  the  definition  given  by  the  code.^  The  Supreme 
Court  of  Missouri  has  also  described  the  counter-claim  in  entire 
conformity  with  the  judicial  definitions  already  given.^  The  lan- 
guage of  the  provision  in  the  Indiana  code  is  somewhat  broader 
than  that  which  is  found  in  most  of  the  other  codes.  The  inter- 
pretation put  upon  it,  however,  will  aid  in  ascertaining  the  general 
spirit  and  object  of  the  entire  legislation  which  introduced  this 
class  of  defences.  In  an  action  to  rescind  a  conveyance  of  land 
made  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant  on  the  ground  of  an  alleged 
fraud,  the  answer,  pleaded  as  a  counter-claim,  denied  the  fraud, 
insisted  upon  the  validity  of  the  deed,  stated  the  plaintiff's  con- 
tinued and  wrongful  possession  and  acts  of  waste,  and  demanded 
judgment  for  the  possession  of  the  land,  for  the  rents  and  profits 
thereof,  and  for  damages  on  account  of  the  waste.     This  answer 

1  Jarvis  v.  Peck,  19  Wis.  74,  per  Dixon  to  the  law  ;  but  it  is  sufficiently  plain  and 
C  J. :  "  It  does  not  deny  the  plaintiff's  de-  simple.  When  the  defendant  has  a  cause 
mand,  except  so  far  as  it  is  founded  upon  of  action  against  the  plaintiif,  upon  wliich 
his  possession,  but  seeks  to  extinguish  it  he  might  have  maintained  a  suit,  sucli 
by  an  equitable  cross-action.  It  is  a  claim  cause  of  action  is  a  counter-claim.  The 
which  of  itself  would  constitute  a  cross-  parties,  then,  have  cross-demands ;  and,  in 
action  in  favor  of  the  defendant  against  fact,  there  are  two  causes  of  action  before 
the  plaintiff  in  a  separate  suit."  See  also  the  court  for  trial  in  the  same  suit.  Both 
Powdery. Bowdle  (N.  Dak.  1893),  54 N.  W.  parties  are  to  a  certain  extent  plaintiffs, 
Rep.  404.  and  both  defendants.     The  answer,  then, 

2  Holzbauer  v.  Heine,  37  Mo.  443,  per  does  not  substantially  differ  from  a  peti- 
Wagner  J. :  "  It  must  contain  the  sub-  tion ;  and  the  reply  performs  substantially 
stance  necessary  to  sustain  an  action  on  the  same  office  as  the  answer  to  the  peti- 
behalf  of  the  defendant  against  the  plain-  tion.  Each  party  claims  affirmative  relief 
tiff,  if  the  plaintiff  had  not  sued  the  de-  from  the  other.  If  both  parties  establish 
fendant.  It  must  have  a  tendency  to  their  claims,  the  judgment  is  rendered  for 
sliow  an  independent  cause  of  action,  —  a  one  or  the  other,  according  as  his  demand 
claim  existing  in  favor  of  the  defendant  may  be  found  to  be  in  excess."  See  also 
against  the  plaintiff,  arising  either  out  of  Hay  v.  Short,  49  Mo.  139,  142,  which  cor- 
the  contract  or  transaction  sued  on,  or  out  rects  a  dictum  of  Holmes  J.  in  Jones  v. 
of  some  otlier  contract.     The  term  is  new  Moore,  42  Mo.  419. 


862  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

was  held  to  be  a  good  counter-claim  so  far  as  it  sought  to  recover 
the  possession  and  the  rents  and  profits,  but  not  in  respect  to  the 
demand  for  damages  on  account  of  the  waste.' 

§  623.  *  747.  Cause  of  Limitation  upon  Counter-Claims.  The 
foregoing  citations  fully  sustain  both  the  conclusions  reached 
in  the  preliminary  independent  analysis  of  the  statute,  and  the 
course  of  reasoning  upon  which  they  were  based.  The  feature 
or  limitation  which  is  pointed  out  by  some  of  the  cases,  as  neces- 
sarily involved  in  all  counter-claims  belonging  to  the  second  sub- 
division, —  namely,  that  the  recovery  therein  must  defeat,  modify, 
or  interfere  with  the  relief  otherwise  recoverable  by  the  plaintiff, 
—  results  from  the  fact  that  the  codes  make  no  provisions  for  two 
independent  and  antagonistic  judgments  rendered  in  favor  of  the 
adverse  parties  in  the  same  action.  One  judgment  alone  is  con- 
templated by  the  statute,  which  shall  determine  the  substantial 
rights  of  the  parties.  Even  in  equitable  actions,  where  relief  may 
be  conferred  upon  defendants  as  against  the  plaintiffs  or  as 
against  each  other,  such  relief  must  be  compatible  witli  that 
granted  to  the  plaintiff,  so  that  the  whole  may  be  contained  in 
one  judgment  without  opposition  or  contradiction.  If  an  action 
upon  contract  is  brought  to  recover  money  alone,  either  debt  or 
damages,  and  a  counter-claim  for  money,  arising  upon  an  entirely 
distinct  contract,  is   interposed,    the  resulting  judgment   would 

1  Woodruff  V.  Garner,  27  Ind.  4,  per  ing  a  definition  obviously  less  comprehen- 
Frazer  J. :  "  Was  this  counter-claim  good  sive  than  that  given  by  the  statute  above 
on  demurrer  1  It  is  not  questioned  that  quoted.  The  counter-claim  comprehends 
it  averred  facts  sufficient  in  an  independ-  recoupment,  and  much  more.  It  liardly 
ent  suit  to  entitle  the  defendant  to  a  admits  of  a  question  that  it  embraces  also 
judgment;  but  it  is  urged  that  these  facts  what  was  known  as  the  cross-hill  in  equity 
could  not  be  pleaded  by  way  of  counter-  against  the  plaintiff.  Unless  this  be  so,  it 
claim  in  this  suit.  A  counter-claim  is  de-  would  result  that,  in  many  cases,  what 
fined  to  be  'any  matter  arising  out  of,  formerly  might  have  been  settled  in  one 
or  connected  with,  the  cause  of  action  litigation,  would,  under  the  code,  require 
which  might  be  the  subject  of  an  action  two  or  more  separate  suits  to  determine  it. 
in  favor  of  the  defendant,  or  which  would  This  is  not  the  .spirit  of  the  code."  In  ivast- 
tend  to  reduce  the  plaintiff's  claim  for  man  i-.  Linn,  20  Minn.  433,  wliich  was  also 
damages.'  It  may  not  lie  ea.sy  to  define  an  action  to  quiet  title,  a  similar  coun- 
the  full  meaning  and  application  of  this  ter-claim  for  the  recovery  of  tlie  land  in 
statute ;  and  it  will  therefore  be  safer,  and  question  by  the  defendant  was  sustained- 
less  likely  to  produce  confusion,  if  the  See  also  Powder  v.  Bowdle  (N.  Dak. 
court  sliail  at  present  consider  only  the  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  404.  For  an  ex- 
question  of  its  influence  upon  the  case  im-  haustive  discussion  of  the  counter-claim 
mediately  in  judgment.  To  say,  as  was  as  defined  by  the  Indiana  code,  and  for 
inadvertently  done  in  Slayback  i'.  Jones,  a  statement  of  the  rules  in  relation  to  its 
9  Ind.  470,  that  the  couuter-daim  is  the  use,  .«ee  Campbell  v.  Routt,  42  Ind.  410, 
same  thing  as  recoupment,  would  be  giv-  413-410. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  863 

necessarily  be  single,  since  it  would  be  rendered  merely  for  the 
difference  between  tlie  two  adverse  sums  found  due  by  the  jury 
or  the  court.  The  implied  restriction  upon  the  use  of  counter- 
claims, therefore,  applies  only  where  one  or  both  of  the  cross- 
demands  are  equitable.  It  cannot  be  enforced  in  an  action  to 
recover  possession  of  lands  or  to  recover  possession  of  chattels, 
since  in  neither  of  these  instances  does  the  cause  of  action  "  arise 
out  of  contract,"  and  a  counter-claim  under  the  second  sub- 
division is  therefore  impossible. 

§  624.  *  748.  How  plead  Counter-Claim.  Characteristic  Marks. 
Reason  herein.  I  shall  finish  this  inquiry  into  the  general  nature 
of  the  counter-claim  by  a  brief  statement  of  the  mode  in  which  it 
should  be  formally  pleaded.  The  defendant  must,  in  some  express 
and  definite  manner,  indicate  his  design  of  treating  and  relying 
upon  this  particular  portion  of  his  answer  as  a  counter-claim. 
Whether  it  stands  alone,  and  thus  constitutes  the  entire  answer, 
or  whether  it  is  united  with  other  defences  or  counter-claims,  it 
must  be  so  distinguished  by  the  formal  language  employed,  that 
the  plaintiff  and  the  court  may  recognize  it  at  once  as  a  counter- 
claim, and  not  as  a  simple  defence.  It  is  not  enough  that  the 
defendant  state  facts,  which,  if  true,  would  constitute  a  cause  of 
action  against  the  plaintiff :  he  must  also  state  his  intention  to 
regard  these  facts  as  constituting  the  affirmative  cause  of  action, 
and  not  to  regard  them  as  a  defence.  This  intention  must  be  in- 
dicated either  by  naming  the  matter  thus  pleaded  "  a  counter- 
claim," —  that  is,  by  declaring  that  it  is  pleaded  as  such,  —  or  by 
concluding  it  with  a  prayer  for  a  judgment  granting  the  desired 
relief.  The  better  practice  is  —  and  it  should  be  universal  —  to 
use  both  of  these  characteristic  marks;  to  commence  the  par- 
ticular allegations  with  the  formal  statement  that  they  are  pleaded 
as  a  counter-claim,  and  to  end  them  with  the  usual  prayer  for 
relief  as  in  a  complaint  or  petition.  This  practical  rule  of  plead- 
ing is  fully  sustained  by  the  decided  cases.^     There  is  one  con- 

1  I^Smith  V.  Coe  (1902),  170  N.  Y.  162,  41  Ore.  601,  69  Pac.  552;  Prichard's  Ex- 

63  N.  E.  57;  Waller  y.  Deranleau  (1903),  ecutrix   v.  Peace    (1895),  98   Ky.   99,   32 

—  Neb.—,  94  N.  W.  1038;    Nicholls  v.  S.  W.  296;  Indiana,  etc.  Ass'n  ;'.  Crawlev 

Hill  (1894),  42  S.  C.  28,  19   S.  E.   1017;  (1898),  151  Ind.  413,  51  N.  E.  466;  Aldeii 

Harris  i;.  Randolph  County  Bank  (1901),  v.   Christianson    (1901),  83  Minn.  21,  85 

157  Ind.  120,  60  N.  E.  1025;  Helmer  v.  N.  W.   824;  Harrison  v.   State   Banking 

Yetzer  (1894),  92  la.  627,  61  N.  W.  206  ;  &  Trust  Co.  (1902),  15  S.  D.  304,  89  N.  W. 

Gurske  y.  Kelpiu  (1901),  61  Neb.  517,  85  477;    Kylander   v.  Laursen    (1902),    113 

N.  W.  557;  Le  Clare  v.  Thibault  (1902),  Wis.  461*^,  89  N.  W.  488;  Brauchle  v.  Noth- 


864 


CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 


trolling  reason  why  the  defendant  should  designate,  in  a  certain 


heifer  (1900),  107  Wis.  457,  83  N.  W.  633 ; 
Barker  i;.  King  (1897),  97  Wis.  53,  72 
N.  W.  222;  Morgan  v.  Hayes  (1898),  98 
Wis.  313,  73  N.  W.  786 ;  Conway  v. 
Mitchell  (1897),  97  Wis.  290,  72  N.  W. 
752;  NoUman  v.  Evensoii  (1895),  5  N.  D. 
344,  65  N.  W.  686 ;  Zion  Church  v.  Parker 
(1901),  114  la.  1,  86  N.  W.  60;  Walker 
t'.  Walker  (1895),  93  la.  643,  61  N.  \V. 
930. 

Rood  I'.  Taft  (1896),  94  Wis.  380,  69 
N.  W.  183  :  "  III  an  action  on  a  pronii.ssory 
note  given  in  part  payment  for  a  stallion, 
there  could  he  no  recovery  of  damages 
against  the  plaintiff  for  fraud  and  deceit 
in  the  sale,  or  for  a  hreach  of  warranty, 
unless  such  matter  was  pleaded  as  a 
counter-claim  expressly  so  denominated, 
and  affirm;itive  relief  asked."  "  Where 
matter  is  pleaded  both  as  a  defence  and 
a.s  a  counterclaim  tlie  defensive  allega- 
tions will  not  be  construed  as  j)art  of  the 
counter-claim,  in  the  absence  of  appropri- 
ate words  of  reference." 

New  Idea  Pattern  Co.  v.  Whelau 
(1903),  75  Conn.  445,  .53  Atl.  9.53:  "A 
counter-claim,  when  pleaded  in  an  answer, 
mast  be  pleaded  'as  such,' and  after  the 
matters  of  strict  defence.  Gen.  St.  §  612  ; 
Practice  Book,  forms  356,  444." 

Stotsenburg  y.  Fordice  (1895),  142  Ind. 
490,  41  N.  E.  313 :  "  It  is  now  well  .settled 
tliat  where  the  plea  is  not,  strictly  speak- 
ing, a  defence  to  tlie  cause  of  action,  but 
sets  up  a  cross-demand,  such  as  set-off  or 
counter-claim,  it  is  not  bad  as  failing  to 
respond  to  so  much  of  the  claim  sued 
upon  as  may  be  in  excess  of  the  set-off  or 
counter-claim,  though  it  be  directed  to  the 
entire  cause  of  action." 

Tron  V.  Yohn  (1896),  145  Ind.  272,  43 
N.  E.  437  :  In  an  action  to  foreclose  a 
mortgage  given  for  the  purchase-money  of 
real  estate,  evidence  of  the  difference  in 
the  quantity  of  the  land  as  claimed  to  have 
been  represented  by  the  grantor  and  that 
conveyed,  is  not  admissible  under  a  general 
denial.  "The  relief  sought  by  the  evi- 
dence was  of  an  affirmative  character,  as 
much  so  as  payment,  set-off,  settlement, 
accord  and  satisfaction,  or  account  stated. 
It  was  in  tiie  nature  of  a  counter-claim." 
Kahrs  v.  Kalirs  (1902),  115  Ga.  28S,  41 
S.  E.  649  :   A  plea  of  setoff  which  fails  to 


set  out  the  demand  as  plainly  as  if  sued 
on,  is  insufficient. 

In  Habcock  v.  Maxwell  (1898),  21  Mont. 
507,  54  Pac.  943,  the  court  said  :  "  Defend- 
ant having  characterized  his  pleading  as 
a  defence,  is  bound  by  the  choice  he 
makes,  and  may  not  afterwards  be  heard 
to  assert  that  it  is  a  counter-claim.  A 
counter-claim  nmst  be  described  as  such 
where  the  question  turns  upon  the  want  of 
a  reply.  '  Such  a  rule  is  essential  to  pro- 
tect a  plaintiff  from  being  misled  by  an 
answer,  and  to  prevent  the  snare  of  a 
counter-claim  lurking  under  the  cover  of  a 
supposed  defence,  and  unconsciously  ad- 
mitted by  a  failure  to  reply.'  " 

Union  Mercantile  Co.  v.  Jacobs  (1897), 
20  Mont.  270,  50  Pac.  793  :  Plaintiff  had  a 
judgment  against  defendants,  and  defend- 
ants, who  were  alleged  to  be  insolvent,  had 
a  judgment  of  less  amount  against  plain- 
tiff which  had  been  assigned,  as  plaintiff 
claimed,  to  defraud  the  plaintiff  and  other 
creditors.  Plaintiff  brought  an  action  in 
equity  to  have  tlie  assigned  judgment  off- 
set against  its  judgment.  The  answer 
admitted  the  recovery  of  the  two  judg- 
ments and  tlie  assignment,  but  denied 
that  the  assignment  of  the  judgment 
was  made  fraudulently,  and  further  de- 
nied each  and  every  alleg.ation  in  the  com- 
plaint not  specifically  admitted.  On  the 
trial  the  defendants  were  allowed  to  show 
that  the  plaintiff  had  in  its  possession  book 
accounts  of  the  "defendants  sufficient  to 
satisfy  its  judgment  against  them,  and  its 
action  was  thereupon  dismissed.  The 
action  of  the  trial  court  in  admitting  evi- 
dence of  this  counter-claim  was  sustained 
on  appeal,  although  no  counter-claim  had 
beeu  pleaded.  This  case  reversed  on  re- 
hearing, 20  Mont.  554,  the  court  hold- 
ing that  a  counter-claim  must  be  pleaded 
or  it  cannot  be  proved. 

See,  however,  the  following  cases: 

Brighton,  etc.  Irrigation  Co.  v.  Little 
(1896),  14  Utah,  42,  46  Pac.  268:  The 
general  rule  is  that  the  court  will  not 
grant  a  decree  for  affirmative  relief  to  tlie 
defendant  without  a  counter-claim  or  cross- 
complaint,  but  in  this  particular  case  the 
court  was  recjuired,  under  the  pleadings,  to 
determine  the  rights  of  the  jjarties  to  tlie 
canal  and  waters  thereof,  and  a  decree  for 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


86{ 


and  obvious  manner,  the  special  character  of  the  pleading.     In  all 


affirmative  relief  was  proper  without  a 
couuter-claim  or  cross-complaint.  Perego 
V.  Dodge  (1893),  9  Utah,  1,  33  Pac.  221  : 
Where  an  answer  alleges  facts  which  en- 
title defendant  to  affirmative  relief,  it  will 
be  granted,  even  tliough  no  counter-claim 
■or  cross-complaint  was  filed. 

City  of  Huron  i-.  Meyers  (1900),  13 
S.  I).'420,  83  N.  W.  553:  Where  facts 
alleged  in  an  answer  amount  to  a  couuter- 
<;laini,  they  will  be  so  considered  although 
iiot  so  designated,  and  hence  are  admitted 
by  failure  of  plaintiff  to  reply  to  them. 
Farrell  v.  Burbank  (1894),  57  Minn.  395, 
59  N.  W.  485.  Allegations  in  an  answer 
manifestly  set  up  as  a  counter-claim,  and 
praying  for  affirmative  relief,  -will  be 
treated  as  a  counter-claim,  though  not 
designated  as  such  in  the  answer. 

Arthurs  i\  Thompson  (1895),  97  Ky. 
218,  30  S.  W.  628:  Sub-sec.  4,  Sec.  97, 
Civil  Code,  provides  that  "  a  defendant 
shall  not  have  judgment  upon  a  set-off  or 
counter-claim,  unless  the  caption  of  the 
answer  contain  the  words  '  answer  and  set- 
off '  or  the  words  '  answer  and  counter- 
claim ; '  but  a  misdescription  in  the  caption 
of  the  nature  of  the  defendant's  claim  shall 
not  prevent  him  from  Iiaving  judgment," 
etc.  Held  that  this  only  made  it  neces- 
sary to  apprise  the  plaintiff  that  he  asked 
some  relief  over  against  him,  and  that  the 
caption  "  answer  and  counter-claim  "  mis- 
takenly used  instead  of  the  caption  "  an- 
swer and  set-off  "  would  not  deprive  the 
defendant  of  such  relief  as  he  showed  him- 
self entitled  to. 

McDougald  r.  Hulet  (1901),  132  Cal. 
154,  64  Pac.  278  :  A. leased  a  tract  of  land, 
and  B.  and  C.  for  a  sufficient  consideration 
guaranteed  the  payment  of  the  rent  by  the 
lessee.  The  rent  was  not  paid,  and  B. 
brought  an  action,  making  A.  and  C.  de- 
fendants, asking  to  have  it  adjudged  how 
much  was  due  A.  under  the  lease,  and  that 
C  was  bound  to  A.  for  such  amount  and 
that  plaintiff"  was  only  surety,  and  further 
it  was  sought  to  have  judgment  that  C. 
pay  A.  the  amount  so  found  and  that  plain- 
tiff recover  from  C.  all  money  paid  and 
losses  sustained  by  reason  of  said  guar- 
anty. A.  in  his  answer  set  out  by  way  of 
counter-claim  and  cross-complaint  the  facts 
of  the  transaction,  and  asked  for  judgment 


again.st  plaintiff  for  tiie  amount  which 
might  be  found  ilue  him  under  the  lease. 
The  trial  court  found  that  a  hvrge  sum  was 
due  A.  under  the  lease,  but  refu.sed  to  give 
A.  judgment  against  jjlaintiff  on  the 
ground  tliat  the  amount  due  was  not  the 
subject  of  a  counter-claim.  On  appeal  it 
was  held  that  this  was  error,  and  look 
entirely  too  narrow  a  view  of  the  matter. 
The  court  .said,  "  Plaintiff  could  not  have 
prevented  the  recovery  by  IJoggs  [A.]  in 
an  independent  suit.  Why  should  he  in 
this  ?  We  do  not  think  it  necessary  to 
go  into  any  nice  distinctions  as  to  the 
name  given  to  an  answer. "J 

Bates  i;.  llosekrans,  37  N.  Y.  409,411, 
per  Hunc  J. ;  McConihe  v.  HoUi.ster,  1 9  Wis. 
269;  Hutchings  v.  Moore,  4  Mete.  (Ky.) 
110;  Wilder  v.  Boynton,  63  Barb.  547; 
McAbee  v.  Randall,  41  Cal.  136.  See 
contra,  Brannaman  r.  Palmer,  Stanton's 
Code  (Ky.),  p.  90;  Sullivan  t-.  Byrne,  10 
S.  C.  122;  Union  Nat.  Bk.  v.  Carr,  49 
Iowa,  359 ;  Equitable  Life  Ass.  Soc.  r. 
Cuyler,  75  N.  Y.  511,  514,  12  Hun,  247  ; 
Bates  ;;.  Rosekrans,  4  Abb.  n.  s.  276,  37 
N.  Y.  409  ;  Wright  v.  Delafield,  25  N.  Y. 
266 ;  Burke  v.  Thorn,  44  Barb.  383  ;  Bur- 
rail  V.  De  Groot,  5  Duer,  362 ;  Beers  v. 
Waterbury,  8  Bosw.  396;  Stowell  r. 
Eldred,  39*  Wis.  614  ;  Selleck  v.  Griswold, 
49  id.  39;  Gilpin  v.  Wilson,  53  Ind.  443  ; 
Holmes  v.  Richet,  56  Cal.  307  {per  contra, 
need  not  be  so  designated).  See,  further, 
in  support  of  the  conclusions  of  the  text, 
Brannan  v.  Paty,  58  Cal.  330;  Carpenter 
V.  Hewel,  67  Cal.  589;  Fuchs  v.  Treat,  41 
Wis.  404  ;  Dobbs  v.  Kellogg,  53  Wis.  448; 
contra.  Mills  v.  Rosenbaum,  103  Ind.  152; 
Acer  v.  Hotchkiss,  97  N.  Y.  395,  408. 

The  Kentucky  code,  §  98,  subd.  4,  pro- 
vides that  "a  defendant  shall  not  have 
judgment  upon  a  set-off  or  counter-cdaim, 
unless  the  caption  of  the  answer  contain 
the  words  '  answer  and  set-off,'  or  the 
words  'answer  and  counter-claim.'"  It 
is  held,  however,  that  the  plaintiff  may 
waive  the  benefit  of  this  subdivision  by 
replying  to  the  answer  and  counter-claim. 
Casou  V.  Cason,  79  Ky.  558 ;  Nutter  v. 
Johnson,  80  Ky.  426.  By  the  Wisconsin 
code  (R.  S.  §  2656),  as  amended,  the  rule 
of  the  text  is  embodied  in  the  provision, 
"  Each  counter-claim  must  be  pleaded  as 


866 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


the  States  but  oue  or  two,  the  phiintiff  must  reply  to  a  counter- 
claim, or  its  averments  of  fact  are  admitted  to  be  true.^     He  ought 


such,  and  be  so  denominated,  and  the 
answer  shall  contain  a  demand  of  the 
judgment  to  which  the  defendant  sup- 
poses himself  to  be  entitled  by  reason  of 
the  counter-claims  therein."  The  plaintiff 
waives  the  defect  that  the  counter-claim 
is  not  so  designated  by  demurring  or 
replj'iug  to  it  as  a  counter-claim,  even 
though  the  objection  is  rai.sed  on  the  trial : 
Voechting  v.  Grau,  55  Wis.  312. 

[^Township  of  Noble  v.  Aasen  (1898), 
8  N.  D.  77,  76  N.  \Y.  990:  Failure  to  de- 
mur to  an  alleged  counter-claim  on  the 
ground  that  the  facts  stated  do  not  consti- 
tute a  counter-claim,  waives  this  objection, 
and  the  only  point  then  open  to  the  plain- 
tiff, which  can  be  raised  at  any  time,  is 
that  the  fiicts  .stated  in  the  answer  do  not 
constitute  a  cause  of  action  in  favor  of  de- 
fendant that  could  be  enforced  against 
plaintiff  under  unj/  circumstances.  See  also 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Laughlin  (1894),  4 
N.  D.  391,  61  N.  W.  473  ;  Talty  v.  Torling 
(1900),  79  Minn.  386,  82  N.  W.  632; 
Campbell  ?;.  Jones  (1878),  25  Minn.  157; 
Lace  f.  Fixen  (1888),  39  Minn.  46,  38 
N.  W.  762  ;  Walker  v.  .Johnson  (1881),  28 
Minn.  147,  9  N.  W.  632. 

Young  V.  Gant  (1901),  09  Ark.  114,  61 
S.  W.  372  :  Where  a  defendant  sets  up  a 
counterclaim  to  which  plaintiff  makes  no 
reply,  if  defendant  does  not  move  for 
judgment  on  the  counter-claim  the  reply 
will  be  deemed  to  have  been  waived  and 
the  issues  treated  as  made.  Lacey  v. 
Lacey  (1893),  95  Ky.  110,23  S.  W.  673 : 
The  objection  that  the  wife's  answer,  in  a 
suit  for  divorce,  seeking  alimony  was  not 
styled  a  "  counter-claim  "  was  waived  by 
the  plaintiff's  replying  and  joining  issue 
on  the  matter  set  up  therein.  See  also 
Warren  v.  Chandler  (1896),  98  la.  237,  67 
N.  W.  242.] 

1  QSloan  i\  Rase  (1899),  101  Wis.  523, 
77  N.  W.  895 ;  City  of  Huron  v.  Meyers 
0900),  13  S.  I).  420',  83  N.  W.  553  ;  liavicz 
V.  Nickells  (1 900),  9  N.  1).  536,  84  N.  W.  353. 

Illsly  V.  Grayson  (1898),  105  la.  685, 
75  N.  W.  518.  Action  to  recover  rent, 
aided  by  attachment.  Defendant  pleaded 
a  counter-claim  for  work  and  labor,  etc. 
To  this  plaintiff  liled  a  rej)ly  consisting  of 


a  set-off  for  a  balance  due  him  upon  a 
note  executed  by  defendant,  etc.  The 
court,  after  quoting  the  sections  of  the 
code  bearing  on  the  matter,  said :  "  It 
will  be  observed  tiiat  while  they  do  not 
mention  either  set-off  or  counter-claim  in 
referring  to  the  reply,  yet  tliey  do  recog- 
nize that  defences,  either  negative  or 
affirmative,  may  be  pleaded,  provided  the 
matter  pleaded  be  not  inconsistent  with 
the  petition.  Plaintiff  could  not  join  the 
matters  pleaded  in  reply  with  his  action 
for  rent ;  for  the  statute  says  the  land- 
lord's lieu  may  be  effected  (that  is,  en- 
forced) by  action  for  the  rent  alone  within 
a  limited  time.  Defendant  had  the  un- 
doubted right  to  plead  his  counter-claim; 
but,  if  no  set-off  is  allowed  by  way  of 
reply,  he  may  thus,  after  litigation  ensues, 
apply  any  unsettled  items  of  account  to 
his  obligation  for  rent,  although  he  may 
at  the  same  time  be  owing  his  landlord 
a  much  larger  sum  on  general  account. 
It  may  be  that  such  a  re|dy  would  not  be 
proper  in  a  case  where  the  items  included 
therein  could  have  been  embraced  in  the 
petition.  But  where  the  statute  expressly 
inhibits  such  a  course,  it  certaiuly  must 
be  true  that  plaintiff  may  interpose  in  his 
rejdy,  as  a  matter  of  defence,  any  set  off 
he  may  have  to  defendant's  counter-claim. 
.  .  .  The  cases  of  Cox  v.  Jordan,  86  111. 
560;  Galligan  v.  Fannan,  9  Allen,  192; 
Mortlaud  v.  Holton,  44  Mo.  58;  Miller  v. 
Losee,  9  How.  Pr.  356 ;  Turner  v.  Simp- 
son, 12  Ind.  413;  Blount  r.  ){ick,  107  Ind. 
238;  and  Starke  v.  Dicks,  2  Ind.  App.  125, 
—  seem  to  su.stain  tiie  right  to  plead  in 
reply  a  set-off  to  defendant's  counter-claim, 
provided  there  is  no  departure  from  the 
antecedent  ground  of  complaint." 

Dunham  v.  Travis  (1902),  25  Utah,  65, 
69  Pac.  468 :  In  an  action  on  a  written 
contract,  the  answer,  after  denying  the 
allegations  of  the  complaint,  alleged  that 
a  nmtual  mistake  had  been  made  in  the 
contract,  and  prayed  to  have  it  corrected, 
to  which  no  reply  was  filed.  Held,  that 
this  constituted  a  counter-claim  and  not 
merely  matter  in  defence,  and  the  counter- 
claim was  admitted  by  failure  to  reply. 

Ashland   Land    &   Live    Stock  Co.  v. 


COUNTER-CI.AIM. 


867 


not  to  be  subjected  to  this  penalty  unless  he  is  told  in  the  most 
express  terms  that  the  pleading  is  a  counter-claim.  It  would  have 
been  better  if  the  courts  had  laid  down  the  most  exphcit  rule,  and 
liad  required  the  defendant  to  name  his  pleading :  but  the  cases 
do  not  go  to  this  length  ;  and  a  prayer  for  relief,  appended  to  the 
proper  allegations  of  fact,  will  su2)ply  the  place  of  a  name.  It 
has  been  held  that  when  the  defendant  has  set  up  facts  wliich 
really  constitute  a  defence,  but  has  mistakenly  called  them  a 
counter-claim,  formally  pleading  them  as  such,  he  must  stand  by 
the  designation,  and  cannot  treat  them  as  a  defence,  and  have  the 
benefit  of  them  as  a  bar  to  the  plaintiff's  recovery.^  This  ruling, 
however,  is  without  any  cogent  reason  in  its  favor,  would  often 
work  injustice,  and  seems  opposed  to  some  of  the  cases  already 
quoted.2 


Woodford  (1897),  50  Neb.  118,  69  N.  W. 
769  :  "  Where  to  a  counter-claim  well 
pleaded  the  plaintiff  interposes  no  reply, 
a  verdict  in  his  favor  in  excess  of  the 
amount  claimed  in  his  petition,  less  the 
amount  of  such  couuter-cl;iim,  should  be 
set  aside  as  unsupported  by  the  pleading :  " 
Medland  v.  Walker  (1895),  96  la.  175,  64 
N.  W.  797  :  Failure  to  plead  to  a  counter- 
claim does  not  have  the  effect  of  admitting 
its  allegations  where  every  fact  pleaded  iu 
the  counter-claim  is  put  in  issue  by  the 
allegations  of  the  petition  and  the  amended 
and  substituted  answer. 

Bank  of  Columbia  v.  Gadsden  (1899), 
56  S.  C.  313,  .33  S.  E.  575  :  Where  a  plea 
of  set-off  is  purely  defensive,  going  merely 
to  defeat  jdaintiff's  recovery,  and  not 
authorizing  any  affirmative  relief  against 
the  plaintiff,  the  plaintiff  is  not  bound  to 
reply  to  it,  as  required  in  case  of  a  coun- 
ter-claim, but  may  on  the  trial  plead  the 
statute  of  limitations  ore  tenus,  under  sec- 
tion 189,  providing  that  new  matter  in 
the  answer  not  relating  to  a  counterclaim 
"  is  to  be  deemed  controverted  by  the  ad- 
verse party  as  upon  a  direct  denial  or 
avoidance,  as  the  case  may  require." 

Replying  set-off  to  set-off:  Small  v.  Ken- 
nedy (1893),  137  Ind.  299,  33  N.  E.  674: 
"It  has  often  been  held  by  this  court 
that  a  plaintiff  may  reply  a  set-off  to  a 
set-off,  and  upon  the  same  principle  there 
is  no  reason  why  he  may  not  reply  a 
counter-claim  to  a  counter-claim."  Per 
contni  :  Hammer  v.    Downing   (1901),  39 


Ore.  504,  64  Pac.  651  :  A  reply  of  a  setoff 
to  a  plea  of  setoff  is  bad,  and  constitutes 
a  departure  iu  pleading.] 

1  Ferreira  v.  l)e  Tew,  4  Abb.  Pr.  131 
(Sp.  Term),  per  Brady  J.;  Campbell  v. 
Koutt,  42  Ind.  410,  415.  See  also  McAbee 
V.  Randall,  41  Cai.  136,  where  the  defend- 
ant, liaving  named  his  answer  a  "  counter- 
claiin,"  was  not  permitted  to  treat  it  as  a 
"  cruss-complaint." 

■^  See  De  Leyer  v.  Mich.'\els,  5  Abb. 
Pr.  203. 

\^Disinhsalof  Actionas  Affecthnj  Couriter- 
Chiim  :  Judd  v.  Gray  (1900),  156  Ind.  278, 
59  N.  E.  849;  Adams  v.  Osgood  (1898), 
55  Neb.  766,  76  N.  W.  446;  Rodgers  r. 
Pari^er  (1902),  136  Cal.  313,  68  Pac.  975; 
Islais,  etc.  Water  Co.  r.  Allen  (1901),  132 
Cal.  432,  64  Pac.  713;  Southern  Pac.  K. 
R.  Co.  V.  Pixley  (1894),  103  Cal.  118,  37 
Pac.  194;  Maffett  v.  Thompson  (1898),  32 
Ore.  .546,  52  Pac.  565;  Bardes  r.  Hutch- 
inson (1901),  113  la.  610,  85  N.  W.  797; 
Rumbough  v.  Young  (1896),  119  N.  C. 
567,  26  S.  E.  143 ;  Axiom  Min.  Co.  r. 
Little  (1894),  6  S.  D.  438,  61  N.  W.  441  ; 
Washington  Nat.  Bank  v.  Saunders  (1901), 
24  Wash.  321,  61  Pac.  546. 

Atnonnt  of  CoiaUer-Claini  (is  Affecting 
Jurisdiction :  Howard  Iron  Works  v.  Buf- 
falo Elevating  Co.  (1903),  176N.Y.  — ,  68 
N.  E.  66;  Griswold  v.  Pieratt  (1895),  110 
Cal.  259,  42  Pac.  820;  Freeman  v.  Scitz 
(1899),  126  Cal.  291,  58  Pac.  690;  Martin 
V.  Eastman  (1901),  109  Wis.  286,  85 
N.  W.  359  ;  General  Elec.  Co.  v.  Williams 


868 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


II.    Tlie  Parties  in  their  lielations  with  th'  Counter- Claim. 

^  625.  *  749.  1.  Relations  of  Defendant  to  Counter-Claim.  Must 
be  a  Demand  in  Favor  of  Defendant  -who  pleads  it.  Test.  Ill  all 
the  States  whose  codes  do  not  contain  a  provision  in  favor  of 
sureties  or  joint-debtors,  the  rnle  is  established  without  exception 
that  the  counter-claim  must  be  a  demand  existing  in  favor  of  the 
defendant  who  pleads  it ;  in  other  words,  the  defendant  cannot 
set  up  and  maintain  as  a  valid  counter-claim  a  right  of  action  sub- 
sisting in  favor  of  another  person,  even  though  there  may  be  close 
legal  relations  between  himself  and  such  other  person.  The  sure 
test  is  very  simple.  Could  the  defendant  have  maintained  an  in- 
dependent action  upon  the  demand  if  he  had  made  it  the  basis  of 
a  separate  suit?  If  he  could  not,  then  he  cannot  use  it  as  a 
counter-claim.  To  this  proposition  there  is  no  judicial  dissent 
nor  exception ;  and  the  cases  which  I  shall  cite  are  intended  to 
illustrate  the  various  circumstances  in  which  the  rule  has  been 
applied.^ 

§  626.  *  750.  Case  of  Surety.  Relief  in  Equity.  The  most 
common  case  is  that  of  a  surety.  When  sued  alone,  or  together 
with  the  principal  debtor,  he  cannot  interpose  as  a  valid  counter- 


(1898),  12.3  N.  C.  .')1,  31  S.  E.  288;  Hay- 
good  V.  Boney  (1894),  43  S.  C.  63,  20 
S.  E.  803  ;  Buiich  v.  Potts  (1893),  57  Ark. 
257,  21  S.  W.  437.] 

1  QNorthera  Trust  Co.  r.  Hiltgen(1895), 
62  Miiiu.  361,  64  N.  W.  909;  Taylor  v. 
Matte.soii  (1893),  86  Wis.  113,  56  N.  W. 
829;  Einenson  v.  Schwindt  (1900),  103 
Wis.  167,  84  N.  W.  186;  Sullivan  v. 
Nicoulin  (1901),  113  la.  76,  84  N.  W.  978; 
Lehaiioii  Steam  Laundry  v.  Dyckraau 
(1900),  Ky.,  57  S.  W.  227." 

Newton  v.  Lee  (1893),  139  N.  Y.  332, 
34  N.  E.  90.) :  "  In  an  action  to  recover 
for  good.s  alleged  to  liave  been  sold 
and  delivered  to  defendants,  the  latter, 
after  a  general  denial,  set  up  in  their 
answer  '  for  a  further  and  separate  auswer 
and  defence '  that  the  transactions  set 
forth  in  tlio  complaint  were  between  the 
plaintiffs  d.s.siijnor  and  a  corporation,  un- 
der a  written  contract  between  vendor 
and  vendee;  that  the  vendor  failed  to 
perform  its  contract,  by  means  whereof 
the  vendee  was  damaged  in  a  man- 
ner .set  forth ;  that  defendants  '  became 
I)rivy   to    the   contract'    by   guaranteeing 


performance  on  the  part  of  the  vendee. 
Said  damages  defendants  claimed  they 
were  '  entitled  to  recoup  and  set  off  as  a 
counter-claim  against  the  jjvetended  cause 
of  action  set  forth  in  the  complaint.' 
Held,  that  the  second  defence,  assuming 
the  facts  therein  stated  to  1)0  true,  had  no 
relation  to  the  cause  of  'action  set  forth  in 
the  complaint ; '  that  it  set  up  '  new  matter  ' 
within  tlie  meaning  of  the  provision  of 
the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  authorizing 
a  demurrer  to  a  counter-claim ;  and  so, 
that  an  order  overruling  a  demurrer 
thereto  was  error.  It  seems,  that  if  de- 
fendants had  been  sued  as  guarantors  or 
sureties,  they  could  not  have  availed  tlicm- 
selves,  in  exoneration  of  tlicir  liability,  of 
a  cause  of  action  for  (lam.iges  for  breacli 
of  the  contract  with  their  principal." 

Computing  Scale  Co.  v.  Churchill 
(1901),  109  Wis.  .303,  85  N.  W.  .337: 
"  A  counter-claim  must  be  one  existing  in 
favor  of  a  defendant  and  against  a  jilain- 
tiff  between  whom  a  several  judgment 
might  be  had  in  the  action,  and  arising 
out  of  one  of  the  causes  of  action  men- 
tioned in  the  statute."] 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


869 


claim  any  cause  of  action  existing  in  favor  of  that  principal,  — 
not  even  one  arising  from  a  breach  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  very 
contract  in  suit.^  There  are  instances  in  which  eqnity  will  un- 
doubtedly relieve  the  surety  when  the  principal  debtor  is  insol- 
vent, and  holds  valid  claims  against  the  plaintiff  which  lie  might 
assert ;  but  such  equitable  relief  would  not  be  in  the  form  of  a 
counter-cljiim :  it  would  he  defensive  merely,  and  would  not  in- 
clude any  recovery  against  the  plaintiff  by  the  surety.  If  the 
principal  debtor  and  the  surety  are  sued  together,  and  the  former 
interposes  the  counter-claim  existing  in  his  own  favor  and  suc- 
ceeds on  it,  the  result,  of  course,  operates  as  a  defence  in  aid  of 
the  surety :  the  plaintiff's  demand  being  partly  or  wholly  extin- 


1  Gillespie  v.  Torrance,  25  N.  Y.  .306, 
308,  310,  per  Selden  J. ;  s.  c.  4  Bosw.  3!) ; 
7  Abb.  Pr.  462 ;  La  Farge  v.  Halsey,  1 
Bosw.  171,  4  Abb.  Pr.  397;  People  v. 
Brandreth,  3  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  224  (Ct.  of 
A  pp.),  per  Hunt  and  Porter  JJ. ;  East 
Iviver  Bank  v.  Kogers,  7  Bosw.  493 ; 
Lasher  v.  Williamson,  55  N.  Y.  619; 
O'Ulenis  v.  Karing,  57  N.  Y.  649;  Gilles- 
pie V.  Torrance  was  an  action  against 
an  indorser  of  a  note.  lie  alleged,  as  a 
counter-claim,  that  he  iudorsed  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  Van  P.,  the  maker;  that 
the  note  was  given  for  the  price  of  timber 
sold  by  the  plaintiff  to  Van  P. ;  that  plain- 
tiff warranted  the  quality  of  the  timber  to 
the  buyer,  —  a  breach  of  tliis  warranty, 
and  conse(pient  damages  Ui  Van  P.,  for 
which  defendant  demanded  judgment. 
This  attempted  counter-claim  was  re- 
jected for  the  reasons  stated  in  tlie  text. 
The  opinion  of  Selden  J.  is  very  elaborate 
and  instructive.  While  holding  that  the 
surety  has  no  legal  counter-claim  nor  set- 
off, Mr.  Justice  Selden  is  of  opinion  that 
he  would  be  relieved  iu  equity  if  the  prin- 
cipal debtor  was  insolvent.  This  equita- 
ble relief,  however,  would  not  be  in  the 
shape  of  a  recovery  against  the  plaintiff. 
In  La  Farge  i'.  Halsey,  the  defendants  were 
sureties  for  the  lessee  on  a  lease,  and 
were  sued  for  rent  in  arrear.  They  set 
up,  as  a  counter-claim,  damages  sustained 
by  the  lessee  from  a  breach  by  the  plain- 
tiff of  an  agreement  made  between  him- 
self and  the  tenant.  This  was  overruled, 
because  the  right  of  action  was  in  the 
lessee  alone.     East  River  Bank  i'.  Rogers 


was  the  ordinary  case  of  a  guarantor  sued 
for  the  debt  secured.  He  pleaded,  as  a 
counter-claim,  a  debt  due  from  tlie  plain- 
tiff to  his  principal,  and  it  was  struck  out 
as  frivolous.  As  to  counter-claim  in  favor 
of  a  surety,  see  also  Morgan  v.  Smitii,  7 
Hun,  244,  citing  Lewis  v.  McMillan,  41 
Bnrb.  420;  Smith  v.  Felton,  43  N.  Y.  419, 
and  Gillespie  i'.  Torrance,  supra  ;  Davis  v. 
Toulmin,  77  N.  Y.  280;  Scott  i,'.  Timber- 
lake,  83  N.  C.  382;  Coffin  v.  McLean,  80 
N.  Y.  560;  Harris  v.  Rivers,  .53  Ind.  216; 
Stockton  Sav.  &  L.  Soc.  v.  Giddings,  96 
Cal.  84;  Thalheimer  v.  Crow,  13  Col. 
397. 

[Bishop  V.  Mathews  (1899),  109  Ga. 
790,  35  S.  E.  161:  A  defendant  in  an 
action  brought  against  him  individually 
upon  a  demand  for  the  payment  of  which 
he  is  individually  liable,  cannot,  witliout 
showing  some  equitable  reason  for  being 
allowed  so  to  do,  such  as  the  insolvency 
of  the  plaintiff,  set  off  .ngain.st  the  plain- 
tiffs claim  a  debt  due  by  the  latter  to  a 
partnership  of  which  the  defendant  is  or 
had  been  a  member. 

Crowley  v.  U.  S.  Fidelity  &  Guaranty 
Co.  (1902),  29  Wash.  268,  69  Pac.  784: 
"In  an  action  against  the  surety  upon  a 
building  contractor's  bond  to  recover  the 
amount  of  unf)aid  bills  for  material  the 
owner  was  compelled  to  pay.  tlie  defend- 
ant is  entitled  to  oifset  the  value  of  extra 
work  performed  by  the  contractor,  and 
for  this  purpose  may  introduce  evidence 
showing  that  there  was  a  dispute  between 
the  owner  and  contractor  as  to  the  reason- 
able value  of  such  extras,  etc."] 


870 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


gLiished,  the  surety  would  iiecessaiily  obtain  the  benefit  of  such 
extinction.^ 

§  627.  *  751.  Rule  not  Confined  to  Sureties.  Other  Instances. 
The  rule  is  not  confined  to  sureties.  It  requires,  in  general,  — 
the  only  exception  being  the  case  where  a  separate  judgment  is 
possible,  —  that  the  counter-claim  should  exist  in  favor  of  all  tlie 
defendants,  and  that  all  the  persons  in  whose  favor  it  exists 
should  be  defendants  in  the  action,  and  that  it  should  be  pleaded 
in  their  common  behalf.  Thus,  where  one  is  sued,  a  demand  in 
favor  of  himself  and  a  former  partner  not  a  party  to  the  suit  is 
inadmissible  as  a  counter-claim  ;  '^  and,  conversely,  in  an  action 
against  partners  upon  a  firm  liability,  a  counter-claim  interposed 
by  one  of  them,  alleging  a  demand  for  damages  accruing  to  him 
individually  from  the  breach  of  a  separate  contract  between  him- 
self and  the  plaintiff,  must  be  rejected,  because  it  is  not  in  favor 
of  all  the  defendants  who  are  thus  jointly  sued.^  A  person  sued 
in  a  representative  capacity  —  for  example,  as  a  receiver  —  to  re- 
cover trust-funds  in  his  hands,  or  to  enforce  the  performance  of 
his  fiduciary  duty,  cannot  avail  himself,  by  way  of  counter-claim, 
of  a  demand  due  to  himself  in  his  personal  and  private  capacity ;  * 


1  O'Blenis  v.  Karing,  57  N.  Y.  649; 
Springer  v.  Dwyer,  50  N.  Y.  19;  Greeu 
V.  Conrad  (Mo.  Supreme,  I89.'l),  21  S.  W. 
Hep.  839 ;  Becker  v.  Northway,  44  Minn. 
61.  Where  tiie  principal  debtor  and  the 
plaintiff  are  insolvent,  the  surety,  who 
is  jointly  bound  with  his  principal,  may 
set  off  his  individual  claim  again.st  the 
plaintiff,  notwithstanding  tlie  statutory 
j)rovision  that  the  "  counter-claim  must 
be  one  existing  in  favor  of  a  defendant 
and  against  a  plaintiff  between  wliom 
a  several  judgment  might  be  had  in 
the  action."  Clark  c.  Sullivan,  2  N.  Dak. 
103. 

2  Campbell  v.  Genet,  2  Hilton,  290. 
See  Bird  v.  McCoy,  22  Iowa,  549,  —  a 
peculiar  case  in  which  parties  were  held 
included  as  defendants  in  the  Jirm  nmne 
against  which  the  action  wa.s  brought. 
See  also,  a.s  to  suits  again.st  ])artners 
and  other  joint  debtors,  V^^eil  v.  Jones,  70 
Mo.  560 ;  Great  West.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pierce, 
1  Wyo.  Ter.  45;  Wilson  v.  Ruukcl,  38 
Wis.  526;  Harris  v.  Rivers,  .53  Ind.  216; 
and  ra.'es  cited /jo.s<,  in  notes  to  §§  *  758, 
♦  75'J. 


3  Peabody  v.  Bloomer,  5  Duer,  678,  6 
Duer,  .53,  3  Abb.  Pr.  353,  per  Woodruff 
J. :  "  To  an  action  against  several  joint 
debtors  for  a  debt  due  by  them  as  part- 
ners, one  of  them  cannot  avail  himself, 
either  by  way  of  set-off  or  counter-claim, 
of  such  a  defence."  See  this  case,  and 
especially  the  opinion  of  Hoffman,  J.  at 
Special  Term  on  tlie  subject  of  joitit 
liabi/iti/.  See  also  Wilson  v.  Kunkel,  38 
Wis.  .526. 

[^Sullivan  v.  Xicouliu  (1901),  113  la. 
76,  84  N.  W.  978  ;  Brown  v.  Fresno  Raisin 
Co.  (1894),  101  Cal.  222,  35  Pac.  639; 
Baxter  r.  Sherman  (1898),  73  Minn.  434, 
76  N.  W.  211  ;  McKinnon  v.  Palen  (1895), 
62  Minn.  188,  64  N.  W.  387;  Pope  Mfg. 
Co.  V.  Cycle  Co.  (1899),  55  S.  C.  528,  33 
S.  E.  787;  Smith  v.  Diamond  (1893),  86 
Wis.  359,  56  N.  W.  922.;] 

*  Johnson  v.  Gunter,  6  Busii,  534  ;  AV 
Jones  (Supreme,  1888),  1  N.  Y.  Suppl. 
127. 

QWilkiihson  u.  Bertock  (1900),  111  Ga. 
187,  36  S.  E.  623;  Carter  v.  Tippins 
(I90I ),  113  Ga.  636,  38  S.  E.  946  ;  Bisho]) 
V.  Mathews  (1899),  109  Ga.  790,  35  S.  E. 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


1 


and  the  converse  of  this  particular  rule  is  also  equally  true.^ 
Under  any  and  all  circumstances,  a  counter-claim  consisting  of  a 
demand  in  favor  of  a  third  person  not  a  party  to  the  action,  and 
having  no  relations  with  the  issues  involved  therein,  is  entirely 
inadmissible.^ 

§628.  *  752.  2.  Relations  of  Plaintiff  to  Counter-Claim.  Must  be 
a  Demand  against  Plaintiff.  Test.  Application  of  Rule  most  Frequent 
in  what  Cases.  The  very  conception  of  a  counter-claim  implies 
that  it  is  a  cause  of  action  against  the  plaintiff.  The  test  is  here 
•equally  simple  and  plain  as  in  the  case  of  the  defendant.  Would 
the  facts,  if  alleged  in  a  separate  action  against  the  plaintiff,  make 
out  a  cause  of  action  against  him,  and  show  him  liable  to  the  ap- 
propriate relief?  If  not,  they  do  not  and  cannot  constitute  a 
€ounter-claim.  This  rule,  althougli  universal,  is  most  frequently 
applied  in  actions  brought  by  assignees  of  the  demands  in  suit. 
When  the  plaintiff  is  such  an  assignee,  no  demand  accruing  to 
the  defendant  against  the  assignor  can  possibly  be  enforced  as  a 
counter-claim.^     Such  liability  of  the  assignor  may,  under  certain 


161;  Davis  t'.  Haddeii  (1902),  115  Ga.  466, 
41  S.  E.  608  ;  Edwards  v.  Williams  (1893), 
39  S.  C.  86,  17  S.  E.  4.57;  Gallagher  v. 
Germania  Brewing  Co.  (1893),  53  Minn. 
214,  54  N.  W.  1115;  Gerdtzen  v.  Cockrell 
(1893),  52  Minn.  501,  55  N.  W.  58;  Ore- 
gon Gold-Mining  Co.  v.  Schmidt  (1901), 
Ky.,  60  S.  W.  530;  Ileadington  v.  Smith 
(1901),  113  1a.  107,84  N.  W.  982:  In  a 
suit  brought  in  a  representative  capacity, 
defendant  cannot  use  as  a  counter-claim 
a  cause  of  action  existing  against  the 
plaintiff  as  an  individual.] 

1  Gansner  i'.  Franks,  75  Mo.  64  ;  Lanier 
V.  Branson,  21  S.  C.  41. 

[Lewis  V.  rickering  (1899),  58  Neb. 
63,  78  N.  W.  368 ;  Le  Clare  r.  Thibault 
<1902),  41  Ore.  601,  69  Pac.  552  :  "  Invok- 
ing the  maxim  that  equity  will  not  suffer 
a  wrong  without  a  remedy,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  counter-claim  ari.sing  in  a 
different  right  will  sometimes  be  allowed 
in  a  suit  by  reason  of  circumstances  tliat 
render  it  equitable  to  do  so."'] 

-  Bates  V.  Rosekrans,  37  N.  Y.  409, 
411;  Babbett  v.  Young,  51  Barb.  466; 
Ernst  V.  Kuukle,  5  Ohio  St.  520 ;  Dolph 
V.  Rice,  21  Wis.  590,  593;  Briggs  v.  Sey- 
mour, 17  Wis.  255;  Carpenter  v.  Leonard, 
5    Minn.    155;    Mealey  v.   Nickerson,    44 


Minn.  430  (stockholders  cannot  set  off  a 
claim  in  favor  of  the  corporation).  See, 
however,  Mooreliead  c.  Hyde,  38  Iowa, 
382,  —  a  case  in  which  the  defendants 
were  held  to  be  trustees  of  an  express 
trust  in  a  contract  made  with  tlie  plain- 
tiff, and  a  counter-claim  by  them  was 
sustained. 

3  [;Sniith  V.  Dawley  (1894),  92  la.  312, 
60  N.  W.  625;  Hoaglin  v.  Henderson 
(1903),  119  la.  720,  94  N.  W.  247  ;  Newton 
V.  Lee  (1893),  139  N.  Y.  332,  34  N.  E.  905  ; 
Emerson  v.  Schwindt  (1900).  108  Wis.  167, 
84  N.  W.  186  :  "A  counterclaim  '  must  be 
one  existing  in  favor  of  the  defendant 
and  against  a  plaintiiS  between  whom  a 
several  judgment  might  be  had  in  the 
action.' "  In  this  case  tlie  defendant  in  a 
suit  brought  by  the  assignee  of  a  land 
contract  for  foreclosure  sought  to  main- 
tain a  counter-claim  for  legal  services 
rendered  the  assignor,  a  receiver.  Held, 
tliat  it  could  not  be  maintained.  See  also 
Computing  Scale  Co.  v.  Churchill  (1901), 
109  Wis.  303,  85  N.  W.  337;  Taylor  v. 
Matteson  (1893),  86  Wis.  113,  56  N.  W. 
829;  Gibson  v.  Trow  (1900),  105  Wis.  288, 
81  N.  W.  411. 

New  Whatcom  v.  Bellingliam  Bay  Imp 
Co.  (1896),  16  Wash.  138,  47  Pac."  1102. 


872 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


circumstances,  be  a  good  defence  in  bar  of  the  recovery :  but,  as 
it  is  not  a  liability  of  the  plaintiff,  it  cannot  be  a  counter-claim ; 
it  is  impossible,  by  means  of  a  valid  demand  against  A.  alone,  to 
obtain  a  judgment  against  B.  The  decisions  are  unanimous,  and 
sustain  the  doctrine  stated  above  under  all  possible  circumstances.^ 
The  rule  is  applied  by  the  cases  cited  in  the  note  to  every  species 


"  In  an  action  by  a  city  to  recover  benefits 
for  street  improvements,  the  defendant 
cannot  offset  a  claim  for  materials  fur- 
nished the  contractor  who  had  charge  of 
making  the  improvements."  See  also 
Sheafe  v.  Hastie  (1897),  l6  Wash.  563,  48 
Pac.  246  ;  Parker  v.  Carolina  Bank  (1898), 
53  S.  C.  58.3,  31  S.  E.  673 ;  Efird  r.  Land 
Co.  (1899),  55  S.  C.  78,  32  S.  E.  758 ;  Lau- 
ragleun  Mills  i'.  Ruff  (1900),  57  S.  C.  53, 
35  S.  E.  387  ;  Rumbough  i\  Young  (1896), 
119  N.  C.  567,  26  S.  E.  143;  Wilkinson  v. 
Bertock  (1900),  111  Ga.  187,  36  S.  E.  623  ; 
Northern  Trust  Co.  r.  Hiltgen  (1895),  62 
Minn.  361,  64  N.  W.  909;  Harrison  v. 
State  Banking  &  Trust  Co.  (1902),  15 
S.  D.  304,  89  N.  W.  477;  Field  v.  Austin 
(1901),  131  Cal.  379,  63  Pac.  292;  Bloch 
Queensware  Co.  v.  Metzger  (1901 ),  70 
Ark.  232,  65  S.  W.  929;  Bernstein  v. 
Coburn  (1896),  49  Neb.  7.34,  68  N.  W. 
1021  ;  Johnson  v.  Geneva  Pub.  Co.  (1894), 
122  Mo.  102,  26  S.  W.  676  ;  Washington 
Sav.  Bank  v.  Butchers',  etc.  Bank  (1895), 
130  Mo.  155,  31  S.  W.  761.3 

'  Boyd  V.  Foot,  5  Bosw.  110;  Vassear 
V.  Livingston,  13  N.  Y.  248,  252,  per  Denio 
J.;  s.  c.  4  Duer,  285,  293,  per  Duer  J.; 
Dillaye  v.  Niles,  4  Abb.  Pr.  253 ;  Ferreira 
V.  De  Pew,  4  Abb.  Pr.  131  ;  Thompson 
'•.  Sickles,  46  Barb.  49 ;  Mcllvaine  ;•. 
Egerton,  2  Robt.  422;  Wolf  v.  H.,  13 
How.  Pr.  84,  i)er  E.  Darwin  Smith  J. ; 
Davidson  v.  Remington,  12  How.  Pr.  310; 
Gleason  r.  .Moen,  2  Duer,  639  ;  Cumings 
V.  Morris,  3  Bosw.  560 ;  Wiltsie  v.  Nor- 
tiiam,  3  Bosw.  162;  Duncan  v.  Stanton, 
30  Barb.  5.33,  536;  Tyler  v.  Willis,  33 
Barl).  327  ;  Spencer  v.  Babcock,  22  Barb. 
326,  33') ;  Weeks  r.  Pryor,  27  Barb.  79 ; 
Van  de  .Sande  v.  Hall,  13  How.  Pr.  458, 
per  Paige  J. ;  Linn  v.  Rugg,  19  Minn.  181, 
185;  Swift  I'.  Fletcher,  6  Minn.  550; 
McConihe  v.  Holli.ster,  19  Wis.  269.  In 
this  case  the  defendant  prayed  e<iuitaV)le 
relief  that  the  mortgage,  etc.,  sued  on  by 
an  assignee,  might  be  cancelled  on  account 


of  the  mortgagee's  fraud  in  obtaining  it. 
Tiic  court  held  tliat  this  answer  was  in 
form  a  counter-claim,  but  that  it  could 
not  be  relied  on  as  such  by  the  defendant 
and  the  relief  granted,  because  the  assignor 
was  a  necessary  party ;  and  the  opinion 
implies  that,  if  he  had  been  made  a  party, 
the  relief  could  have  been  granted.  Not- 
withstanding this  array  of  authorities, 
and  the  explicit  language  of  the  codes, 
the  doctrine  has  sometimes  been  over- 
looked by  courts.  Thus,  in  Page  v.  Ford^ 
12  Ind.  46,  and  Slayback  i'.  Jones,  9  Ind. 
470,  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  en- 
tirely failed  to  notice  tiiat  the  demands 
existing  against  an  assignor,  whicli  were 
set  up  by  the  defendants  against  the  as- 
signee (the  plaintiff),  could  not  possibly 
be  counter-claims ;  and  that  the  discussion 
of  tlie  court  upon  other  points  wa.s  there- 
fore wiiolly  unnecessary.  In  the  later 
case  of  Perry  v.  Chester,  1 2  Abb.  Pr.  N.  8. 
131,  Mr.  Justice  Mouell  is  chargeable  with 
the  same  palpable  oversight.  The  action 
was  on  an  appeal  bond  given  by  two 
defendants  to  A.,  and  by  iiim  assigned  to 
the  plaintiff.  One  of  the  defendants  set 
up  a  demand  in  his  own  favor  alone  against 
A.,  the  assignor,  as  a  counterclaim.  The 
learned  judge  discusses  at  great  length 
the  question,  whether  one  defendant  in 
such  an  action  can  rely  upon  a  claim  due 
to  himself  alone ;  and  finally  reaches  the 
conclusion  that,  as  the  undertaking  of 
tiie  defendants  wa.s  joint,  tlie  demand  of 
the  single  defendant  is  not  available.  He 
is  wholly  oblivious  to  tlie  fact  that  no 
such  claim  could  be  interposed  at  all  in 
the  action  against  the  plaintiff.  See  also, 
as  further  illustrations  of  the  text.  Free- 
man V.  Loriilard,  61  N.  Y.  612;  More  v. 
Rand,  60  id.  208;  Manney  v.  Ingram,  7S 
N.  C.  96;  Holliday  r.  Mi'Mullau,  83  id. 
270;  McCnllocli  r."  Vibbard,  51  Hun,  227: 
National  Bank  of  Chamb.  v.  Grimm,  109 
N.  C.  93.  See  also  cases  cited  ante,  in  last 
note  under  §  *  167. 


CUUNTEU-CLAIM.  873 

of  assignee,  private  and  official ;  and  is  established  with  absolute 
unanimity. 

§  629.  *  753.  Counter-claim  must  be  a  Cause  of  Action  ;  merely- 
Defensive  Matter  not  Sufficient.  It  is  an  essential  element  in  the 
legal  notion  of  a  eountev-claim  that  it  must  be  a  cause  of  action  ; 
must  consist  of  a  right  to  some  affirmative  relief,  and  not  be 
matter  simply  defensive,  either  in  bar  of  the  plaintiff's  recovery, 
or  in  reduction  of  its  amount.  Thus,  in  an  action  for  the  price  of 
work,  labor,  and  material,  the  defendant  in  his  answer  set  up  pay- 
ments made  by  him  in  excess  of  tlie  plaintiff's  demand,  but  did 
not  in  a  formal  manner  call  liis  pleading  a  counter-claim,  nor 
demand  judgment  for  the  surplus.  At  the  trial  he  insisted  that 
his  allegations  were  admitted  because  the  plaintiff  had  not  replied. 
His  contention  was  overruled,  not  upon  tlie  defects  of  form, 
but  upon  the  absence  of  any  cause  of  action.  The  payments  as 
stated  to  have  been  made  being  voluntary,  no  right  to  recover 
back  the  excess  existed ;  and  the  answer  was  nothing  more  than 
the  defence  of  payment.^  And  payments  or  disbursements  made 
by  a  trustee  or  holder  of  a  fund,  and  set  up  by  him  in  his  answer 
to  an  action  for  an  account  and  enforcement  of  the  trust  brought 
by  a  beneficiary,  do  not  create  any  right  of  action,  and  cannot, 
therefore,  be  a  counter-claim,^ 

§  630.  *  754.  In  Actions  by  Married  Women  ;  by  Widov^s.  Must 
be  against  Plaintiff  in  Capacity  in  ■which  he  sues.  Against  Plaintiff 
alone  and  against  all  the  Plaintiffs.  Exception.  In  actions  by 
married  women  to  recover  demands  due  to  them  personally  as  a 
part  of  their  separate  property,  or  their  personal  earnings,  and  the 
like,  debts  and  liabilities  of  their  husbands  cannot  be  successfully 

^  Holzbauer    v.    Heine,   37    Mo.    443 ;  an    action   of   ejectment,    where    the   de- 

and  see  McPherson  v.  Meek,  30  Mo.  34.5;  fendant  alleges  ownership  in  himself,  and 

Lash  i\  McCormick,  17  Minn.  403  (partial  asks  that  his  title  be  ciuieted  again.st  the 

failure  of  consideration) ;  Kent  y.  Cantrall,  plaintiff,  such  answer  is  a  counter-claim: 

44  hid.  452,  459;  McCrary  v.  Demiug,  38  Venable  v.  Dutch,  37  Kan.  515;  Allen  i-. 

Iowa,    527,  531;    Lathrop  v.  Godfrey,  6  Douglass,  29  Kan.  412;  Sale  v.  Bugher, 

N.  Y.  S.  C.  96,  —a  peculiar  case,  in  which  24  Kan.  432. 

a  demand  against  the  plaintiff's  assignor,  -  Duffy  r.  Duncan,  35  N.  Y.  187,  189. 
who,  it  was  alleged,  was  the  real  party  It  has  been  held  tliat  no  counter-claim  i.s 
in  interest,  was  sustained ;  citing  Hunt  v.  possible  against  the  State  beyond  the  de- 
Chapman,  51  N.  Y.  555;  Fir.st  Nat.  Bk.  feating  the  action  brought  by  it,  becau.se 
of  Memphis  y.  Kidd,  20  Minn.  234,  242, —  a  judicial  proceeding  cannot  be  main- 
an  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage,  in  tained  against  it :  the  counter-claim  can 
which  defendant  claimed  that  the  debt  he  used  as  a  de/eure,  but  no  further 
should  be  enforced  upon  other  lands  be-  Commonwealth  w.  Todd,  Q  Bush,  708. 
fore  proceeding  against  those  in  suit.     In 


874 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


interposed  as  counter-claims ;  ^  and  in  a  suit  by  a  widow  to  re- 
cover dower  in  land  conveyed  by  her  liusband  during  the  mar- 
riage without  ■  her  release,  the  defendant  cannot  counter-claim 
damages  arising  from  the  breach  of  a  covenant  of  warranty  in  the 
husband's  deed;  for  no  right  of  action  exists  against  her.^  The 
demand  must  also  be  against  the  plaintiff  in  the  same  capacity  as 
that  in  which  he  sues.  Thus,  where  the  action  is  by  the  plaintiff 
in  his  private  and  personal  capacity,  a  claim  against  him  as  an 
executor  or  an  administrator  cannot  be  made  a  valid  counter- 
claim.^ But,  in  an  action  by  an  executor  on  a  note  given  to  the 
testator,  the  defendant  can  set  up  by  way  of  counter-claim  a  de- 
mand for  damages  caused  by  tlie  fraud  of  the  deceased  in  the  sale 
of  land  for  the  price  of  which  tlie  note  was  given.*  Not  only 
must  the  counter-claim  be  a  right  of  action  against  the  plaintiff, 
but  it  must,  in  general,  be  against  the  plaintiff  alone,  and  against 
all  the  plaintiffs.^     The  exception  to  this  rule  is  expressly  pro- 


1  Paiue  V.  Hunt,  40  Barb.  75. 

2  Hill  r.  Golden,  16  B.  Mon.  .5.51,  5.54. 

3  Merritt  v.  Seaman,  6  Barb.  .3-30.  The 
plaintiff  .sued  on  a  note  given  to  liini  as 
executor  after  the  death  of  the  te.stator, 
and  the  counter-claim  was  a  debt  duo 
from  the  testator.  In  support  of  its  de- 
ci.siou  that  these  demands  ilid  not  affect 
the  plaintiff  in  the  same  capacity,  the 
court  cited  Fry  v.  Evans,  8  Wend.  .530 ; 
Mercein  v.  Smith,  2  Hill,  210;  but  see 
Westfall  V.  Duugau,  14  Ohio  St.  276. 
See,  also,  in  support  of  the  rule  in 
Merritt  v.  Seaman,  Patterson  r.  I'at- 
ter.son,  59  N.  Y.  574;  Harte  v.  Ilouchin, 
.50  lud.  327 ;  McLaui,Wilin  v.  Winn?r, 
63  Wis.  120;  Harris  v.  Taylor,  5.3 
Cunu.  500 ;  in  an  action  by  an  assignee 
for  creditors  for  the  price  of  goods  sold 
after  the  assignment,  an  indebtedness  of 
the  assignor  cannot  be  set  off :  James  v. 
McPhee,  9  Col.  486;  Otis  v.  Shams,  128 
N.  Y.  45.  Conversely,  where  the  plaintiff 
sues  i)i  a  representative  capacity,  a  demand 
against  him  in  his  private  capacity  is  not 
a  j)ri)pcr  subject  for  a  counter-claim  : 
Wakeman  v.  Everett,  41  Hun,  278;  Gel- 
shenen  i:  Harris,  26  Fed.  Rep.  680. 
When  a  receiver,  trustee,  e.xecutor,  or  ad- 
ministrator sues  to  recover  a  debt  due  to 
the  estate,  a  demand  by  the  defendant  for 
services  rendered  on  behalf  of  the  estate 
on   the   iilaiiiliff's    employiiU'iit   is  a  good 


counter-claim.  Davis  v.  Stover,  58  N.  Y. 
473  I  Barbee  v.  Green,  86  N.  C.  158  (set-off 
of  claim  for  funeral  expenses) ;  Patterson 
V.  Patterson,  59  N.  Y.  574  (same).  The 
New  York  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  §  502, 
subd.  .3,  contains  the  following  provision  : 
"  If  the  plaintiff  is  a  trustee  for  another,  or 
if  the  action  is  in  the  name  of  a  plaintiff, 
who  has  no  actual  interest  in  the  contract 
u])on  wiiich  it  is  founded,  a  demand 
against  the  plaintiff  shall  not  be  allowed 
as  a  counter-claim;  but  so  much  of  a  de- 
mand existing  against  the  person  whom 
he  represents,  or  for  whose  benefit  the 
action  is  brought,  as  will  satisfy  the 
plaintiff's  demand,  must  be  allowed  as  a 
countei--claim,  if  it  might  have  been  so 
allowed  in  an  action  brought  by  the  per- 
son beneficially  interested."  See  Pender- 
gast  V.  Greenfield,  40  Hun,  494. 

*  Isliain  r.  Davidson,  52  N.  Y.  237. 
See  McLean  r.  Leach,  68  N.  C.  95;  Bran- 
don r.  Allison,  66  N.  C.  532,  for  the  pecu- 
liar rules  prevailing  in  North  Carolina. 

^  Mynderse  r.  Snook,  1  Lans.  488. 
The  opim'on  of  T.  A.  Johnson  J.  contains 
an  elaborate  discussion  of  the  general 
subject  of  joint  and  separate  demands  and 
judgments.  See  also  S.  P.  Belknap  r. 
Mclntyre,  2  Abb.  Pr.  306  ;  McPherson  r. 
Meek,  30  Mo.  345;  Merrick  v.  Gordon, 
20  N.  Y.  93,  97  ;  N.  Y.  Ice  Co.  v.  Parker, 
8  Bosw.  683.     It  mav  be  intercstiiia;  and 


COUNTEII-CLAIM. 


87^ 


vided  for  by  the  codes,  and  only  exists  in  those  cases  where  a 
separate  judgment  may  be  rendered  for  or  against  the  person 
against  whom  the  counter-claim  is  [)leaded.^  This  exceptional 
case  will  be  examined  in  the  following  subdivision. 

§  631.  *  755.  3.  "When  the  Counter-Claim  may  be  in  Favor  of  One 
or  More  of  Several  Defendants,  and  agaiiast  One  or  More  of  Several 
Plaintiffs.  "When  Possible.  Question  herein  Stated.  The  provision 
found  in  nearly  all  the  codes,  that  the  counter-claim  must  exist 
"  in  favor  of  a  defendant  and  against  a  plaintiff  between  whom  a 
several  judgment  might  be  had  in  the  action,"  implies  that  when- 
ever the  single  defendant  or  all  the  defendants  jointly  may  recover 
against  one  or  some  of  the  plaintiffs  and  not  against  all,  or  when- 
ever one  or  some  of  the  defendants  and  not  all  may  recover  against 
the  single  plaintiff  or  all  the  plaintiffs  jointly,  or  whenever  both 
of  these  possibilities  are  combined,  a  counter-claim  may  be  inter- 
posed against  the  one  or  some  of  the  plaintiffs  and  not  against  all, 
and  by  the  one  or  some  of  the  defendants  and  not  by  all.     Such  a 


instructive  to  contrast  this  rule  as  it  lias 
Leeu  inferred  from  the  language  found  in 
the  coiles  generally  with  the  very  different 
rule  that  results  from  the  freer  provisions 
of  the  Iowa  statute.  luan  action  brought 
hy  a  single  plaintiff  to  recover  damages 
for  the  non-performance  of  a  contract  to 
sell  and  deliver  cattle,  tlie  defendants 
alleged  the  following  facts  as  a  counter- 
claim, and  proved  the  same  at  the  trial ; 
that  subsequently  to  the  agreement  sued 
iipon,  they  entered  into  a  second  and  dif- 
ferent contract  with  the  plaintiff  and 
certain  other  persons  composing  a  part- 
nership under  the  firm  name  of  Gadsden 
&  Co.,  by  which  they  agreed  to  deliver, 
and  the  firm  to  receive,  the  same  cattle 
at  the  same  time  and  place,  but  at  an  en- 
hanced price;  that  this  second  contract 
was  substituted  instead  of  the  former 
one ;  that  they  had  fully  tendered  per- 
formance, but  the  purchasers  had  wholly 
refused  to  accept  and  pay  for  the  cattle, 
to  their  damage,  for  wliicli  tliey  demanded 
judgment  against  the  ])laintiff,  Gadsden 
&.  Co.  of  course  not  being  parties  to  the 
suit.  This  counter-claim  was  sustained, 
the  court  sa3nng :  "  The  defendants  could 
hold  him  [the  plaintiff]  liable  in  this  ac- 
tion for  the  damages  sustained  for  not 
rc'ceiving  tlie  cattle:  that  is  to  say,  though 


others  may  have  been  jointly  liable  with 
him  [the  plaintiff],  the  defendants  could 
recover  their  damages  in  this  action 
against  him.  The  defendants  could  have 
sued  the  plaintiff  on  this  contract,  and,  if 
so,  they  could  set  up  their  counter-claim, 
.and  hold  him  for  his  refusal  to  receive. 
And  within  the  rule  recognized  by  this 
court  in  Ryerson  i\  Hendrie,  22  Iowa, 
480,  this  would  be  so,  though  the  contract 
was  made  with  the  new  parties  as  a  part- 
nership." lledman  v.  Malvin,  23  Iowa, 
296,  299.  See  also  Musselman  v.  Galli- 
gher,  32  Iowa,  383;  Baird  v.  Morford,  29 
iowa,  531,  534;  Sherman  v.  Hale,  7f» 
Iowa,  383;  Allen  v.  Maddox,  40  Iowa, 
124  (a  cause  of  action  may  be  pleaded  as 
a  "set-off,"  under  the  first  subdivision  of 
the  code  section,  by  one  defendant,  where 
several  are  jointly  sued ;  or,  when  it  ex- 
ists against  several,  it  may  be  pleaded 
against  the  single  plaintiff). 

1  I^Drake  v.  Avaazini  (1894),  20  Col. 
104,  36  Pac.  846.  Where  a  plaintiff  is 
jointly  liable  with  another  to  the  defend- 
ant, a  counter-claim  will  not  lie  against  liini 
alone  upon  that  liability.  Holgate  i\ 
Downer  (1899),  8  Wyo.  334,  57  Pac.  918: 
"  It  is  the  general  rule,  both  in  law  and 
equity,  that  joiut  and  separate  debts  can- 
not be  set  off  against  each  other. "]2 


876  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

severance  in  the  recovery  is  possible  when  the  right  sought  to  be 
maintained  on  the  one  side,  and  the  liability  to  be  enforced  on  the 
other,  are  not  originally  joint.  The  discussion  is  therefore  re- 
duced to  the  question.  When  may  a  severance  in  the  judgment  be 
had,  so  that  it  may  be  rendered  for  a  part  of  the  plaintiffs  and 
against  the  others,  and  against  a  part  of  the  defendants  and  for  the 
others?  From  the  answer  to  this  inquiry  we  shall  ascertain  be- 
tween what  parties  "  a  several  judgment  may  be  had  in  tlie  action  ;  " 
and  as  a  further  consequence,  when  the  counter-claim  may  be 
against  one  or  more  of  the  plaintiffs,  or  in  favor  of  one  or  more  of 
the  defendants.  In  pursuing  the  discussion,  I  shall  collect  and 
examine  some  of  the  leading  judicial  decisions  which  have  given  a 
construction  to  the  clause,  and  shall  endeavor  to  ascertain  from  them 
the  general  principles  and  rules  that  may  determine,  in  each  particu- 
lar case,  when  a  counter-claim  of  this  form  and  nature  is  proper.^ 

§  632.  *  75G.  (1)  Against  One  or  Some  of  the  Plaintiffs.  Illustra- 
tive Case.  An  action  for  an  accounting  and  recovery  of  the 
amounts  found  due  was  brought  by  three  plaintiffs  against  two 
defendants  under  the  following  circumstances.  The  five  parties 
had  entered  into  an  agreement  for  the  publication  of  a  newspaper : 
the  defendants  were  to  be  the  actual  publisliers,  and  to  have  charge 
of  the  business ;  and,  after  paying  all  the  expenses,  the  net  pro- 
ceeds were  to  be  divided  into  five  equal  parts,  of  which  the  defend- 
ants were  to  retain  two,  and  one  of  the  other  "  three  parts  shall 
be  paid  by  [defendants]  in  cash  to  each  of  the  other  parties  to 
this  agreement,"  —  the  plaintiffs.  The  answer,  besides  other  sepa- 
rate defences,  contained  a  counter-claim  consisting  of  a  judgment 
recovered  by  the  defendant  R.  against  the  plaintiff  H.,  and  as- 
signed to  both  the  defendants  before  the  suit  was  commenced. 
This  counter-claim  was  set  up  against  the  plaintiff  II.  alone. 
The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals  held  that  although  the  action 
was  inform  joint,  yet  the  right  of  each  plaintiff  was  seveml ;  and 
a  several  judgment,  declaring  the  simi  to  which  each  was  entitled, 
was  necessary.2     Nothing  can  be  more  firmly  settled  than  the 

'  [^r>el)anon  Steam   Laundry  v.  Dyck-  fendants  had  averred  and  proved  payment 

man  (1900),  Ky.,  57  S.  W.  2il ;  Murphy  r.  in  full  of  his  .-<hare,  the  defence  as  to  such 

Colton  (1896),  4  Okla.  181,  44  Pac.  208;  jdaintiff  would  have  been  effectual;  and 

Van  Ktten  )•.  Kosters  (1896),  48  Neb.  152,  yet    the  other  two  idaintiffs  would  have 

66  N.  W.  1106.]  been  entitled  to  judfrment  for  the  several 

2  Taylor  I-.  Hoot,  4  Keyes.. 335  :"  Hence,  amounts  of  their  share.*.  .  .  .  The  same 

a.«  to  eitlier  of  the  jilaintiffs,  if   the  de-  principle  is  :i])idicable  to  a  defence  in  the 


COUNTER-CLAIM.     .  877 

general  rule,  that  in  the  absence  of  a  statutory  provision  to  the 
contrary,  where  an  action  is  brought  by  a  partnership  on  a  claim 
due  the  firm,  no  demand  in  favor  of  the  defendant  against  one  or 
some  of  its  members  can  be  used  as  a  counter-claim  ;  ^  but  an  ap- 
parent exception  to  this  rule  has  been  admitted.  If  the  business 
had  been  carried  on  by  one  or  more  of  the  firm  as  ostensible  part- 
ners, a  debt  owing  by  him  or  them  may  be  interposed  as  a  counter- 
claim, although  all  the  members  have  united  in  the  action.  By 
their  mode  of  conducting  the  business,  the  ostensible  partner  or 
partners  had  been  held  out  to  the  world  as  the  real  firm,  and  they 
could  sue  or  be  sued  without  joining  the  others  as  parties  to  the 
proceeding.^  The  case  of  a  demand  against  the  plaintiff  or  plain- 
tiffs on  the  recoixi,  and  others  who  are  not  parties  to  the  suit,  being 
pleaded  as  a  counter-claim,  has  already  been  considered.  It  does 
not  present  exactly  the  question  now  under  consideration,  but  de- 
pends for  its  solution  upon  the  same  general  principles.  It  is 
settled  by  the  decisions,  that  a  joint  indebtedness  or  liability  due 
from  the  plaintiff  and  from  others  not  parties  to  the  suit  cannot 
be  used  as  a  counter-claim  against  the  plaintiff,  because  such  a 
cause  of  action  cannot  be  severed  and  a  judgment  rendered  against 
a  part  only  of  the  persons  liable.^ 

nature  of  a  counter-claim.  .  .  .  Tlie  plain-  S.  D.  404,  64  N.  W.  188  ;  Folsom  v.  Pail- 

tirt"s  jiosition  is  undoubtedly  correct,  that  ing  (1899),  58  Neb.  478,  78  N.  W.  926.] 

where  the  cause  of  action  is  strictly  joint,  '^  Van  Valen  v.  Russell,  13  Bar!).  590, 

and  the  recovery,  if  had,  is  for  the  joint  592,  per  Edwards  J. ;  citing  7  Duruf.  & 

benefit   of    the   plaintiffs,    the   defendant  E.  T.  li.  .361  (note  c) ;  Ec  p.  Enderby,  2 

cannot  set  off  or  counter-claim  tlie  iiidi-  Barn.  &  C.389;  Smith  ;•.  Watson,  2  Barn, 

vidua!  debt  of   either  plaintiff  to  defeat  &  C.  401.     See   also   Rush  v.  Tliom[)son, 

or  reduce  a  joint  recovery."     Such,  how-  I12lnd.  158.  "  Where  a  factor  dealing  for 

ever,  was   not   the   present   case,  because  a  principal,  but  coucealitig  that  ])riucipal, 

there  was  no  joint   demand  on  the  part  delivers  goods  iu  his  own  name,  tiie  jier- 

of  the  plaintiffs.     The  counter-claim  was  son  contracting  with  him  laas  a  right  to 

therefore   sustained.      See   also,   as   illus-  consider  him  to  all  intents  and  purposes 

trating  the  general  conclusions  of  the  text,  as   the   principal;    and  though   the   real 

Freeman  v.  Lorrillard,  61  N.  Y.  612,  617;  principal  may  appear  and  bring  an  action 

Field  (;.  Hahn,  65  Mo.  417.  upon  that  contract  against  the  purchaser 

1  Nipper  v.  Jones,  27   Mo.  App.  538  ;  of  the  goods,  yet  that  purchaser  may  set 

Peclc  V.  Snow,  47  Minn.  398;  Morganthau  off  any  claim  he    may  have  against   the 

r.  King,  15  Col.  413.  factor  in  answer  to  the  demand  of  the  prin- 

I^Owsley     r.     Bank    of     Cumberland  cipal;"  per  Lord  Mansfield,  in  Rabone  r. 

(1902),  Ky.,  66    S.  W.  33;   Gotthauer   v.  Williams,  7  Durnf.  &  E.  T.  It.  360  (n.)  ; 

Cunningham  (1896),  4  Okla.  551,47  Pac.  followed    in    Hogan  v.  Shorb,  24  Wend. 

479  ;  Witherington  v.  Huntsman  (1897),  64  458  ;  Pratt  ?•.  Collins,  20  Hun,  126  ;  Tanne- 

Ark.  551,  44  S.  W.  74;  McDonald  v.  Mac-  baum  v.  Marsellus  (N.  Y.  City  Ct.  1893), 

kenzie  (1887),  24  Ore.  573,   14  P.ac.  868;  22  N.  Y.  Suppl.  928. 

Adams  v.  Baker  (1898),  24  Nev.  162,  55  3  gee  supra,  §  *754;  Schubart  ;-.  Har- 

Pac.  362;    Sweeney   v.  Bailey    (1895),  7  teau,  34  Barb.  447  ;  Belknap  u.  Mclutyre, 


878 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


J5  633.  *  757.  Several  Judgment  between  Some  of  the  Parties. 
Inquiry  Presented  herein.  Conflict  of  Opinion.  Upon  the  general 
question,  When  can  a  several  judgment  be  rendered  between  some 
of  the  parties  to  an  action  ?  there  has  been  much  contiict  01  judi- 
cial opinion,  and  discrepancy  of  decision.  It  resolves  itself  into 
the  broader  inquiry,  How  far  has  the  common-law  doctrine  of 
joint  rights  and  liabilities  been  changed  by  the  new  procedure  ? 
The  judges  of  one  school  have  denied  any  modilication  in  these 
legal  notions,  and  have  restricted  tlie  language  of  the  statute  to 
equitable  proceedings.  Another  school  have  gone  to  the  opposite 
extreme,  and  liave  declared  the  ancient  rules  as  to  joint  right  and 
liability  to  be  utterly  abolished,  so  that  a  severance  among  the 
plaintiffs  or  defendants  in  the  recovery  may  be  had  in  all  cases.^ 


2  Abb.  Pr.  .3G6 ;  Myn(ler.se  v.  Snook,  1 
Lans.  488;  Spofford  v.  Kowan,  124  N.  Y. 
108  ;  McCulloch  t:  Vibbard,  51  Hun,  227  ; 
Ingols  V.  Plimpton,  10  Col.  5-35 ;  Wood 
V.  Brush,  72  Cal.  224.  Contra  in  Iowa. 
Redman  v.  Malvin,  23  Iowa,  296;  and  in 
North  Carolina,  Sloan  v.  McDowell,  71 
N.  C.  356-3.58 ;  Neal  i-.  Lea,  64  N.  C.  678 ; 
Harris  v.  Burwell,  65  N.  C.  584.  This 
ruling  is  not  based  upon  any  peculiar 
stature,  but  upon  the  general  provision  of 
the  code,  §  248,  that  a  "  judgment  may  be 
given  for  or  against  one  or  more  of  sev- 
eral plaintiffs,  and  for  or  against  one  or 
more  of  several  defendants ;  "  which  is 
the  same  as  found  in  all  the  other  codes. 
Where,  in  Kentucky,  an  action  was  com- 
menced against  a  resident  of  the  State  by 
a  uon-rcsident  firm,  a  demand  against  one 
of  the  plaintiffs  \va.s  allowed  as  an  equita- 
ble set-off  or  counter-claim,  because  the 
defendant  could  not  sue  upon  it  in  that 
State.  Wallenstein  v.  Selizman,  7  Bush, 
175.  Where  the  subject  of  the  counter- 
claim is  a  tort  for  which  each  and  all  of 
the  wrongdoers  are  liable,  it  is  no  ob- 
jection that  the  tort  was  committed  by  a 
firm  composed  of  the  plaintiffs  and  others 
not  parties  to  the  suit.  Walker  v.  Johnson, 
28  Minn.  147. 

^  See  Cowles  v.  Cowles,  9  How.  Pr. 
301.  The  action  was  brought  by  two 
jjlaintiffs  upon  a  promissory  note,  made 
payable  to  them  on  demand.  The  defend- 
ant alleged  facts  tending  to  show  that  the 
note  was  the  sole  property  of  the  plaintiff, 
C,  and  .'Stated  a  demand  in  his  own  favor  . 


against  C,  in  every  respect  proper  and 
sufficient  to  constitute  a  counter-claim,  if 
the  latter  had  been  the  only  plaintiff. 
This  answer  having  been  struck  out  on 
motion,  the  General  Term,  upon  apjieal, 
pronounced  it  a  valid  counter-claim,  and 
available  to  the  defendant  as  pleaded. 
Two  questions,  it  was  said,  are  raised. 
"  First,  in  an  action  upon  contract  by  two 
or  more  plaintiffs,  can  one  of  them  have 
judgment  in  his  favor,  the  evidence  estab- 
lishing the  cause  of  action  in  him  alone  ? 
Secondly,  if  so,  can  the  defendant,  upon 
showing  the  cause  of  action  to  be  solely  in 
the  one  plaintiff,  avail  himself  of  a  set-off 
against  that  plaintiff  in  a  case  where  he 
would  have  had  the  right  to  do  so  had  the 
action  been  commenced  by  thai  plaintiff 
alone  i  "  Both  of  these  questions  were 
answered  in  the  affirmative.  It  was  said 
that  the  new  procedure  extended  the  rules 
of  equity  to  all  legal  actions,  and  so  far 
abrogated  the  legal  notions  of  joint  right 
and  liability  :  that  the  sections  permitting 
a  judgment  "to  be  given  for  or  against 
one  or  more  of  several  plaintiffs,  and  for 
or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defend- 
ants," are  most  general  in  their  terms,  and 
should  not  be  restricted  to  actions  iu  which 
the  right  sued  upon  is  several,  and  not 
joint;  and  that,  a  several  judgment  being 
thus  made  possible,  the  conclusion  as  to  the 
propriety  of  the  counter-claim  against  one 
plaintiff  followed  inevitably  from  the  ex- 
jiress  language  of  the  statute.  In  other 
word.*,  no  matter  what  be  the  form  of  the 
action,  although  the  plaintiffs  have  alleged 


COUNTEK-CLAIM. 


879 


This  loose  or  liberal  interpretation  has,  however,  been  utterly'  re- 
pudiated by  other  eases,  whieli,  as  it  seems  to  me,  establish,  by  a 
very  decided  preponderance  of  judicial  authority,  the  doc-trine  as 
now  generally  accepted  in  those  States  whose  codes  compose  the 
two  groups  mentioned  at  the  commencement  of  the  section.^  The 
doctrine  established  by  these  decisions  is,  that  if  the  demand  in 
suit  was  originally  joint  and  several,  although  the  action  upon  it 
is  joint,  and  a  fortiori  if  it  was  several,  a  several  judgment  miyhl 


a  joint  riglit  in  themselves,  the  defendant 
may  controvert  this  Jillegation,  show  a 
several  right  in  one  of  them  alone,  and 
interpose  a  counter-claim  against  that  one. 
This  decision,  it  will  be  noticed,  does  not 
go  to  the  length  of  holding  that,  when  two 
or  more  plaintiffs  sue  upon  a  legal  right 
which  is  confessedly  joint,  the  deteudaut, 
while  admitting  this  joint  cause  of  action 
and  the  union  of  all  the  plaintiffs  therein, 
may  assert  a  coniiter-claim  against  one,  or 
some  of  them  less  tliau  all.  The  reasoning 
of  the  learned  judge  seems  logically  to  lead 
to  that  result,  for  it  argues  that  a  several 
judgment  is  possible  in  all  cases  upon  con- 
tract ;  and,  if  possible,  the  counter-claim  is 
expressly  permited.  See  also  the  dicliiin 
of  Folger  J.  in  Simar  t'.  Canaday,  53  N.  Y. 
298,  301.  The  same  construction  is  given 
to  the  provision  in  North  Carolina.  Sloan 
V.  McDowell,  71  N.  C.  356,  357;  Neal  v. 
Lea,  64  N.  C.  678 ;  Harris  v.  Burwell,  65 
N.  C.  584. 

^  A  few  cases  will  illustrate  this  pre- 
vailing doctrine.  In  Mynderse  v.  Snook, 
1  Lans.  488,  491-493,  the  court  discusses 
the  general  doctrine  of  joint  and  several 
liabilities  and  judgments ;  and  from  its 
able  opinion  I  make  the  following  ex- 
tracts :  "  The  demand  which  the  defend- 
ants had  was  against  the  plaintiff  and  V. 
jointly  as  partners  and  joint  contractors 
with  them.  It  was  for  damages  arising 
from  an  alleged  breach  of  the  contract  by 
these  two  partners.  This  claim,  as  is  ap- 
parent, was  not  against  tlie  plaintiff,  but 
against  the  firm  of  which  lie  was  an  indi- 
vidual member.  Properly  there  could  be 
no  several  judgment  between  the  parties 
to  this  action  on  account  of  tl)at  claim. 
It  was  not  upon  its  face  or  in  law  a  claim 
against  a  plaintiff  individually.  This  is 
the  test  (Code,  §  150).  It  was  a  partner- 
ship debt  if  a  demand  existed.     Partners 


are  not  joint  and  several  debtors,  but  joint 
debtors  only.  Nothing  is  better  settled 
than  the  general  rule  tliat  a  creditor  of  a 
partnersiiip  is  not  entitled,  as  matter  of 
law,  to  bring  a  separate  action,  and  have 
a  separate  judgment,  against  one  of  the 
several  partners  when  tiieyare  all  living  " 
The  court  then  examined  and  criticised 
certain  cases  relied  upon  by  the  duli; ad- 
ants.  The  language  of  Ingrahani  J.  in 
Schubart  v.  Harteau,  34  Barb.  447,  was 
declared  to  be  a  mere  dictum,  and  its  cor- 
rectness as  such  was  pointedly  denied. 
Briggs  V.  Briggs,  20  Barb.  477,  and  Par- 
sons V.  Nash,  8  How.  Pr.  454,  were  dis- 
tinguished from  the  case  at  bar.  The 
point  of  distinction  in  both  was  the  fact 
that  the  liability  of  the  defendants  therein 
was  several  as  well  as  joint ;  so  that  a 
several  judgment  against  each  of  them 
would  have  been  possible.  "  The  grounds 
of  these  decisions,"  the  court  continues, 
"  were  undoubtedly  correct  if  the  demand 
on  which  the  action  was  brought  was  sev- 
eral as  well  as  joint,  so  that  the  plaintiff 
might  have  had  a  several  judgment  in  the 
action  against  either  defendant.  It  ful- 
filled, in  that  view  of  it,  precisely  the  re- 
(juirements  of  the  code.  Neither  of  these 
cases  supports  the  dictum  in  Schubart  v. 
Harteau.  According  to  the  rule  there 
laid  down,  the  right  to  interpose  and 
prove  a  demand  by  way  of  counter-claim 
depends  upon  the  manner  and  form  of  the 
pleadings  in  the  action,  rather  than  upon 
the  general  principles  of  the  law.  This, 
J  am  sure,  is  not  the  true  meaning  of  §  150 
of  the  code.  By  that  section,  the  demand 
must  be  of  such  a  nature  and  character, 
that,  upon  the  general  rules  and  principles 
of  law,  a  several  judgment  may  bt  had 
upon  it  in  the  action.  If  it  is  not  such,  the 
party  offering  it  is  not  entitled  to  use  it 
in  that  wav." 


880 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


have  been  recovered,  and  the  counter-claim  against  part  of  the 
jjhiintiffs,  or  in  favor  of  a  part  of  the  defendants,  is  possible :  when 
the  demand  in  suit  is  originally  joint,  a  severance  is  impossible. 

§  634.  *  758.  (2)  In  Favor  of  One  or  Some  of  the  Defendants. 
Settled  Rule  herein.  In  the  following  cases  the  counter-claim 
was  interposed  by  one  or  some  of  the  defendants  against  the  single 
plaintiff,  or  all  tlie  plaintiffs  if  more  than  one.  The  same  general 
principles  of  joint  and  several  right  and  liability  control  this  class 
of  actions  and  the  one  just  considered,  and  the  same  decisions  are 
authorities  in  both.^  The  rule  is  settled  that,  in  an  action  against 
defendants  who  are  joint  contractors  and  jointly  liable,  a  separate 
judgment  against  one  or  more  less  than  all  is  not  possible  except 
in  a  few  special  personal  defences ;  that  in  an  action,  though  joint 
in  form,  against  defendants  who  are  joint  and  several  contractors, 
and  a  fortiori  against  defendants  who  are  severally  liable,  such  a 
separate  recovery  may  always  ba  had.  The  doctrine  thus  stated 
has  been  applied  to  the  case  of  defendants  sued  upon  a  bond  in 
terms  joint  and  several.^ 


^  Peabody  v.  Bloomer,  5  Duer,  678, 
679,  per  Wouilruff  J. ;  s.  c.  sab  noin.  Pea- 
body  V.  Beach,  6  Duer,  53  ;  3  Abb.  Pr. 
353.  The  same  construction  was  fifiven  to 
the  statute  by  Mr.  Justice  Marvin,  and 
applied  to  the  admissibility  of  a  counter- 
claim, in  Parsons  v.  Nash,  8  How.  Pr. 
454 ;  and  as  his  reasoning  has  been  fre- 
quently approved,  and  his  conclusions 
.adopted  by  other-courts,  I  shall  ijuote  his 
opinion,  not  as  a  binding  authority,  —  fur 
it  was  delivered  at  Si)ecial  Term,  —  but 
as  an  argument.  The  three  makers  of  a 
joint  and  .several  note,  H.,  N.,  and  P., 
were  sued  in  a  joint  action,  H.  being  the 
principal  debtor,  and  the  others  his  sure- 
ties. The  answer  was  a  counter-claim  of 
a  judgment  in  favor  of  II.  alone  against 
the  plaintiffs  lor  an  amount  greater  than 
t'le  sum  secured  by  the  note.  It  wa.s  ad- 
mitted on  the  trial;  and  the  plaintiffs 
moved  to  set  aside  the  verdict.  After 
referring  to  §  150,  the  judge  proceeds: 
*'  The  counter-claim  is  to  be  a  claim  ex- 
isting in  favor  of  a  defendant  and  against 
a  plaintiff  between  whom  a  several  judg- 
ment might  Ite  bad  in  the  action.  This 
clearly  indicates  that  there  may  be  cases 
where  the  set-off  or  counter-claim  m.ay 
not   be  due  to  or  iii    favor  of  all  the  de- 


fendants ;  and  to  ascertain  between  whom 
a  several  judgment  may  be  had  in  the 
action,  we  must  look  to  other  ]>rovisions 
of  the  code,  particularly  §§  136  and  274. 
In  my  opinion,  in  an  answer  proper  for  a 
set-off  or  counter-claim  against  several 
defendants  severaUi/  liable,  or  jointly  and 
severallji  liable,  any  one  of  thera  may 
avail  himself  of  his  set-off  or  counter- 
claim, or  any  number  of  the  defendants 
to  whom  the  set-off  or  counter-claim  is 
jointly  due  may  avail  themselves  there- 
of." On  the  general  subject  of  counter- 
claims in  favor  of  all  or  a  part  of  the 
defendants,  see  also  Batligate  v.  Haskin, 
59  N.  Y.  533,  539,  540  (in  an  action  to 
foreclose  a  mortgage  made  to  secure  a 
joint  bond  given  In'  the  mortgagor  and 
A.  as  his  surety,  a  debt  due  from  the 
plaintiff  to  the  mortgagor  is  a  good 
counter-claim,  althongli  the  fact  that  A. 
signed  as  surety  did  not  appear  on  the 
face  of  the  bond) ;  Weil  v.  Jones,  70  Mo. 
560;  Davis  v.  Notvvare,  13  Nov.  421; 
Plyer  v.  Parker.  10  S.  C  464  ;  Great  West. 
,1ns.  Co.  ;;.  Pierce,  1  Wyom.  Ter.  45. 

2  People  V.  Cram,  8  IIow.  Pr.  151. 
The  opinion  in  this  ca.se  has  been  fre- 
(juently  cited  with  approval,  and  has 
never  been  questioned.     See  also,  to  the 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  881 

§  635.  *  759.  Where  Partnership  may  be  sued  in  Firm  Name. 
Illustrative  Cases.  A  peculiar  question  has  arisen  in  tliose  States 
whose  codes  permit  a  partnership  to  be  sued  l)y  its  firm  name. 
]n  such  an  action,  a  counter-claim  in  favor  of  all  the  persons 
actually  composing  the  firm  may  be  pleaded  and  proved,  although 
it  discloses  the  existence  of  partners  who  had  not  been  mentioned 
as  such  in  the  petition  or  complaint.^  In  an  action  upon  an  in- 
junction bond  executed  by  the  plaintiff  in  an  equity  suit  and 
sureties,  the  principal  defendant  was  permitted  by  the  Kentucky 
Court  of  Appeals  to  counter-claim  damages  sustained  by  himself 
individually  from  the  wrongful  acts  of  the  plaintiff  committed 
while  the  injunction  was  in  force.^  As  one  of  two  or  more  joint 
debtors  cannot  rely  upon  a  demand  due  to  him  separately,  upon 
the  same  principle  a  defendant  cannot  interpose  a  counter-claim 
in  favor  of  himself  and  another,  or  others  jointly  who  are  not 
parties  to  the  suit.^  Bonds  having  been  issued  in  the  name  of  a 
town  in  aid  of  a  railroad  under  color  of  statutory  proceedings,  the 
town  brought  an  equitable  suit  against  all  the  holders  thereof  to 
have  the  proceedings  declared  void,  and  the  bonds  themselves  can- 
celled. One  of  the  defendants  individually  set  up  as  a  counter- 
claim a  debt  to  himself  from  the  town  for  money  loaned.  This 
answer  was  overruled  on  the  merits,  the  court  holding  that  it  did 
not  fall  within  the  definition  of  any  species  of  counter-claim. 
The  omission  to  rest  the  decision  upon  the  obvious  ground,  if  it 

same  effect,  Briggs   v.  Briggs,  20  Barb.  ^  Tinsley  v.  Tinsley,  15    B.  Mon.  454. 

477,  479  ;  Gordon  v.  Swift,   46  lud.  208,  Altliough  the   particular   question   under 

209;  Johnson?;.   Kent,  9   Ind.  252 ;  Blau-  discussion    was    not    alluded    to    hy  the 

kenship  v.  Rogers,  10  Ind.  333;  Knour  v.  court,  its  very  silence  must  be  taken  as  an 

Dick,  14   Ind.   20;  Utley  r.  Foy,  70  N.  C.  admission    that    such  a  counter-claim    in 

303  ;  Newell    v.  Salmons,  22    Barb.   647  ;  favor  of  one  defendant  was  proper. 
Perry  v.  Chester,   12  Abb.  Pr.  n.  s.  131,  ^  Stearns  v.  Martin,  4  Cal.  227,  229; 

133.      If,    however,   the    defendants    are  Hopkins  v.  Lane,  87   N.  Y.  501  ;  Proctor 

joint   debtors,    no    such    counter-claim  is  v.  Cole,  104  Ind.  373 ;  but  see  Seaman  v. 

admissible.     Pinckney  v.  Keyler,  4  E.  1).  Slater,  49  Fed.  Rep.  37   (when  one  of  the 

Smith,  469  ;    Slayback    v.  Jones,  9   Ind.  owners  of  a  vessel  is  sued  for  the  entire 

470;    Roberts  i'.  Donovan,    70  Cal.  108;  amount  of    damages,  resulting   from   the 

Mortimer    v.  Chambers,    63    Hun,    335 ;  breach  of  a   charter-party,   and   is  to  be 

Coleman  v.  Elmore   (Ore.),  31  Fed.  Rep.  compelled  to  pay  the  entire  sum,  he  can 

391  (action  against  partners).  setoff  the  amount  due  upon  the  charter- 

[[Murphy  i'.  Colton  (1896),  40kla.  181,  party).     Where  the  plaintiff  brought  suit 

44  Pac.  208;  Brodek  r.  Farnum  (1895),  11  against  two   defendants,   and  the    action 

"Wash.  565,40  Pac.  189  ;  Adams  v.  Baker  failed  against  one,  it  was  held  that  a  joint 

(1898),  24  Nev.  162,  55  Pac.  362  ;  Sweeney  demand  in  favor  of  the  defendants  could 

r.  Bailey  (1895),  7  S.D.  404,  64  N.  W.  188.^  not  be  setup  as  a  counter-claim:  Cope- 

1  Bird  V.  McCoy,  22  Iowa,  549.  land  v.  Young,  21  S.  C.  275. 

56 


882 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


existed,  that  a  counter-claim  in  favor  of  one  defendant  was  im- 
proper, was  a  plain  though  silent  admission  that  this  objection 
was  untenable.  In  such  an  action  a  teparate  judgment  is  not 
only  possible,  but  is,  in  fact,  absolutely  necessary.^ 

§  636.  *  7G0.  Construction  Given  to  Language  of  Iowa  Code  in 
Musselman  v.  Galligher.  As  the  lowa  code  is  unlike  that  of  any 
other  State  in  this  respect,  I  quote  somewhat  f reel}'  from  a 
case  which  gives  a  construction  to  its  language,  and  ex- 
plains its  peculiar  provisions.  In  an  action  against  a  husband 
and  wife  jointly,  three  counter-claims  or  cross-demands  were 
pleaded  as  follows :  (1)  By  both  defendants  jointly  to  recover 
damages  caused  by  the  plaintiff's  malicious  prosecution  of  the 
wife ;  (2)  by  the  husband  alone  to  recover  damages  caused  by 
the  malicious  prosecution  of  his  minor  children  ;  (3)  by  the 
husband  alone  to  recover  damages  caused  by  the  malicious 
prosecution  of  himself.  The  judgment  of  the  court,  giving  a 
construction  to  the  statute,  and  passing  upon  the  validity  of  this 
counter-claim,  will  be  found  in  the  foot-note.^ 


1  Venice  v.  Breed,  65  Barb.  597,  605, 
606. 

■■^  Musselman  i-.  Galligher,  32  Iowa, 
383,  389.  There  are,  Jirst, "  set-off,"  which 
is  an  independent  cause  of  action  arising 
on  contract  or  ascertained  bv  the  decision 
of  the  court,  and  can  be  pleaded  only  in 
an  action  on  contract ;  secondli/,  "  counter- 
claim," which  is  a  cause  of  action  in  favor 
of  the  defendants,  or  some  of  them,  against 
the  plaintiffs,  or  some  of  them,  arising  out 
of  the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in 
the  plaintiff's  petition  as  the  foundation 
of  his  claim,  or  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject of  the  action ;  thirdli/, "  cross-demand," 
which  is  a  statement  of  am/  new  matter 
constituting  a)ij/  cause  of  action  in  favor 
of  the  defendant,  or  all  the  defendants,  if 
more  than  one,  against  tlie  plaintiff,  or  (tU 
the  plaintiffs,  if  more  than  one,  and  which 
the  defendant  or  defendants  might  have 
brought  when  the  suit  was  commenced, 
or  which  was  then  held,  whether  matured 
or  not,  if  matured,  when  pleaded.  "The 
'  cross-demand '  is  more  comprehensive 
than  either  the  set-off  or  the  counter- 
claim. A  set-off  is  only  pleadable  in  an 
action  on  a  contract,  and  must  itself  arise 
on  contract.  A  counter-claim  must  ari.se 
out  of  the  cause  of  action,  or  be  connected 


therewith.  A  '  cross-demand,'  however, 
arises  upon  any  independent  cause  of 
action,  whether  on  contract  or  tort.  But 
a  'cross-demand,'  unlike  a  counter-claim, 
nuisf  exist  in  favor  of  all  the  defendants, 
if  there  are  more  than  one,  and  against  all 
the  plaintiffs,  if  there  are  more  than  one. 
This  is  the  plain  reading  of  the  statute  ; 
so  that,  when  there  are  several  defend- 
ants, a  '  cross-demand  '  in  favor  of  one 
only  cannot  be  pleaded."  Applying  these 
principles,  the  answer  in  question  was 
held  to  be  wholly  bad.  The  demands 
Avere  certainly  not  set-offs,  since  they 
arose  out  of  torts  :  they  were  not  counter- 
claims, because  they  did  not  arise  out  of, 
nor  were  they  connected  Avith,  the  plain- 
tiff's cause  of  action.  If  it  is  said  tliey 
were  "  cross-demands,"  they  were  inad- 
missible, because  they  were  in  favor  of 
one  defendant  alone.  The  claim  of  dam- 
ages for  the  tort  to  the  wife  was  declared 
to  lie  one  in  her  owti  favor,  if  it  existed 
at  all ;  and  the  husband  could  not  join 
with  her  in  enforcing  it,  whether  she 
brought  an  action  on  it  as  a  plaintiff,  or 
pleaded  it  as  a  "  cross-demand "  in  an 
action  against  her.  See  also  Corbett  v. 
Hughes,  75  Iowa,  281. 


COUNTEU-CLAIM.  883 

§  637.    *  761.    Rules   Established  in  most  of  the  States.      By   tlu' 
decisions  which  have  been  reviewed  in  the  foregoing  paraoiaplis, 
certain  specific  rules  are  clearly   established  for  all   the   States 
whose  codes  may  he  classed  in  either  of  the  two  general  groups 
mentioned  at  the  commencement  of  this  section.     First,  when 
the  defendants  in  an  action  are  joint  contractors,  and  are  sued 
as  such,  no  counter-claim  can  be  made  available  which  consists 
of  a  demand  in  favor  of  one  or  some  of  them.     Secondly,  when 
the  defendants  in  an  action   are  jointly  and  fcverally  liable,  al- 
though sued  jointly,  a  counter-claim,  consisting  of  a  demand  in 
favor  of  one  or  some  of  them,  may,  if  otherwise  without  objection, 
be  interposed.     Thirdly,  since  it  is  possible,  pursuant  to  express 
provisions  of  all  the  codes,  for  persons  severally  liable  to  be  sued 
jointly  under  certain  circumstances  in  a  legal  action,  —  tliat  is,  in 
an  action  brought  to  recover  a  common  money  judgment,  —  a 
t  ounter-claira  in  favor  of  one  or  more  of  such  defendants  may  be 
pleaded  and   proved.     Fourthly,   in  all  equitable  suits  wherein 
persons  having  different  interests,  and  against  whom  different 
reliefs  are  demanded,  may  be,  and  constantly  are,  united  as  co- 
defendants,  a  counter-claim  existing  in  favor  of  one  or  more  of 
such  defendants  may  be  interposed,  free  from  any  objection  based 
entirely  upon  the  situation  of  the  parties.     Fifthly,  when  two  or 
more  persons  have  a /om^  right  of  action,  and  unite  as  plaintiffs 
to  enforce  the  same,  a  counter-claim  cannot  be  admitted  aoainst 
one    or   some    of  them  in  favor   of  any  or  all   the  defendants. 
Sixthly,  when  two  or  more  persons  have  separate  rights  of  action, 
and  they  are  properly  united  as  plaintiff's  in  one  action  to  enforce 
these  rights,  a  counter-claim  may  be  set  up  against  one  or  more 
of  them,  as  the  case  may  be.     Seventhly,  if  two  or  more  plaintiffs 
should  bring  an  action  joint  in  form,  and  should  allege  and  claim 
to  recover  upon  a  joint  cause  of  action, — even  a  contract,  —  but 
in  fact  the  joinder  was  improper  because  as  to  some,  or  perhaps 
all  but  one,  there  existed  no  right  of  action,  a  recovery  could  be 
had  in  favor  of  the  one  or  more  who  established  a  cause  of  action, 
and  the  complaint  be  dismissed  as  to  the  others ;  and  it  would 
seem  to  follow  as  a  necessary  corollary  that  a  counter-claim  might 
be  interposed  against  the  one  or  more  of  the  plaintiffs  under  such 
circumstances  in  whose  favor  a  separate  judgment  could  be  ren- 
dered.    Lastly,  in  equitable  actions,  counter-claim,  in    favor  of 
one   or  some  of  the  defendants,  and  against  one  or  some  of  the 


88-4  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

plaintiffs,  must  be  permissible  as  a  general  rule,  since  in  equity 
the  common-law  doctrine  of  joint  right  and  liability  does  not 
generally  prevail,  and  separate  judgments,  or  judgments  confer- 
ring separate  relief,  among  the  parties,  are  almost  a  matter  of 
course. 

§  638.  *  762.  Counter-claim  may  fail  for  "Want  of  Necessary- 
Parties,  especially  those  of  an  Equitable  Character.  Illustrative  Case. 
Counter-claims  otherwise  proper  may  be  inadmissible  or  ineffect- 
ual for  the  want  of  the  necessary  parties  before  the  court,  since 
the  same  rules  as  to  parties  must  apply  to  them  as  would  be  ap- 
plied if  the  facts  alleged  and  the  relief  demanded  were  stated  in  a 
complaint  or  petition  as  the  basis  of  a  separate  action.  This 
objection  will  more  frequently  present  itself  in  counter-claims 
that  are  equitable  in  their  nature.  As  the  relief  must  be  denied 
to  the  plaintiff  in  an  equitable  action  unless  he  has  brought  all 
the  necessary  parties  before  the  court,  and  mat/  be  denied  unless 
he  has  brought  in  all  the  proper  parties,  and  as  tlie  defendant 
pleading  a  counter-claim  is  in  the  same  condition  as  an  ordinary 
plaintiff,  while  the  plaintiff  against  whom  it  is  pleaded  is  in  the 
position  of  an  ordinary  defendant,  it  follows,  first,  that  the  relief 
demanded  by  the  counter-claim  must  be  refused  if  all  the  neces- 
sary parties  are  not  present ;  and,  secondly,  that  it  may  be  refused 
if  any  proper  parties  have  been  omitted.  These  propositions 
require  no  argument  or  citation  in  their  support.  They  result 
inevitably  from  the  fact  that  the  counter-claim  is  in  its  nature 
a  cross-action,  governed  by  the  same  rules  which  control  a  suit 
when  proceeding  in  the  ordinary  and  direct  manner.  Several 
examples  of  legal  actions  in  which  the  counter-claim  has  failed 
for  want  of  the  necessary  parties  have  already  been  quoted  ; 
namely,  those  decisions  in  which  counter-claims  against  the  plain- 
tiff in  the  action,  and  others  jointly  liable  with  him,  or  in  favor 
of  the  defendant  and  others  jointly  interested  with  liim  liave  been 
overruled.^  A  single  additional  authority  will  suffice  to  illustrate 
a  principle  which  really  needs  no  illustration.  In  an  action  to 
foreclose  a  mortgage,  brought  by  an  assignee  thereof,  the  mort- 
gagee not  being  a  party  to  the»record,  the  defendants  alleged,  as 
an  equitable  counter-claim,  facts  tending  to  show  that  the  mort- 
gage and  the  note  secured  by  it  were  procured  to  be  executed  by 
the  mortgagee's  fraud,  and  that  the  plaintiff'  took  with  notice  of 

1  See  supra,  §§  *  754  et  seq. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  885 

the  fraud,  and  prayed  that  the  note  and  mortgage  niiglit  be  can- 
celled, and  the  plaintiff  enjoined  from  enforcing  them.  The 
court  said:  "  It  is  evident  that,  if  the  allegations  of  this  answer 
were  in  the  form  of  a  complaint  in  a  separate  action  asking  that 
the  note  and  mortgage  be  surrendered  and  cancelled,  the  railroad 
[the  mortgagee]  would  be  a  necessary  party  defendant.  The  de- 
fendant then  could  not  set  up  the  facts  alleged  in  his  answer  as 
a  counter-claim  in  this  action,  for  the  reason  that  a  new  party 
must  be  brought  before  the  court."  ^  In  a  few  States  this  diffi- 
culty is  very  properly  met  and  obviated  by  express  provisions  of 
their  codes,  which  authorize  the  addition  of  new  parties  in  order 
that  the  relief  demanded  by  the  counter-claim  or  set-oif  may  be 
granted.2 

III.    TJie  Suhjcct- Matter  of  Counter- Claims,  or  the  Nature  of  the 
Causes  of  Action  which  may  he  pleaded  as  Counter- Claims. 

§  639.  *  763.  Introductory.  This  general  subdivision  is  natu- 
rally separated  into  three  heads,  which  I  shall  proceed  to  examine 
in  the  order  stated.  A.  Nature  of  the  subject-matter  generally, 
with  special  reference  to  the  question  whether  the  counter-claim 
may  be  an  equitable  cause  of  action  and  may  result  in  the  gi-ant- 
ing  of  equitable  relief,  or  whether  it  must  be  restricted  to  legal 
causes  of  action  and  reliefs.  B.  The  particular  questions  which 
arise  under  the  first  clause  or  brancli  of  the  statutory  definition. 
C.  Those  Avhich  arise  under  the  second  clause  or  branch  of  the 
same  provision. 

A.  Whether  a  Counter-Claimmayhe  an  Equitable  Cause  of  Action, 
a7id  the  Means  of  Ohtaining  Equitahle  Relief ;  or  whether  it  must 
he  restricted  to  Legal  Causes  of  Action  and  Reliefs. 

§  640.  *  764.  An  Equitable  Counter-Claim  may  be  interposed  in 
an  Equitable  or  Legal  Action.  From  the  decisions  cited  in  the 
foot-note,  the  following  doctrines  and  rules  are  clearly  and  firmly 

1  McConihe  v.  Hollister,  19  Wis.  2G9.  ally    interested  ;    as,    for    example,    tlie 

See  also  Coursen  v.  Hamlin,  2  Duer,  51.3  ;  grantor  in  the  deed  to  be  reformed.     The 

Cummings  v.   Morris,  2.5  N.  Y.  625.     But  case  of  Hicks  v.  Sheppard,  4  Lans.  335, 

see  Du  Font  v.  Davis,  35  Wis.  631,  640,  which    holds  the  contrary,  was  expressly 

641,  which  holds  that  an  equitable  coun-  di.sapproved.     See  also  Pennoyer  ?;.  Allen, 

ter-claim   of    reformation,  and   the    like,  50  Wis.  308. 

may  be  sustained,  and  the  relief  granted,  -  See  these  sections  quoted    at   large, 

witliont  the  presence  of  parties  collater-  ,s)/y)?-a,  §*  584,  note. 


8S6  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

established.  In  an  equitable  action,  a  counter-claim  consisting  of 
an  equitable  cause  of  action,  and  demanding  equitable  relief,  may 
be  interposed  if  it  possesses  all  the  other  elements  required  by  the 
definition,  and  may,  in  many  if  not  most  cases,  be  pleaded  by  one 
or  more  of  the  defendants  less  than  all  against  one  or  more  of 
the  plaintiffs.  The  language  of  the  statute  does  not  confine  the 
use  of  this  afiirmative  species  of  defence  to  legal  actions,  nor 
require  that  it  should  necessarily  be  of  a  legal  nature  itself. 
Adapting  itself  to  the  character  of  the  action  in  which  it  is  intro- 
duced, in  those  which  are  legal  it  resembles,  although  much 
broader  and  more  comprehensive,  the  former  set-off  and  recou}> 
ment,  wiiile  in  those  which  are  equitable  it  often  takes  the  place 
of  a  cross-bill  or  complaint.  In  a  le(jial  action,  also,  an  equitable 
counter-claim  may  be  set  up  and  aftirmative  relief  may  be  granted 
by  its  means.  As  the  codes  in  express  terms  permit  equitable 
defences  in  such  actions,  and  as  in  the  self-same  provision,  and 
by  means  of  the  same  language,  the  statute  authorizes  the  joining 
of  as  many  defences  and  counter-claims,  whether  legal  or  equitable^ 
or  both,  as  the  defendant  may  have,  to  deny  the  possibility  of  an 
equitable  counter-claim  in  a  legal  action,  would  make  it  necessary, 
if  any  consistency  were  preserved,  to  deny  also  the  possibility  of 
an  equitable  defence.  The  courts,  as  may  be  seen  from  the  cita- 
tions made  below,  have,  with  a  few  unimportant  exceptions,  been 
unu'illing  to  nullify  the  language,  and  defeat  the  design  of  the 
legislature  in  this  manner,  and  following  its  plain  meaning  and 
import,  they  have  freely  admitted  and  sustained  the  equitable 
counter-claim  in  all  actions,  whether  legal  or  equitable,  where 
that  form  of  relief  was  appropriate,  and  was  authorized  by  the 
descriptive  terms  of  the  statute.^ 

1  HicksviUe  &  C.  S.  B.  R.  Co.  v.  Long  490;  Cavalli  v.  Allen,  57  N.  Y.  508,  514. 
Island  H.  Co.,  48  Barb.  355,  .360 ;  Fi.sher  See,  per  contra,  that  the  counter-claim 
r.  Moolick,  13  Wis.  321 ;  Sample  r.  Rowe,  must  always  be  a  legal  cause  of  a('tion, 
24  Ind.  208 ;  Lombard  v.  Cowham,'  34  Jones  v.  Moore,  42  Mo.  413,  419.  Tlie 
Wis.  486,  491,492,  and  cases  cited,  which  following  cases  furnish  additional  exam- 
show  that  in  Wisconsin  every  equitable  pies  of  equitable  counter-claims.  Lawe 
defence  mii.^t  be  a  counter-claim.  Vail  v.  i:  Hyde,  39  Wis.  345  (no  kf/al  counter- 
.lones,  31  Ind.  407  ;  Charlton  v.  Tardy,  28  claim  jjossible  in  an  action  of  ejectment)  ; 
Lid.  452  ;  l)u  Pont  v.  Davis,  35  Wis.  631,  Stowell  v.  Eldred,  39  id.  614  ;  Perkins  r. 
639-641;  Spalding  r.  Alexander,  6  Bush,  Port  Washington,  37  id.  177;  Ingles  r. 
160;  Jarvis  v.  Peck,  19  Wis.  74;  Grimes  Patter.«"^n,  36  id.  373;  Glen  &  Hall  Man. 
V.  Duzan,  32  Ind.  361  ;  Woodruff  v.  Gar-  Co.  r.  Hall,  61  X.  Y.  226,  236;  Cook  v. 
nor,  27  Ind.  4  ;  lui.stman  v.  Linn,  20  Minn.  Jenkin.s,  79  id.  575  ;  Winslow  v.  Winslow, 
4.i3;  Andrews  v.    Gillespie,  47  N.  Y.  487,  52    Ind.   8;   Ilinkle   v.    Margeruni,  50  id. 


COUNTER-CLADr. 


887 


§  641.  7<35.  Limitation  upon  Equitable  Relief  Granted  to  Defend- 
ant: in  Actions  of  Equitable  Character  ;  in  Actions  of  Legal  Character. 
Doctrine  Maintained  by  Supreme  Court  of  New  York.  Illustrative 
Case.  Whether  all  alUnnative  ec^uitable  leUef  granted  to  a  de- 
fendant must  be  Hmited  to  the  cases  in  which  a  counter-claim  is 
possible,  that  is,  whether  a  defendant  is  unable  to  set  up  a  case 
for  equitable  affirmative  relief,  and  obtain  a  judgnient  therefor  in 
his  favor  against  the  plaintiff,  unless  he  can  bring  the  facts  con- 
stituting his  cause  of  action  within  some  one  of  the  species  of 
counter-claim  defined  by  the  codes,  is  another  question.^     There 


240;  McManus  r.  Smith,  5;J  id.  211  ;  Gos- 
sard  V.  JFerguson,  54  id.  519;  Teiigue  i'. 
Fowler,  56  id.  569  ;  Morrisou  ?'.  Kramer, 
58  id.  38 ;  Tabor  v.  Mackee,  58  id.  290  ; 
Conaway  v.  Carpenter,  58  id.  477  ;  Jeffcr- 
sonville,"  M.  &  I.  II.  Co.  v.  Oyler,  60  id. 
383;  Hamp,sou  v.  Fall,  64  id.  382  ;  Schafer 
V.  Schafer,  68  id.  374  ;  Movie  v.  Porter,  51 
€al.  639;  Whedbee  r.  Reddick,  79  N.  C. 
521;  Moser  v.  Cochrane,  13  Daly,  159; 
Dempsey  v.  Rhodes,  93  N.  C.  120;  Boyd 
V.  Beaiuiiu,  54  Wis.  1 93. 

Q^c<ilze»).  Torrison  (1903),  118  Wis.  315, 
95  N.  W.  114;  Momsen  v.  Noyes  (1900), 
105  Wis.  565,  81  N.  W.  860;  Hotaling  i: 
Tecumseh  Nat.  Bank  (1898),  55  Neb.  5, 
75  N.  W.  242;  Maffett  v.  Thompson 
(1898),  32  Ore.  546,  52  Pac.  565;  Ber- 
thold  V.  O'Hara  (1893),  121  Mo.  88,  25 
S.  W.  845;  Willis  v.  Barron  (1898),  143 
Mo.  450,  45  S.  W.  289  :  "  It  is  the  settled 
law  of.  this  court  that  an  unsettled  part- 
nersliip  account  cannot  be  pleaded  as  a 
counter-claim."  Salladin  i:  Mitchell  (1894), 
42  Neb.  859,  61  N.  W.  127  ;  Lahiff  v.  Hen- 
nepin County,  etc.  Ass'n  (1895),  61  Minn. 
226,  63  N.  W.  493  ;  Vaule  v.  Miller  (1897), 
C9  Minn.  440,  72  N.  W.  452;  Smith  v. 
Dickinson  (1898),  100  Wis.  574,  76  N.  W. 
766  :  meaning  of  equitable  counter-claim. 

A  debtor  of  an  insolvent  bank  has  an 
equitable  right  to  set  off  a  claim  he  holds 
against  the  bank  against  his  indel)teduess 
to  the  bank,  whether  or  not  liis  indebted- 
ness lias  matured  at  tlie  time  of  the  bank's 
insolvency:  Mercer  v.  Dyer  (1895),  15 
Mont.  317,  39  Pac.  314. 

Matthews  v.  Weiler  (1893),  57  Ark. 
606,  22  8.  W.  569  :  Defendant,  in  order  to 
"  get  even  "  with  plaintiff  for  alleged  dam- 
ages due  to  plaintiff  furnishing  a  second 


hand  instead  of  a  new  soda-water  gener- 
ator, ordered  certain  other  goods  from 
pLiintiff,  and  then  refused  to  pay  for 
them,  //p/f/,  that  in  an  action  by  plain- 
tiff for  tlie  i)rice  of  tho.se  goods,  defendant 
could  not  have  an  ecjuitable  counter-claim 
for  the  unliquidated  damages  connected 
with  the  generator,  even  tiiough  tlie 
plaintiff  was  a  non-resident  and  had  no 
property  in  the  State.  Ecpiity  will  not  aid 
fraud.] 

1  ([Trester  i\  City  of  Sheboygan  (1894). 
87  Wis.  496,  58  N.  W.  747;  Harden  v. 
Lang  (1900),  110  Ga.  392,  36  S.  E.  100  ; 
Bell  w.  O her  &  Sons  Co.  (1900),  111  Ga. 
668,  36  S.  E.  904;  FoUendore  v.  Follendore 
(1896),  99  Ga.  71,  24  S.  E.  407;  Giles  r. 
Bank  of  Georgia  (1897),  102  Ga.  702,  29 
S.E.  600;  Daly*-.  Brenuaii  (1894),  87  Wis. 
36,  57  N.  W.  963;  Richardson  v.  Doty 
(1895),  44  Neb.  73,  62  N.  W.  254. 

See  Armstrong  v.  Mayer  (1903),  — 
Neb.  — ,  95  N.  W.  51,  from'  which  the  fol- 
lowing quotation  is  made  :  "  A  consider- 
able portion  of  the  plaintiff's  argument  in 
this  court  is  devoted  to  the  proposition 
tliat  the  claims  for  damages  set  up  iiy  the 
defendants  are  not  available  as  counter- 
claims under  sections  100,  101,  Code  Civ. 
Proc,  and  were  not  maintainable  in  tiic 
present  cause  for  that  reason.  But  we 
think  a  defendant  in  an  action  is  not  re- 
stricted to  tlie  counter-claim  provided  for 
in  said  sections,  but,  in  a  jiroper  case, 
may  seek  affirmative  relief  either  against 
the  plaintiflF  or  against  co-defendants.  Tlio 
code  of  tliis  State  contains  no  provisions 
with  reference  to  cros.s-petitions.  Never- 
theless, the  practice  of  filing  them  has 
long  obtained  in  this  jurisdiction,  and  tlio 
riffht  to  bring  a  cross-suit  auxiliary  to  and 


888 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


are  decisions  which  answer  tliis  question  in  the  afl&rmative,  and 
hold  that  all  such  relief  must  be  denied  unless  the  defendant's 
cause  of  action  is  a  proper  counter-claim.  This  doctrine  was 
recently  maintained  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York.  An 
action  was  brought  to  restrain  the  defendant  from  using  a  trade- 
mark alleged  to  be  the  sole  property  of  the  plaintiff.  The  answer 
asserted  that  the  trademark  in  question  belonged  in  fact  exclu- 
sively to  the  defendant,  that  the  plaintiff  had  no  right  to  it,  but 
was  unlawfully  and  wrongfully  using  it,  and  thereby  interfering 
with  and  injuring  the  defendant's  business,  and  concluded  by 
praying  for  an  injunction,  an  account,  and  judgment  for  damages. 
At  the  trial,  the  defendant's  allegations  were  fully  sustained  by 
the  proofs,  and  he  obtained  the  judgment  demanded.  This  judg- 
ment was  reversed  on  appeal,  the  court  saying :  "  To  entitle  the 
defendant  to  aifirmative  relief,  the  answer  must  set  up  a  counter- 


dependent  upon  the  original  suit,  yet  dis- 
tinct for  many  purposes,  lias  been  recog- 
nized, at  least,  repeatedly." 

Peter  v.  Farrel.  etc.  Co.  (1895),  53 
Ohio  St.  534,  42  N.  E.  690:  Sec.  5070, 
R.  S.,  declaring  what  an  answer  shall 
contain,  and  sec.  8072,  declaring  that  a 
counter-claim  must  be  one  ..."  in  favor 
of  a  defendant  and  against  a  plaintiff  be- 
tween whom  a  several  judgment  might 
be  had  in  an  action,"  do  not  abridge  the 
former  powers  of  equity.  But  taking  the 
code  as  a  whole,  in  view  of  its  spirit  and 
purpose,  and  in  view  of  sec.  5071,  which 
provides  that  "  The  defendant  may  set 
forth  in  his  answer  as  many  grounds  of 
defence,  counter-claims,  and  set-offs  as  he 
has,  whether  they  are  such  as  have  been 
heretofore  denominated  legal  or  equitable, 
or  both,"  and  "  he  may  claim  therein  re- 
lief touching  the  matters  in  question  in 
the  petition  against  the  plaintiff  or  any 
other  defendants  in  the  same  action,"  the 
court  must  be  held  to  have  the  right  to 
grant  relief  whenever  a  party  shows  even 
a  contingent  right  to  property  or  a  fund 
which  is  the  subject  of  an  equitable 
action,  even  though  his  claim  is  not  one 
which  could  be  made  the  subject  of  a 
several  jutlgment  in  liis  favor  against  a 
fdaintiff. 

Stenberg  v.  State  (1896),  48  Neb.  299, 
67  X.  W.  190:  "The  fode  of  Civil  Pro- 


cedure relating  to  set-offs  authorizes  such 
defences  to  be  interposed  before,  but  not 
after  judgment.  A  court  of  equity,  wiiere 
proper  grounds  exist  therefor,  may  al- 
low a  set-off  in  cases  not  provided  for  by 
statute." 

'*  The  rule  is  well  settled  that  the  in- 
solvency of  a  party  against  whose  de- 
mand a  counter-claim  is  sought  to  be 
interposed  is  a  sufficient  ground  for  equit- 
able interference  in  cases  not  provided  for 
by  statute  :  "  Le  Clare  v.  Thibault  (1902), 
41  Ore.  601,  69  Pac.  552. 

"  The  sy-s^tem  of  pleading,  consisting  of 
complaint,  demurrer,  answer,  and  reply, 
meets  the  necessities  of  all  parties,  in  all 
cases,  and  in  all  courts.  The  answer  set- 
ting up  new  matter  constituting  a  coun- 
ter-claim, where  a  defendant  seeks 
affirmative  relief  against  a  plaintiff,  and 
the  answer  setting  up  facts  entitling  a  de- 
fendant to  such  relief  against  his  co-de- 
fendant as  the  court  has  jurisdiction 
to  grant  under  sec.  2883  R.  S.,  take  the 
place  of  the  cross-bill  of  the  old  practice. 
The  answer  of  a  defendant,  seeking  relief 
of  his  co-defendant,  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
cross-bill,  but  is  an  answer  and  a  code 
pleading  nevertheless  :  "  Kollock  v.  Scrib- 
ner  (1897),  98  Wis.  104.  23  N.  W.  776. 
But  see  Pendleton  r.  Beyer  (1896),  94 
Wis.  31,  68  N.  W.  415.3 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  889 

claim.^  The  claim  of  defendant  for  relief  is  not  a  counter-claim 
within  the  meaning  of  that  term  as  used  in  the  code.  It  does  not 
arise  out  of  the  ti'ansaction  set  forth  in  the  plaintiff's  complaint, 
nor  does  it  arise  on  contract."  ^  The  general  subject  of  tl.e 
afhrmative  equitable  relief  which  may  be  obtained  by  a  defendant 
has  been  already  discussed,  and  the  discussion  need  not  be  re- 
peated. Undoubtedly,  in  the  great  majority  of  instances,  any 
equitable  affirmative  relief  properly  conferred  upon  a  defendant 
would  fall  within  some  description  of  a  counter-claim ;  in  order 
that  it  should  not  be  a  counter-claim,  it  must  be  a  cause  of  action 
entirely  independent  of  that  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff,  and  not 
arising  from  a  contract.  Under  the  equity  practice  and  system 
of  pleading  which  prevailed  prior  to  the  codes,  the  matters  which 
could  be  set  up  by  a  defendant  in  a  cross-bill,  as  the  foundation 
for  affirmative  relief  to  him,  must  have  some  connection  with  the 
matters  originally  charged  against  him  by  the  plaintiff's  bill,  even 
if  his  demand  did  not  directly  arise  out  of  such  original  matters; 
an  entirely  distinct  and  independent  cause  of  action  could  not  be 
alleged  by  the  defendant  in  a  cross-bill ;  if  he  had  such  a  claim, 
he  could  only  enforce  it  by  a  separate  suit.^  The  codes  do  not 
seem  to  have,  in  any  express  manner,  enlarged  the  scope  and 
operation  of  the  defendant's  equitable  affirmative  relief  otherwise 
than  by  the  provisions  relating  to  the  counter-claim.  In  actions 
of  a  legal  nature  it  is  very  clear  that  no  affirmative  relief  can  be 
obtained  by  a  defendant,  unless  his  cause  of  action  or  demand  is 
a  proper  counter-claim. 

§  642.  *  766.  Additional  Instances.  I  shall  close  this  branch  of 
the  subject  by  mentioning  some  special  instances,  or  actions  of  a 
particular  character,  in  whicli  it  has  been  held  that  a  counter- 
claim is  not  possible,  or  that  the  affirmative  relief  demanded  by 
the  defendant  could  not  be  the  subject  of  a  counter-claim.^  In 
an  action  for  a  limited  divorce  on  the  ground  of  cruelty,  the  de- 
fendant's answer,  charging  adultery  by  the  plaintiff  and  demand- 

i  Wright   V.   Delafiekl,  25  N.  Y.  266;  *  (^Meredith   v.   Lyon   (1902),  —  Ne|). 

Garvey  r.  Jarvis,  54  Barb.  179.  — ,  92  N.  W.  122  :  "A  claim  not  reduced 

2  Glen  &  Hall  Man.  Co.  v.  Hall,  6  to  judgment,  for  tlie  statutory  penalties 
Lans.  158,  161,  162.  This  decision  was  for  failure  to  release  paid  chattel  mort- 
reversed  on  appeal,  and  the  counter-claim  gages,  does  not  furnish  such  a  cross-dc- 
■was  su.stained  as  valid.  Glen  &  Hall  mand  as  can  be  used  for  the  basis  of  an 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Hall,  61  N.  Y.  226,  2.36.  equitable  action  to  cancel  another  mort- 

3  Daniell's  Chan.  PI.  and  Prac.  1647;  gage,  between  the  same  parties,  which  has 
Storey's  Eq.  PI.  §§  389,  397.  not  been  paid."J 


890 


CIVIL  iu;medies. 


ing  an  absolute  divorce,  is  not  a  proper  counter-claim  ;  ^  nor,  in 
an  action  for  an  absolute  divorce  because  of  adulter}',  is  an  answer 
alleging  cruelty  and  praying  for  a  judicial  separation.-  In  some 
States  a  mechanic's  lien  is  enforced,  not  by  any  special  proceed- 
ings, but  by  an  ordinary  equitable  suit.  An  answer  in  an  action 
for  such  a  purpose,  alleging  that  the  premises  described  in  the 
complaint  formed  the  defendant's  "  homestead,"  and  were  there- 
fore, pursuant  to  statute,  free  from  all  lien  or  charges  in  favor  of 
creditors,  was  held  not  to  be  a  counter-claim,  since  it  stated  no 
cause  of  action  against  the  plaintiff,  and  was,  in  fact,  tantamount 
to  a  denial.-"' 

§  643.  *  7(37.  Is  Couuter-Claim  Possible  iu  Action  to  recover  Pos- 
session of  Chattels  ?  It  would  seem  that,  in  an  action  to  recover 
llie  possession  of  specilic  chattels,  no  counter-claim  is  possible, 
unless,  perhaps,  equitable  relief  may  be  awarded  under  some  very 
exceptional  circumstances.'*     A  judgment  for  a  return  to  the  de- 


1  Heurv  r.  Meurv,  3  Kobt.  GU  ;  17 
Abb.  Pr.  411. 

[^Butsee  Woodrick  r.  Woodrick  (1894), 
141  N.  Y.  457,  36  N.  E.  395,  frutii  which 
we  quote :  "  This  is  an  appeal  from  a 
judi^ineut  of  the  general  term  of  the  .sec- 
uud  department,  affirming  a  judgment  iu 
favor  of  defenilant  for  an  absolute  divorce, 
and  from  au  order  denying  motiou  for  a 
new  trial.  The  jdaintiff  sued  for  a  limited 
divorce,  alleging  that  the  defendant  was 
guilty  of  cruel  and  iulmmau  treatment. 
T!ie  defendant  denied  tlie  charges  of  tlie 
complaiut,  and  set  up  by  way  of  counter- 
<'laim  the  adultery  of  plaintiff,  and  ])raved 
for  a  judgment  of  absolute  divorce.  The 
jury  found  against  the  plaintiff  on  her  own 
cause  of  action,  and  also  on  the  defend- 
.int's  couuter-claim.  It  is  now  insi.-ted  on 
belialf  of  plaintiff  that  she  was  entitled  to 
judgment  of  separation  on  the  evidence ; 
that  the  finding  of  the  jury  that  she  com- 
mitted adultery  is  uusuj»porled  liy  evi- 
dence ;  and  that  there  were  errors  of  law 
on  the  trial  that  must  lead  to  a  reversal 
of  the  judgment.  In  view  of  the  verv 
.serious  con.sequences  to  tlie  jdaiutiff  Col- 
lowing  the  affirmance  of  the  judgment  au<l 
tlie  in.ii.-^tence  of  her  counsel  that  finding 
her  guilty  of  adultery  was  legal  error,  we 
have  looked  into  tlie  facts  of  this  case 
with  great  care,  ami  are  unable  to  say  tliat 
eitliei-  of  liie  findings  of  the  jury  is  un- 


supported by  evidence.  Tliis  case  was 
properly  submitted  to  the  jury  and  tlielr 
verdict  is  conclusive  on  the  questions  of 
fact."     The  judgment  was  affirmed.] 

^  Diddelli".  Diddell,  3  Abb.  Pr.  167; 
Griffin  i-.  Griffin,  2'5  How.  Pr.  183;  Tor- 
hune  V.  Terhuue,  40  How.  Pr.  258;  but 
see  Armstrong  i'.  Armstrong,  27  Ind.  186; 
McNaniara  c.  McNamara,  9  Abb.  Pr.  IS, 
in  which  such  relief  was  grautetl  to  the 
defendants. 

•^  Knglebrocht  r.  KickerL,  14  Minn. 
1 40. 

•*  CPhipi)s  r.  Wilson  (1899),  125  N.  C. 
106,  34  S.  E.  227  ;  Minneapolis  Threshing 
Co.  r.  Darnall  (1900),  13  S.  D.  279,  83 
N.  W.  266;  Davis  v.  Culver  (1899),  58 
Neb.  265,  78  N.  AV.  504;  Palmer  r. 
Palmer  (1894),  90  la.  17,  57  N.  W.  645; 
Banning  r.  Marleau  (1894),  101  Citl.  238, 
35  Pac.  772 ;  Kenuebaum  r.  Atkinson 
(1S98),  103  Ky.  555,45  S.  W.  874;  Col- 
lins V.  Morrison  (1895),  91  Wis.  324,  64 
N.  W.  1000.  See  also  §  «791,  and  eases 
cited. 

Aultman  Co.  v.  McDonougii  (1901), 
110  Wis.  263,  85  N.  W.  980:  "In  an  ac- 
tion of  repleviu  brouglit  by  a  non-resident 
mortgagee  to  recover  possession  of  ma- 
diinery  sold  to  defendunt  and  mortgaged 
to  secure  the  purchase  price,  tiie  defend- 
ant .  .  .  may  counter-claim  damages  fur 
breucli  of  warrantv  of  the  sroods  sold,  ;uul 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  891 

fendimt  of  the  chattels  in  coutrovorsy  is  not  a  counter-claim,  for 
it  is  expressly  provided  for  by  the  codes,  the  very  issue  in 
the  action  being,  Which  party  is  entitled  to  the  possession?  and 
the  court  by  its  judgment  awarding  tlie  [)OSsession,  or  the  value 
in  money  if  possession  cannot  be  given,  to  the  one  who  establishes 
the  right ;  if,  therefore,  the  plaintiff  had  taken  the  goods  into  his 
own  custody  by  the  authorized  preliminary  proceedings,  they  or 
their  value  must  be  restored  when  the  action  fails.^  If  a  counter- 
claim can  be  interposed  in  this  suit,  it  must  be  either  (1)  a  de- 
mand for  money,  or  (2)  a  demand  for  the  possession  of  certain 
other  and  different  chattels,  or  (3)  a  demand  for  some  kind  of 
equitable  relief.  A  counter-claim  for  money  could  not  be  ad- 
mitted under  the  principle  established  by  the  cases,  that  the 
relief  must  have  so7ne  connection  with  that  asked  for  by  the  plain- 
tiff, and  must  tend  to  diminish  or  modify  it  in  some  manner.  A 
judgment  for  money  obtained  by  the  defendant  could  not  inter- 
fere with  or  be  counter  to  a  judgment  awarding  possession  of 
chattels  to  the  plaintiff.^  The  same  difficulties  attend  the  second 
alternative.  It  seems  impossible  that  when  the  plaintiff  seeks 
to  recover  possession  of  certain  specific  chattels,  the  defendant's 
right  to  the  possession  of  other  and  distinct  articles,  could  arise 
out  of  the  same  transaction  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim  or  could  be  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  plaintiff's 
action.  The  "transactions,"  wliich  are  the  foundations  of  their 
respective  causes  of  action,  must,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case,  be  different.     It  is  not  pretended  that  the  action,  or  the 

also   d.amages  in   tryiug  to  operate    ma-  hiought  to  recover  the  chattels  under  such 

chinery  returned  to  the  plaintiff,  and  for  circumstances,  the  defendant   might,  per- 

which   the   mortgaged    property    Avas    in  liaj).s,  set  up  as  a  counter-claim  au  inde- 

part  taken   iu  exchange. "3  pendent  demand  due  to  himself  from  the 

^  .See  De  Lever  v.  Michaels,  .'>  Abb.  Pr.  plaintiff  on  contract,  and  thus  diminish  or 

20.3,  in  which  this  doctrine  was  affirmed,  extinguish  the  unpaid  balance  of  the  pur- 

although  it  plainly  ueeds  uo  authority  in  chase  price.     Sucli  a  counter-claim  would 

its  support.  be  analogous  to  the  similar  one  in  a  suit 

-  See  Moffat  v.  Van  Doren,  4  Bosw.  by  a  vendor  of  laud  against  the  veudee, 

609;   Williams  v.  Irby,  15  S.  C.  458;  Tal-  which  was  sustained   in  Cavalli  v.  Allen, 

bott  V.  Padgett,  .30  S.  C.  167.     It  is  pos-  57  N.  Y.  508.     The  difficulty  suggested  iu 

sible,  perhaps,  that  the  plaintiff's  right  to  the  text,   that  a   money   judgment   does 

the  possession  might  depend  upon  the  de-  not  tend  to  diminish  or  modify  the  relief, 

fendant's  failure  to  pay  a  stipul.ated  sum  recovery  of  possession,  asked  for  by  the 

of  money,  as  in  the  case  of  a  conditional  plaintiff,  was  not  considered  in  the  cases 

sale  and  delivery,  when  the  property  was  of  Wilson  r.  Hughes,  94  N.  C.  182  ;  Walsh 

to  remain  in  the  vendor  until   tiie    price  v.  Hall,  66  N.  C.  233,  iu  both  of  which  a 

was  paid,  although  possession  had   been  counter-claim  of  damages  was  allowed, 
transferred  to  the  veudee.     In  an  action  /■ 


892  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

cross-demand,  is  based  upon  contract.  And,  finally,  the  relief 
granted  to  the  defendant  would  be  entirely  independent  of  that 
conferred  upon  the  plaintiff ;  the  two  would  be  complete  and 
entire  each  by  itself,  and  thus  there  would  be  in  effect  two  judg- 
ments, not  modifying  or  interfering  with  each  other,  and  not  re- 
lating to  the  same  subject-matter.  This  reasoning,  and  the 
conclusion  reached  by  it,  have  been  sustained  by  judicial  decision, 
and  thus  seem  to  be  supported  alike  by  principle  and  by  authority.^ 
It  is  possible,  perhaps,  though  hardl}'  probable,  that  equitable  re- 
lief may,  under  certain  exceptional  circumstances,  be  recoverable 
by  the  defendant  in  an  action  similar  in  its  nature  and  object  to 
the  ancient  replevin  or  detinue.  Courts  of  equity,  however,  very 
^rely  interfered  in  controversies  concerning  the  title  to  and 
possession  of  chattels. 

B.      The  Particidar  Questions  which  arise  under  the  First  Clavse  or 
Branch  of  the  Statutory  Definition. 

§  644.  *  768.  Language  of  the  First  Clause.  The  Three  Subjects 
Embraced  -within  this  Language.  Particular  Phrases  Requiring  Con- 
struction. Method  of  Interpretation  Adopted  by  the  Courts. 
The  language  of  the  first  clause  or  Ijraneh  of  the  definition, 
which  is  found  in  all  the  codes  except  those  of  Indiana  and  Iowa, 
and  which  is  now  to  be  interpreted,  is:  '' xV  cause  of  action  aris- 
ing out  of  a  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint 
[petition]  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  connected 
with  the  subject  of  the  action."  Following  the  order  of  this 
language,  it  is  plain  that  three  different  subjects  are  embraced 
within  it,  and  the  whole  discussion  must  therefore  be  separated 
into  three  corresponding  divisions :  namely,  1.  Cases  in  which  the 
cause  of  action  alleged  as  a  counter-claim  arises  out  of  the  con- 
tract set  forth  in  the  complaint ;  2.  Those  cases  in  which  it  arises 
out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint ;  3.  Those  cases 
in  which  it  is  connected  ivith  the  subject  of  the  action.  A  com- 
plete examination  of  these  three  subdivisions  requires  a  construc- 
tion of  certain  particular  phrases  which  form  a  part  of  the 
statutory  definition.  These  are  (a)  "  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim,"  or  when  is  a  contract  or  transaction  the  foundation  of  the 

1  Loven.sohn  v.  Ward, 45  Cal.  8.     This     separate  chattels  cannot  be  set  up  as  a 
case  expressly    holds    that    a    claim    to     counter-claim. 
rc<'ovfT   the    possession    of    distinct    and 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  8y3 

plaintiff's  claim?  (&)  "arising  out  of,"  or  when  does  a  cause  of 
action  arise  out  of  a  contract  or  transaction  ?  (c)  "  transaction  ;" 
(fZ)  "  subject  of  the  action  ; "  (c)  "  connected  witli,"  or  when  is 
a  cause  of  action  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action? 
Although  the  signification  of  all  these  phrases  and  terms  must  be 
determined,  for  upon  it  depends  the  interpretation  to  be  given  to 
the  entire  provision,  yet  it  will  be  impracticable  to  take  them  up 
and  examine  them  separately.  Each  is  so  connected  with  the 
others,  that,  in  ascertaining  their  sense,  all  must  be  considered 
together.  The  courts  have  invariably  pursued  this  method  ;  and 
their  opinions,  from  which  our  interpretation  will  be  taken,  have 
always  construed  the  statutory  clause  as  a  whole,  and  have  not 
attempted  to  distinguish  and  analyze  its  constituent  parts.  I 
shall  therefore  pursue  the  order  already  mentioned,  and  shall  dis- 
cuss the  three  subdivisions  into  wliich  the  subject  has  been  sepa- 
rated, and  in  so  doing  shall  incidentally  define  the  legal  import  of 
the  several  phrases  and  terms  above  enumerated.  The  decisions 
which  have  given,  or  have  attempted  to  give,  a  construction  to 
the  clause  are  numerous  and  conflicting.  I  shall  freely  refer  to 
these  cases,  citing  those  which  represent  all  theories  and  schools 
of  interpretation,  and  shall  endeavor  to  collect  from  them  such 
doctrines  and  practical  rules  as  seem  to  be  correct  upon  principle 
and  to  be  supported  by  the  weight  of  authority.  As  a  prelimi- 
nary step  to  the  discussion  of  the  three  subordinate  heads,  I  shall 
quote  and  analyze  certain  judicial  opinions  which  have  treated  of 
the  clause  as  a  whole,  and  have  proposed  general  rules  by  which 
its  meaning  may  be  determined.  Having  thus  ascertained  these 
general  rules,  I  shall  inquire  what  particular  cases  or  classes  of 
cases  do  or  do  not  fall  within  one  or  the  other  of  the  three  sub- 
divisions before  mentioned. 

§  645.  *  769.  Illustrative  Case.  Meaning  of  Term  "  Transaction." 
The  cases  now  to  be  cited  throw  more  or  less  light  upon  the 
meaning  of  the  statutory  clause  as  a  whole,  and  also,  to  a  certain 
extent,  upon  that  of  the  special  phrases  and  terms  which  it  con- 
tains ;  and  from  them  some  general  principles  of  interpretation 
can  be  inferred.  The  lower  floor  of  a  building  having  been 
leased,  the  landlord  brought  an  action  for  rent  due.  The  answer 
was  pleaded  as  a  counter-claim.  It  alleged  that  the  plaintiff 
occupied  the  upper  floors  of  the  building ;  that  he  wantonly  and 
negligently  suffered  waterpipes  to  get  out  of  repair  and  to  leak. 


S9-i 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


and  by  this  means  caused  filthy  water  to  come  upon  the  defendant's 
premises ;  also  that  plaintiff  wantonly  and  negligently  caused 
hlthv  Avater  to  be  thrown  from  his  rooms  upon  defendant's 
premises ;  that  by  these  acts  damages  were  caused  to  the  defend- 
ant in  an  amount  specified,  for  which  judgment  Avas  demanded 
against  the  plaintiff.  A  demurrer  to  this  answer  having  been 
sustained,  the  defendant  appealed  to  the  New  York  Court  of 
Appeals,  which  affirmed  the  decision  below.^     As  already  said  in  a 


1  Edgerton  v.  Page,  20  N.  Y.  281,  285. 
From  the  opinion  of  that  court  the  follow- 
ing extracts  are  taken  :  "  The  demand  of 
the  defendant  set  out  in  the  answer  does 
not  arise  out  of  the  contract  set  forth  in 
the  complaint.  That  contract  is  for  the 
payment  of  rent  upon  a  lease  of  the  de- 
mised premises.  The  defendant's  de- 
mands arise  from  the  wrongful  acts  of 
the  plaintiff  in  permitting  water  to  leak 
and  run  into  the  premises,  and  in  causing 
it  to  be  thrown  upon  the  premises  and 
property  of  the  defendant.  These  acts 
are  entirely  independent  of  the  contract  of 
hiring,  upon  which  the  action  is  brought. 
The  deniauds  are  not  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action  ;  that  is,  the  rent 
agreed  to  be  paid  for  the  use  of  the  premises. 
Tlie  defendant's  demands  are  for  a  series 
of  injuries  to  his  property  deposited  upon 
the  premises,  and  for  impairing  the  value 
of  the  possession.  It  would  be  a  very 
liberal  construction  to  hold  that,  in  an 
action  for  rent,  injuries  arising  from 
trespasses  committed  by  the  lessor  upon 
the  demisr-d  premises  might  be  inter{>osed 
as  a  counter-claim.  The  acts  of  the  plain- 
tiff in  this  case  are  of  a  similar  nature. 
They  are  either  acts  of  trespass  or  of 
negligence  from  which  the  injuries  to  the 
defendant  accrued.  Such  a  construction 
could  only  be  supported  by  the  idea  that 
tlie  subject  of  the  action  was  the  value  of 
the  use  of  the  premises.  But  where  there  is 
an  agreement  as  to  the  amount  of  the 
rent,  that  value  is  inmiaterial.  Unless 
the  acts  of  the  plaintiff'  amount  to  a  breach 
of  the  contract  of  iiiring,  tliey  are  not 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action." 
The  opinion  procteeds  to  show  that  the 
acts  complained  of  were  not  a  breach  of 
an  implied  covenant  of  (|uiet  enjoyment, 
and  concludes  :  "  Tliere  is  nothing  in  the 
answer  in  this  case  tending  to  sliow  that 


any  of  the  acts  of  the  plaintiff  were  done 
under  any  claim  of  right  whatever.  They 
did  not,  therefore,  amount  t»  a  breach  of 
the  contract  created  by  the  lease  ;  and  the 
injuries  sustained  by  the  defendant  do 
not,  therefore,  constitute  a  counter-claim 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action." 
To  the  same  effect  are  the  decisions  and 
tlie  general  interpretation  given  to  the 
clause  in  JNIayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Parker 
Vein  Stp.  Co.^  12  Abb.  Pr.  .300,  301  ;  per 
Woodruff  .T. ;  Askins  v.  Hearns,  3  Abb. 
Pr.  184,  187,  per  Emott  J.  ;  Sclmaderbeck 
V.  Worth.  8  Abb.  Pr.  37,  38,  per  Ingra- 
ham  .1.  ;  Drake  v.  Cockroft,  4  E.  D.  Smith, 
34,  39,  per  Woodruff  J.  ;  Bogardus  v. 
Parker,  7  How.  Pr.  303,  305 ;  Barhyte  v. 
Hughes,  33  Barb.  320,  321,  per  Gierke  J. 
These  cases  all  give  a  very  narrow  mean- 
ing to  the  term  "  transaction,"  and  incline 
to  the  position  that  a  cause  of  action  on 
contract,  and  one  for  tort,  or  two  causes 
of  action  for  tort,  can  never  be  said  to 
arise  out  of  tlie  same  transaction.  The 
last  case  cited,  Barhyte  v.  Hughes,  goes 
so  far  as  to  hold  that  "  transaction  "  and 
"  contract  "  are  synonymous ;  in  other 
words,  that  no  cause  of  action  can  arise 
out  of  a  "  transaction  "  unless  it  springs 
from  a  contract.  The  following  recent 
decisions  illustrate  the  questions  di.scussed 
in  the  paragraphs  of  the  text  (§§  *  769- 
*77C):  Brady  r.  Brennan,  25  Mini:.  210 
(ill  an  action  on  contract,  defendant  may 
counter-claim  a  demand  arising  out  of 
conversion,  by  waiving  the  tort,  etc.)  ; 
People  V.  neunison,  84  N.  Y.  272,  279, 
citing  Smith  r.  Hall,  67  id.  48;  Pattison  v. 
Richards,  22  Barb.  143  (in  an  actiim  for 
a  tort  —  fraud  —  a  counter-claim  on  con- 
tract cannot  be  set  up,  since  it  would  not 
arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  —  a  very 
important  case) ;  Smith  v.  Hall,  G7  N.  Y. 
48  (in  an  action   for  a  conversion,  there 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  895 

former  chapter,  the  difficulty  in  arriving  at  the  true  interpretation 
of  the  term  "  transaction  "  hes  in  the  fact  that  it  had  no  strict 
legal  meaning  before  it  was  used  in  the  statute.  Being  placed  in 
immediate  connection  mth  the  word  "  contract,"  and  separated 
therefrom  by  the  disjunctive  "  or,"  one  conclusion  is  certain  at  all 
events ;  namely,  that  the  legislature  intended  by  it  something  dif- 
ferent from  and  additional  to  "  contract."  The  most  familiar  rules 
of  textual  interpretation  are  violated  by  the  assumption  that  no 
such  signification  was  intended.  The  only  question  at  all  doubt- 
ful is,  How  far  did  the  law-makers  design  to  go,  and  how  broad  a 
sense  did  they  attach  to  the  word?  Is  it  to  be  used  in  its 
widest  popular  meaning,  or  must  it  be  narrowed  into  some 
limited  and  technical  meaning,  and  thus  be  made  a  term  of  legal 
nomenclature?  While  in  common  speech  a  single  assault  or 
slander  or  lie  would  not  be  called  a  "  transaction,"  yet  the  whole 
series  of  events  grouped  around  such  a  central  fact,  and  connected 
with  it,  would,  I  think,  be  so  designated  in  popular  language,  and 
a  fraudulent  scheme,  or  in  other  words  a  cheat,  is  a  most  familiar 
example  of  the  class  of  events  to  which  the  term  is  usually 
applied.  But  taking  the  word  "  transaction  "  in  the  Hmited  sense 
of  a  "  negotiation  of  business,"  or  some  other  similar  expression, 
it  is  certainly  a  mistake  to  say  that  torts  cannot  arise  out  of  it 
different  from  and  adverse  to  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action.  In 
the  first  place,  it  is  certain  that  a  cause  of  action  based  upon  the 
plaintiff 's /rawc?  may  arise  out  of  such  a  "transaction,"  for  it  may 
spring  from  a  contract  pure  and  simple.  In  the  second  place,  as 
the  "  negotiation"  or  "  business  "  or  "  conduct  of  affairs  "  may  be 
concerned  with  property,  with  the  title  to  or  possession  of  land  or 
chattels,  it  is  easily  conceivable  that  a  distinct  cause  of  action  in 

can  be  no  counter-claim,  —  not  the  same  Wilson  Manuf.  Co.  (Ore.  1892),  31  Pac. 
transaction);  Carpenter  w.  Manhattan  Life  Rep.  661;  Sheehan  v.  Pierce  (Supreme, 
Ins.  Co.,  22  Hun,  49  (in  an  action  for  dam-  June,  1893),  23  N.  Y.  Suppl.  1119  (in  an 
ages  from  a  tort,  defendant  may  counter-  action  of  slander,  a  slander  of  the  defend- 
claim  a  demand  for  tort,  if  connected  with  ant  uttered  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  course 
the  subject  of  the  action  or  arising  out  of  of  the  same  conversation  cannot  be  couu- 
the  same  transaction) ;  on  the  general  sub-  ter-claimed).  Facts  showing  that  the  de- 
ject of  arising  out  of  the  same  transaction,  fendant  has  been  damaged  by  tlie  bringing 
see  Bernheimer  v.  Wallis,  11  liun,  16;  of  the  action  do  not  constitute  a  valid 
Bradhurst  I'.  Townsend,  11  id.  104  ;  Gilpin  counter-claim:  Kansas  Loan  &  Inv.  Co. 
f.  Wilson,  .53  Ind.  443  ;  Teague  i'.  Fowler,  v.  Hutto,  48  Kan.  166.  A  counter-claim 
56  id.  569  ;  Douthitt  v.  Smith,  69  id.  463  ;  cannot  be  pleaded  in  an  action  for  a 
Whedbee  V.  Reddick,  79  N.  C.  521;  James  statutory  peualty  :  Woodward  v.  Conder, 
V.  Cutter,  53  Cal.  31 ;  Wait  v.  Wheeler  &  33  Mo.  App.  14?". 


896  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

favor  of  the  defendant  may  arise  out  of  a  tort  to  property  com- 
mitted by  the  plaintiff  in  the  course  of  the  "  business  "  or  "  nego- 
tiation" or  "conduct  of  affairs,"  such  as  a  claim  for  the  taking  or 
conversion  of  goods,  or  for  a  trespass  to  or  wrongful  detention  of 
land.  Indeed,  the  difficulty  in  conceiving  of  distinct  torts  arising 
from  one  and  the  same  "transaction  "  is  confined  almost  entirely 
to  the  cases  of  torts  to  the  person.  It  may  be  noticed  that  most 
of  the  decisions  already  cited,  in  which  the  possibility  of  distinct 
torts  having  such  a  common  legal  origin  is  denied,  directly  relate 
to  personal  wrongs  alone ;  and  the  reasoning  of  the  courts  is  ex- 
tended from  them  to  all  torts,  without  any  discrimination  between 
their  different  classes,  and  the  different  rules  which  may  govern 
them.^ 

§  646.  *  770.  Case  of  Scheunert  v.  Kaehler.  Criticism.  The 
cases  thus  far  cited  have  all  been  decided  by  courts  of  New 
York ;  I  shall  now  quote  a  few  which  have  arisen  in  other 
States.  A  complaint  alleged  that  the  plaintiff  delivered  certain 
flour  to  the  defendant  to  be  sold  on  commission,  but  that  the  latter 
had  converted  the  same,  or  the  proceeds  thereof,  to  his  own  use, 
and  prayed  judgment  for  its  value  as  damages.  The  answer  set 
up  the  following  facts  as  a  counter-claim :  that  defendant  had 
leased  a  flouring-mill  to  the  plaintiff,  who  covenanted  in  the  lease 
that  he  would  furnish  to  defendant  constant  employment  during 
the  continuance  of  the  term  for  two  teams  in  drawingf  flour  to 
Milwaukee  at  a  stipulated  sum  for  each  load,  and  further  cove- 
nanted that  all  the  flour  sent  from  the  mill  should  be  delivered 
to  the  defendant  at  Milwaukee,  to  be  sold  by  him  on  commis.sion, 
in  pursuance  of  which  agreement  the  flour  mentioned  in  the  com- 
plaint was  in  fact  delivered ;  that  the  plaintiff  had  neglected  and 
refused  to  perform  both  of  liis  said  covenants,  by  reason  of  which 
the  defendant  had  sustained  damages  to  a  specified  amount,  and 
judgment  was  demanded  for  such  sum.  A  demurrer  was  inter- 
posed to  this  counter-claim,  and  was  sustained  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Wisconsin.2     This  opinion,  quoted  at  large  in  the  note, 

1  [^Blue  V.  Capital  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  ter-claim  may  be  pleaded  to  an  action  of 
145  Inil.  .518,  43  N.  E.  65.') ;  Watts  !-.  tort,  —  a  question  not  necessary  to  be  de- 
Gantt  (1899),  42  Neb.  869,  61  N.  W.  104  ;  cided,  —  and  assuming  also  th.iV  no  objec- 
Sheildey  v.  Dixon  County  (1901),  61  Neb.  tion  exists,  because  tiie  coiitr.act  for  the 
409,  85  N.  W.  399.]         '  breach    of    which   the   defendant    claims 

2  Scheunert  v.  Kaehler,  23  Wis.  523,  damages  is  not  set  forth  in  the  cnnijilaiiit, 
per  Dixon  ('.  J.  :  "  Assuming  that  a  coun-  but  tliat  the  counter-claim  would   be  ad- 


COUNTKK-CLAIM. 


897 


necessarily  lecads  to  the  conclusion  that  when  the  plaintiff  luis  an 
election  to  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  two  forms  of  remedy,  one  on 
the  contract  for  the  breach  thereof,  and  tJie  other  in  tort  for  a 


missible,  if  at  all,  under  the  last  clause  of 
the  subdivision  as  being  counected  with 
the  subject  of  tlie  action,  tiie  question  re- 
solves itself  into  an  inquiry  as  to  the  ori- 
gin of  the  cause  of  action  stated  in  the 
complaint,  —  whether  it  arises  upon  the 
contract  set  forth  in  the  answer,  or  origi- 
nates ill  fixcts  outside  of  and  disconnected 
with  that  contract.  If  the  former,  then 
the  counter-claim  would  seem  to  be  clearly 
within  the  statute;  but,  if  the  latter,  then 
it  would  uot  be."  The  oi)inion  states  that 
the  plaintiff  might  have  sued  upon  con- 
tract for  a  violation  of  it,  or  might  have 
sued  in  tort  for  the  wrong  done  him,  and 
tliat  he  had  chosen  the  latter  form  of  ac- 
tion, and  adds  :  "  The  subject  of  the  action 
is  the  tort  or  wrong  doue  in  the  conversion 
of  the  money;  that  is  the  foundation, 
aud  the  sole  foundation,  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim  in  this  form  of  action ;  for,  unless 
the  money  was  unlawfully  converted, 
tlie  action  cannot  be  maintained."  The 
counter-claim  was  therefore  held  to  be 
inadmissible.  See  also,  Akerly  v.  Vilas, 
21  Wis.  88,  109,  110,  which  "holds  that 
the  counter-claim  must  be  direct!//  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  plaintiff's 
action,  or  so  connected  that  a  cross-bill 
would  have  been  sustained,  or  a  recoup- 
ment allowed  under  the  former  practice, 
when  it  is  claimed  to  fall  within  the  last 
clause  of  the  first  subdivision ;  and  Vilas 
;'.  Mason,  25  Wis.  310,  321,  where,  in 
an  action  brought  upon  a  contract,  —  on 
a  lease  against  the  tenant,  —  a  counter- 
claim for  the  conversion  of  chattels  which 
the  defendant  had  placed  upon  the  de- 
mised premises,  was  sustaiued,  on  the 
ground  that  both  causes  of  action  arose 
out  of  the  same  transaction ;  also  Ains- 
worth  r.  Bowen,  9  Wis.  348. 

\lln  the  very  recent  case  of  Stolze  v. 
Torrison  (1903),  — Wis.  — ,  95  N.  W.  114, 
the  court  by  Cassoday  C.  J.,  said:  "As 
indicated,  the  '  transaction  set  forth  in  the 
<-omj)laint  as  the  foundation  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim'  was  the  wrongful  breaking 
.mid  entering  the  close  of  which  the  plain- 
tiff was  at  the  time  in  the  quiet  and  peace- 
able possession,  and  malicious  prosecution 


aud  conspiracy  in  support  of  such  conduct. 
The  equitable  counter-claim  sought  tt>  bo 
interposed  is  to  establisii  the  title  of  Tor- 
risou  to  the  locus  in  quo  under  a  tax  (k-cd 
and  asubse(iuent  conveyance  aud  the  stat- 
utes of  limitation,  mentioned  in  the  fore- 
going statement,  and  tcj  have  the  jdaiiitiff'a 
as.sertion  of  title  adjudged  to  be  unfonnded. 
It  is  very  obvious  that  such  equitable 
counter-claim  did  not  arise  out  of  the 
transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint  as 
the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim.  On 
the  contrary,  it  arose  entirely  independent 
and  outside  of  that  transaction,  and  the 
trespasses  of  the  defendants  alleged  are 
sought  to  be  justified  by  virtue  of  it.  Nor 
is  it  legully  '  connected  with  the  subject  of 
the  action  '  set  forth  in  tlie  complaint.  It 
did  not  arise  out  of  the  torts  or  trespasses 
alleged  in  the  complaint,  nor  is  it  legally 
counected  with  such  torts  or  trespasses. 
'  The  subject  of  the  action '  is  not  the 
land,  nor  the  title  to  the  land,  but  the 
torts  alleged.  Bazeraore  v.  Bridgers,  105 
N.  C.  191,  10  S.  E.  888.  The  peaceable 
possession  of  the  plaintiff  was  suflScient 
without  actual  title  to  support  trespass  vi 
et  armis  [citing  many  Wisconsin  cases]. 
Besides,  malicious  prosecution  might  be 
maintained  without  such  pos.session.  '  A 
counter-cliiim  must  be  a  claim  which,  if 
established,  will  defeat,  or  in  some  wny 
qualify,  the  judgment  to  which  plaintiff 
is  otherwise  entitled  '  [citing  Wiscon.--in 
cases].  This  court  has  held  that,  where 
the  complaint  stated  'a  cause  of  action  in 
trespass  quare  clausum,  with  allegations 
of  the  injury,  destruction,  and  carrying 
away  of  personal  property  in  aggravation 
of  damages,'  the  defendant  could  not  inter- 
pose an  'equit.-ible  counter-claim,  as  owner 
in  common  with  the  plaintiff  of  the  personal 
property  injured  or  taken,  to  have  t!ie 
plaintiff  account  for  the  use  of  defendant's 
share  of  the  property,  and  to  have  the 
property  sold,  and  the  proceeds  divided 
between  the  parties,  such  a  claim  not 
arising  out  of  the  trespass  complained  of, 
nor  being  counected  with  the  subject  of 
the  action.' "] 


57 


898  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

conversion,  and  the  like,  the  ability  of  the  defendant  to  plead  a 
counter-claim  depends  upon  the  kind  of  action  selected ;  in  other 
words,  the  propriety  of  the  counter-claim  does  not  depend  upon 
the  actual  facts  out  of  which  the  plaintiff's  remedial  rights  arise, 
but  upon  the  mere  nature  of  the  remedy  which  he  elects  to  en- 
force, and  of  the  means  which  he  employs  for  such  enforcement. 
The  result  would  be,  that  by  changing  the  kind  of  action  the 
plaintiff  may  cut  off  a  counter-claim  otherwise  admissible.  In  my 
opinion,  it  was  not  the  intention  of  the  legislature,  in  adopting 
the  reformed  procedure,  that  the  essential  rights  of  defendants 
should  be  made  to  rest  in  this  manner  upon  the  form  of  remedy 
chosen  by  the  plaintiffs. 

§  647.  *  771.  Cases  in  Indiana  and  Kentucky.  Discussion  of 
the  Meaning  of  the  Phrases  "  Arising  out  of,"  "  Connected  w^ith,"  and 
"  Transaction  "  in  these  Cases.  In  a  case  already  quoted  under  a 
former  head,  an  action  brought  to  set  aside  a  deed  of  lauds  on 
account  of  the  defendant's  fraud,  to  which  a  counter-claim  was 
pleaded  denying  the  fraud,  alleging  the  validity  of  the  convey- 
ance, the  plaintiff's  continued  possession  of  the  land  and  pernancy 
of  the  rents  and  profits,  and  praying  a  judgment  awarding  pos- 
session, quieting  title,  and  giving  damages,  the  Supreme  Ccjurt  of 
Indiana  sustained  the  answer,  and  granted  the  relief  demanded 
by  the  defendant.^  The  same  court  has  discussed  the  legal  mean- 
ing of  the  phrases  "arising  out  of"  and  "connected  with,"  and 
has  arrived  at  one  general  principle,  at  least,  which  may  aid  in 

1  Woodruff  V.  Garner,  27  Ind.  4,  per  the   plaintiff    directly,   and    is    therefore 

Frazer  J.:  "The   plaintiff's  cause  of  ac-  authorized  by  the  statute."     'riie"traus- 

tion  is  the  alleged  fraud  of  the  defendant  action  "  set  forth   in    the  complaint  was 

in  procuring  the  deed  .sought   to  be  re-  not  simply  the  alleged  fraud  :  it  was  the 

scinded.     The  defendant's  cause  of  action  entire  business  or  matter  i)f   agreeing  to 

averred   in    the    counter-claim    does    not  sell  and  ])urchase  tlie  laud,  and  of  exe- 

arise  out  of  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  cuting  and  delivering  the  deed  in   pursu- 

for  it  cannot  even  exist  consistently  with  ance   of   such   agreement.     The    jilaintiff 

it.     If   tlie  fraud  alleged  by  the  plaintiff  averred  that  the  defendant  was  guilty  of 

was  perpetrated,  then  tlie  defendant  can-  fraud ;    and  such  fraud   wa.s  therefore   a 

not   have  any  riglit  of   action  whatever,  jjcirt  of  the  transaction,  according  to  the 

So  the   defendant   found  it  necessary  to  plaintiff's  version.     The  defendant's  cause 

deny  the  fraud.     Hut  the  deed  sought  to  of  action  arose  out  of  tlie  s.inio  transac- 

be  set  aside  constitutes  part  of  the  trans-  tion,  —  in  fact  it  »'a.<!  the  entire  tran.saction, 

action  upon  which  the  plaintiff   and  the  except  the  element  of  fraud,  which  he  as- 

defendant  both  rely  for  a  recovery.     It  is  serted  did  not  exist.     No  plainer  illustra- 

the  link  which  forms  the   direct  connec-  tion  of  a  cause  of  action  arising  out  of 

tion  between  the    two  diverse  causes   of  th<'  transaction  wliich  was  also  tiie  foun- 

actiou.   So  the  counter-claim  for  possession  d.iiion  of  the   plaintiff's   claim  could   be 

is  connected  with  the  cause  of  actiou  of  imagined. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  899 

determining  their  application  to  all  particular  cases.  The  action 
was  to  recover  money  deposited  with  the  defendant  who  had  re- 
fused to  deliver  it  when  demanded.  The  defendant  pleaded  by 
way  of  counter-claim  that  the  plaintiff  liad  falsely  charged  him 
with  stealing  the  money  deposited,  and  had  slandered  him  by 
uttering  such  charge  in  the  presence  of  others,  and  prayed  judg- 
ment for  damages.  In  sustaining  a  demurrer  to  this  answer  the 
court  suggested  a  rule  of  construction  which  may  be  followed  in 
all  cases.^  The  High  Court  of  ApjDcals  in  Kentucky  has  con- 
strued the  phrases  "  arising  out  of  the  transaction  "  and  '-  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  action  "  in  a  very  liberal  and  broad 
manner.  An  action  was  brought  on  an  injunction  bond  given  by 
T.  and  sureties.  The  plaintiff  had  originally  commenced  proceed- 
ings to  obtain  possession  of  a  farm  in  the  occupancy  of  T.  T. 
had  thereupon  brought  an  equitable  suit  to  restrain  these  proceed- 
ings, had  obtained  a  preliminary  injunction,  and  had  given  the 
bond  in  question.  The  suit  being  dismissed,  this  action  was 
brought  on  the  bond,  the  plaintiff  therein  claiming  damages  for 
being  kept  out  of  possession  of  the  farm  by  means  of  the  injunc- 
tion during  the  continuance  of  the  suit.  The  defendant  T. 
pleaded  a  counter-claim,  alleging  that  notwithstanding  the  injunc- 
tion, and  before  it  was  dissolved,  the  plaintiff —  the  defendant  in 
the  injunction  suit  —  wrongfully  took  possession  of  the  land  and 
seized  the  crops  thereon,  and  converted  the  same  to  his  own  use, 
and  demanding  judgment  for  the  damages  thus  caused.  At  the 
trial  the  defendant  had  a  verdict  which  was  sustained  on  appeal.^ 

1  Conner  r.  Winton,  7  Ind.  523.     "  The  have  had  some  connection  with,  the  origi- 

question   is,  What   is    tlie  legal  effect  of  nal  transaction  in  the  view  of  the  parties, 

the  words  'arising  out  of  or  'connected  and  which,  at  the  time  the  contract  was 

Avith '  ?     Do  they  refer  to  those  matters  made,  they  could    have   intended   miglit, 

which  have  an  immediate  connection  with  in   some   event,  give   one  part\'  a   claim 

the  transaction  ?  or  do  they  include  also  against  the  other  for  compliance  or  non- 

tliose  whicli  have  a  remote  relation  with  compliance  witli  its  provisions.     We  refer 

it  hy  a  chain  of  circumstances  which  were  in  this  connection,  of   course,  to  actions 

not  had  ia  view  at  its  inception?      Sup-  ex  contractu  only.     About  actions  for  tort 

pose  C.  [the  defendant]  liad    beaten  W.  it    is   not  necessary  to   say   anything   at 

[the  plaintiff]  for   uttering   the   slander,  present." 

could  W.  have  replied  the  damages  oc-  ^  Tinsley  v.  Tinsley,  15  R.  Mon.  454, 
casioned  by  the  battery  to  those  resulting  459,  per  Marshall  J.  "  It  is  not  required 
from  the  slander  ?  and  couli  the  parties  that  the  counter-claim  itself  shall  be 
have  settled  all  their  quarrels  in  the  ac-  founded  in  contract,  or  arise  out  of  the 
tion  to  recover  the  money  ?  We  do  not  contract  set  forth  in  the  petition  ;  but  it  is 
think  that  the  statute  contemplates  any  sutticient  that  it  arise  out  of  the  trans- 
such  practice.  A  counter-claim  is  that  action  set  forth  in  the  petition,  or  be  con- 
which  might  have  arisen  out  of,  or  could  nected  with  the  subject  of  the  action.     As 


9U0  CIVIL    KE.MEDIES. 

§  648.  *  772.  Cannot  defeat  Counter-Claim  by  Choice  of  Form  of 
Action.  Thompson  v.  Kessel.  The  New  York  Court  of  Appeals 
has  passed  upon  the  question,  How  far  the  form  of  the  action 
chosen  by  the  plaintiff,  when  he  has  an  election  to  sue  for  a  tort 
or  on  a  contract,  can  affect  the  defendant's  right  to  interpose  a 
counter-claim,  and  has  declared  that  it  can  produce  no  effect ;  if 
the  defendant  would  have  been  able  to  plead  a  counter-claim  to  a 
cause  of  action  upon  an  implied  promise,  growing  out  of  a  certain 
state  of  facts,  the  plaintiff  cannot,  by  adopting  an  action  in  form 
for  a  tort  under  the  same  circumstances,  cut  off"  or  abridge  this 
substantial  privilege ;  the  chief  design  of  the  new  procedure  was 
to  suboixlinate  form  to  substance  and  not  substance  to  form.  An 
action  was  brought  to  compel  the  delivery  of  certain  bills  of  lad- 
mg,  the  plaintiffs  alleging  that  the  shipment  was  on  their  account, 
and  that  the  goods  and  the  bills  of  lading  thereof  belonged  to 
themselves,  and  were  wrongfully  detained  by  the  defendants. 
The  answer  put  these  averments  in  issue,  and  also  set  up  by  way 
of  counter-claim  that,  since  the  commencement  of  the  action,  the 
plaintiffs  had  wrongfully  taken  possession  of  the  goods,  and  had 
converted  the  same  to  their  own  use,  and  prayed  judgment  for 
the  value  thereof.  The  court  pronounced  the  defendants'  demand 
to  be  a  cause  of  action  plainly  arising  out  of  the  transaction  set 
forth  in  the  complaint,  or  at  least  connected  with  the  subject  of 
tlie  action,  being,  as  it  was,  for  the  value  of  the  very  goods  which 
the  plaintiffs  sought  to  reach,  and  added  the  following:  "  I  do 
not  think  it  lies  with  the  plaintiffs  to  allege  that  their  taking  was 
a  mere  tort  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  the  counter-claim.  And, 
even  if  an  action  sounding  in  tort  might  be  maintained  by  the 
defendants  for  the  taking,  I  am  still  of  opinion  that  the  cause  of 
action  for  the  value  of  the  goods  would  constitute  a  good  counter- 
claim in  such  a  case  as  this."  ^ 

tlie  petition  states  the  occupation  of  tlie  constitute  the  ground  of  a  counter-claim." 

laud  by  Mrs.  T.  [tlie   present   defendant  In    Wadley   v.  Davis,    63    Barb.  500,  the 

and  the  plaintiff  in  the  equity  suit]  during  same    principle    was   approved    and    fol- 

the  j)eudeucy  of  the  injunction,  and  claims  lowed  ;   and   a  demand  arising  from   tort 

damages  therefor,  any  interference  by  the  to  property  was  held   to  be  a  proper  coun- 

plaintiff  which  rendered  such  occupation  terciaini  in  an  action  on  contract, 
less  profitable  or  less  valuable  to  the  oc-  *  Tliomjjson   i*.  Kessel,  ."JO   N.  Y.  .383, 

cuj)aut  constituted  a  cause  of  action  aris-  389,  per  Johnson  J.     The  same  doctrine 

ing  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the  has  been  recently  approved  and  cnforce<I, 

petition,  and   is  connected  with  the  plain-  after  an  exhaustive    examination   of  tlie 

tiff's    cause    of   action  ;     and   although   it  authorities,  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Mi.s- 

amuunt  to  a  tresp-xsa  or  otiier  tort,  it  ni.iy  sonri,    in    (Jordon  r.  I>rniier,  49  Mo.  ."iTO, 


COUNTEK-CLALM.  901 

§  649.  *  773.  Xenia  Branch  Bank  v.  Lee.  I  sliall  end  this  par- 
ticular branch  of  the  subject  by  quoting  from  a  very  able  and 
instructive  decision  made  b}^  the  Superior  Court  of  New  York 
City,  in  which  the  statutory  definition  was  fully  analyzed  as  to  all 
its  parts,  and  an  attempt  was  made  to  reach  the  basis  of  a  true 
interpretation.  The  action  was  brought  to  recover  damages  for 
the  wrongful  conversion  of  certain  bills  of  exchange.  The  plain- 
tiffs had  been  the  owners  of  the  bills,  which  were  drawzi  by 
divers  persons  on  different  payees ;  they  indorsed  the  same  and 
delivered  them  to  the  Ohio  Life  Insurance  and  Trust  Company, 
for  the  purpose  of  collection  only  ;  this  company  transferred  them 
to  the  defendants,  who  now  retain  them;  it  was  alleged  that  the 
defendants  took  the  bills  with  notice  of  all  these  facts,  and  were 
not  holders  in  good  faith  for  value.  The  complaint  stated  a  de- 
mand and  refusal,  an  unlawful  detention  and  conversion,  and 
demanded  judgment  for  the  value  of  the  securities  as  damages ; 
it  was  strictly  for  an  alleged  tort.  The  answer  was  pleaded  as  a 
counter-claim.  It  set  up  the  drawing  of  the  bills,  their  indorsement 
by  the  plaintiffs,  their  delivery  to  the  Ohio  Trust  Company,  their 
transfer  to  the  defendants  for  full  value  and  without  notice,  de- 
mand of  payment,  nonpayment  and  notice  thereof  to  the  plaintiffs, 
and  prayed  judgment  against  the  plaintiffs  as  indorsers  for  the 
amount  due  on  the  drafts.  In  other  words,  it  was  like  an  ordinary 
complaint  in  an  action  by  the  indorsees  against  the  indorsers  to 

571,  per  Bliss  J.,  supra,  §  *  569  ii.  And  see  the  petition  are,  tliat  the  defendants  came 
Brady  v.  Brennan,  25  Minn.  210;  Kitchie  into  the  possession  of  certain  sacks  of  the 
(-.  Ilayward,  71  Mo.  560;  Kamerick  v.  plaintiff,  and  wrongfully  converted  them 
Castlenian,  23  Mo.  App.  4S1.  Kitchie  y.  to  their  own  use.  The  details  of  the  traus- 
Ilayward  was  an  action  for  the  wrongful  action,  the  evidential  facts,  arc  not  stated, 
conversion  of  certain  sacks.  The  defend-  but  the  ultimate  facts  only,  those  which 
ant  answered  that  the  plaintiff  had  con-  will  entitle  the  plaintiff  to  relief,  when 
tracted  with  him  for  the  sale  and  delivery  established  by  other  facts  at  the  trial.  .  .  . 
of  a  quantity  of  potatoes  of  a  given  quality.  It  (the  transaction)  must  be  held  to  in- 
to be  delivered  in  sacks ;  that  plaintiffs  elude  all  the  facts  and  circumstances  out 
sent  him  potatoes  in  the  sacks  in  contro-  of  which  the  injury  comj)lained  of  by  him 
versy,  but  the  potatoes  were  of  an  inferior  arose,  and  if  these  facts  and  circmnstauces 
quality,  and  asked  damages,  by  way  of  also  furnished  to  the  defendant  a  ground 
counter-claim,  for  the  breach  of  contract,  of  action  against  the  jtlaintiff,  the  defend- 
The  court,  through  Hough  J.,  said:  "  If  ant  will  be  entitled  to  jjresent  such  cause 
the  facts  stated  by  the  defendant  be  true,  of  action  as  a  counter-claim,  showing 
he  certainly  has  a  cause  of  action  against  b\'  proper  averments  that  it  is  a  part  of 
the  plaintiff.  It  is  not,  however,  a  cause  the  same  transaction  which  is  made  the 
of  action  arising  out  of  any  contract  set  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim.  In  this 
forth  in  the  petition,  for  no  contract  is  view  of  the  case,  it  is  immaterial  what  form 
therein  set  forth.     The  facts  set  forth  in  of  action  is  adopted  by  the  plaintiff." 


902 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


recover  the  sum  due  on  a  bill  or  note.  A  motion  to  strike  out 
this  counter-claim  was  denied  at  the  special  term,  and  the  plain- 
tiffs appealed  to  the  general  term,  which,  after  stating  the  facts 
and  the  questions  presented  by  the  record,  and  reciting  the  two 
subdivisions  of  §  150  of  the  New  York  Code,  pronounced  the 
opinion  found  in  the  note.^ 


1  Xenia  Branch  Bank  v.  Lee,  7  Abb. 
Pr.  372,  389,  per  Woodruff  J.:  "This 
division  of  tlie  section  shows  that  there 
may  be  a  counter-claim  when  the  action 
itself  does  not  arise  on  contract ;  for  the 
second  clause  is  expressly  confined  to 
actions  arising  on  contract,  and  allows 
counter-claims  in  such  cases  of  any  other 
causes  of  action  also  arising  on  coutracc; 
and  this  may  embrace,  probably,  all  cases 
heretofore  denominated  '  set-off,'  legal 
or  eiiuitalde,  and  any  other  legal  or  equi- 
table demand  liquidated  or  unliquidated, 
whether  within  the  proper  definition  of 
set-off  or  not,  if  it  arise  on  contract.  Glea- 
soa  V.  Moen,  2  Duer,  642.  The  first  sub- 
division would  therefore  be  unmeaning 
as  a  separate  definition,  if  it  neither  con- 
templated cases  in  which  the  action  was 
not  brought  on  the  contract  itself  in  the 
sense  in  which  these  words  are  ordinarily 
used,  nor  counter-claims  which  did  not 
theni-selves  arise  on  contract.  The  first 
subdivision,  by  its  terms,  assumes  that  the 
plaintiffs'  complaint  may  set  forth,  as  the 
foundation  of  the  action,  a  '  contract '  or 
a  '  transaction.'  The  legi.slature,  in  using 
both  words,  must  be  assumed  to  liave 
designed  that  each  siiould  have  a  mean- 
ing ;  and,  in  our  judgment,  their  construc- 
tion should  be  according  to  the  natural  and 
ordinary  signification  ofthe  terms.  In  this 
sease,  every  contract  may  be  said  to  be  a 
transaction;  but  every  transaction  is  not 
a  contract.  Again,  the  second  subdivision 
having  provided  Jor  all  counter-claims 
arising  on  contract,  and  all  actions  arising 
on  contract,  no  cases  can  be  supposed  to 
which  the  first  subdivision  can  be  applied, 
unless  it  be  one  of  three  classes ;  viz., 
1st.  In  actions  in  which  a  contract  is 
stated  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiffs' 
claim,  couuter-<lairas  which  arise  out  of 
the  same  contract;  or,  2d.  In  actions  in 
wliich  some  transaction,  not  being  a  con- 
tract, is  set  fortli  as  the  foundation  of  the 
plaintiffs'     claim,    counter-claims    which 


arise  out  of  the  same  transaction ;  or, 
3d.  In  actions  in  which  either  a  contract, 
or  a  transaction  which  is  not  a  contract, 
is  set  forth  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaiu- 
tiffs'  claim,  counter-claims  which  neither 
arise  out  of  the  same  contract  nor  out  of 
tlie  same  transaction,  but  which  are  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  action." 
After  some  discussion  upon  the  difference 
between  the  provision  in  the  first  subdi- 
vision and  that  in  the  second  subdivision 
in  reference  to  actions  and  couuter-claims 
based  upon  contract,  in  whicli  he  points 
out  tliat,  in  tlie  former,  the  language  is 
"contract  wiiich  is  XA\g  foundation  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim,"  and,  iu  the  latter,  "  ac- 
tions arising  on  contract,"  and  that  this 
language  appropriately  applies,  in  the 
first  subdivision  to  certain  classes  of  ac- 
tions in  wliich  a  contract  is  the  foundation 
of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  although  tlie  action 
does  not  strictly  arise  on  the  contract,  and, 
in  the  second  subdivision,  to  all  those 
actions  which  are  strictly  brought  on  the 
contract,  —  the  learned  judge  proceeds 
witli  the  main  subject :  "  But,  secondly', 
the  subdivision  authorizes  in  actions  in 
which  a  transaction,  not  being  a  contract, 
is  set  forth  as  the  foundation  of  the  plain- 
tiff's claim,  counter-claims  which  arise  out 
ofthe  same  transaction.  This,  we  think, 
includes  tlie  case  before  u.s:.  The  '  trans- 
action '  here  in  question  may  either  in- 
clude the  history  of  the  bills,  so  far  as  the 
title  of  the  plaintiffs  or  defendants  de- 
pends upon  tiiat  history;  or  tlie  'trans- 
action '  may,  ])erhaps,  be  confined  to  the 
manner  and  circumstances  of  the  transfer 
to  the  defenilants."  The  opinion  recapit- 
ulates the  facts  of  the  case,  and  shows 
that,  giving  to  the  term  "  transaction  "  the 
first  of  the.se  two  meanings,  the  defend- 
ants' cause  of  action  arose  out  of  it,  and 
adds  a  very  important  suggestion  which 
iiad  been  overlooked  in  some  of  the  de- 
cisions lieretofoie  cited :  "  Some  facts 
enter    into  the   plaintiffs'  case   which   do 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  903 

§  650.  *  774.  Meaning  of  Term  "  Transaction."  Differences  of 
Opinion  as  to  the  Import  of  Statutory  Terms.  While  the  foregoing 
decisions  do  not  furnish  any  general  formulas  for  determining  in 
all  cases  what  is  the  "  transaction  "  set  forth  in  tlie  plaintiff's  peti- 
tion or  complaint,  or  what  is  the  "  subject  of  the  action,"  or  when 
the  defendant's  cause  of  action  "  arises  out  of  the  transaction  set 
forth  in  the  complaint,"  or  when  it  is  "  connected  with  the  subject 
of  the  action,"  they  do  throw  some  light  upon  the  true  intent  of 
the  legislature  in  using  these  phrases,  and  they  settle  some  prin- 
ciples which,  when  properly  applied,  may  assist  in  constructing 
the  universal  rules  so  much  needed  by  the  profession  and  the 
bench.  It  is  very  evident  that  there  has  existed  in  the  minds  of 
judges  a  radical  difference  of  opinion  in  respect  to  the  import  of 
the  controlling  terms  of  the  statutory  definition,  and  especially  in 
respect  to  the  word  "  transaction."  One  school  would  narrow  its 
meaning  so  as  to  deprive  it  of  all  separate  significance  in  the 
clause  where  it  is  found.  They  would  make  it  either  synony- 
mous with  "  contract,"  or  would  regard  it  as  being  merely  the 
very  cause  of  action  which  the  plaintiff  has  alleged  in  his  plead- 
ing as  the  ground  of  recovery.^  The  other  school  give  to  the 
word  a  broader  and  more  comprehensive  meaning.^  Ex  vi  termini 
it  imports  something  different  from  "  contract,"  and  is  to  be  taken 
in  its   ordinary  and  popular  sense.     It  is  more  extensive  than 

not  enter  into  the  defendants'  case,  and  ruff  reaches  the  conclusion  that,  even  if 

vice  versa.     But,  from  the  'nature  of  the  the  defendants'  cause  of  action  does  not 

sul)ject,  this  must  alivai/s  he  so.     The  legis-  arise  out  of  the  "  transaction  "  set  forth 

lature  were  not  so  absurd  as  to  mean  that  in   the  complaint,  it  "is  directly  and   im- 

the  defendant  might  counter-claim  when  mediately  cotiuected  with  the  subject  of 

the  very  facts  alleged  by  him,  with  all  the  action.    The  subject  of  the  action  is 

tlieir  particulars,  were  identical  with  those  either  the  right  to  the  possession  of   the 

alleged    by  the  plaintiff.  .  .  .  So,  if   the  bills  of  exchange,  or  it  is  the  bills  them- 

transaction  set  fortli  as  the  foundation  of  selves.     The  defendants'  counter-claim  is 

the  plaintiffs' claim  be  regarded  as  more  not  only  connected  with,  but  is  inseparable 

narrow,  and  as  being  the  transfer  of  the  from,  either  or  both.     The  object  of  the  ac- 

bills  by  the  Ohio  Trust  Company  to  the  tion  is </a wages;  but  the  S!(/)/ec^  is  the  lulls  of 

defendants,  then,  as  before,  the   defend-  exchange,  or  the  right  to  their  possession." 

ants'  counter-claim  arises  out  of  the  same  i  See,    for    example,     Mulberger      r. 

transaction  ;    to   wit,  the  transfer.      The  Koenig,  62  Wis.  558. 

circumstances  that   the  defendants    have  2  [^Stolze  r.  Torrison   (1903).  118   Wis. 

to  superadd  an  allegation  of  demand,  pro-  315,  95  N.  W.  114;  Blue  v.  Capital  Nat. 

test,  and  notice  to  the  plaintiffs  as  indor-  Bank  (1896),  145  Ind.  518,  43  N.  E.  655  ; 

sers,  does  not  alter  the  ca.se.     This  added  Watts  v.  Ganct  (1894),  42  Neb.  869,  61 

fact  is  only  a  means  of  showing  ^ow  the  N.  W.  104;    Gilbert  v.  Loberg  (1894),  86 

defendants'  cause  of  action  arises  out  of  Wis.  661,  57  N.  W.  982;  Story  &  Isliam 

the  transaction  relied  upon,  and   is  made  Co.  i'.  Story  (189.3),  100  Cal.  30,  34  Pac. 

complete."     Finally,  Mr.   Justice   Wood-  671,  quoting  the  text.] 


904  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

"  cause  of  action  *'  or  "  subject  of  the  action ;  "  for  out  of  it  the 
defendant's  "  cause  of  action  "  is  said  to  "  arise,"  and  it  is  also  to 
be  set  forth  in  the  com^jlaint  or  petition,  not  as  the  "  cause  of 
action,"  but  as  the  ''  foundation  "  of  the  plaintiff's  claim.  It  must, 
therefore,  be  something  —  that  comhinatiun  of  acts  and  events,  cir- 
cumstances and  defaults  —  ivhich,  viewed  in  one  aspect,  results  in  the 
plaintiff's  right  of  action  and,  viewed  in  another  aspect,  results  in  the 
defendant" s  right  of  action.  As  these  two  opposing  rights  cannot 
be  exactly  the  same,  it  follows  that  there  may  be,  and  generally 
must  be,  acts,  facts,  events,  and  defaults  in  the  transaction  as  a 
whole,  which  do  not  enter  into  each  cause  of  action,  but  are  con- 
fined to  one  of  them  alone. ^ 

§  651.  *  775.  Meaning  of  "  Subject  of  Action."  No  Agreement 
in  Judicial  Opinions.  Construction  Proposed  by  Author.  In  re- 
gard to  what  constitutes  the  "  subject  of  the  action,"  there  is 
no  agreement  whatever  in  the  judicial  opinions.  Some  of  them 
have  treated  it  as  identical  with  the  "  cause  of  action,"  which  is 
plainly  incorrect.  As  I  have  already  shown,  the  "  cause  of  action  " 
consists  in,  1st,  the  primary  light,  and  the  facts  from  which  it 
flows ;  and,  2d,  the  breach  of  that  right,  and  the  facts  consti- 
tuting such  breach.  These  taken  together  create  a  remedial 
right,  and  are  the  cause  of  action.  The  remedy  itself  is  cer- 
tainly the  "  object  "  of  the  action.  The  "  subject  "  is  certainly 
not  the  cause  of  action  ;  but  when  we  have  reached  this  conclu- 
sion we  find  very  little  judicial  aid  in  arriving  at  any  other  and 
more  affirmative  one.  Some  judges  have  said  that  in  all  posses- 
sory actions,  and  all  actions  to  establish  property,  the  "  subject  of 
the  action  "  denotes  the  things  to  assert  a  right  over  which,  or  to 
obtain  the  possession  of  which,  the  action  is  brought,  as  the  land 
in  ejectment  and  in  many  equity  suits,  or  the  chattels  in  replevin. 
Some  have  said  that  the  "  subject "  denotes  the  same  in  other 
classes  of  actions,  not  brought  to  recover  possession  or  expressly 

^  Tlie  reader  should  consult  the  analy-  repeat  in  the  text  the  former  full  discus- 
sis  of  cases,  and  the  discussion  in  relation  sion ;  hut  it  is  plain  that  the  decisions 
to  the  same  word  given  iu  a  former  chaj)-  there  cited,  and  tiie  results  there  reached, 
ter  (Chap.  III.,  Sec.  2).  The  language  ai>ply  \vith  equal  force  to  the  questions 
of  the  clause  there  under  examination  is  now  under  consideration.  There  is  an 
almost  identical  with  that  of  the  present  evident  connection  between  the  subject 
pa.'jsage  ;  and  the  same  meaning  must,  of  of  uniting  causes  of  action  in  one  coin- 
course,  be  attributed  to  the  words  "  trans-  plaint,  and  the  uniting  them  in  one  con- 
action  "  and  "subject  of  the  action"  in  troversy,  although  tlicy  are  set  forth  in 
both  sections   of   the   statute.     I  do   not  the  adverse  pleadings. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  905 

to  establish  title,  but  in  which,  nevertheless,  the  plaintiff's  right 
to  recover  is  based  upon  his  property  in  a  specific  thing,  as  for 
the  conversion  of  chattels,  or  for  trespass  to  lands  or  chattels ; 
while  some  have  applied  the  same  principle  to  actions  not  based 
upon  any  alleged  propertij  of  the  plaintiff  in  a  specific  thing,  and 
have  gone  to  the  extent  of  holding  that,  in  actions  upon  contract 
to  recover  the  debt  due  or  damages  for  the  non-performance 
thereof,  the  "subject"  is  the  very  contract  itself,  —  the  instru- 
ment in  suit,  as,  for  example,  in  an  action  upon  a  bill  or  note,  the 
"  subject,"  according  to  this  view,  would  be  the  bill  or  note  sued 
upon.  Other  judges  have  said  that  the  "  subject "  is  the  right 
which  is  sought  to  be  enforced  in  the  action  ;  meaning  thereby 
the  'primary  right,  which  has  been  infringed  upon  as  distinguished 
from  the  remedial  right,  and  from  the  delict  and  the  remedy. 
Thus  in  the  case  last  quoted,  which  was  an  action  for  the  con- 
version of  bills,  Mr.  Justice  Woodruff  declared  that  the  subject 
was  either  the  bills  themselves,  or  the  plaintiff's  original  right  to 
their  possession.  It  would,  as  it  seems  to  me,  be  correct  to  say 
in  all  cases,  legal  or  equitable,  that  the  "  subject  of  the  action  "  is 
the  plaintiff's  main  primary  right,  which  has  been  broken,  and  by 
means  of  whose  breach  a  remedial  right  arises.  Thus,  the  right 
of  property  and  possession  in  ejectment  and  replevin,  the  right  of 
possession  in  trover  or  trespass,  the  right  to  the  money  in  all  cases 
of  debt,  and  the  like,  would  be  the  "  subject "  of  the  respective 
actions.  Although  in  a  certain  sense,  and  in  some  classes  of 
suits,  the  things  themselves,  the  land  or  chattels,  may  be  regarded 
as  the  "  subject,"  and  are  sometimes  spoken  of  as  such,  yet  this 
cannot  be  true  in  all  cases  ;  for  in  many  actions  there  is  no  such 
specific  thing  in  controversy  over  which  a  right  of  property  exists. 
The  primary  right,  however,  always  exists,  and  is  always  the 
very  central  element  of  the  controversy  around  which  all  the 
other  elements  are  grouped,  and  to  which  they  are  subordinate. 
In  possessory  and  proprietary  actions,  this  right,  which  will  then 
be  always  one  of  property  or  of  possession,  will  be  intimately 
associated  with  the  specific  thing  itself  which  is  the  object  of  tlie 
right ;  but  this  relation  is  not  and  cannot  be  universal.  It  seems, 
therefore,  more  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  actions  and  more 
in  harmony  with  the  language  of  the  statute  to  regard  the  "sub- 
ject of  the  action  "  as  denoting  the  plaintiff's  principal  primary 
right  to  enforce  or  maintain  which  the  action  is  brought,  than  to 


906  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

regard  it  as  denoting  the  specific  thing  in  regard  to  which  the 
legal  controversy  is  carried  on.'  In  this  manner  alone  can  we 
arrive  at  a  general  rule  applicable  to  all  possible  cases,  and  the 
rule  thus  reached  fully  satisfies  all  the  requirements  of  the  legis- 
lative language,  and  can  be  invoked  in  all  classes  of  actions. 
While  I  suggest  and  adopt  this  meaning  of  the  term  "  subject,"' 
I  freely  concede  that  no  decision,  so  far  as  I  have  discovered, 
pronounces  this  interpretation  to  be  the  only  one  admissible; 
many  cases  sanction  it,  none  directly  reject  it ;  but  none,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  gone  so  far  as  to  declare  in  its  favor  to  the  exclu- 
sion of  all  other  meanings.  The  construction  proposed,  as  it  has 
been  judicially  approved  in  many  instances,  would  remove  all 
doubt  and  conflict  of  opinion,  and  would  furnish  a  simple  and 
practical  rule  of  universal  application.^ 

§  652.  *  77(3.  The  Phrase  "  Connected  with."  Connection  must 
be  Immediate  and  Direct.  h\  respect  to  the  phrase  "  connected 
with"  the  subject  of  the  action,  one  rule  may  be  regarded  as  set- 
tled by  the  decisions,  and  it  is  recommended  by  its  good  sense, 
and  its  convenience  in  practice.  The  connection  must  be  im- 
mediate and  direct.  A  remote,  uncertain,  partial  connection  is 
not  enough  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of  the  statute.^  The  crite- 
rion proposed  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana  in  one  of  the  cases 
cited  is  as  certain  and  practical  as  the  nature  of  the  subject  admits, 
and  only  needs  to  be  known  to  be  universally  accepted.  It  is, 
that  the  connection  must  be  such  that  the  parties  could  be  sup- 
posed to  have  foreseen  and  contemplated  it  in  their  mutual  acts ; 
in  other  words,  that  the  parties  must  be  assumed  to  have  had  this 
connection  and  its  consequences  in  view  when  they  dealt  with  each 
other.  I  now  pass,  according  to  the  order  already  stated,  to  the 
three  branches  into  which  the  subject-matter  is  naturally  separated. 

I.  Cases  in  which  the  Cause  of  Action  alleged  as  a  Counter- Claim 
arises  out  of  the  Contract  Set  forth  in  the  Complaint  or  Peti- 
tion as  the  Foundation  of  the  Plaintiff's  Claim. 
<^  653.    *  777.    First  and  Second  Subdivisions   of  Statute   overlap 

to  a  Certain  Extent.     Mr.  Justice  Woodruff,   in   tlie  opinion  last 

1  Sharp  V.  Kin.<iman.  18  S.  C.  108.  Gl  N.  \V.  104  ;  Ilav.s  ,:  McLain  (1899)  66 

CvStolzc  V.  TorrLson  (190.-}),  118  Wi.s.  Ark.400,508.  W.  1006;  Gurske  ?;.  Kelpiu 

.31.,    9.5  N.   W.   114.:  (1901),61  Xob.517.85X.\V.557;  Walscrr. 

•    LWatts  «•.  Gaiitt  (1894),  42  Neb.  869,  Wear  (1807),  141  .Mo.  443,  42  S.  W.  928.] 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  907 

quoted,  declares  that  the  second  subdivision  of  the  definition  was 
intended  to  embrace  all  cases  in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action  arises  on  contract,  and  the  defendant's  counter-claim  also 
arises  on  contract,  either  the  same  or  another,  and  that  the  clause 
of  the  first  subdivision  above  mentioned  was  designed  to  include 
only  those  cases  in  which  the  contract  is  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff 
as  \he  foundation  of  his  action,  although  the  action  itself  is  not  07i 
the  contract.  This  is,  I  think,  attributing  too  much  nicety  and 
precision  of  thought  to  the  legislature,  and  assumes  that  it  would 
never  enact  any  duplicate  provisions.  The  first  subdivision  no 
doubt  covers  the  cases  mentioned  by  Judge  Woodruff,  but  it  also 
embraces  many  others.  Undoubtedly,  the  codifiers  and  the  legis- 
lature in  drawing  and  adopting  the  first  subdivision  had  in  mind 
the  doctrine  of  recoupment,  and  so  framed  the  language  that  it 
should  include  cases  of  recoupment  and  all  others,  legal  and  equi- 
table, analogous  to  it,  —  that  is,  all  cases  in  which  the  right  of 
action  of  the  plaintiff  and  that  of  the  defendant  arise  from  the 
same  contract.  It  desc^'ibes,  therefore,  not  only  the  special  and 
infrequent  classes  of  instances  in  which  the  plaintiff's  claim  is 
not  technically  on  the  contract,  although  a  contract  is  set  forth  as 
its  foundation,  but  also  air  other  instances  in  which  the  plaintiff's 
action  is  strictly  brought  on  the  contract,  while  the  defendant's 
counter-claim  in  both  cases  arises  from  the  same  contract.  The 
central  idea  of  this  subdivision  then  is,  that  one  and  the  same 
contract  is  the  basis  of  both  parties'  demand  for  relief.^  Passing 
to  -the  second  subdivision,  the  central  thought  is  equally  plain, 
viz.,  that  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  and  that  of  the  defendant, 
spring  from  different  contracts  ;  in  other  words,  the  codifiers  and 
the  legislature  had  in  mind  the  familiar  case  of  set-off,  both  legal 
and  equitable.  But,  in  framing  the  clause,  tlie  language  was 
made  broader  than  was  necessary,  and  it  actually  covers  all  cases 
in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  on  contract,  and  the 
defendant's  counter-claim  is  also  on  contract  the  same  or  another. 
The  law-makers  have  thus  in  fact  given  us  two  provisions  author- 

1  QBrosnan  v.  Kramer  (1901),  135  Cal.  the  lessor  against  the  lessee  at  the  time  of 

.36,  66  Pac.  979  :  Where  a  lease  is  entered  the  foreclosure  sviit  is  not  a  claim  arising 

into  between  two  parties,  and  on  the  same  "  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the 

date  the  lessee  loans  money  to  the  lessor  complaint  as  the  foundation  of  the  ))lain- 

secured    by   a  mortgage   ou    the    leased  tiff's  claim  or  connected  with  the  subject 

premises,  and  an  action  of  foreclosure  is  of  the  action,"  whicli  is  barred  by  failure 

subsequently  brought  by  the  lessee,  a  de-  to  set  it  up.    Citing  the  text.    Richardson 

maud  for  unpaid  rent  existing  in  favor  of  v.  Penny  (1900),  10  Okla.  32,  61  Pac.  584.3 


908  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

izing  a  counter-claim  arising  from  the  same  contract  as  that  from 
which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  results,  but  only  one  author- 
izing a  counter-claim  springing  from  another  contract  than  the 
one  upon  Avhich  the  plaintiff's  demand  is  based.  The  same  case 
mav  therefore  be  often  referred  to  both  of  these  subdivisions ;  but 
I  shall,  following  what  seems  to  be  the  plain  design  of  the  statute, 
consider  under  the  first  all  those  instances  in  which  the  demands 
of  both  parties  arise  from  the  same  contract,  and  postpone  to  the 
second  all  those  in  which  each  demand  arises  from  a  separate 
contract.  That  this  is  the  correct  construction  of  the  whole  pro- 
vision is  made  certiiin,  when  we  turn  to  the  form  which  it  assumes 
in  all  the  codes  which  constitute  the  second  group  according  to. 
the  classification  stated  at  the  commencement  of  this  section.^ 

§  654.  *  778.  General  Proposition  Stated.  Illustrative  Examples. 
It  may  be  stated  as  a  general  proposition  that  in  all  actions  to 
recover  a  money  judgment,  debt  or  damages,  upon  a  contract,  or 
where  a  contract  is  set  forth  as  the  foundation  of  the  plaintiff's 
claim,  a  counter-claim  of  a  money  judgment  against  the  plaintiff 
for  his  breach  or  non-performance  of  any  stipulations  of  the  same 
agreement,  or  for  his  fraud  in  procuring  the  same  to  be  entered 
into,  is  admissible.  The  following  examples  will  illustrate  this 
proposition.-     In  an  action  for  rent  brought  by  the  lessor  or  by 

1  The  following  recent  decisions  give  Ohio  St.  550;  Hade  i\  McVay,  31  id.  2.31 ; 

examples    and    illustrations   of    counter-  Fraker  v.  Galium,  24  Kan.  679. 
claims  arising  out  of  the   contract,  etc.:  -  I^Mack  v.   Snell    (1893),    140   N.  Y. 

More  I.-.  Uand,  60  N.  Y.  208,  214  ;  Kin;,'  v.  193,  35   N.  E.  493  ;  Rood   v.  Taft    (1896), 

Knapp,  59  id.  460;  Boyd  v.  Schlesinger,  94    Wis.   380,    69  N.    W.   183;  Smith  v. 

59  id.  301,  305  (action  to  cancel  a  contract  Building  Ass'n  (1896),  119  N.  C.  257,  26 

for  the   sale  of    land    by  plaintiff  to  de-  S.  E.  401  ;  Kuhn  v.  Sol.  Heaveurich  Co. 

fendant,  as  a  cloud   upon  plaintiff's  title,  (1902),  115  Wis.  447,  91   N    W.  994. 
counter-claim  for  the  specific  performance  Where   lessees  enter  into   and   retain 

of  the   contract) ;    Howard    v.  Johnston,  possession  of  the  rented  premises  under  a 

82  id.  271  ;  Nat   Bk.  of  Auburn  v.  Lewis,  covenant  in  the   lea,«e  that  the  landlord 

81   id.   15;  Cook  v.  Jenkins,  79  id.  575;  will  make  improvements,  which  he  fails  to 

Levy  V.  Loeb,  85  id.  365  ;  Read  v.  Decker,  do,  the  le.>i.sees,   wiien   sued  for  the  rent, 

.^  Hun,  646;  Morgan  v.  Smith,  5  id.  220;  may  recoup  tlie  damages  resulting  from 

Elwell    r.  Skiddy,  8  id.    73;    Nichols    v.  such   breach  of  the  covenant,  or  set    up 

Townscnd,  7  id.  375  ;    Griffin    v.  Moore,  the  resulting  damages  as  a  counter-claim. 

52  Ind.  295;  Mc.Mahan  v.  Spinning,  51  iil.  Such  counter-claim  arises  out  of  the  con- 

187;  Hinkle    v.  Margeruni,   50    id.    240;  tract  sued  upon  as  the  foundation  of  the 

Black  V.  Elmer,  54  id.  544;  Morri.son  ;'.  landlord's  claim,   and    is  connected  with 

Kramer,  58  id.  38;  Howe  Machine  Co.  r.  tiie  subject  of  the  action:  I'ionecr  Press 

Reber,  66  id.  489  ;  Merrill  v.  Niirhtingalc,  Co.  r.   Ilutciiinsou   (1896),  63  Minn.  481, 

39  Wis.  247  ;  Bonnell  v.  Jacobs,  30  id.  59  ;  65  N.  \V.  938. 

Cr(iUir)ger  v.   Parze.   48  id.   229;  Caleb  c.  ^Latney  c.  Ferrill    (1897).  100  Ky.3Gl, 

Morgan,  83  N.  C.  21 1  ;  Craig  v.   Ileis,  30  38  S.  W. '4:14 :   Wiiere  a  wife,  tliroiigli  her 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  909 

the  grantee  of  the  reversion  against  the  lessee  or  an  assignee  of 
the  term,  where  the  lease  contains  a  covenant  to  repair  on  the 
part  of  the  landlord,  damages  sustained  by  the  defendant  from  a 
breach  of  this  covenant  may  be  alleged,  and  recovered  as  a  coun- 
ter-claim. The  damages  in  one  such  case,  where  the  demised 
premises  were  a  hotel,  were  held  to  be  the  sum  paid  by  the  defend- 
ant for  making  the  necessary  repairs,  together  with  the  amount 
of  loss  occasioned  by  the  inability  to  use  certain  rooms  in  the 
hotel  while  they  were  out  of  repair.^  In  an  action  by  the  buyer 
against  the  seller  to  recover  damages  for  the  non-delivery  of 
goods  bargained  and  sold,  the  latter  may  counter-claim  the  un- 
paid price  of  that  part  of  the  goods  already  delivered  under  the 
contract.^  When  sued  for  the  price  of  two  articles  sold  under 
one  agreement,  the  defendant  may  set  up  and  recover  damages 
resulting  from  the  fraudulent  representations  of  the  plaintiff  in 
respect  to  one  of  tliem,  even  though  such  damages  exceed  in 
amount  the  whole  price  agreed  to  be  paid  for  both.^  A  person 
having  sold  his  business  and  good-will  at  a  certain  price,  and  hav- 
ing covenanted  in  the  same  agreement  not  to  engage  therein  at 
the  same  place,  and  the  damages  for  a  breach  of  this  covenant 
having  been  liquidated  and  fixed  at  a  specified  sum,  in  an  action 
brought  by  the  vendee  to  recover  this  amount  of  liquidated  dam- 
husband  as  agent,  made  false  and  fraud-  51  Pac.  664  :  A  tenant  may  set  up  a  coun- 
ulent  representations  in  the  sale  of  a  tract  ter-claim  for  breach  of  the  implied  cov- 
of  land  with  reference  to  a  vein  of  coal  euant  for  quiet  enjoyment,  in  an  action 
thereon,  and  its  location,  thickness  and  brought  by  the  landlord  for  rent,  where 
quality,  which  induced  the  purchaser  to  the  landlord  has  disturbed  tbe  tenant  in 
buy  the  land,  and  the  wife  caused  such  his  possession.  See  also  Hunter  r.  Hatha- 
false  representations  to  be  made  and  knew  way  (1900),  108  Wis.  620,  84  N.  W.  996  ; 
they  were  untrue,  in  an  action  to  enforce  Illsly  y.  Grayson  (1898),  105  la.  685.75 
a  vendor's  lien  for  deferred  payments,  the  N.  W.  518;  Frederick  i'.  Daniels  (1902), 
defendant  may  set  off  the  damage  he  has  74  Conn.  710,  52  Atl.  414. J 
sustained  by  reason  of  such  false  repre-  ^  Leavenworth    v.   Packer,    52    Barb. 

sentations  against  the  purchase  price.  132,  136. 

Driver   v.   Salt  Lake  Gas  Co.   (1900),  ^  Rawley    v.  Woodruff,  2    Lans.  419, 

22  Utah,  143,  61  Pac.  733  :  The  suing  out  and  see  Hoffa  ?;.  Hoffman,  33  Ind.  172, 
and  serving  of  an  injunction  prohibiting  where  damages  from  fraud  were  counter- 
defendant  from  exercising  a  right  under  claimed  in  a  foreclosure  suit.  When,  in 
the  contract  sued  on  by  plaintiff,  is  a  an  action  on  a  contract,  the  defendant  set 
breach  of  the  contract  by  plaintiff  suffi-  up  a  counter-claim  of  damages  from  the 
cient  to  form  a  basis  for  a  counter-claim  plaintiff's  fraud,  he  cannot,  at  the  trial, 
by  defendant,  and  a  counter-claim  setting  rely  upon  a  mistake  in  making  the  agree- 
up  such  facts  states  a  cause  of  action.]  raent:  fraud    and    mistake    are    distinct 

1  Myers  v.  Burns,  35  N.  Y.  269;  Cook  grounds  of  recovery  or  defence  ;  an<[  proof 
V.  Soule,  56  N.  Y.  420;  1  N.  Y.  S.  C.  116  ;  of  one  cannot  be  given  when  the  otlier 
Benkard  r.  Babcock,  2  Robt.  175.  alone  is  pleaded  :  Dudley  v.  Scranton,  57 

I^Hanley  v.  Banks   (1897),  6  Okla  79,     N.  Y.  424,  427. 


910 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


ages  on  the  ground  that  the  vendor  had  violated  his  agreement, 
the  defendant  was  permitted  to  recover  the  unpaid  portion  of  the 
purchase  price  as  a  counter-claim.^ 

§  655.  *  779.  Examples  Continued.  It  is  settled  by  numerous 
decisions,  although  there  were  at  first  some  expressions  of  a  con- 
trary opinion,  that  in  an  action  to  recover  the  price  of  goods  sold 
and  delivered,  or  bargained  and  sold,  the  purchaser's  demand  of 
damages  for  the  plaintiff's  breach  of  his  warranty  of  the  quality  of 
the  goods  may  be  pleaded  as  a  counter-claim  ;  in  fact,  there  can  be 
no  simpler  and  plainer  illustration  of  a  counter-claim  arising  out  of 
the  very  contract  set  up  by  the  plaintiff  as  the  basis  of  his  recovery.^ 
When  the  plaintiff,  wlio  had  been  employed  as  a  superintendent 
of  the  defendants'  manufactory  under  a  written  agreement  stipu- 
lating for  his  services  in  that  capacity  at  a  specified  salary  for  a 
year,  brought  an  action  for  his  wages,  alleging  that  he  had  been 
wrongfully  chscharged,  a  counter-claim  of  damages  sustained  by 
the  defendants  in  their  business,  through  the  negligent  and  unskil- 
ful conduct  of  the  plaintiff  in  violation  of  the  provisions  of  the 
same  contract,  was  pleaded,  and  was  fully  upheld  by  the  court.^ 


1  Baker  v.  Connell,  1  Daly,  409 ;  and 
see  Ains worth  r.  Bowen,  9  Wis.  .348 ; 
Snow  V.  Holmes,  71  Cal.  142. 

2  Lemou  v.  Trull,  13  How.  Tr.  248; 
Warren  v.  Van  Pelt,  4  I-:.  D.  Smith,  202 ; 
Dounce  v.  Dow,  57  N.  Y.  16;  Love  v. 
Oldham,    22    Ind.    .51 ;    French    v.  Saile, 


damages  resulting  from  a  breach  of  war- 
ranty in  recoupment.  Haygood  r.  Boney 
(1894),  43  S.  C.  63,  20  S.  E.  803 :  Where 
suit  is  brought  to  recover  wages  for  ser- 
vices rendered  as  a  farm  hand,  the  de- 
fendant may  .set  up  as  a  counter-claim  the 
damages  he    has  sustained   by  reason  of 


Stanton's    Code    (Ky.),  96;  Morehead  v.     plaintiff's  careless  and  negligent  use  of  a 


Haisell,  id.  90  ;  Earle  v.  Bull,  15  Cal.  421 ; 
Hoffa  V.  Hoffman.  33  Ind.  1 72.  See  contra, 
Nichols  I'.  Bo(;rum,  6  Abb.  Pr.  290.  This 
case  has  been  expressly  overruled.  See 
also  Nichols  i:  Townsend,  7  Hun,  375, 
citing  Gurney  r.  Atlantic,  etc.  11.  Co.,  58 
N.  Y.  358;  Dounce  v.  Dow,  57  id.  16  : 
Day  V.  Pool,  52  id.  416;  and  see  Merrill 
V.  Nightingale,  39  Wis.  247;  Bonnell  r. 
Jacobs,  36  id.  59  ;  Giffert  r.  West,  33  id. 
617;  Schurmeier  v.  English,  46  Minn. 
306  ;  Rugland  c.  Thompson,  48  Minn.  .539  ; 
Mass.  Loan  &  T.  Co.  v.  Welch,  47  Minn. 
183  ;  Maders  v.  Lawrence,  49  Hun,  360. 

(^Heebner  i-.  Shepard  (1895),  5  N.  D. 
56,  63  N.  W.  892. 

Laney  r.  Ing.iUs  (1894),  5  S.  D.  183, 
58  N.  W.  572:  Where  an  action  is  brought 
on  a  promissory  note  given  for  the  pur- 
chase yjrice  of  a  warranted  article  of  nior- 
chaudise,   the    defendant   may   plead   the 


horse  while  working  under  said  contract.] 
3  Lancaster,  etc.  Man.  Co.  ?'.  Colgate, 
12  Ohio  St.  344;  Stoddard  v.  Treadwell, 
20  Cal.  294.  But  see  Barker  r.  Knicker- 
bocker Life  Ins.  Co.,  24  Wis.  6.30,  in  wiiich, 
under  exactly  similar  circumstances,  the 
defendant's  claim  that  the  contract  should 
be  cancelled  was  refused,  on  the  ground 
that  the  facts  made  out  a  jierfect  defence 
at  law;  but  no  counter-claim  of  damages 
was  pleaded.  It  is  the  rule  in  Wisconsin 
that,  in  general,  where  the  invalidity  of 
the  plaintiff's  claim  appears  in  an  action 
at  law,  tlie  court  will  not  interfere  upon 
a  counter-claim  to  set  it  aside  or  enjoin  it : 
S.  L.  Siieldon  Co.  r.  Mayers,  81  Wis.  627; 
Commercial  Bk.  of  Milw.  v.  Fire  Ins.  Co. 
of  Phil.  (Wis  1893),  54  N.  W.  Hep.  109. 

Counter-claim  of  damages  for  negli- 
gence in  carrying  out  the  provisions  of 
the    contract  sued  uj>on  :    Whitelegge  v. 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


911 


§  656.  *  780.  Examples  Continued.  I  have  collected  and  placed 
in  the  foot-note  a  number  of  additional  cases  in  which  the  an- 
swers were  sustained  as  valid  counter-claims  on  the  ground  that 
they  arose  out  of  the  contract  set  forth  in  the  compliant  or  peti- 
tion; in  some  of  them,  however,  the  court  merely  said  that  they 
arose  either  from  the  "  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  "  bv  the 
plaintiff,  and  did  not  distinctly  determine  which  of  these  expres- 
sions was  strictly  the  proper  one  to  be  used.^ 


II.  Cases  in  ivliicli  the  Cause  of  Action  Alleged  as  a  Counter-  Claim 
arises  out  of  the  Transaction  Set  forth  in  the  Complaint  or 
Petition  as  the  Foundation  of  the  Plaintiff's    Claim. 

§  657.    *  781.    Plan    of    Discussing    this    Subdivision.      I    shall   in 
this  subdivision  pursue  the  same  plan  as  in  the  last,  and  collect 


De  Witt,  12  Daly,  .319  (action  for  services 
by  attorney) ;  Schweickhart  v.  Stuewe, 
71  Wis.  1  ;  Muth  v.  Frost,  7.5  Wis.  166; 
Black  Riv.  Imp.  Co.  v.  Holway  (Wis. 
1893),  .53  N.  W.  Rep.  418;  Aultman  v. 
Case,  68  Wis.  612;  McGregor  v.  Auld 
(Wis.  1892),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  845;  Harlan 
V.  St.  Paul,  M.  &M.  R.  Co.,  31  Minn.  427; 
Zigler  V.  McClellan,  1 5  Ore.  499  ;  Empire 
Transp.  Co.  v.  Boggiano,  52  Mo.  294. 

I^Punteuey-Mitcliell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  North- 
wall  Co.  (1902),  —  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W.  863  ; 
McCormick  Harvesting  Mach.  Co.  v.  Gus- 
tafson  (1898),  54  Neb.  276,  74  N.  W.  576; 
Parry  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Tobin  (1900),  106  Wis. 
286,  82  N.  W.  154 ;  Mallory  Commission 
Co.  V.  Elwood  (1903),  120  la.  632,  95N.  W. 
176;  Hobbs  v.  Bland  (1899),  124  N.  C. 
284,  32  S.  E.  683.] 

1  Racine  Cy.  Bk.  v.  Keep,  13  Wis.  209 ; 
Butler  V.  Titus,  13  Wis.  429  ;  Koenipel  v. 
Shaw,  13  Minn.  488  ;  Gleadell  v.  Thomson, 
56  N.  Y.  194,  198;  Isham  v.  Davidson,  52 
N.  Y.  237  ;  Whaloa  v.  Aldrich,  8  Minn. 
346;  Mason  v.  Hey  ward,  3  Minn.  182; 
Dale  V.  Masters,  Stanton's  Code  (Ky.), 
97  ;  Dennis  v.  Belt,  30  Cal.  247 ;  Wilder 
I'.  Boynton,  63  Barb.  547 ;  Burton  v. 
Wilkes,  66  N.  C.  604,  610;  Hay  v.  Short, 
49  Mo.  139;  Scott  v.  Menasha  (Wis. 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  263  (action  on  cou- 
pons, counter-claim  for  cancellation  of  the 
bonds  to  which  they  were  attached) ; 
Church  V.  Spiegelberg,  .31  Fed.  Rep. 
601  ;  Moser   v.  Cochrane,    107    N.  Y.  35 


(action  to  recover  earnest  money  paid  on 
a  contract  for  purcliase  of  land,  counter- 
claim for  specific  performance) ;  King  v. 
Knapp,  59  N.  Y.  462  (same)  ;  Patton  v. 
Royal  Baking  Powder  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  1  ; 
Smith  V.  Wall,  12  Col.  363  ;  Seaman  v. 
Slater,  49  Fed.  Rep.  37  ;  Thomson  v.  San- 
ders, 1 18  N.  Y.  252  (counter-claim  of  dam- 
ages for  plaintiff's  fraud  in  procuring  the 
contract)  ;  More  v.  Rand,  60  N.  Y.  208 
(same).  See  McKegney  v.  Widekind,  6 
Bush,  107,  as  to  the  extent  of  the  relief 
which  may  he  granted  to  the  defendant 
in  a  legal  action,  and  when  the  contract 
must  be  reformed  by  an  equitable  pro- 
ceeding. For  examples  of  vnlid  coun- 
ter-claims where  the  defendant  had  an 
election  to  sue  for  a  tort  or  on  contract, 
see  Gordon  v.  Bruner,  49  Mo.  570 ;  Tinsley 
V.  Tinsley,  15  B.  IMon.  454;  Norden  v. 
Jones,  33  Wis.  600,  604 ;  but,  per  contra, 
see  Slayback  v.  Jones,  9  Ind.  470  Dam- 
ages resulting  to  the  defendant  from  a 
wrongful  issue  of  an  attachment  in  the 
action  may  be  counter-claimed,  if  such 
act  of  the  plaintiff  was  a  breach  of  the 
contract  sued  on,  Waugenheim  v.  Graham, 
39  Cal.  1 69,  176 ;  hut  such  damages  cannot 
generally  be  recovered  by  way  of  a  coun- 
ter-claim, Hembrock  v.  Stark,  53  Mo.  588; 
Nolle  V.  Thompson,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  121. 
A  counter-claim  of  damages  from  a  per- 
sonal tort,  ase.  g  ,  a  slander,  is  impossible. 
Conner  i'.  Winton,  7  Ind.  523  ;  Aferritt 
Milling  Co.  v.  Finlav,  110  N.  C.  41 1. 


912  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

the  various  classes  of  cases  in  which  counter-cLaims,  legal  or 
equitable,  have  been  sustained  as  properly  arising  out  of  the 
transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint,  and  also  those  in  which 
such  attempted  counter-claims  have  been  overruled ;  and  I  shall 
add  whatever  comments,  or  extracts  from  judicial  opinions,  seem 
necessary  to  the  clear  inference  and  statement  of  the  general 
principles  and  practical  rules  established  by  tiie  courts.  The 
import  of  the  term  "  transaction,"  and  of  the  phrase  "  arising  out 
of,"  has  been  already  discussed  with  some  fulness.  Without  re- 
peating this  discussion,  the  cases  cited  will  illustrate  and  com- 
plete it. 

S  658.  *  782.  Classification  and  Arrangement  of  Cases  to  be  cited. 
The  cases  cited  will  be  classified  and  arranged  into  groups  accord- 
ing to  their  nature ;  that  is,  according  to  the  relief  demanded  by 
the  respective  litigants.  The  first  of  these  classes  will  contain 
cases  in  which  the  actions  are  legal,  and  both  parties  seek  to  re- 
cover a  judgment  for  money  alone.  This  will  be  subdivided  into 
(1)  Those  in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  and  the  defend- 
ant's counter-claim  are  in  form  for  debt  or  damages  upon  contract 
express  or  implied ;  (2)  Those  in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action  is  in  form  for  debt  or  damages  upon  contract  express  or 
implied,  and  the  defendant's  counter-claim  is  for  damages  arising 
from  a  tort,  either  (a)  for  conversion  of  goods,  or  (b)  for  tres- 
passes or  injuries  to  property  or  to  person,  or  (c)  for  fraud  ;  (3) 
Those  in  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  in  form  for  dam- 
ages arising  from  a  tort,  and  the  defendant's  counter-claim  is  for 
debt  or  damages  upon  contract ;  and  (4)  Those  in  which  the  de- 
mands of  both  parties  are  for  damages  arising  from  a  tort.  The 
second  will  contain  legal  actions  in  which  the  judgment  is  other 
than  for  money;  and  the  third  will  embrace  equital)le  actions. 

§  659.  *  783.  First  Class.  (1)  Where  the  Plaintiffs  Cause  of 
Action  and  the  Defendant's  Counter-Claim  are  in  Form  Debt  or  Dam- 
ages upon  Contract  Express  or  Implied.  A  complaint  alleged  that 
the  defendant  luid  in  his  possession  $115,  of  which  two  thirds  l:>e- 
longed  to  the  plaintiff,  and  was  received  by  the  defendant  to  his 
use,  and  demanded  judgment  therefor ;  the  answer,  besides  a  de- 
fence of  denial,  stated  by  way  of  counter-claim  that  the  plaintiff 
had  himself  in  fact  received  all  the  money  in  question  (iftll5)  ; 
that  one  third  thereof  belonged  to  the  defendant,  and  was  received 
by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendant's  use,  and  prayed  judgment  for 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


913 


such  sum.  This  answer  was  adjudged  to  be  a  proper  counter- 
claim arising  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint ;  and 
the  plaintiff  having  failed  to  reply,  the  allegations  thereof  were 
admitted.^  Several  of  the  decisions  quoted  in  the  last  preceding 
subdivision  may  also  be  regarded  as  examples  of  the  class  de- 
scribed under  the  present  head;  the  contract  set  forth  by  the 
plaintiff  might  be  considered  a  "  transaction."  Their  facts  need 
not  be  repeated,  and  their  titles  will  be  found  in  the  foot-note.^ 

§  660.  *  784.  (2)  Cases  in  which  the  Plaintiffs  Cause  of  Action 
is  upon  Contract,  and  the  Defendant's  Counter- Claim  is  for  Damages 
Arising  from  a  Tort.  No  little  conflict  will  be  found  among  the 
decisions  which  are  embraced  within  this  group.  The  judges 
have  been  constantly  influenced  by  the  established  doctrine  of 
the  former  procedure,  which  excluded  without  exception  any  set- 
off or  recoupment  or  cross-demand  that  did  not  spring  from  con- 
tract.^    Some  have  gone  to  the  length  of  holding  that  a  cause  of 


1  Clinton  V.  Eddy,  1  Lans.  61.  In  an 
action  upon  a  note,  the  defendant  vvas 
not  permitted  to  recover  back  t;surious 
interest  paid  by  him  to  the  -plaintiff  on 
former  loans  as  a  counterclaim,  because 
the  demand  did  not  arise  out  of  the  same 
transaction  ;  nor  as  a  set-off,  because  it 
did  not  arise  on  contract,  Smead  v.  Chris- 
field,  I  Disney,  18;  but  it  seems  a  demand 
to  recover  back  usurious  interest  paid  for 
the  very  loan  which  is  the  basis  of  the 
action  would  be  a  valid  counter-claim, 
Martin  v.  Pugh,  23  Wis.  184.  A  claim 
for  the  loss,  by  the  negligence  of  the 
holder  of  the  note,  of  certain  collateral 
security  for  its  payment,  is  a  proper 
counter-claim,  First  Nat.  Bk.  of  Ft.  Dodge 
V.  O'Connell  (Iowa,  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
162. 

QPunteney-Mitchell  Mfg.  Co.  v.  North- 
wall  Co  (190-2),  —  Neb.  — ,  91  N.  W.  863 ; 
Dowdcli  ',-.  Carpy  (1902),  137  Cal.  333,  70 
Pac.  167  ;  Adams  v.  Warren  (1900),  27 
Col.  293,  61  Pac.  609;  Wintringhara  v. 
Hayes  (1894),  144  N.  Y.  1,  38  N.  E.  999. 
In  an  action  by  an  administrator  to  re- 
cover the  price  of  articles  purchased  by 
defendant  at  the  administrator's  sale, 
debts  due  the  defendant  ffom  the  intestate 
could  not  constitute  a  counter-claim  as 
thev  did  not  grow  out  of  the  same  trans- 
action, nor  a  set-off  because  not  mutual  : 
Hancock    v.   Hancock's  Adm'r   (1902), — 


Ky.  — ,  69  S.  W.  757.  See  also  Griswold  v. 
Pieratt  (1895),  110  Cal.  259,  42  Pac.  821.] 

■^  Racine  Cy.  Bank  v.  Keep,  13  Wis. 
209  ;  Butler  v.  Titus,  13  Wis.  429  ;  Koem- 
pel  r.  vShaw,  13  Minn.  488;  Whalon  v. 
Aldrich,  8  .Minn.  346  ,  .Mason  i'.  Heyward, 
3  Minn.  182;  Dale  v.  Masters,  Stanton's 
Code  (Ky.),  97;  McKeguey  v-  Widekind, 
6  Bush,  107  ;  Stoddard  v.  Treadwell,  26 
Cal.  294  ;  Dennis  v.  Belt,  30  Cal.  247  ,  Hay 
V.  Short,  49  Mo.  139;  Gordon  v.  Bruner, 
49  .Mo.  570;  Wilder  c.  Boynton,  63  Barb. 
547  ;  McKinnon  v.  Morrison,  104  N.  C.  354. 

3  [Rood  v.  Taft  (1896),  94  Wis.  380, 
69  N.  W.  183  ;  Hunter  v.  Hathaway  (1900), 
108  Wis.  620,  84  N.  W.  996 ;  Loomer  v. 
Thomas  (1893),  38  Neb.  277,  56  N.  W. 
973 ;  President,  etc.  of  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parker 
(1902),  64  Neb.  411,  89  N.  W.  1040;  Young 
V.  Borzone  (1901),  26  Wash.  4,  66  Pac. 
135;  McHard  v.  Williams  (1896),  8  S.  D. 
381,  66  N.  W.  930. 

In  an  action  for  the  value  of  goods, 
wares,  and  merchandise  sold  and  delivered, 
and  for  services  rendered,  defendant  cannot 
plead  as  counter-claim  a  cause  of  action 
for  wilfully  and  maliciously  causing  a  writ 
of  attachment  to  issue  against  him,  where 
the  facts  on  which  the  alleged  counter- 
claim rests  arose  subsequent  to  and  were 
wholly  independent  of  those  alleged  in 
the  complaint;  Jones  v.  Swank  (1893),  54 
Mmn.  259,  55  N.  W.  1126.^ 


58 


914 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


fiction  in  favor  of  the  defendant  resulting  from  a  tort  cannot 
possibly  arise  from  th0  "  transaction  "  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff  as 
the  foundation  of  his  claim ;  others,  however,  have  given  a  more 
liberal  and  comprehensive  interpretation  of  the  term.^  Their  dif- 
fering \dews  can  best  be  seen  by  a  comparison  of  their  judicial 
opinions.  In  an  action  for  the  price  of  a  safe  sold  and  delivered, 
the  defendant  pleaded  a  counter-claim,  that  the  plaintiff  had  con- 
verted to  his  own  use  a  safe,  the  propert}^  of  tlie  defendant,  for 
the  value  of  which  he  demanded  judgment.^  The  Common  Pleas 
of  New  York  City  held  that  this  answer  was  based  upon  tort ; 


1  [^Waring  v.  Gaskill  (1895),  95  Ga. 
731,  22  S.  E.  659  :  A  note  was  given  to 
plaintiff  by  the  defendant  as  drawer,  with 
certain  shares  of  stock  as  collateral,  under 
the  agreement  that  the  collateral  should 
not  be  sold  unless  ten  days'  notice  was 
given  to  the  defendant.  The  stock  was 
sold  without  the  required  notice  being 
given,  and  did  not  bring  the  amount  of 
the  note.  In  an  action  on  the  note  the 
court  held  that  defendant  might  plead 
in  recoupment  the  damages  occasioned  by 
the  conversion.  Yet  the  Georgia  statute 
defines  recoupment  as  based  only  upon 
cross-obligations  or  iudependent  covenants 
arising  under  the  same  contract.  But  see 
.Ma.<hburn  r.  Inman  (1895).  97  Ga.  396, 
where  the  court  said :  ''  This  case  falls 
witliin  the  general  rule,  that,  to  an  action 
sounding  in  contract,  the  defendant  can- 
not plead  as  a  set-off  a  claim  arising 
ex  delicto." 

In  Hecht  «;.  Snook  (1902),  114  Ga.  921, 
41  S.  E.  74,  the  court  said :  "  There  is 
notliing  in  the  statutes  of  this  State  which 
authorizes  a  defendant  in  a  suit  at  law  to 
set  off,  as  a  matter  of  legal  defence  to  a 
suit  on  a  contract,  damages  arising  from 
a  tort  committed  by  the  plaintiff ;  or  to 
set  off,  in  a  suit  for  damages  arising  from 
the  commission  of  a  tort  by  the  defendant, 
a  claim  growing  out  of  a  contract  between 
the  plaintiff  and  the  defendant." 

Blue  1-.  Capital  Nat.  Bank  (1896),  145 
Ind.  518.  43  N.  E.  655:]  "Can  slander 
be  the  subject  of  a  counter-claim  in  an 
action  upon  a  promissory  note  for  bor- 
rowed money  ?  In  our  judgment  it  can- 
not. .  .  .  '  A  counter-claim  is  that  which 
might  have  ari.'sen  out  of,  or  could  have 
some  connection  with,  the  original  trans- 


action, in  view  of  the  parties,  and  which, 
at  the  time  the  contract  was  made,  they 
could  have  intended  might,  in  some  event, 
give  one  party  a  claim  against  the  otiier 
for  compliance  or  non-compliance  with  its 
provisions.'  Conner  v.  \Y'vau>i\,  7  Ind.  523. 
A  tort  cannot  be  regarded  as  growing 
out  of  or  connected  with  contract,  within 
the  meaning  of  the  statute,  simply  because 
the  contract  had  suggested  it,  or  was 
remotely  an  incident  to  it." 

-  QCarson's  Executors  v.  Buckstaff 
(1898),  57  Neb.  262,  77  N.  \V.  670:  "A 
debtor,  wheu  sued  by  his  creditor,  may 
plead  as  a  counter-claim  or  set-off,  the 
actual  value  of  any  collateral  security 
which  the  creditor  has  converted  to  his 
own  use  or  the  value  of  any  collateral 
security  which  he  lias  released,  dissipated, 
or  diverted  from  the  purpose  for  wliich  he 
held  it." 

Braithwaite  v.  Akin  (1893),  3  N.  D. 
365,  56  N.  W.  1.33  :  Plaintiffs  [intervenors] 
owned  certain  claims  in  a  steamboat,  which 
was  about  to  be  sold  under  judicial  order 
so  as  to  deprive  them  of  their  claims. 
To  ]>rotect  themselves  they  arranged  with 
defendant  that  they  would  furnish  part  of 
the  funds  necessary  to  purchase  tlie  boat 
at  the  judicial  sale,  that  defendant  should 
attend  the  .sale  and  hny  the  b(jat,  that  the 
claims  of  plaintiffs  and  their  advancements 
should  be  paid  out  of  the  earnings  of  the 
boat,  the  boat  being  managed  by  defend- 
ant. Jleld  that  a  counter-claim  based  on 
tlie  conversion  of  the  boat  by  plaintiffs,  in 
an  action  for  an  accnimting,  was  improper 
and  did  not  arise  out  <>f  the  contract  or 
transaction  set  forth  in  the  intervenors 
complaint.] 


COUNTKR-Cr.AIM.  015 

that  the  defendant  liad  not  so  framed  it  as  to  waive  the  wrong 
and  sue  upon  an  implied  promise  for  the  price,  and  that  the 
pleading  was  not  a  proper  counter-claim.  Having  thus  fully 
disposed  of  the  issues,  the  court  went  on  to  declare  that  if  the 
defendant  miglit  waive  the  tort  and  bring  suit  in  form  for  the 
price,  the  demand  would  not  be  a  valid  counter-claim,  because 
the  cause  of  action  would  not  arise  upon  contract ;  ^  and  upon  a 
complaint  for  the  price  of  goods  sold  and  delivered,  the  Superior 
Court  of  New  York  City  rejected  a  counter-claim  for  the  Avrong- 
ful  conversion  by  the  plaintiff  of  other  goods  belonging  to  the 
defendant.^  No  allusion  was  made  in  the  latter  decision  to  the 
doctrine  of  election  of  remedies  between  an  action  for  the  tort, 
and  one  in  form  upon  contract ;  and  in  neither  of  the  cases  could 
it  be  pretended  that  the  defendant's  demand,  in  whatever  shape 
it  might  be  put,  arose  out  of  the  transaction  stated  by  the  plain- 
tiff. On  the  other  hand,  when,  in  a  suit  ujDon  a  promissory  note. 
the  defendant  pleaded  as  a  counter-claim  that  he  had  pledged 
certain  stocks  with  the  plaintiff  as  security  for  the  debt ;  that  the 
latter  had  wrongfully  sold  them,  and  prayed  judgment  for  their 
value,  —  the  Supreme  Court  of  Wisconsin,  in  reversing  a  judg- 
ment for  the  plaintiff  rendered  on  the  trial,  assumed  that  the  facts 
constituted  a  good  counter-claim.^ 

§  661.  *  785.  Damages  from  Trespasses,  Nuisances,  Negligences, 
and  the  Like.  In  an  action  by  the  lessor  for  rent,  an  answer, 
which  stated  that  during  the  continuance  of  the  term  the  plaintiff 
erected  an  oven,  furnace,  and  other  apparatus  for  a  bakery  under 
the  store  demised  to  and  occupied  by  the  defendant,  and  by  the 
use  thereof  had  filled  the  premises  with  smoke,  soot,  and  steam, 
and  had  injured  the  defendant's  goods,  and  demanded  judgment 
for  the  damages  so  caused,  was  treated  as  a  valid  counter-claim 
by  the  New  York  Superior  Court.*     But  in  a  similar  action  the 

1  Piser  r.  Stearns,  1  Hilt.  86.  *  Ayres  v.  O'Farrell,  4  Kobt.  668;   10 

■^  Kurtz  V.  McGuire,  5  Duer,  660.     See  Bosw.    143.      When    the  cause   was   first 

also  Steinhart  v.  Pitcher,  20  Minn.   102;  before  it,  the  court  held  that  by  replying 

Street   v.   Bryan,   6.5   N.   C.   619,   actions  the  plaintiff  had  waived  all  objection ;  on 

on  contracts   in  which  counter-claims  of  the  second  appeal,  t)ie  counter-claim  was 

damages  arising  from  unconnected  torts  more  definitely  approved, 

were  rejected.  [^Kiihn  )•.  Sol   Heavenrich  Co.  (1902), 

»  Ainsworth    v.    Bowen,    9   Wis.    348;  1  I.t  Wis.  447,  91  N.  W.  994 ;  Hawley  Bros. 

s.  p..  Cass  V.  Higenbotam,  100  N.  Y.  248;  Hardware  Co.  v.  Brownstone  (1899),  123 

Weston  V.  Turver  (Supr.  Ct.,  Gen.  Term,  Cal.  643,  56  Pac.  468.] 
1888),  17  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  502. 


916  CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 

New  York  Common  Pleas  rejected  a  counter-claim  which  alleged 
that  at  the  time  of  the  letting  mentioned  in  the  complaint  the 
plaintiff  leased  other  premises  to  the  defendant,  and  that  he  had 
before  the  commencement  of  this  suit  wrongfully  broken  into  said 
premises  and  taken  therefrom  certain  chattels  of  the  defendant, 
which  he  had  injured,  destroyed,  or  lost,  and  prayed  judgment 
for  the  value  of  the  goods  so  taken.  The  court  declared  that 
this  cause  of  action  clearly  did  not  arise  out  of  the  contract  or 
transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint,  nor  was  it  connected  with 
the  subject  of  the  action  :  it  was  a  naked  and  independent  act  of 
trespass.^ 

§  662.  *  786.  Same  Subject.  Similar  decisions  have  been  made 
in  other  actions  than  those  for  the  recovery  of  rent.  In  a  suit 
upon  a  note  given  for  the  purchase  price  of  land  conveyed  to  the 
defendants,  they  were  not  permitted  to  counter-claim  damages 
for  the  plaintifif's  wrongful  entry  upon  the  land  so  conveyed,  and 
cutting  and  carrying  away  a  growing  crop  the  title  to  which  had 
passed  by  the  deed.^  It  has,  however,  been  recently  held  by  the 
Supreme  Court  in  New  York,  that  a  cause  of  action  for  a  tort  may 
arise  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff ;  and  such  a 
counter-claim  was  fully  sustained  in  an  action  on  contract.^ 

1  Drake  v.  Cockroft,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  counter-claims  of  damages  from  trespasses 
34,39.  See  also  Gallup  v.  Albany  R.  Co.,  to  land  were  sustained;  but  a  counter- 
7  Lans.  471 ;  Edgerton  v.  Page,  20  N.  Y.  claim  of  damages  arising  from  a  personal 
281,  285;  Mayor,  etc.  of  N.  Y.  v.  Parker  tort  cannot  be  sustained,  Conner  r  Win- 
Vein  Stp.  Co.,  12  Abb.  Pr.  300;  McKeu-  ton,  7  Ind.  523;  Merritt  Milling  Co.  v. 
sie  V.  Farrell,  4  Bosw  192,  202;  Avery  Finlay,  1 10  N.  C.  41 1  j^Ander.son  o.  John- 
■V.  Dougherty,  102  Ind.  443;  Thorp  v.  son  (1900),  106  Wis.  218,  82  N.  W.  177]. 
Philbin,  15  Daly,  155;  Brugman  v.  Burr,  *  Wadley  v.  Davis,  63  Barb.  500.  The 
30  Neb.  406 ;  which  were  all  actions  for  discussions  of  tlie  text  are  further  illus- 
rent  in  which  counter-claims  for  damages  trated  by  tlie  following  recent  ca.ses  : 
from  torts  of  the  lessor  were  rejected.  Brady  v.  Brennan,  25  Minn.  210  (action 
In  Littman  v.  Coulter,  23  Abb.  N.  Cas.  GO,  on  contract,  counter-claim  for  conversion 
however,  an  action  for  rent,  the  defendant  by  waiving  the  tort) ;  Goebel  v.  Hough, 
was  allowed  to  counter-claim  damages  for  26  id.  252  (action  by  a  lessor  for  rent, 
the  conversion  by  the  plaintiff  of  the  counter-claim  of  damages  for  plaintiff's 
defendant's  goods,  under  a  claim  of  lieu  wrongful  trespass  on  the  premi.ses) ;  Dev- 
thereon  for  the  rent.  rios    '•    Warren,   82    N.   C.  356  (])laintiff 

■^  Slayback   v.  .Jones,  9  Ind.  470;  and  ami  defendants  were  co-tenants  of  land; 

see   Humbert   v.   Brisbane,  25  S.  C.  506  ;  jilaintiff  sold  his  share  to  defendant  and 

per  contra,  see  Gordon   v.  Bruner,  49  Mo.  took  defendant's   bond    fur  the  price;   in 

570,    571     (which     w!us    decided    on    the  an  .action  on   the   i)ond,  defendant  could 

doctrine  of  election)  ;  Tinsley  v.  Tinsloy,  not   counter-claim    damages   done   to  the 

15   B.   Mon.  454,  459;  Smith   r.   Fife,  2  land    by   the    plaintiff   before   the   sale); 

Neb.  10,  13;  Aj)persou's  Adin.  v.  Triplett  Harris  i'.    Kivcrs,   53   Ind.  216  (in  action 

(Ky.   1890),  13   S.  W.  791  ;   in   all   which,  on  a  jironii.s.sory  note,   no  set-off   for  tort 


COUNTER-CLAIM,  917 

§  663.  *  787.  Damages  Arising  from  Fraud.  CroSS-demailds  for 
iLiniages  resulting  from  fraud  will  naturally  occur,  and,  it  would 
seem,  might  be  easily  sustained.  But  there  have  been  decisions 
which  reject  even  such  counter-claims.  In  an  action  on  two 
promissory  notes,  the  defendants — the  makers — alleged  that 
they  executed  a  trust  deed  of  land  as  security  for  their  notes,  and 
proceeded  to  state  acts  of  fraud  committed  by  the  plaintiff  in  col- 
lusion with  the  trustee  in  the  deed,  by  whic-h  the  land  was  sacri- 
ficed and  bought  in  by  the  plaintiff  at  far  less  than  its  value, 
and  prayed  judgment  for  the  damages  resulting  from  the  fraud. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Missouri  overruled  this  counter-claim  in 
an  opinion  which  contains  many  palpable  errors,  and  which  has 
been  disregarded  by  subsequent  decisions  of  the  same  tribunal.^ 
The  Supreme  Court  of  Indiana,  however,  sustained  a  counter- 
claim in  every  way  analogous  to  the  one  just  described.^  It  would 
seem  that  little  or  no  difficulty  would  be  met  in  giving  such  a 
construction  to  the  statutory  definition  as  will  embrace  the  cases 
of  damages  resulting  from  the  plaintiff's  frauds.  If  the  action 
was  on  contract,  such  damages  formed  a  most  familiar  example 
of  the  former  "  recoupment ;  "  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  extend 
that  doctrine  to  analogous  cases  in  which  a  "  transaction  "  is  to 
be  substituted  in  place  of  a  contract. 

§  664.  *  788.  (3)  Cases  in  which  the  Plaintiffs  Cause  of  Action  is 
for  a  Tort  and  the  Defendant's  Counter-Claim  is  in  Form  upon  Con- 
tract. The  examples  of  this  class  of  controversies  have  generally 
been  actions  for  the  wrongful  conversion  of  goods  in  which  the 
counter-claim  of  debt  or  damages  upon  contract  was  interposed, 
and  rested  either  upon  the  theory  that  both  demands  arose  out  of 
the  one  transaction  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff,  or  upon  the  notion 
that  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  might  be  regarded  as  founded 
upon  an  implied  contract,  the  tort  being  waived.  Such  an  action 
having  been  brought  in  form  for  the  conversion  of  goods,  the  an- 
swer contained  a  counter-claim  setting  up  a  liability  of  the  plain- 
possible);  Collier  v.  Ervin,  3  Mont.  142  (1901),  1.57  Ind.  120,  60  N.  E.  1025:  The 
(action  on  contract,  no  counter-claim  for  rule  is  well  settled  in  this  State  that  a 
a  tort  unless  it  arose  out  of  the  same  claim  or  demanil  arising  out  of  tort  cannot 
transaction,  etc.).  be  pleaded  as  a  set-off  against  a  cause  of 

1  Jones  V.  Moore,  42  Mo.  413,  per  action  arising  out  of  contract.  Abraham- 
Holmes  .1.  son  i\  Laml)er.son  (1898),  72  Minn.  308,  7."} 

2  Vail  V.  Junes,  31  Ind.  467.  N.  W.  226.]] 
[[Harris    r.    Randolph     County    Bank 


918  CIVIL   REMEDIKS. 

tiff  as  a  stockholder  in  a  certain  manufacturing  corporation, 
averring-  all  the  facts  required  by  the  statute  to  create  a  personal 
responsibility  iu  him  for  a  debt  of  the  company.  This  attempted 
counter-claim  was  of  course  overruled,  as  it  had  not  the  least  con- 
nection with  the  transaction  stated  iu  the  complaint,  nor  with  the 
subject  of  the  action.^  I  submit  the  following  doctrine  as  correct 
ou  principle,  and  as  derived  from  a  true  interpretation  of  the 
statute.  Whenever  the  facts  are  such  that  an  election  is  given 
to  the  plaintiff  to  sue  in  form  either  for  a  tort  or  on  contract,  and 
if  he  sues  on  contract  the  defendant  may  counter-claim  damages 
for  the  breach  of  that  contract,  the  same  counter-claim  may  also 
be  interposed  when  the  suit  is  in  form  for  the  tort :  the  facts  being 
exactly  the  same  in  both  phases  of  the  action,  the  counter-claim 
would  clearly  arise  out  of  the  real  transaction  which  was  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  demand.''^  The  term  "  transaction  " 
refers  to  the  actual  facts  and  circumstances  from  which  the  rights 
result  and  which  are  averred,  and  not  to  the  mere  form  and  manner 
in  which  these  facts  are  averred.  Although  there  are  decisions 
which  repudiate  this  interpretation  of  the  codes,  and  reject  the 
liberal  rule  drawn  from  it,  I  think  the  doctrine  thus  stated  is  now 
approved  and  supported  by  the  decided  weight  of  judicial  opinion 
as  expressed  in  the  more  recent  authorities."^ 

1  Chambers  v.  Lewis,  28  N.  Y.  454;  McMillan,  83  id.  270;  Ring  i'.  Ogdeu,  44 

11  Al)b.  I'r.  210.     See  also  Allen  v.  Ran-  Wis.  .'JOS  ;    Ferris   v.   Arm.strong  Manuf. 

dolph,    48     lud.    496.      In   Scheunert   r.  Co.  (Supreme,  1890),  10  N.  Y.  Suppl.  750; 

Kaehler,  2.3  Wis.  52.3,  which  was  an  action  Loewenherg    v.   Rosenthal,    18  Ore.    178; 

for   the   conversion  of  good.s,  a  counter-  hut  Spouseuberger  v.  Lemert,  23  Kan.s.  55, 

claim  of  damages  from  the  breach  of  the  held  that  in  an  action  against  a  constable 

contract  between  the  parties  out  of  which  for  his  failure  or  neglect  to  serve  ])ri)cess 

the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  arose  was  properly,  the  defendant's  fees  in  the  same 

rejected,  the   court  adding  that   it   must  case  were  a  good  set-off  or  counter-claim, 

also    have    been    rejected   even    had    the  [^Harden  v.  Lang  (1900),  110  Ga.  392, 

plaintiff  l)rought  his  suit  in  form  on  the  36   S.  E.  100;  Bell  v.  Ober  &   Sons  Co. 

contract,  which   he  might  have  done,  be-  (1900),  111  Ga.  668,36  S.  E.  904;  Follen- 

cause  the   right  of  action   would  still  in  dore  v.   Follcndore  (1896),  99  Ga.   71,  24 

fact  be  for  a  tort.     The  following  recent  S.  E.  407  ;  Giles  i-.  Bank  of  Georgia  (1897), 

cases   show   that  the  courts  are  strongly  102  Ga.  702,29S.  E.  600;  Britton  !-'.  Ferrin 

inclined  to  hold  that  a  counter-claim  on  (1902),    171    N.   Y.    2.35,   63    N.    E.   954; 

contract  is  impossible  in  an  action  for  tort,  Hecht  v.  Snook   (1902),  114  Ga.  921,  41 

since  the  two  could  not  in  the  nature  of  S.  E.  74.] 

things  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction :  '^  Hitchie   i'.    Ilayward,   71     Mo.    560; 

People   1-.    Deni.son,   84   N.  Y.   372,  379 ;  Kamcrick    v.    Castleman,    23    Mo.    App. 

Smitli    V.    Hall,   67    id.   48;    Ilumplirey  v.  481. 

Merritt,   51    Ind.   197;  He.ss  ;•.  Young,  59  "   QStory  &  Ishani  Co.  c.  Story  (1893), 

id.  379;   Boil   v.  Simms,  60  id.  162;  Man-  100    Cal.    30,    34    I'ac.    671;    Wimmer   r. 

ucy  v.  Ingram,   78  N.  C.  96;   Ilolliday  r.  Simon  (1894),  9  Utah,  378.  35  I'ac.  507; 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


919 


§  665.  *  789.  Same  Subject.  The  tort  complained  of  by  the 
plaintiff  may  not  be  a  conversion  of  chattels.  The  fact  that  a 
cause  of  action  upon  contract  in  favor  of  the  defendant  may  arise 
out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint  or  j)etition  in  an 
action  in  form  for  damages  resulting  from  a  tort,  was  distinctly 
recognized,  and  the  doctrine  that  a  counter-claim  setting  up  such 
a  demand  should  be  jwlmitted,  and  should  not  be  rejected  in  defer- 
ence to  notions  which  the  new  procedure  was  designed  to  sup- 
plant, was  clearly  and  cogently  enforced  by  the  Supreme  Court 
of  Indiana  in  an  opinion  from  which  I  make  a  quotation.^ 


Warren   v.   Hall  (1895),  20  Col.  508,  38 
Pac  767. 

"  In  replevin  by  a  lessor  to  obtain  pos- 
session of  his  lessee's  furniture,  under  a 
provision  of  the  lease  authorizing  it  to  be 
taken  and  sold  to  satisfy  unpaid  rent,  the 
lessee  may  counter-claim  for  damages  for 
breach  of  the  lessor's  covenant,  in  the 
same  lease,  to  keep  the  demised  premises 
in  repair,"  citing  §  *  788  of  the  text  : 
Collins  V.  Morrison  (1895),  91  Wis.  324, 
€4  N.  W.  1000.3 

1  Judah  V.  Vincennes  Univ.  Trs.,  16  Ind. 
56,  60.  The  plaintiffs  —  trustees  of  the 
Vincennes  University  —  sue  to  recover 
the  value  of  certain  bonds  belonging  to 
the  corporation,  received  by  the  defendant 
as  its  attorney,  and  converted  by  him  to 
his  own  use.  He  admits  the  receipt  and 
detention  of  the  securities,  and  alleges, 
by  way  of  counter-claim,  that  the  Uuiver- 
sity  was  indebted  to  him  for  certain  pro- 
fessional services,  particularly  described, 
including  his  services  in  procuring  these 
very  bonds,  among  others,  to  be  issued  to 
it  by  the  State,  and  prays  judgment  for 
the  amount  of  such  indebtedness.  In 
pronouncing  upon  the  validity  of  this 
answer  as  a  counter-claim,  the  court  say  : 
"  The  point  is,  that  the  action  is  in  form 
trover,  —  an  action  ex  delicto,  —  and  that, 
under  such  action,  the  defendant  cannot 
avail  himself  of  any  claim  which  he  may 
have  against  the  plaintiffs  for  services 
rendered,  or  money  expended,  on  their 
behalf,  even  if  it  was  in  tiie  recovery  of 
the  identical  property  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  the  present  action.  We  are  clear 
that  it  was  the  intention  of  those  who 
initiated  and  inaugurated  tlie  present 
•Code   of  Procedure  that  parties  litigant 


might,  and  perhaps  should,  determine  in 
each  suit  all  matters  in  controversy  be- 
tween them  which  could  legitimately  be 
included  therein,  keeping  in  view  their 
substantial  rights.  As  proceedings  so  dis- 
tinct as  those  were  at"  law  and  in  equity 
are  no  longer  required  to  be  separated, 
but  are  now  blended  in  one  action,  we 
are  unable  to  see  any  reason  for  requiring 
two  actions  to  determine  a  controversy 
in  which  the  rights  of  each  party  are  so 
dependent  upon  the  rights  of  the  other  as 
in  the  case  at  bar.  There  is  most  surely 
an  equitable  view  of  this  question,  as  pre- 
sented iu  the  case  at  bar,  which  renders 
it  distinct  and  different  from  an  ordinary 
case  iu  which  one  should  convert  the 
property  of  another,  and  then  set  up  as  a 
defence  that  the  owner  was  indebted  to 
him  for  some  otlier  and  distinct  transac- 
tion." See  also  Birch  v.  Hall  (Supreme, 
1888),  3  N.  Y.  Suppl.  747.  The  Supreme 
Court  of  North  Carolina  has  recently  ap- 
proved this  doctrine  in  the  most  emphatic 
and  general  manner,  holding  that  oppos- 
ing demands  on  contract  and  for  tort  may 
arise  out  of  the  same  transaction.  Bitting 
V.  Thaxton,  72  N.  C.  541,  549.  In  St. 
Louis,  F.  &  W.  K.  Co.  V.  Chenault,  36 
Ivans.  51,  the  treasurer  of  the  plaintiff,  a 
railroad  company,  who  was  sued  for  the 
conversion  of  the  company's  funds,  was 
allowed  to  counter-claim  demands  against 
the  plaintiff,  in  payment  of  which  he  had 
appropriated  the  money.  In  Cow  Run 
Co.  V.  Lehmer,  41  Ohio  St.  384,  an  action 
for  the  conversion  of  oil  delivered  to  the 
defendant  for  storage,  the  allowance  for 
evaporation,  and  the  charges  for  storage, 
both  provided  for  by  the  contract,  were 
held    to    be   proper  subjects  for  counter- 


920 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


^  666.  *  790.  (4)  Cases  in  -wrhicli  the  Demands  of  both  Parties  are 
for  Damages  Arising  from  Tort.  Countei-elaims  of  damages  from 
torts,  when  attempted  to  be  enforced  against  causes  of  action  for 
damages  also  arising  from  other  torts,  have,  with  few  exceptions, 
been  rejected.-  The  courts  have  been  inclined  to  adopt,  or  at  least 
to  assume,  a  general  principle  that  such  a  cross-demand  can  never 
arise  from  the  transaction  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff  as  the  founda- 
tion of  his  claim.  It  will  be  seen,  however,  that  this  doctrine  has 
not  been  universally  accepted.^  In  all  the  cases  placed  in  the 
foot-note,  the  proposed  counter-claims  were  over-ruled  on  the 
ground  that  the  cross-demands  were  for  unconnected  torts.'-^ 
Opposed  to  this  array  of  authorities,  all  announcing  the  same 
general  doctrine,  there  are  a  few  cases  which  sustain  a  counter- 
claim of  tort  against  a  tort   under  special  circumstances.^     The 


claim.  For  a  case  in  which  such  a  coun- 
ter-claim was  rejected  becau.sc  it  did  not 
"  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,"  etc., 
see  Pattison  v.  Riciiards,  22  Barb.  143.  See 
the  additional  cases  cited  ante  under 
§*788. 

[;Smith  V.  Building  Ass'n  (1896),  119 
N.  C.  2.57,  26  S.  E.  40;  Lovell  v.  Ham- 
mond Co.  (1895),  66  Conn.  .500,  34  Atl. 
511.] 

1  (^Gilbert  v.  Loberg  (1894),  86  Wis. 
661,  57  N.  W.  982:  "In  an  action  by  a 
landlord  against  tenants  for  waste  the 
defendants  may  counter-claim  for  the 
value  of  personal  property  placed  by  tliem 
on  the  premises  durin<^  their  tenancy,  and 
which  the  landlord  has  converted  by  pre- 
venting its  removal." 

Keuaker  v.  Smith  (1901),  109  Ky.  643, 
60  S.  W.  407  :  In  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  trespass  and  destruction  of 
crops  by  defendant's  cattle,  defendant  can- 
not plead  as  a  counter-claim  the  damages 
wlii(-h  he  has  suffered  from  trespasses  by 
plaintiff's  cattle,  though  tliey  resulted 
from  plaintiff's  breach  of  his  agreement 
to  keep  up  a  portion  of  the  division  fence, 
as  the  claim  of  defendant  did  not  arise 
oat  of  the  same  trausacti(jn  stated  in  the 
petition. 3 

2  Askius  V.  IIearn.s,  3  Abb.  Pr.  184, 
187;  Schnaderbeck  i:  Worth,  8  Abb.  Pr. 
37;  Barhyte  v.  Hughes,  33  Barb.  320; 
Henry  v.  Henry,  3  Hobt.  614,  17  Abb. 
Pr.  411;   Murden  i:   Prirnent,   1    Hilt.  75; 


Shelly  r.  Vanarsdoll,  23  Ind.  543 ;  Love- 
joy  V.  Robin.son,  8  Ind.  399  ;  Macdougall 
V.  Maguire,  35  Cal.  274,  280 ;  the  last  case 
holding  that  the  objection  is  not  removed 
by  replying  and  going  to  trial  instead  of 
demurring.  See,  further,  Ward  v.  Black- 
wood, 48  Ark.  396 ;  Kothschild  r.  Whit- 
man, 132  N.  Y.  472  ;  Allen  v.  Coates,  29 
Minn.  46  ;  Heckman  v.  Swartz,  55  Wis. 
173;  Terre  Haute  &  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Pierce, 
95  Ind.  496  ;  Keller  t:  B.  F.  Goodrich  Co., 
117  Ind.  556 ;  Lake  Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co. 
V.  Van  Auken,  1  Ind.  App.  492;  Roths- 
child V.  Whitman,  57  Hun,  135;  Sheehan 
V.  Pierce  (Supreme,  .June,  1893),  23  N.  Y. 
Suppl.  1119  (in  an  action  of  slander,  a 
counter-claim  for  slander  not  allowed). 

'■^  Tarwater  v.  Hannibal  &  St.  ,lo.  R.  R., 
42  Mo.  193.  In  Mc Arthur  v.  Green  Bay, 
etc.  Canal  Co.,  34  Wis.  139,  146,  the  action 
was  brought  for  injuries  done  to  the  plain- 
tiff's boat  wiiile  passing  through  the  canal, 
cau^d  by  a  break  in  the  canal  alleged 
to  have  resulted  from  defendant's  negli- 
gence ;  the  defendant  set  up,  as  a  counter- 
claim, that  the  break  itself  was  caused  by 
the  plaintiff's  negligence,  and  prayed  a 
judgment  for  the  damages.  This  counter 
claim  was  sustained,  liie  court  saying - 
"  If  it  does  not  arise  out  of  the  tran.sac- 
tibn  set  forth  in  the  complaint,  it  certainly 
is  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  ac- 
tion." See  also  Walsh  r.  IlaU,  66  N.  C. 
23T,  237,  in  which  the  ])laintiff  sued  to  re- 
co\  er  possession  of  a  horse  which  defend- 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  921 

court  of  last  resort  in  Kentucky  has  even  gone  to  the  extent  of 
liolding  that,  in  an  action  for  an  assault  and  battery,  a  counter-claim 
of  damages  for  an  assault  and  battery  committed  by  the  plaintiff 
at  the  same  time,  and  as  a  part  of  the  same  affray,  can  be  inter- 
posed, because  it  arises  out  of  the  same  transaction,  thus  giving 
to  that  word  a  very  broad  and  liberal  meaning.^ 

§  667.  *  791.  Second  Class.  Legal  Actions  in  which  the  Judg- 
ment is  other  than  for  Money.  I  pass  now  to  the  consideration  of 
legal  actions  in  which  the  judgment  is  other  than  for  money  ;  tliat 
is,  for  the  recovery  of  chattels  or  of  lands.  In  all  instances  of 
this  class,  the  question  would  present  itself,  and  would  be  the 
controlling  one,  whether  the  counter-claim  has  such  a  relation  to 
the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  that  a  recovery  upon  it  would  defeat, 
lessen,  or  modify  the  relief  which  would  otherwise  be  obtained 
by  him.'-^  The  practical  question  therefore  is.  When,  if  ever,  may 
there  be  a  counter-claim  of  money  in  an  action  brought  to  recover 
possession  of  chattels  ?  In  some  exceptional  cases  such  counter- 
claims have  been  allowed,  and  in  my  opinion  properly  allowed. 
For  example,  an  answer  stating  the  circumstances  under  which 
the  goods  demanded  by  the  action  came  into  the  defendant's 
possession,  that  the  plaintiff  was  indebted  to  him  in  a  specified 

ajit  had  sold  him  in  exchange  for  a  tract  course  of  those  events  which  must,  of  ne- 

of  laud,  and  the  defendant  counter-claimed  cessity,  be  fully  established  and  considered 

damages  arising  from  the  plaintiff's  fraud-  in  the  trial  of  plaintiff's  demand."     See 

ulent  representations  in  reference  to  the  also  Pelton  i\  Powell  (1897),  96  Wis.  473, 

land  so   exchanged.     This  case  certainly  71    N.    VV.  887.     See  Stolze  v.    Torrisou 

carries  the  doctrine  of   counter-claim    to  (190.3),  —  Wis.  — ,  9.5  N.  W.  114,  distin- 

its  extreme  limits.  guishing  these   two  cases  and  saying  of 

1  Slone  V.  Slone,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  339.  the  former  that  it  is  "  au  extreme  case." 
In  Heigel  v.  Willis  (Supreme,  1889),  3  Horton  y.  Pintchunck  (1900),  110  Ga.  355, 
N.  Y.  Suppl.  497,  an  action  for  damages  35  S.  E.  663 :  In  an  action  for  malicious 
caused  by  the  defendant's  driving  his  prosecution  defendant  may  set  off  a  cause 
wagon  against  the  wagon  of  the  jjlajntiff,  of  action  for  assault  and  battery,  and  if 
a  counter-claim  for  injuries  resulting  to  the  damages  for  the  latter  exceed  in 
the  person  and  property  of  the  defendant  amount  those  for  the  former,  the  defend- 
from  the  same  collision  was  held  proper,  aut  may  enter  up  judgment  for  the  ex- 
Contra  to  tliese  decisions,  see  several  re-  cess.  Savage  v.  Davis  (1902),  131  N.  C. 
cent  cases  presenting  similar  facts,  cited  159,  42  S.  E.  571  :  Defendant  had  plain- 
in  last  note  but  one.  tiff  arrested  and  brought  before  a  justice 

QGutzman  v.  Clancy  (1902),  114  Wis.  of  the   peace  on  a  charge  of  having  ob- 

589,  90  N.  W.  1081  :  Holding  "that  the  tained  five  tons  of  guano  from  him,   the 

word  '  transaction  '  in  the  statute  is  broad  defendant,  by  false   pretences.      Plaintiff 

enough  to  include  an  entire,  continuous  sued  defendant  for  malicious  prosecution, 

phvsical  encounter,  and  that,  upon  couu-  and  defendant  pleaded  the  value  of  the 

ter-claim,  defendant  may  have  recovery  for  guano  as  a  set-off.     Held  proper.] 
his  damages  resulting   from  any  assault  '^  See  ante,  §  *  767. 

committed  upon  him  by  plaintiff  in  the 


922 


CIVIL  remi;dies. 


amount,  that  the  chattels  were  dehvered  to  him  as  a  security  for 
such  debt,  and  that  he  held  them  by  virtue  of  the  lien  thus 
created  by  the  pledge,  and  demanding  judgment  for  the  debt 
itself,  was  adjudged  a  proper  counter-claim.^  The  New  York 
Court  of  Appeals  has  also  sustained  the  counter-claim  under 
circumstances  involving  the  same  principle.^  The  result  of  these 
authorities  is,  that  a  cause  of  action  on  contract  for  money  may 
so  arise  out  of  the  transaction  which  is  the  foundation  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim  that  it  can  be  interposed  as  a  counter-claim  in  an 
action  brought  to  recover  the  possession  of  chattels.^     The  case 


^  Brown  v.  Buckingham,  11  Abb.  Pr. 
387  (Sp.  Term).  See  also  Walsh  v.  Hall, 
66  N.  C.  233,  237  ;  Wilson  v.  Hughes,  94 
N.  C.  182;  but  see  per  contra,  Gottler  v. 
Babcock,  7  Abb.  Pr.  392  (n.).  It  should 
be  noted  that  in  neither  of  the  North  Car- 
olina cases  was  the  objection  considered, 
that  the  counter-claim  does  not  tend  to 
defeat  or  modify  the  plaintiff's  recovery. 

2  Thompson  i-.  Kessel,  30  N.  Y.  383, 
389  ;  per  contra,  see  Moffat  v.  Van  Doren, 
4  Bosw.  609.  If  the  plaintiff  sues  for 
damages,  as  well  as  to  recover  possession, 
the  counter-claim  is,  of  course,  proper, 
although  the  claim  of  damages  was  not 
allowed  by  the  jury  ;  see  ante,  §  *  739  ; 
Lapham  v.  Osborne,  20  Nev.  168.  By  ex- 
press provision  of  the  Iowa  Code,  §  3226, 
there  can  be  no  counter-claim  in  an  action 
for  the  recovery  of  specific  personal  prop- 
erty. With  respect  to  lethal  counter- 
claims in  the  action  of  ejectment,  see 
Lawe  V.  Hyde,  39  Wis.  34.5 ;  Reed  v. 
Newton,  22  Minn.  541  ;  Haggin  v.  Clark, 
51  Cal.  112;  Moyle  v.  Porter,  51  id.  639; 
Whitlock  V.  Redford,  82  Ky.  390;  Car- 
penter V.  Hewel,  67  Cal.  589. 

"  QRennebaum  v.  Atkinson  (1898),  103 
Ky.  555,  45  S  W.  874  ;  Banning  v.  Mar- 
leau  (1894),  101  Cal.  238,  35  Pac.  772. 

Plaintiff  sold  defendant  a  tiireshing 
outfit,  and  took  back  a  chattel  mortgage 
for  a  pijrtion  of  the  purchase  price.  Plain- 
tiff subsequently  also  required  defendant 
to  insure  the  property,  and  agreed  that  it 
Would  procure  the  insurance.  The  prop- 
erty was  subserjuently  damaged  by  fire,  but 
no  insurance  had  been  taken  out.  Plaintiff 
brought  replevin,  and  defendant  pleaded 
as  a  counter-claim  the  loss  he  had  sus- 
tained by   reason  of   plaintiff's  failure   to 


procure  the  insurance.  Held  proper,  as 
arising  out  of  Uhe  contract  or  transac- 
tion set  forth  by  plaintiff:  Minneapolis 
Threshing  Co.  v.  Darnall  (1900),  13  S.  I). 
279,  83  N.  W.  266. 

"  In  an  action  of  replevin,  brought  by  a 
non-resident  mortgagee,  to  recover  posses- 
sion of  machinery  sold  to  defendant  and 
mortgaged  to  secure  the  purcha.se  price, 
the  defendant  .  .  .  may  counter-claim  dam- 
ages for  breach  of  warranty  of  the  goods 
sold,  and  also  damages  in  trying  to  oper- 
ate machinery  returned  to  the  pbiintiff 
and  for  which  the  mortgaged  property 
was  in  part  taken  in  exchange:"  Ault- 
man  Co.  v.  McDonough  (1901),  110  Wis. 
263,  85  N.  W.  980. 

Sections  3226  and  3245  of  the  Code  forbid 
the  allowance  of  counter-claims  in  actions 
to  recover  personal  property :  Palmer  r. 
Palmer  (1894),  90  la.  17,  57  N.  W.  645. 

Plaintiff  brought  an  action  for  the  pos- 
session of  personal  property,  and  defend- 
ant sought  to  set  up  a  counter-claim  for 
damages  sustained  by  reason  of  the  un- 
lawful seizure  of  said  property.  Held  not 
a  proper  counter-claim,  as  it  did  not  arise 
out  of  the  same  cause  of  action  and  did 
not  exist  at  the  commencement  of  the 
action.  Phipps  v.  Wilson  (1899),  125  N.  C. 
106,  34  S.  E.  227. 

"  In  a  replevin  action  for  property 
covered  by  a  chattel  mortgage  given  to 
secure  the  payment  of  a  note  owned  by 
plaintiff,  the  defendant,  under  a  general 
denial,  may  show  that  plaintiff  at  the 
commencement  of  the  suit  was,  and  still 
is,  indebted  to  him  for  labor  in  an  amount 
equal  to  the  amount  due  on  the  note :  " 
Davia  v.  Culver  (1899),  58  Neb.  265,  78 
N.  W.  .504.] 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


92; 


of  a  pecuniary  counter-claim  in  an  action  to  recover  possession  of 
lands  has  already  been  fully  discussed.^ 

§  668.  *  792.  Third  Class.  Cases  in  which  the  Plaintiffs  Cause 
of  Action  or  the  Defendant's  Counter-Claim,  or  both,  are  Equitable  in 
their  Nature.  The  general  subject  of  equitable  counter-claims  has 
already  been  examined,  and  illustrated  by  numerous  exampl&s. 
It  is  thoroughly  settled  as  a  fundamental  doctrine  of  the  new 
procedure  in  relation  to  pleading,  that  an  equitable  counter- 
claim may  be  interposed  to  a  legal  cause  of  action,  and  a  fortiori 
to  one  which  is  itself  equitable.  I  shall  not  repeat  the  discus- 
sion to  be  found  in  a  former  part  of  this  section,  but  shall  simply 
collect  in  the  note  a  few  examples  which  will  illustrate  the  modes 
by  which  such  species  of  cross-demands  may  arise  out  of  the  trans- 
actions set  forth  by  the  plaintiff  in  his  complaint  or  petition.^ 


1  HDinan  y.  Coneys  (1894),  143  N.  Y. 
544,38  N.  E.  715  ;  Wigmore  v.  Buell  ( 1897), 
116  Cal.  94,  47  Pac.  927  ;  Wilkins  v.  Sut- 
tles  (1894),  114  N.  C.  550,  19  S.  E.  606; 
Nevvlaad  v.  Morris  (1902),  115  Wis.  207, 
91  N.  W.  664. 

In  ejectment  a  defendant  cannot  set  off 
a  demand  for  improvements  to  an  amount 
greater  than  the  claim  for  mesne  profits, 
and  obtain  affirmative  relief  for  the  dif- 
ference. The  set-off  can  be  u.sed  defen- 
sively only:  Dudley  v.  Johnson  (1897), 
102  Ga.  1,  29  S.  E.  50.  But  see  Mills  u. 
Geer(1900),  111  Ga.  275,  36  S.  E.  673, 
where  it  was  held  that  under  the  act  of 
December  21,  1897,  in  a  suit  to  recover 
land,  the  defendant  who  has  bond  Jide 
posses.sion  of  such  land  under  adverse 
claim  of  title  may  plead  as  a  set-off  the 
value  of  all  permanent  improvements 
bona  fide  placed  thereon  by  himself  or 
other  ionayjafe  claimants  under  whom  he 
asserts  title. 

Falck  V.  Marsh  (1894),  88  Wis  680, 
61  N.  W.  287  :  "  In  ejectment  the  grantee 
of  a  life  tenant  by  quitclaim  deed  cannot 
counter-claim  for  the  value  of  improve- 
ments made  and  taxes  paid  by  him  while 
holding  under  such  deed,  as  against  the 
owner  of  the  fee.  Such  a  deed  cannot  be 
made  the  basis  of  an  adverse  holding  of 
the  fee  in  remainder." 

"Comp.  Laws  Dak.  1887,  §  5455,  de- 
clares that,  in  an  action  for  the  recovery  of 
real  property  npon  which  permanent  im- 


provements have  been  made  by  a  defend- 
ant claiming  to  hold  under  color  of  title 
in  good  faith,  the  value  of  such  improve- 
ments must  be  allowed  as  a  counter- 
claim:" Skelly  V.  Warren  (1903),  —  S.  1). 
— ,  94  N.  W.  408  (Syllabus).^ 

2  Sandford  v.  Travers,  40  N.  Y.  140, 
143  ;  Akerly  v.  Vilas,  15  Wis.  401  ;  Allen 
V.  Shackelton,  15  Ohio  St.  145,  147  ;  Mo- 
berly  v.  Alexander,  19  Iowa,  162;  Hill 
V.  Butler,  6  Ohio  St.  207,  216;  Foss  v. 
Newbury,  20  Ore.  257.  The  foregoing 
were  foreclosure  .suits  of  purchase-money 
mortgages,  in  which  the  mortgagor  coun- 
ter-claimed damages  for  the  breach  of  the 
covenants  of  title  in  the  plaintiff's  deeds, 
or  for  the  breach  of  some  other  collateral 
agreement,  or  for  the  plaintiff's  fraud; 
but  in  such  an  action  a  counter-claim  for 
a  slander  of  title  in  respect  to  the  land 
cannot  be  sustained  :  Akerly  v.  Vilas,  21 
Wis.  88,  109;  Briggs  v.  Seymour,  17  Wis. 
255.  It  has  been  intimated  that  in  a 
mortgage  foreclosure  suit  a  counter-claim 
of  debt  or  damages  on  any  contract  is 
proper:  Briggs  v.  Seymour,  17  Wis.  255. 
The  following  were  actions  for  other  kiuds 
of  equitable  relief  :  Grimes  ?;.  Duzan,  32 
Ind.  361  ;  Woodruff  r.  Garner,  27  Ind.  4 
(actions  to  set  aside  a  deed  of  land) ; 
Ea.stman  v.  Linn,  20  Minn.  433  (to  quiet 
title);  Vail  y.  Jones,  31  Ind.  467;  Pow- 
der V.  Bowdle  (N.  Dak.  1893),  54  N.  W. 
Kep.  404  (to  quiet  title)";  Grignon  v. 
Black,  76  Wis.  674  (action  to  enjoin  waste. 


924 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


III.  C>i8f'S  in  which  the  Cause  of  Action  Alleged  by  the  Defendant 
as  a  Counter-Claim  is  or  is  not  connected  with  the  Subject  of 
the  Action. 

§  669.  *793.  References  to  Cases  already  Cited.  Little  need 
be  added  under  this  particular  head  to  what  has  been  alread}*  said 
in  the  foregoing  subdivisions.  The  cases  cited  in  the  preliminary 
general  discussion  contain  all  the  most  important  attempts  to 
give  a  judicial  construction  to  the  phrase  "connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action :  "  many  of  those  which  have  been  quoted  to 
explain  and  illustrate  the  clause  "  arising  out  of  the  transaction," 
etc.,  were  also  referred  by  the  courts  which  decided  them  to  the 
language  of  the  statutory  definition  now  under  consideration,  — 
tliat  is,  the  counter-claims  were  held  valid  because  they  were  ''  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  action,"  as  well  as  because  they 
"  arose  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in  the  complaint."  Finally, 
it  may  be  said  that  each  one  of  the  cases  in  which  the  counter-claim 
was  overruled  is  an  illustration  of  a  demand  in  favor  of  the 
defendant  not  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action.^ 


counter-claim  to  quiet  title  to  the  prem- 
ises) ;  but  if  the  cross-demand  does  not 
arise  out  of  the  transaction  which  is  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action,  and  is  not  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject of  liis  action,  it  cannot  lie  a  counter- 
claim, Town  of  Venice  v.  Breed,  65  Barb. 
597,  605;  Tallman  v.  Barnes,  54  Wis.  181. 
See  recent  cases  cited  ante  under  §  *7r)4  ; 
also  in  last  note  under  §  *824.  [^Rens- 
berger  i-.  Britton  (1903),  — Col.  — ,  71  Pac. 
379J 

1  {^President,  etc.  of  Ins.  Co.  v.  Parker 
(1902),  64  Neb  411,  89  N.  W.  1040;  Mc- 
Hard  c.  Williams  (1896),  8  S.  I).  381,  66 
N.  W.  930;  Aultman  Co.  i\  McDonough 
(1901),  110  Wis.  263,  85  N.  W.  980;  Pio- 
neer Press  Co.  V.  Hutchinson  (1896),  63 
Minn.  481,  65  N.  W.  938;  Sheiblev  v. 
Dixon  County  (1901),  61  Neb.  409,  85 
N.  W.  399;  Stolze  v.  Torrison  (1903),— 
Wis  — ,  95  N.  W.  114;  Kuhn  r.  Sol. 
Ileavenrich  Co.  (1902),  115  Wis.  447,  91 
N.  W.  994;  Duffger  v.  Dempsey  (1895), 
13  Wash.  396,  43  Pac.  357  ;  B.irr  v.  Post 
(1898),  56  Neb.  698,  77  N.  W.  123  ;  Wilcke 
V.  Wilcke  (1897),  102  la.  173,  71  N.  W. 
201. 

.Stillwell  V.  Duncan  (189S),  103  Ky.  .59, 


44  S.  W.  357  :  In  an  action  of  quare 
cJausum /regit,  based  on  the  bare  possession 
of  the  plaintiff,  defendant  may  plead  title 
and  also  maintain  a  counter-claim  for  dam- 
ages to  the  property  during  the  time  that 
plaintiff  was  in  possession.  Such  counter- 
claim is  connected  with  the  subject  of  the 
action,  which  is  the  land  in  controversy. 

To  an  action  for  work  and  labor  in 
cutting  timber  trees,  defendant  filed  a 
counter-claim  for  damages  by  reason  of 
plaintiff  negligently  permitting  fire  to 
escape  while  engaged  in  the  work  for 
which  he  sues.  Held  a  proper  matter  for  a 
counter-claim  as  connected  with  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  action  :  Branch  v.  Chap- 
pell  (ISOiV),  119  N.  C.  81,25  S.  E.  783. 

Plaintiff  sued  defendant  for  a  libel 
published  in  defendant's  paper.  Just  pre- 
vious to  the  libel  the  plaintiff,  a  stockholder 
of  defendant  company,  maliciously  and 
without  ])robable  cause,  as  defendant  al- 
leged, commenced  a  suit  for  dissolution  of 
the  company,  to  the  defendant's  damage, 
and  these  facts  defendant  pleaded  as  a 
counter-claim.  Held  that  the  action  for 
malicious  prosecution  w.ns  connected  with 
the  subject  of  the  action  and  hence  a 
proper  matter  for  counter-claim:   Cincin- 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


92: 


§  670  *  794.  Construction  of  the  Phrases  "  Subject  of  the  Action," 
"  Counected  with,"  and  "  Arising  out  of."  The  language  of  the 
phrase  is  exceedingly  general  and  vague.     To  construe  it  requires 


nati  Daily  Tribune  Co.  r.  Bruck  (1900), 
61  Ohio  St.  489,  .56  N.  E.  198. 

lu  au  action  on  a  judgment  the  defend- 
ant may,  by  way  of  counter-claim,  set  up 
facts  which  would  justify  a  court  of  equity 
in  cancelling  the  judgment  on  the  ground 
that  no  summons  was  ever  served  on  him, 
such  cause  of  action  being  counected  with 
the  subject  of  the  plaintiff's  action  ;  that 
is,  the  ju(]gment :  Vaule  w.  Miller  (1897), 
69  Minn.  440,  72  N.  W.  452.  In  an  action 
to  quiet  title  to  real  property,  a  cross- 
complaint  alleging  ownersliip  and  demand- 
ing possession  and  damages  pleads  matters 
"  connected  with  the  cause  of  action  "  in 
the  complaint  and  constitutes  a  proper 
counter-claim  :  Gill'enwaters  v.  Campbell 
<189.5),  142  lud.  529,  41  N.  E.  1041. 

I'laintiff  brought  an  action  to  have  a 
mortgaj^e  upon  certain  land  reformed. 
Defendant,  the  mortgagee,  admitted  the 
mistake  in  the  mortgage,  and  by  way  of 
counter-claim  asked  to  have  the  mortgage, 
as  reformed,  foreclosed.  As  a  second 
counter-claim  defendant  asked  to  have  a 
second  mortgage  upon  the  same  land,  be- 
tween tlie  same  parties,  reformed  and 
foreclosed.  Held,  both  counter-claims  were 
proper,  the  first  as  a  cause  of  action  aris- 
ing out  of  the  contract  or  transaction  set 
forth  in  plaintiff's  complaint,  the  sec- 
ond as  connected  with  the  subject  of  the 
action :  Lahiff  v.  Hennepin  County,  etc. 
Ass'n  (1895),  61  Minn.  226,  63  N.  W. 
49.3. 

A  tenant  in  common,  who  had  control 
of  the  renting  of  premises  held  in  com- 
mon, was  sued  by  his  co-tenant  for  his 
share  of  the  rents,  and  the  defendant 
counter-claimed  for  damages  sustained 
by  him  because  the  plaintiff  wrongfully 
induced  lessees  of  such  premises  to  leave 
before  their  leases  expired,  thereby  caus- 
ing him  to  lose  his  share  of  rents  which 
would  have  accrued  but  for  such  inter- 
ference. The  court  sustained  the  counter- 
claim on  the  ground  that  it  was  a  demand 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action, 
entering  into  a  somewhat  full  discussion 
of  the  phrase  "  subject  of  the  action," 
and   holding  it  to  be  the  rent  of  the  lots  : 


Dale  V.  Hall  (1897),  64  Ark.  221,  41  S.  W. 
761. 

In  a  suit  to  compel  specific  perform- 
ance of  a  contract  to  convey  land,  a  de- 
fendant cannot,  by  way  of  counter-claim, 
ask  foreclosure  of  a  mortgage  on  the  same 
land  given  by  plaintiff  to  defendant.  The 
decision  turned  upon  the  question  whether 
the  two  demands  were  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action.  The  court  said, ''  Is 
it  [the  counter-claim  asking  for  fore- 
closure] connected  with  the  subject  of  the 
action  ?  It  is  sometimes  difficult  to  de- 
termine when  a  cianse  of  action  set  forth 
in  a  counter-claim  is  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action.  We  think,  however, 
in  this  case  that  the  cause  of  action  set  up 
in  the  counter-claim  is  a  separate  and  in- 
dependent cause  of  action,  not  connected 
with  the  cause  of  action  set  forth  in  the 
original  complaint.  The  original  action 
was  to  enforce  specific  performance  of  a 
contract  to  convey  land.  The  cross  com- 
plaint asked  a  decree  to  foreclose  a  mort- 
gage upon  the  land.  It  seems  clear  that 
there  was  no  connection  between  the  causes 
of  action."  The  opinion  proceeds  upon 
the  assumption  that  the  terms  "  cause  of 
action  "  and  "  subject  of  the  action  "  are 
exactly  synonymous,  which  is  clearly 
erroneous.  Wood  J.,  in  his  dissenting 
opinion,  is  more  discriminating,  and  con- 
sidering the  land  itself  as  the  subject  of 
the  action  he  finds  no  reason  to  reject  the 
counter-claim  :  Hays  v.  McLain  (1899),  66 
Ark.  400,  50    S.  W.  1006. 

A  suit  was  brought  by  a  grantor  to  set 
aside  a  deed  to  city  lots  on  the  ground  of 
fraud,  and  defendant  pleaded  a  prior  fraud 
of  plaintiff  practised  upon  him  in  the  pur- 
chase by  defendant  from  a  third  person  of 
farm  lands,  for  which  defendant  conveyed 
these  city  lots.  Held,  not  a  proper  coun- 
ter-claim :  Rensberger  i\  Britton  (1903), 
—  Col.  — ,  71  Pac.  379. 

Smith  V.  Building  Ass'n  (1896),  119 
N.  C.  257,  26  S.  E.  40 :  In  an  action  to 
recover  twice  the  amount  of  usurious  in- 
terest paid,  tlie  defendant  may  set  up  a 
counter-claim  for  the  debt  on  which  the 
interest  was   paid,    whether   the   original 


•926 


CIVIL    REMEDIES. 


a  satisfactory  interpretation  of  the  terms  "  subject  of  the  action  " 
and  "  connected  with."     It  may,  I  think,  be  regarded  as  settled 


action  be  considered  in  tort  or  contract, 
since  such  counter-claim  arises  "  out  of 
the  contract  or  transaction  set  forth  in 
tlie  complaint  as  the  foundation  of  the 
plaintiff's  claim,  or  is  connected  with 
the  subject  of  the  action." 

First  Nat'l  Bank  r.  Heun  (1901),  63 
Kan.  334,  65  I'ac.  698 :  In  an  action  to 
foreclose  a  mortgage  by  one  holding  it  by 
assignment  in  trust  for  certain  outstand- 
injx  obligations,  said  mortgage  iiaving 
been  left  in  the  hands  of  the  mortgagee 
to  be  cared  for  and  renewed  if  necessary, 
the  assignee  of  property  {i.  e.  vendee) 
may  counter-claim  loss  resulting  from 
failure  of  mortgagee  or  trustee  to  notify 
insurance  company  of  transfer  of  property. 

Dowdell  i:  Carpy  (1902),  137  Cal.  333, 
70  Pac.  167  :  Where  a  decree  of  fore- 
closure was  reversed  only  as  to  certain 
property  included  in  the  mortgage,  and 
was  finally  affirmed  as  to  all  other  prop- 
erly included  tiiereiu,  the  mortgagee,  in 
an  action  for  restitution  by  tlie  mort- 
f^'igor,  mny  counter-claim  the  amount  of 
the  deficiency  judgment  against  them. 
Sncl)  judgment  arose  out  of  the  same 
transaction  and  was  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  action. 

See  First  Nat.  Bank  of  Snohomish  v. 
Parker  (1902),  28  Wash.  234,  C8  Pac.  756  : 
An  action  to  foreclose  a  mortgage  on  real 
estate,  the  complaint  being  in  the  usual 
fuirn.  The  counter-claim  was  "  that  plain- 
tiff, through  its  cashier  Snyder,  brought 
an  action  in  1896  for  the  possession  of  the 
mortgaged  premises  against  the  defend- 
ant, and  in  said  action  had  a  writ  of  res- 
titution issued  ;  tiiat  plaintiff  thereupon 
went  into  possession  of  the  })remises,  and 
retained  such  possession  until  tlie  final 
determination  of  the  action,  when  defend- 
ant was  restored  to  the  possession  of  the 
premises  :  that  by  reason  of  plaintiff's  re- 
tention of  the  possession  of  the  mortgaged 
premises  defendant  was  damaged  in  the 
sum  of  SI 970,  and  the  specification  of  the 
damages  is  made.  Plaintiff  demurred  to 
the  affirmative  defences  and  counter- 
claim Tlie  demurrer  of  the  defence  was 
sustained  and  that  to  the  counter-claim 
overrulfd.     A   jury   was  called  to  assess 


the  damages  alleged  in  the  counter-claim. 
The  court,  after  reducing  the  assessment 
of  damages  to  some  extent,  affirmed  the 
finding  of  the  jury,  and  allowed  $1,000 
counter-claim,  and  decreed  foreclosure  for 
the  remainder  due  u))ou  the  mortgage. 
Both  parties  appealed.  "  Plaintiff  assigns 
as  error  the  overruling  of  the  demurrer 
to  the  counter-claim,  and  the  reduction  of 
the  amount  due  upon  the  mortgage  in  the 
amount  of  the  counter-claim.  It  is  main- 
tained by  counsel  for  plaintiff  that  the  de- 
murrer to  the  counter-claim  should  have 
been  sustained,  that  tlie  allowance  of  any 
counter-claim  in  the  action  was  error,  and 
that  the  damages  specified  were  not  the 
subject  of  counter-claim  within  Bal.  Code, 
§  4913."  In  disposing  of  the  (juestion,  the 
court  by  Beavis  C.  J.  said  :  "  Subd.  I.  of 
the  section  permits  a  counter-claim  '  m  an 
action  arising  out  of  the  contract  or  trans- 
action set  forth  in  the  complaint  as  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  or  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  action.' 
The  construction  of  this  section  and 
similar  language  in  other  codes  has  not 
been  uniform  or  clear.  See  Pomeroy, 
Remedies  &  Remedial  Rights,  §  775 
p775];  Collier  r.  Krvin,  3  Mont.  142. 
The  general  rule  is  that  the  statute  au- 
thorizing a  counter-claim  should  be  liber- 
ally construed.  It  is  said  in  22  Am.  & 
Eng.  Enc.  Law,  p.  396 :  '  In  actions  in 
which  either  a  contract  or  a  transaction 
which  is  not  a  contract,  is  set  forth  as  the 
foundation  of  the  plaintiff's  claim,  coun- 
ter-claims may  be  interposed  which  neither 
arise  out  of  the  same  contract  nor  out  of 
the  same  transaction,  if  they  are  connected 
with  the  subject  of  the  action.  The  sub- 
ject of  an  action  is  either  the  property 
which  is  thereby  sought  to  be  recovered 
or  alleged  to  be  injured,  or  a  violated 
right  or  the  right  to  enforce  or  maintain 
which  the  action  is  brought.' 

"  It  would  seem  in  the  present  action  that 
virtually  the  same  parties  are  in  contro- 
versy as  were  in  the  case  of  Snyder,  who 
is  the  cashier  of  j)laintiff,  against  Parker 
and  rejiorted  in  19  Wash.  276  (.53  Pac.  59, 
07  Am.  St  Rep.  720).  In  that  case  the 
plaintiff  claimed  the  prcmisr'S  under  a  deed 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  9_/ 

that  the  connection  here  spoken  of  must  be  direct  and  immediate. 
At  the  same  time  it  must  be  considered  as  sometliing  different  from 
"  arising  out  of;  "  in  other  words,  the  defendant's  cause  of  action 
may  be  sufficiently  "  connected  witli  the  subject  of  the  action," 
although  it  do  not  '•'•arise  out  of  the  transaction."  It  can  hardly 
be  said,  however,  that  the  courts  have  definitely  settled  what  is 
a  sufficient  connection  of  itself,  when  not  so  complete  that  the 
defendant's  cause  of  action  could  also  be  said  to  arise  out  of  the 
transaction  set  forth  by  the  plaintiff ;  unfortunately,  in  nearly  all 
tlie  cases  where  the  judges  have  held  that  the  counter-claim  was 
connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action  according  to  the  true 
meaning  of  the  statute,  they  have  also  said  that  it  arose  out  of  the 
transaction  stated  in  the  complaint.  The  most  that  can  be  as- 
serted with  any  degree  of  assurance  is,  that  the  connection  must 
be  immediate  and  direct,  and  something  that  the  parties  can  be 
assumed  to  have  contemplated  in.  their  dealings  with  each  other.^ 
I  shall  merely  cite  in  the  note  a  few  cases  which  contain  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  clause,  and  serve  to  illustrate  and  explain  its  scope 
and  operation.^ 


absolute  in  form,  which,  however,  was 
adjudi^ed  to  be  a  mortgage  and  only  a  lien 
on  the  premises.  In  the  case  at  bar  the 
action  is  to  foreclose  a  lien  upon  the  same 
property.  It  would  seem  that,  by  the  acts 
authorized  by  the  plaintiff  in  taking  and 
holding  possession  of  the  premises,  and 
which  were  found  to  be  injurious,  the  sub- 
ject-matter of  the  lien  was  damaged,  and 
that  the  defendant  is  entitled  to  such 
damages,  and  we  think  in  this  case  that 
the  realty  may  properly  be  held  as  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  the  action. 
Metropolitan  T.  Co.  v.  Tonawanda,  etc. 
R.  R.  Co.,  43  Hun,  521 ;  Tinsley  v.  Tinsley, 
15  B.  Mon.  454.  Upon  the  record  here  we 
are  not  disposed  to  disturb  tlie  finding  of 
the  amount  of  the  counter-claim. "3 

1  [Sheibley  v.  Dixon  County  (1901).  CI 
Neb.  409,  85  N.  W.  399  •  "  The  phrase 
'  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action  ' 
should  be  construed  liberally  to  prevent  a 
multiplicity  of  actions."  Le  Clare  i'. 
Thibault  (1902),  41  Ore.  601,  69  Pac.  552  : 
"  The  connection  of  the  counter-claim 
with  the  subject  of  the  suit,  to  render  it 
available,  must  be  direct  and  immediate, 
and   such   as  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 


that  the  parties  had  in  contemplation 
when  dealing  with  each  other."  Text 
§  *  794  cited.3 

2  Ashley  v.  Marshall,  29  N.  Y.  494  ; 
Vose  I'.  Galpen,  18  Abb.  Pr.  96;  Xenia 
Branch  Bk.  v.  Lee,  7  Abb.  Pr.  372  ;  2 
Bosw.  694  ;  McAdow  v.  Ross,  53  Mo  199, 
207  ;  Jones  i-.  Moore,  42  Mo.  413  ;  McAr- 
thur  V.  Green  Bay  &  Miss.  Canal  Co  ,  34 
Wis.  139,  146;  Eastman  y.  Linn,  20  Minn. 
4.33  ;  Walsh  v.  Hall,  66  N.  C.  233,  237  ; 
Bitting  V.  Thaxton,  72  N.  C.  541,  549; 
Thompson  v.  Kessel,  30  N.  Y.  383,  389 ; 
Vilas  V.  Mason,  25  Wis.  310,  319;  Judali 
r.  Vincennes  Univ.  Trs.,  16  Ind.  56,  60; 
Wadley  v.  Davis,  63  Barb.  500  ;  Waugen- 
heim  »■  Graham,  39  Cal.  169,  176;  Kolle 
V  Thompson,  3  Mete.  (Ky.)  121.  See 
Glen  &  Hall  Manuf.  Co.  v.  HalJ,  61  N.  Y. 
226,  236,  where  it  was  held  that  the  subject 
of  the  action  was  the  device  constituting 
the  trade-mark.  See  also  Powder  v.  Bow- 
die  (N.  Dak.  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  404; 
Grange  v.  Gilbert,  44  Hun,  9  ;  Mulberger 
I'.  Koenig,  62  Wis.  5.58  (the  "subject  of 
the  action "  is  identical  with  the  facts 
constituting  the  plaintiffs'  cause  of  ac- 
tion) ;    Lehmair   v.    Griswold,   40   N.    Y. 


928  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

C     CunUr- Claims  Embraced  u'ithin  the  Second  Subdivision  of  the 
Statutory  Definition  and  Set-offs. 

§  671.  *  795.  Statutory  Provision.  Limitatiou  upon  the  Discus- 
sion herein.  The  form  of  this  provision,  as  fouud  in  the  codes 
which  make  up  the  first  group,  as  originally  classified  at  the 
commencement  of  this  section,  is,  ""  2.  In  an  action  arising  on 
contract,  any  other  cause  of  action  also  arising  on  contract,  and 
existing  at  the  commencement  of  the  action."  This  is  substan- 
tially the  definition  of  "set-off  "  given  in  the  codes  of  the  second 
group.  The  language  of  this  clause  plainly  includes  all  cases 
of  counter-claim  based  on  contract  when  the  plaintiff's  cause  of 
action  is  also  on  contract.  Since,  however,  the  first  branch  of 
the  definition  covers  all  those  instances  where  the  counter-claim 
and  the  plaintiff's  right  of  action  both  spring  from  the  same  con- 
tract, the  discussion  of  this  second  subdivision  will  be  confined 
to  the  instances  in  which,  the  cause  of  action  being  on  contract, 
the  counter-claim  arises  from  a  different  contract.^  For  the 
reasons  before  given,  and  which  need  not  therefore  be  repeated, 
this  construction  of  the  two  parts  into  which  the  entire  definition 
is  divided  seems  to  mo  to  be  in  conformity  with  the  plain  intent 
of  the  legislature  and  the  evident  design  of  the  statute. 

§672.  *  796.  statute  enlarges  Former  Legal  "Set-off"  and  is 
Broader  in  its  Operation  than  "  Equitable  Set-oflF."  DiflBcult  Ques- 
tions herein.  Order  of  Treatment.  In  reference  to  the  most 
important  and  controlling  requisite  of  this  provision  and  that 
defining  set-off,  no  questions  of  difficulty  can  arise,  since  the 
language  itself  is  so  simple  and  direct  that  no  room  is  left  for 

Super.  Ct.  100  (same)  ;  Carpenter  v.  Man-  r.  Kinsman,  18  S.  C.  108  ("  subject  of  the 

hattau  L.  Ins.  Co.,  93  N.  Y.  552  (in  con-  action  "  denotes  tlie  plaintiff's  main  pri- 

version,  the  "subject    of  the   action"   is  mary  right,  to  support  or  enforce  which 

the   chattel   converted)  ;    Adams  v.   Loo-  the  action  is  brought).     [^Watts  v.  Gantt 

mis  (Supreme,  1889),  8  N.  Y.   Suppl.  17  (1894),  42  Neb.  8G9,  61  N.   \V.  104;  Hays 

(same)  ;  Revere  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Chamber-  v.  McLain  (1899),  CO  Ark.  400,  50  S.    W. 

liu,  56  Iowa,  508  (in  an  action  to  cancel  1006;  Gurske  v.  Kelpin   (1901),  CI   Neb. 

an  insurance  policy,  the  "subject  of  the  517,  85  N.  W.  557  ;  Walserc  Wear  (1897), 

action  "  is  the  policy  itself,  and  a  cause  141  Mo.  44.3,  42  S.  W.  928/] 

of  action  thereon  for  loss  of  the  property  i  Qllarden  v.  Lang  (1900),  1 10  (Ja.  392, 

insured  is  a  proper  counter-claim);  Cor-  36  S.  K.   100;  Rell  ;•.    Oben  &  Sons  Co. 

nclius  V.  Kessel,  58   Wis.  237    (in   eject-  (1900),  111  (la.  668.  36  S.  E.  904 ;  Jones  y. 

ment,  tlie  "  subject  of  the  action  "  is  the  Swank  (1893),  54  Minn.  259,  —  N.  W.  — ; 

land  in  controversy)  ;  Lapham  v.  Osborne,  Conner  r.  Scott  (1897),  10  Wash.  371,  47 

20  Nev.  168  (in  replevin,  the  "subject  of  Pac  76]  ;  Richard.son  r.  Penny  (1900),  10 

the  action  "  is  the  ch:>ttf'l  in  controversy)  ;  Okla.  32,  61  Pac.  584.] 
Humbert  v.  Brisbane,  25  S.  C.  506  ;  Sharj) 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  929 

doubt  as  to  the  construction.  If  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action 
arises  on  contract,  any  counter-claim,  legal  or  equitable,  or  set- 
off, also  arising  on  contract,  is  admissible,  provided  the  general 
rule  heretofore  stated  is  complied  with,  that  the  relief  granted 
to  the  defendant  shall  in  some  manner  interfere  with,  lessen,  or 
modify,  if  not  destroy,  that  otherwise  obtained  by  the  plaintiff. 
This  clause  greatly  enlarges  the  scope  of  the  former  legal  "set- 
off," for  it  admits  demands  for  unliquidated  damages  as  well  as 
for  debts  or  amounts  ascertained  and  fixed  by  the  stipulations  of 
the  parties.^  It  is  also  much  broader  in  its  operation  than  the 
"equitable  set-oft","  which  was  permitted  by  courts  of  chancery, 
for  affirmative  equitable  relief  may  be  obtained  by  the  defendant 
which  would  come  within  no  description  of  an  "equitable  set-off," 
as  the  term  was  formerly  understood.  So  far  as  relates  to  the 
subject-matter,  therefore,  in  all  actions  to  recover  money,  either 
debt  or  damages  arising  on  contract,  any  counter-claim  of  debt 
or  damages  arising  on  another  contract  is  valid.  When  the  relief 
asked  for  by  the  plaintiff,  or  that  demanded  by  the  defendant,  is 
equitable,  whether  the  counter-claim  is  proper  must  depend  upon 
the  nature  of  these  reliefs ;  that  is,  upon  the  fact  of  their  inter- 
fering with  each  other  so  that  one  tends  to  destroy,  or  at  least  to 
modify,  the  other.  While  there  can  be  little  or  no  difficulty, 
therefore,  in  applying  this  provision,  so  far  as  the  subject-matter 
of  the  counter-claim  is  concerned,  certain  collateral  questions  are 
presented,  either  expressly  or  impliedly,  by  the  clause,  which  are 
not  always  so  easy  of  solution.  One  of  these  is  involved  in  the 
requirement  that  the  cause  ot  action  constituting  the  counter- 
claim must  be  "existing  at  the  commencement  of  the  action." 
Another  is  implied  in  the  phrase  "arising  on  contract."  Can 
a  cause  of  action  be  said  to  "arise  on  contract"  when  it  results 
from  facts  which  amount  to  a  tort,  and  would  enable  the  injured 
party  to  bring  an  action  in  form  ex  delicto  ?  In  other  words,  can 
either  party  resort  to  an  election  between  two  kinds  of  proceed- 
ings, and  thus  make  his  suit  or  counter-claim  in  form  "arising 
on  contract  "  so  as  to  satisfy  the  requisites  of  the  statute?  In 
treating  of  the  topics  thus  suggested,  I  shall,  first,  consider 
the  general  requirement  that  the  cause  of  action  constituting  the 

1  QShelton  v.  Conant  (1894),  10  Wash.  (1894),  41  Neb.  149,  59  N.  W.359  ;  Boyer 
193,  38  Tac.  1013  ;  Niver  ;'.  Nash  (1893),  v.  Robinson  (1901),  26  Wash.  117,  66  I'ac. 
7  Wash.  558,  35  Pac.  380  ;  Burge  v.  Gandy     119.] 

59 


930  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

counter-claim  must  be  existing  at  the  commencement  of  the 
action;  and  shall,  secondly^  collect  and  classify  the  various  cases 
which  have  been  determined  by  the  courts,  and  which  furnish 
examples  of  counter-claims  arising  from  different  contracts.  In 
this  review  the  question  how  far  a  party  may,  for  the  purposes 
of  complying  with  this  statute,  elect  between  an  action  for  a  tort 
and  an  action  on  contract,  will  be  answered.^ 

§  673.  *  TUT.  Requisites  of  Counter-Claim  under  this  Clause  of 
the  Statute.  The  codes  do  not  require  that  the  contract  out  of 
which  the  counter-claim  arises  should  have  been  originally  made 
with  the  defendant.  The  demand  may  have  once  been  in  favor 
of  some  third  person,  and  by  him  assigned  to  the  defendant. 
When  this  is  the  case,  the  provision  under  review,  as  found  in 
most  of  the  codes,  makes  it  necessary  that  the  assignment  should 
be  fully  completed  before  the  action  is  commenced,  or  else  the 
cause  of  action  could  not  be  "existing"  in  the  defendant  at  the 
"commencement  of  the  action."  ^  In  the  second  place,  the  right 
of  action,  which  is  the  basis  of  the  counter-claim,  must  have 
accrued  before  the  commencement  of  the  action;  the  debt  or 
damages  must  be  both  due  and  payable,  or  the  claim  for  equi- 

'  The  following  are   recent   decisions  826;    Sweetser  v.  People's  Bank  (1897), 

illustrating   this  class  of  counter-claims:  69  Minn.  196,71  N.  W.  934. 
Bathgate   r.    Haskin,  59  N.  Y.  533,  539,  Thomas  v.  Exchange  Bank  (1896),  99 

540;    I'atterson  v.  Patterson,  59  id.   574,  la.  202,  68  N.  W.  780:  One  Pearson  was 

1  Hun,  323;  Tavlor  r.  The  Mayor,  etc.,  82  indebted  to  a  bank  in  the  sum  of  -SlOOQ. 

N.  Y.   10;    We.stervelt   v.  Aciiley,  62  id.  He  had  on  deposit  in  said  bank  $1044.50. 

505  ;    2  Hun,  258  ;  4  T.  &,  C.  444  ;  Van  He  then  drew  drafts  upon  the  hank  to  the 

Brunt  V.  Day,  81  N.  Y  251  ;   17  Hun,  166  ;  amount  of  $1195,  and  immediately  there- 

Clapp  V.  Wright,  21   Hun,  240;  Wilson  v.  after  made  a  general  assignment  for  the 

Runkel,  38  W^is.  526;  Chapman  v.  Plum-  benefit  of  creditors.     Tlie  bank  learned  of 

mer,  36   id.    262;  Foulks   v.    Rhodes,    12  the   assignment   before   the    drafts    were 

Nev.  225;  Carver  r.  Shelly,  17  Kan.  472;  presented,  and  refused    payment   for  the 

Greer   v.    Greer,    24    id.    102  ;    Quinn    c.  rea.wn  that  it  wislied  to  set  off  its  claim 

Smith,  49  Cal.   163;  Wheelock  v.  Pacific  against  the  deposit,  altliough  its  claim  was 

Pneumatic  Gas  Co.,  51  id.  223;  Humphrey  evidenced  by  a  note  not  due.     Held,  that 

V.  Merritt,  51   Ind.  197;  Hart  v.  Housten,  when  the  debtor  is  insolvent  a  bank  may 

50  id.  327;  Grover  &  B.  Sewing  Mach.  Co.  offset  as  against  a  debt  not  due  any  sum 

V.  Newby,  58  id.  570;  Town  r.  Bringolf,  which  it  may  be  owing  to  the  debtor,  nn- 

47  Iowa,  133;  Tolman  v.   Johnson,  43  id.  less  the  account  which  it  owes  has  been 

127.  pledged  to  some   ^ippcific  purpose  or  im- 

[|First  Nat.   Bank  v.    Riggins    (1899),  pre.s.sed  with  a  trust.] 
124  N.  C.   534,  32   S.  E.  801  ;  Helms   v.  2  Kgyn.dds  v.    Smith,    28    Kan.    810; 

Harclerode  (1902),  65  Kan.  736,  70  Pac.  Enter  !\  Que.sse,  30  8.  C.  126;  Skaggs  v. 

866;  Mercer  I'.  Dyer  (1895),  15  Mont.  317,  Given,  29  Mo.  App.  612;  Todd  v.  Crut- 

39  Pac.  314;  Waiters  y.  Eaves  (1898),  105  singer,   30    Mo.    App.    145;     Ru.ssell    i;. 

Cia.  584,  32  S.  E.  609  ;  St.  Paul,  etc.  Trust  Koouce.  104  N.  C.  237.     QIack  v.  Hosmer 

Co.  V.  Leek  (1894),  57  Minn.  87,  58  N.  W.  (1596),  97  la.  17,  65  N.  W.  1009.] 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


931 


table  relief  must  be  perfect,  so  that  a  suit  to  enforce  it  could  be 
maintained,  or  else  the  cause  of  action  would  not  be  "  existing  " 
in  the  defendant  at  the  time  specified  in  the  statute.  ^  If,  then, 
an  existing  right  of  action  is  assigned  to  the  defendant  after  the 
action  against  him  is  commenced ;  or  if  a  claim  on  contract  is 
transferred  to  him  before  that  time,  but  does  not  become  due 
and  payable  or  enforceable  until  after  the  suit  is  begun;  or, 
lastly,  if  a  claim  is  existing  in  favor  of  the  defendant  at  the 
time  the  action  is  commenced  by  virtue  of  a  contract  originally 
made  with  him,  but  does  not  become  payable  or  enforceable  until 
after  that  time,  —  in  none  of  these  cases  can  the  demand  be  set 
up  by  him  as  a  counter-claim  in  the  action.  The  answer  must 
also  allege  that  the  demand  was  existing  in  favor  of  the  defend- 
ant when  the  action  was  commenced. ^  These  positions  are  fully 
sustained  by  the  decisions.^ 


1  Russell  V.  Koonce,  104  N.  C.  237; 
Mayo  V.  Davidge,  44  Hun,  342.  In  one 
or  two  of  the  codes,  however,  it  is  suffi- 
cient that  the  demand  is  due  and  payable 
wlien  pleaded,  if  it  was  held  by  the  de- 
fendant at  the  time  the  action  was  com- 
menced. Shannon  v.  Wilson,  19lnd.  112. 
I~ee  also  Chapman  v.  I'lummer,  36  Wis. 
262. 

-  McGuire  v.  Lamb  (Idaho,  1888),  17 
Pac.  Rep.  749. 

•3  Rice  V.  O'Connor,  10  Abb.  Rr.  362  ; 
Van  Valen  v.  Lapham,  5  Duer,  689  ;  Gan- 
non V.  Dougherty,  41  Cal.  661 ;  Rickard 
V.  Kohl,  22  Wis.  506  ;  Newkirk  v.  Neild, 
19  Ind.  194.  If  the  demand  had  been 
actually  transferred  to  the  defendant  by 
an  absolute  verbal  assignment  before  the 
commencement  of  the  action,  although 
the  written  assignment  of  the  same  was 
executed  after  that  date,  it  can  be  used  as 
a  counter-claim.  West  i\  Moody,  33  Iowa, 
137,  139;  Cottle  v.  Cole,  20  Iowa,  485; 
Conyngham  v.  Smith,  16  Iowa,  471.  It  is 
held,  in  North  Carolina,  that,  if  the  coun- 
ter-claim is  not  barred  by  the  statute  of 
limitations  at  the  time  the  suit  is  com- 
menced, it  is  good,  although  the  statutory 
lime  may  have  elapsed  when  it  is  actually 
pleaded.  Brumble  v.  Brown,  71  N.  C. 
513.  516. 

[^Lawrence  v.  Congregational  Church 
(1900),  164  N.  Y.  115,  58  N.  E-  24  :  "An 
owner  who  after  the  termination  of  the 


original  building  contract  without  the 
fault  of  the  builder,  and  after  the  latter 
had  commenced  an  action  to  foreclose  his 
mechanic's  lieu  and  had  assigned  the  lieu 
and  cause  of  action,  but  without  knowl- 
edge of  the  assignment,  entered  into  a 
new  contract  with  the  assignor  with  refer- 
ence to  the  same  subject-matter,  is  not 
entitled  to  set  off  against  the  assignee  any 
damages  arising  out  of  the  assignor's 
failure  to  perform  the  new  contract,  but  is 
entitled  to  set  off  whatever  he  actually 
paid  to  the  assignor  upon  the  assigned 
claim,  after  the  assignment,  in  good  faith, 
and  without  notice." 

"  A  judgment  which  has  been  super- 
seded and  is  pending  for  review  in  an 
appellate  court  cannot  be  pleaded  as  a  set- 
off in  another  action  between  tlie  same 
parties."  "  In  the  absence  of  equitable 
considerations  a  defendant  can  only  plead 
as  a  set-off  a  claim  or  judgment  upon 
wliich,  at  the  commencement  of  the  action, 
he  might  have  maintained  an  indepen- 
dent suit  against  the  plaintiff :  "  Spencer 
I'.  Johnston  (1899),  58  Neb.  44,  78  N.  W. 
482.  See  also  Shabata  v.  Johnston  (1897) 
53  Neb.  12,  73  N.  W.  273 ;  Jones  v.  Dris- 
coll  (1895),  46  Neb.  57.5,  65  N.  W.  194; 
Burge  V.  Gandy  (1894),  41  Nebt  149,  59 
N.  W.359  ;  Momsen  v.  Noyes  (1900),  105 
W^is.  565,  81  N.  W.  860;  Jones  v.  Swank 
(1893),.54Miun.  259,  55N.  W.  1126;  Bank 
of  Arkan.sas  City  i-.  Ilasie  (1897),  57  Kan. 


932 


CIVIL    KEJ.II'DIES. 


§  674.  *  798.  May,  but  need  not,  counter-claim  Unliquidated 
Damages.  Claim  for  Contribution  by  Surety.  Pleading.  I  now 
proceed  to  inquire,  What  causes  of  action  on  contract  may  be 
counter-claimed  under  this  second  branch  of  the  definition  ?  It 
may  be  stated  as  the  universal  rule  that,  in  an  action  on  contract 
to  recover  debt  or  unliquidated  damages,  the  defendant  may 
counter-claim  debt  or  damages  arising  on  another  contract,  . 
whether  such  damages  are  unliquidated  or  ascertained.  ^  But  in 
the  absence  of  statutory  requirement  he  is  not  obliged  to  do  so ; 
he  may  refrain  from  urging  his  demand  in  this  manner,  and  may 
enforce  it  in  a  separate  action. ^     A  few  early  cases  lay  down  a 


751,  48  Pac.  22;  St.  Louis  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Gay  (1894),  101  Cal.  286,  35  Pac.  876; 
Rood  V.  Taft  (1896),94  Wis.  380,  69  N.  W. 
183. 

"Under  Code  Proc.  Sec.  195,  subd.  2, 
a  cause  of  action  which  can  be  pleaded  as 
a  counter-claim,  where  it  does  not  arise 
out  of  the  contr.'\ct  or  tran.saction  set 
forth  in  the  complaint,  must  exist  at  the 
coinmeiicemeut  of  the  action  :  "  Conner  i-. 
Scott  (1897),  16  Wash.  371,  47  Pac.  761. 

Kirhy  v.  Jameson  (1896),  9  S.  1).  8,  67 
N.  W.  854 :  In  an  action  on  a  due  bill, 
defendant  set  up  a  so-called  counter-claim 
consisting  of  an  account  bearing  date 
subse  luent  to  the  commencement  of  the 
action,  and  there  was  no  affirmative  proof 
that  it  existed  at  the  time  the  suit  was 
brought.  Held  not  a  proper  counter- 
claim.] 

1  ^Hancock  i».  Hancock's  Adm'r  (1902), 
Ky.,  69  S.  W.  757;  Niver  v.  Nash  (1893), 
7  Wash.  558,  35  Pac.  380 ;  Shelton  v.  Co- 
nant  (1894),  10  Wash.  193,  38  Pac.  1013, 
citing  the  text;  Waller  v.  Deranleau 
(1903),  —Neb.  —  ,  94  N.  W.  1038;  Lit- 
tle's Adm'r  w.  City  Nat.  Bank  (1903),— 
Ky.  — ,  74  S.  W.  699.] 

2  Lignot  I'.  Redding.  4  E.  D.  Smith, 
285  ;  Schubart  v.  Harteau,  34  Barb.  447. 
per  Ingraham  .1. ;  Atwater  v.  Schenck,  9 
Wis.  160,  164,  per  Colo  .1.,  an  action  on  a 
note,  counter-claim  of  the  amount  due  for 
tlie  price  of  land  sold  ;  Conway  v.  Smith, 
13  Wis.  n25,  139,  per  Paine  J.,  counter- 
cbiiiii  of  dainages  for  non-performance  of 
.'I  building  contract  by  the  builder;  Bid- 
well  I'.  Madison.  10  Min.  13,  action  by  a 
bank  on  a  note,  counter-claim  of  damages 


from  the  negligence  of  the  bank  in  not 
collecting  another  note  left  with  it  for  col- 
lection ;  Ijouisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son, 18  B.  Mon.  735,  742,  action  iiy  a 
railroad  to  recover  stock-subscription, 
counter-claim  of  damages  from  a  breach 
of  an  agreement  to  pay  for  land  taken  by 
the  railroad  ;  Williams  v  Weiting,  3  N.  Y. 
Sup.  Ct.  439,  440,  action  by  a  veteri- 
nary surgeon  to  recover  for  professional 
services ;  counter-claim,  that  defendant 
bought  a  span  of  horses,  relying  upon 
plaintiff's  knowledge  and  recommenda- 
tion, and  promise  to  pay  for  them  if  they 
were  not  good,  etc., — breach,  and  dam- 
ages. Held,  a  good  counter-claim  ;  that 
plaintiff's  promise  was  binding,  the  de- 
fendant's prejudice  in  buying  them  being 
a  sufficient  consideration.  The  defendant 
need  not  set  up  his  cross-demand  as  a 
counter-claim :  see  Douglas  v.  First  Nat. 
Bk.  of  Hastings,  17  Minn.  35;  Emer- 
son's Adm.  V.  Herriford,  8  Bush,  229,  and 
cases  cited ;  Woody  v.  Jordan,  69  N.  C. 
189,  197  ;  Uppfalt  v.  Woerraann,  30  Neb. 
189.  For  an  example  of  this  species  of 
counter-claim  or  set-off,  see  Mullendore  v. 
Scott,  45  Iiid.  113;  Curtis  v.  Barnes,  30 
Barb.  225,  action  for  goods  sold,  counter- 
claim of  damages  from  the  breach  of  an 
arbitration  bond ;  Wilkcrsou  v.  Farn- 
hatn,  82  .Mo.  672,  action  for  rent,  counter- 
claim for  improvements  under  express 
promi.se  of  plaintiff  to  pay  for  them  ;  Mid- 
land Co.  V.  Broat  (Minn.'  1892),  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  972  (counter-claim  on  a  statutory 
bond  given  on  the  issue  of  a  writ  of  ne 
ereat).  An  action  on  an  undertaking  to 
obtain   an    attachment    is  an  "  action  on 


C0U^"^ER-CLA1M. 


U3: 


different  doctrine,  and  require  the  damages  to  Le  liquidated  so 
that  they  would  constitute  a  good  set-off  under  the  ancient  rules ; 
but  these  decisions  are  palpably  erroneous,  and  are  completely 
overruled.^  The  right  of  action  must  of  course  arise  out  of 
contract,  or  be  on  contract;  and  it  has  been  doubted  whether 
the  claim  for  contribution  by  one  surety  against  a  co-surety  so 
arises  from  contract  that  it  may  be  counter-claimed  in  an  action 
brought  upon  another  contract.^  This  doubt,  in  my  opinion,  is 
altogether  too  refined.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  equitable 
origin  of  the  claim  of  one  surety  against  another,  it  is  very 
well  settled  that  he  could  maintain  a  common  law  action  of 
assumpsit  to  recover  his  contributory  share.  This  shows  that  the 
law  treated  the  liability  as  one  arising  from  an  implied  promise. 
In  presenting  his  counter-claim  the  defendant  must  conform  to 
all  the  requirements  of  pleading  by  plaintiffs  in  stating  their 
causes  of  action.  All  the  facts  constituting  the  cause  of  action 
must  be  averred  in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  same  degree  of 
particularity  as  would  be  requisite  were  the  pleading  a  complaint 
or  petition. 3 


contract;"  Wickliani  v.  Weil  (Com.  PI. 
I8'J2),L7  N.  Y.  Suppl.  518.  It  was  held, 
liowever,  by  the  New  York  Supreme 
(Jourt,  General  Term,  iu  Furber  i'.  Mc- 
Carthy (Supreme,  1889),  7  N.  Y.  Suppl. 
t>13,  that  an  undertaking  to  obtain  an 
order  of  arrest  is  a  statutory  indemnity 
in  the  nature  of  penalty,  and  not  a  con- 
tract; contra,  see  Cornell  v.  Donovan,  14 
l^aly,  295.  An  action  to  collect  taxes  is 
not  an  action  on  contract;  Kansas  City 
V.  Kidenour,  84  Mo.  253  ;  Catling  v.  Car- 
teret Cy.  Com'rs,  92  N.  C.  536  ;  Anderson 
V.  Mayfield  (Ky.  1892),  19  S.  VV.  Rep.  598. 
That  the  counter-claim  or  set-off  may  be 
of  unliquidated  damages,  see  also  Parsons 
V.  Sutton,  66  N.  Y.  92  ;  Mills  v.  Carrier, 
30  S.  C.  617;  Empire  Transp.  Co.  v.  Bog- 
giaiio,  52  Mo.  294  ;  Morrison  v.  Lovejoy, 
6  Minn.  319,  352  ;  Gardner  v.  Rishcr,  33 
Kan.  93  ;  Wheelock  v.  Pacific  Pneumatic 
Gas  Co.,  51  Cal.  223. 

1  See,  e.  ^.,  Evens  i'.  Hall  (Cine.  Super. 
Ct.,  Sp.  T.),  1  Handy,  434.  This  construc- 
tion is  given  to  the  provision  in  Nebraska ; 
it  is  held  that  a  claim  for  unliquidated  dam- 
ages even  on  contract  cannot  be  set  off 
under  a  clause  identical  with  the  second 
subdivision  in  the  codes  of  the  first  group. 


Boyer  v.  Clark,  3  Neb.  161,  168,  169. 
The  provision  is  similarly  construed  in 
Arkansas  ;  Mathews  v.  Weiler  (Ark.  1893), 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  569 ;  and  in  Kentucky ; 
Shropshire  v.  Conrad,  2  Mete.  143;  but 
the  unliijuidated  claim  may  be  used  de- 
fensively, when  the  plaintiff  is  insolvent 
or  a  non-resident ;  Taylor  r.  Stowell,  4 
Mete.  (Ky.)  175;  Forbes  v.  Cooper,  88 
Ky.  285 ;  and  see  Garner  v.  Jones  ( Ky. 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  647;  but  not.  when 
to  allow  it  to  be  used  would  be  to  aid  the 
defendant  in  tlie  execution  of  a  fraudu- 
lent design ;  Mathews  v.  Weiler  (Ark. 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Hep  569.  See  also  Frick 
r.  White,  57  N.  Y.  103,  ante,  in  note  to 
§  *163. 

(^Beaty  v.  Johnston  (18';)9),  66  Ark.  529, 
52  S.  W.  129  ;  Garner  i;.  Jones  (1893),  94 
Ky.  135,  21  S.  W.  647;  Huber  v.  Egner 
(1901 ),  Ky.,  61  S.  W.  3.53  ;  Virginia  Chem- 
ical Co.  v.  Moore  (1901),  61  S.  C.  166, 
39  S.  E.  346.] 

2  Sciimidt  J-.  Coulter,  3  Minn.  492. 

\  Holgate  r.  Broome,  8  Minn.  243,  a 
counter-claim  held  bad  because  defendant 
did  not  state  liis  cause  of  action  for  goods 
sold  iind  delivered  with  sufficient  fulness. 
[[See  §§  *738,  *  748] 


^34  CIVIL    KEMEDIES. 

5  675.     *  799.     May  set  up  as   a  Counter-Claim  the  Following  :   A 
Judgment  against  the   Plaintiff ;   Rights  of  Actions   Allowed   only  by 
Statute   and  Regarded  as  Arising   on   an   Implied   Promise  ;   Demand 
Growing   out   of   Unsettled   Partnership   Transactions.      In  ail  action 
on  an  ordinary  contract  the  defendant  may  set  up  as  a  counter- 
claim a  judgment  which  he  has  recovered  against  the  plaintiff, 
and  this  without  leave  first  obtained  from  the  court,  where  such 
leave  is  necessary-  in  order  to  sue  on  the  judgment. ^     The  doc- 
trine  also   applies    to  those    rights    of   action   which,    although 
allowed  only  by  statute,  are  regarded  as  arising  on  an  implied 
promise,  and  under  the  old  system  would  have  been  enforced 
by  an  action  ex  contractu.     As,  for  example,  where  the  plaintiff' 
sued  to  recover  back  money  lost  by  a  wager  and  paid  to  the  de- 
fendant, a  counter-claim  of  a  similar  demand  against  the  plain- 
tiff, originally  in  favor  of  a  third  person  and  duly  assigned  to  the 
defendant,  was  sustained  by  the  New  York  Supreme  Court.2     It 
is  now  established  in  opposition  to  some  of  the  earlier  decisions 
which   have  been  expressly  overruled,  that  a  demand  growing 
out  of  the  unsettled  partnership  transactions  between  the  plain- 
tiff and  defendant  may  be  pleaded  as  a  counter-claim.     It  is 
necessary,  however,  that  the  defendant  should  not  only  aver  the 
existence  of  such  unsettled  transactions  and  ask  an  accounting, 
but  allege  that  upon  such  accounting  a  balance  will  be  found  due 
him  from  the  plaintiff,  and  he  must  demand  judgment  therefor. 
Without  the  averment  of  such  a  balance,  the  counter-claim  will 
be  bad  on  demurrer.  ^ 

1  Wells  V.  Henshaw,  3  Bosw.  625  ;  N.  D.  455,  75  N.  W.  908  ;  Long  v.  Collins 
Clark  V.  Story.  29  Barb.  295  ;  Cornell  v.  (1901),  15  S.  D.  259,  88  N.  W.  571  ;  Col- 
Donovan,  14  Daly,  295;  Taylor  v.  Root,  cord  y.  Conger  (1900),  10  Okla.  458,  62 
4  Keyes,  335  (judgment  in  an  action  of  Pac.  276;  Kcifer  i-.  Summers  (1893).  'l37 
«'*"^^'")-  Ind.    106,   35    N.   E.    1103;  Lundberg   v 

LSweeney   v.   Bailey    (1895),  7   S.   1).  David.son  (1897),  68  Minn.  328,  71  N.  W. 

404,    64    N.  W.    188;    Adams    v.    Baker  71,  395 ;  Lindliolm  y.  Ita.sca  Lumber  Co 

(1898),  24  Nev.    162,  55   Pac.  362;  Dunn  (1896).  64  Minn.  46,  65  N.  W.  931  ;  Prav 

';.    Uvalde   Asphalt    Paving     (1903),    175  r.  Life  Indemnity  Co.  (1897)    104  La    114 

N.    Y.  214,   67    N.   E.    439;  De   Camp  v.  73  N,    W.  485;   llier  v.  Anheuser-Hu.scli 

Thomson  (1899).   159  N.  Y.  444,  54  N.  E.  Brewing  A.ss'n  (1900),   60   Neb    320    83 

H:  Pendleton  v.    Beyer   (1896),   94  Wis.  N.  W.  77;  Welsher  v.   Libbv,   McNeil  & 

31.  68    N.  W.  415;    Spencer  i-.   Johnston  Libby  (1900),  107  Wis.  47,  82  N.  W.  693  ; 

(1899),  58  Neb.  44.  78  N.  W.  482  ;  Pity  of  Richmond  v.  Bloch  (1900),'38  Ore.  317.  60 

S.imerset  v.  Banking  Co.  (1900),  109  Ky.  Pac.  388  ] 

549,  60  S.  W.  5  ;   Powell    ,'.   Nolan  (1902),  ^   McDougall  v.  Walling,  48  Barb   364. 

27  Wa.sh.  318,  67  Pac.  712  ;  Northwe.stern,  »  Il.-ndrv  r.  Il-ndrv.  32  Ind.  r..:<};  Wad- 

etc.  Bank  r.  Ranch  (1901).  Idaho,  66  Pac  doH  ,-.  Darling.  51  N.Y.  327,  330 ;  Clift  v. 

807;    Cleveland    i-.    McCanna    (1898),    7  Northrup,  6  Lans.  330 ;  ;)er  co;i^ra',   Ham- 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


935 


§  676.  *  800.  Counter-claim  against  an  Executor  de  son  tort. 
In  an  Action  by  a  Pledgor.  An  executor  de  son  tort  becomes 
liable  to  those  interested  in  the  estate  to  the  extent  of  the  value 
of  the  property  wliich  he  appropriated ;  this  is  not  the  liability 
of  a  mere  tort-feasor  towards  the  owner  of  the  thing  injured:  it 
is  the  same  liability  which  flows  from  the  ordinary  trust  relation 
of  executor  towards  the  creditors  and  legatees,  enforceable  by 
actions  of  accounting,  etc.  It  has  been  held,  therefore,  that  such 
responsibility  of  the  plaintiif  may  be  interposed  as  a  counter- 
claim by  a  defendant  sued  on  contract,  when  he  is  a  creditor  of 
the  estate  with  which  the  plaintiff  has  wrongfully  intermeddled.^ 
An  action  by  a  pledgor  of  stocks  against  the  pledgee,  to  recover 
damages  for  their  wrongful  sale  at  private  sale  and  without  notice, 
has  been  said  to  be  on  contract  and  not  for  conversion,  and  for 
that  assigned  reason  a  counter-claim  based  upon  another  contract 
was  held  admissible. ^ 


mond  V.  Terry,  3  Lans.  186  ;  Ives  v.  Miller, 
19  Barb.  196  ;  Iliff  v.  Brazill,  27  Iowa,  1.31 ; 
Haskell  v.  Moore,  29  Cal.  437. 

1  McKenzie  v.  Pendleton's  Adm.,  1 
Bush,  164.  The  cause  of  action  accruing 
to  a  bank  against  its  cashier  for  wrong- 
fully permitting  an  overdraft,  is  a  cause 
of  action  on  contract,  namely,  the  con- 
tract of  employment  as  cashier;  or  may 
be  treated  as  a  cause  of  action  for  a 
breach  of  his  bond  given  for  the  faithful 
performance  of  his  duties  as  cashier  ;  and 
hence  is  a  valid  set-off:  Board,  etc.  of  St. 
Louis  Pub.  Schools  v.  Broadway  Sav.  Bk. 
Est.,  12  Mo.  App.  104,  affirmed  84  Mo.  56. 
As  a  general  rule,  when  a  receiver,  execu- 
tor, administrator,  or  trustee  sues  to  re- 
cover a  debt  due  to  the  estate  in  his 
hands,  a  demand  of  the  defendant  for 
services  rendered  on  the  employment  of 
the  plaintiff  beneficial  to  the  estate  is  a 
good  counter-claim,  Davis  v.  Stover,  58 
N.  Y.  473. 

2  Seaman  v.  Reeve,  15  Barb.  454.  The 
following  cases  give  a  construction  to  the 
language  of  the  clause  defining  "  set-off" 
as  it  is  found  in  the  second  group  of  codes  : 
Evens  v.  Hall,  1  Handy,  434 ;  Smead  v. 
Christfield,  1  Disney,  18  ;  Anthony  v.  Stin- 
soi),  4  Kan.  211 ;  Collins  v.  Groseclose,  40 
Ind.  414,  416  ;  Curran  {•.  Curran,  40  Ind. 
473,  480-484,   and   cases    cited;  West  v. 


Moody,  33  Iowa,  137,  139;  Remington  r. 
King,  1 1  Abb.  Pr.  278 ;  Williams  v.  Brown, 
2  Keyes,  486 ;  Schieffelin  ;;.  Hawkins, 
1  Daly,  289  ;  Berry  v.  Brett,  6  Bosw.  627  ; 
Roberts  v.  Carter,  38  N.  Y.  107  ;  Miller  r. 
Elorer,  15  Ohio  St.  149;  Stanberry  v. 
Smythe,  13  Ohio  St.  495  ;  Ross  u.  Johnson, 
1  Handy,  388;  McCulIough  v.  Lewis,  1 
Disney,  564  ;  Mortland  v.  Holton,  44  Mo. 
58;  Jones  v.  Moore,  42  Mo.  413 ;  Lamb  v. 
Brolaski,  38  Mo.  51 ;  Kent  v.  Rogers,  24 
Mo.  306;  Brake  v.  Corning,  19  Mo.  125  ; 
Mahan  v.  Ross,  18  Mo.  121  ;  Pratt  v.  Men- 
kens, 18  Mo.  158;  House  v.  Marshall,  18 
Mo.  368;  Smith  v.  Steinkamper,  16  Mo. 
150;  Griffin  v.  Cox,  30  Ind.  242;  Blew  r. 
Hoover,  30  Ind.  450;  Stilwell  f.  Chappell, 
39  Ind.  72  ;  Grossman  v.  Lauber,  29  Ind. 
618;  Lewis  v.  Sheaman,  28  Ind.  427; 
Dayhuff  v.  Dayhuff's  Adm.,  27  Ind.  158; 
Sayres  v.  Linkart,  25  Ind.  145 ;  Kiuir  r. 
Conn,  25  Ind.  425  ;  Keightley  v.  Walls,  24 
Ind.  205;  Durbon  v.  Kelley's  Adm.,  22 
Ind.  183;  Indianapolis  &  Cine.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ballard,  22  Ind.  448;  Fankboner  v.  Fauk- 
boner,  20  Ind.  62  ;  Shannon  v.  Wilson,  19 
Ind.  112;  Schoonover  v.  Quick,  17  Ind. 
196;  Irish  v.  Snelson,  16  Ind.  365  ;  Reilly 
r.  Rucker,  16  Ind.  303;  Knouer  v.  Dick, 
14  Ind.  20;  Fox  v.  Barker,  14  Ind.  309; 
Bool  I'.  Watson,  13  Ind.  387;  Turner  i-. 
Simpson,     12    Ind.    413 ;  Blankenship    v. 


936  CIVIL   REMEDIES. 

§  677.  *  801.  Statement  of  Established  Doctrine.  Question  of 
Doubt  herein.  It  may  be  regarded  as  a  doctrine  established  by 
the  overwhelming  weight  of  authority,  that,  whenever  by  the 
j^rinciples  of  the  law,  independent  of  the  new  procedure,  a  cause 
of  action  may  be  treated  as  arising  either  from  tort  or  on  con- 
tract, and  the  party  holding  the  right  may  elect  between  the 
two  kinds  of  remedial  proceeding,  and  does  in  fact  elect  to  sue 
on  contract,  the  demand  thus  determined  to  be  upon  contract 
may  be  counter-claimed  against  a  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  aris- 
ing on  another  contract,  or  when  itself  set  up  by  a  plaintiff,  it 
may  be  opposed  by  a  counter-claim  arising  out  of  another  con- 
tract. ^  The  only  question  of  doubt  in  the  practical  application 
of  this  doctrine  relates  to  the  necessity  of  indicating  the  election 
in  the  pleading  itself;  or,  in  other  words,  whether  the  demand 
ma)'  not  be  thus  used  as  a  counter-claim,  or  against  a  counter- 
claim, even  though  the  pleading  contains  no  averments  showing 
the  election  to  have  been  actually  made.  While  the  courts 
have  generally  sustained  this  doctrine,  they  are  not  absolutely 
unanimous.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Minnesota  holds  that  the 
code  has  abolished  this  rule  and  the  right  of  electing  between  the 
different  forms  of  action  ex  contractu  and  ex  delicto ;  or,  rather, 
has  destroyed  all  possibility  of  the  advantage  which  could  once 
have  been  derived  under  the  circumstances  above  mentioned 
from  such   an  election.  ^     This  opinion  is   based   upon  a  close 

Rogers,  10    Ind.  333;  Johnson    v.    Kent,  11  Cal.  93;  Nagleeu.  Minturn,  8  Cal.  540; 

9  Ind.    252 ;  Lovejoy  i-.  Robinson,  8   Ind.  Marye  v.   Jones,  9  Cal.  335  ;  Howard  v. 

399;  Woodward  c.  Laverty,  14  Iowa,  381  ;  Shores,  20  Cal.  277;  Collins  v.  Butler,  14 

Cook  v.  Lovell,  11  Iowa,  81;  Campbell  v.  Cal.  223;  Lubert   v.    Chauviteau,   3  Cal. 

Fox,  11  Iowa,  318  ;  Eyre  f.  Cook,  10  Iowa,  458;    Ricketson    v.    Richardson,     19    Cal. 

586;  Stadler    v.  Parmelee,   10   Iowa,  23;  330;  Corwin  i.  Ward,  35  Cal.  195. 
Donahue  v.  Prosser,  10  Iowa,  276  ;  Reed  v.  QCentral  Nat.  Bank  v.  Haseltine  (1900), 

Chubb,  9   Iowa,   178;  Sample  i".   Griffith,  155    Mo.   58.  55  S.  W.  1015;   Momsen  v. 

5  Iowa,  376;  Davi.o    i-.    Milburn,  3  Iowa,  Atkins(1900),  105  Wis.  557,81  N.W.  647.] 
163;  Dorsey    r.   Reese,   14  B.  Mon.    157;  i  See  Norden  c.  Jones,  33  Wis.  600,  604. 

Lausdale   r.  Mitchell,    14    B.  Mon.  350;  See  Ogilvie   v.  Lightstone,   1    Daly,   129; 

Clark  V.  Finnell,  16  B.  Mon.  337 ;  Graham  Starr  Cash   Car  Co.  v.   Reinhardt  (Com. 

r.  Tilford,  Stanton's  Code,  98  ;  Thatcher  v.  PI.  1892),  20  N.  Y.  Suppl.  872  ;   Barnes  v. 

Cannon,  6   Bush,  541;  Eversole  i'.  Moore,  McMullins,  78  Mo.  260;  Green  i;.  Conrad 

3  Bu.sh,  49;   Haddix  u.   Wilson,  3  Bu.sh,  (Mo.    1893),  21   S.  W.  Rep.  839;  Challiss 

523;    Miller    ;•.    Gaither,    3    Bu.sh,    152;  i-   Wylie,  35  Kan.   506;  Smithy.  McCar- 

Brown  v.  Phillips,  3  Bush,  656;  Taylor  i:  thy,  39   Kan.   308;   Smith   r.  Young,  109 

Stowell,  4  Mete.  (Ky.)  175;  Shropshire  f.  N.  C.  224   (counterclaim  not  allowed,  as 

Conrad,  2  id.   143;  Geoghegan  r.  Ditto^  jdaintiff  did  not  elect  to  waive  the  tort). 
2  id.  433;  Finnell    r.  N'esbitt,  16  \i.  Mon.'  -  Folsom   r.  Carii,  6  Minn.  420.      The 

354;  Naglee  r.  Palmer.  7  Cal.  543 ;  Hobbs  rule  in  Indiana  is  the  same  :     Richey  r. 

V.  Duff,  23  Cal.  596;  Russell  v.  Conway,  Ely,  115  lud.  232. 


COUNTER-CLAIM.  937 

and  logical  adherence  to  tlie  letter  and  to  the  spirit  of  the 
code,  which  require  that  the  facts  constituting  the  cause  of 
action  should  be  averred  in  a  pleading,  and  abolish  all  forms 
of  action. 

§  678.  *  802.  Illustrative  Examples  in  Equitable  Actions.  In 
all  the  foregoing  examples  the  actions  were  legal.  Some  illus- 
trations will  now  be  given  of  those  that  are  equitable.  Many 
species  of  equitable  actions  may  arise  on  contract  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute,  and  equitable  remedies  may  thus  be 
obtained  as  counter-claims  under  the  second  branch  of  the  defi- 
nition. A  suit  was  brought  to  compel  the  conveyance  of  land 
alleged  to  be  held  by  the  defendant  in  trust  for  the  plaintiff. 
The  defendant  was  a  lawyer,  and  the  plaintiff  had  been  his 
client.  As  such  attorney,  he  had  agreed,  it  was  said,  to  bid 
in  the  land  at  a  public  sale,  and  to  hold  it  for  the  plaintiff:  he 
did,  in  fact,  purchase  it  in  his  own  name,  but  retained  it  for 
himself,  and  refused  to  convey.  In  his  answer  to  these  allega- 
tions, the  defendant,  besides  denials,  pleaded,  as  a  counter-claim, 
a  debt  due  from  the  plaintiff  for  professional  services  in  relation 
to  this  and  other  matters.  Evidence  to  sustain  this  counter- 
claim was  rejected  at  the  trial,  for  the  reason  that  the  defendant 
had  forfeited  all  claim  to  compensation  on  account  of  his  fraudu- 
lent practices.  The  Superior  Court  of  New  York  City,  in  re- 
versing this  decision,  held,  that,  as  the  action  was  on  contract, 
the  counter-claim  was  admissible,  and,  even  if  the  defendant 
had  been  guilty  of  wrong  in  one  matter,  his  right  to  compensa- 
tion in  respect  of  other  matters  was  not  affected ;  also,  that,  on 
the  facts  as  proved,  he  had  committed  no  fraud  or  breach  of  his 
fiduciary  duty  in  the  instances  charged  against  him.^  In  an 
action  to  foreclose  a  purchase-money  mortgage,  it  is  well  settled 
that  the  mortgagor  may  interpose  a  counter-claim  for  the  dam- 
ages sustained  by  him  from  the  breach  of  covenants  in  the 
plaintiff's  deed  of  conveyance.  Both  causes  of  action  arise 
from  contract,  though  from  different  contracts. ^ 

§  679.  *  803.  Counter-Claim  of  Money  Demand  on  Independent 
Contract  Interposed  in  Action  to  foreclose  Mortgage.     The  COUnter- 

1  Carrie  v.  Cowles,  6  Bosw.  452.  See  Hall  v.  Gale,  14  Wis.  54;  Walker  u.  Wil- 
also  .Judah  v.  Vincennes  Univ.  Tr.s.,  16  son,  1.3  Wi.«.  522  ;  Lowry  r.  Hurd,  7  Miun. 
Ind.  .56.  .356,  36.3  ;  Cov  r.  Dowuie,  14  Fla.  544.  5fi2. 

2  Eaton  V.  Talmadge,  22  Wis.  526,  See  also  §*  792,  note,  ante;  Merritt  t;.  Gou- 
528;    Akerly  v.  Vilas,  21  Wis.   88,  109;  ley,  58  Hun,  372. 


938  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

claim  of  a  money  demand  on  an  independent  and  separate  con- 
tract may  be  interposed  in  the  action  to  foreclose  any  mortgage 
of  land,  purcliase-mone}',  or  other,  by  the  mortgagor  or  defend- 
ant personally  liable  for  the  mortgage-debt,  and  against  whom 
a  decree  for  a  deficiency  could  be  rendered:  in  respect  to  such 
defendants,  both  causes  of  action  arise  on  contract,  and  tho 
recovery  on  the  counter-claim  directly  interferes  with  that  on 
the  complaint.  In  respect  to  other  defendants  who  are  not 
parties  nor  privies  to  the  contract  of  mortgage,  but  whose 
liens,  or  encumbrances,  or  rights  of  property  in  the  land  are 
simpl}-  cut  off  by  the  decree,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether 
the  cause  of  action  in  the  foreclosure  suit  can  be  said  to  arise 
on  contract.  This  question  was  recently  passed  upon  by  the 
New  York  Court  of  Appeals;  and  the  doctrine  above  stated 
was  fully  sustained,  and  made  the  basis  of  decision.^ 

IV.    Some  Miscellaneous  Provisions  in  Belation  to  Coiinter- Claims. 

§  680.  *  804.  Opportunity  to  interpose  Counter-Claim  not  a  Bar 
to  another  Suit  thereon.  Provision  of  Code  herein  in  few  States. 
As  a  counter-claim  is  always  a  separate  and  independent  cause 
of  action,  wliich  the  defendant  may  enforce  against  the  plain- 
tiff, is  he  obliged  to  avail  himself  of  it  when  sued?  Or  may  he 
omit  to  set  up  the  demand  in  his  answer,  and  make  it  the  sub- 
ject of  another  action  brought  by  himself?  In  other  words,  is 
the  opportunity  thus  furnished  by  the  codes  to  try  and  determine 
his  own  claim  in  the  prior  suit  against  himself  a  bar  to  his  subse- 
quently maintaining  a  second  suit  for  the  purpose  of  determining 
the  issues  which  might  have  been  so  disposed  of  in  the  former 
one?  In  the  absence  of  statutory  prohibition,  no  such  effect  is 
produced  by  the  provisions  of  the  codes  which  authorize  the 
counter-claim.     The  defendant  has  an   election. ^     He   may  set 

1  Iluut  V.  Chapman,  51   N.  Y.  5.55,5.57.  80  X.  W.  59:  J.  suod  defendant  in  1898  on 

See  also  Charlton  f.  Tardy,  28  Ind.  452  ;  defendant'.s  guaranty  that  a  heating  appa- 

Bathgate  v.   Ha.skin,  59    N.  Y.  5.33,   5.39,  ratus  con.structed  in  J.'.s  hou.^io  by  defend- 

540  ;  Kichinoud  v.  Lattin,  64  Cal.  273.     In  ant  woulii  give  .sati.sf action,  and  defendant 

Oregon,  a  legal  counter-claim  to  a  suit  in  ])leaded  in  bar  that  in  1897  lie  sued  J.  in 

equity  is    not   allowed,  unless  it  be  con-  a  jii.stice's  court  for  a  balance  due  on  the 

nected  with  the  subject  of  the  suit.     See  price  of  the  apparatus,  and  that  J.  set  up 

Ore.  Code,  §  393  ;  Sears  v.  Martin  (Ore.  tlie  breach  of  guaranty,  and  tliat,  on  ap- 

1892),  29   I'ac.  Hej).  890  ;  Hurrage  i'.  Bo-  peal  to  the  district  court,.!,  had  judgment. 

nanza  fi.  ^  <^.  Min.  Co.,  12  Ore.  1G9.  Held  that  since  no  counter-claim  had  been 

■^  QJones  V.  Witousek  (1901)  114  la.  14,  pleaded,  the  judgment  of  the  district  court 


COUNTER-CLAIM. 


939 


up  his  cause  of  actiou  as  a  eountei-elaiin,  and  have  both  oppos- 
ing demands  adjudicated ;  or  he  nuiy  withhold  it,  and  prosecute 
it  in  a  separate  action  brought  for  that  purpose.^  The  codes  of 
a  few  States  expressly  require  the  defendant's  cross-right  to  be 
interposed  as  a  counter-claim,  if  a  proper  one  for  that  purpose ; 
and,  if  he  fails  to  do  so,  he  cannot  enforce  it  by  a  direct  action.^ 


was  no  bar  to  the  action  for  damages  for 
breach  of  guaranty,  since  J.  was  not 
obliged  to  plead  the  couuter-claim  in  the 
former  action.  "  It  is  well  settled  that  a 
set-off  or  couuter-claim  may  or  may  not  be 
pleaded,  as  the  defendant  shall  elect ;  and 
unless  it  is  pleaded,  the  right  to  sue  upou 
it  as  an  independent  cause  of  action,  or  to 
rely  upon  it  in  defence  of  another  action 
by  the  same  plaintiff,  is  in  no  wise  affected 
or  impaired  by  a  judgment  for  or  against 
the  defendant.  In  other  words,  if  the 
matter  of  set-off  or  counter-claim  is  pre- 
sented and  passed  upon  in  a  suit,  it  is 
barred  by  the  judgment ;  if  not,  the  de- 
fendant may  make  it  the  subject  of  a  sep- 
arate and  distinct  action  :  Hunt  i\  Brown, 
146  Mass.  253 ;  Roach  v.  Privett,  90  Ala. 
391  ;  Minnaugh  v.  Partlin,  67  Mich.  391." 
Contra,  Bellinger  r.  Craigue,  31  Barb. 
5.34;  Mauney  v.  Hamilton  (1903),  132 
N.  C.  295,  303,  43  S.  E.  903  :  A  defendant 
is  not  bound  to  make  use  of  a  counter- 
claim as  such,  but  may  make  it  the  basis 
of  a  separate  suit. 

Murphy  v.  Russell  (1901),  Idaho,  67 
Pac.  427  :  The  statute  relative  to  counter- 
claims was  intended  to  prevent  a  multi- 
plicity of  suits,  and  "  a  cause  of  action 
arising  out  of  the  transaction  set  forth  in 
the  complaint  as  the  foundation  of  plain 
tiff's  claim  or  connected  therewith,  in 
favor  of  the  defendant,  must  be  set  forth 
iu  the  answer  as  a  counter-claim,  and 
could  not  be  made  the  basis  of  another 
suit."  Stevens  v.  Home  Savings  Ass'n 
(1897),  Idaho,  51  Pac.  779;  Beaty  v. 
Johnston  (1899),  66  Ark.  529,  52  S.  W. 
129.3  Lowry  v.  Hurd,  7  Minn.  356,  363  ; 
Ricker  v.  Pratt,  48  Ind.  73. 

1  Welch  V.  Hazelton,  14  How.  Pr.  97 ; 
Lignot  V.  Redding,  4  E.  D.  Smith,  285 ; 
Gillespie  v.  Torrance,  25  N.  Y.  306,  308, 
310,  per  Selden  J.;  Bellinger  v.  Craigue, 
31  Barb.  534,  530.  See  also  Giles  v.  Aus- 
tin, 62  N.  Y.  486  ;  Brown  v.  Gallaudet,  80 
id.  413;  Inslee  v.  Hampton,  8  Hun,  230; 


Swenson    v.    Cresop,    28    Ohio    St.  668; 
Uppfalt  V.  Woermann,  30  Neb.  189. 

-  ^CaUfornia  :  "  If  the  defendant  omits 
to  set  up  a  counter-claim  in  tlie  cases  men- 
tioned iu  the  first  subdivision  of   the   last 
section,  neither  he  nor   his   assignee  can 
afterwards  maintain  an  action  against  the 
plaintiff  therefor."    Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  439  ; 
Idaho;  Same  provision  as  in  California. 
Code  Civ.  Pro.,   1901,  §  3213;    Indiana: 
"If  any  defendant  ])ersonally  served  with 
notice  omit  to  set  up  a  counter-claim  aris- 
ing out  of  the  contract,  or  transaction  set 
forth  iu  the  complaint  as  the  ground  of 
the  plaintiff's  claims,    or    any   of    them, 
he  cannot  afterward   maintain  an  action 
against  the  plaintiff  therefor,   except   at 
his   own  costs."     Burns' St.,  1901,  §354; 
Iowa:  "Judgment   obtained  in  an  actiou 
by  ordinary  proceedings  shall  not  be  an- 
nulled or   modified  by  any  order   in   an 
action   by  equitable   proceedings,   except 
for  a  defence  which  has  arisen  or  been  dis- 
covered since  the  judgment  was  rendered. 
But  such  judgment  does  not  prevent  the 
recovery  of  any  claim,  though  such  ciaifu 
might  have  been  used  by  way  of  counter- 
claim in  the  action  on  which  the  judgment 
was    recovered."      Code,    1897,    §   3440; 
Kansas :  "  If  the  defendant  omit  to   set 
up  a  counter-claim  or  set-off,  he  cannot 
recover  costs,  against  the  plaintiff  in  any 
subsequent  action  thereon  ;  but  this  section 
shall  not  apply  to  causes  of  action  which 
are  stricken   out   of  or  withdrawn   from 
the    answer,  as  in   sections   ninetj'-seveu 
and  one    hundred  and    twenty."      Code, 
1901,   §   96;    Minnesota:    "The  pleading 
of  a  set-off  or  counter-claim  by  a  defend- 
ant in  any  action,  in  any  of  the  courts  of 
this  State,  shall  not  be  held  or  construed 
to  be  an  admission  of  any  cause  of  action 
on  the  part  of  plaintiff  against   such  de- 
fendant."    St.,  1894,  §  5238;     Montana: 
Same  as    the    California  statute.     Code, 
1895,    §    697;    Nebraska:    Same    as    the 
Kansas  statute.  Code,  1901,  §  102;   Ohio: 


940  CIVIL    REMEDIES. 

§  681.  *  805.  Form  of  Verdict,  Finding,  and  Judgment.  When 
the  plaintiff's  demand  is  proved  and  found  by  the  jury  or  court, 
and  the  amount  of  the  eounter-chiim  as  proved  and  found  equals 
it,  the  verdict  must  be  for  the  defendant,  and  a  judgment  ren- 
dered dismissing  the  action ;  if  the  counter-claim  as  found  be  less 
than  the  plaintiff's  demand  as  found,  a  verdict  should  be  given 
for  the  plaintiff  for  the  excess  of  his  recovery  over  that  of  the  de- 
fendant; finally,  if  the  counter-claim  as  found  is  greater  than  the 
plaintiff's  demand  as  found,  a  verdict  should  be  given  for  the 
defendant  for  the  excess.^  If  the  plaintiff  should  fail  entirely  to 
prove  his  cause  of  action  as  alleged,  the  defendant  would  be  en- 
titled to  a  verdict  for  the  whole  amount  of  his  counter-claim  as 
established  by  his  proofs.  The  foregoing  rules  presuppose  that 
both  demands  are  for  the  recovery  of  money,  either  debt  or 
damages.  If  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action,  or  the  counter-claim, 
is  for  the  recovery  of  some  special  relief,  legal  or  equitable,  the 
judgment  rendered  must  be  according  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  case.  As  has  been  shown  in  the  foregoing  citations,  there 
may  be  instances  in  which  it  would  be  impossible  for  the  defend- 
ant to  take  anything  by  his  counter-claim,  unless  the  plaintiff's 
cause  of  action  should  be  entirely  defeated.  There  is  a  dictuyji 
in  an  Indiana  case  to  the  effect  that,  where  the  action  is  for  the 
recovery  of  money,  a  pecuniary  counter-claim,  less  in  amount 
than  the  sum  demanded  by  the  plaintiff,  is  inadmissible,  because, 
as  was  said,  it  was  not  a  complete  bar  or  answer  to  the  action.^ 
This  dichim  was  founded  upon  an  entire  misconception  of  the 
object  and  uses  of  the  counter-claim.  It  is  not,  in  any  true 
sense,  a  defence  in  bar  of  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action.  It 
may  be  pleaded  when  the  plaintiff's  claim  and  right  to  recover 

Same  as  Kansas  statute.  Bates'  St.,  1904,  42  Iowa,  .526;  luslce  r.  Hampton,  11  Hun, 
§  .5.348;  Oklahoma:  Same  as  Kansas  15G.  Wlieii  a  counter-claim  is  jileaded 
statute,  St.,  189.3,  §  3974;  Utah:  Same  as  the  plaintiff  cannot  dismiss  or  discontinue 
California  statute.  Rev.  St.,  1898,  §  2970;  the  whole  action  without  defendant's  con- 
iryortuny  .■  Same  as  Kansas  statute.  Rev.  sent,  so  as  to  prevent  the  counter-claim 
St.,  1899,  §  3546.]  from  being  tried.  Turnell  v.  Vaughan, 
1  Moore  v.  Caruthers,  17  B.  Mon.  669,  80  N.  C.  46;  Amos  r.  Humboldt  Loan 
681;  Hay  v.  Short,  49  Mo.  139,  142;  Ass.,  21  Kan.  474;  Sale  v.  Bugher,  24 
Hogan  V.  Shnart,  11  Mont.  498;  Hitch-  id.  432  ;  Gwathuey  ?'.  Cheatham,  21  Hun, 
cock  D.  Baughan,  44  Mo.  App.  42.  With  .576;  Tabor  v.  Mackkee.  58  Ind.  290; 
respect  to  the  recovery  and  judgment,  see  Whedhee  v.  Leggett,  92  N.  C.  469  ;  Fran- 
Grove  c.  Schweitzer,  36  Wis.  554;  Wes-  cis  v.  Edwards,  77  N.  C.  271. 
tervelt  v.  Ackley,  62  N.  Y.  .505  ;  2  Hun,  -  McClintic's  Adm.  v.  Cory,  22  Ind. 
258  ;  Heine  v.  Meyer,  61  N.  Y.  171  ;  Derr  170,  173,  per  Worden  J. 
V.  Stubbs,  83  N.  C.  539;  Hall  i-.  Clayton, 


CIlOSS-COxMl'LAINT.  U41 

thereon  are  admitted;  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  .is  alleged  that 
the  defendant  has  also  a  right  on  his  side  to  recover  a  sum  from 
the  plaintiff  upon  an  independent  cause  of  action,  which  will 
equal,  and  so  destroy,  or  exceed,  or  diminish  the  amount  which 
would  otherwise  be  the  plaintiff's  due.      Undoubtedly,  when  the 

plaintiff's  complaint  shows  that  he  is  entitled  to  a  certain  sum, 

say  $500,  —  and  the  defendant,  not  controverting  these  allega- 
tions by  any  defence  in  bar,  simply  interposes  a  distinct  cross- 
demand  for  a  less  amount,  —  say  $300,  —  the  plaintiff's  right  to 
a  judgment  for  the  difference  is  at  once  admitted ;  and  the  plead- 
ings may  be  so  framed,  by  the  express  provisions  of  some,  if  not 
all,  of  the  codes,  that  he  is  immediately  able  to  recover  the  sum 
so  admitted  upon  the  record,  while  the  issues  as  to  the  remainder 
are  left  to  be  tried.  To  say  that  a  defendant  shall  not  avail 
himself  of  a  smaller  demand,  and  thus  lessen  the  amount  of 
the  i^laintiff's  recovery,  because  he  cannot  allege  facts  which 
would  defeat  that  recovery  altogether,  is  palpably  unjust,  and 
is  warranted  by  no  requirements  of  the  statute. 

§  682.  *  806.  Cross-Complaints.  Provisions  of  the  Codes.  Dif- 
ference in  Practice.  Illustrative  Cases.  The  practice  in  a  few  of 
the  States  admits  a  "cross-complaint"  by  a  defendant,  not  only 
against  the  plaintiff,  but  against  other  defendants.  ^  Although 
there  is  a  general  similarity,  if  not  substantial  identity,  in  the 
provisions  of  the  various  codes  concerning  the  granting  of  relief 
to  defendants  against  the  plaintiff's  or  against  each  other,  yet  a 
very  great  difference  in  the  actual  practice  founded  upon  these 

1  f  See  §  *585  (n.),  where  the  statutory  Van  Sautvoord,  in  his  work  on  Pleading 

provisions  are  set  out  at  length.  (p.   574),  after   discussing   generally   the 

"  It   is  said  that  the  counter-claim   of  purpose   of  the  cross-bill    under   the  old 

the  code  was  intended   to  preserve  to  a  practice,  says :  '  All  these  various  matters 

defendant  all  remedies  he  formerly  had,  which,   under    the   eijuity   practice,   were 

either  in  an  action  at  law  or  by  a  bill  in  proper  subjects  for  a  cross-bill,  where  the 

equity   or  a   cross-bill   on    similar    facts,  object    was   for    relief    and    not   for   dis- 

2  Wait,  Pr.  476,  and  cases  cited.     Said  covery,  are  sui)posed  to  be  within  the  term 

Bosworth  J.  in  Gleason  i-.  Moen,  2  Duer,  "counter-claim,"  as  used  in  the  Code,  and 

639:    'The  counter-claim  secures  to    the  may  be  set  up  by  the  defendant  in  the 

defendant    full    relief,   which   a   separate  action:'"   Kollock   ?•.  Scrihner  (1897),  98 

action  at  law,  or  a  bill  in  chancery,  or  a  Wis.  104,  73  N.  W.  776.     See  also  Trestor 

cross-bill,  could  have  secured   to  him  on  r.  City  of  Sheboygan  (1894),  87  Wis.  406, 

an  allegation  or  proof  of  the  same  facts,  58  N.  W.  747  ;  Gillenwaters  >,'.  Campbell 

but  it  relates  to  only  such  causes  of  action  (1895),  142  Ind.  529,  41  N.  K.  1041  ;  Peter 

as  exist  against  the  plaintiff,  and  might,  v.  Farrel,  etc.  Co.  (1895),  53  Ohio  St.  534, 

in  their  nature,  be  the  basis  of  an  action  42   N.    E.    690.      See    also    §  *765   and 

against  him  at  the  suit  of  the  defendant.'  notes.] 


942 


CIVIL   REMEDIES. 


provisions  has  grown  up  in  the  several  States.  In  most  of  them, 
the  clauses  of  the  statute  referred  to  are  practically  a  dead  letter; 
Wijile  in  a  few  they  have  been  accepted  and  acted  upon  accord- 
ing to  their  evident  intent.^  A  wide  departure  has  thus  been 
made  in  the  latter  commonwealths  from  the  methods  which 
prevailed  before  the  introduction  of  the  reformed  procedure. 
This  practice,  in  respect  to  cross-complaints  against  plaintiffs 
and  against  other  defendants,  will  be  best  illustrated  by  a  refer- 
ence to  the  facts  and  decisions  of  a  few  prominent  cases  taken 
as  examples.-     In  an  action  brought  by  Joanna  ^Morris  against 


1  In  some  of  these  States  the  cross- 
complaint  or  petition  is  used  in  cases 
M-Iiere,  under  the  equity  practice,  the  de- 
fendant would  be  entitled  to  file  a  cross- 
bill, but  which  do  not  fall  under  the 
statutory  definition  of  a  "counter-claim," 
or  where  new  parties  must  be  brought  in. 
In  a  few  of  these  St:ites,  however,  it  would 
seem  tliat  the  cross-complaint  or  petition 
is  used  in  all  cases  where  the  defendant 
seeks  to  obtain  affirmative  relief,  so  that 
the  "counter-claim"  is  actually  enforced 
by  means  of  such  a  cross-pleading.  The 
following  are  some  of  the  most  important 
recent  decisions  illustrating  its  use  in  vari- 
ous States:  Marr  v.  Lewis,  31  Ark.  203; 
Trapnall  v.  Hill,  31  id.  346 ;  Earle  v.  Hale, 
31  id.  473;  Abbott  v.  Monti,  3  Call, 
oC ;  Monti  v.  Bishop,  3  id.  605 ;  Mills  v. 
Uuttrick,  4  id.  53;  Tucker  v.  McCoy,  3 
id.  284;  Hatcher  i'.  Briggs,  6  Ore.  31; 
Scheland  v.  Erpelding,  6  id.  258 ;  Pond  r. 
Waterloo  Agric.  Works,  50  Iowa,  596 ; 
Kellogg  v.  Aherin,  48  id.  299 ;  Hervey  v. 
Savery,  48  id.  313;  Wright  v.  Bacheller, 
16  Kan.  259  ;  Hopkins  v.  Oilman,  47  Wis. 
581 ;  Tippecanoe  Cy.  Com'rs  i-.  Lafay- 
ette, etc.  U.  Co.,  50  Ind.  85,  116,  117; 
Kwing  V.  Patterson,  35  id.  326;  Winslow 
)•.  Winslow,  52  id.  8;  Daly  v.  Nat.  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  64  id.  1  ;  Joyce  v.  Whitney,  57  id.  550  : 
Shoemaker  v.  Smith,  74  id.  71 ;  Williams 
V.  Boyd,  75  id.  286  ;  Wilson  v.  Madison,  55 
Cal.  5 ;  O'Connor  v.  Frasher,  53  id.  435 ; 
Kreichbaum  v.  Melton,  49  id.  50.  See  also 
I'illow  y.  Sentelle,  49  Ark.  430;  Marriott 
V.  Clise,  12  Col.  561  ;  Mahaska  Cy.  State 
Bank  v.  Christ,  82  Iowa,  56;  Grimes  ?•. 
Grimes,  88  Ky.  20;  Demartin  ;•.  Albert, 
68  Cal  277;  jlarrison  c.  McCormick,  69 
Cal.   616;  Shain    v.   Belvin,   79  Cal.   262; 


Goldman  v.  Bashore,  80  Cal.  146;  Heil- 
bron  I'.  Kings  River  &  F.  Canal  Co.,  76 
Cal.  11;  Wadswonh  r.  Wadsworth,  81 
Cal.  182  ;  Mott  v.  Mott,  82  Cal.  413 ;  Van 
Bibbor  1-.  Hilton,  84  Cal.  585;  Winter  v. 
McMillan,  87  Cal.  256 ;  Blakely  v.  Blakely, 
89  Cal.  324  ;  Clark  v.  Taylor,  91  Cal.  552^ 

2  I^Powell  V.  Nolan  "{H'02),  27  Wash. 
318,  67  Pac.  712;  Zarrs  c.  Keck  (1894), 
40  Neb.  456,  58  N.  W.  933 ;  Patrick  Land 
Co.  V.  Leavenworth  (1894).  42  Neb.  715, 
60  N.  W.  9.54;  Smith  v.  Allen  (1901),  63 
Neb.  74,  88  N.  W.  155 ;  Berdolt  v.  Berdolt 
(1898),  56  Neb.  792,  77  N.  W.  399;  Putt 
r.  Putt  (1897),  149  Ind.  30,  48  N.  E.  356; 
Fleishman  r.  Woods  (1901),  135  Cal.  256, 
67  Pac.  276  ;  Barnacle  v.  Henderson  (1894), 
42  Neb.  169,  60  N.  W.  382;  IIa.«lam  «. 
Ha.<lam  11899),  19  Utah,  1,  56  Pac.  243; 
Am.  Exch.  Bank  v.  Davidson  (1897),  69 
Minn.  319,  72  N.  W.  129;  Maxwell  v. 
Northern  Trust  Co.  (1897),  70  Minn.  334, 
73  N.  W.  173;  Wheeler,  etc.  Mfg.  Co. 
V.  Bjelland  (1896),  97  la.  637,  66  N.  W. 
885;  Nevada  Ditch  Co.  v.  Bennett  (1896), 
30  Ore.  59,  45  Pac.  472;  Hill  v.  Friuk 
(1895),  11  Wa.sh.  562,  40  Pac.  128; 
Armstrong  v.  Mayer  (1903),  —  Neb. — , 
95  N.  W.  51  ;  Kollock  v.  Scribner  (1897), 
98  Wis.  104,  73  N.  W.  776;  Ballin  r. 
Merchants'  Exch.  Bank  (1895),  89  Wis. 
278,  61  N.  W.  1118. 

"  While  the  code  makes  no  express  pro- 
visions for  cross-complaints  or  bills,  they 
are  yet  recognized  by  our  practice.  .  .  . 
The  answer  in  such  a  case  must  contain 
all  the  allegations  required  in  a  complaint 
to  justify  the  granting  of  a  temporary 
injunction,  for  the  only  real  difference  I'e- 
tween  a  comjdaint  and  a  cross-complaint 
is  that  the  former  is  maile  by  the  plaintiff 


CKOSti-Co:.IPLAINT.  043 

Thompson  and  Dice,  tlie  complaint  alleged  that  the  plaintiff,  as 
widow  of  C.  Morris,  deceased,  was  owner  in  fee  of  certain  land, 
namely,  one  undivided  third  of  land,  of  which  her  husband  died 
seized;  that  she  was  induced  by  the  frauds  of  Thompson,  in  a 
manner  particularly  described,  to  execute  to  him  a  deed  of  all 
her  said  lands :  a  second  paragraph  states  the  same  deed  to  have 
been  made  to  Thompson  by  mistake;  that  the  heirs  of  her  hus- 
band also  conveyed  all  their  interest  in  the  same  land  to  T.  at 
the  same  time,  who  thus  held  the  title  to  the  entire  tract;  that 
therefore  T.  conveyed  five-sevenths  of  said  tract  to  the  defendant 
Dice,  who  took  with  knowledge  of  the  plaintiff's  claim;  prayer, 
that  her  deed  to  Thompson  might  be  declared  void,  that  T.'s  deed 
to  D.  might  be  set  aside,  so  far  as  it  conveyed  her  land,  that  her 
title  might  be  established,  etc.  Dice  answered,  first,  denials; 
and,  second,  that  he  took  from  T.  in  good  faith,  without  notice, 
and  for  a  full  consideration.  Thompson,  as  an  answer,  inter- 
posed a  cross-complaint  against  Dice,  in  which,  after  denying 
any  fraud,  he  alleged  that  he  took  a  conveyance  from  the  heirs 
of  C.  Morris,  deceased,  of  all  their  interest,  which  was  an  un- 
divided two-thirds  of  the  tract;  that  by  mistake  his  own  deed  to 
D.  conveyed  a  greater  interest  in  the  land  than  that  which  the 
heirs  of  C.  M.  had  owned,  and  which  was  all  that  he  had  in- 
tended to  convey  to  D.  ;  prayer,  that  his  deed  to  D.  might  be 
reformed  by  correcting  the  mistake.  Dice  answered  this  cross- 
complaint,  denying  its  averments.  On  the  trial,  D.  moved  for 
a  separate  trial  of  the  issues  between  himself  and  T.,  which  was 

and  the  latter  by  the  defendant : "  Pine  "  matters  in  (juestion  in  tlie  petition,"  the 
Tree  Lumber  Co.  v.  McKinley  (1901),  83  summons  issued  on  the  petition  would  be 
Minn.  419,  86  N.  W.  414.  sufficient  notice  to  sustain  a  judgment 
Joyce  V.  Growney  (1900),  154  Mo.  253,  rendered  on  the  cross-petition  ;  but  where 
55  S.  W.  466 :  "  The  statute  limits  the  the  cross-petition  sets  up  matters  which 
new  matter  that  may  be  pleaded  in  the  are  not  drawn  "  in  question  in  the  peti- 
answer  to  that  which  is  a  defence  to  tion,"  and  seeics  affirmative  relief  against 
the  ])laintiff's  suit  or  else  a  counter-claim  a  co-defendant,  of  a  nature  different  from 
against  hivi;  it  does  not  authorize  a  that  sought  in  the  petition,  a  summons  to 
counter-claim  or  an  equitable  cross-action  the  party  to  be  charged,  issued  on  the 
of  one  defendant  against  another,  except  petition,  will  not  confer  jurisdiction  to 
as  one  defendant  may  be  entitled  to  such  render  judgment  on  the  cross-petition, 
relief  against  another  as  will  enable  him  especially  wlien  the  cross-petition  is  filed 
to  make  good  his  defence  to  the  plaintiff's  after  the  defendant  thereto  is  in  default 
suit."  for  answer  to  the  petition,  and  a  sum- 
Southward  V.  Jamison  (1902),  66  Ohio  mons  on  the  cross-petition  in  such  case  is 
St.  290,  64  N.  E.  135:  So  long  as  a  cross-  necessary.] 
petition  in  an  action  is  strictly  confined  to 


944  CIVIL    REMKDIES. 

refused.  The  court  found  from  the  evidence  that  the  plaintiff's 
deed  to  T.  was  a  mistake;  that  T.  had  reconveyed  to  her  by 
quitclaim;  that  on  the  same  day  T.  conveyed  to  D.,  and  in 
that  deed  also  there  was  a  mistake,  namely,  that  it  conveyed 
five-sevenths  of  the  whole  tract  instead  of  five-sevenths  of  an 
undivided  two-thirds,  which  was  the  amount  intended  to  be 
conveyed;  and  a  judgment  was  rendered  reforming  this  deed 
from  T.  to  D.  On  an  appeal  by  D.  from  this  judgment,  the 
court  held  that  the  matters  averred  in  the  cross-complaint,  and 
the  relief  sought  by  it,  were  so  intimately  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  principal  suit  by  Mrs.  Morris,  that  the  whole 
might  be  properly  litig-ated  together;  that  the  cross-complaint 
stated  a  good  cause  of  action  against  D.,  and  that  the  latter  was 
not  entitled  to  a  separate  trial  of  the  issues  raised  hy  his  answer 
to  it.^  It  is  plain,  from  the  facts  as  they  were  found  by  the 
trial  court,  that  the  real  object  of  the  suit  by  Mrs.  Morris  was 
to  get  rid  of  Thompson's  deed  to  Dice.  Thompson's  deed  back 
to  herself  had  purported  to  reconvey  the  title  to  her,  but  was 
partially  inoperative  by  reason  of  the  outstanding  deed  from 
Thompson  to  Dice,  which  was  at  least  a  cloud  upon  her  title. 
By  making  both  of  these  persons  defendants,  she  forced  Thomp- 
son to  attack  his  own  deed  to  Dice.  As  the  matters  of  difference 
between  Thompson  and  Dice  were  closely  blended  with  her  own 
claims  against  both,  and  as  her  remedy  so  directly  depended  upon 
the  result  of  the  contest  between  these  two  parties,  it  seems  emi- 
nently proper  that  this  triangular  legal  duel  should  be  fought  in 
one  contest,  as  was  done. 

§  683.  *  807.  Illustrative  Cases  Continued.  Another  decision 
by  the  same  court  shows  when  a  cross-complaint  by  defendants 
against  other  defendants  will  not  be  sustained.  Gasharie  and 
Davis  sue  one  hundred  and  seven  defendants,  partners  trading 
under  the  name  of  "Farmers'  Home  Store,"  and  seek  to  recover 
the  amount  of  certain  notes  given  by  the  firm  for  the  price  of 
goods  sold  on  credit,  amounting  to  several  thousand  dollars. 
The  firm  was  an  association  having  a  president,  directors,  and 
memljers.  The  business  was  conducted  by  a  managing  agent, 
and  overseen  by  the  directors.  One  of  the  articles  of  associa- 
tion forbade  the  purchase  or  sale  of  goods  on  credit.  The  notes 
in  suit  were  given  by  the  managing  agent  for  goods  bought  on 

1  Dice  V.  Morris,  32  Ind.  283. 


CROSS-COMPLAINT.  945 

credit.  Twenty-eight  of  the  defendants  put  in  an  answer  by 
way  of  a  cross -coniphiint  against  the  directors  and  managing" 
agent,  who  were  also  defendants.  Tliis  pleading  stated  the 
articles  of  association,  alleged  a  violation  of  tlieni  by  the  di- 
rectors and  managing  agent  in  the  said  purchase  upon  credit, 
and  prayed  that  the  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiffs  might 
be  rendered  against  said  directors  and  agent  in  the  iirst  in- 
stance, and  enforced  out  of  their  property.  The  plaintiffs,  and 
the  directors  and  agent  defendants,  demurred  to  this  cross- 
complaint.  The  court  held  that  it  stated  no  defence  to  the 
plaintiff's  action,  and  presented  no  case  for  relief  against  the 
directors  and  agent.  While  the  code  provides  that  "  judgment 
ma}"-  be  rendered  for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  plaintiffs, 
or  for  or  against  one  or  more  of  several  defendants,  and  it  may, 
when  the  justice  of  the  case  requires  it,  determine  the  ultimate 
rights  of  the  parties  on  each  side  as  between  themselves,"  and 
while  the  court  has  thus  the  power  to  settle  disputes  between  the 
defendants,  it  will  not  do  so  to  the  detriment  of  the  plaintiff.^ 

§  684.  *  808.  Code  Provision  in  Indiana.  Procedure.  Iowa 
and  California.  The  Code  of  Indiana  expressly  authorizes  the 
court  to  determine  the  rights  of  the  parties  as  between  them- 
selves on  each  side,  when  the  justice  of  the  case  demands  it. 
The  mode  of  procedure  is  not  pointed  out,  and  therefore  the 
general  methods  of  chancery  must  be  adopted,  modified  by  the 
spirit  of  the  code.  When  a  defendant  seeks  relief  against  a 
defendant  as  to  matters  not  appearing  on  the  face  of  the  original 
complaint,  he  must  file  a  cross-complaint  setting  up  the  matters 
on  which  he  relies,  making  as  defendants  thereto  such  of  his 
co-defendants  and  others  as  are  proper;  and  process  is  necessary 
to  bring  them  in.  It  is  plain  that  there  must  be  notice  and  pro- 
cess to  the  persons  against  whom  relief  is  sought  on  the  cross- 
complaint.2  "The  only  real  difference  between  a  complaint  and 
a  cross-complaint  is,  that  the  first  is  filed  by  the  plaintiff,  and 
the  second  by  the  defendant.  Both  contain  a  statement  of  the 
facts,  and  each  demands  affirmative  relief  upon  the  facts  stated. 
In  the  making  up  the  issues  and  the  trial  of  questions  of  fact, 
the  court  is  governed  b}^  the  same  principles  of  law  and  rules  of 

1  Mauning  v.    Gasharie,    27    Ind.  399.  2  Fletcher  v.  Holmes,  25  Ind.  458,  465, 

See  Indiana  Code  (2  G  &  H.  218),  per  Frazer  C.  J. ;  Meredith  i-.  Lackey,  16 
§  368.  lud.  1. 

60 


946 


CIVIL   KEMEDIES. 


practice  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other.  When  a  defendant 
liles  a  cross-coraphiint,  and  seeks  affirmative  relief,  he  becomes 
a  plaintiff,  and  the  plaintiff  in  the  original  action  becomes  the 
defendant  in  the  cross-complaint."  ^  The  same  rules  as  to  set- 
ting out  written  instruments  and  copies  thereof  apply  to  cross- 
petitions  which  are  prescribed  in  reference  to  original  petitions.^ 
Where,  however,  the  cross-petition  is  based  upon  a  writing 
which  it  does  not  set  out  in  full,  but  which  is  annexed  to  the 
petition  in  the  action,  this  is  sufficient;  the  rule  is  practically 
complied  with.^  An  answer  being  denominated  a  counter- 
claim by  the  pleader,  cannot  in  California  be  treated  as  a 
cross-complaint.^ 


1  Ewing  V.  Pattison,  35  Ind.  326,  330. 

-  QBallin  v.  Merchants'  Exch.  Bank 
(1895),  89  Wis.  278,  61  N.  W.  1118  ;  Pine 
Tree  Lumber  Co.  v.  McKinley  (1901),  83 
Minu.  419,  86  N.  W.  414;  Smith  v.  Allen 
(1901),  63  Neb.  74,  88  N.  W.  155;  Lang- 
ford  V.  Langford  (1902),  136  Cal.  507,  69 
Pac.  235  ;  Hargreaves  v.  Tennis  (1901),  63 
Neb.  356,  88  N.  W.  486  ;  Mills  v.  Fletcher 
(1893),  100  Cal.  142,34  Pac.  637  ;  VVitten- 
brock  V.  Parker  (1894),  102  Cal.  93,  36 
Pac.  374. 

Leach  v.  Rains  (1897),  149  Ind.  152,  48 
N.  E.  858 :  "  A  cross-complaint,  like  an 
original  complaint,  must  state  facts  suffi- 
cient to  entitle  the  pleader  to  some  affirm- 


ative relief,  and  it  cannot  be  aided  by  the 
allegations  of  other  pleadings  in  the  ac- 
tion." Schmidt  f.Zahrndt  (1897),  148  Ind. 
447,  47  N.  E.  335  :  "  A  cross-complaint 
must  be  sufficient  within  itself,  without  aid 
from  any  otiier  pleadings  in  the  case.  .  .  . 
Yet  for  matters  of  mere  description  and 
identification  many  of  the  allegations  of 
the  complaint  may  be  referred  to."  See 
also  Dudenhofer  v.  Johnson  (1895),  144 
Ind.  631,  43  N.  E.  808;  Island  Coal  Co.  r. 
Streitlemier  (1894),  139  Ind.  83,  37  N.  E. 
340-3 

3  Coe  V.  Lindley,  32  Iowa,  437,  444; 
Ilyder  v.  Thomas,  32  Iowa,  56. 

*  McAbee  y.^Randall,  41  Cal.  136. 


INDEX. 


[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 


A. 

ABATEMENT, 

defences  in,  at  common  law  and  under  reformed  procedure,  573,  574. 

difference  between  pleas  in  and  those  in  bar  under  reformed  procedure, 
574. 

defences  in,  are  new  matter,  574,  587. 

joining  of  pleas  in,  with  those  in  bar,  597« 
ACCORD   AND   SATISFACTION, 

defence  of,  new  matter,  588, 
ACCOUNT, 

how  to  plead,  page  668,  n. 
ACCOUNTING, 

plaintiffs  in  actions  for,  171-173. 
defendants,  275. 

parties  in  actions  for,  in  trust  estates,  173,  182,  253,  n.,  254,  n.,  255. 
between  partners,  262,  275. 

how  to  plead,  page  668,  n. 
ACCOUNT   STATED, 

how  to  plead,  page  668,  n. 
ACT   OF   GOD, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n, 
ACTION   FOR   PRICE, 

how  to  plead,  page  668,  n. 
ACTION   ON   THE   CASE, 

nature  of  pleading  in,  404. 

ACTIONS, 

general  nature  of  the  civil,  3. 

distinction  between  legal  and  equitable,  abolished  by  reformed  pro- 
cedure, 4,  10-13. 

abrogation  of  common-law  forms  of,  4. 

doctrine  of  parties,  50,  60,  61. 

theory  of  pleading,  14,  15. 
proceedings  in  civil,  are  ordinary  and  equitable,  4. 
principles  as  to  union  of  legal  and  equitable,  adopted  by  the  courts,  5-15, 

two  schools  of  judges,  6. 


948  I^■DEX. 

[the  eefeeences  arb  to  th«  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
ACTIONS  —  continued. 

restrictive  construction  by  one  school,  6,  7. 

liberal  and  correct  by  the  other,  S-13. 

distinction  between  legal  and  equitable  rights  or  causes  of  action, 

not  abolished,  8. 
distinction  between  legal  and  equitable  reliefs,  not  abolished,  9. 
distinction   between    abolished,   and  one   action   established  for  all 

rights  and  reliefs,  10-13. 
doctrine  of  unity  in  procedure  applied  to  pleading,  14,  15. 
imion  of  legal  and  equitable  rights  and  remedies  in  civil,  16-25. 

union  of  both  legal  and  equitable  causes  of  action,  and  granting  of 

both  legal  and  equitable  reliefs,  17,  18. 
union  of  both  causes  of  action    and  granting  of  legal  relief   only, 

19,  20. 
legal  cause  of  action  stated,  and  legal  relief  granted,  where  equitable 

asked,  11,  21. 
equitable  cause  of  action  stated,  and  equitable  relief  granted,  where 

legal  asked,  11,  22 
equitable  or  legal  relief  prayed  for,  but  not  granted,  where  corre- 
sponding cause  of  action  not  pleaded,  23. 
use  of  equitable  right  in  support  of  a  legal  cause  of  action,  24. 
mode  of  trial  of  legal  and  equitable  issues  when  united,  25. 
equitable  defences  to  legal,  26-35.     See  Dkfexces. 
legal  remedy  on  equitable  ownership  or  right,  36-44. 

action  by  equitable  owner  of  land  for  possession,  36-41. 
by  one  partner  against  another  for  a  share  of  firm  property,  42. 
special  ;  partition,  trover,  43. 
nature  of  civil  and  essential  differences  between  them,  45-49. 

differences  are  not  in  forms  of,  but  in  the  primary  rights  and  reme- 
dies. 4.5-47. 
right  of  election  between  ex  contractu  and  ex  delicto,  48,  387. 
impropriety  of  retaining  former  names  of,  49. 
by  or  against  one  as  representative  for  all  others  interested,  285-298.    See 

Parties. 
against  persons  severally  liable  on  the  same  instrument,  299-307.     See 
Liabilities. 

ADMINISTRATORS.     See  Executors  and  Administrators. 
as  parties,  page  353,  n. 

ADMISSIONS   IN    PLEADINGS, 

general  rules  respecting,  page  736,  n. 

AGENCY, 

how  to  plead,  page  608,  n. 

AGENTS.     See  Principal  and  Agent. 
AGREED   PRICE,    ACTION    FOR, 

how  to  plead,  page  668,  n. 
ALLEGATIONS, 

in  foreclosure  suits,  238. 

in  suits  by  or  against  one  on  behalf  of  all  interested,  287,  288,  298. 

where  causes  of  action  arise  out  of  the  same  transaction,  etc.,  .372. 


INDEX.  949 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
AhLEGATIO:SS  — CO  nthtued. 

sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of,  cases  illustrating,  427-430. 
of.piomise,  whether  proper  in  actions  on  implied  contracts,  431-435. 
insufficient,  imperfect,  incomplete,  or  informal,  how  objected  to,  442-444. 
redundant,  immaterial,  and  irrelevant,  what  are,  and   how  objected   to, 

445,  440. 
proofs  must  correspond  with,  417-455.     See  Proofs. 
of  one  part  of  pleading  aiding  those  of  another,  466,  586. 
admitted  by  failure  to  deny,  469,  508. 

immaterial,  nature  of,  and  effect  of  denial  of  the  same,  469,  508. 
qualified  admission  of,  effect  of,  469. 
admission  of,  by  one  of  several  defendants,  effect  of,  409. 
effect  of  admission  of,  in  one  part  of  answer  on  denial  in  another,  469, 

600. 
defective,  supplied  by  answer,  470. 

effect  of  general  denial  depends  upon  plaintiff's,  546,  547. 
what,  necessary  in  counter-claims  in  different  cases,  673-675. 
See  Pleadings;  Complaint;  Answer. 

ALTERATION   OF   INSTRUMENT, 
is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

ALTERED   CONTRACT, 

how  to  plead,  page  G69,  n. 

ALTERED   INSTRUxMENT, 
how  to  plead,  page  609,  n. 

ALTERNATIVE, 

allegations  in  the,  page  600,  n. 

AMENDMENTS, 

of  parties,  308-325.     See  Parties. 
of  pleadings,  456,  457. , 

provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  329,  481. 

ANSWER, 

affirmative  equitable  relief  in  legal  action  on  mere,  35. 
nonjoinder  or  defect  of  plaintiffs,  when  raised  by,  123,  124. 

misjoinder  when  raised  by,  128-133. 
nonjoinder  or  defect  of  defendants,  when  raised  by,  188,  189. 

misjoinder,  when  raised  by,  191,  193. 
misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  when  objected  to  by,  337,  342,  343. 
principles  of  reformed  pleading  apply  to,  containing  affirmative  matter, 

410,  563-565. 
allegations  not  controverted  by,  admitted,  469,  508. 
qualified  admissions  by,  effect  of,  469. 
admissions  by  one  of  several  defendants,  effect  of,  469. 
effect  of  admissions  in  one  part  of,  on  denial  in  another,  469,  600. 
defective  complaints  aided  by,  470. 
rules  and  doctrines  concerning,  471-684. 
provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  472-482. 

in  general,  472. 

union  of  defences,  473. 

counter-claims  and  set-offs,  474,  475. 


950  INDEX. 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
AXSWEll  —  continued. 

cross-complaints,  476. 

sham  and  irrelevant,  stricken  ont  on  motion,  476. 
pleadings  responsive  to;  demurrer,  reply,  477-479. 
special  [jrovisions  in  certain  codes,  480. 
amendments,  481. 
general  requisites  of,  and  rules  applicable  to  all,  483-500. 
cla.s3es  of;  denials,  new  matter,  484. 
questions  of  form,  and  those  of  substance,  485-496. 
when  the  different  questions  arise,  485,  486. 
how  taken  advantage  of ;  general  and  special  demurrer,  487. 
defective  in  form  distinguished  from  those  demurrable,  488,  489. 
objections  to  form,  how  waived,  488,  491. 
defective,  cured  by  motion,  487,  490. 
decisions  illustrating,  490-496. 
joint,  by  several  defendants,  497. 
partial  defences,  498-500. 

to  be  pleaded,  498,  569-572. 
how  pleaded,  499.  .")00. 
defence  of  denials,  501-561.     See  Denials. 
defence  of  new  matter,  562-590.     See  New  Matter. 
union  of  defences  in  the  same,  591-601.     See  Defences. 
counter-claims,  set-offs,  and  cross-complaints,    002-684.     See   Counter- 
claims, Set-offs,  and  Cross-Complaints. 
AXTICIPATING   DEFENCES, 

rule  as  to,  page  069,  n. 
ARTICLES   OF   INCORPORATION, 

how  to  plead,  page  669,  n. 
ASSAULT   AND   BATTERY, 
joinder  of  plaintiffs,  148. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  to  wife,  153,  154,  156,  157»  159. 
joinder  of  defendants  in  actions  for,  208. 
defendants  in  suits  against  wife  for,  221. 

ASSIGNMENT, 

of  things  in  action  at  common  law,  62. 
not  affected  by  code  provisions,  63. 
of  things  in  action,  effect  of,  upon  defences  thereto,  82-98. 
provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  82. 
defences  to,  are  not  counter-claims,  83,  95,  628. 
former  rules  re-enacted  by  the  codes,  84. 
rule  as  to  defences  in  favor  of  tlie  debtor,  85. 
equities  between  successive  assignors  and  assignees,  86-89. 
cases  illustrating,  87-89. 
doctrine  of  estoppel  against  assignor,  88,  89. 
summary  of  the  discussion,  90. 

demands  against  assignor,  set-off  in  action  by  assignee,  91-97. 
other  defences  not  .set-offs,  98. 
plaintifts  in  suits  to  set  aside,  for  benefit  of  creditors,  182. 
how  to  plead,  page  070,  n. 

See  Assignors  and  Assignees. 


INDEX.  951 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

ASSIGNMENT   FOR   BENEFIT   OF   CllEDlTOliS, 
how  to  plead,  page  670,  n. 

ASSIGNORS   AND   ASSIGNEES, 

assignees  of  things  in  action  to  sue  in  their  own  names,  63-75,  165. 
when  the  assignment  is  absolute,  61. 

when  equitable,  05,  73,  149. 
when  of  negotiable  paper,  66,  69,  78. 
when  conditional  or  partial,  70,  75. 
illustrations,  71,  72. 
assignor  to  be  joined  in  certain  States,  73,  165,  217,  236,  261. 
when  the  assignment  is  made  pending  action,  74. 
equities  between  successive,  86-89. 
cases  illustrating,  87-89. 
doctrine  of  estoppel  against  assignor,  88,  89. 
demands  against  assignor  set  off  in  action  by  assignee,  91-97. 

but  are  not  counter-claims,  S3,  95,  628. 
defences  other  than  set-off,  when  available  against  assignee,  98. 
parties  in  suits  by  assignees  of  creditors  and  in  bankruptcy,  175,  253,  n. 
against  assignees  of  creditors,  182,  254,  255,  291. 
against  assignees  in  bankruptcy,  253,  n. 
assignees  of  judgment  debtors,  defendants  in  creditors'  suits,  245,  246. 
defendants  in  suits  against  corporations  by  assignees  of  stock,  261. 
assignors   not   necessary  defendants  in  suits  by   asi^ignees   to   foreclose 

securities,  280. 
assignees  of  mortgages  defendants  in  suits  to  redeem,  284. 
See  Assignments. 
ASSUMPSIT, 

action  of,  origin  and  appropriate  use,  406. 

use  of  forms  of  pleading  in,  15,  436-438. 

right  to  waive  tort  and  bring,  48,  387,  458-464.     See  ToRTS. 

impropriety  of  present  use  of  word,  49. 

nature  of  pleading  in,  at  common  law,  404. 

ASSUMPTION  OF  RISK, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 
ATTORNEY,  QUALIFICATION  OF, 
how  to  plead,  page  670,  n. 

AWARD, 

defence  of  arbitration  and,  new  matter,  578. 


B. 

BANKRUPTCY, 

parties  in  suits  by  or  against  assignees  in,  175,  253,  n. 
defence  of  discharge  in,  new  matter,  588. 

BAR, 

extent  of  pleas  in,  at  common  law,  and  change  made  by  codes,  498,  569, 

570. 
difference  between  pleas  in,  and  those  in  abatement  under  the  codes,  574. 
joining  of  pleas  in  abatement  with  those  in,  597. 


952  INDEX. 

[the  references  are   to  the   sections   except  when   otherwise  INDICATED.3 

BILLS  OF  EXCHANGE.     See  Negotiable  Paper. 

BONA  FIDES, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

BOND, 

how  to  plead,  page  670,  n. 

BREACH  OF  COVENANTS, 
how  to  plead,  page  670,  n. 

BREACH  OF  PROMISE  TO  MARRY, 

how  to  plead,  page  670,  n. 

BREACH  OF  WARRANTY, 

how  to  plead,  page  670,  n. 


c. 

CANCELLATION, 

defendants  in  action  for,  276-278. 

CAPACITY, 

how  to  allege,  page  670,  n. 

CAPACITY  TO  SUE, 

meaning  of  want  of,  124 

CAUSES  OF  ACTION, 

no  change  made  by  reformed  procedure  in,  8. 

union  of  both  legal  and  equitable,  and  granting  of  both  legal  and  equitable 
reliefs,  17,  18. 
granting  of  legal  relief  only,  19,  20. 
legal  stated,  and  legal  reliefs  granted,  where  equitable  asked,  11,  21. 
equitable  stated,  and  equitable  reliefs  granted,  where  legal  asked,  11,  22. 
equitable  or  legal  reliefs  prayed  for,  but  not  granted  where  coiTespond, 

not  pleaded,  23. 
use  of  equitable  rights  in  support  of  legal,  24. 
mode  of  trial  when  legal  and  equitable  are  united,  25. 
joinder  of,  3:51,  309. 

provisions  of  the  codes,  332-334. 

misjoinder  of,  bow  may  occur  and  be  objected  to,  336-345. 
to  be  separately  stated,  336. 
how  objected  to;  demurrer,  answer,  waiver,  337. 
effect  of  sustaining  objection,  337-339. 
forms  of  misjoinder  of,  340. 
proper,  mingled  in  one  count,  341. 
separately  stated,  but  improperly  joined,  342,  343. 
improper,  mingled  in  one  count,  344,  345. 
meaning  of  "cause  of  action,"'  340-348,  412-414,  page  461,  n. 
not  defined  by  the  courts,  346. 
elements  which  form,  347,  348,  412-414. 

distinctions   between,   and   "object   of  action,"   and  remedial 
right,  347,  348. 
test  to  determine  number  of,  349-351,  page  467,  n. 
splitting,  page  470,  n. 


INDEX.  953 

[the  BEFERENCES   ABE  TO   THE   SECTIONS   EXCEPT   WHEN   OTHERWIBB   INDICATED.] 

CAUSES    OF    ACnO'S  —  contiyiued. 

cases  where  but  one,  stated,  but  several  reliefs  demanded,  352-356, 

page  470,  n. 
■when  arising  out  of  tlie  same  transaction,  or  transactions  connected 
with  the  subject  of  action,  357-372. 
nature  of  cases  described  by  this  clause,  357,  358. 
judicial  interpretation  of  clause,  359-365. 
meaning  of  "  transaction,"  366-368. 
meaning  of  "  subject  of  action,"  369. 
examples,  370,  371. 
necessary  allegations  by  plaintiff,  372. 
•when  joined  must  affect  all  parties,  373-384. 
need  not  affect  all  alike,  374. 
examples  of  misjoinder,  375-378. 
must  affect  all  plaintiffs  as  well  as  defendants,  377. 
examples  of  proper  joinder,  379. 
multifariousness,  doctrine  of,  discussed,  380. 
Mr.  Calvert's  positions  examined,  381-384. 
■when  against  a  single  defendant,  or   against  all  defendants  alike, 
385-395. 
in  actions  on  contract,  386,  387. 
election  between  tort  and  contract,  387. 
in  actions  relating  to  lands,  388. 
for  injuries  to  property,  389. 
for  injuries  to  character,  390. 
special  cases,  391. 

illustrations  of  law  of  Iowa  and  Indiana,  392. 
examples  of  improper  joinder,  394,  395. 
must  affect  all  parties  in  the  same  capacity,  396. 
miscellaneous  cases,  397-3.99. 
distinction  between  legal  and  equitable,  415,  416. 
nature  of  facts  constituting,  417-419. 

facts  only,  constituting,  to  be  pleaded,  13,  347,  418,  424,  425. 
material  facts  only,  constituting,  to  be  pleaded,  411,  420-422,  426. 
ex  contractu  alleged,  and  ex  delicto  proved,  452-455. 
separate,  how  stated  in  complaint,  466. 
one,  in  two  or  more  different  counts,  467. 
manner  of  demurring  when  several,  468,  497. 

prayer  for  relief  whether  forms  a  part  of,  and  effect  on,  11,  21,  22,  471. 
counter-claims  must  be,  614. 

CESTUI  QUE  TRUST.     See  Trustee. 
CHAMPERTY, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 
CHATTELS, 

action  analogous  to  trover  by  equitable  owner  of,  43. 
plaintiffs  in  actions  concerning,  138-143. 
of  wife,  plaintiffs  in  actions  concerning,  151-154. 
parties  in  equitable  suits  concerning,  by  holders  of  joint  rights,  169. 
defendants  in  actions  concerning,  198,  199,  210,  211. 
in  actions  concerning  wife's,  220,  222,  223. 


954  INDEX. 

[thb  kepb&bnces  are  to  thb  sections  except  when  otebbwue  indicated.] 
CHATTELS  —  continued. 

joinder  of  causes  of  action  relating  to,  389,  397. 

defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in  actions  for  goods  sold,  552, 
585. 
in  actions  for  conversion  of,  55;3,  580,  581. 
in  actions  to  recover  possession  of,  5;38,  554. 
defences  when  new  matter  in  actions  to  recover  possession  of,  554,  579. 
counter-claims  in  actions  to  recover  possession  of,  643,  667. 
in  actions  for  goods  sold,  655. 

COLLATERAL   SECURITY, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

COMMITTEES, 

of  lunatics,  etc.,  suits  by,  in  their  own  names,  110. 
defendants  in  suits  against,  253,  n. 

COMMON   COUNTS.     See  Pleadings. 

COMMON    LAW, 

pleadings  under,  14. 

COMPLAINT   OR   PETITION, 

provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  326-330. 

joinder  of  causes  of  action  in,  3;Jl-399.     See  Causes  of  Action. 
general  principles  of  pleading,  400-464.     See  Pleading. 
form  of,  465^71. 

separate  causes  of  action,  how  stated  in,  466. 

one  cause  of  action  in  two  or  more  counts,  467. 

demurrer,  joint  or  separate,  where  several  causes  of  action,  or  several 
defendants,  468. 

■what  allegations  of,  admitted  by  failure  to  deny,  469. 

qualified  admission  of,  allegations  of,  469. 

defective  allegations  of,  supplied  by  answer,  470. 

prayer  for  relief,  471. 

COMPROMISE, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

CONCLUSIONS   OF   LAW.     See  Law. 

CONDITION   IN   CONTRACT, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

CONDITIONS   PRECEDENT, 

how  to  plead,  page  071,  n. 

CONDITIONS  SUBSEQUENT, 

necessity  for  negativing,  page  672,  n. 

CONSENT    AND    CONNIVANCP; 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 
CONSIDERATION, 

necessity  of  pleading,  page  672,  n. 
CONSTRUCTION    OF   PLEADINGS, 

rules  as  to,  page  592,  n. 
CONTRACT   LIMITING    LIABILITY, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 


INDEX.  955 

[the  eeperences  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

CONTRACTS, 

equitable  defences  to  action.s  on,  ol. 

actions  by  those  for  whose  benefit,  are  made  with  others,  77. 

actions  by  those  with  whom,  or  in  whose  names,  are  made  for  otiiers,  78, 

103-105. 
actions  by  holders  of  joint  rights  arising  from,  14;i-145. 
actions  by  holders  of  several  rights  arising  from,  146. 
actions  at  common  law  against  persons  jointly  liable  on,  144. 

under  the  reformed  procedure,  146-205. 
actions  against  persons  jointly  and  severally  liable  on,  206. 
actions  against  persons  severally  liable  on,  207. 
wife's,  defendants  in  suits  on,  21.9,  220,  223. 
joinder  of  causes  of  action  arising  from,  385-387. 

ari.sing  from  torts  with  those  arising  from,  392,  394,  395. 
allegation  of  promise  on  implied,  improper,  431-435. 
use  of  common  counts  in  actions  on,  436-438. 
cause  of  action  arising  from,  alleged,  and  tort  proved,  452-455. 
election  to  waive  tort  and  sue  on,  48,  387,  458-464.      See  Touts. 
what  defences  to  be  specially  pleaded  in  actions  on,  583-586. 
counter-claims   where  there  is  an  election  between   tort   and,   646,   648, 

656,  n„  664,  677. 
counter-claims  arising  from,  set  forth  by  plaintiff,  653-656,  659. 
counter-claims  where  plaintiff's  claim  is  on,  and  defendant's  for  tort,  aris- 
ing from  the  same,  660-663. 
where  plaintiff's  claim  is  for  tort,  and  defendant's  on,  664,  665. 
counter-claims  arising  from  other,  in  suits  on,  671-679.     See  Specific 

Performance. 

CONTRIBUTION, 

defendants  in  actions  for,  253,  n.,  282. 
CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE, 

necessity  and  manner  of  negativing,  page  673,  n. 
is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

CONVERSION, 

how  to  allege,  page  673,  n. 

CORPORATE   EXISTENCE, 

necessity  of  alleging,  page  674,  n. 

CORPORATION   BY-LAW, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 
CORPORATIONS, 

doctrine  of  set-off  in  case  of  insolvent,  96. 
suits  by  certain  municipal,  107. 

against,  217. 
demurrer  on  ground  of  legal  capacity  of,  to  sue,  125,  n. 
parties  in  actions  against  stockholders  of,  146,  184,  218,  259. 

in  actions  by  stockholders,  258,  260. 
suits  by  and  against  quasi,  and  certain  other,  107,  217. 
defendants  in  suits  to  wind  up,  257,  258. 

in  suits  against,  by  assignees  of  stock,  281. 
denying  existence  of,  559. 


956  INDEX. 

[the  references  are  to  the  sectioks  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

COUNTER-CLAIMS, 

amount  as  affecting  jurisdiction,  j)age  8G7,  n. 
dismissal  of  action  as  affecting,  paye  867,  n. 

defence  to  actions  by  assignees  of  things  in  action  not,  83,  95,  628. 
in  what  States  replies  are  necessary  to,  478,  479. 
classes  of,  602,  603. 

provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  474,  47"i,  602. 
cross-demands  by  the  former  system,  604-608. 
set-off,  605,  606. 
recoupment,  607,  608. 

reduction  of  damages  in  quantum  meruit  and  quantum  valebant,  609. 
general  description,  nature,  objects,  and  uses  of,  (510-624. 
embraces  set-off  and  recoupment,  610-612,  619,  n. 
other  demands  embraced,  613,  619,  n.,  622. 
must  be  a  cause  of  action,  G14,  629. 
whether  valid  claims  by  plaintiff  are  implied  by,  615. 
must  be  in  favor  of  defendant,  616,  62r>-627. 
must  exist  against  plaintiff,  617,  628-630. 
subject-matter  of,  618. 
judicial  constructions  of,  619-623. 

must  defeat  or  interfere  with  plaintiff's  recovery,  620,  621,  623. 
how  pleaded,  410,  565,  614,  624. 
parties  iu  their  relations  with,  625-638. 
the  defendant,  616,  625-027. 
the  plaintiff,  617,  628-630. 

when  in  favor  of,  or  against,  one  or  more  of  several  defendants  or 
plaintiffs,  631-638. 
against  one,  or  some,  of  plaintiffs,  632,  633. 
in  favor  of  one,  or  some,  of  defendants,  634-636. 
summary,  637. 

want  of  necessary  parties,  638. 
subject-matter  of,  or  nature  of  causes  of  action  which  may  be,  639-679. 
may  be  equitable  causes  of  action,  35,  013,  622,  640-643,  668. 
in  actions  to  recover  possession  of  chattels,  613,  067. 
under  the  first  branch  of  the  definition  of,  644-670. 

interpretation  of  this    clause,    "transaction,"    and   "connected 

with  the  subject  of  action,"  613,  618,  645-652. 
where  there  is  an  election  between  tort  and  contract,  .646,  648, 
6.56,  n.,  664. 

(1)  arising  from  the  contract  set  forth  by  plaintiff,  653-656. 

(2)  arising  from  the  same  transaction,  657-668. 

in  legal  actions  where  both  parties  demand   a  money 

judgment,  659-660. 
where  both  are  on  contract,  659. 

where  plaintiff's  claim  is  on  contract,  and  defendants 
for  tort,  660-063. 
for  trespasses,  nuisances,  or  negligences,  661,  662. 
for  fraud,  063. 
where  plaintiff's  claim   is  for  tort,  and  defendant's  on 

contract,  004.  665. 
where  both  claims  are  for  torts,  606. 


INDEX.  957 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
COUNTER-CLAIMS  —  continued. 

in  legal  actions  for  the  possession  of  lands  or  chattels, 

643,  667. 
ill  equitable  suits,  668. 
(.3)  connected  with  the  subject  of  the  action,  669,  670. 
under  the  second  branch  of  the  definition,  and  set-offs,  671-679. 
subject-matter  of,  67ii. 

when  the  right  of  action  must  accrue  to  defendant,  673. 
allegations  necessary  in  different  cases,  673-675. 
what  causes  of  action  are  subject  for,  665-679. 

where  there  is  an  election  between  tort  and  contract,  677. 
in  equitable  suits,  678,  679. 
whether  defendants  are  obliged  to  plead,  680. 
form  of  verdict  and  judgment  in,  681, 

COUNTS, 

use  of  the  word,  at  common  law  and  under  reformed  procedure,  336. 
use  of  the  common,  under  the  reformed  procedure,  436-438. 

in  actions  on  express  contracts,  437. 

criticism  of  the  rules,  438. 
one  cause  of  action  in  two  or  more  different,  467. 

COVENANT, 

nature  of  pleading  in,  404. 

CREDITORS   AND   DEBTORS, 

suits  by  partnership  creditors  against  purchasers  agreeing  to  pay  firm 

•debts,  77. 
assignment  of  things  in  action  subject  to  defences  of  debtor,  85,  91-97. 
joinder  of  creditors  as  plaintiifs,  143-146. 
survivorship  among  joint  creditors,  143. 

parties  in  actions  by  creditors  of  corporations,  146,  184,  218,  259. 
joinder  of  creditors  in  suits  by  or  against  assignees  for  creditors  or  In 

bankruptcy,  175,  182,  253,  n.,  254,255,  291. 
creditors'  actions,  plaintiffs  in,  180-182. 

defendants  in,  243-247. 
joinder  of  debtors  as  defendants,  200-207. 
survivorship  among  joint  debtors,  203-205. 
satisfaction  and  discharge  in  case  of  joint  debtors,  215. 
parties  in  actions  by  creditors  of  estates,  166,  216,  251. 
creditors  when  defendants  in  foreclosure  suits,  233,  n.,  235,  239. 

in  action  for  partition,  250,  272,  274. 

See  Rights;  Liabilities. 

CROSS-COMPLAINTS, 

affirmative  equitable  relief  in  legal  action  obtained  by,  35. 
provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  476. 
general  nature  of,  682-684. 

CROSS-DEMANDS.     See  Counter-Claims. 
CUSTOM, 

necessity  for  pleading,  page  674,  n. 


958  INDEX. 

[the  refebei^ces  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 


D. 

DAMAGES, 

in  joint  torts,  215. 

where  parties  are  jointly  and  severally  liable,  215,  n. 

how  stated  in  complaint,  where  two  or  more  causes  of  action,  466. 

whether  payment  can  be  proved  in  mitigation  of,  535. 

defences  in  mitigation  of,  how  pleaded,  569-572. 

defence  of  recoupment  of,  new  matter,  581. 

recoupment  of,  under  former  procedure,  607,  608. 

reduction  of,  in  quanlum  meruit  and  quantum  valebant  MnAerrei.  proc,  609. 

demands  for  liquidated   and   unliquidated,  embraced  in    counter-claims, 

613,  654,  055,  674. 
damages  sustained  by  defendant,  is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 
general  and  special  allegations,  page  674,  n. 

DEBT, 

nature  of  pleading  in,  404. 

DEBT  DUE, 

averment  of,  in  action  to  foreclose,  page  675,  n. 

DEBTORS.     See  Creditors  and  Debtors. 

DEFECT  IN  REGISTRATION, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

DEFECT  OF  PARTIES, 

reached  by  demurrer,  124. 

DEFENCES, 

meaning  of,  27-2.9. 

equitable,  to  legal  actions,  26-35. 

former  mode  of  defeating  a  legal  action  by  an  equitable  right,  26. 

nature  of  equitable,  27,  28. 

whether  it  requires  aflBrmative  relief,  or  a  right  to  it,  on  the  part  of 
the  defendant,  29,  30. 

in  actions  on  contract,  31,  34. 

in  actions  to  recover  land,  32,  33. 

in  special  cases,  34. 

how  pleaded,  33. 

joinder  of,  with  other,  34. 

when  affirmative  relief  will  be  granted  to  defendant,  35. 
effect  upon,  by  assignmetit  of  things  in  action,  82-98.     See  Assignment. 
separate,  by  wife  when  sued  with  husband,  225. 
joint  or  separate  demurrer  where  several,  468,  497. 
sham  and  irrelevant,  stricken  out  on  motion,  476. 
new  matter  of  codes  when,  484. 
partial,  to  be  pleaded,  498.  560-572. 

how  pleaded,  499-500. 
of  denials,  501-561.     See  Denials. 
of  new  matter,  562-590.     See  New  Matter. 
union  of,  in  the  same  answer,  .591-601. 

provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  473,  591. 


INDEX.  959 

[the  beferekces  ake  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
DEFENCES  —  continued. 

how  the  separate,  to  be  stated,  592-596. 
must  be  complete,  592. 

separate  spcfific  denials,  how  alleged,  593-596. 
kinds  of,  that  may  be  joined ;  those  in  abatement  and  those  in  bar. 

597. 
inconsistent,  598-601. 

DEFENDANTS, 

who  may  be  joined  as,  185-284. 

code  provisions,  185. 
principles  of  the  reformed  procedure  concerning,  187. 
manner  of  raising  questions  as  to  proper,  188-194. 
nonjoinder,  or  defect  of,  188,  180. 
misjoinder  of,  190,  194. 
where  all  are  improperly  sued,  190. 
where  some  are  improperly  sued,  191-193. 
in  legal  actions,  195-218. 

owners  or  occupants  of  lands,  195-197. 
owners  or  possessors  of  chattels,  198,  199. 
persons  jointly  liable  on  contracts,  200-205. 

survivorship,  203-205. 
persons  jointly  and  severally  liable  on  contracts,  206. 
persons  severally  liable  on  contracts,  207. 
persons  liable  for  torts,  208-215. 
settlement  of  decedents'  estates,  216,  248-252. 
in  special  cases,  217,  218. 
in  actions  against  husband  and  wife,  or  either  of  them,  219-225. 
general  nature  of  the  legislation  as  to,  219. 
against  wife  concerning  her  separate  property,  220,  222. 
for  torts  of  wife,  221,  222. 

personal  liability  of  wife  on  contracts,  220,  223. 
concerning  homesteads,  224. 

separate  defences  by  wife  when  sued  with  husband,  225. 
in  equitable  actions,  226-284. 

general  principles ;  necessary  and  proper  parties,  226-229. 
foreclosure  of  mortgages,  230-242. 

general  doctrine,  230-232. 

mortgagors  and  their  grantees,  233,  234. 

creditors,  233,  n.,  235,  239. 

heirs  and  representatives,  233,  n.,  234,  275. 

assignor.s,  217,  n.,  233,  n.,  236. 

where  several  notes  are  given,  237. 

occupants  of  the  land,  238. 

persons  remotely  interested  in  result,  238. 

subsequent  and  prior  encumbrancers,  233,  n.,  239. 

wife  of  mortgagor,  and  of   subsequent  owners,  233,  n.,  240, 
241. 

case  of  homesteads,  242. 

speci.al  cases,  242. 
in  creditors'  actions,  243-247. 


960  INDEX. 

[tSB  REFSRBNCeS   ARE   TO   THE   SECTIONS   EXCEPT   WHEN   OTHERWISE   INDICATED.] 

DEFENDANTS  —  cimunucd. 

nature  of  creditors'  actions,  243. 
judgment  debtor  or  his  representatives,  244,  247. 
his  assignees,  245,  246. 
his  trustees,  247. 
in  actions  concerning  decedents'  estates,  216,  248-252. 

personal   representatives   and   heirs   when  necessary,   249, 

2.50. 
legatees,  distributees,  or  beneficiaries,  when  not  proper,  216, 
251. 
when  necessary,  175,  216,  252. 
in  actions  involving  trusts,  253-256. 
trustees  necessary',  253. 
when  beneticiaries  necessary,  254,  255. 
in  enforcement  of  implied  trusts,  256. 
in  actions  against  corporations  and  stockholders,  257-261. 
to  wind  up  corporations,  257,  258. 
by  creditors  against  stockholders  personally  liable,  146,  184, 

218,  259. 
by  stockholders  against  corporations,  260. 
by  assignees  of  stock.  261. 
in  actions  for  specific  performance,  263-265. 
in  actions  to  quiet  title,  266-269. 

all  adverse  claimants  to  be  joined,  266-269. 
where  mistakes  in  deeds,  etc.,  are  to  be  corrected,  268. 
in  actions  for  partition,  270-274. 

general  rules  of  equity  concerning,  270,  271. 
creditors  and  lieu-holders  when  to  be,  270-272. 
wife  of  tenant  in  common,  273,  274. 
personal  representatives  when  to  be,  273. 
in  actions  concerning  partnership  matters  and  for  an  accounting, 

262,  275. 
in  actions  for  rescission  or  cancellation,  276,  278. 
in  actions  for  enforcement  of  liens,  279-281.  ' 

mechanics'  liens.  279. 
pledges  of  securities,  280. 
in  actions  for  contribution,  282. 
in  actions  by  tax-payers,  283. 
in  actions  to  redeem,  284. 
in  actions  by  or  against  one  person  in  behalf  of  all  interested,  285-298. 

See  Actions. 
persons  severally  liable  upon  the  same  instrument  aa,  299-307.     See  Lia- 
bilities. 
proper  joinder  of,  connected  with  proper  joinder  of  causes  of  action,  373- 

384.     See  Causks  of  Action. 
•when  all  causes  of  action  are  against  a  single,  or  against  all  alike,  385- 

399.     See  Causes  of  Actio.n. 
manner  of  answering  or  demurring  when  several,  468,  497. 
effect  of  admi.ssions  by  one  of  several,  on  others,  469. 
defences  relating  to  joinder  or  capacity  of,  new  matter,  587. 
in  their  relations  wi'.ii  c(junter-clairas,  62.5-038.     See  Couxter-Ci.ai.ms. 


INDEX.  961 

[the  references  arb  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  iwdicatbd.] 
DEFENDANTS  —  continued. 

whetlier,  must  plead  counter-claims,  GSO. 

pleadings   on    the   part   of.      See    Answkr;    De.mals;   New  Matter  ; 
Countek-Claims  ;  Cross-Complaints. 

DELIVERY, 

how  to  plead,  page  676,  n. 

DEMAND, 

necessity  of  alleging,  page  676,  n. 

DEMURRERS, 

general  rules  as  to,  page  608,  n.,  page  708,  n. 

nonjoinder  or  defect  of  parties  plaintiff  as  gi-ound  of,  123,  124. 

for  want  of  legal  capacity  to  sue,  125. 

misjoinder  of  plaintiffs,  whether  a  ground  of,  126-133. 

nonjoinder  or  defect  of  parties  defendant,  as  ground  of,  188,  189. 

misjoinder  of  defendants  as  ground  of,  190-194. 

to  complaint,  provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  327. 

when  proper  in  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  337. 

effect  of  sustaining,  for  misjoinder  of  causes  of  action,  337-339. 

proper  causes  of  action  mingled  in  one  count,  as  ground  of,  341. 

to  causes  of  action  separately  stated,  but  improjjerly  joined,  342,  343. 

to  improper  causes  of  action  mingled  in  one  count,  314,  345. 

to  insufficient,  imperfect,  incomplete,  and  informal  allegations,  442-444. 

to  redundant,  immaterial,  and  irrelevant  allegations,  445,  446. 

joint  or  separate,  where  several  causes  of  action,  defences,  or  defendants, 

468,  497. 
to  answer,  provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  477. 
to  answer,  confined  to  new  matter  in,  486. 
use  of  general,  487. 
motion  substituted  for  special,  487. 

to  special  defences  equivalent  to  general  denials,  519,  522,  523. 
statute  of  limitations,  when  to  be  raised  by,  589,  590. 

DENIALS, 

of  immaterial  allegations,  469. 

effect  of  admission  in  one  part  of  answer  on.  in  another,  469,  600. 
questions  that  arise  upon,  are  those  of  form,  485. 
defence  of,  501-561. 
kinds  of,  .501,  .502. 

external  forms  of,  general  or  specific,  504. 
specific,  nature  and  objects  of,  50-5-507. 
allegations  admitted  by  failure  to  deny,  469,  508. 
in  form  of  a  negative  pregnant,  .509-514. 
negative  pregnant  defined,  509. 
cases  holding  that  no  issues  are  formed  by,  510-512. 
contrary  cases,  513,  514. 
argumentative,  and  specific  defences  equivalent  to  general,  515-523. 
argumentative,  described,  515-518. 
examples  of  argumentative,  519. 
special  defences  equivalent  to  general,  520-523. 
Indiana  rule,  522,  523. 
61 


962  INDEX. 

[the  befebekces  are  to  the  sections  except  when  othebwise  indicated.] 

DENIALS  —  continued. 

general,  of  all   allegations  not  otherwise  admitted  or  referred  to, 

524-527. 
allegations  of  issuable  facts  and  not  conclusions  of  law  to  be  denied, 
528-5:50. 
of  knowledge  or  information,  531,  532. 
issues  raised  by,  and  what  proved  under  them,  53.3-558. 
same  rules  applicable  to  specific  as  to  general,  533. 
general,  compared  with  general  issues  at  common  law,  534. 
nature  and  office  of,  and  issues  formed  by  general,  535-545. 
cases  describing  general,  535-541. 
what  plaintiff  must,   and  defendant   permitted   to,    prove 

under  general,  542. 
material,  issuable  facts  put  in  issue  by  general,  54-3-545. 
general  nature  of  evidence  and  defences  provable  under  general, 
546-549. 
effect  of  general,  depends  upon  allegations  of  plaintiff,  546 

547. 
■what  cannot  be  proved  under,  .548,  549. 
some  particular  defences  admissible  under  general,  550-558. 
in  actions  for  services,  550. 
for  injurie.s  througli  negligence.  551. 
on  notes,  and  for  goods  sold,  552. 
for  conversion  of  chattels,  553,  580. 
in  actions  to  recover  possession  of  chattels,  538,  554. 
in  actions  to  recover  possession  of  land,  555. 
for  malicious  injuries,  556. 
in  certain  equitable  actions,  557. 
other  miscellaneous  actions.  558. 
Bome  special  statutory  rules,  559,  5Go. 
denying  corporate  existence,  559. 
denying  partnership  existence  in  Wisconsin,  559. 
in  actions  on  written  instrument.-^.  560. 
general,  cannot  be  treated  as  sham.  561. 
distinction  between,  and  new  matter,  567,  568. 
separate  specific,  how  alleged,  593-596. 

DESCRIPTION, 

rules  as  to,  in  pleading,  page  676,  n. 
DETINUE, 

joinder  of  defendants  in  action  of,  211. 
nature  of  pleading  in,  404. 

DEVISEES   AND   LEGATEES, 

personal  representatives  necessary  parties  in  suits  by,  166,  175. 

are  not  parties  in  suits  by  personal  representatives,  175. 

parties  in  suits  by  residuary,  or  where  legacy  is  charged  on  land,   175, 

216,  2.52. 
parties  in  suits  by  legatees  for  accounting,  172,  173. 
to  be  parties  in  suits  to  set  aside  will.s,  178,  2.52. 
are  not  parties  in  suits  by  creditors  of  estate,  216,  251. 
legatees  when  to  sue  for  debts  due  the  estate,  216. 


INDEX.  963 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

DOING    EQUITY, 

necessity  of  allegation,  page  676,  n. 

DOUBLE    AGENCY, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

DURESS, 

how  pleaded  as  a  defence,  r,64. 

DUTY, 

necessity  of  alleging,  page  G7G,  u. 


E. 
EJECTMENT, 

equitable  defences  to,  32,  33. 

not  maintainable  at  common  law  by  equitable  owner  or  holder,  36. 

whether  maintainable  under  the  reformed  pmceihire,  37-41. 
impropriety  of  present  use  of  word,  49. 
by  owners  in  common  and  joint  owners,  at  common  hiw,  lo."). 

under  the  reformed  procedure.  135-187. 
under  reformed  procedure  resembles  ancient  real  actions,  195. 
defendants  in,  195-197. 

joinder  of  other  causes  of  action  with,  388,  389,  397,  398. 
nature  of  pleading  in,  at  common  law,  404. 
defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in,  555. 
what  defences  in,  to  be  specially  pleaded,  582. 
equitable  defences  to,  to  be  specially  pleaded,  555,  582. 

ELECTION, 

to  waive  tort  and  sue  on  contract,  48.     See  Tort. 

ELECTION  CONTEST, 

necessary  allegations,  page  676,  n. 

EQUITABLE    ACTIONS, 

distinction  between  legal  and,  abolished,  4,  10-13. 

principles  as   to  union   of  legal  and,  adopted  by  the  courts,  5-15.     See 

Actions. 
plaintiffs  in,  161-184.     See  Plaintiffs. 
defendants  in,  226-284.     See  Df.fendants. 
against  personal  representatives  of  joint  debtors,  203-205. 
provisions  concerning  suits  by  or  against  one  on  behalf  of  others   apply 

to  both  legal  and,  290. 
counter-claims,  when  permissible  in,  637,  668,  678,  679. 

EQUITABLE    ASSIGNEES, 

to  be  plaintiffs,  65,  73,  78,  149. 

EQUITABLE   CAUSES   OF   ACTION, 

distinction  between  legal  and,  415,  416. 

EQUITABLE   DEFENCES, 

to  legal  actions,  26-35.     See  Defences. 

to  be  specially  pleaded  in  ejectment,  555,  582. 


964  INDEX. 

[the  bbfbsences  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

EQUITABLE    RIGHTS   AND   REMEDIES, 

union  of  legal  and.  in  tlie  civil  action,  16-25.     See  Actu)N's. 

legal  remedy  on  equitable  ownership  or  right.  36-41.     See  Actions. 

equitable  demands  as  subjects  for  counter-claims,  613,  622,  64U-643,  668. 

EQUITY, 

doctrines  of,  applied  to  parties  to  the  civil  action,  50,  61,  113-117,  187. 

to  plaintiffs,  113-117. 

to  defendants,  187. 
doctrine  of  latent  equities,  86. 

equities  between  successive  assignors  and  assignees,  86-89. 
doctrines  of,  adopted  in  actions  concerning  wife,  1.52. 
rules  of,  concerning  actions  to  quiet  title,  266. 

partition,  270,  271. 

as   to  parties  in  actions  by  or  against  one  on  behalf  of  others,  289, 
297,  n. 
pleadings  in,  401. 

ESTATES   OF    DECEDENTS, 

defendants  in  actions  concerning,  216. 
in  equitable  actions,  248-252. 

ESTOPPEL, 

against  assignor  of  things  in  action,  88,  89. 
defence  of,  new  matter,  588. 
how  to  plead,  page  676,  n. 

EVIDENCE, 

not  to  be  alleged  in  pleading,  411,  420-422. 
,    matters  of,  not  admitted  by  failure  to  deny,  469,  508,  544. 
admissible  under  the  general  denial,  542,  546-549. 

determined  by  allegations  of  complaint,  546,  547. 

what  admissible,  548,  549. 

EXCEPTION   IN   CONTRACT, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  817,  n. 

EXCEPTIONS   IN   STATUTES, 

how  to  plead,  page  677,  n. 

EXCEPTIONS   TO    RULE   OF   LAW, 
pleading,  page  677,  n. 

EX   CONTRACTU   ACTIONS, 

causes  of  action  ex  contractu  alleged,  and  ex  delicto  proved,  452-455. 
election  to  use,  48,  387,  458-464.     See  Tokts. 

counter-claims  where  election  between  ex  delicto  and,  646,  648,  656,  n., 
604,  077. 

EX   DELICTO   ACTIONS.     See  Ex  Contractu  Actions. 

EXECUTION,   ISSUANCE   AND    RETURN   OF, 
pleading,  page  677,  n. 

EXECUTION   OF   INSTRUMENT, 

pleading,  page  677,  n. 


INDEX.  9G5 

[the   references  ABE  TO  THE  SECTIONS  EXCEPT  WHEN  OTHERWISE   INDICATED.  ] 

EXECUTORS   AND   ADMINISTRATORS, 

set-off  against,  of  claims  due  from  decedents,  97. 

suits  by,  in  their  own  names,  109. 

.suits  by,  under  the  reformed  procedure,  143. 

cannot  sue  for  torts  to  hxnd  after  death  of  owner,  136. 

are  indispensable  parties  in  administration  suits,  160,  249,  250. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  against,  for  accounting,  172,  173. 

persons  interested  in  estate  not  parties  in  suits  by,  175. 

must  all  be  parties  in  suits  by,  175. 

executors  parties  in  §uits  to  set  aside  wills,  178. 

suits  against,  under  the  reformed  procedure,  203-205,  253. 

suits  by  creditors  to  be  onlj'  against,  216,  251. 

actions  by  legatees  or  distributees,  for  debts,  when,  incapacitated,  216. 

when  parties  defendant  in  foreclosure  suits,  233,  n.,  234,  235. 

of  judgment  debtors,  defendants  in  creditors'  suits,  244. 

of  trustees,  when  co-defendants  with  surviving  trustees,  253. 

as  parties,  256,  n. 

when  parties  in  suits  for  specific  performance,  107,  263,  264, 

when  defendants  in  actions  for  partition,  273. 

of  mortgagee,  defendants  in  suits  to  redeem,  284. 

joinder  of  causes  of  action  by,  or  against,  in  representative  and  personal 

capacity,  378,  396. 
capacity  to  sue,  not  put  in  issue  by  general  denial,  587. 
counter-claims  by,  or  against,  627,  630,  676. 
EXHIBITS, 

Function  of,  in  pleading,  page  543,  n. 


F. 
FACTS, 

what,  and  how  pleaded  in  pleading  by  allegation,  400. 

in  equity,  401. 

at  common  law,  402,  404-406. 

under  the  reformed  procedure,  411,  420-426,  528-530. 
nature  of,  constituting  cause  of  action,  417-419. 

only,  constituting  cause  of  action  to  be  pleaded,  13,  347,  418,  424,  425. 
issuable,  and  not  legal  conclusions  to  be  denied,  528,  530,  545. 
material  and  issuable,  only,  put  in  issue  by  general  denial,  543-545. 
constituting  new  matter,  how  set  forth,  563,  505. 
what,  and  how  stated,  in  counter-claims,  505,  614,  624. 
FAILURE  TO  SAVE  GOODS, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

FALSE  IMPRISONMENT, 

right  of  action  in  cases  of,  several,  148. 
plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  157,  159. 

FELLOW  SERVANT,  INJURY  BY, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

FICTIONS, 

abolished,  328. 


966  INDEX. 

[the   BEFSSZSCE3    AEE   TO   THE   SECTIONS    EXCEPT   WEZS   OTHEBmSE   ISBIC ATBD. ] 

FIRE  SET  BY  INSURED, 

i.s  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  SIS.  n. 

FORCIBLE  ENTRY  AND  DETAINER, 

pleading  iu  actions  of,  page  677,  n. 

FORECLOSURE, 

pleading  in  actions  of,  page  677,  n. 

FOREIGN  LAWS, 

how  to  plead,  page  677,  n. 

FORFEITURE, 

i3  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  81 S,  n. 

FRAUD, 

how  pleaded  as  a  defence.  563. 

counter-claim.s  for.  where  plaintiff's  demand  is  on  contract,  663. 

actions  for,  by  husband  and  wife,  15.5. 

how  to  plead,  page  678,  n. 


G. 
GENERAL  DENIALS, 

specific  defences  equivalent  to,  520-.523. 

of  all  allegations  not  otherwise  admitted  or  referred  to,  524-527. 

issues  raised  by.  and  what  proved  under  them,  533-558.     See  Denials. 

cannot  be  treated  as  sham,  561. 

defences  in  mitigation  not  to  be  proved  under,  571,  572. 

verification  of,  page  787,  n.  1. 

GENERAL  ISSUES, 

compared  with  general  denials,  534. 

GRANTORS  AND  GRANTEES, 

when  grantee  cannot  sue  in  his  own  name  for  breach  of  covenants,  75. 
suits  by  mortgagees  against  grantees  assuming  mortgage  debt,  77,  218. 
suits  by  grantees  in  name  of  grantors,  81. 
grantees  of  mortgagors  as  defendants  in  foreclosure  suits,  233,  234,  242. 

GUARANTORS, 

whether,  can  be  sued  jointly  with  principal  debtors,  306,  307. 

GUARDIAN  AND  WARD, 

suits  by  guardians  of  infants,  lunatics,  etc.,  in  their  own  names.  110. 
suits  by  guardians  for  seduction  or  injuries  to  wards,  5S,  150. 
defendants  in  suits  against  guardians  of  lunatics,  idiots,  etc.,  253,  n. 

GUARDIANS, 

as  parties,  256,  n. 


H. 

HEIRS, 

parties  in  suits  to  set  aside,  or  enforce  trusts  of,  wills,  178,  252. 

when  to  be  sued  jointly  for  decedents'  debts,  216. 

when  parties  defendant  in  foreclosure  suits.  233,  n.,  234. 

of  judgment  debtors  not  defendants  in  creditors'  suits,  244. 


INDEX.  967 

[the  references  abb  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
necessaiy  defendants  in  suits  to  reach  lands  of  decedents,  252,  254. 
when  parties  in  suits  for  specific  performance,  177,  263,  264. 

HOMESTEADS, 

wife  a  defendant  in  actions  concerning,  224,  242. 

HUSBAND  AND  WIFE, 

actions  by,  concerning  wife's  property,  person,  or  character,  151-160. 
actions  against,  or  wife  alone,  219-225. 

general  nature  of  the  legislation,  219. 

against  wife  concerning  her  separate  property,  220,  222. 

for  torts  of  wife,  221,  222. 

personal  liability  of  wife  on  contracts,  220,  228. 

wife  a  defendant  in  actions  concerning  homesteads,  224,  242. 

separate  defences  by  wife  when  sued  with  husband,  225. 
husband,  when  defendant  in  foreclosure  suits,  233,  n.,  239. 
■wife,  when  defendant  in  foreclosure  suits,  233,  n.,  240.  241. 
defendants  in  foreclosure  of  mortgage  on  homestead,  242. 
wife  of  tenant  in  common,  party  in  action  for  partition,  273,  274. 
defence  that  party  is  a  married  woman,  new  matter,  587. 
counter-claims  in  suits  by  married  women,  630. 

HYPOTHETICAL  PLEADING,  page  601,  n. 


I. 

IDIOTS, 

whether  guardians  of,  can  sue  in  their  own  names,  110. 
are  proper  defendants  in  actions  against  guardians,  253,  n. 

IMMATERIAL  ALLEGATIONS,  page  612,  n. 

INCONSISTENT  ALLEGATIONS,  page  612  n. 

INFANTS, 

suits  by  guardians  of,  in  their  own  names,  110. 

INFORMATION  AND  BELIEF, 
pleading  on,  page  601,  n. 

INJURY, 

necessity  of  averring,  page  678,  n. 

INJURY  BY  FELLOW  SERVANT, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

INJURY  TO  PERSON, 

meaning  of  statutory  term,  page  679,  n. 

INNOCENT  PURCHASER, 
allegation  of,  page  679,  n. 

INSURANCE, 

suits  by  third  persons,  to  whom  it  is  stipulated  the  loss  shall  be  paid,  77. 

INTEREST, 

allegations  respecting,  page  679,  n. 

INTERVENTION, 

assignor  of  part  of  a  demand  allowed  to  intervene,  75. 


968  INDEX. 

[the  refebences  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
INTERVENTION  —  continued. 

provisions  of  the  codes  concerning,  310. 

nature  of  provisions  concerning,  found  in  codes  generally,  320-322. 
when  permitted,  321. 
examples,  322. 
Iowa  and  California  system  of,  323-325. 
cases  illustrating,  323. 
cases  in  California,  324.  n. 
importance  of  the  system,  325. 
INVALIDITY  OF  ST.-VTUTE  OR  ORDINANCE, 

allegation  of,  page  679,  n. 
IRRELEVANT  ALLEGATIONS,  page  612,  n. 
IRREPARABLE  IN.IL'RY, 
allegation  of,  page  680,  n. 


JOINDER  OF  CAUSES  OF  ACTION,  331-399.     See  Causes  of  Action. 
JOINDER  OF  DEFENDANTS,  18.3-281.     See  Defendants. 
JOINDER  OF  PLAINTIFFS,  111-184.     See  Plaintiffs. 
JOINT  OWNERS  OF  CHATTELS, 

legal  actions  by,  138-142. 
JOINT  OWNERS  OF  LAND, 

legal  actions  by,  135-137. 
JUDGMENTS, 

for  excess  of  claims  of  debtors  against  assignees,  impossible,   83,  95,  628. 

how  far  binding,  and  how  taken  advantage  of  in  actions  by  or  against 
one  on  behalf  of  others,  29."}-297. 

where  persons  severally  liable  on  upon  the  same  instruments  are  joined, 
304. 

defences  of  former,  new  matter,  578. 

how  to  plead,  page  680,  n. 

on  counter-claims,  681. 
JURISDICTION, 

pleading  facts  showing,  page  680,  n. 

want  of,  is  defence  of  new  matter,  page  819,  n. 
JUSTIFICATION, 

defence  of,  how  pleaded,  564,  580,  581. 


L. 

LACHES, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

LAND.S, 

equitable  defences  in  actions  to  recover,  32,  33. 

whether  eciuitable  owner  can  maintain  action  for  possession  of,  36-41. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  concerning,  by  owners  of,  135-137. 


INDEX.  969 

[the  eeferences  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
LANDS  —  continued. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  concerning  wife's,  151-lCO. 
owners  of,  out  of  possession,  suits  by,  for  injuries  to,  149. 
jiarties  in  equitable  suits  concerning,  by  holders  of  joint  rights;   parti- 
tion, boundaries,  etc.,  168. 
holders  of  Intiire  estates  in,  to  be  parties  in  equitable  suits  concerning, 

170. 
joinder  of  owners  of  sepaiate  interests  in,  in  equitable  suits  concerning,  183. 
defendants  in  actions,  other  than  for  torts,  against  owners  or  occupants 
of,  195-197. 
for  joint  torts  to,  213. 
defendants  in  suits  concerning  wife's,  '220,  222. 
joinder  of  causes  of  action  relating  to,  388,  389,  397-399. 
defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in  actions  to  recover,  555. 
what  defences  to  be  pleaded  as  new  matter,  582. 
LAW, 

conclusions  of,  pleaded  at  common  law,  402,  404. 

not  to  be  pleaded  under  the  codes,  411,  423-425.     See  Legal  Con- 

CLUSIO.N'S. 

cases  illustrating,  424,  42.'). 

may  be  pleaded  when  common  counts  are  used,  436-438. 
not  to  be  denied  in  pleadings,  528-530,  545. 

LEGAL  ACTIONS, 

distinction  between  equitable  and,  abolished,  4,  10-13. 

principles  as  to  union  of  equitable  and,  adopted  by  the  courts,  5-15.     See 

ACTIOXS. 

equitable  defences  to,  26-35.     See  Defkxces. 
plaintiffs  in,  13.5-150.     See  Pl.\intiffs. 
defendants  in,  19.5-218.     See  Defendants. 

LEGAL  CONCLUSIONS, 

not  to  be  pleaded,  page  564,  n.     See  Law. 

LEGAL  EFFECT, 

pleading  according  to,  page  542,  n. 

LEGAL  RIGHTS  AND  REMEDIES, 

union  of  equitable  and,  in  one  civil  action,  16-25.     See  Actions. 
legal  remedy  on  equitable  ownership  or  right,  36-44.     See  Actions. 
LIABILITIES, 

joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several,  187-242.     See  Defendants. 
joinder  of  persons  severally  liable  upon  the  same  instrument,  299-307. 
provisions  of  the  codes  relating  to,  299-300. 
effect  of,  on,  301. 
judicial  interpretation,  302,  303. 
judgment  in,  304. 

code  provisions  apply  to  joint  and  several,  305. 
surety  or  guarantor,  and  principal  debtor,  306,  307. 
counter-claims  in  case  of  joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several,  634,  637. 
LIBEL  AND  SLANDER, 

right  of  action  in  cases  of,  generally  several,  148. 
partners  uniting  in  suits  for,  147. 


970 


INDEX. 


('the   REFEKENCES   are    to   the   sections   except   WHEK  OTHEBWISB   INDICATED.] 

LIBEL    AND    6LASDER  —  continued. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  to  wife,  154.  156,  157,  159. 

defendants  in  suits  for,  208.  214. 
in  suits  against  wife  for,  221. 

causes  of  action  for,  joined  with  other,  390. 

allegations  in  actions  for,  page  680,  n. 
LICENSE, 

defence  of,  new  matter,  712. 
LIENS, 

plaintiffs  in  actions  to  foreclose  vendors'.  169. 

holders  of  distinct,  not  joined  as  plaintiffs  in  actions  to  enforce,  181 

holders  of,  when  defendants  in  actions  for  partition,  270-272. 

defendants  in  actions  to  enforce,  279-281. 
mechanics',  279. 
pledges  of  securities,  280. 

See    MORTGAGKS. 

LIMITATIONS,  STATUTE  OF.     See  Statute  of  Limitatioxs. 
LIQUID  ATIOX, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 
LUNATICS, 

whether  guardian  of,  can  sue  in  his  own  name,  110. 

are  proper  defendants  in  actions  against  guardians,  253,  n. 


M. 

MARRIED   WOMEN.     See  Husband  and  Wife. 

MLSJOINDER   OF  PARTIES, 
effect  of,  126-133. 

MISNOMER   OF   DEFENDANT, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 
MISTAKE, 

parties  in  actions  to  quiet  title  by  correcting.  268. 
parties  in  actions  to  correct,  268,  n. 

MORTGAGES, 

equitable  defences  in  actions  to  foreclose,  33. 

suits  by  mortgagees  against  grantees  assuming  mortgage  debts,  77,  218. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  to  foreclose  and  redeem,  16!),  170. 

defendants  in  suits  to  foreclose,  230-242. 

general  doctrine;  necessary  and  proper  parties,  230-232. 

mortgagors  and  their  grantees,  233,  234. 

creditors  when  necessary  or  proper  defendants,  235,  239. 

heirs  when  necessary,  233,  n.,  234. 

personal  representatives  when  necessary.  233,  n.,  234,  235. 

assignor  of  mortgage  note  when  not  necessary,  217,  n.,  233,  n.,  236. 

when  several  notes  are  given,  237. 

occupants  of  the  land,  23S. 

persons  remotely  interested  in  result,  238. 


INDEX.  971 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when-  otherwise  indicatbd.] 
MORTGAGES  —  conlinued. 

subsequent  and  pri<n-  encumbrancers,  2-;3,  n..  230. 
wives  of  mortgagors  and  subsequent  owners,  233,  n.,  240,  241. 
beneficiaries,  in  suits  against  trustees,  2;j3,  n.,  241,  n. 
case  of  homesteads,  242. 

persons  claiming  adversely  to  mortgagor,  242. 
trust  deeds  foreclosed  as,  242. 
defendants  in  suits  to  redeem,  284. 
counter-claims  insults  to  foreclose,  G68,  n.,  678,  679. 

MOTIONS, 

general  rules  as  to,  page  600,  n.,  page  717,  n. 
misjoinder  of  plaintiffs  objected  to  by,  126-133. 

of  defendants,  190-1.94. 
proper  causes  of  action  mingled  in  one  count,  corrected  by,  341. 
causes  of  action  separately  stated  but  improperly  joined,  corrected  by,  343. 
improper  causes  of  action  mingled  in  one  count,  corrected  by,  344,  34.5. 
to  correct  insufficient,  imperfect,  incomplete,  or  informal  allegations,  442- 

444. 
to  correct  redundant,  immaterial,  and  irrelevant  allegations,  445-446. 
sham  and  irrelevant  answers  and  defences  stricken  out  on,  476. 
use  of,  to  correct  defects  of  form  in  answer,  487,  490. 
argumentative  denials  corrected  by,  518. 

specific  defences  equivalent  to  general  denial  corrected  by,  522,  523. 
MULTIFARIOUSNESS, 

discussed  and  defined,  380,  page  508,  n. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS.     See  Corporations. 


NAMES   OF   PARTIES, 

pleading,  page  680,  n. 

NEGATIVE    AVERMENTS, 

necessity  of,  page  681,  n. 

NEGATIVE   PREGNANT, 

denials  in  the  form  of,  509,  514. 
definition  of,  509. 

cases  holding  that  no  issues  are  formed  by,  510-512. 
contrary  cases,  513,  514. 

NEGLIGENCE, 

defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in  actions  for,  551. 
counter-claims  for,  where  plaintiff's  demand  is  on  contract,  661,  662. 
how  to  plead,  page  681,  n. 

NEGOTIABLE   PAPER, 

equitable  defences  to  actions  on,  34. 

suits  by  assignees  of,  66-69,  78. 

doctrine  of  estoppel  as  applied  to  transfer  of  quasi,  88,  89. 

transferred  after  maturity,  subject  to  equities,  91,  n.,  92,  n.,  94. 

defendants  in  actions  on  joint  notes,  200. 


972  INDEX. 

[tub  ttBrEREIfCBB    ARE   TO   THB    BBCTIONS    BXCEPT   WHE!*   OTHERWISB   INDlCATEl).] 

NEGOTI AHLE   PArEll  —  continue,!. 

actions  against  persons  severally  liable  on,  207,  '_'99-;J()7. 

assignor  of  mortgage  note  not  necessary  defendant  in   foreclosure    suit, 

J 17,  n.,  23o,  n.,  2>(j. 
parties  in  foreclosure  suits  when  sr-vcral  notes  given,  'JM. 
defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in  actions  on,  052,  OGO. 
defence  of  want  of  consideration,  new  matter,  5H5. 

NEW   iMATTEK, 

classes  of  answers  containing,  when  defensive  and  when  not,  4Sl. 
questions  that  arise  upon,  may  be  either  of  substance  or  form,  485. 
demurrer  confined  to,  4S6. 

difference  between,  and  pleas  by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance,  549. 
defences  of,  562-590. 

how  pleaded,  410,  5G3-5G7. 

when  to  be  pleaded,  and  when  general  denial  sufficient,  548,  549,  567, 

568. 
distinction  between,  and  denials,  507,  508. 
in  mitigation  of  damages,  how  jileaded,  509-572. 
in  abatement,  how  pleaded,  573,  574.  587. 
particular  defences  held  to  be,  575-590. 
payment,  576,  577. 
arbitration  and  award,  578. 
former  recovery,  578. 

in  actions  to  recover  possession  of  chattels,  554,  579. 
in  actions  for  torts,  580,  581. 
in  actions  concerning  lands,  582, 
in  actions  upon  contracts,  583-58(i. 
joinder  an<l  capacity  of  parties,  587. 
miscellaneous  defences;  license,  estoppel,  accord  and  satisfaction, 

etc.,  588. 
statute  of  limitations,  when  to  be  pleaded  as,  and  when  raised 
by  demurrer,  555,  557,  589,  590. 

NEW    PAirriES, 

bringing  in,  308-319.     See  J'aktiks. 

NEW    PROMISE, 

allegation  of,  page  083,  n. 

NON-IN'COKrORATIOX. 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

NON-PAYMENT, 

allegation  of,  page  683,  n. 

NOTICE, 

when  necessary  to  protect  assignee  from  set-off,  85,  91,  94. 

kind  of,  necessary  to  protect  assignee  from  transactions  between  assignor 

and  debtor,  95. 
defence  other  than  set-off,  available  from  time  of,  98. 

nuisancp:, 

counter-claims    for,  where  plaintiff's  deman<l  is  on   contract,  061,  662. 
See  Toiris. 


IKDEX.  973 

[THK  BMrZBXSCU  JLZE  TO  THB  RSCTI0X8  BXCEPT  WHKV  OTBKBWUB  urOICATSO.j 


o. 

OB.JECT  OF  ACTIOX, 

what  is,  347. 
OFFICERS, 

auiti  by  public,  107. 
against,  217. 

ORDINANCE-S, 

how  to  plead,  page  679,  n.,  page  68i,  n. 


P. 

PARENT  AND   CHILD, 

action  by  mother  or  father  for  seduction  of  daughter,  58,  150. 
action  by  parents  for  injuries  to  child,  58,  150. 
PARTIE.S, 

to  the  ci^al  action,  50—325. 
doctrine  of,  50,  00,  61. 

coDQmon  law  and  equity  theories  contrasted,  50. 
provisioos  of  codes  relating  to,  51-59. 
general  theory  of  code  provisions,  00,  01. 
real  party  in  interest  to  be   plaintiff,  62-81.     .See  Real    Party   r>'   In- 
terest. 
effect  of   assignment  of  things  in  action  upon  defences  thereto,  82-98. 

See  Assignment. 
when  trustees  of  express  trusts  may  sue,  99-110.     See  Tkusteks 
defect  of.  reached  by  demurrer,  124. 
misjoinder  of,  effect  of,  126-133. 

who  may  be  joined  as  plaintiffs,  111-184.     See  Plaintiffs. 
who  may  be  joined  as  defendants,  185-284.     See  DEf  exdants. 
when  one  may  sue  or  be  sued  on  Vjehalf  of  aU  interested,  285-298. 
proFioions  of  codes  concerning,  285. 
interpretation  of,  286,  288-290. 
facts  to  be  alleged,  287,  288,  298. 
examples  of  decided  cases,  291,  292. 

nature  of  action,  and  effect  upon  those  represented.  29.3-297. 
who  are  parties,  and  how  persons  may  become.  293.  294. 
how  far  the  judgment  is  binding,  and  how  taken  advantage  of, 
25.>-297. 
persons  severally  liable  on  the  same  instrument,  299-307.     See  Liabili- 
ties. 
bringing  in  new,  :^tS-319. 

provisions  of  codes  concerning,  308,  .309. 
three  proceedings  provided  for.  311-314. 

when  necessary  to  complete  determination  of  controversy.  315-319. 
when  code  provisions  are  peremptory,  316. 

when  discretionary,  317. 
examples.  318. 
importance  of  provisions,  319, 


974  INDEX. 

[the   BEIXnENCBS   ARE   TO   THE    SECTIONS   EXCEPT   WHEN   OTHEBWISB    INDICATED.] 

PARTIES  — co/i^/iue^/. 

intervening  of,  320-325.     See  Intervention. 

proper  joinder  of  causes  of  action  connected  with  proper  joinder  of,  364- 

399.     See  Causes  op-  Action. 
defences  relating  to  joinder  and  capacity  of,  are  new  matter,  ."iS?. 
in  their  relations  with  counter-claims,  625-638.     See  Countek-Claims. 

PARTITION, 

action  for,  by  tenant  in  common  holding  legal  or  equitable  title,  43. 
parties  interested  to  be  before  court  in  action  for,  168,  274. 
defendants  in  actions  for,  270-274. 

general  rules  of  equity  concerning,  270,  271. 

creditors  and  lien-holders,  when  to  be,  270-272. 

wife  of  tenant  in  common,  273.  274. 

personal  representative  when  to  be,  273. 

PARTNERS, 

actions  by,  or  against,  other,  to  recover  shares  of  firm  property,  42,  262. 

actions  by,  or  against,  in  name  of  partnership,  59,  81,  149. 

actions  by  creditors  of  partnership  against  purchasers  promising  to  pay 

firm  debts,  77. 
joining  as  plaintiffs  in  actions  for  personal  torts,  147. 
actions  by,  concerning  chattels,  140,  144. 
rights  and  powers  of  surviving,  141. 
account  between,  parties  in,  171,  262,  275. 
whether  dormant,  should  be  plaintiffs  at  common  law  and  under  code,  144. 

whether  they  should  be  defendants,  202. 
refusing  to  join  as  co-plaintiffs,  may  be  made  defendants,  187,  n. 
joinder  of,  as  defendants,  in  actions  on  contract,  201. 

in  actions  for  personal  torts,  214. 

in  actions  to  enforce  mechanics'  liens,  279. 
provisions  of  codes  concerning  joinder  of  "  coparceners  "  and  "  copartners," 

300. 
denying  existence  of  partnership  in  Wisconsin,  559. 
counter-claims  by,  or  against,  627,  632,  635,  675. 

PARTNERSHIP, 

allegation  of,  page  684,  n. 

PASSENGER, 

how  to  plead  relation  of,  page  684,  n. 

PAYMENT, 

whether,  can  be  proved  in  mitigation  of  damages,  535. 
defence  of,  when  new  matter,  535,  n.,  511,  576,  577. 

PENALTIES, 

pleading  in  actions  for,  page  684,  n. 

PERFORMANCE, 

how  to  plead,  page  684,  n. 

PETITION.     See  Complaint. 

PL.UXTIFFS, 

real  parties  in  interest  to  be,  62-81.     See  Real  Party  in  Interest. 
who  may  be  joined  as,  111-181. 


INDEX.  975 

[the   references    are   to   TirE   SECTIONS    EXCEPT   WHEN    OTHERWISE   INDICATED.] 

PLAINTIFFS  —  conlinued. 

provi.sions  of  the  codes  concerning,  111. 
principles  of  the  reformed  procedure  concerning,  lli'-117. 
equitable  theory  adopted,  113-117. 
judicial  construction,  llS-llJli. 
manner  of  raising  questions  as  to  proper,  123-lo3. 
nonjoinder,  or  defect  of,  123,  124. 
want  of  legal  capacity  to  sue,  125. 
misjoinder,  how  objected  to,  and  effect  of,  126-133. 
in  legal  actions,  135-150. 

owners  in  common  and  joint  owners  of  land,  135-137. 

of  chattels,  138-142. 
holders  of  joint  rights  arising  from  contracts,  143-145. 

of  several  rights,  146. 
holders  of  joint  rights  arising  from  personal  torts,  147. 

of  several  rights,  148. 
in  special  cases,  149,  150. 
in  actions  by  or  between  husband  and  wife,  151-1  GO. 
in  equitable  actions,  161-184. 

theory  of  parties  in  equity,  161-163. 

owner  of  legal  estate  made  party  in  action  by  equitable  owner, 
164-167. 
by  beneficiary,  164. 
by  assignees,  165. 
by  legatees,  distributees,  etc.,  166. 
holders  of  equitable  rights  to  be  parties,  168-178. 

where  holders  have  joint  rights  or  interests,  168,  169. 
in  actions  for  partition,  boundaries,  etc.,  168. 
concerning  personal  property,  169. 
to  foreclose  and  redeem,  169,  170.  • 
for  accounting,  171-173. 
by  trustees,  174. 
by  executors,  etc.,  175. 
by  assignees  in  bankruptcy,  etc.,  175. 
of  future  estates  to  be  parties,  176. 
in  actions  for  specific  performance,  177. 
heirs-at-law  or  devisees  when  parties,  178,  252. 
holders  of  antagonistic  interests  not  to  be  joined  a.s,  179. 
joinder  of  holders  of   separate,  but  not  antagonistic,  interests, 
180-183. 
creditors.  180-182. 
beneficiaries,  182. 

other  holders  of  distinct  interests,  183. 
holders  of  distinct  liens,  184. 
actions  by  or  against  one  person  on  behalf  of  all  interested,  285-298.     See 

Parties. 
proper  joinder  of,  connected  with  proper  joinder  of  causes  of  action.  373- 

884.     See  Causes  of  Action. 
defences  relating  to  joinder  or  cajjacity  of,  new  matter,  587. 
in  their  relations  with  counter-claims,  625-638.     See  Counter-Claims. 
pleadings  on  the  part  of.     See  Complaint  ;  Rei'LY. 


976  INDEX. 

[the   EEFERENCE3   ARE   TO   THE    SECTIONS    EXCEPT   WHEN   OTHEEWISE    Ih'DICATBD.] 

PLEADING. 

theory  of,  iu  the  civil  action,  14.  15. 
doctrine  of  unity  in  procedure  as  applied  to,  14,  15. 
of  equitable  defences,  33. 
three  types  of,  prior  to  codes,  400-406. 
by  allegation,  399. 
in  equity,  401. 
at  common  law,  402-406. 
technicality  of,  403. 
requisites  in  different  actions;  ejectment,  trover,  debt,  assumpsit, 

etc.,  404. 
nature  of  allegations  in,  405. 
assumpsit,  illustrating,  406. 
principles  uf  the  reformed,  407. 

old  systems  abolished,  and  codes  the  only  sources  of  authority,  408, 

409. 
apply  to  answers  containing  affirmative  matter,  410,  478-565. 
"cause  of  action  "  defined,  346-348,  412-414. 

distinction  between  legal  and  equitable  causes  of  action,  415,  416. 
nature  of  facts  constituting  cause  of  action,  417-419. 
facts  only,  constituting  cause  of  action  to  be  pleaded,  13,  347,  418, 

424,  425. 
material  facts  only  to  be  pleaded,  411,  420,  423,  426. 
evidence  not  alleged,  411,  420-422. 
in  legal  actions.  411,  420. 
in  equitable  actions,  411,  421,  422. 
legal  meaning  not  alleged.  411,  423-425. 
sufficiency  or  insufficiency  of  alleg.,  cases  illustrating,  427-430. 
promise,  allegation  of,  improper  in  actions  on  implied  contracts,  431- 

435. 
comn)on  counts,  use  of.  15,  436-438. 

in  actions  on  express  contracts,  437. 
criticism  of  the  rule,  438. 
to  be  liberally  construed,  439-441. 

insufficient,  imperfect,  incomplete,  or  informal  allegations,  how  ob- 
jected to,  442-444. 
redundant,  immaterial,  and  irrelevant  allegations,  how  objected  to, 

445,  446. 
proofs  must  correspond  with  allegations,  447-455.     See  Phooks. 
amendments  of,  456,  457. 

election  between  actions  ex  contractu  and  ex  delicto,  48,  3S7,  458-464. 
See  Torts. 
on  the  part  of  plaintiff.     See  Co.mi'Laint;  IIkply. 

on  the  part  of   defendant.      See    Axswku;    Dk.\i.\ls;  New    Matter; 
Counter-Claims  ;  Cross-Complaints. 

POSSESSION, 

how  to  plead,  page  685,  n. 

PRAYER, 

for,  and  granting  of  both  legal  and  equitable  reliefs,  17,  18. 
granting'  of  legal  relief  only,  19,  20. 


INDF.X.  977 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 
PRAYER  —  continued. 

for   equitable  relief,  but  legal  granted,  where    necessary  facts  for  legal 
alleged,  11,  21. 

legal  relief,  but  equitable  granted,  where  necessary  facts  for  equitable 
alleged,  11,  22. 
for  equitable  or  legal  relief,  effect  of,  where  facts  alleged  are  not  proved,  23. 
for  relief,  effect  of,  11,  21,  22,  471. 
for  relief  as  supplying  name  of  counter-claim,  624. 

PRINCIPAL   AND   AGENT, 

actions  by  principal  as  real  party  in  interest  on  contracts  made  by  agent, 

70,  105,  n. 
actions  by  agent  on  contracts  made  for  principal's  benefit,  79,  103,  105. 
when  agent  must  join  in  suit  with  prin.,  1G4. 
jointly  sued  for  torts,  213. 

PRIVILEGE, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  u. 
PROMISE, 

allegations  of,  on  implied  contracts,  431-435.       / 
PROOFS, 

must  correspond  with  allegations,  447-45-"). 

immaterial   and  material  variances,  and  total  failure  of,  difference 

between,  447,  448. 
variances,  cases  illustrating,  440. 
total  failure  of,  cases  illustrating,  450,  451. 
causes  of  action  ex  contractu  alleged,  and  ex  delicto  proved,  452-455. 


Q. 

QUIET   TITLE, 

defendants  in  actions  to,  266-269. 

nature  of  the  action,  266. 

all  adverse  claimants  to  be  joined,  266-269. 

where  mistakes  in  deeds,  etc.,  are  to  be  corrected,  268. 
pleading  in  actions  to,  page  685,  n. 


E. 

RATIFICATION, 

how  to  plead,  page  685,  n. 

of  altered  instrument,  is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

REAL   PARTY   IN   INTEREST. 

definition,  62,  n.  1. 
to  be  plaintiff,  62-81. 

assignment  of  things  in  action  at  com.  law,  62. 
assignees  to  sue  in  their  own  names,  63-76,  165. 
when  the  assignment  is  absolute,  64. 
when  equitable,  65,  73,  149. 
when  of  negotiable  paper,  66-69,  78. 
62 


978  INDEX. 

[the  BSFEBEMCES   are   to   the   sections   except   when   OTHEBWISE    I>-D1CATED.] 

REAL  PARTY  IX  1}^TEREST  —  continued. 
when  conditional  or  partial,  70,  75. 
illustrations,  71,  72. 

assignor  to  be  joined  in  certain  States,  73,  1G5,  217,  23fi,  261. 
when  the  assignment  is  made  pending  action,  74. 
possibility  of  one  suing  "  to  the  use  of  "  another,  76. 
suits  by  one  for  whose  benefit  a  promise  is  raad^;  to  another,  77-218. 

by  the  person  to  whom  the  promise  is  made,  78. 
special  instances  ;  principal  and  agent,  etc.,  79,  105,  u. 
suits  by  taxpayers  to  restrain,  remove,  or  redress  public  wrong,  etc.,  80. 
suits  by  grantees  of  land  in  names  of  grantors,  81. 
defence  that  party  is  not,  new  matter,  587. 
RECEIVERS. 

actions  by  and  against,  258,  n. 
how  to  plead  capacity  of,  page  685,  n. 
RECITAL, 

pleading  by  way  of,  page  601,  n. 
RECOUPMENT, 

defence  of,  new  matter,  581. 

under  the  former  procedure.  607,  608. 

embraced  by  counter-claim,  612,  019,  n. 

See  Countkk-Claims. 
REDUNDANT   ALLEGATIONS,  page  612,  n. 
REFORMATION, 

parties  in  actions  for,  278,  n. 
how  to  plead,  page  685,  n. 
RELEASE, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 
RELIEF, 

prayer  for.     See  Prayer. 

different  kinds  of,  from  one  cause  of  action,  page  466,  n.    . 
REMEDIES, 

definition  of,  2. 

distinction  between,  not  abolished  by  reformed  procedure,  9. 

union  of  legal  and  equitable  rights  and,  in  one  civil  action,  16-25.     See 

Actions. 
legal,  on  equitable  ownerships  or  rights,  36-44.     See  Actions. 
differences  between  civil  actions  are  only  in  primary  rights  and,  4.5-47. 
distinction  between,  and  causes  of  action,  250,  251. 
REPLEVIN, 

impropriety  of  present  use  of  word,  49. 

joinder  of  plaintiffs  in,  at  common  law  and  under  reformed  procedure, 
138-142. 
of  defendants,  108,  211. 
causes  of  action  in,  united  with  other,  307. 
defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in,  538,  554. 

when  new  matter,  554-579. 
counter-claims  in,  643,  667, 
pleading  in  actions  of,  page  68.5,  n. 


INDEX.  'J79 

[the  references  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

REPLY, 

general  rules  as  to,  page  703,  n. 
defects  in  complaint  not  cured  by,  470. 
provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  478,  479. 

RESCISSION, 

defendants  in  actions  for,  •270-278. 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

RIGHTS, 

primary  duties  and.  what  are,  1. 

remedial  duties  and,  described  and  defined,  1-3. 

no  alteration  or  direct  effect  upon  primary  duties  and,  8. 

effect  of  misconception  of  remedial,  l)y  plaintiffs,  11. 

union  of   legal  and  equitable  remedies   and,  in  one  civil  action,  16-25. 

See  Actions. 
legal  remedies  on  equitable  estates  or,  34-44.     See  Actions. 
differences  between  civil  actions  are  only  in  primary,  and  remedies,  45-47. 
joint  and  several,  112-178.     See  Plaintiffs. 
distinction  between  remedial,  and  causes  of  action,  348. 
counter-claims  in  case  of  joint,  joint  and  several,  and  several,  633,  637. 


S. 

SEDUCTION, 

action  by  parents  for  seduction  of  child,  58,  150. 

by  woman  for  her  own,  58,  150. 
pleading  in  actions  for,  page  686,  n. 

SET-OFF, 

to  things  in  action  when  assigned,  82-98.     See  Assignment. 
provisions  of  codes  relating  to,  475.  002. 
under  the  former  procedure,  G05,  606. 

under  the  codes,  671-679.     See  Counter-claims. 
embraced  by  counter-claims,  611,  619,  n.,  672. 

SETTLEMENT, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

SLANDER, 

allegations  in  actions  for,  page  680,  n. 

SPECIFIC   DENIALS, 

nature  and  objects  of,  505-507. 
mode  of  alleging  separate,  593-596. 

See  Dfnials. 

SPECIFIC   PERFORMANCE, 

plaintiffs  in  actions  for,  177. 
defendants  in  actions  for,  263-265. 

parties  to  the  contract,  their  heirs  and  representatives,  263. 

persons  acquiring  subsequent  interests,  263-265. 

heirs  or  representative.s  of  vendor  and  vendee,  264. 
defences  admissible  under  general  denial  in  actions  for,  557. 


980  INDEX. 

[thb  bbferences  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

STATUTE    OF   FRAUDS. 

pleading  contracts  within,  page  686,  n. 
is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  u. 

STATUTE  OF   LIMITATIONS, 

whether  to  be  specially  pleaded  in  ejectment,  555. 

in  specific  perfonnance,  557. 
when  and  how  pleaded,  and  when  raised  by  demurrer,  589, 590. 

STATUTES, 

how  to  plead,  page  079,  n.,  page  686,  n. 

STATUTORY  BARS, 

must  be  pleaded  specially,  page  818,  n. 

STOCK, 

estoppel,  as  applied  to  transfer  of  certificates  of,  88,  89. 
defendants  in  suits  by  assignees  of,  201. 

STOCKHOLDERS, 

parties  in  actions  against,  146,  184,  218,  259. 

in  actions  by,  258,  200. 
allegations  in  actions  against,  page  086,  n. 

SUBJECT  OF  ACTION, 

meaning  of,  309,  381-384,  page  493,  n. 

as  used  in  connection  with  counter-claims,  613,  618,  651,  652,  669,  670. 

SUBROGATION, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

SUICIDE, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  n. 

SUMMONS, 

when  service  of,  on  husband  is  service  on  wife,  225. 

as  indicating  election  between  actions  ex  contractu  and  ex  delicto,  464. 

SURETIES, 

contribution  among,  282,  n. 

when  liable  on  the  .same  or  separate  mstriiments,  joinder  of,  300,  301. 
whether  can  be  sued  jointly  with  principal  debtor,  307. 
counter-claims  by,  625,  626. 

SURGEON, 

how  to  plead  qualification  of,  page  686,  n. 

SURVIVORSHIP, 

among  joint  creditors  at  common  law  and  under  codes,  143. 
among  joint  debtors,  203-205. 


T. 

TAX-P.\YER.S, 

actions  by,  to  restrain,  remove,  or  redress  public  wrong,  etc.,  80. 

joinder  of,  as  plaintiffs,  183. 

defendants  in  actions  by,  283. 

actions  by  one  for  benefit  of  other,  292. 


INDEX.  981 

[the  rbfkbences  are  to  the  sections  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

TENDER, 

how  to  plead,  page  686,  n. 

THEORY  OF  CASE, 

necessity  of  theory  in  pleading,  page  656,  n. 

THINGS  IN  ACTION, 

defences  to  suits  by  assignees  of,  82-98. 

See  Assignment. 
THIRD  PERSONS, 

action  by,  for  whose  benefit  contracts  have  been  made,  77. 

TIME. 

pleading,  page  687,  n. 

TITLE, 

how  to  plead,  page  687,  n. 

TORTS, 

to  person  or  character,  plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  147, 148. 

to  lands,  plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  lo6. 

to  chattels,  plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  140-142. 

to  person,  property,  or  character  of  wife,  plaintiffs  in  suits  for,  1.53-160. 

defendants  in  suits  for,  where  tort  may  be  treated  as  breach  of  contract, 

212. 
defendants  in  suits  for,  208-215. 
of  wife,  defendants  in  suits  for,  221,  222. 
"when  causes  of  action  arising  from,  can  be  joined  with  those  on  contracts, 

392,  394,  395. 
proved,  where  causes  of  action  arising  from  contracts  alleged,  452-455. 
election  to  waive  tort,  and  sue  on  contract,  48.  387,  458-464. 

as  regards  joining  of  causes  of  action,  387. 

doctrine  of  election  discussed,  48,  387,  458,  459,  462. 

cases  in  which  election  permitted,  460-462. 

manner  of  indicating  election,  463,  464. 
justification  by  one  of  several  defendants,  good  for  all,  in  action  for   497. 
defence  of  justification  for,  how  pleaded,  564,  580,  581. 
defences  of  new  matter,  in  actions  for,  580,  581. 

what  demands  arising  from,  are  counter-claims,  613,  636,  649,  656,  n. 
counter-claims  where  election  between  tort  and  contract,  646,  648,  656,  n., 

664,  677. 
counter-claims  where  plaintiff.s'  claims  are  on  contracts,  and  defendants' 
for,  660-663. 

for  trespasses,  nuisances,  or  negligences,  661,  662. 

for  fraud,  663. 
counter-claims  where  plaintiffs'  claims  are  for,  and  defendants'  on  con- 
tracts, 664,  665. 
counter-claims  where  both  claims  are  for,  666. 

TRANSACTION, 

meaning  of,  359-368,  page  491,  n. 
judicial  interpretation,  355-365. 
true  interpretation,  366-368. 
as  used  in  connection  with  counter-claims,  613,  618,  636,  6.50. 


982  INDEX. 

[the  references  are  to  the  sectiuxs  except  when  otherwise  indicated.] 

TRESPASS, 

impropriety  of  ^iresent  use  of  word.  49. 

plaintiffs  in  actions  for,  to  lands  or  chattels,  135,  136,  138,  140-142. 
by  owners  of  lands  out  of  jiossession,  149. 
defendants  in  actions  for,  210,  213. 

joinder  of  causes  of  action  for,  with  other,  388,  389,  395. 
how  to  plead  in  actions  for,  page  (388,  u. 

counter-claims  for,  where  plaintiff's  demand  is  on  contract,  661,  662. 
TROVER, 

action  analogous  to,  by  equitable  owner  of  chattels,  43. 

impropriety  of  present  use  of  word,  49. 

plaintiffs  in  action  of,  138,  140-142. 

defendants  in  action  of,  210,  211. 

joinder  of  causes  of  action  for,  with  other,  389,  397. 

nature  of  pleading  in,  at  common  law,  404. 

counter-claims  on  contracts,  in  actions  of,  664. 

TRUSTEE   AXD    CESTUI   QUE   TRUST, 

trustees  of  expres.s  trusts,  when  may  sue,  99-110. 

provisions  of  codes  concerning,  99. 

meaning  of  the  term,  100-102. 

persons  '•  with  whom,  or  in  whose  name,  a  contract  is  made  for  the 
benefit  of  another,"  103-105. 

special  instances  of,  106. 

public  officers  ;  counties  ;  towns,  107. 

persons  expressly  authorized  by  statute  to  sue,  108. 

executors  and  administrators,  109. 

guardians  of  infants,  lunatics,  etc.,  110. 
ownership  of  trustees  joint  where  land  is  conveyed  to  several,  135. 
trustees  when  co-plaintiff's  in  actions  by  l)eneficiaries,  lfi4. 
accounting,  parties  in  suits  against  trustees  for,  173,  182,  253,  n.,  254,  n., 

255. 
cestuis  que  trustent  when  co-plaintiffs  in  actions  by  trustees,  174. 

to  be  parties  in  foreclosure  suits  against  trustees,  233,  n.,  241,  n. 
defendants  in  suits  against  trustees,  in  creditors'  actions,  247. 

in  administration  suits,  252. 
beneficiaries,  defendants  in  suits  against  trustees  to  redeem,  284. 
joinder  of  causes  of  action  by  or  against  trustee,  in  personal  and  repre- 
sentative capacity,  378,  396. 
counter-claims  by  or  against,  627,  630,  076,  n. 

TRUSTS, 

of  will,  heirs-at-law  to  be  j^arties  in  suits  to  enforce,  178. 
plaintiffs  in  suits  to  administer,  173,  182. 
defendants  in  actions  involving,  253-256. 

trustees  necessary,  253. 

personal  representatives  of  trustee,  when  to  be  joined  with  surviving, 
253. 

beneficiaries,  when  necessary,  254,  2.55. 

where  there  is  a  breach  of  trust,  253,  255,  n. 

in  enforcenienl  of  implied,  256. 


INDEX.  983 

[the  BEFERENCES  are  to  the  sections  except  when  0THEBWI8B   IKUICATEU.j 


u. 

ULTRA   VIRES, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  818,  u. 
UNCERTAINTY, 

cases  of,  in  pleading,  page  GOI,  n. 

UNDUE  influi:nce, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  819,  n. 

unreasonableness, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  819,  n. 
USE, 

suing  to  use  of  another,  76. 


V. 
VALUE, 

allegations  of,  in  pleading,  page  689,  n. 
VARIANCES, 

between  proofs  and  allegations,  447-455.     See  Proofs. 
VENDOR   AND   VENDEE, 

equitable  defences  in  actions  by  vendor  to  recover  lands,  33. 

plaintiffs  in  suits  to  foreclose  vendor's  lien,  170. 

parties  in  actions  by  or  against,  for  specific  performance,  177,  263-265. 
VERIFICATION. 

rules  respecting,  page  669,  n. 


w. 

WAIVER, 

how  to  plead,  page  689,  n, 

of  formal  defects,  page  603,  n. 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  819,  n. 
WANT  OF   FUNDS, 

is  a  defence  of  new  matter,  page  819,  n. 
WANTONNESS, 

how  to  plead,  page  689,  n. 
WARD.     See  Guardian  and  Ward. 
WIFJL     See  Husband  and  Wifk. 
WILLS, 

parties  in  actions  to  set  aside,  178,  LJ52. 
WRITTEN   INSTRUMENT, 

how  to  plead,  page  689,  n. 


FACILITY 


AA    000  859  612    4 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CAUFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 

This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


JAN  2  0  1979 


PSD  1916     8/77 


MB 


viii 

iiiiiliiii 


iiPi|ii|S|il 


iiiiiliiii 


§ 


